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Tag: BRICS

  • Positioning Sri Lanka in an Emerging Multipolar World Order

    Positioning Sri Lanka in an Emerging Multipolar World Order

     Summary 

    Sri Lanka sits at a strategic crossroads, with geography that positions it at the heart of global trade and regional security. Yet economic vulnerability, political inconsistency, and limited strategic clarity have constrained its influence. As global power fragments and the Global South rises, the island faces a choice: remain reactive and peripheral or leverage its location, strengthen its economy, and build stable institutions to become a neutral logistics hub, a trusted diplomatic partner, and an active contributor to the emerging multipolar order. Acting decisively now will transform strategic opportunity into lasting national influence. 

    Over the past four years, geopolitical, economic, and technological shifts have progressed at a pace unmatched in the previous three decades. The world we face today is fundamentally different from the one we knew before. War has returned to Europe, shattering the assumption that major interstate conflict on the continent was a thing of the past. The Middle East is once again engulfed in overlapping crises that draw in both regional actors and global powers. Across Africa—from the Sahel to the Horn—coups, insurgencies, and persistent violence are eroding state institutions and deepening humanitarian emergencies. The impact of Trump’s tariffs threatened many sectors globally.

    At the same time, trust in multilateral institutions, long the guardians of global order, is fading. The UN struggles to act decisively, the WTO is weakened, and even climate negotiations are increasingly shaped by national interests rather than collective responsibility. The consensus that once underpinned global cooperation is fragmenting. 

    Meanwhile, technological disruption is accelerating competition. Artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and strategic supply chains have become the new battlegrounds for influence. Nations no longer compete only for territory or ideology; they compete for data, minerals, energy, and technological dominance. 

    The post–Cold War optimism that once promised a borderless world of global democracy and free markets has evaporated. In its place has emerged an era defined by political fragmentation, economic rivalry, and strategic competition. Great-power tensions are rising, regional blocs are hardening, and smaller states are being compelled to navigate an increasingly complex and divided international landscape. 

    The rules-based order that emerged after World War II is weakening, and neither the United States nor China can dictate the future alone. Instead, a triangular contest among the global West, global East, and the global South is shaping a new geopolitical reality. 

    In addition, the Indo-Pacific has become the central arena of strategic competition between the United States and China. As China expands its economic reach, military power, and political influence, the U.S. seeks to uphold a free, open, and rules-based regional order. This rivalry now shapes security, diplomacy, trade, and technology across the entire region, with flashpoints such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea posing the greatest risks of confrontation and global economic disruption. 

    Where does Sri Lanka stand 

    Sri Lanka is a small island nation, but one with a singular and powerful advantage: its geography. Positioned at the center of the world’s busiest East–West maritime corridor, the island lies along sea lanes that carry nearly two-thirds of global oil shipments and almost half of all container traffic. In an era when supply chains, shipping routes, and energy pathways are becoming strategic assets in their own right, Sri Lanka’s location is not merely convenient—it is consequential.

    This makes the island strategically valuable to every major power. For India, Sri Lanka’s stability is essential to security in its immediate neighbourhood and to its ambitions in the wider Indian Ocean. For China, the island is a vital node in the Belt and Road Initiative, linking the maritime silk route to broader trade and energy networks. For the United States, Sri Lanka is central to its Indo-Pacific strategy, where freedom of navigation, open sea lanes, and counter-balancing rival influences are paramount. 

    Beyond the great powers, there is a range of middle powers, which includes Japan, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and even Turkey. These countries are deepening economic, maritime, and diplomatic engagement across the Indian Ocean. Their interests converge on Sri Lanka not merely because of geography, but because of the island’s potential as a stable partner, a logistical hub, and a platform for regional connectivity. Collectively, these factors position Sri Lanka as not just a nation-state but a geopolitical crossroads, where the interests of global and regional actors meet, overlap, and at times compete. 

    Yet, despite this inherent strategic value, Sri Lanka continues to struggle in transforming geography into meaningful geopolitical influence. The island’s location offers an extraordinary opportunity, but opportunity alone does not translate into power. 

    Policy inconsistency—driven by frequent political turnover, short-term decision-making, and competing domestic priorities—has created persistent uncertainty that discourages long-term investment and undermines Sri Lanka’s international credibility. At the same time, an overly cautious geopolitical posture, often bordering on indecision, has prevented the country from defining a clear strategic identity in the Indian Ocean. 

    As a result, Sri Lanka has too often been a reactor rather than an actor: responding to external pressures instead of anticipating them, accommodating the interests of major powers instead of assertively advancing its own. Although global actors are drawn to the island because of its strategic location, Sri Lanka has not consistently leveraged that interest to secure lasting economic, diplomatic, or security advantages. 

    The task ahead is to break this cycle. Sri Lanka must transition from being merely a geographical point of convergence to becoming a strategic participant capable of shaping outcomes that affect its future. This requires strengthening the domestic economic base, setting coherent long-term foreign policy priorities, and building the institutional stability needed to negotiate with confidence. Only then can Sri Lanka convert its location into lasting influence—anchoring its long-term security, enhancing its prosperity, and securing a respected place within a rapidly reordering world. 

    For countries like Sri Lanka, the challenge is to navigate this environment with careful diplomatic balance—leveraging economic opportunities from both the U.S. and China while preserving strategic autonomy and avoiding undue dependency. At the same time, Sri Lanka’s trade-driven economy relies heavily on stable, rules-based maritime routes across the Indian Ocean and the wider Indo-Pacific, making regional peace and open sea lanes essential for national economic stability. 

    The Weak Link in Sri Lanka’s Strategy. 

    The 2022 economic crisis significantly weakened Sri Lanka’s geopolitical standing. A nation’s foreign policy is only as strong as the economic foundation beneath it. When an economy collapses, sovereignty is not formally lost, but it is quietly constrained. Sri Lanka’s reliance on external lenders, bilateral creditors, and major-power investments has narrowed its strategic flexibility and limited its ability to negotiate from a position of strength. 

    Instead of shaping regional agendas, we increasingly find ourselves adjusting to those set by others. Unless Sri Lanka restores economic resilience and rebuilds fiscal credibility, the country risks becoming a pawn in a larger great power contest rather than a strategic actor capable of advancing its own interests. 

    Real impact on Sri Lanka 

    The Trump administration’s imposition of tariffs on Sri Lankan exports functioned as a form of trade restriction rather than a targeted sanction or financial embargo. Nevertheless, the measures had material implications for the country’s economy. The garment sector, which constitutes the backbone of Sri Lanka’s foreign-exchange earnings and employment, was particularly exposed. Given that the United States represents a significant share of Sri Lanka’s export market, the tariffs threatened to impede post-2022 economic recovery and constrain critical foreign-exchange inflows. Beyond immediate economic effects, the episode highlights Sri Lanka’s structural vulnerability to shifts in global trade policy, revealing a broader strategic challenge: without enhanced economic resilience and proactive engagement in international trade frameworks, Sri Lanka risks being perpetually reactive rather than an influential actor in the global economic system. 

    The Global South Is Rising 

    One of the most consequential geopolitical shifts of our time is the emergence of middle powers within the Global South as influential actors in global affairs. Countries such as India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, Nigeria, Indonesia, and Mexico are no longer peripheral participants in a system dominated by the West. They possess the economic weight, demographic scale, technological ambition, and diplomatic confidence to reshape global institutions, from trade and finance to climate governance and security frameworks. 

    This rise is visible everywhere. India is now the world’s fastest-growing major economy and a central player in the G20 and Indo-Pacific. Brazil shapes global environmental and agricultural policy. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are redefining energy geopolitics and investing heavily across Asia and Africa. South Africa and Nigeria influence continental politics, peacekeeping, and resource diplomacy. Turkey has become a pivotal actor in West Asia, Central Asia, and global mediation efforts. Together, these countries are forming new coalitions, from BRICS+ to the G20’s expanded role, challenging the old North–South divide and demanding a more equitable international order. 

    And yet, amid this global transformation, Sri Lanka remains largely absent from the strategic conversation. We participate in international forums, but seldom shape their agendas. We attend summits, but rarely articulate a coherent long-term national strategy. The country possesses clear potential, but lacks the strategic clarity and diplomatic consistency required to convert that potential into influence. 

    Sri Lanka belongs to the Global South by geography, history, and shared developmental challenges—but not yet by strategic weight or leadership. At a time when emerging powers across Asia, Africa, and Latin America are redefining global governance, Sri Lanka risks remaining on the sidelines. Unless we strengthen our capacity to articulate priorities, build alliances, and engage proactively, we may become spectators in a moment when others are reshaping the international order. 

    If the Global South continues its ascent as current economic, demographic, and diplomatic trends indicate, it will become a decisive force in global negotiations on climate, trade, energy, technology, and security. The question then becomes: Where will Sri Lanka stand? We must choose whether to meaningfully align with this emerging bloc, articulate our own national priorities, and build partnerships that reflect our strengths or risk being left behind, irrelevant in a world that is rapidly reorganising itself. 

    Opportunities in the New Disorder 

    Disorder brings danger, but it also brings opportunity. History shows that moments of global turbulence create openings for small, agile states to elevate their influence. Finland, Singapore, Qatar, and the UAE are prime examples—nations that turned geography, diplomacy, and strategic clarity into disproportionate global relevance. They became connectors, mediators, hubs, and conveners at a time when great powers were distracted by rivalry. Sri Lanka, too, possesses the attributes to rise in this emerging landscape, if we choose to act with purpose. 

    As a Maritime and Logistics Hub, Sri Lanka sits along the world’s most important East–West maritime highway, yet has not fully realised the potential of this position. With the right investment climate, regulatory consistency, and diplomatic balance, the island can become an efficient, neutral logistics hub serving all blocs: West, East, and South. This includes strengthening ports, aviation links, and digital infrastructure to support regional supply chains and trans-shipment networks. 

    As a Diplomatic Bridge in the Indian Ocean Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific is increasingly defined by competition, mistrust, and strategic ambiguity. Amid this environment, Sri Lanka can offer what few others can: a neutral, trusted venue for dialogue, confidence-building, and conflict prevention. By convening maritime security forums, climate adaptation roundtables, and regional economic dialogues, Sri Lanka can redefine itself as a facilitator rather than a battleground for competing interests. This diplomatic role, rooted in neutrality and credibility, can become a cornerstone of the island’s long-term relevance. 

    The global transition to clean energy is rewriting economic and political priorities across continents. Sri Lanka’s hydropower, solar, and wind capacity create an opportunity to position the country as a renewable energy partner for the region. Expanding grid connectivity, attracting green financing, and partnering on technology transfers can anchor national energy security while forging deeper alliances with both great powers and rising middle powers as a Renewable Energy Partner. 

    As the Global South demands a fairer international order, Sri Lanka has the opportunity to join voices calling to democratise global governance, from the UN Security Council to the IMF and World Bank. Smaller nations deserve equitable representation and greater institutional responsiveness. By aligning with reform-oriented coalitions, Sri Lanka can gain diplomatic visibility and credibility that far exceeds its size, as a Voice for Reform in Global Institutions. 

    But seizing these opportunities requires qualities we have not consistently demonstrated: political stability, coherent foreign policy, and economic credibility. These are the foundations upon which successful small states build influence, and they are the areas where Sri Lanka has repeatedly stumbled. If Sri Lanka can correct this trajectory, through disciplined governance, strategic clarity, and long-term national planning, then the disorder of today’s world need not be a threat. Instead, it can become the opening through which the island finally realises its potential as a regional connector, a diplomatic actor, and a resilient nation in a rapidly changing global order. 

    The Path Forward 

    Choosing Influence Over Vulnerability Sri Lanka must urgently embrace a new strategic mindset built on five pillars: Balanced Foreign Policy, Avoiding entanglement in rival blocs. Economic Transformation, Strengthening the economy to regain autonomous decision-making. Indian Ocean Strategy, Leveraging geography as a national asset, not a bargaining chip. Institutional Reform, building trustworthy governance that inspires investor and diplomatic confidence. Most importantly engagement with the Global South, positioning Sri Lanka as an active contributor to the emerging world order. The next decade will determine the shape of global power for a generation. If Sri Lanka hesitates, the world will move forward without us. 

    A Moment of Choice 

    Sri Lanka stands at a historic juncture. We possess strategic advantages that many nations envy, yet economic vulnerabilities limit our choices. The world is being reordered, messily, rapidly, irreversibly. The question is not simply Where does Sri Lanka stand today? The real question is: Where will Sri Lanka choose to stand tomorrow? In a world drifting toward rivalry and fragmentation, Sri Lanka must choose to be not a pawn, but a purposeful small power—neutral, stable, connected, and confident. This is our moment to reclaim agency. If we fail, the new world order will be written around us, not with us. The choice before us is stark, to remain a spectator in a world that is rapidly changing—or to step forward, with clarity and purpose, as a nation that shapes its own destiny. 

    References: 

    Alexander Stubb, The West’s Last Chance How to Build a New Global Order Before It’s Too Late January/February 2026 Published on December 2, 2025 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ 

    Rizwie, Rukshana; Athas, Iqbal; Hollingsworth, Julia “Rolling power cuts, violent protests, long lines for basics: Inside Sri Lanka’s unfolding economic crisis” (3 April 2022). 

    Wignaraja, Ganeshan (16 February 2025). “Sri Lanka struggles to deliver a new era of post-crisis growth | East Asia Forum”. East Asia Forum. Retrieved 29 July 2025. 

    https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-17/shock-waves-from-the-war-in-ukraine-threaten-to-swamp-sri-lanka 

    https://www.reuters.com/markets/rates-bonds/sri-lankas-ambitious-governance-macro-linked-bonds-2024-12-17/#:~:text=LONDON%2C%20Dec%2017%20(Reuters),ever%20arranged%20in%20a%20restructuring. 

    https://www.voanews.com/a/india-feels-the-squeeze-in-indian-ocean-with-chinese-projects-in-neighborhood-/6230845.html 

    Reuters+2isas.nus.edu.sg+2 

    https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/tracking-impact-of-us-tariffs-on-apparel-footwear-supply-chains-wpftc/ 

    Author:

    Air Chief Marshal Gagan Bulathsinghala RWP RSP VSV USP MPhil MSc FIM  ndc psc.

    Formerly Commander Sri Lanka Air Force & Ambassador to Afghanistan

    Director, Charisma Energy
    Director, Strategic Development, WKV Group 
    President, Association of Retired Flag Rank Officers
    Senior Fellow South Asia Foresight Network     

    Feature Image Credit: ndtv.com

     

  • BRICS, SCO, and Beyond: Multilateralism as a Sovereignty Safeguard:

    BRICS, SCO, and Beyond: Multilateralism as a Sovereignty Safeguard:

    Introduction

     In an era marked by profound geopolitical transformations and the gradual erosion of the Western-dominated liberal world order, emerging multilateral institutions have emerged as crucial pillars for safeguarding state sovereignty. The BRICS coalition and the SCO represent more than mere economic or regional partnerships– they embody a new paradigm of multilateralism that prioritises sovereign equality, non-interference, and consensus-based decision-making. As traditional multilateral institutions struggle to adapt to contemporary power dynamics, these alternative frameworks offer developing countries pathways to maintain autonomy while engaging meaningfully in global governance.

    The significance of these institutions extends beyond their immediate membership. They represent what scholars term “non-Western multilateralism”- a system of international cooperation that explicitly challenges the hegemonic tendencies of Western-led institutions while promoting a more inclusive and equitable global order. This emerging multilateral architecture does not seek to destroy existing institutions, but rather create parallel frameworks that better reflect the interests and values of the Global South.

    The Crisis of Traditional Multilateralism

    The contemporary crisis of multilateralism stems from structural imbalances that have persisted since the establishment of the post-World War II international order. Traditional institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the UNSC reflect power distributions that no longer reflect current global realities. The Global South, which represents over 80% of the world’s population, remains underrepresented in decision-making despite its growing economic significance.

    This crisis has been further aggravated by the instrumentalisation of multilateral institutions by dominant powers. The “weaponisation of finance” through unilateral sanctions and conditional lending has prompted developing countries to seek alternatives that respect their sovereignty. Recent developments, including the blocking of Russian assets and the use of SWIFT as a political tool, have demonstrated how traditional financial architecture can be used to coerce sovereign states. Moreover, the decline of American hegemony has created what scholars describe as a “multipolar reality” without corresponding multilateral adaptation. The US, while maintaining significant capabilities, faces increasing challenges to its global leadership from rising powers, internal polarisation and diminished moral authority. This hegemonic transition has created space for alternative arrangements to emerge and flourish.

    BRICS: Institutional Innovation and Economic Sovereignty

    BRICS has evolved from an economic concept to a comprehensive institutional framework that challenges Western financial dominance through concrete initiatives. The New Development Bank (NDB), established in 2014 with $100 billion in authorised capital, provides infrastructure financing without the political conditionalities typically imposed by Western institutions. Unlike the World Bank or the IMF, the NDB operates on the principle of equal governance, with founding members maintaining equal voting rights regardless of their economic contributions. The bank’s commitment to financial sovereignty is evidenced by its promotion of local currency lending, reducing dependence on the US Dollar and enhancing monetary autonomy for member states. Since its establishment, the NDB has approved over $32.8 billion across 96 projects, extending beyond the original BRICS members to include countries like Bangladesh, the UAE, Egypt, and Algeria. This expansion demonstrates the institution’s growing appeal as an alternative development finance mechanism.

    The Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA)[1], BRICS $100 billion financial safety net, further exemplifies this sovereignty-preserving approach. Unlike IMF bailout programs that typically require structural adjustment policies, the CRA provides emergency liquidity support without compromising domestic policy autonomy. This mechanism reflects BRICS’ broader commitment to “sovereign equality”- the principle that all states, regardless of size or power, possess equal rights in international affairs. BRICS has also pioneered what can be termed “multipolarity without hegemony”[2]. Unlike traditional power blocs dominated by a single leader, BRCIS operates through consensus-based decision-making, preventing any member from imposing its will on others. This approach has enabled the organisation to survive even amid tensions between members, such as the China-India border disputes, demonstrating institutional resilience.

    SCO: Security and Sovereignty in Eurasia

    The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation presents a different but complementary model of sovereignty-preserving multilateralism. Founded in 2001 and now encompassing ten full members from Kazakhstan to Iran, the SCO operates under the “Shanghai Spirit”- a framework emphasising mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and respect for civilisational diversity. This principle explicitly rejects hegemonic behaviour and promotes what member states call “sovereign equality”.   The SCO’s approach to security cooperation illustrates how multilateralism can enhance rather than diminish sovereignty. Unlike NATO’s collective security model, which subordinates national decision-making to alliance commitments, the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) operates through voluntary coordination and information-sharing while respecting member states’ autonomous security policies. This flexibility allows diverse political systems- from China’s one-party rule to India’s democracy- to cooperate without ideological convergence.

    Recent SCO initiatives further demonstrate this sovereignty-preserving orientation. The organisation’s condemnation of Israeli airstrikes on Qatar in 2025 emphasised violations of sovereignty and territorial integrity, reaffirming members’ commitment to the UN Charter and international law. Similarly, the SCO’s consistent opposition to unilateral sanctions and “use of force” reflects its members’ shared experience of external pressure and desire for autonomous development. The proposed SCO Development Bank, approved during the 2025 Tianjin Summit, represents the organisation’s evolution toward comprehensive economic cooperation while maintaining its sovereignty-centric principles. This institution aims to reduce dependence on Western-controlled financial mechanisms.

    Beyond BRICS and SCO: The Emerging Multipolar Architecture

    The significance of BRICS and SCO extends beyond their individual contributions, encompassing their role in fostering a broader “alternative multilateral order”. This emerging architecture is characterised by overlapping institutional arrangements that provide developing countries with multiple options for international cooperation. The intersection between BRICS and SCO- with China, Russia, India and Iran participating in both organisations-creates synergies that multiply their collective influence. This networked approach to multilateralism offers several advantages for sovereignty preservation.

    First, it provides “institutional balancing” against Western dominance without creating rigid opposing blocs. Countries can selectively engage with different institutions based on their specific interests and needs, maintaining strategic autonomy while benefiting from multilateral cooperation. Second, the proliferation of alternative institutions creates competitive pressure on traditional multilateral organisations to reform. The success of the NDB and AIIB has prompted the World Bank to reconsider its lending practices, while BRICS expansion has encouraged greater Global South representation in G20 deliberations. Third, these institutions promote what scholars term “civilisational diversity” by accommodating different political systems and development models without imposing uniform standards. This approach contrasts sharply with the liberal internationalist emphasis on convergence toward Western norms and institutions.

    Challenges Ahead

    Despite their achievements, BRICS and SCO face significant challenges that constrain their effectiveness as sovereignty safeguards. Internal heterogeneity presents the most fundamental obstacle. BRICS encompasses liberal democracies, authoritarian systems, and hybrid regimes with vastly different economic structures and foreign policy priorities. This diversity, while philosophically valuable, complicates coordination on specific issues and limits the depth of integration possible.

    The organisation also suffers from what critics describe as “institutional impersonation”, rather than genuine innovation. The NDB, despite its rhetoric of alternative development finance, continues to rely heavily on US Dollar funding and has yet to break from neoliberal lending paradigms fundamentally. Similarly, the SCO’s expansion has diluted its cohesion without proportionally enhancing its capabilities.

    Geopolitical tensions among members pose additional challenges. China-India border disputes, Russia-Iran competition in Central Asia and Brazil’s complex relationship with both Washington and Beijing create centrifugal forces that limit institutional effectiveness. The organisations’ consensus-based decision-making, while respecting sovereignty, can also enable paralysis when member interests diverge significantly. Moreover, these institutions seem primarily reactive rather than proactive in their approach to global governance, except for the SCO. They struggle to develop comprehensive solutions to transnational challenges such as climate change, cross-border terrorism, pandemic response, or financial instability.

    Implications for Global Governance

    The rise of BRICS, SCO and similar institutions signals a fundamental transformation in global governance architecture. Rather than replacing existing institutions, they are creating a phenomenon of competitive multilateralism, a system where multiple institutional frameworks compete for legitimacy and membership. This competition has both positive and negative implications for international cooperation. On the positive side, institutional competition encourages innovation and responsiveness to members’ needs. The success of alternative development banks has prompted traditional institutions to reform their practices and increase the representation of developing countries. Competition also gives smaller states greater bargaining power by offering alternative forums to address their concerns.

    However, competitive multilateralism also risks fragmenting global governance and reducing its effectiveness in addressing transnational challenges. If great powers increasingly retreat into separate institutional ecosystems, the coordination necessary to manage global problems may become more difficult. The Ukraine conflict has already demonstrated how geopolitical divisions can paralyse international institutions and hinder collective responses to security threats.

    The success of these institutions lies in creating alternatives to traditional development finance, providing platforms for South-South cooperation and articulating alternative visions of international order for contemporary global governance. However, their ultimate impact will depend on their ability to transcend their current limitations and develop more sophisticated approaches to balancing the preservation of sovereignty with practical international cooperation. Their continued evolution will significantly influence whether the emerging multipolar world becomes characterised by cooperation or competition, inclusion and fragmentation.

    Notes:

    [1]Wso, A.A. & Mahmood, R.M. (2025). The Role of BRICS in Reshaping the Global Order: Confronting Western Hegemony in a Multipolar World. European Scientific Journal, ESJ, 21 (17), 24. https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2025.v21n17p24

    [2] ibid

  • The Perils and Promise of the Emerging Multipolar World

    The Perils and Promise of the Emerging Multipolar World

    The world economy is experiencing a deep process of economic convergence, according to which regions that once lagged the West in industrialisation are now making up for lost time.

    We are therefore entering a post-hegemonic, multipolar world.

    The World Bank’s release on May 30 of its latest estimates of national output (up to the year 2022) offers an occasion to reflect on the new geopolitics. The new data underscore the shift from a U.S.-led world economy to a multipolar world economy, a reality that U.S. strategists have so far failed to recognize, accept, or admit.The World Bank figures make clear that the economic dominance of the West is over. In 1994, the G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, U.K., U.S.) constituted 45.3% of world output, compared with 18.9% of world output in the BRICS countries (Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Russia, South Africa, United Arab Emirates). The tables have turned. The BRICS now produce 35.2% of world output, while the G7 countries produce 29.3%.

    As of 2022, the largest five economies in descending order are China, the U.S., India, Russia, and Japan. China’s GDP is around 25% larger than the U.S.’ (roughly 30% of the U.S. GDP per person but with 4.2 times the population). Three of the top five countries are in the BRICS, while two are in the G7. In 1994, the largest five were the U.S., Japan, China, Germany, and India, with three in the G7 and two in the BRICS.

    The core U.S.-led alliance, which includes the U.S., Canada, U.K., European Union, Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, was 56% of world output in 1994, but now is only 39.5%. As a result, the U.S. global influence is waning.
    As the shares of world output change, so too does global power. The core U.S.-led alliance, which includes the U.S., Canada, U.K., European Union, Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, was 56% of world output in 1994, but now is only 39.5%. As a result, the U.S. global influence is waning. As a recent vivid example, when the U.S.-led group introduced economic sanctions on Russia in 2022, very few countries outside the core alliance joined. As a result, Russia had little trouble shifting its trade to countries outside the U.S.-led alliance.
    The world economy is experiencing a deep process of economic convergence, according to which regions that once lagged the West in industrialization in the 19th and 20th centuries are now making up for lost time. Economic convergence actually began in the 1950s as European imperial rule in Africa and Asia came to an end. It has proceeded in waves, starting first in East Asia, then roughly 20 years later India, and for the coming 20-40 years in Africa.These and some other regions are growing much faster than the Western economies since they have more “headroom” to boost GDP by rapidly raising education levels, boosting workers’ skills, and installing modern infrastructure, including universal access to electrification and digital platforms. The emerging economies are often able to leapfrog the richer countries with state-of-the-art infrastructure (e.g., fast intercity rail, 5G, modern airports and seaports) while the richer countries remain stuck with aging infrastructure and expensive retrofits. The IMF’s World Economic Outlook projects that the emerging and developing economies will average growth of around 4% per year in the coming five years, while the high-income countries will average less than 2% per year.

    It’s not only in skills and infrastructure that convergence is occurring. Many of the emerging economies, including China, Russia, Iran, and others, are advancing rapidly in technological innovations as well, in both civilian and military technologies.

    China’s capacity for innovation and low-cost production is underpinned by enormous R&D spending and its vast and growing labor force of scientists and engineers.

    China clearly has a large lead in the manufacturing of cutting-edge technologies needed for the global energy transition, including batteries, electric vehicles, 5G, photovoltaics, wind turbines, fourth generation nuclear power, and others. China’s rapid advances in space technology, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and other technologies is similarly impressive. In response, the U.S. has made the absurd claim that China has an “overcapacity” in these cutting-edge technologies, while the obvious truth is that the U.S. has a significant under-capacity in many sectors. China’s capacity for innovation and low-cost production is underpinned by enormous R&D spending and its vast and growing labor force of scientists and engineers.

    Despite the new global economic realities, the U.S. security state still pursues a grand strategy of “primacy,” that is, the aspiration of the U.S. to be the dominant economic, financial, technological, and military power in every region of the world. The U.S. is still trying to maintain primacy in Europe by surrounding Russia in the Black Sea region with NATO forces, yet Russia has resisted this militarily in both Georgia and Ukraine. The U.S. is still trying to maintain primacy in Asia by surrounding China in the South China Sea, a folly that can lead the U.S. into a disastrous war over Taiwan. The U.S. is also losing its standing in the Middle East by resisting the united call of the Arab world for recognition of Palestine as the 194th United Nations member state.

    Yet primacy is certainly not possible today, and was hubristic even 30 years ago when U.S. relative power was much greater. Today, the U.S. share of world output stands at 14.8%, compared with 18.5% for China, and the U.S. share of world population is a mere 4.1%, compared with 17.8% for China.
    The trend toward broad global economic convergence means that U.S. hegemony will not be replaced by Chinese hegemony. Indeed, China’s share of world output is likely to peak at around 20% during the coming decade and thereafter to decline as China’s population declines. Other parts of the world, notably including India and Africa, are likely to show a large rise in their respective shares of global output, and with that, in their geopolitical weight as well.

    We are therefore entering a post-hegemonic, multipolar world. It too is fraught with challenges. It could usher in a new “tragedy of great power politics,” in which several nuclear powers compete—in vain—for hegemony. It could lead to a breakdown of fragile global rules, such as open trade under the World Trade Organization. Or, it could lead to a world in which the great powers exercise mutual tolerance, restraint, and even cooperation, in accord with the U.N. Charter, because they recognize that only such statecraft will keep the world safe in the nuclear age.

     

    This article was published earlier in commondreams

    Feature Image Credit: The World Financial Review

  • BRICS Summit 2023

    BRICS Summit 2023

    The 15th BRICS Summit will be held next week from the 22nd to the 24th of August in Johannesburg under the chairmanship of South Africa. Unlike in the past when the West largely ignored the summits as of little consequence, the 15th Summit has got the world’s attention in a major way. Given the current turmoil in the world order and the realisation in much of the world that the West is largely responsible for the unending wars and interventions, this summit has assumed enormous importance. To put it bluntly, the BRICS is being seen as having the potential to end Western dominance and reshape the world into a more equitable and multipolar world order. The summit, which South Africa hosts next week, could mark a significant step in the reconfiguration of geopolitical power in the not-too-distant future.

    Already, BRICS countries represent over 40% of the global population and an estimated 30% of its GDP, and with China expected to overtake the United States as early as 2035 as the world’s largest economy, many sovereign states are eager to establish themselves for a de-dollarised future. 40 countries have expressed their interest to join BRICS, while 23 countries have formally applied, including Argentina, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Thailand, Cuba, Egypt, and Nigeria. A total of 67 countries, including 53 African states have been invited to the BRICS Summit 2023. This is a significant development. The important issues likely to be discussed at the summit include the expansion of BRICS and the possible introduction of BRICS currency.  As a prelude, the joint statement of BRICS’ foreign ministers meeting in June 2023 shows the expanding domains of cooperation that included international security and world order. The joint statement is reproduced below.

    – Team TPF

    Joint Statement of the BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs and International Relations Cape Town, South Africa 1 June 2023

    1. The BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs and International Relations met on 1 June 2023 in Cape Town, South Africa. They exchanged views on major global and regional trends and issues. They reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening the framework of BRICS cooperation under the three pillars of political and security, economic and financial, and cultural and people-to-people cooperation upholding the BRICS spirit featuring mutual respect and understanding, equality, solidarity, openness, inclusiveness, and consensus.

    2. The Ministers reiterated their commitment to strengthening multilateralism and upholding international law, including the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations (UN) as its indispensable cornerstone, and the central role of the UN in an international system in which sovereign states cooperate to maintain peace and security, advance sustainable development, ensure the promotion and protection of democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and promoting cooperation based on the spirit of solidarity, mutual respect, justice and equality.

    3. The Ministers expressed concern about the use of unilateral coercive measures, which are incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the UN and produce negative effects notably in the developing world. They reiterated their commitment to enhancing and improving global governance by promoting a more agile, effective, efficient, representative and accountable international and multilateral system.

    4. The Ministers recalled UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 75/1 and reiterated the call for reforms of the principal organs of the United Nations. They recommitted to instil new life in the discussions on the reform of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and continue the work to revitalise the General Assembly and strengthen the Economic and Social Council. They recalled the 2005 World Summit Outcome document and reaffirmed the need for a comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council, with a view to making it more representative, effective and efficient, and to increase the representation of the developing countries so that it can adequately respond to global challenges. China and Russia reiterated the importance they attach to the status and role of Brazil, India and South Africa in international affairs and supported their aspiration to play a greater role in the UN.

    5. The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of the G20 to continue playing the role of the premier multilateral forum in the field of economic cooperation that comprises both developed and developing countries where major economies jointly seek solutions to global challenges. They looked forward to the successful hosting of the 18th G20 Summit under the Indian G20 Presidency. They noted the opportunities to build sustained momentum for change by India, Brazil and South Africa chairing the G20 from 2023 to 2025 and expressed support for continuity and collaboration in their G20 presidencies and wish them all success in their endeavours.

    6. The Ministers called for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in its three dimensions – economic, social and environmental – in a balanced and integrated manner by mobilising the means required to implement the 2030 Agenda. They highlighted in this regard that the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) Summit, to be held in New York in September 2023, constitutes a unique opportunity for renewing international commitment to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda.

    7. The Ministers recognised the impact on the world economy from unilateral approaches in breach of international law and they also noted that the situation is complicated further by unilateral economic coercive measures, such as sanctions, boycotts, embargoes and blockades.

    8. The Ministers expressed their support for the free, open, transparent, fair, predictable, inclusive, equitable, non-discriminatory and rules-based multilateral trading system with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) at its core, with special and differential treatment (S&DT) for developing countries, including Least Developed Countries. They stressed their support to work towards positive and meaningful outcomes on the issues at the 13th Ministerial Conference (MC13). They committed to engage constructively to pursue the necessary WTO reform with a view to presenting concrete deliverables to MC13. They called for the restoration of a fully and well-functioning dispute settlement system accessible to all members by 2024, and the selection of new Appellate Body Members without further delay. They condemned unilateral protectionist measures under the pretext of environmental concerns such as unilateral and discriminatory carbon border adjustment mechanisms, taxes and other measures.

    9. They supported a robust Global Financial Safety Net with a quota-based and adequately resourced International Monetary Fund (IMF) at its centre. They called on continuing the process of IMF governance reform under the 16th General Review of Quotas, including a new quota formula as a guide, to be completed by 15 December 2023.

    10. The Ministers congratulated Ms Dilma Rousseff, former President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, as President of the New Development Bank (NDB) and expressed confidence that it will contribute to strengthening the NDB in effectively achieving its mandate. They encouraged the NDB to follow the member-led and demand-driven principle, mobilise financing from diversified sources, enhance innovation and knowledge exchange, assist member countries in achieving the SDGs and further improve efficiency and effectiveness to fulfil its mandate, aiming to be a premier multilateral development institution.

    11. The Ministers emphasised the importance of financial inclusion so that citizens can reap the benefits of economic growth and prosperity and welcomed the many new technological instruments for financial inclusion, developed in BRICS countries, that can contribute to ensuring the citizens full participation in the formal economy.

    12. Ministers underscored the importance of encouraging the use of local currencies in international trade and financial transactions between BRICS as well as their trading partners.

    13. The Ministers emphasised that ensuring energy security is a crucial foundation for economic development, social stability, national security, and the welfare of all nations worldwide. They called for resilient global supply chains and predictable, stable energy demand to ensure universal access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy sources. They also stressed the importance of enhancing energy security and market stability by strengthening value chains, promoting open, transparent, and competitive markets, and ensuring the protection of critical energy infrastructure. They strongly condemned all terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure, including critical energy facilities, and against other vulnerable targets.

    14. The Ministers reiterated that the objectives, principles and provisions of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Paris Agreement, in particular, the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) in the light of different national circumstances, must be honoured. They reaffirmed their national and joint efforts to promote the implementation of the Paris Agreement In this regard, they stressed the importance of the fulfilment by developed countries of their commitments to provide technology and adequate, predictable, timely, new and additional climate finance that is long overdue to assist developing countries to address climate change. They expressed concern that the goal of developed countries to jointly mobilise USD 100 billion per year by 2020, and annually through 2025, has not been achieved and urged developed countries to meet their commitments. They rejected attempts to link security with the climate change agenda and recalled that the UNFCCC, including the annual Conference of the Parties (COP) sessions, is the appropriate and legitimate international forum to discuss the issue of climate change in all its dimensions.

    15. The Ministers emphasised their determination to contribute to a successful COP28 in Dubai, later this year, with the focus on implementation. As the main mechanism for promoting implementation and climate action on all aspects of the Paris Agreement under the UNFCCC, the Global Stocktake must be effective in assessing and identifying implementation gaps on the global response to climate change, whilst prospectively laying the foundations for enhanced ambition by all, in particular by developed countries, and for the fulfilment of outstanding gaps in means of implementation for mitigation and adaptation actions in developing countries.

    16. The Ministers welcomed Brazil’s candidacy to host COP30 as the year 2025 will be key to the very future of the global response to climate change.

    17. The Ministers recognised the importance of the inclusion of women in peace processes including in conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction and development, and sustaining peace.

    18. The Ministers recalled their national positions concerning the situation in and around Ukraine as expressed at the appropriate fora, including the UNSC and UNGA. They noted with appreciation relevant proposals of mediation and good offices aimed at peaceful resolution of the conflict through dialogue and diplomacy. They called for the full and effective implementation of both the Black Sea Grain Initiative and the Memorandum of Understanding between the Russian Federation and the Secretariat of the United Nations on promoting Russian food products and fertilizers to the world markets and stress the importance of allowing grains and fertilisers to continue to reach those most in need.

    19. The Ministers expressed serious concern over continued conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and endorsed the Joint Statement by BRICS Deputy Foreign Ministers and Special Envoys at their meeting of 26 April 2023.

    20. The Ministers welcomed the readmission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the League of Arab States on 7 May 2023 and reaffirmed their support to all efforts conducive to a political and negotiated solution that respects Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity.

    21. The Ministers expressed concern about the outbreak of violence in Sudan. They urged the immediate cessation of hostilities and they called for the unimpeded access of the Sudanese population to humanitarian assistance. They welcomed the efforts of the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development, the League of Arab States, the United Nations and its Security Council in seeking solutions for the ongoing crisis. They further welcomed support rendered by various countries, international organisations and agencies in the evacuation of foreign citizens from Sudan.

    22. The Ministers expressed strong condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations whenever, wherever and by whomsoever committed. They recognised the threat emanating from terrorism, extremism conducive to terrorism and radicalisation. They are committed to combating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, including the cross-border movement of terrorists, and terrorism financing networks and safe havens. They reiterated that terrorism should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilisation or ethnic group. They reaffirmed their unwavering commitment to contribute further to the global efforts of preventing and countering the threat of terrorism on the basis of respect for international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations, and human rights, emphasising that States have the primary responsibility in combating terrorism with the United Nations continuing to play central and coordinating role in this area. They also stressed the need for a comprehensive approach of the whole international community to effectively curb the terrorist activities, which pose a serious threat, including in the present-day pandemic environment. The Ministers rejected double standards in countering terrorism and extremism conducive to terrorism. The Ministers called for an expeditious finalisation and adoption of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism within the UN framework and for launching multilateral negotiations on an international convention for the suppression of acts of chemical and biological terrorism, at the Conference of Disarmament. They welcomed the activities of the BRICS Counter-Terrorism Working Group and its five Subgroups based upon the BRICS Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the BRICS Counter-Terrorism Action Plan. We also look forward to further deepening counter-terrorism cooperation.

    23. They expressed the need to comprehensively strengthen mechanisms for countering the increased use, in a globalised society, by terrorists and their supporters of emerging and evolving technologies such as Unmanned Aerial Systems, the Internet and other information and communications technologies, including social media platforms, for terrorist purposes, such as for recruitment and incitement to commit terrorist acts, as well as for the financing, planning, and preparation of their activities.

    24. The Ministers called for strengthening the system of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, including the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BTWC) and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC), and for preserving their integrity and effectiveness to maintain global stability and international peace and security. They underlined the need to comply with and strengthen the BTWC, including by adopting a legally binding Protocol to the Convention that provides for, inter alia, an efficient verification mechanism. The Ministers reasserted their support for ensuring the long-term sustainability of outer space activities and prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) and of its weaponization, including through negotiations to adopt a relevant legally binding multilateral instrument. They recognised the value of the updated Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) submitted to the Conference on Disarmament in 2014. They stressed that practical Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures (TCBMs), may also contribute to PAROS.

    25. The Ministers, while emphasising the formidable potential of the ICTs for growth and development, recognised new associated possibilities they bring for criminal activities and threats, and expressed concern over the rising level and complexity of criminal misuse of ICTs. They welcomed the ongoing work in the Ad Hoc Committee to elaborate a comprehensive international convention on countering the use of ICTs for criminal purposes and reaffirmed their commitment to cooperating in the implementation of the mandate adopted by the UN General Assembly resolution 75/282 in a timely manner.

    26. In line with paragraph 57 of the Beijing Declaration, the Ministers emphasised the responsible and ethical development and use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) for socio-economic development and inclusive growth of all societies. They supported communication and cooperation on AI technology to promote mutual benefits, called for strengthening AI international governance and encourage policy exchanges and dialogues on AI, with a view to exploring to establish an effective global governance framework with the aim to protect human rights and spur innovation and economic growth.

    27. The Ministers reiterated the need for all countries to cooperate in promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms under the principles of equality and mutual respect. They agreed to continue to treat all human rights, including the right to development, in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing and with the same emphasis. They agreed to strengthen cooperation on issues of common interests both within BRICS and in multilateral fora including the United Nations General Assembly and Human Rights Council, taking into account the necessity to promote, protect and fulfil human rights in a non-selective, non-politicised and constructive manner and without double standards.

    28. The Ministers noted the Chair’s internal report on BRICS Institutional Development in line with paragraphs 71 to 73 of the Beijing Declaration.

    29. The Ministers welcomed the Friends of BRICS Foreign Ministers meeting on 2 June 2023.

    30. The Ministers expressed their full support to South Africa’s BRICS Chairship in 2023 under the theme “BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Mutually Accelerated Growth, Sustainable Development, and Inclusive Multilateralism”. They expressed their commitment to working together to ensure the success of the XV BRICS Summit. The Ministers looked forward to the next BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs and International Relations meeting to be held on the margins of UNGA78 and hosted by the Russian Federation as the incoming Chair of BRICS in 2024.

     

     

  • BRICS++: The West tries playing ‘catch-up’, but it’s too late

    BRICS++: The West tries playing ‘catch-up’, but it’s too late

    Until recently, the West has largely derided the BRICS project. But it finally is awaking to the fact that the BRICS initiative possesses the potential to turn both geo-politics, and the international monetary system, upside-down.

    The seismic Geo-Political event of this era is the explosion of BRICS membership and of even bigger potential BRICS membership. This movement has crossed a key threshold. It has transited from ‘vanilla’ multipolarity to being an anti-colonial expression — a shift that should not be underestimated. It is an ethos drawing energy from deep layers of passionate feeling that was stifled in the immediate post-war years, but which is re-surfacing to invest the multi-polar framework with evident dynamism.

    There are currently eight nations that have formally applied for membership and 17 others that have expressed interest in joining. If Saudi Arabia and Russia are both members, that is two of the three largest energy producers in the one camp.

    If Russia, China, Brazil and India are all members, there will be four of the seven largest countries in the world measured by landmass — possessing 30% of the Earth’s dry surface and related natural resources — as BRICS members.

    Almost 50% of the world’s wheat and rice production, as well as 15% of the world’s gold reserves, are in the BRICS.

    Meanwhile, China, India, Brazil, and Russia are four of the nine highest-population countries on the planet with a combined population of 3.2 billion people or 40% of the Earth’s population.

    “China, India, Brazil, Russia and Saudi Arabia have a combined GDP of $29 trillion or 28% of nominal global GDP. If one uses purchasing power parity to measure GDP, then the BRICS share is over 54%. Russia and China have two of the three largest nuclear arsenals in the world”.

    “By every measure then — population, landmass, energy output, GDP, food output and nuclear weapons — BRICS is not just another multilateral debating society. They are a substantial and credible alternative to Western hegemony”, Jim Rickards asserts.

    With a new trading currency framework likely to be fore-shadowed in August at the BRICS summit, the currency will descend upon a highly receptive audience. It will fall into an increasingly sophisticated network of capital and communications. This network will greatly enhance its chances of success.

    The key mistake is the failure to distinguish between the respective roles of a payment (trading) currency and a reserve currency. Payment currencies are used in trade for goods and services. Nations can trade in whatever payment currency they want; it doesn’t have to be dollars. However, in so doing – in a large way – the demand for the dollar incrementally is drained away. Ultimately this loss of foreign demand for dollars circumscribes the ability of the US to go on spending well above its income.

    What has defined a reserve currency has been a large, well-developed sovereign bond market. No country in the world comes close to the US Treasury bond market in terms of breadth and convertibility.

    And Western finance personnel, therefore, snort in derision at the prospects of the US dollar ever losing its hegemony. But they forget perhaps that there was no US bond market until WW1 when  Woodrow Wilson authorized Liberty Bonds to help finance the war. There were bond rallies and Liberty Bond parades in every major city. It became a patriotic duty to buy Liberty Bonds. The effort worked, and it birthed the US bond market.

    In short, the way to create an instant reserve currency is to create an instant bond market using your own citizens as willing buyers. As Jim Rickards earlier noted, were the BRICS to ‘use a patriotic model’ (by drawing on today’s anti-colonial spirit sweeping the BRICS countries) it would be possible to create international reserve assets denominated in the BRICS+ (trading) currency.

    Also, the recent Bank for International Settlements (BIS)-led experiments in real-time and digital Central Bank foreign exchange transactions promises to transform such a project – and to lessen substantially the need for a large reserve-asset reservoir.

    Until recently, the West has largely derided the BRICS project. But it finally is awaking to the fact that the BRICS initiative possesses the potential to turn both geo-politics and the international monetary system, upside-down.

    This month, the Chair of the Eurasia Group, Cliff Kupchan, wrote in Foreign Policy that “6 Swing States Will Decide the Future of Geopolitics”

    “Middle powers today have more agency than at any time since World War II. These are countries with significant leverage in geopolitics. Much more interesting [however] are the six leading middle powers of the global south: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey. These swing states of the global south are not fully aligned with either superpower and are therefore free to create new power dynamics. These six also serve as a good barometer for broader geopolitical trends”.

     

    “… the question remains whether the BRICS states are going to become a more formal institution under China’s direction … that prospect is a clear challenge to the West…But the threat is unlikely to materialize. These countries may have tacked away from the United States — but that’s different from joining a Chinese-directed, Russian-assisted body actively opposing the United States. As of now, BRICS has not shown the ability to develop and implement a common agenda, so there is very little institutional strength for China to co-opt”

    The blinkers are on. The Western Establishment just doesn’t ‘get it’. Kupchan’s article’s conclusion: “the US has been playing catch-up – and not doing very well at even that”. It needs a well-crafted strategy toward each of the key Swing States (to halt their ‘tacking away’ from the US, towards the Russia-China axis), he warns. Arm-twisting, threats and coercion, presumably, as usual.

    ‘Catching-up’?  The horse already has bolted. The stable is empty.

     

    Feature Image: Indian Express

    This article was published earlier in Al Mayadeen English.

  • Towards a Conversation Across Civilisations

    Towards a Conversation Across Civilisations

    Alongside the BRICS, the construction of regional trade and development projects in Africa, Asia, and Latin America that are not controlled by the Western states or Western-dominated institutions – including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (2001) the Belt and Road Initiative (2013), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (2011), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (2022) – heralds the emergence of a new international economic order.

     

    It has become increasingly difficult to engage in reasonable discussions about the state of the world amid rising international tensions. The present environment of global instability and conflict has emerged over the course of the past fifteen years driven by, on the one hand, the growing weakness of the principal North Atlantic states, led by the United States – which we call the West – and, on the other, the increasing assertion of large developing countries, exemplified by the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). This group of states, along with several others, have built the material conditions for their own development agendas, including for the next generation of technology, a sector that had previously been the monopoly of Western states and firms through the World Trade Organisation’s intellectual property rights regime. Alongside the BRICS, the construction of regional trade and development projects in Africa, Asia, and Latin America that are not controlled by the Western states or Western-dominated institutions – including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (2001) the Belt and Road Initiative (2013), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (2011), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (2022) – heralds the emergence of a new international economic order.

    Since the world financial crisis of 2007–08, the United States and its North Atlantic allies have become acutely aware that their hegemonic status in the world has deteriorated. This decline is the consequence of three key forms of overreach: first, military overreach through both enormous military expenditure and warfare; second, financial overreach caused by the rampant waste of social wealth into the unproductive financial sector along with the widespread imposition of sanctions, dollar hegemony, and control of international financial mechanisms (such as SWIFT); and, third, economic overreach, due to the investment and tax strike of a minuscule section of the world’s population, who are solely fixated on filling their already immense private coffers. This overreach has led to the fragility of the Western states, which are less able to exercise their authority around the world. In reaction to their own weakness and the new developments in the Global South, the United States has led its allies in launching a comprehensive pressure campaign against what it considers to be its ‘near peer rivals’, namely China and Russia. This hostile foreign policy, which includes a trade war, unilateral sanctions, aggressive diplomacy, and military operations, is now commonly known as the New Cold War.

    In Western societies today, any effort to promote a balanced and reasonable conversation about China and Russia, or indeed about the leading states in the developing world, is relentlessly attacked by state, corporate, and media institutions as disinformation, propaganda, and foreign interference.

    In addition to these tangible measures, information warfare is a key element of the New Cold War. In Western societies today, any effort to promote a balanced and reasonable conversation about China and Russia, or indeed about the leading states in the developing world, is relentlessly attacked by state, corporate, and media institutions as disinformation, propaganda, and foreign interference. Even established facts, let alone alternative perspectives, are treated as matters of dispute. Consequently, it has become virtually impossible to engage in constructive discussions about the changing world order, the new trade and development regimes, or the urgent matters which require global cooperation such as climate change, poverty, and inequality, without being dismissed. In this context, dialogue between intellectuals in countries such as China with their counterparts in the West has broken down. Similarly, dialogue between intellectuals in countries of the Global South and China has also been hampered by the New Cold War, which has strained the already weak communication channels within the developing world. As a result, the conceptual landscape, terms of reference, and key debates that are taking place within China are almost entirely unknown outside of the country, which makes the holding of rational cross-country discussions very difficult.

    The New Cold War has led to an enormous spike in Sinophobia and anti-Asian racism in the Western states, frequently egged on by political leaders. The rise in Sinophobia has deepened the lack of genuine engagement by Western intellectuals with contemporary Chinese perspectives, discussions, and debates; and due to the immense power of Western information flows around the world, these dismissive attitudes have also grown in many developing countries. Although there are increasing numbers of international students in China, these students tend to study technical subjects and generally do not focus on or participate in the broader political discussions within and about China.

    This diversity of thought is not reflected in external understandings or representations of China – even in the scholarly literature – which instead largely reproduces the postures of the New Cold War.

    In the current global climate of conflict and division, it is essential to develop lines of communication and encourage exchange between China, the West, and the developing world. The range of political thinking and discourse within China is immense, stretching from a variety of Marxist approaches to the ardent advocacy of neoliberalism, from deep historical examinations of Chinese civilisation to the deep wells of patriotic thought that have grown in the recent period. Far from static, these intellectual trends have evolved over time and interact with each other. A rich variety of Marxist thinking, from Maoism to creative Marxism, has emerged in China; although these trends all focus on socialist theories, history, and experiments, each trend has developed a distinct school of thought with its own internal discourse as well as debates with other traditions. Meanwhile, the landscape of patriotic thinking is far more eclectic, with some tendencies overlapping with Marxist trends, which is understandable given the connections between Marxism and national liberation; whereas others are closer to offering culturalist explanations for China’s developmental advances. This diversity of thought is not reflected in external understandings or representations of China – even in the scholarly literature – which instead largely reproduces the postures of the New Cold War.

     

    This article was published earlier in thetricontinental.org

  • BRICS Real Value: One Step Towards New World Order

    BRICS Real Value: One Step Towards New World Order

    While “BRICS” has been a frequently occurring acronym in our discourse in recent years, not many seem to have grasped the reality of Brics and its actual utility.

    The post-Cold War era has seen the economic and political rise of a host of nations — Brazil, China and India being foremost among them. Since 2000 and the advent of Vladimir Putin, Russia has with some help from soaring oil prices made impressive economic gains. The new South Africa, based equally on the industrial inheritance of the robust but unequal and exploitative apartheid regime and the bounty of nature, now finds itself as an advancing economic power. Unlike Nigeria, which has frittered its oil wealth and has been looted by its native kleptocracy, South Africa has been a relative symbol of responsible government and probity in public life. Each one of these nations is now a major economic player and some already have bigger GDPs than many countries in the Group of Seven. Together, in the next two decades, Brics is likely to outstrip the G-7.

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