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  • China’s Expanding Presence in the Pacific Islands

    China’s Expanding Presence in the Pacific Islands

    The Pacific Island Countries (PICs) have received increasing attention recently as they continue to be centres of geopolitical tension between China and western powers – the USA, Australia, and New Zealand. The island nations are generally grouped into three distinct regions, namely – Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia, on the basis of their physical and human geography. They possess some of the largest Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in the world spanning about 30 million sq km (11.6 million sq miles) of the ocean despite their small size and limited population. 

    The Chinese efforts to secure a strong military presence in the Pacific Island Countries could not only enable it to achieve ‘Blue Navy Status’ but also counter this overwhelming US military presence surrounding it.

    The economic potential of these Exclusive Economic Zones, which are rich in fisheries, energy, minerals and other marine resources, is so immense that these nations prefer to be regarded as the Big Ocean States, rather than the Small Island States. In the past, the islands have functioned as launchpads and laboratories, playing crucial roles in power rivalries due to their location and geography¹. With China endeavouring to spread its power and influence to achieve Great Power status, it is natural that it set its sights on areas which have been traditionally dominated by Western powers. Increased Chinese presence in the Pacific Islands is aimed at ending the United States unchallenged influence in the region and to enable suitable backups in a potential conflict over Taiwan. The US presently has 53 overseas military bases across Japan and South Korea, in close proximity to the Chinese mainland as opposed to China’s only overseas military base in Djibouti. Thus, the Chinese efforts to secure a strong military presence in the Pacific Island Countries could not only enable it to achieve ‘Blue Navy Status’ but also counter this overwhelming US military presence surrounding it.

    Economic Factors and China’s Strategy

    The economic attractiveness of the Pacific Islands also includes access to its trade and shipping routes.  On the diplomatic front, these nations tend to serve as a vote bank at forums like the United Nations and can help Beijing in its ambition to further isolate Taiwan. Additionally, stronger relations would help in advancing China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative while also enhancing its image as a reliable partner and viable alternative to other major powers, especially the US and Australia.

    China has had ties with the Pacific Islands since the 1970s but many island nations’ official diplomatic recognition of Taiwan continued to be a major hurdle throughout these years. Through continued economic assistance, China has succeeded in getting diplomatic recognition from 10 out of the 14 Pacific Islands. Presently, only four countries namely Tuvalu, Palau, Marshall Islands and Nauru recognise Taiwan, with Kiribati being the latest nation to withdraw its recognition in September 2019. The success of the Chinese approach can be seen in the fact that they have successfully secured Belt and Road cooperation MOUs with all the 10 PICs and have signed the Belt and Road cooperation plans with Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Vanuatu. As per the fact sheet released by the Chinese government, China and the PICs have continued to expand cooperation in more than 20 different areas, which include trade, investment, ocean affairs, environmental protection, disaster prevention and mitigation, poverty alleviation, health care, education, tourism, sports and culture. 

    Significant progress in China – PIC relations was seen with the establishment of the China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum in 2001, which functions as the highest-level dialogue mechanism between the countries in the fields of economy and trade. In November 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Fiji where he held a group meeting with the PIC head of states. An agreement was signed to establish a strategic partnership and these ties were elevated to a comprehensive strategic partnership featuring mutual respect and common development in November 2018, during President Xi Jinping’s visit to PNG. One of the more recent developments is the China-Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in October 2021, which resulted in the Joint Statement of China-Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers’ Meeting.

    Attention towards climate change action has given China a strong foothold amidst rising frustration among the PICs about the Western powers’ proclivity to focus on geopolitical concerns without sparing sufficient attention to the island country’s paramount needs and concerns. 

    The major success of the Chinese strategy with regards to the Pacific Island nations can be found in their harnessing of pressing issues like climate change, environment, agricultural development, infrastructure and rising sea levels which have been largely neglected by traditional powers. From providing yearly financial assistance to the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) since 1998, the Chinese government has taken efforts to address and assist the PICs in tackling climate change and achieving sustainable development. April 2022 saw the launch of the China-Pacific Island Countries Climate Change Cooperation Centre in the Shandong Province of China. The Chinese have strengthened renewable energy cooperation with the PICs and have facilitated the construction of hydro-power stations in countries like PNG and Fiji. This attention towards climate change action has given China a strong foothold amidst rising frustration among the PICs about the Western powers’ proclivity to focus on geopolitical concerns without sparing sufficient attention to the island country’s paramount needs and concerns. 

    Infrastructure Strategy – BRI Model

    Infrastructure development has been another avenue where the Chinese have shown significant enthusiasm. Several important connectivity projects have been executed in the PICs including the Independence Boulevard in PNG, Malakula island highway in Vanuatu, renovation of Tonga national road, and Pohnpei highway in Micronesia. Aside from providing much needed support in a variety of fields, the Chinese approach to the Pacific islands as a collective entity has helped acknowledge the group as having a combined identity and decision-making capability. Addressing issues which have only been previously discussed on a bilateral basis also provides the PIC with enhanced political strength and purpose, because despite all their differences, most of the countries share similar needs and requirements. 

    Chinese efforts to establish a strong military presence in the region were in 2018, when the Australian press reported that China had requested the right to establish a permanent military presence in Vanuatu, situated less than 2,000 kilometres from Australian territory. However, no formal agreement was drafted. The then Prime Minister of Vanuatu strongly denied that any such talks had taken place and assured the local and international community that there would be no Chinese military presence in the country. A similar report was released by the Australian press in the same year alleging that China held a keen interest in refurbishing a port on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea which had previously functioned as the site of an Allied naval base during World War II. The claims were dismissed when the PNG government contracted Australia and the United States to redevelop the port instead. 

    The Chinese efforts finally materialized in the form of the China – Solomon Islands Security Pact in April 2022. As per the terms of the pact, permission is granted to the Chinese navy to dock and refuel in the Solomon Islands, laying the groundwork for a facility that could be expanded over time. The pact allows the Solomon Islands to seek Chinese assistance when required to maintain social order and stability. The pact has been understood by several scholars as a way for China to establish a permanent military presence gradually under the guise of performing this role. The security pact came at a time when international attention was already on the growing closeness of China and the Pacific Island nations following the leak of two draft documents “China-Pacific Island Countries (PICs) Common Development Vision”, and “China-Pacific Islands Five-Year Action Plan on Common Development (2022-2026)” at the start of 2022. 

    USA’s Response

    In the face of China’s rising threat, the United States released its Indo-Pacific Strategy in February 2022 which emphasized the importance of the Pacific Islands to the United States. Along with the “Partners in the Blue Pacific” initiative, it reiterated its commitment to cement itself as a dominant power in the region. However, definitive action on a large scale was taken only in late May when the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, embarked on a 10-day visit to the region attempting to secure a comprehensive framework agreement with engagements on multiple fronts with the PICs. Although the attempt was unsuccessful, Wang, during his visit, travelled to eight countries (the Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Samoa, Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste) and held virtual meetings with three additional nations (Cook Islands, Niue and the Federated States of Micronesia), ultimately signing 52 bilateral treaties. Although the Chinese foreign minister stressed the country’s commitment and intent for long-term engagement in the region, news of the framework agreement sparked great controversy. The Pacific Island nations could not reach a unanimous decision on signing this agreement and decided to deliberate the matter at the PIF meeting. However, this decision to postpone discussions was disadvantageous to China as the PIF has membership from both New Zealand and Australia both of which were sure to put up strong opposition to the signing of this agreement. Perhaps foreseeing this, the agreement was soon withdrawn after which China immediately released a Position Paper on Mutual Respect and Common Development ² with Pacific Island Countries, which offers 15 “visions and proposals” for deepening China’s engagement in the region. The security issues (China sought to train local police forces, conduct mapping of sensitive marine areas, and play a role in the cyber security of the nations) that had caused much controversy were only mentioned briefly within the paper with much of the focus pointed notably towards political and economic issues. Wang, as part of his visit, also hosted the second round of the China-Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers Meeting in Fiji where he delivered the Secretary General of the Chinese Communist, Party Xi Jinping’s written remarks on China’s continued support. 

    Swift responses came about on May 31, when US President Biden and New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern issued a joint statement that highlighted the two countries’ shared commitment to the Pacific Islands. The statement also expressed their concern over the China – Solomon Islands Security Pact and warned against “the establishment of a persistent military presence in the Pacific by a state that does not share our values or security interest.” ⁴ Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong embarked on a similar visit to Fiji, Samoa and Tonga in early June to reinforce Canberra’s commitments to its neighbours. 

    Despite these advancements, public response to the Chinese visit and in a broader sense, to China’s growing footprint in the region was largely negative. Domestic response in Kiribati was lukewarm due to the wariness stemming from rumours that surfaced in 2021 about China’s plans to upgrade a World War II airstrip in the country, which is likely to damage the country’s already strained fish stocks. The announcement that Fiji would become a founding member of the U.S. led Indo- Pacific Economic Framework by President Frank Bainimaram immediately prior to Wang’s visit reflected wariness about China’s future presence in the area. Additionally, despite signing the security pact, Solomon Islands Prime Minister Sogavare’s support for Beijing gave rise to worries that China would now be in a position “to prop up an unpopular regime and undermine the democratic processes in the name of maintaining social order” among his critics. However, the most vocal voice of protest was that of David Panuelo, the president of the Federated States of Micronesia, who called upon his fellow Pacific Island leaders to reject China’s offers of a comprehensive framework agreement calling it “the single-most game-changing proposed agreement in the Pacific in any of our lifetimes.” ³ The lack of transparency during Wong’s visit drew further criticism with the strict regulation of foreign journalists and ban on direct questions. It eventually led the Media Association of the Solomon Islands to issue a boycott notice to its members, urging them to skip the press event in protest of these restrictions.

    Concerns have also arisen due to China’s reputation for extremely stringent terms of lending and what the West accuses as ‘debt trap’ policy. 60 percent of all Chinese loans are offered at commercial rates rather than concessional rates with extremely short repayment periods – usually less than 10 years. Additionally, the confidentiality clauses (borrowing countries cannot reveal terms of the loan provided or in some cases the very existence of the loan), stabilization clause (lender can demand immediate repayment of loan in case of significant change in the borrowing country’s laws like labour or environment policies), cross-default clause (contract can be terminated and full and immediate repayment can be demanded if the borrowing country defaults on any of its other lenders), political clause ( termination or acceleration of repayment if the borrower acts against China) as well as holding Chinese projects in the country as collateral which are characteristic of Chinese loans are also worrying. The lack of public access to the China – Solomon Islands security pact document and similar documents is also unsettling. 

    Demand for addressing Climatology threats and not Geopolitics

    Chinese interest in the region has served as an efficient bargaining chip for the Pacific Islands to secure their key security interests.

    The geopolitical competition brewing in the region has been a topic of discussion at the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). Its members include Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Palau, Tuvalu and Nauru in addition to the other Pacific Island Nations. Kiribati’s withdrawal from the Forum on July 9 led to debates on China’s influence on this decision among the opposition parties in the country. However, the government cited the failure to adhere to previous engagements, which in turn threatened equal respect and position accorded to the members of the forum as a reason for this move. The PIF meetings conducted between July 11 and July 14 gave ample opportunity for traditionally influential powers like the US and Australia to promise stronger support for the region. US Vice President Kamala Harris addressed the forum as a special invitee announcing two new embassies in Kiribati and the Solomon Islands. She also pledged to triple current aid levels (up to 60 million dollars per year for 10 years) to help combat illegal fishing, enhance maritime security and tackle climate change, after decades of stalled funding as well as a return of peace corps volunteers to Fiji, Tonga, Samoa and Vanuatu. Australia’s remarks ran along similar lines i.e.; pledges of greater support for the climate change agenda of its neighbours.

    Chinese interest in the region has served as an efficient bargaining chip for the Pacific Islands to secure their key security interests. Using this geopolitical competition to its favour could be the way forward for these island nations whose very existence is threatened by rising sea levels. As Dame Meg Taylor, former secretary-general of the Pacific Islands Forum states, the process is already underway. “In general, Forum members view China’s increased actions in the region as a positive development, one that offers greater options for financing and development opportunities — both directly in partnership with China, and indirectly through the increased competition in our region.”

    The most recent PIF meeting concluded with the island nations declaring a climate emergency and making it clear that climate action would be the most preferred front for engagement with all powers including China, US and Australia. Although the western powers, especially Australia had previously pledged to take climate action, the Pacific Island nations had expressed disappointment that the targets for phasing out of carbon emissions had not been met. Thus, greater realignment towards taking definitive climate action would be the next step in relations with the Pacific Islands.  As Fiji’s Bainimarama put it, “Geopolitical point-scoring means less than little to anyone whose community is slipping beneath the rising seas. With jobs being lost to the pandemic, and families being impacted by the rapid rise in the price of commodities, their greatest concern isn’t geopolitics — it’s climate change.”

    It is vital that the Pacific Island Countries band together to maintain solidarity, leverage the opportunities afforded to them due to competition brought about by China’s increased interest in the region and show solidarity in light of the unifying, clarifying priority for all Pacific leaders, which is survival. 

    The effects of climate change are already manifesting in “countries like Vanuatu, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Tonga which are no longer facing category five (severe tropical) cyclones once every 10 years, it’s once every two or three years.” Rising sea levels have allowed salt water to rise through the ground in countries like the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu, which pollute the existing fresh water sources. As former Kiribati President Anote Tong explains in an interview to The Drum, “climate change is not some hypothetical future threat – his islands may not be habitable by 2060.” Thus, it is vital that the Pacific Island Countries band together to maintain solidarity, leverage the opportunities afforded to them due to competition brought about by China’s increased interest in the region and show solidarity in light of the unifying, clarifying priority for all Pacific leaders, which is survival. 

    REFERENCES : 

    1. Dirk H. R. Spennemann (1992) The politics of heritage: Second world war remains on central Pacific Islands, The Pacific Review, 5:3, 278-290, DOI: 10.1080/09512749208718990 
    2. “China’s Position Paper on Mutual Respect and Common Development with Pacific Island Countries.” China’s Position Paper on Mutual Respect and Common Development with Pacific Island Countries, www.fmprc.gov.cn, 30 May 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202205/t20220531_10694923.html.
    3. Panuelo, D. (2022). DocumentCloud. Retrieved 1 August 2022, from https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/22037013-letter-from-h-e-david-w-panuelo-to-pacific-island-leaders-may-20-2022-signed
    4. The United States Government. (2022, May 31). United States – Aotearoa new zealand joint statement. The White House. Retrieved August 1, 2022, from https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/31/united-states-aotearoa-new-zealand-joint-statement/ 
  • RCEP, Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and Vietnam

    RCEP, Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and Vietnam

    The World Bank projection for the RCEP is indeed very impressive and the Member States will see GDP increase by 1.5 per cent. Furthermore, by some estimates, the RCEP could add almost US$ 200 billion to the global economy by 2030.

    ASEAN Member States, Australia, China, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand have heralded the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) on 01 January 2022. This 15 Member consortium is the largest economic grouping and constitutes nearly 30 per cent of the global population which relates to a market of 2.3 billion people with an output value of about US$26.2 trillion with over a quarter in world exports. The World Bank projectionfor the RCEP is indeed very impressive and the Member States will see GDP increase by 1.5 per cent. Furthermore, by some estimates, the RCEP could add almost US$ 200 billion to the global economy by 2030.

    Infographics Credit: Vietnam Investment Review

    As far as Vietnam is concerned, the leaders in Hanoi must be happy to see the RCEP take concrete shape given that it was signed in November 2020 during the ASEAN Summit under Vietnam’s chairship. Vietnam, according to Fitch Solutions, is expected to benefit enormously from the RCEP particularly the IT, footwear, agriculture, automobiles, and telecommunications sectors being the major export categories. The RCEP will also provide Vietnam access to huge consumer markets which could be double the size of those included in the CPTPP. Vietnam can potentially move to become a high-tech manufacturer, and the RCEP can facilitate “local firms increase exports and attract high-quality goods for its consumers. Likewise, agriculture and fisheries product exports will benefit”.

    Vietnam, according to Fitch Solutions, is expected to benefit enormously from the RCEP particularly the IT, footwear, agriculture, automobiles, and telecommunications sectors being the major export categories

    Vietnam’s economic outlook for 2022 is positive with numerous growth opportunities. The National Assembly has identified (2021-2025 period) focus areas in sectors such as “digital economy, hi-tech industries, developing the urban economy, strengthening regional connectivity, strengthening the role of key economic zones, and restructuring to achieve a green and sustainable economy among others”. These sectors can be expected to grow given that the country has strong economic indicators notwithstanding the downturn in economic growth due to COVID-19. This is premisedon “investor-friendly policies, relative economic and political stability, cost efficiency, and consumer demand prospects, supply chains restructuring in Asia” which will attract both old and new investors.

    However, Vietnam should also be prepared for the ongoing and impending geo-economic and geopolitical triggers emerging from contestation between the US and China. During the East Asia Summit in October 2021, President Biden announced that the US was considering a major trade and economic initiative in the form of an “Indo-Pacific economic framework”. Soon thereafter Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo visited Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea to “begin discussions on potential negotiations that could start in early 2022”. Besides some Members of Congress, the new framework is also inspired by Australia and Japan, who had called for a “more active U.S. trade policy, including U.S. leadership in regional trade initiatives”. Above all, the initiative should be seen as a move by the Biden Administration to put to rest any doubts in the minds of regional leaders that the US “lacks an economic and trade strategy sufficient to counter China’s increasing economic influence” in the aftermath of President Trump decision to withdraw from the proposed 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2017.

    The new US economic framework, it is hoped, will also lessen fears in the minds of regional countries arising from the geopolitical-geostrategic issues between the US and China. The US’ “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy which pivots on ‘rule of law’ is essentially diplomatic and military and is symbolized by the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue among the US, Japan, India, and Australia (the Quad) and the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) security partnership.

    The Quad has made significant progress and the first-ever in-person Leaders’ Summit was held in September 2021. It was agreed to advance practical cooperation on 21st-century challenges such as “ ending the COVID-19 pandemic, including by increasing production and access to safe and effective vaccines; promoting high-standards infrastructure; combatting the climate crisis; partnering on emerging technologies, space, and cyber security; and cultivating next-generation talent”. The leaders also called for building quality infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region which was targeted against China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).  As far as the AUKUS is concerned, the rationale is quite clear and is driven by the growing Chinese assertiveness amid fears of extreme coercion against regional countries particularly Taiwan and the claimants of the South China Sea.

    The RCEP and the “Indo-Pacific economic framework” are significant developments but can potentially pose a dilemma for Vietnam

    The RCEP and the “Indo-Pacific economic framework” are significant developments but can potentially pose a dilemma for Vietnam. There are numerous economic benefits to be accrued from the RCEP, but at the same time there are both economic and strategic rewards from the “Indo-Pacific economic framework”.  The US Indo-Pacific strategy has not found much favour in Hanoi; instead, Vietnam has chosen to support and pursue the ASEAN Outlook for Indo Pacific (AOIP) which envisages ASEAN Centrality and the East Asia Summit (EAS), as the underlying principle for promoting cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.

     

    Feature Image Credit: worldakkam.com

  • Dealing with China in 2021 and Beyond

    Dealing with China in 2021 and Beyond

                                                                                                                         TPF Occasional Paper
                                                                                                                                                                            February 2021

    The Current Situation

    As Eastern Ladakh grapples with a severe winter in the aftermath of a violent and tension-filled 2020, much analysis concerning happenings on the India-Tibet border during the previous year has become available internationally and within India. Despite variance in individual perspectives and prognoses, the one issue starkly highlighted is that 2020 marks a turning point in the India-China relationship, which, shorn of diplomatese, has taken a clear adversarial turn.

    Enough debate has taken place over the rationale and timing behind the Chinese action. It suffices to say that given the expansionist mindset of the Xi regime and its aspiration for primacy in Asia and across the world, it was a matter of time before China again employed leverages against India. In 2020 it was calibrated military pressure in an area largely uncontested after 1962, combined with other elements of hard power – heightened activity amongst India’s neighbours and in the Indian Ocean plus visibly enhanced collusivity with Pakistan This, despite platitudes to the contrary aired by certain China watchers inside India, who continued to articulate that existing confidence-building mechanisms (CBMs) would ensure peace on the border and good relations overall. Multiple incidents on the border over the last few years culminating in the loss of 20 Indian lives at Galwan have dispelled such notions.

    Currently, in terms of militarization, the LAC in Eastern Ladakh can vie with the Line of Control (LOC) on the Western border.

    As an immediate consequence, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the arena of conflict in East Ladakh is seeing the heaviest concentration of troops in history, supplemented by fighter jets, utility and attack helicopters, the latest artillery acquisitions, armoured formations, road building teams and an inventory of drones, backed by matching logistics. Currently, in terms of militarization, the LAC in Eastern Ladakh can vie with the Line of Control (LOC) on the Western border.

    Within the country, the perception of China as the principal foe has crystallised. At no other time since 1962 has China come in for such intense scrutiny. Indian public discourse is focused on China, towards interpreting its policies and implications for India and the world – all against the backdrop of international geopolitics churned further by the Covid pandemic.

    China and the World in 2021

    In 2017, President Xi Jinping had given a foretaste of things to come when spelling out his vision during the 19th Party Congress – that China has entered a “new era” where it should take the “centre stage in the world’[1]. In an insightful essay, Jake Sullivan (now National Security Adviser in the Biden administration) and Hal Brands have observed that ‘China has two distinct paths towards achieving this aim’ [2]. The first ‘focuses on building regional primacy as a springboard to global power’ while the second ‘focuses less on building a position of unassailable strength in the Western Pacific than on outflanking the U.S. alliance system and force presence in that region by developing China’s economic, diplomatic, and political influence on a global scale’. In the same piece, the authors sombrely conclude that the US ‘could still lose the competition with China even if it manages to preserve a strong military position in the Western Pacific….softer tools of competition—from providing alternative sources of 5G technology and infrastructure investment to showing competent leadership in tackling global problems—will be just as important as harder tools in dealing with the Chinese challenge…’ [3] These observations are prescient.

    China and the Pandemic. A look at China’s conduct in this context and those of other nations over the last 12 months is instructive. The first aspect is its reaction to worldwide opprobrium for initially mishandling the Corona crisis – reprehensible wolf warrior diplomacy, crude attempts to divert the narrative about the origin of the Virus, unsuccessful mask diplomacy[4] and successfully delaying a WHO sponsored independent investigation into the matter for a full year without any guarantee of transparency. Secondly, it has exploited the covid crisis to strengthen its hold on the South China Sea commencing from March 2020 itself. Some examples are the renaming of 80 islands and geographical features in the Paracel and Spratly islands, commissioning research stations on Fiery Cross Reef and continued encroachment on fishing rights of Indonesia and Vietnam[5], in addition to a host of aggressive actions too numerous to mention, including ramming of vessels. Retaliatory actions from the US have continued, with the Trump administration in its final days sanctioning Chinese firms, officials, and even families for violation of international standards regarding freedom of navigation in January 2021[6]. The outgoing administration delivered the last blow on 19 January, by announcing that the US has determined that China has committed “genocide and crimes against humanity” in its repression of Uighur Muslims in its Xinjiang region[7]. As regards Taiwan, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute had recently forecast that China Taiwan relations will be heading for a crisis in a few weeks’ time,[8] (as borne out by serious muscle-flexing currently underway). If so, it would put the American system of alliances in the region since 1945 squarely to the test.

    Pushback in the Indo Pacific. With China constantly pushing the envelope in its adjoining seas, the Quadrilateral Dialogue, whose existence over the last decade was marked only by a meeting of mid-level officials in Manila in November 2017, has acquired impetus. Initially dismissed as ‘sea foam’ by China, the individual interpretations of roles by each constituent have moved towards congruence, with Australia openly voicing disenchantment with China. Though an alliance is not on the cards, it can be concluded that increased interoperability between militaries of India, Australia, Japan and the US is both as an outcome and driver of this Dialogue, deriving from respective Indo Pacific strategies of member nations. Further expansion of its membership and tie-ups with other regional groupings is the practical route towards an egalitarian, long-lasting and open partnership for providing stability in this contested region. Japan’s expression of interest in joining the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network of the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand[9], is a step in this direction. European nations like Germany, the Netherlands and France have recently declared their Indo Pacific strategies. France has provided the clearest articulation, with the French Ambassador in Delhi spelling out the prevailing sentiment in Europe about China, as ‘ a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival’[10], while further stating that  “when China breaks rules, we have to be very robust and very clear”[11] . A blunt message befitting an Indo Pacific power, reflecting the sentiments of many who are yet to take a position.

    BRI will see major reprioritisation – though its flagship program, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is unlikely to suffer despite disagreements on certain issues between the two countries.

    Slowing of a Behemoth. China’s other driver the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has considerably slowed in 2020. Lee YingHui, a researcher with Nanyang Technological Institute Singapore wrote last September  ‘..in June this year, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that about 20 per cent of the projects under its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) had been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same press briefing, Wang Xiaolong, director-general at the Foreign Ministry’s International Economic Affairs Department, also revealed that a survey by the ministry estimated that some 30 to 40 per cent of projects had been somewhat affected, while approximately 40 per cent of projects were deemed to have seen little adverse impact[12]. Given the parlous condition of economies of client states post Covid-19 with many including Pakistan requesting a renegotiation of loans[13], BRI will see major reprioritisation – though its flagship program, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is unlikely to suffer despite disagreements on certain issues between the two countries.

    Resilient Economy. China’s economy has rebounded fastest in the world, growing at 6.5 % in the final three months of 2020[14]. Despite the rate of annual growth being lowest in 40 years[15], its prominence in global supply chains has ensured some successes, such as the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with the EU in December 2020. The deal, which awaits ratification by the European Parliament is more a diplomatic than an economic win for China, being perceived as detrimental to President Biden’s efforts to rejuvenate the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. China has notched up another win with the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), where it along with 14 Asian countries from ASEAN and others (including Quad members like Australia and Japan)  have agreed on an ‘ integrated market’. Given India’s position on the RCEP, how this agreement pans out and implications for its members will be watched with interest.

    America in the New Year. The Biden Administration’s initial actions reaffirm the bipartisan consensus achieved last year on dealing with China. Comments of  Secretary of State Anthony Blinken that  ‘China presents the “most significant challenge” to the US while India has been a “bipartisan success story” and the new US government may further deepen ties with New Delhi,’[16] were indicative, as were those of Gen Lloyd Austin the Secretary of Defence during his confirmatory hearing[17].  President Biden’s first foreign policy speech on 04 February that ‘America is Back’ have provided further clarity. Earlier, Blinken and Austin had dialled Indian counterparts NSA Doval and Defence minister Rajnath Singh to discuss terrorism, maritime security, cybersecurity and peace and stability in the Indo Pacific.[18]Economically, American interest in joining or providing alternatives to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP, with an 11 nation membership, born out of President Trump’s withdrawal from its previous format, the TPP), will be another determinant in matters of trade with China. Harsh national security challenges will test the new administration’s resolve, as has already happened in the South China Sea over Taiwan where at the time of writing, the USS Theodore Roosevelt is conducting Freedom of Navigation operations[19]. Similar tests will occur over North Korea and Tibet, where the Senate’s passage of the Tibet Policy and Support Act 2020 mandates that decisions regarding the Dalai Lama’s succession be taken exclusively by the Tibetan people and the incumbent. Overall, a sense of how the world including the US will deal with China in 2021 is well captured by Commodore Lalit Kapur of the Delhi Policy Group when he states that ‘ …China has become too unreliable to trust, too powerful and aggressive to ignore and too prosperous, influential and connected to easily decouple from………[20] Going back to the views essayed by Sullivan and Brands, it appears that China is following both paths to achieve its objective, ie Great Power status.

    India and China

    The Early Years  India’s attempt, soon after independence to develop a relationship with China, its ‘civilisational neighbour’ was overshadowed by the new threat to its security as the PLA invaded Tibet in 1950 – effectively removing the buffer between the two large neighbours. Dalai Lama’s flight to India in March 1959, the border clash at Hot Springs in Ladakh six months later and the subsequent 1962 war shattered our illusions of fraternity.  Documents published recently pertaining to the period from 1947 to the War and beyond[21], reveal differences in perception within the Indian government in the run-up to 1962 despite the availability of sufficient facts. This combined with Chinese duplicity and disinformation, Indian domestic and international compulsions resulted in disjointed decision making, leading to the disastrous decision to implement the ‘Forward Policy’ with an unprepared military. A brief period of security cooperation with the US ensued including the signing of a Mutual Defence Agreement.[22] However, the US-China rapprochement of the early 70s and India’s professed non-alignment ensured its diminished status in the great power calculus.

    Reaching Out to China. India’s outreach to China commenced with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988 in the aftermath of the Chinese intrusion at Somdorung Chu in 1986 in Arunachal Pradesh, resulting in a full-fledged standoff which lasted till mid-1987. The consequent push towards normalisation of relations resulted in the September 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas,  the November 1996 Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, followed thereafter by the Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between India and China, of June 2003 and finally the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question of April 2005, signed during the visit of Chinese premier Wen Jiabao, which also saw the India China relationship elevated to a ‘Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity’.

    Despite partially successful attempts to broad base the engagement, territorial sovereignty continued to dominate the India China agenda, as can be observed by the number of agreements signed on border management – with minimal outcomes. It appears now that what can only be construed as diffidence in dealing with China on the border (and other issues) arose not because of misplaced optimism over such agreements, but for several other reasons. Some were structural weaknesses, such as lack of development of the border areas and poor logistics. Others arose because of want of a full-throated consensus on how strong a line to take with a  visibly stronger neighbour  – aggravated by growing economic disparity and the limitations imposed by self-professed non-alignment, especially so in the absence of a powerful ally like the Soviet Union, which had disintegrated by 1991. Also, American support could not be taken for granted, as was the case in the 60s.  Overall, the approach was one of caution. This, coupled with lack of long term border management specialists induced wishful myopia on the matter, which was dispelled periodically by border skirmishes or other impasses, before returning to ‘business as usual’.  

    The extent of Engagement Today. To objectively analyse the relationship, it is important to comprehend the extent of the India China engagement on matters other than security. In the context of trade and industry, a perusal of the website of the Indian embassy in Beijing provides some answers. There is a list of 24 agreements/ MoUs /protocols between the two countries on Science and Technology alone, covering fields as diverse as aeronautics, space technology, health and medicine, meteorology, agricultural sciences, renewable energy, ocean development, water resources, genomics, geology, and others. The Embassy brings out India’s concerns regarding trade including impediments to market access, noting that trade imbalances have been steadily rising, to reach $58.4 billion in 2018, reducing marginally to $56.95 in 2019, a first since 2005. The poor penetration of Indian banks in China, India’s second-largest shareholding (8%) in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and being the largest borrower from the New Investment Bank or NIB, a BRICS bank of which all members have equal shareholding provide an understanding of linkages between the countries in the banking sector[23]. Other areas of cooperation are in petroleum and railways.

    Economic Fallout Post April 2020. After the Galwan incident, India has taken strong measures on the economic front against China, from banning over 250 software applications to a partial ban on various categories of white goods,and the imposition of anti-dumping duties on many others. The Consolidated FDI Policy of the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade dated 15 October 2020, mandates Government scrutiny of every Chinese investment proposal before approval. However, the paradox in the India China relationship is well illustrated by trade figures for the first half of the Financial Year 20-21, where China surpassed the USA to become India’s largest trading partner. India reduced imports from China but exports to China grew by a robust 26.2 per cent at $10.16 billion[24]. Also, conditionalities for borrowing from the AIIB and NIB have resulted in India having to permit Chinese firms to bid for works connected with projects funded by these institutions. Consequently in January this year, the contract for construction of a 5.6 km long underground stretch of the Rapid Rail Transit System in the National Capital Region has been awarded to a Chinese company, Shanghai Tunnel Engineering Company Limited.[25] As noted earlier, decoupling is not easy. Incentives for companies to relocate to India have been announced, with some investment flowing in from Google and Facebook, and plans for Samsung to relocate a factory to NOIDA[26]. Finally, India’s exclusion from the RCEP will also have to be factored in when negotiating a long term trade policy with China.

    However, the paradox in the India China relationship is well illustrated by trade figures for the first half of the Financial Year 20-21, where China surpassed the USA to become India’s largest trading partner.

    Soft Power and Academia. Indian soft power in China remains subservient to harsh security concerns despite oft-quoted historical antecedents. Some elements like Indian cinema continue to be extremely popular. Student exchange programs have taken shape, especially under the aegis of Confucius Institutes which have secured a toehold in some Indian campuses. Following the trend worldwide, their programs are also under scrutiny[27].  The few Indian students in China (less than 25000)[28] have been hit hard by the coronavirus. Overall, given the current state of engagement, employing soft power as an effective tool has limited potential. Exchange of scholars from policy and security think tanks has been a good way of imbibing a sense of the other, resulting in greater awareness. While the trust deficit and reasons for the same have always been highlighted by the Indian side, it has been the general experience that China has been less forthcoming in its responses.

    Building Blocks for a China Policy

    In the middle term, unless there is a concerted and verifiable effort by China, trade with that country will be overshadowed by security issues  (the huge trade imbalance also becoming one of these !). The Indian economy has commenced its post-Covid recovery in the new year. The budget for FY 21-22, trade policies of others like the EU and the US, will impact economic policy, as will national security concerns.

    Immediate security priorities vis a vis China are a mix of the geopolitical and purely military. These can broadly be outlined – safeguarding Indian interests in the Indian Ocean region and the littorals, holding the line in the high Himalayas and ensuring sanctity over Indian skies. The first being both a geopolitical and security matter would leverage all elements of statecraft including the military. The balance two are a direct outcome of India’s military power. These, intertwined with India’s multilateral approach towards cooperation in world fora would form the basis of dealing with China.

    Countries in the neighbourhood other than Pakistan when in distress, look first towards India for relief – natural calamities, food shortages[29], and now the corona vaccine, where Indian generosity remains unsurpassed worldwide. India does not indulge in cheque book diplomacy, nor entice weaker neighbours into debt traps.

    Managing the Neighbourhood. In South Asia, India is primus inter pares due to size, geographical location, resources, capability and potential. Its soft power, economic reach ( while not comparable to China’s) and associated linkages with other countries are huge, at times even considered overwhelming. Countries in the neighbourhood other than Pakistan when in distress, look first towards India for relief – natural calamities, food shortages[29], and now the corona vaccine, where Indian generosity remains unsurpassed worldwide. India does not indulge in cheque book diplomacy, nor entice weaker neighbours into debt traps. Despite ethnic linkages and security concerns resulting sometimes in what is perceived by others as ‘interventionist politics’, India’s respect for its neighbours’ sovereignty is absolute. This is in contrast to China, whose recent interventions in Nepal have led to rallies in front of the Chinese embassy[30]. Its pressure on the NLD government in Myanmar over BRI projects had again not been viewed favourably in that country,[31] though the trajectory that the China-Myanmar relationship now follows remains to be seen, with China attempting to support Myanmar’s military in international fora after the coup[32]. Within South Asia, strengthening delivery mechanisms, sticking to timelines in infrastructure projects, improving connectivity and resolving the myriad issues between neighbours without attempting a zero-sum game with China is the way forward for India, which should play by its considerable strengths. Simultaneously, it must look at growing challenges such as management of Brahmaputra waters and climate change, and leverage these concerns with affected neighbours.

    Strengthening Military Capability. A more direct challenge lies more in the military field,  and in measures necessary to overcome these.  The justifiable rise in military expenditure during the current year would continue or even accelerate. The armed forces are inching towards a mutually agreed road map before implementing large scale organisational reforms. Conceptual clarity on integrated warfighting across the spectrum in multiple domains (including the informational ) is a sine qua non, more so when cyberspace and space domains are concerned. This mandates breaking up silos between the military and other specialist government agencies for optimisation and seamless cooperation. Also, while classical notions of victory have mutated, swift savage border wars as witnessed in Nagorno Karabakh remain live possibilities for India, with open collusion now established between China and Pakistan. As always, the study of the inventory, military capability of the adversary and his likely pattern of operations will yield valuable lessons. The armed forces have to prepare multiple options, to deal with a range of threats from full scale two front wars down to the hybrid, including responses to terrorist acts while ensuring sovereignty across the seas. Network-centric warfare will take centre stage, with information operations being vital for overall success, possibly even defining what constitutes victory.

    Progress has been achieved in these directions. As an example, the first Indian weaponised drone swarm made its debut on Army Day 2021, and visuals of a ‘wingman drone’ underdevelopment have been shown during the Aero India 2021 at Bangalore. The military would be planning for operationalisation, induction, deployment, staffing and human resource aspects of this weapon platform with the nominated service. An estimate of the time required to resolve these issues as also for full-scale production of such systems and larger variants will dictate procurement decisions with respect to other land and air platforms providing similar standoff kinetic effects, and surveillance capability. A concurrent requirement to develop sufficient capability to counter such systems would doubtless be under scrutiny. In this regard, the outcome of the PLA merging its cyber and electronic warfare functions for multiple reasons merits attention.[33] While the Navy’s requirements to dominate the Indian Ocean are well appreciated, a consensus on its future role and the need (or otherwise) for a third aircraft carrier would decide the nature, type and numbers of future naval platforms – unmanned underwater vehicles, submarines, shore/ carrier-based aircraft and others.  With decisions over the Tejas LCA induction finalised, induction of a state of the art platforms from the USA and France over the last few years and hope for the acquisition of new generation indigenous air defence systems[34] on the anvil, the IAF is set to gradually regain its edge. Overall, India’s military has to leverage the latest technology and develop the capability to fight in multiple domains, which its hard-earned experience in third-generation warfighting would complement. With restructuring planned concurrently, each decision will have to be fully informed and thought through – more so when mini faceoffs as has happened at Naku La in Sikkim this month continue to occur.

    A Way Forward

    Traditional Chinese thinking has simultaneously been dismissive and wary of India. In his seminal publication at the turn of the century, Stephen Cohen noted that ‘…from Beijing’s perspective India is a second rank but sometimes threatening state. It poses little threat to China by itself and it can be easily countered but Beijing must be wary of any dramatic increase in Indian power or an alliance between New Delhi and some hostile major state..’[35]  As brought out in this paper, outlines of a grounded long term China policy based on previous experiences and new realities are visible. Rooted primarily in the security dimension followed thereafter by the economic, its success will be predicated on peace and tranquillity on the border, without entering into the trap of competition in either of the two domains. As pointed out by the Minister for External Affairs in his talk to the 13th All India Conference for China Studies this month [36] the India-China relationship has to be based on ‘mutuality…  mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interests ..’. The EAM further noted that ‘expectations…. that life can carry on undisturbed despite the situation at the border, that is simply not realistic. There are discussions underway through various mechanisms on disengagement at the border areas. But if ties are to steady and progress, policies must take into account the learnings of the last three decades’[37].

    Rooted primarily in the security dimension followed thereafter by the economic, its success will be predicated on peace and tranquillity on the border, without entering into the trap of competition in either of the two domains.

    In the same talk, the EAM has laid down eight broad and eminently practical propositions as guidelines for future India-China relations. Most prominent of these is that peace and tranquillity on the border are a must if relations in other spheres are to develop. Also, the need to accept that a multipolar world can have a multipolar Asia as its subset. He stressed that reciprocity is the bedrock of a relationship, and sensitivities to each other’s aspirations, interests and priorities must be respected. Concurrently, management of divergences and differences between two civilizational states should be considered over the long term.

    A China policy crafted on these principles would ensure that India’s concerns vis a vis its neighbour is addressed, within the larger National goal of all-round growth and development of India and its citizens in the 21st Century.

     

    Notes:

    [1] ‘Xi JinPing Heralds New Era of Chinese Power’ Dipanjan Ray Chaudhury, Economic Times 18 October 2017

    [2] ‘China Has Two Paths To Global Domination’ Jake Sullivan,  Hal Brands, Foreign Policy, 22 May 2020

    [3] ibid

    [4] ‘China’s Mask Diplomacy is Faltering.But the US isn’t Doing any better’ Charlie Campbell Time Magazine 03 April 2020

    [5] ‘China’s Renewed Aggression in the South China Sea’ Gateway House Infographic 22 April 2020

    [6] ‘US imposes new sanction on Beijing over South China Sea’  Mint 15 January 2021

    [7] In parting shot, Trump administration declares China’s repression of Uighurs ‘genocide’ Humeyra Pamuk, Reuters 19 January 2021

    [8] ‘Pacific Panic: China-Taiwan relations to reach breaking point in ‘next few weeks’ skynews.com.au 18 January 2021

    [9] ‘Japan wants de facto ‘Six Eyes’ intelligence status: defence chief’ Daishi Abe and Rieko Miki Nikkei Asia 14 August 2020

    [10] ‘Emmanuel Bonne’s interview to the Times of India’ 10 January 2021  Website of the French Embassy in New Delhi

    [11] ‘When China breaks rules, we have to be very robust and clear: French diplomat’ Dinakar Peri, The Hindu 08 January 2021

    [12] ‘COVID-19: The Nail in the Coffin of China’s Belt and Road Initiative?’ Lee YingHui, The Diplomat 28 September 2020

    [13] ibid

    [14] ‘Covid-19: China’s economy picks up, bucking global trend’ BBC.com  18 January 2021

    [15] ibid

    [16] ‘New US govt may look to further deepen ties with India: Blinken’ Elizabeth Roche, The Mint 21 Jan 2021

    [17] ‘What Biden’s Defence Secretary Said About Future Relations With India, Pakistan’ Lalit K Jha, The Wire 20 January 2021

    [18] ‘US NSA speaks to Doval, Def Secretary dials Rajnath’ Krishn Kaushik and Shubhajit Roy Indian Express 27 January 2021

    [19] ‘As China Taiwan tension rises, US warships sail into region’ The Indian Express 25 January 2021

    [20] ‘India and Australia: Partners for Indo Pacific Security and Stability’  Lalit Kapur, Delhi Policy Group Policy Brief Vol. V, Issue 42 December 15, 2020

    [21] ‘India China Relations 1947-2000 A Documentary Study’ (Vol 1 to 5)  Avtar Singh Bhasin   Geetika Publishers New Delhi 2018

    [22] ‘The Tibet Factor in India China Relations’  Rajiv Sikri  Journal of International Affairs , SPRING/SUMMER 2011, Vol. 64, No. 2, pp 60

    [23] Website of the Embassy of India at Beijing   www.eoibeijing.gov.in

    [24] ‘What an irony! Mainland China beats US to be India’s biggest trade partner in H1FY21’  Sumanth Banerji        Business Today 04 December 2020

    [25] ‘Chinese company bags vital contract for first rapid rail project’  Sandeep Dikshit   The Tribune   03 January 2021

    [26] ‘Samsung to invest Rs 4,825 cr to shift China mobile display factory to India’ Danish Khan  Economic Times 11 December 2020

    [27]  ‘The Hindu Explains | What are Confucius Institutes, and why are they under the scanner in India?’

    Ananth Krishnan The Hindu August 09 2020

    [28] ‘23,000 Indian students stare at long wait to return to Chinese campuses’  Sutirtho Patranobis  Hindustan Times  08  September 2020

    [29] ‘Offering non-commercial, humanitarian food assistance to its neighbours: India at WTO’ Press Trust of India 19 December 2020

    [30] ‘Torch rally held in Kathmandu to protest against Chinese interference’ ANI News  30 December 2020

    [31] ‘Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visits Myanmar with aim to speed up BRI projects’  Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury  Economic Times  09 January 2021

    [32] ‘China blocks UNSC condemnation of Myanmar coup’ India Today Web Desk 03 February 2021

    [33] ‘Electronic and Cyber Warfare: A Comparative Analysis of the PLA and the Indian Army’ Kartik Bommankanti ORF Occasional Paper July 2019

    [34] ‘India successfully test fires new generation Akash NG missile’ Ch Sushil Rao  Times of India  25 January 2021

    [35] ‘ India  Emerging Power’  Stephen Philip Cohen   Brookings Institution Press 2001   pp 259

    [36] Keynote Address by External Affairs Minister at the 13th All India Conference of China Studies January 28, 2021

    [37] ibid

     

    Image Credit: Wion  and Trak.in

  • BeiDou: China’s Space Flight to Global Dominance

    BeiDou: China’s Space Flight to Global Dominance

    Technological independence and Economic prowess define a ‘Great power’ in today’s Information Age. In an era of rapid technological advancements, China has emerged as an economic and technology juggernaut, rising in stature as a global superpower. Ever since the beginning of Deng Xiaoping’s modernisation strategy, China has invested heavily in its science and technology sector aiming to reduce its dependency on foreign technology. After nearly three decades of the relentless pursuit of technological competence, China has now established itself as a dominant force in innovation and technology. One such milestone because of its relentless pursuit is the establishment of its indigenous Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), The BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS). BeiDou marks China’s entry into an elite club of GNSS systems, becoming one of only four global navigation systems worldwide. It cements China’s place as a prominent Space Power and as a potential suitor among countries for future space co-operation. BeiDou will directly rival the Global Positioning System (GPS) of the U.S. and its cheap costs with greater accuracy could bring an end to the monopoly of GPS in the global navigation systems arena.

    Military Objectives

    ‘National security’ is the primary reason for the development of the BDS navigation system. China’s ambition to build an indigenous satellite navigation system stemmed from the “embarrassment” it suffered during the Taiwan strait missile crisis in 1996[1]. It is believed that two of the warning missiles fired by the PLA, close to Taiwan’s Keelung military base, failed to hit the designated target due to the sudden disruption of the GPS. Missiles launched rely on Position Navigation and Timing (PNT) data, provided by a constellation of satellites, to navigate accurately to their designated target. With the BeiDou Navigation System (BDS) online, the Chinese military possesses a military and strategic autonomy and no longer requires to be dependent solely on the GPS for tracking and navigation. BeiDou aims to offer the Chinese PLA with precision-guided missile delivery systems, robust communication systems, enhanced cyber and drone warfare capabilities. Thus, integrating BeiDou into military systems and equipment will enable China to effectively bypass any constraints on GPS imposed by the U.S.[2].

    The BDS navigation system offers signals at a higher bandwidth, thus providing better accuracy than the GPS. Its global position accuracy is under 10 cm in the Asia-Pacific compared to the GPS’s 30cm [3]. BeiDou’s higher accuracy and affordable prices may encourage many countries to consider it as a viable alternative to GPS service provided by the U.S. Many militaries today fear manipulation of the navigation signals by the U.S. in times of conflict, as they are solely reliant on GPS for precision guidance and navigation. The BDS is compatible with GPS, GLONASS & GALILEO navigation systems, thus offering militaries with a fool-proof alternative. This dynamism will be a key strategic asset to any country during conflict situations[4]. One such example of countries moving away from GPS is Pakistan, which is all set to incorporate BeiDou into its civil and military domain as part of its defence and strategic cooperation with China. It gives Pakistan access to precise geospatial data for application in surveying and mapping, construction and scientific studies[5]. With Pakistan on a defence equipment buying spree from China, its military would gradually be fully integrated with the BDS navigation system soon, moving away from its reliance on GPS. This shows China’s pursuit of establishing its indigenous navigation system in the Asian region, putting an end to the GPS hegemony.

    Space Silk Road

    The BeiDou navigation satellite system is of critical importance to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BDS navigation system will ensure accurate navigation capabilities that will complement the Land and Maritime Silk routes, which are a part of the larger Belt and Road Initiative of China. The Space Silk road aims to establish an array of space capabilities including a fully operational space station, ground infrastructure, launch services, satellites, aerospace industries and BDS related industries[6]. It offers a wider dimension to China’s ambitions for BRI and could promote greater growth and development of its space infrastructure and technology. It also promotes civil-military dual-use technologies and provides a platform for enhancing China’s indigenisation in communication, satellite navigation, aerospace and artificial intelligence[7]. It aims to provide the international community with credible alternative infrastructure and promote further cooperation in space-innovation and space-technology. China’s Space Silk Road legitimises its stake as a credible leader in space and a growing superpower in the international system.

    Over 30 countries including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and Indonesia have already signed agreements with China to integrate the BDS navigational system in the domestic sectors like transportation, communication, etc. They have also allowed the construction of ground stations, which would improve the accuracy and range of the BDS navigation system. The Space Silk road aims to tap into the lucrative satellite navigation industry, its system and components market enabling China to wield greater influence in third countries and their economy[8]. The BDS navigation satellite system is the centrepiece of the Space Silk Road under China’s Belt and Road Initiative and is of massive strategic and geopolitical importance in China’s ambition to establish itself as a global superpower.

    Economic Implications of BeiDou

    It is clear as day that any country that possesses an economic might wields greater influence in the world’s geopolitics. The U.S. has been the dominant force in the world economy until the turn of the 21st century, but not anymore. China’s meteoric rise to economic supremacy is deeply rooted in its aim to knock the U.S. right off their perch and take its place as a global leader in technology innovation and manufacturing. It aims to be the focal point of global manufacturing and offer nations credible and high-tech equipment and exercise a greater foothold in the global markets. ‘Made in China 2025’ espouses this ambition of China to cement its place as a global manufacturing leader in strategic industries like information technology, communication systems, a global navigation system, aerospace, railways, agricultural machinery etc. which are critical to the economic competitiveness and growth in the 21st century[9].

    A major cornerstone of the ‘Made in China 2025’ and the ‘13th 5-year plan’ is to fast-track the commercial applications of the BeiDou navigation satellite system. The Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) industry is estimated to be worth US$82.4 billion and is forecast to grow at an average rate of 7% p.a. through 2023 with over 3.6 billion GNSS devices currently in use worldwide. China aims to gain control of this lucrative market, which would give it economic superiority against the U.S. in the GNSS downstream industry and also aims to break the monopoly that the GPS enjoys in the satellite navigation industry. As of 2012, the U.S. led the GNSS downstream industry with a share of 31% followed by Japan 26%, the E.U. 25.8% and China with 7% share. China aims to capture 60% of the domestic GNSS downstream industry and 80% of important applications, becoming globally competitive by 2020. It envisions to build an industrial chain comprising all parts of the GNSS downstream industry ranging from chips, modules, antennae, receivers etc, all compatible with the BDS navigation system. China expects Beidou to have a global market penetration of 60% and attain worldwide coverage by 2020[10].

     In sheer numbers, it projects the GNSS market to grow by US$81.5 billion and have a compounded annual growth rate of 6.6%. Estimated at US$155.1 billion in 2027, the GNSS global market is expected to reach US$228.7 billion by 2027 growing at a CAGR of almost 6% between 2020-2027. The U.S. GNSS market is estimated to be worth US$42 billion in 2020 while China, being the world’s second-largest economy is likely to reach a GNSS market size worth US$47.8 billion in 2027 with a CAGR of 8.6%, effectively getting even with or overtaking the U.S. in the global GNSS market[11]. In a study carried out by a North Carolina based research organization RTI International, sponsored by the U.S. government’s National Institutes of Standards and Technology, between 1984-2017 GPS has generated economic benefits to the tune of US$1.4 trillion. The largest contributing sectors were the telecommunications industry with US$685.9 billion, telematics with US$325 billion and location-based services on smartphones with US$215 billion. It is estimated that losing GPS service business would have a US$1 billion per day impact on the economy[12].

    In a recent report published in the White Paper on the Development of China’s Satellite Navigation and Location Services Industry (2020), released by the GNSS and LBS Association of China, China’s satellite navigation and location-based services industry achieved an output of US$48.58 billion in 2019. The industry’s core sector associates with the development and implementing satellite navigation technology including chips, devices, algorithms, software, navigation data, terminal equipment and infrastructure. The BDS navigation system alone has contributed a whopping 80% of output value generated from these sectors[13]. The sheer scope and economic opportunity in the GNSS sector substantiate China’s dogged persistence to gain control of this industry. As the global navigation satellite systems move towards interoperability soon, BeiDou could lead the race to offer high-tech navigation systems and equipment compatible with GPS, GLONASS, GALILEO to the international community. Implementing the BDS navigation system has bolstered China’s standing in the international community as an economic powerhouse and stands as a testament to the country’s resilience and steadfast vision to become a global superpower and a leader in space.

    BeiDou’s Geopolitical Implications and the Future of Space

    The BeiDou Navigation Satellite System is an important strategic asset for China, in its ambitions to achieve global supremacy and establish itself as a leader in Space. China looks to use BeiDou’s scope and potential to achieve its larger geopolitical and strategic goals in the military and economic domain. On the economic front, this would negatively affect U.S. companies operating in the Chinese markets, as China has taken steps to reward its domestic sector to promote BeiDou and expand its GNSS industry. Effectively, U.S. suppliers would be driven out of the market by the local Chinese suppliers whose equipment would be on par or even better than equipment bought from the West. It would enable China to create a global industrial chain of satellite navigation and telecommunication equipment, which are of the highest quality and at affordable prices, wooing third countries and providing a credible alternative to the Western equipment. This serves well to two of China’s prominent strategic objectives of establishing itself as a leading global economy and driving the U.S. out of the Asian markets.

    Considering heightened U.S. presence in the highly contested South China Sea and China’s lingering territorial disputes with neighbouring countries, BeiDou’s initial deployment in South East Asia offers China strategic advantage and Area Access/Area Denial capabilities. Incorporating the BDS navigation system, possessing greater accuracy than GPS, in both ballistic and cruise missile systems offers China with precision-guided weapons capability, thus acting as an effective deterrent and strategic threat to the U.S. in the region. Greater precision and accuracy implies greater reconnaissance capabilities, digital espionage and enhanced tracking capabilities, thus countries like the U.S. feel BeiDou poses a critical security threat to their national security[14] With the BeiDou navigation satellite system going online, all roads lead to China realizing its dream of an Asia devoid of the West and attaining military autonomy over the U.S., especially in South East Asia.

    The BDS satellite navigation system is the third dimension of China’s strategic Belt and Road Initiative, aiming to achieve global coverage from all fronts. It is an effective foreign policy tool that China can utilise to garner international support and cooperation. With over 130 countries on board China’s BRI project, BeiDou would be a critical asset to attract more countries aboard its ambitious project. Achieving global coverage through BRI, supported by BeiDou, would increase China’s standing in the international community and mark another step towards the end of U.S. dominance in the global geopolitical arena.

    The global ambitions of China with its BeiDou navigation system bring with it a sense of caution and uncertainty in the geopolitical arena. Behind the veil of China’s good Samaritan measures, lie the desires of a power-hungry dragon. The BDS navigation system and its subsequent GNSS downstream industrial chain offer countries lucrative opportunities, but at what cost? Recent patterns would show clearly China’s cut-throat diplomacy with its BRI project. Deceived by vast sums of money in the BRI project, countries who were aboard the project were pushed into a debt-trap by the Chinese, ceding control over their markets and economy to China. BeiDou could be just another tool China could use to seize control of the third country’s markets and strong-arm them to bend to their will and desire.

    In the geopolitical arena of Space, China’s emergence as a space power would no longer give the U.S. leverage that it had been enjoying in the international institutions on discussions and matters on Space technology and governance. BeiDou could be China’s ticket to space superiority. It could give China the upper hand in GNSS discussions and the ability to wield greater influence in Space innovation and technology. History has taught us frequently that once a nation or group of nations achieve technology superiority in any sector, they monopolize it to safeguard their strategic interests and consolidate their position of power. A good example would be the discriminatory Non-Proliferation Treaty which, under the pretext of bringing order in the domain of Nuclear Technology, has only achieved to limit the capabilities and ambitions of aspiring nuclear states driving a wedge between haves and have-nots. The signatory parties themselves show no compliance with the guidelines of the Treaty. Today, there are nine countries having space launch capabilities. China’s place at the top in countries having space capabilities is fast becoming a reality, and its role in the politics of Space presents an interesting conundrum. China’s pattern of unilateral acts of aggression and its zero-sum approach could sow the seeds for its hegemony in Space. BeiDou could be the most important piece for China in the jigsaw of Space, setting the precedent for an interesting future in the geopolitics of Space, possibly tilting the fine margins of power in favour of the Dragon that is poised to take its decisive flight.

     

     

    References

    [1] Chan, Minnie. “‘Unforgettable Humiliation’ Led to Development of GPS Equivalent.” South China Morning Post [Hong Kong], 13 Sept. 2009, www.scmp.com/article/698161/unforgettable-humiliation-led-development-gps-equivalent

    [2] Sloane, Heath. “Precision Politics: China’s Answer to GPS Comes Online.” The Diplomat, 7 Apr. 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/precision-politics-chinas-answer-to-gps-comes-online/

     [3] Woo, Ryan, and Liangping Gao. “China Set to Complete Beidou Network Rivalling GPS in Global Navigation.” Reuters [Beijing], 12 June 2020, www.reuters.com/article/us-space-exploration-china-satellite-idUSKBN23J0I9

    [4] Xiaoci, Deng. “China Completes BDS Navigation System, Reduces Reliance on GPS.” Global Times, 23 June 2020, www.globaltimes.cn/content/1192482.shtml.

    [5] “Pakistan Military to Use Chinese Navigation System BeiDou to Improve Interoperability.” The Economic Times, 21 Aug. 2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/pakistan-military-to-use-chinese-navigation-system-beidou-to-improve-interoperability/articleshow/77675471.cms?from=mdr

     [6]  Ibold, Sebastian. “China’s Space Silk Road.” Belt and Road Initiative, 12 Apr. 2018, www.beltroad-initiative.com/space-silk-road.

    [7] Aluf, Dale. “China’s Space Silk Road Reaches Mars and beyond.” Asia Times, 31 July 2020, https://asiatimes.com/2020/07/chinas-space-silk-road-reaches-mars-and-beyond/

    [8] China Briefing. Dezan Shira & Associates, www.china-briefing.com/news/made-in-china-2025-explained. Accessed 4 Nov. 2020.

    [9] United States Chamber of Commerce. “Made in China 2025: Global Ambitions Built on Local Ambitions”. Washington D.C.: 16 March 2017, https://www.uschamber.com/report/made-china-2025-global-ambitions-built-local-protections-0

     [10]  Wilson, Jordan. “China’s Alternative to GPS and its implications for the United States”, U.S. – China Economic and Security Review Commission. 5 January 2017. https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-alternative-gps-and-its-implications-united-states

    [11] “Global Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) industry.” ReportLinker, July2020, www.reportlinker.com/p05443565/Global-Global-Navigation-Satellite-System-GNSS-Industry.html?utm_source=PRN.

    [12] RTI International, “Economic Benefits of the Global Positioning System”. North Carolina. 31 May 2019. https://www.rti.org/publication/economic-benefits-global-positioning-system-gps

    [13] Global Times. “China’s Satellite Navigation Industry Turned up $49 Billion in 2019.” Global Times, 23 Sept. 2019, www.globaltimes.cn/content/1188659.shtml.

    [14]https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_China’s%20Alternative%20to%20GPS%20and%20Implications%20for%20the%20United%20States.pdf