The Peninsula Foundation

Tag: ASEAN

Hegemonic Regionalism (Indo-Pacific concept): As opposed to locally based Regional Cooperation (ASEAN and Bay of Bengal)

The late embracing of the Indo-Pacific concept by the United States further supports the position that it is being employed as a strategic instrument to counter a rising power and a potential challenger to its global quasi-hegemonic power position.

Based on a consideration of capabilities, the United States is currently the only country that can be described as a potential global hegemon. Certainly, there are a number of other countries that have the potential, based on their capabilities, of being candidates to become regional hegemons. Notably, China is among them, but Japan, India, and Brazil are also potential candidates, though their individual capacities vary widely and one could argue, based on capacities, that China takes the lead among them. With the implication that China becomes the main target of the de facto global hegemon, the other potential contenders must be kept in sight, as well. While most recent academic and non-academic discussions about global power transfer are focusing on rising countries, on potential challengers to the existing global hegemon, China in particular, a focus on how the existing quasi-global hegemon, the United States, is reacting to challenges to its dominance, to preserve its leading position and influence, seems almost completely missing. This lack of emphasis constitutes a rather critical issue, because when we focus on global or regional power competition, what should be of interest to analysts is not only the behaviour and strategy of a rising county, i.e., a potential challenger to an existing hegemon, but also to analyse the response of the existing hegemon, as well. After all, when it comes to issues of global and regional stability, the actions of both the existing hegemon and the potential challenger must be taken into account.

There is no doubt that an existing hegemon does not just ‘sit back’ and watch when its influence is challenged by a new contender for power. Even a declining hegemon will try to challenge a rising power contender, consequently, the potential for instability within the international system arises not only from a rising power but also from the actions of the country which possesses a quasi-hegemonic position, trying to defend its power position. In one of his earlier and most influential works, Mearsheimer (2001) points out that great powers always aim to maximise their share of power and are in constant competition with other power contenders, with the aim of maximising their own power. Therefore, the rise of a new competitor occurs in a dynamic context between the established and the rising hegemon. Ikenberry (2014) points out that, as the overwhelmingly global power once concentrated within the United States dispersed with the arrival of new power challengers in different parts of the world, new struggles over global rules and institutions are emerging. At the very least, as emphasised by Mearsheimer (2013), great powers do not trust one another, as they worry about other countries’ capabilities and intentions.

Not without reason, Mearsheimer (2013) argues that the United States did not and does not tolerate peer competitors, adding that the United States has demonstrated this clearly during the twentieth century.

For these reasons, we cannot expect that a hegemon will stay inactive when watching the rise of potential challengers. An established great power, holding an almost global hegemonic position as the United States does, has the capacity to respond to the challenges arising from power contenders, and there are clear indications, past and present, that it will act to preserve its dominant power position, even within an international system that has become more multilateral in comparison with the Cold War period. Not without reason, Mearsheimer (2013) argues that the United States did not and does not tolerate peer competitors, adding that the United States has demonstrated this clearly during the twentieth century. One just has to remember that in the late 1980s, when Japan was close to economically overtaking the United States. at the global level, various United States administrations actively worked against it, refusing Japan more decision-making rights within international organisations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, even though Japan had become a major donor to both organisations. Obviously, the previous Japanese challenge to the United States’ dominance was only economic. Neither will the United States allow other challengers to succeed in undermining its dominant position, even in distant regional settings. Mearsheimer (2001) reminds us that the dominant power will act at the regional level to ensure that no challenge to its own global position will take place, since the crucial task is to block potential peer competitors, even within distant regional settings.

When evaluating the influence of a hegemon it is worth remembering that this goes beyond a focus on military capabilities, even though such capabilities are essential, and include the hegemon’s ability to disguise its ambitions and interests by pretending that it provides global public goods, which in reality satisfy primarily its own interests. More importantly, as pointed out by Griffiths, O’Callaghan and Roach (2002), all hegemonic states enjoy ‘structural power’, which permits the hegemon to occupy a central position within its own system, as well as shape other states’ preferences. As emphasised by Kupchan (2014), a hegemon also strives to generate a normative and ideological dominance, in support of its power dominance. Indeed, Gilpin, in his seminal influential work on war and change, emphasises that a major power aims to create social structures to serve its hegemonic interests, consequently supporting its domineering position with rules, institutions, and organisational principles, supporting, indeed screening and protecting, its power position with normative dominance (Gilpin 1981).

one can also reasonably assume that when a hegemonic country introduces a new geopolitical or regional concept of space, such as the Indo-Pacific framework, will be of foremost importance to its own strategy of dominance. Indeed, the Indo-Pacific framework signals the re-mapping of geopolitical space, with little, if any, historical relevance.

By considering these arguments describing the behaviour of a typical hegemonic power, it is rather consistent to assume that a country, such as the United States, which holds a nearly global like hegemonic position, will use its position and capabilities to support its own power position in different regional settings so as to ward off any potential competitor. For this reason, one can also reasonably assume that when a hegemonic country introduces a new geopolitical or regional concept of space, such as the Indo-Pacific framework, will be of foremost importance to its own strategy of dominance. Indeed, the Indo-Pacific framework signals the re-mapping of geopolitical space, with little, if any, historical relevance. From a historical perspective, the Indian and Pacific Oceans have been perceived as separate maritime spaces. What marries them into one geopolitical space is an invented geopolitical strategy facilitating the strategic power interests of the existing hegemon. What is more, a hegemon or hegemon-like state will not introduce or favour a new geopolitical concept if it goes against its own strategic interests.

Indeed, from a United States perspective, the Indo-Pacific strategy not only re-strengthens, at least from a hegemonic perspective, its role within the older geopolitical concept of Asia-Pacific, but now extends this influence, from a conceptual perspective, to include the Indian Ocean, as well. One can further argue that the adoption of the Indo-Pacific approach by the United States comes at a time when we can observe considerable changes in the power configuration within East Asia (which encompasses Northeast and Southeast Asia) and to a lesser extent within South Asia. Certain changes in the regional power configuration, namely the rise of China – not only as an economic but increasingly as a military and especially as a maritime power – generate considerable challenges from the perspective of hegemonic power competition. While the strategic challenge that China, as a rising power, generates to the United States quasi hegemonic position is so far limited to a regional challenge, instead of a global challenge, still, based on hegemony theory, the existing hegemon cannot allow such a challenge to take place.

The late embracing of the Indo-Pacific concept by the United States further supports the position that it is being employed as a strategic instrument to counter a rising power and a potential challenger to its global quasi-hegemonic power position. We may remember that the origin of the Indo-Pacific concept is associated with the previous Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ concept. Shinzo Abe mentioned it as early as 2007 when addressing the Indian parliament and began frequently restating it from 2016 onwards. This was part of his intention that Japan should take a more active role in East Asia and beyond. As such, the Indo-Pacific concept was born out of the political-strategic considerations of a regional actor within East Asia. Only later, around 2018, did the United States become considerably interested in the concept, at a time when the potential challenges from rising countries increased – not only from China; one may also consider India’s rise in this context. In 2018, the United States administration even changed the name of its Pacific Command to United States Indo-Pacific Command to highlight its changing geopolitical perspective and to address the increasing regional challenges it faced from a rising China. Not without reason was the replacement of the previous Asia-Pacific concept with the Indo-Pacific concept aimed at integrating India, another rising power in Asia, more firmly with the hegemonic interests of the United States. In academic terms, one could argue that this may represent a strategy of accommodation, in which an existing hegemon accommodates a rising power by offering political and strategic space for that country. It is a strategy the United States followed previously with China until China started to become a too fundamental strategic challenge to the United States hierarchic position. One may wonder if this may also happen to India, once India becomes too powerful to be contained within a United States hegemonic project. However, for the time being, India seems to feel quite comfortable within the geopolitical space it has been offered by the existing quasi-global hegemon. As revealed by Paul T.V (2016) the strategy of accommodation is not only quite a challenging undertaking – as the hegemon has to offer political status, leadership responsibilities, and even a sphere of influence to a rising country – but in the long run the implications are that this will weaken, if not undermine, the hegemon’s own position, thus indicating the limitation of such a strategy. After all, a hegemon is rather unwilling to give up its dominant position voluntarily, though a strategy of accommodation may buy some time and allow it to employ a strategy of divide-and-rule by offering support to a potential weaker power contender when addressing the challenges of a more powerful contender. There can be no less doubt that the ongoing border conflicts between India and China and the emerging regional power competition between them facilitate India’s readiness to become increasingly enveloped in a stronger relationship with the United States which, by the way, contradicts India’s previous entrenched national strategy of non-alignment in global power politics. Consequently, drafting India into its power orbit enhances the United States’ strategic influence in regions where it is not even a resident power, like East, Southeast, or South Asia.

There can be no less doubt that the ongoing border conflicts between India and China and the emerging regional power competition between them facilitate India’s readiness to become increasingly enveloped in a stronger relationship with the United States which, by the way, contradicts India’s previous entrenched national strategy of non-alignment in global power politics.

Therefore, a hegemonic state will try to manipulate even distant regional settings in its favour, to arrest the rise of potential challengers to its dominant position, even by facilitating the introduction of a new geopolitical concept, like the Indo-Pacific, which ignores local perceptions of regional cooperation dynamics, the Bay of Bengal approach or ASEAN. While there are some claims that the Indo-Pacific approach does not represent a challenge to ASEAN, a position that is widely disputed, the more specific issue is that the Indo-Pacific approach does not contribute or offer support to those local-based regional cooperation processes from a conceptual perspective. Therefore, while one has to recognise that more recent regional cooperation processes within the Bay of Bengal are less dynamic for the time being, it does not mean that such a regional cooperation process is altogether missing. As stated by Amrith (2013), Asian economic connections led to renewed interest in the Bay of Bengal as a focus for regional cooperation. Indeed, BIMSTEC^[1] which was established in 1997, does provide focus on regional cooperation.

BIMSTEC creates political space for economic cooperation by addressing common challenges like underdevelopment. Consequently, offering a strategic vision for national development to its member countries, a focus fundamentally different from the geopolitical outlook of the Indo-Pacific regional hegemonic project, with its focus on military and especially maritime power distribution. Another crucial difference is that, while the Indo-Pacific strategy is a rather recent invention, regional recognition of the Bay of Bengal as a particular and unique geographic location for regional cooperation, particularly as a centre for trade and cultural migration, goes back centuries, if not millennia. As such, the Bay of Bengal commands a rich history as a historically recognised cultural and trade-inspired region. Yet, with geopolitical concepts based on hegemonic interests, such home-grown sources of regional cooperation are not recognised or supported only if they would fit the interests of the hegemon. It is evident that the Indo-Pacific concept, from a conceptual perspective, also ignores the ASEAN regional cooperation process. As such, the Indo-Pacific approach represents an artificial strategic overlay, not linked with local beads regional cooperation dynamics, even when a regional cooperation process is very well established, as is the case with ASEAN. With regard to the Indo-Pacific concept, ASEAN’s statement on the Indo-Pacific (ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific 2019) clearly indicates that the perception of the Indo-Pacific area is a contiguous geographic space is misleading and not appropriate, even though the two geopolitical spaces are geographically connected. Indeed, while the Bay of Bengal and the ASEAN regional cooperation favour regional cooperation characterised by horizontal relationships, facilitating the cooperation of countries within the region to address common challenges, the Indo-Pacific approach represent a vertical power arrangement, where a dominant power is projecting its influence onto the regional level.

However, it should not come as too much of a surprise that a hegemon’s regional strategy, which primarily focuses on supporting its own power interests, has little to say about regional cooperation processes initiated by the people living in that region. Indeed, a global acting hegemon has only a limited interest in the empowerment of independent regional cooperation projects, since they could signal the creation of a more independent political sphere. As Mearsheimer (2013) asserts, based on its superior standing and its need to defend this position, a hegemon has always an inclination to interfere in and re-order the political outlook of even distant regions. We may take into consideration what Mearsheimer (2013) made earlier, that the United States will ensure that it will dominate the commanding heights in Asia. For all these reasons, the Indo-Pacific approach should be recognised as the newest geopolitical strategy supporting the United States’ hegemonic position in Asia.

Bibliography

Mearsheimer, John J (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), W.W Norton & Company: New York

Mearsheimer, John J (2013) Structural Realism. In: Dunne T, Kurki M., Smith S (eds) International Relations Theories Discipline and Diversity, 3^rd ed., Oxford University Press: Oxford. pp. 77-93

Ikenberry, G. J. (2014) Introduction: power, order, and change in world politics. In: Ikenberry, G. J. (ed.) Power, order, and change in world politics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp.1-16.

Griffiths, M, O’Callaghan T, Roach S T (2002) International Relations: The Key Concepts 2nd; Martin Griffiths, Routledge

Kupchan, C. A. (2014) Unpacking hegemony: the social foundations of hierarchical order. In: Ikenberry, G. J. (ed.) Power, order, and change in world politics. Cambridge, University Press Cambridge, pp. 19-60.

Gilpin, R. (2010) War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

Paul T.V. (2016) The accommodation of rising powers in world politics. In: Paul, T. V. (ed.) Accommodating rising powers past, present, and future. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 3 32.

Amrith, S. S. (2013) Crossing the Bay of Bengal: The furies of nature and the fortunes of migrants By Sunil S. Amrith Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific 2019, available at: https://asean.org/asean-outlook-on-the-indo-pacific/

Notes

[1] BIMSTEC has seven members: Thailand, Myanmar, Bangladesh, India, Bhutan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.

Feature Image credit: War on the Rocks

July 6, 2022
RCEP, Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and Vietnam

The World Bank projection for the RCEP is indeed very impressive and the Member States will see GDP increase by 1.5 per cent. Furthermore, by some estimates, the RCEP could add almost US$ 200 billion to the global economy by 2030.

ASEAN Member States, Australia, China, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand have heralded the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) on 01 January 2022. This 15 Member consortium is the largest economic grouping and constitutes nearly 30 per cent of the global population which relates to a market of 2.3 billion people with an output value of about US$26.2 trillion with over a quarter in world exports. The World Bank projectionfor the RCEP is indeed very impressive and the Member States will see GDP increase by 1.5 per cent. Furthermore, by some estimates, the RCEP could add almost US$ 200 billion to the global economy by 2030.

Infographics Credit: Vietnam Investment Review

As far as Vietnam is concerned, the leaders in Hanoi must be happy to see the RCEP take concrete shape given that it was signed in November 2020 during the ASEAN Summit under Vietnam’s chairship. Vietnam, according to Fitch Solutions, is expected to benefit enormously from the RCEP particularly the IT, footwear, agriculture, automobiles, and telecommunications sectors being the major export categories. The RCEP will also provide Vietnam access to huge consumer markets which could be double the size of those included in the CPTPP. Vietnam can potentially move to become a high-tech manufacturer, and the RCEP can facilitate “local firms increase exports and attract high-quality goods for its consumers. Likewise, agriculture and fisheries product exports will benefit”.

Vietnam, according to Fitch Solutions, is expected to benefit enormously from the RCEP particularly the IT, footwear, agriculture, automobiles, and telecommunications sectors being the major export categories

Vietnam’s economic outlook for 2022 is positive with numerous growth opportunities. The National Assembly has identified (2021-2025 period) focus areas in sectors such as “digital economy, hi-tech industries, developing the urban economy, strengthening regional connectivity, strengthening the role of key economic zones, and restructuring to achieve a green and sustainable economy among others”. These sectors can be expected to grow given that the country has strong economic indicators notwithstanding the downturn in economic growth due to COVID-19. This is premisedon “investor-friendly policies, relative economic and political stability, cost efficiency, and consumer demand prospects, supply chains restructuring in Asia” which will attract both old and new investors.

However, Vietnam should also be prepared for the ongoing and impending geo-economic and geopolitical triggers emerging from contestation between the US and China. During the East Asia Summit in October 2021, President Biden announced that the US was considering a major trade and economic initiative in the form of an “Indo-Pacific economic framework”. Soon thereafter Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo visited Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea to “begin discussions on potential negotiations that could start in early 2022”. Besides some Members of Congress, the new framework is also inspired by Australia and Japan, who had called for a “more active U.S. trade policy, including U.S. leadership in regional trade initiatives”. Above all, the initiative should be seen as a move by the Biden Administration to put to rest any doubts in the minds of regional leaders that the US “lacks an economic and trade strategy sufficient to counter China’s increasing economic influence” in the aftermath of President Trump decision to withdraw from the proposed 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2017.

The new US economic framework, it is hoped, will also lessen fears in the minds of regional countries arising from the geopolitical-geostrategic issues between the US and China. The US’ “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy which pivots on ‘rule of law’ is essentially diplomatic and military and is symbolized by the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue among the US, Japan, India, and Australia (the Quad) and the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) security partnership.

The Quad has made significant progress and the first-ever in-person Leaders’ Summit was held in September 2021. It was agreed to advance practical cooperation on 21^st-century challenges such as “ ending the COVID-19 pandemic, including by increasing production and access to safe and effective vaccines; promoting high-standards infrastructure; combatting the climate crisis; partnering on emerging technologies, space, and cyber security; and cultivating next-generation talent”. The leaders also called for building quality infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region which was targeted against China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As far as the AUKUS is concerned, the rationale is quite clear and is driven by the growing Chinese assertiveness amid fears of extreme coercion against regional countries particularly Taiwan and the claimants of the South China Sea.

The RCEP and the “Indo-Pacific economic framework” are significant developments but can potentially pose a dilemma for Vietnam

The RCEP and the “Indo-Pacific economic framework” are significant developments but can potentially pose a dilemma for Vietnam. There are numerous economic benefits to be accrued from the RCEP, but at the same time there are both economic and strategic rewards from the “Indo-Pacific economic framework”. The US Indo-Pacific strategy has not found much favour in Hanoi; instead, Vietnam has chosen to support and pursue the ASEAN Outlook for Indo Pacific (AOIP) which envisages ASEAN Centrality and the East Asia Summit (EAS), as the underlying principle for promoting cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.

Feature Image Credit: worldakkam.com

January 21, 2022
Vietnam Successfully Delivers at the UNSC

Vietnamese leaders and people have every reason to celebrate the successful completion of their country’s role as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the years 2020 and 2021. Before assuming the responsibilities at the UNSC it had announced that it will “make the most of its two years to contribute to improving the effectiveness of the Council, to foster dialogue to help find peaceful solutions to conflicts and to bring the voice of small countries to the work of the council” with particular focus on “conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy, peaceful settlement of disputes, and strengthened implementation of Chapter VI of the UN Charter,” By all accounts, the country achieved all set goals notwithstanding the “complicated and unpredictable socio-economic, political, and security developments as well as unprecedented challenges, including the widespread impact of the COVID-19 pandemic”.

Vietnam has accrued international prestige not only as an important regional actor but also responsible international actor whose focus is on Chapter VI and Chapter VIII of the UN Charter

During the above period, Vietnam served twice as President of UNSC in January 2020 and April 2021. It led to several events and initiatives, and these were acknowledged by other members of the UNSC; above all, these received an active response. Some of the important proposals led by Vietnam were (a) two resolutions on reappointing the prosecutor and reviewing the two-year operation of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT) and on the protection of essential infrastructure; (b) three President’s statements on respecting the UN Charter, strengthening the relationship between the UN and regional organisations in promoting trust-building and resolving the consequences of mines; (c) one press statement on the terrorist attack in Indonesia; and (d) the Hanoi declaration on women, peace and security. It also promoted issues concerning UN peacekeeping and called on the international community to “respond to and reduce climate change impacts on international peace and security”.

Vietnam also supported issues raised by other non-permanent members of the UNSC. For instance, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh supported Indian Prime Minister Modi’s Five Principles and assured that Vietnam is “committed to working with India and other Council members in promoting dialogue, cooperation and mutual respect, for global peace and prosperity”. He too made three proposals i.e. (a) sustainably utilizing the oceans and seas; (b) comprehensive and holistic maritime security through “cooperation, dialogue and international law” and led by the UN; and (c) uphold legal obligations in line with international law, especially the United Nations Charter and UNCLOS 1982.

In the context of the latter, Prime Minister Chinh made known that his country was “determined” to engage with ASEAN and China to “seriously, fully and effectively implement the 2002 Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and negotiate an effective and substantive Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (COC) consistent with international law, in particular, UNCLOS 1982”.

The country can be credited for raising the issue of the South China Sea at the United Nations

During its tenure-ship as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, Vietnam concurrently held the Chairship of the ASEAN in 2020. The country can be credited for raising the issue of the South China Sea at the United Nations. In his message to the High-level General Debate of the UN General Assembly, President Nguyen Phu Trong conveyed that while Vietnam is committed to the “maintenance and promotion of peace, stability, maritime security and safety and freedom of navigation in the East Sea (South China Sea)” and upholding international law, particularly the 1982 UNCLOS, emphasised and called on “all concerned parties to exercise restraint, avoid unilateral acts that would complicate the situation, and settle disputes and differences through peaceful means with due respect for diplomatic and legal processes.” It is not surprising that there was a reaction from Beijing and the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated that the “Security Council is not a suitable place to discuss the South China Sea issue,”

In essence, Vietnam not only addressed international-transnational-global issues at the UNSC, but it also raised regional issues such as the South China Sea which is the collective voice of the ASEAN as well as the claimant States. This is a big politico-diplomatic advantage for the ASEAN and Vietnam has accrued international prestige not only as an important regional actor but also responsible international actor whose focus is on Chapter VI and Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

Feature Image Credit: VnExpress International

January 6, 2022
India and Vietnam Need to set up an Industry 4.0 Technology Task Force

Amid the ongoing difficult times marked by the COVID-19 pandemic and the fear of its highly virulent Omicron variant spreading across the globe, India and Vietnam pledged to further deepen the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. In this context, the recent visit to India by National Assembly Chairman Vuong Dinh Hue to New Delhi this month has strengthened the relationship between the two countries. Also, next year, India and Vietnam would be celebrating the 50^thanniversary of the establishment of their diplomatic relations and their legislative bodies plan to organise commemorative joint events both in New Delhi and Hanoi.

Chairman Vuong Dinh Hue held wide-ranging discussions in New Delhi with India’s Vice President of India and Chairman of Rajya Sabha, Shri M Venkaiah Naidu and these focused on international matters of common concern and other global challenges. Both sides aim to contribute to global peace, security, stability and development in the region. At the bilateral level, issues concerning COVID-9, socio-economic development in respective countries, economy, trade & investment, energy, security-defence, science-technology, air connectivity, culture, education and training were also the agenda. As many as 12 MoUs were exchanged between Vietnamese and Indian enterprises in the fields of public health, provision of pharmaceutical materials, drug and vaccine production, oil and gas, information technology and technology transfer, education, and tourism.

India acknowledged and extended gratitude for the timely supply by Vietnam of oxygen and related equipment and the gifting of 40,000 facemasks to the Indian Red Cross Society. As a reciprocal and goodwill gesture, India has announced a donation of 2,00,000 doses of indigenously developed Bharat Biotech COVAXIN to Vietnam through Duc Minh, Bharat Biotech’s local partner in Vietnam. It is useful to mention that Bharat Biotech has been working with Duc Minh Medical JSC, towards the commercialisation of INDIRAB (Inactivated Rabies Vaccine).

The bilateral cooperation and mutually beneficial partnership between India and Vietnam in the field of energy are noteworthy. For the last three decades, India’s ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) has been engaged in Vietnam’s offshore energy projects in the South China Sea. New Delhi is now seeking a 15-year extension of the existing arrangement beyond May 2023 when the current MOU between OVL and PetroVietnam (PVN) expires. India hopes that Vietnam and other claimants including China can establish a binding ‘Conduct of Conduct’ and develop concrete mechanisms to institutionalize a regional dialogue among the claimants and other stakeholders to serve for de-escalation of tensions.

During his interactions, Chairman Vuong Dinh Hue was also assured of India’s support for the ASEAN Outlook for Indo Pacific (AOIP). External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar has noted that “From the Indian perspective, Vietnam is a key partner both in the ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific context,” It was also reiterated that there is strong convergence between India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) and the AOIP and India is looking forward to continuing working closely with Vietnam.

In an interview with a major Indian media house, Chairman Vuong Dinh Hue emphasised investments in the digital sphere to usher in Fourth Industrial Revolution in Vietnam. This fits into Vietnam’s call for greater investment from Indian corporations in fields such as information technology, innovation and renewable energy. Industry 4.0 technologies are high on Vietnam’s agenda and the Party and the State have introduced several policies, guidelines and programs to harness these technologies. In particular, the country hopes that the digital component of the economy could account for about 20% of the GDP. According to a consulting company, Vietnam’s “GDP may rise by US$28.5-62.1 billion by 2030 depending on the level of technology put into use by businesses, or equivalent to an increase of between 7-16% of the GDP”.

Earlier this year, Vietnam issued the National Strategy on the Fourth Industrial Revolution by 2030 under which Vietnam hopes to be named among the 40 top performers in the Global Innovation Index (GII), the top 30 in the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)’s Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) and the top 50 in the United Nations (UN)’s e-Government Development Index (EGDI) by 2030.

Vietnam is committed to expanding international cooperation and integration in science and technology, particularly the Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies. India too has similar ambitions and PM Modi highlighted the issue at the WEF’s Davos Digital Agenda, how India is harnessing AI and other technologies of the fourth industrial revolution for achieving its developmental objectives and for promoting social good. Given the political will of both sides, India and Vietnam could explore setting up a task force to ascertain areas of convergences.

Image Credit: vir.com.vn

December 25, 2021
Vietnam and Russia Commit to Engagements across Domains

Vietnamese President Nguyen Xuan Phuc has completed a “very successful and meaningful” visit to Russia with both sides making commitments to reinforce the comprehensive strategic partnership that spans multifaceted engagements across domains. Vietnam figures prominently in the Russian foreign policy and their bonhomie is best demonstrated by the fact that President Vladimir Putin has visited the country five times, a number more than any other country.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and President of Vietnam Nguyen Xuan Phuc made a statement in the wake of their talks in Moscow – “The relations of comprehensive strategic partnership between the Russian Federation and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam are based upon years-long traditions of friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation, laid down by the previous generations. They have been tested by time, they are not affected by conjuncture oscillations, and serve as an example of mutually respectful cooperation that corresponds to the basic interests of the two countries”

President Nguyen Xuan Phuc’s visit to Russia merits attention from at least five perspectives. First at the politico-diplomatic levels: both sides have a common understanding of international issues; they endorse a multipolar world order; guided by the principles of resolving major conflicts in the world through diplomacy based on respect for international law. Moscow also acknowledges the increasing role of the ASEAN and Vietnam as important Member State. Russia has also agreed to “explore promising areas of cooperation” within the framework of the ASEAN Outlook for Indo-Pacific.

Second, the Vietnam-Russia bilateral trade has made significant strides. Their bilateral trade reached US$4.05 billion in the first ten months of 2020 and Russia ranked 24 among 129 countries and territories investing in Vietnam. Russia plans to increase its offshore energy business in the country and the joint statement notes that “creation of favourable conditions for the expansion of activities of Russian and Vietnamese oil and gas companies in the territories of the two states and the implementation of joint projects in third countries in accordance with international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the national legislation of Russia and Vietnam”; however, it is important to mention that there are frequent standoffs. For instance, there was a major standoff in the Vanguard Bank involving 50 Vietnamese and 40 Chinese vessels over the operations of the drilling rig Hakuryu 5 operated by Russia’s Rosneft in Vietnam’s oil and gas Block 06-01.

Third, their bilateral defence and security cooperation is well established and in September this year, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and his Vietnamese counterpart Bui Thanh Son announced plans to ramp up military-technical cooperation including setting up a centre for nuclear science and technologies in Vietnam. Vietnamese military has acquired Russian origin naval and air platforms (Kilo Class submarines and SU-30MKK fighter jets) and the bilateral trade in arms increased from US$ 293 million (1993-99) to US$ 6514 million (1999-2018) and constituted nearly 84 per cent of all its military purchases.

Fourth is about the COVID-19 pandemic that continues to rage in the world and its new variant Omicron bringing new fears. Vietnam has been impacted severely by the pandemic and has recently begun to open up. The US and China have provided it with vaccines. During President of Vietnam Nguyen Xuan Phuc visit to Russia, the Russian Direct Investment Fund has signed an agreement for the “expansion of cooperation with partners in Vietnam aimed at the production of the Russian Sputnik V vaccine” involving the Russian pharmaceutical company Binnopharm Group and Vietnam’s T&T GROUP. RDIF, leading to creating a full-cycle production of Sputnik V in Vietnam.

Fifth is the US-led Indo Pacific initiatives that clearly target China. It merits mention that the joint statement issued at the end of the Summit notes that Russia and Vietnam “do not enter alliances and do not sign agreements with third countries to carry out actions that harm each other’s independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and basic interests,” and that “the development of Russian-Vietnamese relations is not aimed against any third side.”

Vietnam has no plans to align with the US’ Indo Pacific strategy or any US initiatives that target China even though it has disputes with China in the South China Sea. Russia has stayed clear of the South China Sea disputes and has not supported China. It is conscious that it enjoys cordial relations with the majority of the ASEAN Member States.

Meanwhile, the Russian Navy recently conducted joint exercises with the ASEAN navies including the Vietnamese Navy. The Russian ambassador to the ASEAN has stated that the exercises were about “peace, stability and prosperity in the region,” and the Indonesian first fleet commander said the exercise “enhance the interoperability and understanding between the Russian and ASEAN militaries”. Interestingly, these exercises are also being viewed as signalling ASEAN’s principle of non-alignment, particularly in current times of high regional tensions given that the ASEAN navies held similar exercises with the PLA Navy. The ASEAN Member States routinely conduct bilateral military-naval exercises with the navies of the US, Japan, Australia, India, France and the UK.

Vietnam has adopted a pragmatic foreign policy and successive leadership have successfully managed tensions in the South China Sea. Likewise, Russia has major stakes in augmenting regional stability which provides for crucial convergences between Hanoi and Moscow.

Feature Image Credit: tass.com

December 7, 2021
Cambodia Assumes Chairmanship of the ASEAN

While there is euphoria in Phnom Penh over the new responsibility, Prime Minister Hun Sen inherits at least five challenges from the previous ASEAN Chairmanship under Brunei.

The gavel representing the ASEAN has arrived in Phnom Penh and it is a proud moment for the country to hold the position of Chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for the third time after joining the grouping in 1999. In his customary remarks, Prime Minister Hun Sen announced that his country is “committed to leading ASEAN by championing the 2022 theme of “ASEAN Act” – Addressing Challenges Together – to increase harmony, peace and prosperity across the whole region”. He also assured to “uphold the core spirit of ASEAN’s basic principles of “One Vision, One Identity and One Community,”

While there is euphoria in Phnom Penh over the new responsibility, Prime Minister Hun Sen inherits at least five challenges from the previous ASEAN Chairmanship under Brunei. First is the South China Sea. Prime Minister HunSen did not hesitate to refer to it as “an unwelcome guest which now turns up on ASEAN’s doorstep annually and without fail”. He even labelled it a “very hot rock” amid fears that his country could be “tossed” requiring sophisticated diplomacy wherein it is necessary to “catching it to avoid getting burned”

In this context, it is useful to recall the 26 October 2021 Chairman’s Statement of the 24^th ASEAN-China Summit which emphasised the “importance of non-militarisation and self-restraint in the conduct of all activities by claimants and all other states, including those mentioned in the DOC that could further complicate the situation and escalate tensions in the South China Sea”. China continues to engage in exploration activities in the region much to the discomfort of the Philippines. Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia. Also, the Chinese coast guard vessels have engaged in coercion and their operations potentially undermine the ongoing negotiations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC).

The second is about ASEAN’s post-pandemic economic recovery. So far ASEAN Member States’ economic indicators are quite promising and marked by positive growth rates. Cambodia has an opportunity to prepare the region and the human resources for the impending disruption that will be marked by Industry 4.0 technologies. It requires regional digitalisation and impetus to fintech through innovation pivoting on resilience across sectors. This issue is also highlighted in the Chairman’s Statement of the 38^th and 39^th ASEAN Summits. The ASEAN Leaders’ Statement on Advancing Digital Transformation in ASEAN has also called for strengthening “regional digital integration and transformation to enhance the region’s competitiveness, and turn the current pandemic crisis into an opportunity through digital transformation.”

The third issue is about Myanmar. It may be recalled that Myanmar did not participate in the 38^th and 39^thASEAN Summits after the ASEAN decided to bar Myanmar’s military chief Min Aung Hlaing to join the meeting. This decision, by all accounts, was a “rare bold step by a regional grouping known for its non-interference and engagement”. Prime Minister Hun Sen is concerned about the possibility of a humanitarian crisis in the country and was quite candid to note that the “situation in Myanmar could escalate – and maybe even turn into a full-scale civil war – and so Cambodia must be well-prepared and ready to deal with any potential crisis there.”

The fourth priority for Cambodia as the Chairmanship of the ASEAN would be to take forward the objectives and principles of the ASEAN Outlook for Indo Pacific (AIOP) initiative. ASEAN’s engagement in the wider Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions would be in four key areas i.e. Maritime cooperation, connectivity, UN SDGs 2030, economic and other possible areas of cooperation. However, the grouping believes that the existing ASEAN-led mechanisms should drive the AIOP for which Cambodia would have to marshal all diplomatic skills at its disposal to convince the major players in the Indo-Pacific of the importance of the AOIP as also about ASEAN’s centrality.

Although AUKUS did not feature in Prime Minister Hun Sen’s remarks or the Chairman’s statement on the 38^th and 39^th ASEAN Summits, it looms large in the minds of the Member States

Fifth, Cambodia would have to develop a sophisticated response to the AUKUS which has added a new dimension to the existing security challenges emerging from the QUAD which is allegedly targeted against China. Although AUKUS did not feature in Prime Minister Hun Sen’s remarks or the Chairman’s statement on the 38^th and 39^th ASEAN Summits, it looms large in the minds of the Member States. Indonesian and Malaysian are concerned fearing that the development can result in an arms race and encourage the buildup of power projection capabilities; however, the Philippines has welcomed the AUKUS. The current situation is akin to the division among the ASEAN Member States over the presence of the Western military in the region. AUKUS has provoked China too and it can potentially intensify US-China military contestation in the western Pacific that further adds to insecurities among the Southeast Asian countries.

Finally, Cambodia’s Chairmanship of the ASEAN attracts numerous challenges but it remains to be seen how Phnom Penh steers the ASEAN in the coming months particularly when the US too has come down heavily with sanctions on Cambodia after it permitted a Chinese company to build military-naval infrastructure at the Ream Naval Base arguing that it threatens regional security.

Image Credit: cambodianess.com

November 21, 2021
Does ASEAN Need a New Approach to Code of Conduct for the South China Sea?

Reference to Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC, and formulations such as early adoption of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) have featured in the ASEAN Chairman’s Statement of East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers’ Meeting since 2013 when Brunei Darussalam had held the Chairmanship of the ASEAN. These references were reiterated, and the section relating to the South China Sea in the ASEAN Chairman’s Statement for the 11^th East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in August 2021 under the leadership of Brunei Darussalam, is no different.

While the Chinese intent is a welcome development, its new “Maritime Traffic Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China” (MTSL) that came into effect on 01 September 2021, has caused turbulence among the claimant States.

Meanwhile, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement of 5 August 2021 notes that a new goal has been set by China under which Beijing and ASEAN would “refrain from unilateral actions that aggravate tensions and widen differences, or using force or threat of force in particular”. While the Chinese intent is a welcome development, its new “Maritime Traffic Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China” (MTSL) that came into effect on 01 September 2021, has caused turbulence among the claimant States. As per the MTSL guidelines and procedures, vessels must “report the name, call sign, current position, next port of call and even estimated time of arrival to Chinese authorities”.

The Philippines has decided to “ignore” the new Chinese Regulations and Philippine Defence Secretary Delfin Lorenzana has clarified his country’s stand on the issue that “we do not honour those laws by the Chinese within the West Philippine Sea because we consider that we have the sovereign right within this waters. So we will not recognise this law of the Chinese,” The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry too has reiterated strict compliance with the 1982 UNCLOS “when promulgating documents of domestic law related to the sea”.

The Pentagon has accused China of “Unlawful and sweeping maritime claims, including in the South China Sea, pose a serious threat to the freedom of the seas, including the freedoms of navigation and overflight, free trade and unimpeded lawful commerce, and the rights and interests of the South China Sea and other littoral nations,” and the Defense Department spokesman has stated that the country will “ continue to fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows,”

By all counts, an early conclusion of CoC in the South China Sea is only wishful given that the idea has been on the table for over two and a half decades since 1996. At that time there was euphoria among ASEAN foreign ministers that a CoC in the South China Sea could be the “foundation for long term stability in the area and foster understanding among claimant countries.”

There is now a view that it is time to change the “objective from coming up with a comprehensive CoC”; instead, ASEAN and China must work towards “incremental development of a series of agreements” that could “eventually become the CoC in the future”

The ASEAN has made earnest efforts and continues to negotiate a legally binding CoC but its finalization has eluded it. There is now a view that it is time to change the “objective from coming up with a comprehensive CoC”; instead, ASEAN and China must work towards “incremental development of a series of agreements” that could “eventually become the CoC in the future”. This can be achieved by developing “more realistic” and “smaller accords” that can help “de-escalate potential contentious situations”.

The above argument merits attention for at least two important reasons. First, the South China Sea is simmering due to US-China military contestations. The US Navy continues to engage in exercises and the current deployment in the South China Sea by USS Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group and Air Wing of the Future is a reflection of the US’ commitment to field “combat-ready force to protect and defend the collective maritime interests of the U.S. and its regional allies and partners”. Also, the US Navy has conducted FONOPs relentlessly and is now joined by the US Coast Guard. The Quad Member States have also dispatched their warships to the South China Sea for Malabar Naval exercises and the European navies led by France and Britain are operating in the region. These multi-nation naval manoeuvers have prompted China to respond through similar actions and the PLA Navy and the Air Force are persistently deployed in the region. This ‘state of affairs’ will continue.

Second, there is a view that while the CoC should necessarily be consistent with the 1982 UNCLOS and should not “prejudice legitimate rights and interests of nations not a party to discussions,” this assessment can potentially trigger clamour among other stakeholders who have politico-diplomatic, economic and strategic interests in the region and have vehemently argued for a rules-based system and have challenged China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea as also its non-adherence to the 2016 PCA ruling.

Under such circumstances, there are no incentives for China and it is deliberately delaying the finalization of the COC; it prefers to pursue a “business as usual” approach causing immense insecurity in the minds of the claimant States. Meanwhile, there is now a sense of urgency among the ASEAN Member States to finalize the CoC and their “patience” is wearing thin.

Feature Image Credit: Nikkei Asia

September 14, 2021
US Policy in the South China Sea since 2016 PCA Ruling

In the foreseeable future, ASEAN will become more divided over South China Sea issues in the Biden era. The conflicts brought about by geopolitical competitions and maritime disputes in the South China Sea will become more challenging and uncertain

The US does not lay any territorial claim in the South China Sea and had not taken any position on sovereignty over islands, reefs, and features in the South China Sea. Its 2010 policy was of not taking “sides on the competing territorial disputes over land features in the South China Sea, we believe claimants should pursue their territorial claims and accompanying rights to maritime space in accordance with the UN convention on the law of the sea”. Towards that end, the US had consistently urged the contesting parties to settle disputes based on international law and without intimidation-coercion. Even in 2016, the US had encouraged claimants to resolve their disputes “free from coercion or the use or threat of force” after endorsing the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) award to the Philippines.

However, in July 2020, the US revised its South China Sea policy through a Position Paper titled “U.S. Position on Maritime Claims in the South China Sea”. The Paper questioned China’s “claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea” and categorically stated that these are “completely unlawful, as is its campaign of bullying to control them,” This was in sharp contrast to the 2010 policy articulations.

Since the publication of the Position Paper, South China Sea has appeared in Statements by respective US political leaders. For instance, at the G 7 summit on 11-13 June 2021, President Joe Biden was able to rally the leaders of the grouping and succeeded in a consensus over the critical necessity of a free and open Indo-Pacific and the G7 leaders also expressed concerns about the “situation in the East and South China Seas” and strongly opposed “any unilateral attempts to change the status quo and increase tensions”.

There is continuity in US policy on the South China Sea since President Trump’s administration and the issue has figured prominently in US’ statements particularly in the context of coercion and intimidation of its smaller neighbours by China. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo drew attention to the “trampling” of the “sovereign rights of its neighbours” and “destabilizing the region” as also causing “untold environmental devastation” of 3,000 acres of the sea space in the South China Sea; furthermore, “the United States will act until we see Beijing discontinue its coercive behaviour in the South China Sea, and we will continue to stand with allies and partners in resisting this destabilizing activity.” Also, he was uncompromising on US’ commitment to its ASEAN partners in safeguarding sovereign rights to “offshore resources, consistent with their rights and obligations under international law.”

President Biden’s Administration has continued to pursue a similar policy as that of the predecessor. For instance, in his conversation with National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on 1 July 2021 with Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh, they discussed the South China Sea, including the United States’ support for the 2016 arbitral tribunal award.

It is not surprising that a Chinese commentator has observed that “Biden administration’s South China Sea policy has attached great importance to US allies within and outside the region, this precisely reflects its Cold War mentality” and is reflected in the US-Philippine Mutual Defence Treaty, which now applies to the South China Sea and freedom of navigation operations (FONOP) in the South China Sea continues unabated. For instance, in 2017 there was one FONOP by the US, in 2018 there were three incidents, nine in 2019; 15 in 2020; and then this year four FONOPs have been reported. There is also a new emphasis on mini multilateralism in the form of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) to support its “traditional strategy of relying on allies and partners” to “establish a new regional order dominated by the US”.

The Chinese commentator’s assertion that “in the foreseeable future, ASEAN will become more divided over South China Sea issues in the Biden era. The conflicts brought about by geopolitical competitions and maritime disputes in the South China Sea will become more challenging and uncertain” merits attention.

Last week, while speaking in a forum on global security issues at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy is aimed at countering Beijing and the strategy “should be dumped at a trash heap.” Wang also observed that China would oppose any framework of cooperation to “fuel rivalry” and “an action to accelerate division” ostensibly referring to Taiwan.

Finally, a continuous war of words between political leaders of the US and China over the South China Sea can be expected to continue. Notwithstanding that ASEAN Member States can be expected to continue to engage China for a legally binding Code of Conduct and at the 19^th Senior Officials’ Meeting on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) held on June 7, 2021, in Chongqing, all “parties agreed to resume as soon as possible the second reading of the Single Draft COC Negotiating Text and strive for the early conclusion of negotiations”.

Feature Image: USS Ronald Reagon in the South China Sea. Credit: asiatimes.com

July 16, 2021
China’s New Coast Guard Act: Vietnam could lead Response

China’s new Coast Guard Act has put the ‘cat among the pigeons’ and the South China Sea claimants Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan are visibly worried. The Act has also attracted international attention; for some, it is an act of war and for others, it violates the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The Act came into effect last month on 01 February. In its administrative content, the Act is the culmination of at least two reorganizations of the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) that began in 2013 involving administrative and operational control of five closely associated national maritime law enforcement agencies, also referred to as the Five Dragons , that were brought under one umbrella. In 2018, CCG became part of the People’s Armed Police Force.

Under the new Act, it is feared, the CCG would conduct operations just like the PLA Navy and would be directly controlled by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. The CCG is empowered with powerful ‘security and control measures’ and has the rights to take necessary actions to “restrain foreign military vessels and foreign vessels used for non-commercial purposes in waters under China’s jurisdiction from violating the laws or regulations of China” which is potentially in contravention to the 1982 UNCLOS.

The Act has also attracted international attention; for some, it is an act of war and for others, it violates the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Under Article 20, the CCG may demolish “buildings, structures, and various fixed or floating devices” built by foreigners “in the sea areas and islands under our jurisdiction”, and Article 47 authorizes the agency to “directly use weapons if there is no time for warning or if there is a risk of serious harm after giving a warning.”

It is the latter that prompted Japan to label the Act as “blatantly threatening” and “aimed directly at the Senkakus” raisingspeculation that the Japanese Coast Guard, which hitherto could “fire weapons directly at foreign vessels in cases of self-defence and emergency escape” may now “ fire on foreign official vessels under laws by regarding vessels aiming to land on the Senkaku Islands as committing violent crimes”.

However, it is fair to say that some of the provisions contained in the Chinese Coast Guard Act are not extraordinary. Navies, Coast Guards and law enforcement agencies of many countries are administratively controlled by the ministries of national defence and routinely operate with the national navies albeit pursue different rules of engagements. Many maritime law enforcement agencies are also known to intercept and even sink foreign fishing vessels especially when these engage in IUU fishing. These naturally attract diplomatic protests from the affected countries including China.

Be that as it may, the ASEAN and China signed the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) in the South China Sea in 2016 under which both sides are committed to “maintaining regional peace and stability, maximum safety at sea, promoting good neighbourliness and reducing risks during mutual unplanned encounters in air and at sea, and strengthening cooperation among navies”. This agreement is for the navies and draws upon the CUES (voluntary and non-binding) adopted by the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS).

The new Chinese Coast Guard Act may have created an opportunity for ASEAN and China to conceptualize CUES that is tailored to the mandate of the Coast Guards i.e. law enforcement. The issue can also be on the agenda of the Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agency Meeting (HACGAM), a grouping of 22 Member States and multilateral organisations, which aims at cooperative and proactive efforts to address maritime issues confronting the region.

Among the ASEAN member countries, Vietnam is well placed to lead the initiative for at least three reasons. First, it is a claimant and some of the features in the South China Sea are under its control; second, it has a larger Coast Guard when compared to the capabilities of the other ASEAN claimants; and third, the Vietnamese Communist Party maintains close contacts with their counterparts in China and this could be a useful channel to facilitate a dialogue.

However, it remains to be seen if Beijing would allow debate and discussion on the Coast Guard Act particularly when it also involves contested areas such as the South China Sea. For that deft diplomacy by Vietnam could be a good idea.

Feature Image: www.japantimes.co.jp

March 18, 2021
Chinese Economic Sops over the South China Sea: A Mixed Bag of Successes

The South China Sea is a resource-rich sea space and its net worth is estimated to be US$ 2.5 trillion.[i] The proven oil reserves are around 7.7 billion barrels and natural gas reserves could be around 266 trillion cubic feet.[ii] The Chinese strategy in the South China Sea against other claimant States is a mix of aggressive posturing including the threat of use of force as also offering economic incentives and sops such as ‘joint development of resources’ in the contested waters.

Deng preferred a “moderate approach” i.e. “sovereignty remains ours; shelve disputes; pursue joint development.

The idea of joint development can be attributed to Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader and author of market-economy reforms in the 1980s that earned him the title of ‘Architect of Modern China’. Deng preferred a “moderate approach” i.e. “sovereignty remains ours; shelve disputes; pursue joint development.”[iii]

Map Credit: The Australian Naval Institute

China’s current thinking on joint development of resources in South China is built around at least seven policy choices i.e. (a) promote good faith in the South China Sea; (b) limit unilateral activities in disputed areas; (c) focus on less-sensitive areas of the South China Sea; (d) reach joint development arrangements by establishing relevant working mechanism; (e) begin the process in areas where there are only two claimants; (f) define sea areas for the joint development by seeking consensus, and (g) discuss the feasibility of setting up a Spratly Resource Management Authority (SRMA) with supranational character.[iv] Further, it has been argued that the ASEAN-China Single Draft Negotiating Text of the Code of Conduct (COC) is “conducive to creating benign bilateral relations, which serves as a prerequisite to joint development”.[v]

The general belief among the claimants is that China thinks ‘what is mine [Chinese] is of course mine, but what is your [claimants] is also mine’

However, the above policy choices for joint development and intention are flawed and dismissed by the aggrieved claimants of the South China Sea. The general belief among the claimants is that China thinks ‘what is mine [Chinese] is of course mine, but what is your [claimants] is also mine’; i.e. Chinese joint development initiatives are based on the wrong assumption that what belongs to China is for China only to develop, and what belongs to other claimants is for development.

In 2018, China and the Philippines signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation on Oil and Gas Development. President Xi Jinping urged President Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte to “set aside disputes, eliminate external interference, and concentrate on conducting cooperation, making pragmatic efforts and seeking development”; furthermore, “both sides can take a ‘bigger step’ in the joint development of offshore oil and gas”.[vi] The Philippines proposed a “60-40 sharing arrangement in its favour” and both sides could then develop the “Reed Bank, the main site of the oil and gas reserves, despite the arbitration award declaring that Manila had sovereign rights to exploit them”.[vii]

Similarly, Brunei has an ongoing arrangement with China on bilateral joint development/cooperation in the South China Sea. Economic and strategic considerations are Brunei’s twin drivers; it has been “pushing hard to diversify its economy away from the oil and gas industry” for a long time and the “unstable oil market, a slow foreign investment growth (especially in non-oil and gas sector) and a contracting national GDP” has acted as a catalyst to diversify and “joint development” is an integral part of Brunei’s wider economic diversification strategy. [viii]

Unlike the Philippines and Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam have shied away from joint development of resources with China in the South China Sea.

Unlike the Philippines and Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam have shied away from joint development of resources with China in the South China Sea. This is despite the March 2005 China, the Philippines and Vietnam Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Scientific Research in Certain Areas in the South China Sea by respective national oil companies.

Malaysia is not averse to joint development with other claimants except China and at least four such projects were undertaken i.e. (a) Malaysia-Thai Joint Development Authority in the Gulf of Thailand based on the 1979 MOU; (b) 1992 MOU which designates overlapping continental shelf claims (about 2000km square) in the Gulf of Thailand as Commercial Arrangement Area (CAA); (c) the 2009 CAA between Brunei and Malaysia; and (d) Fisheries MOU between Malaysia and Indonesia, quasi-joint exploitation of fisheries resources, in overlapping claim area of about 14,300 square kilometres in the Straits of Malacca.[ix]

Vietnam’s boundary and territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea including clashes over the Parcels have resulted in mistrust and preclude joint development with China. In essence, Vietnam does not accept joint development in areas that belong to Vietnam according to the UNCLOS 1982.

Vietnam promotes international cooperation on resource development and has a rich body of laws to support such initiatives such as the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea, the Petroleum Law (Article 3, No. 12), the Navigation Law, Fisheries Law, the Law on Natural Resources and Environment of Sea and Islands (Article 4, No. 5), the Tourism Law, and the Mineral Law. However, its boundary and territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea including clashes over the Parcels have resulted in mistrust and preclude joint development with China. In essence, Vietnam does not accept joint development in areas that belong to Vietnam according to the UNCLOS 1982.

The US rejects Chinese maritime claim in the South China Sea and proclaimed “any PRC action to harass other states’ fishing or hydrocarbon development in these waters – or to carry out such activities unilaterally – is unlawful.”[x]Furthermore, while extending help to Vietnam on the matter, US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo announced that “America stands with our South-East Asian allies and partners in protecting their sovereign rights to offshore resources, consistent with their rights and obligations under international law.”

Notes

[i] “China Escalates Coercion against Vietnam’s Longstanding Oil and Gas Activity in the South China Sea”, https://china.usembassy-china.org.cn/china-escalates-coercion-against-vietnams-longstanding-oil-and-gas-activity-in-the-south-china-sea/ (accessed 15 September 2020).

[ii] “South China Sea: Beijing has a major natural advantage in the geopolitical power game”, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/south-china-sea-beijing-has-a-major-natural-advantage-in-the-geopolitical-power-game/articleshow/76423659.cms (accessed 15 September 2020).
[iii] “Xi Jinping and China’s Maritime Disputes”, https://taylorfravel.com/2013/08/xi-jinping-and-chinas-maritime-disputes/ (accessed 15 September 2020).
[iv] “Joint development in the South China Sea: China’s incentives and policy choices”,https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24761028.2019.1685427 (accessed 15 September 2020).
[v] Ibid.
[vi] “China Focus: Xi, Duterte meet on pushing forward ties”, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-08/30/c_138350348.htm (accessed 15 September 2020).
[vii] “China’s Xi sees bigger role for joint energy exploration with Philippines”, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-philippines/chinas-xi-sees-bigger-role-for-joint-development-of-offshore-oil-gas-with-philippines-idUSKCN1VK00M (accessed 15 September 2020).
[viii] “Cooperative Research Report on Joint Development in the South China Sea: Incentives, Policies & Ways Forward”, http://www.iis.fudan.edu.cn/_upload/article/files/9f/21/992faf20465fae26c23ccce1ecc6/f003a68f-eb6a-4b09-a506-3c00897b0862.pdf (accessed 15 September 2020).
[ix] “Cooperative Research Report on Joint Development in the South China Sea: Incentives, Policies & Ways Forward”, http://www.iis.fudan.edu.cn/_upload/article/files/9f/21/992faf20465fae26c23ccce1ecc6/f003a68f-eb6a-4b09-a506-3c00897b0862.pdf (accessed 15 September 2020).
[x] “China pressurizes Vietnam to cancel, compensate offshore firms operating in South China Sea”, https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/oil-and-gas/china-pressurises-vietnam-to-cancel-compensate-offshore-firms-operating-in-south-china-sea/77189060 (accessed 15 September 2020).

Image Credit: nbcnews.com

October 8, 2020