Category: Vietnam

  • Chinese Economic Sops over the South China Sea: A Mixed Bag of Successes

    Chinese Economic Sops over the South China Sea: A Mixed Bag of Successes

    The South China Sea is a resource-rich sea space and its net worth is estimated to be US$ 2.5 trillion.[i]  The proven oil reserves are around 7.7 billion barrels and natural gas reserves could be around 266 trillion cubic feet.[ii] The Chinese strategy in the South China Sea against other claimant States is a mix of aggressive posturing including the threat of use of force as also offering economic incentives and sops such as ‘joint development of resources’ in the contested waters.

    Deng preferred a “moderate approach” i.e. “sovereignty remains ours; shelve disputes; pursue joint development.

    The idea of joint development can be attributed to Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader and author of market-economy reforms in the 1980s that earned him the title of ‘Architect of Modern China’. Deng preferred a “moderate approach” i.e. “sovereignty remains ours; shelve disputes; pursue joint development.”[iii]

     

    Map Credit: The Australian Naval Institute

    China’s current thinking on joint development of resources in South China is built around at least seven policy choices i.e. (a) promote good faith in the South China Sea; (b) limit unilateral activities in disputed areas; (c) focus on less-sensitive areas of the South China Sea; (d) reach joint development arrangements by establishing relevant working mechanism; (e) begin the process in areas where there are only two claimants; (f) define sea areas for the joint development by seeking consensus, and (g) discuss the feasibility of setting up a Spratly Resource Management Authority (SRMA) with supranational character.[iv] Further, it has been argued that the ASEAN-China Single Draft Negotiating Text of the Code of Conduct (COC) is “conducive to creating benign bilateral relations, which serves as a prerequisite to joint development”.[v]

    The general belief among the claimants is that China thinks ‘what is mine [Chinese] is of course mine, but what is your [claimants] is also mine’

    However, the above policy choices for joint development and intention are flawed and dismissed by the aggrieved claimants of the South China Sea. The general belief among the claimants is that China thinks ‘what is mine [Chinese] is of course mine, but what is your [claimants] is also mine’; i.e.  Chinese joint development initiatives are based on the wrong assumption that what belongs to China is for China only to develop, and what belongs to other claimants is for development.

    In 2018, China and the Philippines signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation on Oil and Gas Development. President Xi Jinping urged President Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte to “set aside disputes, eliminate external interference, and concentrate on conducting cooperation, making pragmatic efforts and seeking development”; furthermore, “both sides can take a ‘bigger step’ in the joint development of offshore oil and gas”.[vi] The Philippines proposed a “60-40 sharing arrangement in its favour” and both sides could then develop the “Reed Bank, the main site of the oil and gas reserves, despite the arbitration award declaring that Manila had sovereign rights to exploit them”.[vii]

    Similarly, Brunei has an ongoing arrangement with China on bilateral joint development/cooperation in the South China Sea. Economic and strategic considerations are Brunei’s twin drivers; it has been “pushing hard to diversify its economy away from the oil and gas industry” for a long time and the “unstable oil market, a slow foreign investment growth (especially in non-oil and gas sector) and a contracting national GDP” has acted as a catalyst to diversify and “joint development” is an integral part of Brunei’s wider economic diversification strategy. [viii]

    Unlike the Philippines and Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam have shied away from joint development of resources with China in the South China Sea.

    Unlike the Philippines and Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam have shied away from joint development of resources with China in the South China Sea. This is despite the March 2005 China, the Philippines and Vietnam Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Scientific Research in Certain Areas in the South China Sea by respective national oil companies.

    Malaysia is not averse to joint development with other claimants except China and at least four such projects were undertaken i.e. (a) Malaysia-Thai Joint Development Authority in the Gulf of Thailand based on the 1979 MOU; (b) 1992 MOU which designates overlapping continental shelf claims (about 2000km square) in the Gulf of Thailand as Commercial Arrangement Area (CAA); (c) the 2009 CAA between Brunei and Malaysia; and (d) Fisheries MOU between Malaysia and Indonesia, quasi-joint exploitation of fisheries resources, in overlapping claim area of about 14,300 square kilometres in the Straits of Malacca.[ix]

    Vietnam’s boundary and territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea including clashes over the Parcels have resulted in mistrust and preclude joint development with China. In essence, Vietnam does not accept joint development in areas that belong to Vietnam according to the UNCLOS 1982.

    Vietnam promotes international cooperation on resource development and has a rich body of laws to support such initiatives such as the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea, the Petroleum Law (Article 3, No. 12), the Navigation Law, Fisheries Law, the Law on Natural Resources and Environment of Sea and Islands (Article 4, No. 5), the Tourism Law, and the Mineral Law. However, its boundary and territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea including clashes over the Parcels have resulted in mistrust and preclude joint development with China. In essence, Vietnam does not accept joint development in areas that belong to Vietnam according to the UNCLOS 1982.

    The US rejects Chinese maritime claim in the South China Sea and proclaimed “any PRC action to harass other states’ fishing or hydrocarbon development in these waters – or to carry out such activities unilaterally – is unlawful.”[x]Furthermore, while extending help to Vietnam on the matter, US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo announced that “America stands with our South-East Asian allies and partners in protecting their sovereign rights to offshore resources, consistent with their rights and obligations under international law.”

     
     
    Notes

    [i]China Escalates Coercion against Vietnam’s Longstanding Oil and Gas Activity in the South China Sea”, https://china.usembassy-china.org.cn/china-escalates-coercion-against-vietnams-longstanding-oil-and-gas-activity-in-the-south-china-sea/  (accessed 15 September 2020).

    [ii] “South China Sea: Beijing has a major natural advantage in the geopolitical power game”, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/south-china-sea-beijing-has-a-major-natural-advantage-in-the-geopolitical-power-game/articleshow/76423659.cms (accessed 15 September 2020).
    [iii] “Xi Jinping and China’s Maritime Disputes”, https://taylorfravel.com/2013/08/xi-jinping-and-chinas-maritime-disputes/  (accessed 15 September 2020).
    [iv] “Joint development in the South China Sea: China’s incentives and policy choices”,https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24761028.2019.1685427  (accessed 15 September 2020).
    [v] Ibid.
    [vi] “China Focus: Xi, Duterte meet on pushing forward ties”, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-08/30/c_138350348.htm  (accessed 15 September 2020).
    [vii] “China’s Xi sees bigger role for joint energy exploration with Philippines”, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-philippines/chinas-xi-sees-bigger-role-for-joint-development-of-offshore-oil-gas-with-philippines-idUSKCN1VK00M  (accessed 15 September 2020).
    [viii] “Cooperative Research Report on Joint Development in the South China Sea: Incentives, Policies & Ways Forward”, http://www.iis.fudan.edu.cn/_upload/article/files/9f/21/992faf20465fae26c23ccce1ecc6/f003a68f-eb6a-4b09-a506-3c00897b0862.pdf  (accessed 15 September 2020).
    [ix] “Cooperative Research Report on Joint Development in the South China Sea: Incentives, Policies & Ways Forward”, http://www.iis.fudan.edu.cn/_upload/article/files/9f/21/992faf20465fae26c23ccce1ecc6/f003a68f-eb6a-4b09-a506-3c00897b0862.pdf  (accessed 15 September 2020).
    [x] “China pressurizes Vietnam to cancel, compensate offshore firms operating in South China Sea”, https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/oil-and-gas/china-pressurises-vietnam-to-cancel-compensate-offshore-firms-operating-in-south-china-sea/77189060  (accessed 15 September 2020).
     
    Image Credit: nbcnews.com

  • US-China Tensions Could Spill Into Lancang-Mekong River Basin

    US-China Tensions Could Spill Into Lancang-Mekong River Basin

     The Lancang-Mekong River is the 12th longest river and runs through six countries i.e. China (upper riparian), Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam (the lower riparian)and finally discharges into South China.

    A recent US government-funded study has noted that in 2019 China held back large amounts of water upstream in dams on the Mekong River which caused a  severe drought in the downstream countries,[1] prompting a US ambassador in the region accusing China of “hoarding” water and “harming the livelihoods of millions of people in downstream countries”.[2] Likewise, another report by Stimson Centre, a Washington-based think tank, has corroborated the above and pointed that in 2019 “upstream dams at Nuozhadu and Xiaowan had restricted around 20 billion cubic meters of water between July and November” and that current “satellite images show those dams are once again poised to restrict a similar amount of water from July 2020 through the end of this year … Portions of the Mekong mainstream are once again dropping to historically low levels,”[3]

    China has dismissed the reports and the Global Times in an article cited a report by the Tsinghua University and clarified that the “river dams in China [instead] helped alleviate drought along Lancang-Mekong”; furthermore, in November 2019, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) had concluded that “the drought was caused by insufficient rainfall during the wet season with a delayed arrival and earlier departure of the monsoon rain and an El Niño event that led to abnormally high temperatures and high evapotranspiration”.[4]

    At the heart of this problem is that China has built as many as 11 dams on the 4,800 kilometres long Lancang-Mekong River that originates in the Tibetan Plateau.

    At the heart of this problem is that China has built as many as 11 dams on the 4,800 kilometres long Lancang-Mekong River that originates in the Tibetan Plateau.  The Lancang-Mekong River is the 12th longest river and runs through six countries i.e. China (upper riparian), Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam (the lower riparian)and finally discharges into South China.

    China has been reluctant to share hydrological data particularly during the dry seasons and releases water during rainy seasons causing flooding in lower riparian countries. This is despite the 2002 MoU under which China had agreed to provide daily river flow and rainfall data from two monitoring stations in Yunnan Province during the wet season, and the periodic MRC Heads of Government meeting over a Summit which is held every four years.

    Earlier this year, the Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi had assured that his country would “give positive consideration to share the full-year hydrological information with Mekong countries and enhance cooperation under the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) framework to ensure reasonable and sustainable use of water resources”.[5]

    Perhaps a recent statement by the MRC may temporarily obviate suspicions over China not sharing hydrological information on the Lancang-Mekong River which notes that it welcomes China’s sharing of data “ throughout the year” as also for the “ establishment of an information-sharing platform for water resources cooperation led by China and Myanmar”.[6] Also, during the 3rd Mekong-Lancang Cooperation (MLC) Leaders’ Meeting, the Global Center for Mekong Studies (GCMS) has been tasked to study the potential benefits from “aligning and synergizing the MLC and the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor with a vast market”.[7]

    It has been observed that although the 1995 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin is legally binding, it “does not have a compliance mechanism such as punitive measures on the party that violates the spirit and principles of the Agreement.

    In 1995, the upper and lower riparian countries had adopted Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin which lays out “principles and norms of regional cooperation in managing the river basin”. A formal dialogue process under the MRC was instituted to address issues relating to Mekong River and the Member States agreed to “promote common procedures and practices throughout the region for data collection, storage and analysis to support data sharing and integration of existing data management systems based on the voluntary participation of countries and institutions.”[8] In 2001, they adopted the “Procedures for Data and Information Exchange and Sharing,” or PDIES to enable the Member States to share data ‘to provide real-time water level information and more accurate flood forecasting.

    It has been observed that although the 1995 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin is legally binding, it “does not have a compliance mechanism such as punitive measures on the party that violates the spirit and principles of the Agreement. The conflict resolution mechanism is also not clearly stipulated”.[9] This is one of the many reasons for discord among the Parties which needs to be addressed by the MRC whose mandate includes dispute resolution.

    Be that as it may, the lower Mekong countries have set up the Mekong Water Data Initiative, and at the 10th Ministerial Meeting of the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) in 2017 to ‘create a robust, integrated, and transparent platform for collecting, sharing, and managing data on the Mekong River system.’[10]

    there are fears that the Lancang-Mekong River issue is slowly shaping into a major ASEAN-China bilateral issue similar to the contestation in the South China Sea.

    At another level, there are fears that the Lancang-Mekong River issue is slowly shaping into a major ASEAN-China bilateral issue similar to the contestation in the South China Sea; and the current situation is being described as “becoming a geopolitical issue, much like the South China Sea, between the United States and China,”[11] Perhaps the biggest worry is that the Lancang-Mekong River should not attract contestation between the US and China which surely is going to make the region more turbulent. It would thus be prudent that ASEAN and China work on a Code of Conduct to manage the river affairs or add more robustness in the existing dialogue mechanism over the Lancang-Mekong River.

     
    End Notes
    [1] “China could have choked off the Mekong and aggravated a drought, threatening the lifeline of millions in Asia”, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/28/china-choked-off-the-mekong-which-worsened-southeast-asia-drought-study.html  (accessed 12 September 2020).
    [2] “Water wars: Mekong River another front in U.S.-China rivalry”, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/07/25/asia-pacific/mekong-river-us-china/  (accessed 12 September 2020).
    [3] “The next US-China battleground: Chinese dams on the Mekong River?”,https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3095581/next-us-china-battleground-chinese-dams-mekong-river  (accessed 12 September 2020).
    [4] “River dams in China helped alleviate drought along Lancang-Mekong, research finds”, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1194654.shtml  (accessed 10 September 2020).
    [5] “River dams in China helped alleviate drought along Lancang-Mekong, research finds”, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1194654.shtml  (accessed 10 September 2020).
    [6] “Lancang-Mekong cooperation provide stronger impetus for regional development and prosperity”, http://www.lmcchina.org/eng/hzdt_1/t1812281.htm  (accessed 12 September 2020)
    [7] “Full text of Co-chairs’ Statement on Cooperation of Synergizing the MLC and the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor of the Third MLC Leaders’ Meeting”, http://www.lmcchina.org/eng/zyxw_5/t1808947.htm  (accessed 12 September 2020).
    [8] “Joint Statement To Strengthen Water Data Management and Information Sharing in The Lower Mekong”,
    https://www.lowermekong.org/news/joint-statement-strengthen-water-data-management-and-information-sharing-lower-mekong (accessed 14 April 219)
    [9] “Code of Conduct for the Mekong”,https://vannarithchheang.com/2018/04/04/code-of-conduct-for-the-mekong/  (accessed 12 September 2020).
    [10] “Mekong River Commission keen to improve data sharing and management in the Lower Mekong Basin”, https://mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/mrc-keen-data-management-in-mekong-basin/  (accessed 12 September 2020.
    [11] “Water wars: Mekong River another front in U.S.-China rivalry”, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/07/25/asia-pacific/mekong-river-us-china/  (accessed 12 September 2020).
     
    Image: Mekong Riverside, Phnom Penh-Cambodia

  • Consolidating India-ASEAN Strategic Partnership under Chairmanship of Vietnam

    Consolidating India-ASEAN Strategic Partnership under Chairmanship of Vietnam

    During the first six months of the year, there were 26 meetings and most of these were through video-conferencing, exhibiting a high degree of commitment by the ASEAN under the Chairmanship of Vietnam.    

    Vietnam’s Chairmanship of the ASEAN comes at a time of immense turbulence marked by COVID-19 pandemic, disruption in the global supply chains resulting in economic recession among major economies, and strategic instability in the Indo-Pacific region marked by high tensions between the United States and China in the South China Sea. However, the ASEAN calendar of engagements with its Partner countries has remained busy, and Vietnam has spearheaded the Organisation with adeptness and alacrity and sustained the momentum of the ASEAN’s mandate through meetings and conversations.  During the first six months of the year, there were 26 meetings and most of these were through video-conferencing, exhibiting a high degree of commitment by the ASEAN under the Chairmanship of Vietnam.

     On 16 June 2020, at the 20th ASEAN-India Joint Cooperation Committee Meeting, through a video conference, India and the ASEAN “reaffirmed their commitment to further strengthen and deepen their cooperation.” Both sides noted the progress made for the implementation of the ASEAN-India Plan of Action (2016-2020), and “shared their commitment to complete the development of the new Plan of Action for 2021-2025 to further strengthen their strategic partnership over the next five years”.[i]

    A month later Secretary (East), Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), India, participated in the 22nd annual meeting of the Senior officials of ASEAN countries and India, and commended Viet Nam’s ASEAN chairmanship. Both sides “agreed to continue assisting each other’s citizens affected by the coronavirus outbreak”; provide “ASEAN countries with detailed information about the Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative proposed by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the 16th ASEAN-India Summit in 2019”; welcomed “ASEAN bringing into play its role in fostering cooperation, dialogue and trust building in the region”; and conveyed India’s support for “efforts to seriously and fully implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea and build an efficient and effective Code of Conduct in the waters in line with international law and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea”.[ii]

    COVID-19 Pandemic

    India and ASEAN are confronted with COVID-19 pandemic and there is ample evidence that both sides have conveyed their intention to fight the pandemic together. Prime Minister Modi engaged the leaders of Indonesia, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam through telephonic conversations and assured support to ASEAN Member States. Likewise, Indian Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla has had weekly tele-conversations with counterparts from US, Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Vietnam to share ideas and best practices in the Indo-Pacific region for responding to COVID-19 pandemic.[iii]

    It is an opportune moment for the officials of the health departments in India and ASEAN to set up a dedicated virtual platform/dashboard designated as ‘India-ASEAN Meeting for Health Development (AI-MHD) that can be pluggedinto the ‘ASEAN Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) Network, the ASEAN Risk Assessment and Risk Communication Centre, the ASEAN Bio Diaspora Virtual Center (ABVC) and the ASEAN Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) for future public health emergencies’.

     India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jayashankar, in his remarks at the 6th Roundtable Meeting of ASEAN-India Network of Think Tanks (AINTT), noted that “the impact of the Coronavirus has been beyond our collective imagination. Current estimates put the cumulative loss in the range of USD 5.8-8.8 trillion or approximately 6.5-9.7% of the global GDP.[iv]

    ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific (AOIP)

    India has acknowledged the importance of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific (AOIP) and New Delhi is committed to “explore cooperation in the key areas outlined in the AOIP, covering maritime cooperation, connectivity, sustainable development and economic cooperation, in order to contribute to the maintenance of peace, freedom and prosperity in the region”.[v] Similarly, ASEAN has endorsed synergies in various sectors and promoted regional frameworks under India’s Act East Policy, and SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision. Although health and pandemic issues are conspicuously absent in the AIOP and SAGAR, but these are surely part of the broader thematic issues contained therein.

    India is committed to positive contribution to ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus). It is a staunch believer of ‘rule of law’ and India believes that a Code of Conduct is a useful solution to reduce tensions in the South China Sea.

    On November 04, 2019, Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched the Indo Pacific Oceans’ Initiative (IPOI) at the East Asia Summit held in Bangkok, Thailand.[vi] It is an “ an open global initiative” and “ draws on existing regional cooperation architecture and mechanisms to focus on seven central pillars conceived around Maritime Security; Maritime Ecology; Maritime Resources; Capacity Building and Resource Sharing; Disaster Risk Reduction and Management; Science, Technology and Academic Cooperation; and Trade Connectivity and Maritime Transport.”

    Cooperation, Dialogue and Trust Building

    India is committed to positive contribution to ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus). It is a staunch believer of ‘rule of law’ and India believes that a Code of Conduct is a useful solution to reduce tensions in the South China Sea. India’s Foreign Minister has stated that India is working in conjunction with Vietnam and “responses to that (CoC) are being handled by the Vietnamese and that is the way it should be,” [vii]

                Finally, it has been noted that “as we come out of this pandemic, let us be clear on one fact. The world will never be the same again. That means new thinking, fresh ideas, more imagination and greater openness. We need to go beyond orthodoxies, whether of trade, politics or security. These are domains that all of you debate regularly and I am sure today you will have a very productive discussion.”[viii]  It is useful for ASEAN and India to explore commonalities and convergences in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific (AOIP) and the Indo Pacific Oceans’ Initiative (IPOI). In this context, Vietnam has the unique opportunity to further expand, deepen and strengthen the ASEAN India Strategic Partnership.

     

    Notes

    [i] “ASEAN, India strengthen cooperation”, https://asean.org/asean-india-strengthen-cooperation/ (accessed 20 August 2020).

    [ii] “ASEAN, Indian senior officials gather at online 22nd meeting”, https://www.asean2020.vn/xem-chi-tiet1/-/asset_publisher/ynfWm23dDfpd/content/asean-indian-senior-officials-gather-at-online-22nd-meeting (accessed 20 August 2020).

     

    [iii] “Cooperation among select countries of the Indo-Pacific in fighting COVID-19 pandemic”, https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/32691/Cooperation+among+select+countries+of+the+IndoPacific+in+fighting+COVID19+pandemic (accessed 20 August 2020).

    [iv] “Remarks by EAM during the 6th Roundtable Meeting of ASEAN-India Network of Think Tanks (AINTT)”,https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/32904/Remarks_by_EAM_during_the_6th_Roundtable_Meeting_of_ASEANIndia_Network_of_Think_Tanks_AINTT(accessed 20 August 2020).

    [v] “ASEAN Outlook On The Indo-Pacific” https://asean.org/storage/2019/06/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf (accessed 20 August 2020).

    [vi] “Ministry of External Affairs Indo-Pacific Division Briefs”, https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Indo_Feb_07_2020.pdf (accessed 20 August 20200.

    [vii] “Incident between Indian, Chinese militaries was ‘not skirmish but face-off’: Jaishankar”,https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/incident-between-indian-chinese-militaries-was-not-skirmish-but-face-off-  (accessed 20 August 2020).

    [viii] “Remarks by EAM during the 6th Roundtable Meeting of ASEAN-India Network of Think Tanks (AINTT)”, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/32904/Remarks_by_EAM_during_the_6th_Roundtable_Meeting_of_ASEANIndia_Network_of_Think_Tanks_AINTT (accessed 20 August 2020).

     

    Image Credit: Asia Times

  • Vietnam: Bright Economic Outlook post-COVID

    Vietnam: Bright Economic Outlook post-COVID

    COVID-19 is truly a ‘Black Swan’ event and its impact is being felt across the globe. There is widespread worry about the future of economic growth in the post-pandemic period and the World Bank has observed that the pandemic caused the deepest global recession since Second World War. [i] There are at least three reasons which triggered and added to the current crisis. First, it has involved the US and China in a trade war since July 2018, when US President Donald Trump imposed wide-ranging tariffs on China for its alleged unfair trade practices. In August 2019, Trump ordered U.S. companies to “immediately start looking for an alternative to China, including bringing your companies home and making your products in the USA.”[ii] China responded in a similar manner with counter tariffs on US goods. Since then numerous negotiations between them have been held, the last in June 2020 at Hawaii, did not yield any breakthrough. This revengeful tariff war has now blown into a full-fledged trade war and President Trump aggravated with the renewed threat of a “complete decoupling from China.”

    There is widespread worry about the future of economic growth in the post-pandemic period and the World Bank has observed that the pandemic caused the deepest global recession since Second World War.

    Second, amid the trade war, the Corona-19 pandemic made matters worse for the two protagonists. The US accused China of withholding information about the Wuhan virus which was detected in December 2019 and Beijing did not make public the information till January 2020 after which it spread across the globe from Europe to the US. The pandemic has caused massive disruptions in supply chains and some countries have decided to shift businesses out of China. For instance, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe government announced US $2.2 billion stimulus package to help companies shift production out of China back to Japan or elsewhere.[iii]

    Third, the new security law in Hong Kong has triggered an exodus by several companies to move out of China. The Law “targets acts of secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign forces, with life in prison for those committing the most serious offences”[iv] has scared common people. Many technology companies, startups, entrepreneurs are now confronted with uncertainty and are exploring alternative destinations.[v]

    many companies are being forced to shut down their operation in China and rethink-reevaluate-reinvest in new destinations to remain buoyant for the time being and slowly make their networks more resilient across sectors for the future.

    Furthermore, the pandemic exposed the weaknesses and susceptibilities of many organizations, business houses and industries particularly those that are intimately connected and dependent on China to fulfil their need for raw materials or finished products. Consequently, many companies are being forced to shut down their operation in China and rethink-reevaluate-reinvest in new destinations to remain buoyant for the time being, and slowly make their networks more resilient across sectors for the future. According to a leading business research and advisory company, “tariffs imposed by the U.S. and Chinese governments during the past years have increased supply chain costs by up to 10% for over 40% of organizations” and “popular alternative locations are Vietnam, India, and Mexico.” [vi]

    Vietnam and Thailand have a very good scorecard in their fight against COVID-19 and are rearing to attract investments and kick start the economy.

    Even before COVID-19 pandemic crisis, in 2019, five Asian countries i.e. Malaysia, India, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam (MITI-V) or “Mighty Five” had been identified as “up-and-coming players” with high potential for being world’s next manufacturing hubs.[vii] Among these, Vietnam and Thailand have a very good scorecard in their fight against COVID-19 and are rearing to attract investments and kick start the economy.

    According to the World Economic Forum, Vietnam’s economic rise is marked by trade liberalization, domestic reforms through deregulation, lowering the cost of doing business and investments made in human resource development.[viii] During the first six months of the current year, FDI commitments was at over US$15 billion which is a positive outlook for the country. In fact, Vietnam has attracted FDI from 136 countries and territories with nearly 32,000 projects with a combined value of US$378 billion. Among these Japan is the second largest investor with over US$60 billion. Last month, Vietnam’s Ministry of Planning and Investment, Embassy of Japanese at Hanoi, Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), and Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) held a virtual conference to explore FDI investments “especially in the context of Japanese government providing a US$2.3 billion aid package for Japanese firms to diversify their supply chains”.[ix]

    Vietnam has many common export products from China such as broadcasting equipment, and could emerge as the “top exporter of broadcasting equipment to developed countries” but is constrained by “smaller GDP and workforce”; but its   progresses in infrastructure could potentially make it a more appealing option.[x]

    Vietnam has attracted FDI from 136 countries and territories with nearly 32,000 projects with a combined value of US$378 billion. Among these Japan is the second largest investor with over US$60 billion.

    Besides, there are other contenders such as Thailand and India to attract FDI and these two countries offer attractive FDI policies and manufacturing infrastructure. In mid-2019, as many as 200 American companies were planning to move their manufacturing base from China and were looking at India.[xi] Similar trends have been reported from South Korea [xii] and Japan [xiii] who could migrate to “production-conducive economies like India, Vietnam and Thailand”.[xiv]

    According to one estimate, FDI “across the globe may decline by 40% this year due to the Covid-19 crisis”[xv], but by all counts and accounts, Vietnam is a resounding success story.  It is a stable economy, possesses necessary infrastructure and facilities, and above all it enjoys “multilateral and bilateral agreements with foreign countries”[xvi], which makes it a popular destination in the post-COVID economic revival outlook.

    Notes

    [i] “Global Economic Prospects”, https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects (accessed 16 July 2020).
    [ii] “Trump says he’s ordering American companies to immediately start looking for an alternative to China”, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/23/trump-says-hes-ordering-american-companies-to-immediately-start-looking-for-an-alternative-to-china.html (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [iii] “Coronavirus Impact: Japan to offer $2.2 billion to firms shifting production out of China”, https://www.businesstoday.in/current/world/coronavirus-impact-japan-to-offer-22-billion-to-firms-shifting-production-out-of-china/story/400721.html (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [iv] “Hongkongers contemplate a second exodus”, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3093517/home-and-away-after-national-security-law-hongkongers (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [v] “Tech Firms Begin to Abandon Hong Kong over Security Law”, https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:tmQW3Yjx5vcJ:https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-20/tech-firms-begin-to-abandon-hong-kong-because-of-security-law+&cd=13&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=in (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [vi] “Gartner Survey Reveals 33% of Supply Chain Leaders Moved Business Out of China or Plan to by 2023”, https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2020-06-24-gartner-survey-reveals-33-percent-of-supply-chain-leaders-moved-business-out-of-china-or-plan-to-by-2023 (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [vii] “5 China Sourcing Alternatives In Asia”, https://www.intouch-quality.com/blog/5-alternatives-to-sourcing-from-china (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [viii] “Vietnam races ahead of China in economic growth: opportunities and challenges for Vietnam in the post-COVID- 19 period”, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/ChanakyaCode/vietnam-races-ahead-of-china-in-economic-growth-opportunities-and-challenges-for-vietnam-in-the-post-covid-19-period/ (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [ix] Ibid.
    [x] “COVID-19: Developing countries and shrouded opportunities”, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/covid-19-developing-countries-and-shrouded-opportunities/ (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [xi] “About 200 US firms aim to move manufacturing base from China to India post-general election: USISPF”, https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/about-200-us-firms-aim-to-move-manufacturing-base-from-china-to-india-post-general-election-usispf/story/341011.html ( 30 July 2020).
    [xii] “Korean companies keen to move out of China to India”, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/75130387.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst (30 July 2020).
    [xiii] “Global firms look to shift from China to India”, https://www.livemint.com/industry/manufacturing/global-firms-look-to-shift-from-china-to-india-11587494725838.html  (30 July 2020).
    [xiv] “India isn’t ready yet for foreign companies that want to quit China”, https://theprint.in/opinion/india-isnt-ready-yet-for-foreign-companies-that-want-to-quit-china/415040/ (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [xv] “1,000 Japanese firms looking for investment opportunities in Vietnam”, http://hanoitimes.vn/1000-japaneses-firms-looking-for-investment-opportunities-in-vietnam-313133.html (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [xvi] “Vietnam races ahead of China in economic growth: opportunities and challenges for Vietnam in the post-COVID- 19 period”, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/ChanakyaCode/vietnam-races-ahead-of-china-in-economic-growth-opportunities-and-challenges-for-vietnam-in-the-post-covid-19-period/ (accessed 30 July 2020).

     

    Image: Ho Chi Minh city and Saigon River – Credit: Adobe Stock

  • High expectations during Vietnam’s Chairmanship of the ASEAN

    High expectations during Vietnam’s Chairmanship of the ASEAN

    Vietnam assumed ‘2020 Chairmanship of the ASEAN’ in November 2019 from Thailand in accordance with Article 31 of the ASEAN Charter under which the Chairmanship rotates annually. Hanoi announced the theme for its Chairmanship as ‘Cohesive and Responsive’, in which ‘Cohesive reflects the need to enhance ASEAN unity and solidarity, economic integration, ASEAN awareness and identity, and work toward a “people-centered” community’ and                                 ‘Responsive underlines the importance of promoting ASEAN pro-activeness, creativity and capacity in response to opportunities and challenges brought about by rapid changes in regional and global landscape’.

    Soon after taking over the 2020 Chairmanship, Vietnam was confronted with a ‘black swan’ event i.e. COVID-19. It  delivered admirably by taking bold measures to control the spread of the virus in the country and announced that the ASEAN Coordinating Council (ACC) will compile a report on the COVID-19 to be submitted to ASEAN leaders at the 36th ASEAN Summit scheduled in Vietnam in April.

    Vietnam’s Deputy Foreign Minister Nguyen Quoc Dung, who is the Secretary-General of the 2020 ASEAN National Committee, has identified five key priorities for his country’s Chairmanship Year and it is not surprising to see reference to Hanoi’s commitment to ‘regional peace and stability amid strategic complexities’. Boundary and associated disputes including illegal occupation, reclamation and weaponization of islands and features in South China Sea are central to ASEAN, and as a corollary a major issue for Vietnam’s 2020 Chairmanship. There is now evidence of a push back against Beijing’s intimidation. This is evident from the forceful statements and credible operational initiatives in South China Sea by the claimant states against China which has deployed law enforcement and paramilitary vessels.

    In this context there are expectations from Vietnam to vigorously pursue and make substantive contributions towards keeping the South China Sea less turbulent and more peaceful, and address issues that threaten regional peace and security. It would also be Hanoi’s endeavor to prevent any confrontation and further escalation in disputes in the South China Sea. However, this may not be the case as a number of incidents in the South China Sea over resources i.e. fishing and offshore energy exploration have begun rather very early in Vietnam’s ‘2020 Chairmanship of the ASEAN’.

    First is about Indonesia and China. The former does not claim any island or features in the Spratly Islands and therefore does not have any dispute in South China Sea; but presence of Chinese coast guard vessel escorting Chinese fishermen to fish in Natuna, part of  Indonesian waters, which China claims to be the traditional fishing ground, prompted political and military response from Jakarta. There was also a standoff between China and Vietnam in the Vanguard Bank involving 50 Vietnamese and 40 Chinese vessels over the operations of the drilling rig Hakuryu 5 operated by Russia’s Rosneft in Vietnam’s oil and gas Block 06-01.

    Another three-way standoff over oil and gas operations is playing out between China and Malaysia in which the state-owned Petronas is exploring on the extended continental shelf of a ‘Malaysian oil and gas block in the area for which Hanoi and Kuala Lumpur had submitted a joint claim’. China has resorted to intimidation similar to the Vanguard Bank between China and Vietnam.

    At another level, United States military response in support of Taiwan after Chinese military airplanes flew across the Taiwan Straits and the Bashi Channel is noteworthy. Likewise, US’ support has been forthcoming for Vietnam against China and could trigger enhanced defence and security cooperation between the two sides as also create new opportunities for Hanoi to inform Beijing about its confidence to deal with China on the South China Sea issue at its own terms.

    However, the Philippines would be a different challenge for Vietnam after President Rodrigo Duterte announced annulment of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) notwithstanding the fact that the US has been the most important ally of the Philippines in countering China’s expansive claims in the disputed Philippines Sea. It is useful to mention that Philippines is critical  for US’ Indo-Pacific  strategy of a free and open oceans.

    Second is the about the Code of Conduct (CoC), an upgraded document of the earlier Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS (DOC), which is under negotiation between China and ASEAN member states and is expected to be adopted in 2021.Vietnam must concentrate on the CoC. The onus will be on Vietnam to not only build consensus among the  ASEAN , Hanoi will have to work hard  to put in place a workable COC which can then be taken forward by Brunei Darussalam who would assume the ‘2021 Chairmanship of the ASEAN’.

    Third is about the contestation between the US and China over freedom of navigation operation (FONOP). During the last three years, the US forces have routinely conducted FONOP which Washington claims to be in accordance with international law and that its military will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law permits. Chinese reaction and response to the FONOP has been at the political, diplomatic and strategic levels. It has exercised coercion at sea through dangerous maneuvers and more recently a PLA Navy destroyer fired a military grade laser at a US P-8 surveillance aircraft.

    ASEAN Chairmanship is a challenging position and attracts high expectations from the member countries. The position entails building upon the work done by the previous Chair as also pursue new regional issues that are always as challenging as the earlier ones. Besides, there are anticipations by regional and other global players to not only follow up the ongoing challenges but address new questions that confront the ASEAN. More often than not, the ASEAN countries have delivered and received appreciation from the international community.

    By all counts Vietnam’s chairmanship of the ASEAN can be expected to be both challenging and rewarding. Hanoi is expected to live up to the expectations on the responsibilities enshrined in the ASEAN charter and deliver to the peoples of the ASEAN as also build upon the themes and priorities set by previous Chairmanship. Vietnam will also be under pressure to adopt a tougher line against China on the South China Sea issue in view of the recent spats between China and other claimant states. But Vietnamese leaders are known for their maturity and diplomatic skills and would play a pragmatic role to manage tensions in the region.

    Image Credit: Vietnam Economic Times