Category: Sri Lanka

  • Positioning Sri Lanka in an Emerging Multipolar World Order

    Positioning Sri Lanka in an Emerging Multipolar World Order

     Summary 

    Sri Lanka sits at a strategic crossroads, with geography that positions it at the heart of global trade and regional security. Yet economic vulnerability, political inconsistency, and limited strategic clarity have constrained its influence. As global power fragments and the Global South rises, the island faces a choice: remain reactive and peripheral or leverage its location, strengthen its economy, and build stable institutions to become a neutral logistics hub, a trusted diplomatic partner, and an active contributor to the emerging multipolar order. Acting decisively now will transform strategic opportunity into lasting national influence. 

    Over the past four years, geopolitical, economic, and technological shifts have progressed at a pace unmatched in the previous three decades. The world we face today is fundamentally different from the one we knew before. War has returned to Europe, shattering the assumption that major interstate conflict on the continent was a thing of the past. The Middle East is once again engulfed in overlapping crises that draw in both regional actors and global powers. Across Africa—from the Sahel to the Horn—coups, insurgencies, and persistent violence are eroding state institutions and deepening humanitarian emergencies. The impact of Trump’s tariffs threatened many sectors globally.

    At the same time, trust in multilateral institutions, long the guardians of global order, is fading. The UN struggles to act decisively, the WTO is weakened, and even climate negotiations are increasingly shaped by national interests rather than collective responsibility. The consensus that once underpinned global cooperation is fragmenting. 

    Meanwhile, technological disruption is accelerating competition. Artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and strategic supply chains have become the new battlegrounds for influence. Nations no longer compete only for territory or ideology; they compete for data, minerals, energy, and technological dominance. 

    The post–Cold War optimism that once promised a borderless world of global democracy and free markets has evaporated. In its place has emerged an era defined by political fragmentation, economic rivalry, and strategic competition. Great-power tensions are rising, regional blocs are hardening, and smaller states are being compelled to navigate an increasingly complex and divided international landscape. 

    The rules-based order that emerged after World War II is weakening, and neither the United States nor China can dictate the future alone. Instead, a triangular contest among the global West, global East, and the global South is shaping a new geopolitical reality. 

    In addition, the Indo-Pacific has become the central arena of strategic competition between the United States and China. As China expands its economic reach, military power, and political influence, the U.S. seeks to uphold a free, open, and rules-based regional order. This rivalry now shapes security, diplomacy, trade, and technology across the entire region, with flashpoints such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea posing the greatest risks of confrontation and global economic disruption. 

    Where does Sri Lanka stand 

    Sri Lanka is a small island nation, but one with a singular and powerful advantage: its geography. Positioned at the center of the world’s busiest East–West maritime corridor, the island lies along sea lanes that carry nearly two-thirds of global oil shipments and almost half of all container traffic. In an era when supply chains, shipping routes, and energy pathways are becoming strategic assets in their own right, Sri Lanka’s location is not merely convenient—it is consequential.

    This makes the island strategically valuable to every major power. For India, Sri Lanka’s stability is essential to security in its immediate neighbourhood and to its ambitions in the wider Indian Ocean. For China, the island is a vital node in the Belt and Road Initiative, linking the maritime silk route to broader trade and energy networks. For the United States, Sri Lanka is central to its Indo-Pacific strategy, where freedom of navigation, open sea lanes, and counter-balancing rival influences are paramount. 

    Beyond the great powers, there is a range of middle powers, which includes Japan, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and even Turkey. These countries are deepening economic, maritime, and diplomatic engagement across the Indian Ocean. Their interests converge on Sri Lanka not merely because of geography, but because of the island’s potential as a stable partner, a logistical hub, and a platform for regional connectivity. Collectively, these factors position Sri Lanka as not just a nation-state but a geopolitical crossroads, where the interests of global and regional actors meet, overlap, and at times compete. 

    Yet, despite this inherent strategic value, Sri Lanka continues to struggle in transforming geography into meaningful geopolitical influence. The island’s location offers an extraordinary opportunity, but opportunity alone does not translate into power. 

    Policy inconsistency—driven by frequent political turnover, short-term decision-making, and competing domestic priorities—has created persistent uncertainty that discourages long-term investment and undermines Sri Lanka’s international credibility. At the same time, an overly cautious geopolitical posture, often bordering on indecision, has prevented the country from defining a clear strategic identity in the Indian Ocean. 

    As a result, Sri Lanka has too often been a reactor rather than an actor: responding to external pressures instead of anticipating them, accommodating the interests of major powers instead of assertively advancing its own. Although global actors are drawn to the island because of its strategic location, Sri Lanka has not consistently leveraged that interest to secure lasting economic, diplomatic, or security advantages. 

    The task ahead is to break this cycle. Sri Lanka must transition from being merely a geographical point of convergence to becoming a strategic participant capable of shaping outcomes that affect its future. This requires strengthening the domestic economic base, setting coherent long-term foreign policy priorities, and building the institutional stability needed to negotiate with confidence. Only then can Sri Lanka convert its location into lasting influence—anchoring its long-term security, enhancing its prosperity, and securing a respected place within a rapidly reordering world. 

    For countries like Sri Lanka, the challenge is to navigate this environment with careful diplomatic balance—leveraging economic opportunities from both the U.S. and China while preserving strategic autonomy and avoiding undue dependency. At the same time, Sri Lanka’s trade-driven economy relies heavily on stable, rules-based maritime routes across the Indian Ocean and the wider Indo-Pacific, making regional peace and open sea lanes essential for national economic stability. 

    The Weak Link in Sri Lanka’s Strategy. 

    The 2022 economic crisis significantly weakened Sri Lanka’s geopolitical standing. A nation’s foreign policy is only as strong as the economic foundation beneath it. When an economy collapses, sovereignty is not formally lost, but it is quietly constrained. Sri Lanka’s reliance on external lenders, bilateral creditors, and major-power investments has narrowed its strategic flexibility and limited its ability to negotiate from a position of strength. 

    Instead of shaping regional agendas, we increasingly find ourselves adjusting to those set by others. Unless Sri Lanka restores economic resilience and rebuilds fiscal credibility, the country risks becoming a pawn in a larger great power contest rather than a strategic actor capable of advancing its own interests. 

    Real impact on Sri Lanka 

    The Trump administration’s imposition of tariffs on Sri Lankan exports functioned as a form of trade restriction rather than a targeted sanction or financial embargo. Nevertheless, the measures had material implications for the country’s economy. The garment sector, which constitutes the backbone of Sri Lanka’s foreign-exchange earnings and employment, was particularly exposed. Given that the United States represents a significant share of Sri Lanka’s export market, the tariffs threatened to impede post-2022 economic recovery and constrain critical foreign-exchange inflows. Beyond immediate economic effects, the episode highlights Sri Lanka’s structural vulnerability to shifts in global trade policy, revealing a broader strategic challenge: without enhanced economic resilience and proactive engagement in international trade frameworks, Sri Lanka risks being perpetually reactive rather than an influential actor in the global economic system. 

    The Global South Is Rising 

    One of the most consequential geopolitical shifts of our time is the emergence of middle powers within the Global South as influential actors in global affairs. Countries such as India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, Nigeria, Indonesia, and Mexico are no longer peripheral participants in a system dominated by the West. They possess the economic weight, demographic scale, technological ambition, and diplomatic confidence to reshape global institutions, from trade and finance to climate governance and security frameworks. 

    This rise is visible everywhere. India is now the world’s fastest-growing major economy and a central player in the G20 and Indo-Pacific. Brazil shapes global environmental and agricultural policy. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are redefining energy geopolitics and investing heavily across Asia and Africa. South Africa and Nigeria influence continental politics, peacekeeping, and resource diplomacy. Turkey has become a pivotal actor in West Asia, Central Asia, and global mediation efforts. Together, these countries are forming new coalitions, from BRICS+ to the G20’s expanded role, challenging the old North–South divide and demanding a more equitable international order. 

    And yet, amid this global transformation, Sri Lanka remains largely absent from the strategic conversation. We participate in international forums, but seldom shape their agendas. We attend summits, but rarely articulate a coherent long-term national strategy. The country possesses clear potential, but lacks the strategic clarity and diplomatic consistency required to convert that potential into influence. 

    Sri Lanka belongs to the Global South by geography, history, and shared developmental challenges—but not yet by strategic weight or leadership. At a time when emerging powers across Asia, Africa, and Latin America are redefining global governance, Sri Lanka risks remaining on the sidelines. Unless we strengthen our capacity to articulate priorities, build alliances, and engage proactively, we may become spectators in a moment when others are reshaping the international order. 

    If the Global South continues its ascent as current economic, demographic, and diplomatic trends indicate, it will become a decisive force in global negotiations on climate, trade, energy, technology, and security. The question then becomes: Where will Sri Lanka stand? We must choose whether to meaningfully align with this emerging bloc, articulate our own national priorities, and build partnerships that reflect our strengths or risk being left behind, irrelevant in a world that is rapidly reorganising itself. 

    Opportunities in the New Disorder 

    Disorder brings danger, but it also brings opportunity. History shows that moments of global turbulence create openings for small, agile states to elevate their influence. Finland, Singapore, Qatar, and the UAE are prime examples—nations that turned geography, diplomacy, and strategic clarity into disproportionate global relevance. They became connectors, mediators, hubs, and conveners at a time when great powers were distracted by rivalry. Sri Lanka, too, possesses the attributes to rise in this emerging landscape, if we choose to act with purpose. 

    As a Maritime and Logistics Hub, Sri Lanka sits along the world’s most important East–West maritime highway, yet has not fully realised the potential of this position. With the right investment climate, regulatory consistency, and diplomatic balance, the island can become an efficient, neutral logistics hub serving all blocs: West, East, and South. This includes strengthening ports, aviation links, and digital infrastructure to support regional supply chains and trans-shipment networks. 

    As a Diplomatic Bridge in the Indian Ocean Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific is increasingly defined by competition, mistrust, and strategic ambiguity. Amid this environment, Sri Lanka can offer what few others can: a neutral, trusted venue for dialogue, confidence-building, and conflict prevention. By convening maritime security forums, climate adaptation roundtables, and regional economic dialogues, Sri Lanka can redefine itself as a facilitator rather than a battleground for competing interests. This diplomatic role, rooted in neutrality and credibility, can become a cornerstone of the island’s long-term relevance. 

    The global transition to clean energy is rewriting economic and political priorities across continents. Sri Lanka’s hydropower, solar, and wind capacity create an opportunity to position the country as a renewable energy partner for the region. Expanding grid connectivity, attracting green financing, and partnering on technology transfers can anchor national energy security while forging deeper alliances with both great powers and rising middle powers as a Renewable Energy Partner. 

    As the Global South demands a fairer international order, Sri Lanka has the opportunity to join voices calling to democratise global governance, from the UN Security Council to the IMF and World Bank. Smaller nations deserve equitable representation and greater institutional responsiveness. By aligning with reform-oriented coalitions, Sri Lanka can gain diplomatic visibility and credibility that far exceeds its size, as a Voice for Reform in Global Institutions. 

    But seizing these opportunities requires qualities we have not consistently demonstrated: political stability, coherent foreign policy, and economic credibility. These are the foundations upon which successful small states build influence, and they are the areas where Sri Lanka has repeatedly stumbled. If Sri Lanka can correct this trajectory, through disciplined governance, strategic clarity, and long-term national planning, then the disorder of today’s world need not be a threat. Instead, it can become the opening through which the island finally realises its potential as a regional connector, a diplomatic actor, and a resilient nation in a rapidly changing global order. 

    The Path Forward 

    Choosing Influence Over Vulnerability Sri Lanka must urgently embrace a new strategic mindset built on five pillars: Balanced Foreign Policy, Avoiding entanglement in rival blocs. Economic Transformation, Strengthening the economy to regain autonomous decision-making. Indian Ocean Strategy, Leveraging geography as a national asset, not a bargaining chip. Institutional Reform, building trustworthy governance that inspires investor and diplomatic confidence. Most importantly engagement with the Global South, positioning Sri Lanka as an active contributor to the emerging world order. The next decade will determine the shape of global power for a generation. If Sri Lanka hesitates, the world will move forward without us. 

    A Moment of Choice 

    Sri Lanka stands at a historic juncture. We possess strategic advantages that many nations envy, yet economic vulnerabilities limit our choices. The world is being reordered, messily, rapidly, irreversibly. The question is not simply Where does Sri Lanka stand today? The real question is: Where will Sri Lanka choose to stand tomorrow? In a world drifting toward rivalry and fragmentation, Sri Lanka must choose to be not a pawn, but a purposeful small power—neutral, stable, connected, and confident. This is our moment to reclaim agency. If we fail, the new world order will be written around us, not with us. The choice before us is stark, to remain a spectator in a world that is rapidly changing—or to step forward, with clarity and purpose, as a nation that shapes its own destiny. 

    References: 

    Alexander Stubb, The West’s Last Chance How to Build a New Global Order Before It’s Too Late January/February 2026 Published on December 2, 2025 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ 

    Rizwie, Rukshana; Athas, Iqbal; Hollingsworth, Julia “Rolling power cuts, violent protests, long lines for basics: Inside Sri Lanka’s unfolding economic crisis” (3 April 2022). 

    Wignaraja, Ganeshan (16 February 2025). “Sri Lanka struggles to deliver a new era of post-crisis growth | East Asia Forum”. East Asia Forum. Retrieved 29 July 2025. 

    https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-17/shock-waves-from-the-war-in-ukraine-threaten-to-swamp-sri-lanka 

    https://www.reuters.com/markets/rates-bonds/sri-lankas-ambitious-governance-macro-linked-bonds-2024-12-17/#:~:text=LONDON%2C%20Dec%2017%20(Reuters),ever%20arranged%20in%20a%20restructuring. 

    https://www.voanews.com/a/india-feels-the-squeeze-in-indian-ocean-with-chinese-projects-in-neighborhood-/6230845.html 

    Reuters+2isas.nus.edu.sg+2 

    https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/tracking-impact-of-us-tariffs-on-apparel-footwear-supply-chains-wpftc/ 

    Author:

    Air Chief Marshal Gagan Bulathsinghala RWP RSP VSV USP MPhil MSc FIM  ndc psc.

    Formerly Commander Sri Lanka Air Force & Ambassador to Afghanistan

    Director, Charisma Energy
    Director, Strategic Development, WKV Group 
    President, Association of Retired Flag Rank Officers
    Senior Fellow South Asia Foresight Network
     

    Feature Image Credit: ndtv.com

     

  • China’s Role in the Infrastructure Development in Post-Civil War Sri Lanka: A Causal Factor for Current Crisis

    China’s Role in the Infrastructure Development in Post-Civil War Sri Lanka: A Causal Factor for Current Crisis

    It is also obvious that the way China handles Sri Lanka’s issue will have a significant impact on the future of China’s debt strategy in other developing nations across the world

    Sri Lanka and China share an ‘all-weather friends’ relationship. Long-standing diplomatic ties between Sri Lanka and China have developed into an infrastructure-focused economic partnership. Beginning in the early 1970s, China began to offer support for the economic development of some landmark projects in the country. The financial assistance offered by China has increased significantly since 2005. Soon their relationship transformed into a model that made use of interest-bearing loans and foreign direct investments. With Chinese assistance, the Mahinda Rajapaksa administration launched significant transportation, energy, and telecommunications projects. Some of these were the coal-fired Norocholai power station in 2006, the Hambantota port in 2007, the Mattala International Airport in 2010, the Colombo International Container Terminal at the Colombo port in 2011, and the Lotus Tower in 2012. With the launch of China’s BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) strategy in 2013, projects like Colombo Port City were taken up and further investment was made in earlier projects like the Hambantota port deal (Wignaraja et al. 2020).

    During the period between 2006 and 2019, the total value of Chinese investment in Sri Lanka was around $12.1 Billion (Wignaraja et al. 2020). According to a data analysis, China’s bilateral assistance and export credit loans have tripled from US $386.1 million in 2007 to US$1.2 billion in 2009 (Nilanthi Samaranayake 2011). The major sector of Chinese investment is the road and expressway, which accounts for over 68% of the country’s total expressway length. The other significant sector which has received Chinese investment and loans is the port projects.

    Port City – Colombo

    The Port City of Colombo (PCC) is the dream project of Sri Lanka that was unveiled during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit in 2014. Since Colombo is one of the top 25 busiest ports in the world, the proposed project promoted Colombo as a “world-class city” not only for Sri Lanka but also for South Asia as a whole (Revi 2021), with the government expecting to turn it into a financial centre like Singapore and Dubai. The initiative is supposed to improve Sri Lanka’s economy, which is primarily dependent on the export of tea and tourism, to more prosperity through a wide range of service sectors. It is projected to cost $14 billion, with China investing $1.4 billion to assist PCC in reclaiming 269 hectares of land in the Indian Ocean. In return, China received a 99-year lease over 116 hectares of the surrounding area. The initiative is a private-public partnership project between the Sri Lankan government and CHEC Port City Colombo Pvt. Ltd. It is also the first Special Economic Zone of Sri Lanka. CHEC Port City Colombo Pvt. Ltd is a part of China Communication Construction Enterprise, which is the state-run infrastructure company that oversees the Belt and Road Initiative (Basu 2022). However, even if Port City manages to produce a sixth of Sri Lanka’s present economic production by 2041, as suggested by an independent study, it will still be a costly venture. Even though China is funding its construction, these commercial activities will provide little income for the debt-ridden country (Mukherjee 2022).

    The Hambantota Port 

    The Hambantota port is in southern Sri Lanka. Its construction began in 2008. The port was built under the state-owned enterprises – China Harbour Engineering and Sinohydro Corporation. Around $1.4 billion was financed by EXIM Bank China in the form of three fixed interest rate loans (Wignaraja et al. 2020, 9). The project’s first phase was finished in 2010 at a cost of US $361 million (Samaranayake 2011), and the port started operations in November 2011. The second phase started in 2012 and ended in 2015. The project took more time than was expected to complete, and was not very successful, leading to a substantial capital loss. By 2016, the Sri Lanka Ports Authority, which owned the Hambantota Port, had suffered losses roughly amounting to SLR 46.7 billion. By this time, it was also evident that this extravagant project was not commercially viable, as had been demonstrated in preliminary feasibility studies (Gupta 2022). To counter this financial loss, the government, in 2017, decided to grant the port to the Chinese state-owned enterprise – China Merchant Port Holdings Company Limited – for a 99-year lease. The revenue from the contract was primarily utilised to address the balance of payment problems brought on by the rising cost of debt payments in the country. 

    The leasing of the port also represents Sri Lanka’s current external sector crisis (Moramudali 2020). Despite restructuring and turning it over to a Chinese entity for 99 years, Sri Lanka is still responsible for paying the debt associated with the failed port. The presence of the established trans-shipment hub, Colombo Port, which is 200 kilometres from Hambantota also makes the port commercially unviable. Because of this proximity issue, even though the port possesses several berths for diverse purposes, just about 400 vessels visit it each year as compared to 4,000 vessels in Colombo Port (Gupta 2022). Moreover, the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport (MRIA) constructed in the southern Hambantota district with a $200 million loan from China, is referred to as the “emptiest airport in the world” (Shepard 2016). 

    Investments in the Energy sector

    Another key sector that has received Chinese investment is the energy sector. The Norocholai power station was built by the China Machinery Engineering Corporation over a seven-year period in three phases. Three loans from the EXIM Bank of China totalling $1.4 billion and extra funding from the Sri Lankan government contributed to its co-financing. The power plant is now the largest and a vital contributor to the nation’s electricity supply (Wignaraja et al. 2020).

    Projects’ Viability and Performance

    In the Global Competitiveness Report 2019, released by the World Economic Forum, Sri Lanka ranked 84 out of 141 countries, which shows that the country’s infrastructure performance is far worse than that of other middle-income economies like Malaysia (Wignaraja et al. 2020). According to the publicly available figures, the Chinese debt is around 10% of Sri Lanka’s total foreign debt of $55 Billion and the actual figures are much higher than that. Chinese loans to Sri Lankan state-owned firms and other sorts of loans are not included in the current official estimates. According to some experts, this might amount to more than the US $6 billion, or about 20% of Sri Lanka’s external debt with higher interest rates (Gupta 2022). 

    The protracted effects of  Chinese investments must be carefully re-examined by the Sri Lankan government so as to prevent an increase in China’s coercive influence

    Hambantota Port which was built in the home district of the Rajapaksa family clearly portrays the family’s interest in their hometown. The 99-year lease of the port reflects the ever-increasing hold of China on the trade in the strategic Indian Ocean region and there are also prevailing accusations that China is likely to use the port for military purposes in future. In the case of Port City Colombo, scholars worry that it might develop into another Hambantota. Given the present situation, where Sri Lanka is unable to pay its obligations, Colombo Port City may also fall into Chinese control. Due to the political upheaval and financial issues the project construction has been interrupted multiple times. 

    The main causes behind the failures of these projects are that many of these were undertaken for political expediency and electoral considerations rather than for sound economic analysis and commercial viability. The government did not conduct proper feasibility studies to establish the commercial viability of these projects. Unbridled corruption made it worse. For the Hambantota port, more connectivity projects would provide more market and for the Port City Colombo, proper management plans should be given during its ongoing construction period.

    The protracted effects of such Chinese investments must be carefully re-examined by the Sri Lankan government so as to prevent an increase in China’s coercive influence. In light of the current economic crisis in Sri Lanka, China as the largest creditor in the country should offer reasonable restructuring on its loans. China’s response to the current crisis, particularly in the aftermath of the large-scale protests and a new government, will impact the relations between the two countries. It is also obvious that the way China handles Sri Lanka’s issue will have a significant impact on the future of China’s debt strategy in other developing nations across the world (Latiff and Wijesinha 2022).

    References

    Basu, Nayanima. 2022. “Crisis-Hit Sri Lanka Bets Big on $14 Bn China-Backed Port City, Wants Reluctant India to Invest.” ThePrint. March 24, 2022. https://theprint.in/diplomacy/crisis-hit-sri-lanka-bets-big-on-14-bn-china-backed-port-city-wants-reluctant-india-to-invest/883643/.

    Gupta, Shishir. 2022. “Was Cash Strapped Sri Lanka Duped by China in Hambantota Port?” Hindustan Times. June 26, 2022. https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/was-cash-strapped-sri-lanka-duped-by-china-in-hambantota-port-101656205405799.html.

    Latiff, Aquilah, and Anushka Wijesinha. 2022. “Understanding China’s Role in Sri Lanka’s Debt Restructuring Efforts.” Thediplomat.com. August 2, 2022. 

    Moramudali, Umesh. 2020. “The Hambantota Port Deal: Myths and Realities.” Thediplomat.com. January 1, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/the-hambantota-port-deal-myths-and-realities/.

    Mukherjee, Andy. 2022. “Port City Colombo: The Great Chinese White Elephant of Sri Lanka.” Business Standard India, April 14, 2022. https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/port-city-colombo-the-great-chinese-white-elephant-of-sri-lanka-122041400365_1.html.

    Revi, Vinitha. 2021. “Colombo Port City Project: Controversial since Its Inception.” ORF. December 28, 2021. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/colombo-port-city-project/.

    Samaranayake, Nilanthi. 2011. “Are Sri Lanka’s Relations with China Deepening? An Analysis of Economic, Military, and Diplomatic Data.” Asian Security 7 (2): 119–46. https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2011.581603.

    Shepard, Wade. 2016. “For Sale: The World’s Emptiest International Airport.” Forbes. July 18, 2016. https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/07/18/for-sale-the-worlds-emptiest-international-airport-mattala-international-hambantota-sri-lanka/?sh=74595f4c1e3b.

    Wignaraja, Ganeshan, Dinusha Panditaratne, Pabasara Kannangara, and Divya Hundlani. 2020. “Chinese Investment and the BRI in Sri Lanka.” Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank. March 24, 2020. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/03/chinese-investment-and-bri-sri-lanka-0/2-economy.

    Feature Image Credits: South China Morning Post

  • The Tamils Are The Original Inhabitants Of Sri Lanka

    The Tamils Are The Original Inhabitants Of Sri Lanka

    Many of history writing across the world is heavily influenced by nationalist narratives, religion, mythologies, and dominant accounts. However, it is now possible to re-establish past histories with the assistance of modern science through the use of anthropology, genetics, linguistics, etc. Sri Lanka’s history is intimately tied to that of the subcontinent, more particularly the Peninsula and Tamilnadu. Justice C M Wigneswaran provides a very incisive analysis of the island nation’s origins.

    Ruwanwalisay Temple at Anuradhapura – Image Credit: M Matheswaran

    Someone asked me; We read in the press your response to a question recently. You seem to be making sweeping statements about the Sinhalese. As far as we know the Sinhalese were the original inhabitants of this Island and the Tamils came in the 10th Century AD after the Chola Conquest. What proof have you about what you say?

    My response was; Professor Wijeyanayake from London like many other Sinhala Scholars wrote in the Sunday Observer of 17th November 1996 as follows- “The Origin of the Sinhala Race is in Lanka. There is no scientific evidence of Indians originating in India who spoke Sinhala”. Sinhalese are those who speak the Sinhala Language. Of course these days there are Sinhalese who have forgotten their mother language and have embraced other languages like English and French in their countries of emigration. But in early times the Sinhalese would have been those who spoke the Sinhala Language mainly. Without the Sinhala Language, there could have been no Sinhalese.

    When did the Sinhala Language come into being?

    The earliest Sinhala work was Siyabaslakara around 848 CE (9th Century AD). The next was Dhampiya-atuva Gatapadayo which came out around 918 CE (10th Century AD). Pali words are used both in a modified and pure form quite heavily in this latter work. The first Sinhala grammar Sidath Sangaraya belongs to the 13th Century AD. The inscriptions before the 7th Century AD do not mention Sinhala as a language and ethnicity of the people. The term “Sihala” (Lion in Pali) occurs for the first time in the Dipawansa (5th Century AD). Only once is the term coming up to say the Island was known as Sihala on account of the presence of Lions.

    In the Mahawansa the term Sihala appears twice. But there is no reference to the people called Sinhalese nor the Language called Sinhala. R.A.L.H. Gunawardana in his book “The People of the Lion: The Sinhala Identity and ideology in History and Historiography” (Sri Lanka Journal of the Humanities Vol V:1-2 (1979)) claims that before the 12th Century AD the Sinhala identity did not cover a whole people in Sri Lanka but only a small ruling class. This meant even by the 12th Century AD Sinhala had not become a full-fledged people’s language yet. What you have been fed to believe as per your question is pseudo-history created before the 1970s.

    After the 1970s even Sinhala historians have begun to doubt the story of Sri Lanka’s history starting with the coming of Vijaya from North India. Now our history books do not start with the coming of Vijaya as before. They start with the Stone Age civilization which was long prior to (the fictitious) Vijaya landing in Sri Lanka. Our history books now accept that permanent settlements, agriculture, use of skills, use of iron, urbanisation etc took place in this Island before the coming of (the fictitious) Vijaya. It is interesting to note that none of the books on the ancient history of any of the States in North India refers to the emigration of a person called Vijaya with 700 followers from their shores at any time in their ancient history. So now we start history from dates anterior to the coming of (the fictitious) Vijaya. Historically it is more plausible to believe that Mahawamsa written in Pali was a fiction written for the glorification of Buddhism. In fact, the author mentions so at the end of every stanza.

    But so far our Sinhala historians have not officially identified who these people who lived in this country before the coming of (the fictitious) Vijaya were. This is because any attempt, to tell the truth, will be beneficial to the Tamils and the pseudo-history of the Sinhalese hitherto purveyed would get exposed! I am told there was pressure recently to prevent the author of “Demala Baudhayo” bringing out a reprint of his book.

    The importance of the 1970s and the post-1970s period lies in the fact that scientific archaeological research began to take place here from then on. Not only that, our local researchers were helped by erudite foreign archaeologists from France, Germany, Britain and USA together with UNESCO experts. The pseudo-Sinhala Buddhist historians found it difficult to make progress due to this.

    A view of the Twin tanks: Archaelogical site at Anuradhapura – Photo Credit: M Matheswaran

    There is now archaeological evidence that pre-historic Stone Age people lived on this Island from over 125000 years ago according to excavations made in Iranaimadu in Kilinochchi District and in certain areas in Southern Sri Lanka. Dr Siran Deraniyagala brought these matters out, through his researches.

    The Stone Age could be generally divided into three periods 1. Paleolithic (Old Stone Age) (Before 10000 BC) 2. Mesolithic (Middle Stone Age) (Between 10000 BC and 8000 BC) 3. Neolithic (New Stone Age) (from 8000 BC to 3000BC). (Greek – lithos – Stone). But in certain regions, the Mesolithic period may have started even before 10000 BC.

    There is evidence that from 30000 years ago the Mesolithic people lived in our Hill Country as well as the Low Lands. About 75 evidences have been unearthed. Also, there is evidence to show that majority of these Mesolithic people lived mainly in the Northern and Eastern parts of Sri Lanka. They led a nomadic life. Their advancement in civilization is perceivable from the findings in caves, hills and on level ground.

    Thus the idea that the early inhabitants of Sri Lanka came from North India is now not accepted. It is agreed that long before the time of Mahawamsa, Sri Lanka enjoyed a culture similar to South India and those ancients were the progenitors of the present Sinhalese and Tamils.

    They attribute close similarities in lifestyle between these people and those who lived in the South of present Tamil Nadu. These are confirmed by experts in the fields of archaeology, humanities, philology and history. About 200 words found in the Tamil Language spoken by these people were taken into the Sinhala language later.

    It has been authoritatively said that the stone implements used by our Mesolithic people were the same as those used in Thirunelveli District in South India. According to Professor Indrapala, this civilization spread from South India to North Sri Lanka and thereafter spread to other parts of Sri Lanka.

    Around 3000 years ago early Iron Age was introduced to this Island. There too we see very close similarities between what was found in Southern Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka. Vimala Begley who conducted researches in Kantharodai in the 1970s concluded that those who inhabited the Jaffna Peninsula in ancient times had very close relationship with the Southern part of present Tamil Nadu.

    Their cultural affinity in Sri Lanka extended from Kantharodai up to Puttalam. Pomparipu in the Puttalam District especially had very close resemblance to what is found in Kantharodai. Professor Sudarshan Seneviratne too has confirmed this finding. Professor Indrapala too confirms that the culture of the Stone Age people in Sri Lanka came within the ambit of the South Indian cultural ambience of that time.

    Thus the idea that the early inhabitants of Sri Lanka came from North India is now not accepted. It is agreed that long before the time of Mahawamsa, Sri Lanka enjoyed a culture similar to South India and those ancients were the progenitors of the present Sinhalese and Tamils. Professor Senaka Bandaranayake has said that these ancients had no ethnic differences but only cultural differences. These differences he says could have existed even before the time of the visit of the so-called Vijaya to the Island. If we examine the culture and life habits of the ancient Stone Age people they had a habit of inscribing their name or the names of those who shaped the clay pots and utensils, on them. This habit is seen to have existed both in South India and Sri Lanka during that period. This habit is not visible in any other part of India. These writings on clay pots have been unearthed in Tamil Nadu and in Anuradhapura. Anuradhapura pots belong to a period over 2750 years ago. The writings on pots have been identified as Tamil letters in the Tamil Language. Writing started in North India only about 2300 years ago. But both in Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka these writings have been found to exist much earlier. Now historians believe that the art of writing went from the South to North India.

    Recent Keeladi excavations in Madurai, South India has shown evidence of a civilization anterior to all others in India. Thus, before the introduction of Buddhism to Sri Lanka, the fact that the progenitors of the present Sinhalese and the Tamils lived here, has been accepted scientifically. The recent DNA tests confirmed this.

    When we examine the writings in Sinhala, Professor Fernando, Professor Saddha Mangala Karunaratne and Professor Ariya Abeysinghe have said that before the North Indian Prakrit was introduced with Buddhism into Sri Lanka, the Script similar to the South Indian Script was available in Sri Lanka. We could gather from their researches that Tamil Script and Tamil Language and Dravidian words were in use in Sri Lanka before Sinhala Language came into use. That is why I boldly said the language of our ancients was Tamil and the original indigenous population of Sri Lanka were Tamil.

    Buddhism spread in this Island from the 3rd Century BC onwards. Over 1500 identified inscriptions confirm this. These inscriptions have Brahmi script from North India plus Tamil Script inscribed on them. There was no Sinhala script nor Sinhala language nor Sinhalese people then. Thus it is clear that the Tamil Language was in use in Sri Lanka prior to the introduction of Buddhism and before the introduction of the North Indian Brahmi Script.

    Even though Professor Paranavithana tried to identify the North Indian Prakrit as an old Sinhala Script and tried to show wherever Prakrit was in use the Sinhalese lived there, this statement of the Professor is now not accepted because with the spread of Buddhism, the Prakrit script too spread all over South and South East Asia and was in use for over 700 years as the script of inscriptions. Prakrit was not old Sinhala. If it was, the Sinhala language should have been spoken in other South East Asian countries too.

    But in Tamil Nadu the language of the Buddhist inscriptions was Tamil. If we examine the 1500 Brahmi inscriptions in Sri Lanka even though Northern Brahmi was generally used, in addition, many Tamil words were also used. Specially the names of individual Tamils were referred to in Tamil. Relationships among individuals were referred to in the Tamil Language. Place names have been written in Tamil. Even titles of Tamil rulers were written in Tamil. This shows the existence of the Tamil language in Sri Lanka before the introduction of Buddhism and hence Tamils were the original inhabitants of this Island at the time Buddhism was introduced.

    If we examine the evolution of the Sinhala language we have a parallel in the evolution of Malayalam. The present Kerala was part of Tamil-speaking regions in Tamil Nadu. They were ruled by Chera Kings. The transformation of Tamil to Malayalam took place due to the heavy influence of Sanskrit from the 10th  Century AD on the Tamil language. Tamil plus Sanskrit brought in Malayalam. Hence I referred to a new language in the offing in Chennai today. Tamil plus English might produce Tamilish in 25 to 50 years.

    Similarly, the introduction of the Pali language in Sri Lanka as the language of Buddhism when it mixed with the local Tamil language it developed into a new language called Sinhalese around the 6th or 7thCentury AD.

    The evidence for this could be found in Sigiriya. Sigiriya inscriptions of 5th Century AD portray early Sinhalese not yet developed into a proper language. Thus there is no evidence that the Sinhala language existed before the 7th Century AD. The Sinhala Script has developed due to the mixing of Brahmi letters with the Pallava period grantha letters.

    The Sinhala literature like Rajavaliya and Poojavaliya belongs to the 13th Century AD.

    Your question contains a reference to the Tamils coming here only during the Chola conquest in 10thCentury. There had been Tamils living on this Island from a long, long time ago. May be from the time of the Lemurian Continent which is now under the Indian Ocean. The earliest Tamil Sangam period and the Second Sangam period (Muthal Sangam and Idai Sangam) have been referred to in the last Sangam period (Kadai Sangam) literature and the literary works of the earlier Sangam Periods are referred to in the Kadai Sangam literature. Tamil is one of the earliest languages of this World if not the earliest. There have been Pandya, Pallava, and Chola conquests of Sri Lanka from ancient times. Thus there have been waves of Tamil intrusions. But the original Tamils of Sri Lanka have been occupying this Country from over 3000 years ago. The present tendency to refer to Buddhism as that of the Sinhalese and Hinduism as that of the Tamils is erroneous. When religions are introduced into a Country they are not introduced to be followed only by particular races. When Buddhism was introduced into this Island there were no Sinhalese. Thus the Tamil King Devanampiya Theesan got converted to Buddhism.

    There is considerable evidence to show the existence of Tamil Buddhists in Pali literature and Brahmic inscriptions. Tamil Kings were given the titles Buddha thasan and Buddhadevan when they supported Buddhism and Buddhist causes.

    Up to 15 th or 16 th  Century there were Tamil Buddhists according to Pali literature. The inscriptions of Nainatheevu in North Sri Lanka refer to Tamil Buddhists. Professor Sunil Ariyaratne in his “Demala Baudhayo” refers to Tamil Buddhists.

    In recent times Sinhalese portraying themselves as Buddhists and Tamils as Hindus have brought about polarization says Professor Pushparatnam. This could have been avoided he says.

    When I was living in the old Anuradhapura Town in the 1940s there were Tamils who owned lots of lands around Nuwara Wewa who were more or less Demala Baudhayos. Even I used to go to Ruwanwelisaya and Mahabodhi to worship with my parents (both Hindus). We joined the Buddhists who came from nearby villages to do “Pongal” during Poson. Buddhist philosophy influenced me considerably. Together with Dr Adikaram and others, we were votaries of Philosopher J. Krishnamurthi whose teachings were close to Buddhist philosophy. Of course, later, Hindu Saints were able to point out the limitations of the Buddhist philosophy to me.

    Professor Pushparatnam has said even the Mahawansa is a useful reference Book to prove the existence of Tamils at the time of the arrival of Vijaya.

    Mahawansa refers to 700 Tamil Brides from Madurai together with 1000 Tamil families employed in 18 professions being brought down to Sri Lanka on Vijaya’s request. That means more Tamil families came into the Country from Madurai than the 701 who came from elsewhere! This is according to the Mahawansa!

    Even the so-called statement of Dushta Gamini that the Tamils are on one side and the sea on the other side refers to the existence of a large amount of Tamils in the country at that time says Professor Pushparatnam. Ellalan was a Tamil King thus how could anyone say Tamils for the first time arrived at the time of the Chola conquest in the 10th century AD?

    Finally a word about Homeland of the Tamils. Before the Bakthi Cult was born in Tamil Nadu there is evidence of Tamils living outside the North and East as well. Pali Literature and certain inscriptions refer to the presence and influence of Tamils in Anuradhapura.

    Before Independence, the influence of Tamils in Anuradhapura was considerable in the Old Town. The new Town was constructed, one is forced to deduce, to reduce and negate the Tamil influence in Anuradhapura.

    Mahawansa refers to 32 Petty Tamil Kings Dutugemunu had to overcome before reaching Ellalan’s Capital. Coins of that period have been unearthed which point to Tamil presence from South to North. There are Tamil letters in those Coins. Names of Tamil Petty Kings are found in some of them. After the Bakthi Cult prospered in the North and East many Tamils living in other parts of Sri Lanka preferred to go to the North and East since the famous Hindu Temples lay there. This was a time when Jainism and Buddhism were beginning to go out of vogue due to the re-emergence of Saivaism consequent to the Bakthi Cult. The Thevarams of Nayanmars in South India referred to Thiruketheeswaram and Thirukoneswaram in Sri Lanka.

    Especially there is reference to Trincomalee being a full-fledged Saivite Tamil City. When the Cholas were ruling from Polonnaruwa their commercial outlet was Trincomalee. The North and East were distinct areas of Tamil habitation during the Chola Rule. The Jaffna Kingdom was consequent and subsequent to the Chola Rule. From the 13th Century to the 17th Century the Jaffna Kingdom existed. Puttalam came under the rule of the Jaffna King. Udapu is still a Tamil Village.

    When the Dutch during their rule brought out Coins they referred to the North and East separately and had them minted in Tamil. Thus the North and East were the homelands of the Tamils.

    To conclude – the Tamils were the Original inhabitants of this Island and there have been several waves of Tamil conquest but they only added to the Original indigenous Tamils who continued to live here from pre-historic times. Chola conquest was only one such intrusion from South India. Sinhala Language and Sinhala Race are very recent chronologically though the Sinhalese and the Tamils have had common progenitors from ancient times.

    Feature Image: Kandy Temple Precincts – Photo Credit: M Matheswaran

    This article was published earlier in Colombo Telegraph.

  • Indian Foreign Secretary visits Colombo: Attempt to reset India-Sri Lanka ties

    Indian Foreign Secretary visits Colombo: Attempt to reset India-Sri Lanka ties

    India and Sri Lanka are immediate neighbours that share cultural, historical and religious ties spanning over thousands of years. Indian tourists to Sri Lanka are a major source of tourism revenue for the island nation. Despite all these ties, the bilateral relations continue to be impacted by considerable mistrust. Recent increase in tensions between the two South Asian neighbours is a result of the island nation allowing China to enhance its strategic footprints in Sri Lanka and increase its influence in the region. Despite certain inconsistencies in the Indo-Sri Lankan bilateral relationship, it will still be in the best interests of both countries to enhance their relationship amid the uncertain shifts in the geopolitical landscape.

    Indian Foreign Secretary’s visit to Colombo

    India’s foreign secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla concluded a four-day state visit to the Island nation on October 5. His sojourn commenced at a time when Colombo expressed her eagerness to ink a few defence pacts with New Delhi.

    The visit was eventful as well as broad-based. The Foreign Secretary  held a meeting with the Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa on tourism, power generation, and cooperation in economic recovery. To reset the strained relations with Colombo, Shringla’s schedule was kept tight and focused on closed-door discussions. He called on Sri Lankan Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa, Finance Minister Basil Rajapaksa, Foreign Minister G.L. Peiris and Foreign Secretary Admiral Jayanath Colombage (Rerd). From the capital, Shringla hopped from one town to another. He visited and held meetings in Kandy, Trincomalee and Jaffna to enhance bilateral ties.

     

    While in Trincomalee, he explored the possibilities for materializing the India-Sri Lanka energy partnership. In separate meetings with  Tamil National Alliance (TNA), Tamil Progressive Alliance (TPA), and Ceylon Workers’ Congress (CWC), Shringla voiced India’s firm support to the implementation of the 13th Amendment, a constitutional amendment that would empower the Tamil minorities but continues to be held in abeyance by the Sri Lankan government. During his visit, Shringla launched a few Indian initiatives like Model Housing Village’ in the northern district of Vavuniya, a school building at Vadamarachchi in Jaffna, and the Saraswathy Central College building in Pussellawa in Kandy. India had earlier constructed over 46,000 houses for the war-affected families in north.

    New Delhi has supplied to Colombo 100 tons of liquid medical oxygen, 26 tons of medicines and ambulances as part of its support to the Island’s efforts to overcome the pandemic. The state has also received about half a million Covid vaccines from India. Sri Lanka’s Suwa Seriya programme was supported by India. Sri Lanka and India together have implemented a USD 400 million currency swap agreement and one more is expected to happen.

    Colombo Crisis

     India’s External Affairs minister S. Jaishankar and Sri Lankan Foreign minister GL Peiris had a tête-à-tête on the side lines of UNGA in September. Weeks after Dr S. Jaishankar’s visit to Sri Lanka in the first week of January this year, Indian fishermen were killed by the Sri Lankan Navy, which resulted in renewed tensions between the two countries.  Moreover, the cancellation of the tripartite Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Sri Lanka, India, and Japan for the development of the strategically located East Container Terminal (ECT) at the Colombo Port in February, added more salt to the already strained relations between the two neighbours.

    What became an even more controversial issue was when Sri Lanka cleared a Chinese energy project in three islands off the Jaffna peninsula that is barely 50 km from Tamil Nadu coast. Recently, Sri Lankan parliament passed the Colombo Port City Economic Commission Act to oversee a huge Chinese luxury oceanside development project. This gives China a significant foothold in the country and will allow it to enhance its strategic presence throughout the region. Accordingly, India emphasised that it expected Sri Lanka to be “mindful” of ties with New Delhi, particularly in the security realm.

    Interestingly, the series of events that have taken place this year came after the statement given by Sri Lankan Foreign Secretary Jayanath Colombage last year regarding Sri Lanka’s adoption of an “India first approach”, which reflects Colombo’s supposed willingness to protect New Delhi’s strategic interests in the region. However, despite these guarantees, the geopolitical shifts occurring in South Asia make it arduous for Sri Lanka to maintain consistently positive relations with its neighbour.

    Ties that continue to stand

     China has become a critical factor in the Indo-Sri Lankan bilateral equation. The East Asian giant’s deep pockets have become a more attractive economic option for Sri Lanka vis-à-vis India. While India took five months to approve a loan moratorium requested by Sri Lanka last year, China approved an additional USD 500 million loan expeditiously. Moreover, the issue involving the Tamil cause continues to sustain the long-standing trust deficit between the two South Asian neighbours.

    However, this is not to say that Sri Lanka will disregard India for its partnership with China. Colombo is aware of the risks involved in engaging deeply with China. Sri Lanka is no stranger to Beijing’s debt trap that compromises its sovereignty. Despite Rajapaksa’s cordial ties with China, Sri Lanka will have to inevitably reconsider its priorities if this continues to persist.

    While China may have the upper hand in mega-infrastructure projects, India’s role in cementing its people-to-people ties with Sri Lanka and taking the lead in the education, health, and tourism sectors, continue to give it considerable edge in the overall inter-state dynamics. Apart from being its major trading partner, India has also demonstrated its proactive partnership by being the first responder in humanitarian assistance.  Most importantly, India has no interest in compromising Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Additionally, India continues to reiterate that it gives priority to Sri Lanka under key regional frameworks such as its Neighbourhood First Policy and Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR).

    Sri Lanka is also aware of this and has tried to make up for its decisions that have compromised India’s interests. Despite cancelling the ECT tri-partite MoU, Sri Lanka has taken the prerogative to permit Indian companies to develop its West Container Terminal (WCT). Moreover, the scheduled address by Pakistani Prime Imran Khan, to the Sri Lankan Parliament during his visit to Sri Lanka in February, was also cancelled. Recently, much attention has been placed on Sri Lanka’s “roadmap” to restore ties with India and address several important issues such as the fishermen’s issues, building connectivity, trade and investment, and promoting religious links.

    A way forward

     At a time when India’s Indo-Pacific concerns are on the rise, New Delhi is perturbed by Beijing’s diplomatic successes in Sri Lanka and throughout South Asia. China’s quick responses and its its large funding are attractions that has swayed the Island nation towards a pro-China policy. Given the endemic corruption and the Chinese-engineered Sinhala chauvinism with anti-India stance has forced Indian companies to become very cautious about investing in Sri Lanka. But India is ahead of China when it comes to tourism, and health care. Sri Lankan students are now eligible to compete in India’s National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET) and Joint Entrance Examination for the IITs. Last year India’s allocation of $50million for counter-terrorism and $15 million for promoting the Buddhist links drew tremendous positive attention of Lankan policymakers. The first pilgrims’ flight from Sri Lanka to Kushinagar in Uttar Pradesh is expected to take off soon. From the days of Julius Jeyawardane Sri Lanka has evolve a very crafty and nuanced diplomatic strategy, a truly Chanakyan approach. India will need to be equally crafty to checkmate the Chinese inroads into Sri Lanka. [TPF].

     

    Feature Image Credit: Lankaxpress

     

  • Changing Paradigms of Political Canvas in Sri Lanka

    Changing Paradigms of Political Canvas in Sri Lanka

    The intransigent ethno-political emotional divide amongst the Sri Lankan society of 1980s manifested into a bloodiest insurgency with the Tamil separatists almost succeeding in carving out a separate Tamil Elam in the North and Eastern regions of the island nation. The political divide at that juncture was result of a racial cleavage between the Sinhala majority and oppressed Tamil minority which prompted the later to rebel in the face of socio-economic denials of all kinds.

    It was India who came to rescue of the Sri Lankan government of the day in 1987 to ensure territorial integrity of the country even at the cost of negative political repercussions within India. The India had to pay the price of this political outreach to Sri Lanka with life of Rajiv Gandhi, the prime minister who went out of way to help them in their hour of crisis. The deeply indebted Sinhala dominated Sri Lanka of 80s seem to be chartering a different trajectory now with self serving opportunist afflictions due to inducements of easy money from extra regional players, especially China.

    While encashing the apparent Chinese benevolence, the gullible Sri Lankan politicians seem to have ignored the basic dictum that ‘there are no free lunches’ in this world. And the slip is showing wherein the Sri Lankan political dispensation seems to have compromised on their territorial integrity by leasing out Habantota port and 15000 acres of land in lieu of repayment of Chinese loans. A precedence has been set for more such sovereign compromises in times to come for which India had fought a bloody battle against their own co ethnic insurgents.

    The motive of the ongoing political drama appears to be focused on facilitating the Chinese cause even if it amounts to tempering with the constitutional jurisprudence. Indeed, there is a paradigm shift in political thinking with its doctrine of development through Chinese support which has obvious inherent centrifugal tendencies as against focus on internal economic consolidation. Instead of reclaiming the lost politico-economic ground to China post Habantota episode, a major part of Sri Lankan polity seem to be under compulsion to toe the Chinese lines due to debt diplomacy so cleverly orchestrated by the Chinese.

    The close scrutiny of Sri Lankan political conduct in the past hinges on the non accommodation of rival ethnic, social or political groups within the Sri Lankan society which seem to continue even today in some form or other. Earlier it was based on ethnic rivalry between Sinhala and Tamils, and now it is intra Sinhala dispensation vying for more political and money power in a political set up with opportunist tendencies. Despite a vibrant democratic political dispensation to take care of well being of its subjects, the island nation has witnessed spells of changing political priorities and concomitant societal upheavals in the recent times. The military driven turbulent ethno- political complexion of 80s gave way to consolidation of socio-political synergies alongside resolving the internal security issues for almost three decades.

    Subsequently, in the aftermath of subjugation of Tamil insurgency in 2009, the priorities changed to the much needed economic development of the nation. However, the tourist predominant economy had woeful inadequacies of infrastructure and public conveniences to tap the potential of the nation at par with other international tourist destinations close by. To do that, there was no money due to prolonged war effort which in turn prompted Sri Lankan polity to look outwards paving way for externally influenced politico-economic opportunism.

    Chinese concept of BRI suited both China as well as the Sri Lanka as a mutually beneficial mechanism to take care of each other’s interests. The BRI concept envisages development of communication and transportation net work, industrial and power corridors as part of Chinese grand game for their global economic expansion. As far as China is concerned all the countries in the Indian Ocean are important for Chinese geo political matrix as a response mechanism for the security of her economic interests. Chinese conduct when hyphenated with their ‘’String of Pearls in the Indian Ocean’’, and their defiant politico-military stance in the South China Sea speaks of their seriousness and sensitivities of their interest in the Indo Pacific region. Sri Lanka happens to be in a pivotal position to serve the Chinese geo political interests.

    In the given circumstances, close affiliation with the China is a win -win situation for Sri Lanka for their economic buoyancy and a politically strong anchor to stand by their side in the time of crisis. However, there are also apprehensions of negative fallouts of new found political bonhomie with an outsider with prospects of disturbing existing stable regional political equilibrium fully aligned with socio- cultural emotional bind of Indian legacy. Accordingly, there is an emerging pattern of an internal political divide amongst Sri Lankan parties and individuals believing in encashing the pragmatic opportunism as against continuation of stability through India centric regional cohesiveness.

    The Mahindra Rajpaksha during his premiership was given loans worth $ 6 billion for various infrastructural projects including Hambantota port. Later the dept trap diplomacy of China got highlighted in their demand of ownership of the port plus land adjacent to it. It, surely, has exposed the dubious ways of China which has prompted number of recipients of Chinese benevolence to revisit their commitments with them as regards to BRI scheme. Sri Lankan civil society is ceased with this Chinese conduct and there is a resistance to encouraging Chinese intrusion into Sri Lankan affairs beyond a point.

    The opponent Ranil Wickremasinghe, is known to be a proponent of the Indian lobby who had, recently , cancelled housing project of more than 50,000 houses in North and Eastern Tamil areas given earlier to China in favour of Indian companies. The Rajapaksha was brought back as the prime minister by the president through an untenable political move leaving the country in a political chaos. The parliament was dissolved paving way for fresh elections. However, the Supreme Court ruled against this unconstitutional move by the president. It was probably done as Rajapakshe, like his previous tenure, would facilitate better relationship with the China looking at their current political compulsions and national interests.

    What is happening in the Sri Lankan political canvas seem to have imprints of pro India vs pro China lobbies. The fact that there is an outstanding loan of almost $ 5 billion despite handing over the Hambantota port to them, China may be pulling the strings to bring in a political dispensation favourable to them to do their bidding. The way the democratic norms are being flouted do indicate a desperate situation precipitated by the looming economic catastrophe waiting to happen.

    The military geography of Sri Lanka has bestowed her with a unique location to take care of the most vulnerable security concerns of China with 70% of trade and 90% of energy supplies passing through the Indian Ocean. Therefore, it is obvious that China is here to stay as a permanent feature and to do that they seem to have acquired a substantial political space in the Sri Lanka. Whereas, the Sri Lanka seem to have lost out on her autonomy to some extent as there is a probability of China dictating their terms when they find the policies are not in sync with Chinese interests.

    The likely Chinese naval presence at Hambantota port barely few hundred miles from Indian shores is a security concern for India. The Chinese politico-military afflictions in Sri Lanka is likely to prompt the western powers also to further enhance their military presence closer to the Indian shores. It, obviously, would impact the Indian security matrix with the extra regional players milling around in the areas of Indian influence all this time. The new nomenclature of ‘Indo Pacific ‘ referring to erstwhile IOR and Asia Pacific is manifestation new US maritime doctrine as a response mechanism to Chinese geo political expansion. The increase in the US sponsored military diplomacy in the region and revival of Quad are all indicative of new global strategic grand games being unfolded closer to the Indian shores.

    India has no choice but to upgrade her military capabilities to take care of the inimical developments around her periphery both on land as well as maritime domain. It warrants looking beyond defensive doctrines and acquire offensive capabilities for optimum power projection in the areas of concern, besides defence of the island territories and international maritime obligations. Given the distances from the main land and bottle necks for shipping, China would always be militarily vulnerable in the Indian Ocean. It stands to an advantage for India which need to be factored in the design of the military doctrine and its political strategic outreach.

    The Sri Lanka needs to recall that they stand integrated today due to unflinching support by India in their hour of crisis and sacrifices made by the Indian soldiers to hold their country together. They should also appreciate that the India continues to be the stabilizing factor for Sri Lanka and a friend in need. China on other hand is here to exploit the Sri Lankan geographical space for their geo political motives sans any benevolent emotional connect. In fact, China has already usurped their strategically located land through their manipulative ways. If the Sri Lankan polity has not understood their game plan then they should be prepared for more such disintegrating moves as part of their dubious debt diplomacy. The Sri Lanka is in economic crisis and stands vulnerable which is reflective in their recent political conduct. In that, there seem to be tell tale signs of Chinese complicity in the ongoing happenings in the Sri Lankan political space which is not a good news.

    India, obviously, has not been pro active enough to sense the aspirations of her neighbours and propensity of China to exploit the political deficit on the strength of her deep pockets and liberal military outreach. The Sri Lanka has a great significance for Indian security and we need to take all the possible measures to neutralize the Chinese foot prints in the island nation. India fortunately has a large influence in the Sri Lankan society and reckonable political leverages which needs to be nurtured and exploited in our national interests. India as a responsible regional country need to go all out to extend a helping hand to Sri Lanka in her testing times as their political stability is essential to the Indian strategic interests.

    Lt Gen Rameshwar Yadav is an Indian Army veteran and former Director General, Infantry. The views expressed are his own. This article was published earlier in https://cenjows.gov.in/article-detail?id=122