The Peninsula Foundation

Category: Afghanistan

  • INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN: PRAGMATISM IS KEY

    INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN: PRAGMATISM IS KEY

    Given that the Taliban appear sincere in their determination to secure peace and improve their citizens’ standard of living, it is prudent for India to remain cooperative and avoid overinvolvement in such matters at this time. It is also likely that, over time, Indian influence on Afghanistan—whether through development, trade, security, health, or education—will have a positive impact on Afghan society, mainly through the younger generation of Afghans studying in India

     

    Introduction

    During his week-long visit to India in October 2025, Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi, the foreign minister of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, became the first high-ranking Afghan official to travel to the country since the fall of the Ashraf Ghani regime in August 2021. The minister who faced a travel ban was permitted to enter India after the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee approved a waiver application on his behalf [1]. His visit and its portents have sparked numerous commentaries across South Asia. India-Afghanistan relations, which had receded from the limelight post the 2021 Taliban takeover in Kabul, are now being viewed with renewed interest.

    ‘Afghanistan Map: courtesy Nations Online Project’

    Afghanistan’s Enduring Importance

    A glance at the map above shows why Afghanistan is called the ‘Heart of Asia’. A country for the most part rugged and mountainous, it borders seven nations – Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China (Tibet at the tip of the Wakhan Corridor), India, and Pakistan- and sits at the crossroads of South, Central, and West Asia. The sheer geostrategic importance of this location, the multitude of tribal ethnicities and loyalties that transcend borders, and a fierce sense of independence have resulted in a turbulent history and the awarding of a less flattering designation: ‘Graveyard of Empires’. The most recent example is the defeat of the mighty Soviet Union by the Afghan Mujahedin, who were armed and aided by the West and trained by its proxy, Pakistan.

    Another reason for interest in Afghanistan is its vast untapped mineral reserves, valued at over $1 trillion, located in 24 specific ‘areas of interest’ across the country’s 34 provinces[2]. With nations eager to diversify sources of critical minerals and rare earths, this represents a hugely attractive opportunity. Landlocked Afghanistan’s access to the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf passes through Pakistan and Iran, respectively. This has implications for the West’s relations with both countries. Russia, seeking to consolidate influence in its neighbourhood, became the first country to recognise the Taliban regime in July this year. However, it is China that has arguably taken the lead in rehabilitating the Taliban regime globally. It has resumed full diplomatic relations by posting an ambassador in Kabul. To quote Shivam Shekhawat in his paper of July 2025, ‘…At the international level, Beijing has argued for Afghanistan’s reintegration and urged the international community not to interfere in its internal affairs. It has called for the removal of sanctions imposed on the Taliban leaders, the release of the country’s foreign reserves, and keeping aid independent from any political preconditions[3]. Also, it steadily expands its influence through trade. During the period August 2024 to August 2025, its exports to Afghanistan increased by 41.7% from $114 million to $161 million[4].

    With its unbroken history of conflict since 1979 and the geopolitical, social, and economic consequences on its neighbours, Afghanistan remains crucial to regional stability. Zobair Solahi discusses this in his April 2022 paper, where he states, ‘..A stable and peaceful Afghanistan could be an integral actor in trade, transit, and political stability across the Eurasian continent, but continued unrest will undermine regional peace and stability…’[5] This perspective needs to be appreciated by those who hold reservations about India-Afghanistan relations and who attribute hidden motives to our development efforts aimed at improving the lives of the Afghan people.

    The Situation Today

    The reasons for the failure of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (the US mission focused on counterterrorism and strengthening Afghan security forces) and NATO’s Operation Resolute Support are widely debated. What is not debated is the outcome – a Taliban regime that holds sway over the entire country. The new government (Taliban 2.0) now includes various factions of the Taliban militia, integrated into a new Afghan Army (AA). This AA has kept the structures of the old Afghan National Army (ANA) intact, replacing key commanders with Taliban loyalists. The AA has successfully sidelined a splintered opposition. While certain officials of previous regimes are eking out a quiet existence in Kabul under Taliban watch, warlords of past eras like Gen Rashid Dostum, now largely ineffective, live in exile. Younger men such as Ahmed Masood, son of the renowned ‘Lion of Panjsher’, Ahmed Shah Masood, lack both experience and influence. The few leaders of significance who still hold credibility, like former Vice President Amrullah Saleh, do not possess the resources to challenge the Taliban on a large scale needed to effect regime change. Although an armed opposition will continue mounting guerrilla actions against the Islamic Emirate, these are unlikely to lead to a change of government, at least in the medium term, and that too with extensive outside support, which is currently not forthcoming.

    After its voluntary exit in 2021, the recent shift of the US towards Afghanistan has sparked much speculation. The US desire to retake the Bagram air base outside Kabul is being linked to a host of reasons, including the official one of monitoring Chinese nuclear assets across the Wakhan corridor. There may be other motives—such as using a strategic asset like Bagram to effectively oversee activities in Russia, Iran, and Pakistan, and even the possibility that the threat of retaking the base could be used to extract unspoken concessions from the Taliban. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that the US would forcibly enter Afghanistan without the Taliban’s approval. More critically, even if a small American military presence is allowed by the Taliban, the implications of a superpower’s re-entry into the Heart of Asia will be significant, considering China’s and Russia’s footprints, and the situations in Iran and Pakistan. Afghanistan will once again be a key factor, with potential consequences for India.

    India and Afghanistan

    The Indian Embassy in Kabul. Original photo courtesy India Today, posted on KabulNow 22 October 2025

    Although India downgraded its diplomatic presence in Kabul following the Taliban takeover, it maintained a ‘technical mission’ with minimal staff. After a four-year period of ‘wait and watch’, it became evident that the Taliban is now the sole governing force in Afghanistan. The longstanding history of friendly economic, developmental, and people-to-people ties, the shared strategic understanding with previous regimes dating back to 1947, and the current regional security concerns highlight the need to restore the relationship for the benefit of both nations. On its part, the Taliban is eager to once again secure Indian developmental assistance, especially amid the reduction of Western aid following criticism of the human rights situation in the country.

    The outcome of this understanding is the visit of Mawlawi Muttaqi, an event of seminal importance. This was followed by the elevation of the technical mission in Kabul to the status of the Embassy of India on 21 October 2025[6]. Even a brief review of India’s assistance to Afghanistan over the years would reveal the substantial stakes India has in that country and the benefits it has gained in terms of goodwill. Areas of cooperation and assistance (including security collaboration) are well-known and numerous. It is to the credit of successive Indian governments that policy towards Afghanistan has remained consistent (except for a brief cooling period during the first Taliban regime and the current situation).

    Understandably, India at this juncture does not want to be crowded out of Afghanistan, ceding all the space to others. To their credit, the Taliban have recognised the advantages of cooperation. Mawlawi Muttaqi struck the right chords in his media interactions in Delhi by answering all questions (including those about women’s rights from Indian women journalists). He has welcomed the return of Sikh and Hindu refugees (an unlikely event, considering that most have either obtained Indian citizenship or secured asylum in the West) and has echoed India’s stance on terrorism. Importantly, he has criticised Pakistan, blaming its policies for the unrest along the Durand Line. India, on its part, has announced six new development projects in Afghanistan, along with several other measures outlined by External Affairs Minister Mr Jaishankar during his meeting with Mawlawi Muttaqi[7]. Muttaqi has also requested increased trade, including via Wagah-Attari, for which Pakistan’s cooperation is vital. Given that countries with hostile relations continue to trade (Bangladesh and Myanmar being examples, with Bangladesh approving the import of 50,000 tonnes of rice from Myanmar under government-to-government agreements)[8], this is a proposal worth pursuing, especially with Chabahar under US sanctions and the economic unviability of a sustained air corridor for trade and commerce.

    Importantly, on security issues, India and non-Taliban Afghan regimes have traditionally shared a similar outlook. With Taliban 2.0 promising to end the influence of terror organisations, including Al Qaeda and Islamic State, a stable Afghanistan could become a reality, benefiting regional stability. This would support Indian plans for trade corridors to Central Asia and beyond. It is clear that Afghanistan no longer considers Pakistan its benefactor, as shown by the changes in Afghan-Pakistani relations following the rise of Taliban 2.0. Actions such as Pakistan’s unilateral fencing of the Durand Line (allegedly even encroaching on Afghan territory in certain instances)[9], forcibly returning Afghan refugees, and border skirmishes culminating in Pakistani air strikes on Kabul, followed by the Doha ceasefire, are indicators. Currently, Pakistan’s prized ‘strategic depth’ through Afghanistan stands denied. This benefits India, as Pakistan must maintain heightened vigilance on two borders. If the Pakistani government recognises its constraints, a less hostile relationship with India might also be possible.

    Conclusion

    Optimists might argue that India-Afghanistan relations have come full circle over four years. However, there are vital differences in how the two nations approach ideology and governance. Despite claims to the contrary, gender and ethnic disparities in Afghanistan are too evident to overlook. Additionally, India must bear in mind that the opposition’s return to power could always be a possibility in the long run. Therefore, fully endorsing Taliban policies in the face of visible social instability in Afghanistan is neither wise nor desirable, as it conflicts with India’s longstanding views on such issues.

    That said, the mere fact that such problems have been acknowledged by Taliban 2.0, even if somewhat vaguely, is a step forward. Also, given that the Taliban appear sincere in their determination to secure peace and improve their citizens’ standard of living, it is prudent for India to remain cooperative and avoid overinvolvement in such matters at this time. It is also likely that, over time, Indian influence on Afghanistan—whether through development, trade, security, health, or education—will have a positive impact on Afghan society, mainly through the younger generation of Afghans studying in India. With a combination of pragmatism and goodwill, this relationship is destined to benefit both nations.

     

    End Notes:

    [1]‘UNSC Panel Clears Muttaqi’s Travel, Paving Way for Taliban’s First Ministerial Trip to India’ The Wire 03 October 2025.

    [2]  ‘Mapping Afghanistan’s Untapped Natural Resources’ Mohammed Hussein and Mohammed Haddad  Al Jazeera, 24 September 2021.

    [3] ‘Understanding China’s Engagement with Afghanistan Under Taliban 2.0’  Shivam Shekhawat  Issue Brief Issue No 816 July 2025 Observer Research Foundation.

    [4] ‘  Website of the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) China and Afghanistan trade figures’.

    [5] ‘Afghanistan: A Junction of Asia’s Connectivity’  Zobair Salahi  The National Bureau of Asian Research May 28, 2022

    [6] Upgradation of the Technical Mission of India in Kabul to Embassy of India, Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs  , media centre press release dated 21 October 2025 on website mea.gov.in

    [7] EAM’s opening remarks during meeting with Foreign Minister of Afghanistan (October 10, 2025)’ Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs media centre speeches and statements on website mea.gov.in

    [8] 100,000 tons of rice to be imported from Myanmar, Dubai, Dhaka Tribune, 22 October 2025,   Tribune Desk.[4] ‘  Website of the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) China and Afghanistan trade figures’.

    [9] ‘The Durand Line and the Fence: How are communities managing with cross-border lives?’ Sabawoon Samim,  Afghanistan Analysts Network  , Regional Relations  , April 2024.

     

    Feature Image Credit: www.arabnews.com

     

  • What Ukraine needs to learn from Afghanistan about proxy wars

    What Ukraine needs to learn from Afghanistan about proxy wars

    The greatest enemy of economic development is war. If the world slips further into global conflict, our economic hopes and our very survival could go up in flames. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has moved the hands of the Doomsday Clock to a mere 90 seconds to midnight. The world’s biggest economic loser in 2022 was Ukraine, where the economy collapsed by 35% according to the International Monetary Fund. The war in Ukraine could end soon, and economic recovery could begin, but this depends on Ukraine understanding its predicament as a victim of a US-Russia proxy war that broke out in 2014.

    The US has been heavily arming and funding Ukraine since 2014 with the goal of expanding Nato and weakening Russia. America’s proxy wars typically rage for years and even decades, leaving battleground countries like Ukraine in rubble.

    Unless the proxy war ends soon, Ukraine faces a dire future. Ukraine needs to learn from the horrible experience of Afghanistan to avoid becoming a long-term disaster. It could also look to the US proxy wars in Vietnam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Iraq, Syria, and Libya.

    Starting in 1979, the US armed the mujahideen (Islamist fighters) to harass the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan. As president Jimmy Carter’s national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski later explained, the US objective was to provoke the Soviet Union to intervene, in order to trap the Soviet Union in a costly war. The fact that Afghanistan would be collateral damage was of no concern to US leaders.

    The Soviet military entered Afghanistan in 1979 as the US hoped, and fought through the 1980s. Meanwhile, the US-backed fighters established al-Qaeda in the 1980s, and the Taliban in the early 1990s. The US “trick” on the Soviet Union had boomeranged.

    In 2001, the US invaded Afghanistan to fight al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The US war continued for another 20 years until the US finally left in 2021. Sporadic US military operations in Afghanistan continue.

    Afghanistan lies in ruins. While the US wasted more than $ 2 trillion of US military outlays, Afghanistan is impoverished, with a 2021 GDP below $400 per person! As a parting “gift” to Afghanistan in 2021, the US government seized Afghanistan’s tiny foreign exchange holdings, paralysing the banking system.

    The proxy war in Ukraine began nine years ago when the US government backed the overthrow of Ukraine’s president Viktor Yanukovych. Yanukovych’s sin from the US viewpoint was his attempt to maintain Ukraine’s neutrality despite the US desire to expand Nato to include Ukraine (and Georgia). America’s objective was for Nato countries to encircle Russia in the Black Sea region. To achieve this goal, the US has been massively arming and funding Ukraine since 2014.

    The American protagonists then and now are the same. The US government’s point person on Ukraine in 2014 was Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland, who today is Undersecretary of State. Back in 2014, Nuland worked closely with Jake Sullivan, president Joe Biden’s national security adviser, who played the same role for vice president Biden in 2014.

    The US overlooked two harsh political realities in Ukraine. The first is that Ukraine is deeply divided ethnically and politically between Russia-hating nationalists in western Ukraine and ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine and Crimea.

    The second is that Nato enlargement to Ukraine crosses a Russian redline. Russia will fight to the end, and escalate as necessary, to prevent the US from incorporating Ukraine into Nato.

    The US repeatedly asserts that Nato is a defensive alliance. Yet Nato bombed Russia’s ally Serbia for 78 days in 1999 in order to break Kosovo away from Serbia, after which the US established a giant military base in Kosovo. Nato forces similarly toppled Russian ally Moammar Qaddafi in 2011, setting off a decade of chaos in Libya. Russia certainly will never accept Nato in Ukraine.

    At the end of 2021, Russian president Vladimir Putin put forward three demands to the US: Ukraine should remain neutral and out of Nato; Crimea should remain part of Russia; and the Donbas should become autonomous in accord with the Minsk II Agreement.

    The Biden-Sullivan-Nuland team rejected negotiations over Nato enlargement, eight years after the same group backed Yanukovych’s overthrow. With Putin’s negotiating demands flatly rejected by the US, Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022.

    In March 2022, Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky seemed to understand Ukraine’s dire predicament as a victim of a US-Russia proxy war. He declared publicly that Ukraine would become a neutral country, and asked for security guarantees. He also publicly recognised that Crimea and Donbas would need some kind of special treatment.

    Israel’s prime minister at that time, Naftali Bennett, became involved as a mediator, along with Turkey. Russia and Ukraine came close to reaching an agreement. Yet, as Bennett has recently explained, the US “blocked” the peace process.

    Since then, the war has escalated. According to US investigative reporter Seymour Hersh, US agents blew up the Nord Stream pipelines in September, a claim denied by the White House. More recently, the US and its allies have committed to sending tanks, longer-range missiles, and possibly fighter jets to Ukraine.

    The basis for peace is clear. Ukraine would be a neutral non-Nato country. Crimea would remain home to Russia’s Black Sea naval fleet, as it has been since 1783. A practical solution would be found for the Donbas, such as a territorial division, autonomy, or an armistice line.

    Most importantly, the fighting would stop, Russian troops would leave Ukraine, and Ukraine’s sovereignty would be guaranteed by the UN Security Council and other nations. Such an agreement could have been reached in December 2021 or in March 2022.

    Above all, the government and people of Ukraine would tell Russia and the US that Ukraine refuses any longer to be the battleground of a proxy war. In the face of deep internal divisions, Ukrainians on both sides of the ethnic divide would strive for peace, rather than believing that an outside power will spare them the need to compromise.
    Feature Image Credit: politico.eu

    This article was published earlier in dailymaverick.co.za and is republished with the permission of the author.

  • Women in Afghanistan: The Fight Back

    Women in Afghanistan: The Fight Back

    [powerkit_button size=”lg” style=”info” block=”true” url=”https://admin.thepeninsula.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Womens-Right-In-Afghanistan_Hemantika-1.pdf” target=”_blank” nofollow=”false”]
    Download
    [/powerkit_button]

    Introduction:

    Women and men undergo varied experiences in the event of an absolute collapse of the socio-political order. When combined with a catastrophic political transformation, their exposure to systemic abuse and violence dramatically increases. The vulnerability of women and their exposure to such violence is much more pronounced compared to what men face. This paper attempts to map the violence and abuse of rights women in Afghanistan are facing under the new Taliban rule after the American withdrawal. It also focusses on their response to the same. 

    Women under Taliban 1.0

    Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic country with a diverse population. Women’s issues have always had a central role in the governance system. From the beginning of the birth of modern-day Afghanistan, different monarchs have played a key role in determining the status of women in society, in line with their Islamic worldview. However, though women were considered inferior to men, they had their share of rights that were in no way meant to keep them confined to their houses. Instead, their free movement was hardly restricted. Covering their heads or wearing a burqa was not mandatory. There were organizations like the Anjuman-I-Himayat-I-Niswan(Organization for Women Protection), which worked to encourage women into reporting any kind of injustice meted to them. 

    After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, women’s rights were further amplified with universities in most cities, especially Kabul admitting them. After the departure of the Soviets in May 1988, the Mujahedeen overturned all that the Soviet Union had stood for, which included women’s rights regarding employment and education. Women were pushed away from public life and forced to wear a burqa. Fewer women were visible on television.

    [powerkit_button size=”lg” style=”info” block=”true” url=”https://admin.thepeninsula.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Womens-Right-In-Afghanistan_Hemantika-1.pdf” target=”_blank” nofollow=”false”]
    Download
    [/powerkit_button]

  • The Geopolitical Significance of Chabahar Port to India 

    The Geopolitical Significance of Chabahar Port to India 

    The port of Chabahar is a seaport in south-eastern Iran, located on the Gulf of Oman, at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz. It is situated in Sistan-va-Baluchestan, one of Iran’s least developed provinces. Contrary to Bandar Abbas, the busiest port in Iran, Chabahar is a deep-water port with direct access to the Indian Ocean that is outside the Hormuz Strait. It is Iran’s only seaport and consists of two separate ports called Shahid Beheshti and Shahid Kalantari. The last Shah of Iran proposed the port’s development in 1973. Work in Chabahar began when the Shah of Iran, Reza Pahlavi, was in power. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 hindered the development of this port. Following the 1979 Islamic revolution, US firms involved in various infrastructure investments fled the country. The new government took on these projects. The port of Chabahar grew in importance during the Iran-Iraq war of 1983 when ships were hesitant to enter the Strait of Hormuz. The port’s first phase opened during the Iran-Iraq war, when Iran began shifting maritime trade up the east coast toward the Pakistani border to reduce the reliance on Persian Gulf ports which were susceptible to attack by the Iraq Air Force. Chabahar is substantial for its fishing industry and will serve as a major trade hub designed to connect South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Chabahar can emerge as a potential global trading hub – and an arena for geopolitical competition. Chabahar is vital for both India and Iran to reduce their dependence on the Suez Canal for transporting cargo to Europe. Chabahar is a strategic port from an Indian perspective. Apart from being easily accessible from India’s western coasts, it serves several important functions. For starters, by having access to the port, India can reduce its commute time to Central Asia by one-third. Second, a link between Afghanistan and India could be built without going through Pakistan and this could help the already established diplomatic, security and economic relationship between New Delhi and Kabul. Third, India gains road access to four cities in Afghanistan via Chabahar: Herat, Kandahar, Kabul, and Mazar-e-Sharif. This will help India strengthen its trade with Afghanistan (“Chabahar and Beyond” 2016). However, the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 gives rise to a certain level of uncertainty. The current geopolitical environment, both regional and global, creates opportunities for India to overcome possible uncertainties.

    New Delhi views Chabahar port as a means of bypassing Pakistan’s land routes to gain access to the Afghan and Central Asian markets.

    Being one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, expansion of trade relations and access to new markets is a necessity for India. As an investor, New Delhi views Chabahar port as a means of bypassing Pakistan’s land routes to gain access to the Afghan and Central Asian markets. Pakistan’s Gwadar port is one possible route for India to access Central Asian markets, India has long aimed for alternative routes due to its adversarial relationship with Pakistan (“Chabahar Port: A Step toward Connectivity for India and Afghanistan,” n.d.). Additionally, the port will strengthen relations between India and Iran, which may help counterbalance strong Sino-Pakistani cooperation. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MEA), India and Iran share close historical and civilizational ties, “Our bilateral relations are marked by strong linkages across institutions, cultures and people-to-people ties,” the MEA said in a statement. Afghanistan also seeks to explore new trade routes to reach international markets. It aims to reduce its dependence on Pakistan, which handles most of the Afghan trade due to the country’s landlocked status. 

    Afghanistan is crucial for India’s ‘neighbourhood first’ strategy. India assisted Afghanistan in becoming a full member state of SAARC in 2007. It signed a Preferential Trade Agreement with Kabul in 2003 following the establishment of the interim government post the US’s intervention in 2001. Under the North-South Transport Corridor framework, India, Afghanistan, and Iran signed the Chabahar port agreement in 2003, allowing all three countries to use the Chabahar port as a trade hub. India is working on constructing the Chabahar port primarily to compete with the Gwadar port project and to connect it to Russia’s International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). India has already built a 218-km-long road from Delaram to Zaranj (“India Completes Zaranj-Delaram Highway in Afghanistan” 2008) and now plans to connect this road to Chabahar port and deliver goods through this route. India is also keen on using the Chabahar port to connect the oil-rich Central Asian countries by road connectivity via the Milak (Iran) and Zaranj-Dilaram (Afghanistan) roads. For India, the port, which is only 940 kilometers from Mundra in Gujarat, is about more than just facilitating the flow of trade with Afghanistan. Rather, the development of Chabahar is a crucial component of the country’s grand strategy to connect with Central Asia. India’s justification for wanting to develop the Chabahar Port goes beyond its interest in Afghanistan. Enhancing regional trade and connectivity as well as thwarting China’s expanding influence in the Indian Ocean are other top priorities for Indian foreign policy (“What Are India, Iran, and Afghanistan’s Benefits from the Chabahar Port Agreement? Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses,” n.d.).

    Geopolitical Challenges

    The port of Chabahar will be of little use if Afghanistan is not stable. Indian interest in the Chabahar Port, therefore, continues to be closely linked to the geopolitical changes the region is currently experiencing.

    The competition for regional dominance between India and China can be seen in the development of ports in the regions. Indian involvement in the Chabahar port is important in securing India’s interest in the region. A calculative China will seize any opportunity that India might present in the port facility. If China moves in, Indian investments in the Chabahar port may be unfavorably affected (Pant and Mehta, 2018). A significant barrier is the complex nature of India-Iran relations, in which the former does not hold a privileged position. Given India’s priorities in the Middle East, it is unlikely that the relationship with Iran could compete with the comprehensive partnership that China and Pakistan share, which includes a strong defence and security arrangement. Iran may find it challenging to ignore or exclude China, its largest foreign investor, from the Chabahar project. Additionally, China has successfully completed several infrastructure projects in Iran, including the Tehran Metro, and has allocated US$ 1.5 billion through its EXIM Bank for the electrification of the Tehran-Mashhad railway line (“$1.5b China Loan for Iranian Rail Project” 2017).

    Peace and stability in Afghanistan will also impact the performance of the Chabahar Port. The tumultuous security situation in Afghanistan could jeopardise trilateral efforts between India, Iran, and Afghanistan to operate the Chabahar Port facility. And finally, the port of Chabahar will be of little use if Afghanistan is not stable. Indian interest in the Chabahar Port, therefore, continues to be closely linked to the geopolitical changes the region is currently experiencing.

    References

    “$1.5b China Loan for Iranian Rail Project.” 2017. Financial Tribune. July 25, 2017. https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-domestic-economy/68986/update-15b-china-loan-for-iranian-rail-project.

    Amirthan, Shawn. 2016. “What Are India, Iran, and Afghanistan’s Benefits from the Chabahar Port Agreement?” Strategic Analysis 41 (1): 87–93. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2016.1249184.

    “Chabahar and Beyond.” 2016. Www.thehindubusinessline.com. May 25, 2016. https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/editorial/chabahar-and-beyond/article8646239.ece.

    “Chabahar Port: A Step toward Connectivity for India and Afghanistan.” n.d. Thediplomat.com. https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/chabahar-port-a-step-toward-connectivity-for-india-and-afghanistan/.

    “India Completes Zaranj-Delaram Highway in Afghanistan.” 2008. Development News from Afghanistan, August 24, 2008. https://afghandevnews.wordpress.com/2008/08/24/india-completes-zaranj-delaram-highway-in-afghanistan/.

    Pant, Harsh V., and Ketan Mehta. 2018. “India in Chabahar.” Asian Survey 58 (4): 660–78. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2018.58.4.660.

    “What Are India, Iran, and Afghanistan’s Benefits from the Chabahar Port Agreement? Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.” n.d. Idsa.in. https://idsa.in/strategicanalysis/40_1/india-iran-and-afghanistans-benefits-from-the-chabahar-port-agreement.

    Featured Image Credit: Lowy Institute

  • Dagshai And Kasauli – The Afghanistan Connection

    Dagshai And Kasauli – The Afghanistan Connection

    With Afghanistan, the Taliban, and the for-ever conflict grabbing the headlines across the world over the last few months, it is well to recognise that the histories of India and Afghanistan are intertwined from time immemorial. Anand Sethi digs into the 19th and 20th-century history to bring out some fascinating connections between Dagshai in Himachal Pradesh and Afghanistan – Team TPF

    The Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) in Dagshai Cantonment is quite unique. Set up some 14 years ago at the instance of a dynamic Commanding Officer of the then Gorkha Rifles Battalion stationed in Dagshai, the ATM is housed in a smallish, stand-alone, colonial-era stone-built sloped roof hutment which most likely served as an extension of the kitchen facilities for a cluster of similarly constructed nearby barracks. It is quite unique. It communicates with the infrastructure by means of a huge, floor-mounted, satellite dish antenna. Given the nearly non – existent banking facilities, this ATM has served as our ‘go-to’ facility to withdraw cash for our personal expenses during the exasperating COVID times!

    On normal working times and days, with the troops busy with their official duties, there is usually only a rare person ahead of one at the ATM. Social distancing is the least of the problems here. However, on this particular day a few months back there were two persons ahead of me to use the ATM. This prompted a little ‘walkabout’ to while away the time and to maintain social distancing. While returning I noticed that there was some inscription or lettering on a whitish background near the top of the hutment but quite obscured due to the collection of grime, mud, rainwater stains that had accumulated over many years. Upon completing the ATM transaction I managed to clamber up and did a vigorous cleaning of the inscription.  What emerged was the signage: ’40 A GHAZNI LINES’. This was quite incredible! There has never been any mention of Dagshai having had a ‘Ghazni Lines’. Certainly not in any maps or documents painstakingly collected over the years by me for our ‘Dagshai Jail Museum’. Evidently, some Regiment(s) had gone from Dagshai to fight in the battles at Ghazni during the Afghan wars (or stationed in Dagshai afterward), received their ‘Battle Honours’ there.

    Research conducted indicates that no formations linked with Dagshai were involved in the Battle of Ghazni (‘Ghuznee’) in September 1842. However, two Regiments with clear Dagshai connections were very much in the ‘Battle Order’ during the First Battle of Ghazni in July 1839 (Gen. Sir John Keane versus Hyder Khan). Both received the Ghazni Battle Honours. One was the 1st Bengal Fusiliers who had been stationed in Dagshai during the tumultuous period of 1856 – 57. They of course had the dubious distinction of having as one of their Officers the ‘infamous’ (Brevet) Major William Hodson (whose portrait hangs amongst the ‘infamous Dagshaiites’ in our Jail Museum), the one who in 1857 apprehended Bahadur Shah Zafar and killed the royal princes. However, it is somewhat doubtful that the 1st Bengal Fusiliers had the Ghazni Lines in Dagshai named after their Battle Honours. The unit was away from Dagshai for a large part of their stay doing duties in and around Delhi during the 1857 ‘troubles’.

    The most likely formation to have the Ghazni Lines in Dagshai named after them would thus be the 2ndRegiment of Foot (Queen’s Royal West Surrey – the Queen, in this case, being Queen Catherine of Braganza, wife of King Charles II), presently operating as the Princess of Wales Royal Regiment.  This was the second senior-most line Regiment (after the Royal Scots) in the regular British Army. (The 1stBengal Fusiliers, on the other hand, was a formation of the East India Company’s Army, during their Dagshai stay). They were first garrisoned in Dagshai in 1870 -71. They not only took part in the 1839 battle at Ghazni but also got Battle Honours at the Battle of Khelat later that year. The Regimental History of the 2nd Regiment of Foot carries this interesting piece – “The formidable Ghazni fortress protected by thick 60 feet high walls prevented a major problem especially due to the lack of heavy artillery. The capture of Ghazni fortress was made possible only because Mohan Lal, a Kashmiri interpreter, spy, and assistant to the Political Officer Captain Sir Alexander Burnes, managed to discover that one of the gates to the fortress was somehow left poorly defended”. An interesting trivia about the 2nd Regiment of Foot – they were the only British Regiment where the Officers were allowed to remain seated while drinking the Loyal Toast to the Monarch. Apparently, this was so because the Regiment had been attached to the Royal Navy for a period of time and adopted the Navy’s tradition of sitting!

    The case for the 2nd Regiment of Foot for having set up Dagshai’s Ghazni Lines gets strengthened by the fact that they returned to Dagshai for the period 1895 – 96.  The Regiment went back to fight in Afghanistan in 1897, this time in Tirah (now in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan) before being garrisoned in Peshawar in 1902. They returned to Dagshai in 1916 for a short third spell in the garrison.

    Arguably, the Regiment with Dagshai as well as old Afghanistan links would be the Gordon Highlanders (earlier the 92nd Regiment of Foot). First stationed in Dagshai in 1860, the Regiment acquired as their Regimental Tune (still is the Regimental Tune and my mobile phone caller tune), the now-classic Pipes and Drums composition “Dagshai Hills” in 9/8 format march by the famous John Wallace. The Gordons fought in the Second Afghan War (1878 – 80) and saw action at Charasaib, Sherpur, and Kandahar where they took part in a winning battle after marching 320 miles from Kabul in just 23 days.

    The greatest battle achievement of the Gordons, however, was at Dargai (near Tirah and now part of Pakistan’s Kabul Pakhtunkhwa). In 1897 the heights at Dargai were held by a strong contingent of Afridi tribesmen. As part of the Tirah campaign, at the time the 21 valiant soldiers of the 36th Battalion (Now 4th Sikhs) of the Sikh Regiment were putting up their heroic stand at Saragarhi, the Gordons were tasked to capture the Dargai height at all costs. On October 20th, 1897 the Gordon Highlanders, with their flanks protected by the Gurkhas and Sikhs, attacked the Afridi-held hilltop redoubt. Despite numerous attempts, the Gordon’s were unable to take the height and had suffered numerous casualties. The Commanding Officer called out to his Pipers, led by Sergeant Piper George Findlater to keep playing ‘Dagshai Hills’ until the hill was taken. Findlater, despite being shot all over his body and bleeding profusely kept on playing the Regimental Tune until Dargai Hill was captured.

    For his extraordinary valour, Piper Findlater was awarded the Victoria Cross which he received in person from Queen Victoria. A huge painting to commemorate this famous battle hangs in the Officers Mess room of the Gordon Highlanders in Aberdeen, Scotland.  A large replica is available to view in our Dagshai Jail Museum along with other exhibits related to the Gordon Highlanders. The Pipe Bands of every formation that gets posted to Dagshai learns to play ‘Dagshai Hills’ and is played at the beginning of the Army Band display at the annual ‘Dagshai Concert’.

    Several of the formations garrisoned in Kasauli (then ‘Kussowlie’) also took part in the various Afghan Wars. Most notable amongst these were the Somerset Light Infantry (action at Jalalabad), 9th Regiment of Foot – Norfolks (action at Kabul), 66th Regiment – King’s Royal Rifles (action at Maiwand), and the 8thKing’s Regiment of Foot (action in the Kurram Valley). However, Kasauli’s Afghanistan connection is predominantly that of the famous Warburton family.

    During the First Afghan War in 1839 when the Bengal and Bombay Divisions of the East India Company (‘John Company’) Army along with some formations of regular British Army troops in India, in support of the ousted Shah Shuja, attacked Afghanistan in an attempt to retake Afghanistan from the ‘usurper’ Amir Dost Mohammed Khan’s forces and their allied tribal warriors.

    Amongst the ‘John Company’ troops was a 27-year-old Lt. Robert Warburton of the 6th Battalion, Bengal Foot Artillery. During the war, Lt. Robert Warburton found himself imprisoned in an Afghan lockup near the famous Buddhist site of Bamyan. A young lady named Shah Jahan Begum Durrani, a niece of Shah Shujah as well as that of Amir Dost Mohammed Khan was married (apparently against her wishes) to Sardar Faiz Talab Khan, a senior advisor to Dost Mohammed, and had a son (named Jahandad Khan) born from him in August 1840. Dost Mohammed and Faiz Talab Khan fled Kabul late in 1839 as the British troops advanced. Dost Muhammad was later to be exiled to Mussoorie.

    What ensued seems like scenes from a potboiler Hindi movie. Apparently, Shah Jahan Begum had met Lt. Robert Warburton in Kabul before she was married off. Clearly, as it turned out, Shah Jahan Begum had already become fond of Robert and this may have been the reason that she was hastily married off against her wishes. With her husband, Sardar Faiz Talib Khan having left along with Amir Dost Mohammed, Shah Jahan Begum managed to get hold of a few of her Durrani tribesmen and went hastily to Bamyan.

    At Bamyan, she and her Durrani followers somehow managed to free Robert Warburton from custody and hastily fled, escorted by the Durrani tribesmen. Somewhere during this daring escape, in November of 1840, Lt. Robert Warburton and Shah Jahan Begum got officially married. A son (also named Robert Warburton) was born to them in July 1842 whilst they were still holed up in Ghilzai (aka ‘Khilji’) fort. By early 1843 the four of them, Lt. Warburton, Shah Jahan Begum, Jahandad Khan, and little Robert Warburton) somehow managed to sneak into Peshawar. On arrival in Peshawar Lt. Robert Warburton officially adopted young Jahandad Khan and had him renamed John Paul Warburton.

    In 1864 John Paul Warburton joined the Punjab Police. Over the next few years, he had a spectacular career as a highly efficient Police Officer busting many criminal gangs and putting into jail scores of offenders. For his efforts, John Paul Warburton (aka Jahandad Khan) became popularly known all across Punjab as ‘Button Saheb – Controller of Devils”. From 1864 through 1900 when he retired, ‘Button Saheb’ had successful postings at Karnal, Delhi, Ludhiana, etc. In a rare eulogy, the famous Rudyard Kipling wrote – “He is supposed to have the gift of invisibility and executive control over many devils.” Needless to say, Kipling’s character Strickling (“Plain Tales From The Hills”) is based on Button Saheb. The then government in appreciation of his services gifted John Paul Warburton a large piece of land in Gujranwala District. This town with its own mainline railway station still exists in Pakistan as ‘Warburton’.

    From 1900 through 1909 Button Saheb served as the Special Advisor to the Patiala State Police with the rank of Inspector General. On his finally quitting service in 1909 John Paul Warburton along with his family came to live in Kasauli after having acquired ‘Gilbert House’ (presently the residence of the Brigade Commander and the former home of the historic figure  Maj. General Walter Raleigh Gilbert. In 1919 Button Saheb tragically died in the driveway of ‘Gilbert House’ after he fell off his favourite horse which had been ‘disturbed’ by his grandchildren and friends playing nearby.

    John Paul Warburton and his wife Mary Meakins had seven children. His youngest son’s (Robert Paul) granddaughter, Pamela Warburton (aka Durrani Warburton) was the last of the family to occupy ‘Gilbert House’. Old-time residents of Kasauli still talk about the regal style that Durrani Warburton lived in and especially about her going around Kasauli in an ornate Rickshaw pulled by fully liveried bearers.

    Durrani or Dani Warburton occupied ‘Gilbert House’ in Kasauli until 1943. She never married but was reputed to be a spectacular tennis player having been Punjab Singles Champion five times. Durrani Warburton did yeoman community service through the years of World War II and for her efforts was awarded the title of ‘Kaiser –i- Hind’.

    The senior Robert Warburton died in Peshawar on Nov. 10th, 1863. Button Saheb’s half-brother, Col. Sir Robert Warburton Jr, KCIE, also joined the Royal Artillery. Later he went on to found the ‘Khyber Rifles’ and died in April 1899 in Kensington, London.

    Needless to say, there have been other individuals and families that have Dagshai / Kasauli – Afghanistan connections. Most notably of course being Rudyard Kipling and the three redoubtable Lawrence brothers. But let this wait for another piece someday.

  • The US retreat from Afghanistan: Looking back on an ill-conceived peace deal and a hasty withdrawal

    The US retreat from Afghanistan: Looking back on an ill-conceived peace deal and a hasty withdrawal

    Under an agreement signed on February 29, 2020, between Qatar, The US and the Taliban, the US agreed to withdraw all its troops within 14 months of signing the accord. In return, the Taliban pledged to prevent any terrorist group from operating in Afghanistan against the US and its allies. The pact also envisaged a prisoner swap, the start of intra-Afghan dialogue and sanction removals against the Taliban. But, as we have seen, the peace deal accelerated the collapse of the Afghan state on which the US spent trillions of dollars.

    Trump also permitted the US chief negotiator Zalmay Khalilzad to place the withdrawal of US forces on the negotiating table with the Taliban, throwing away their biggest bargaining chip. The Taliban themselves seemed surprised that the US put the withdrawal of US troops on the negotiating table.

    The US started the peace talks with four specific goals. An end to violence by declaring a ceasefire, an Intra-Afghan political settlement, Taliban renunciation of Al-Qaeda and long-term presence of intelligence assets and special operation forces in Afghanistan for counterterrorism operations, and a timeline for US troops withdrawal[1]. However, with the presidential elections approaching in 2020, Trump was being increasingly restless and wanted a quicker exit. So, to accelerate talks, the long-standing demand for the presence of special operation forces in a counterterrorism mission along with inter-Afghan led peace talks were jettisoned. Trump also permitted the US chief negotiator Zalmay Khalilzad to place the withdrawal of US forces on the negotiating table with the Taliban, throwing away their biggest bargaining chip. The Taliban themselves seemed surprised that the US put the withdrawal of US troops on the negotiating table.

    The US committed itself to a set of measurable commitments, while the Taliban did not. The idea was to create an environment of good faith. However, the Taliban never reciprocated the ‘good faith’ shown by the US, except to ensure safe passage for the retreating US troops. Once the deal was struck, violence increased in the country.

    The Taliban never agreed to a ceasefire or a political settlement. While the intra-afghan dialogue was a part of the deal struck between the Taliban and the US, there was a lack of progress, with the Afghan government and the Taliban blaming each other for the impasse. Violence escalated by almost 50% after the start of the intra-afghan dialogue.

    The peace deal also included a prisoner swap agreement where the Taliban would release up to 1000 prisoners and the Afghan government release up to 5000 prisoners. The Afghan government asked the Taliban prisoners for a written guarantee that they would not return to the battlefield. However, thousands immediately rejoined the insurgency. The Taliban commander, Maulawi Talib, who led a Taliban assault on the capital of Helmand, Lashkargah, was one among the 5000 prisoners released. There was an uptick in violence after the prisoner swap was completed. Afghan officials said the agreement went through only because of pressure from Washington.

    The Taliban proved reluctant to break ties with Al-Qaeda, too, according to a UNSC report. Under the peace deal, the Taliban agreed not to allow al-Qaeda or any other extremist group to operate in areas under their control. However, the Taliban needs allies and Al-Qaeda is one reliable ally. Further, the Haqqani network, an integral part of the Taliban, is known to harbour close links with Al-Qaeda. While stopping a future terrorist attack emanating from Afghanistan will be in the Taliban’s interests, it is unlikely they will break relations with Al-Qaeda after years of close collaboration.

    It was clear from the beginning that the viability of the agreement depended on the US willingness to call off the withdrawal in the future if the Taliban renegade on their promises. But that decision fell to president Biden, who has always made it clear that Afghanistan is a lost cause.

    When Biden came to power, the situation in Afghanistan was deteriorating. The choice he had, according to Biden himself, was to either expand US presence or follow through with the agreement. The dilemma was a result of poor policies pursued during the trump era. The US has been bogged down in Afghanistan for 20 years, and the resolve of president Biden to not escalate meant that the US followed through with the agreement. The peace talks became a cover for complete US disengagement.

    The US withdrawal accelerated the collapse of the Afghan state. The uncertainty of the Doha talks demoralized the Afghan military, who saw it as a deal between the Taliban and the US that guaranteed Taliban victory.

    With the collapse of morale, everything that was rotting started collapsing as well.  Around 30000 troops existed on paper, but the numbers were inflated due to a phenomenon called ‘ghost’ soldiers – soldiers on the official payroll but who never showed up for fighting. There were reports that the soldier was not paid and there were not enough supplies.

    Jack Watling, a research fellow for land warfare and military sciences at the Royal United Services Institute in London, said that the Afghan military collapse was not a reflection of military capability, but a reflection of a collapse in the will to fight.

    In truth, ever since the surge in troops authorized by the Obama administration right after coming to power, what every successive US President wanted was an orderly withdrawal from Afghanistan. The most baffling thing is that the US resorted to negotiation when its leverage was the weakest. Perhaps, in hindsight, greater efforts could have been made during the time of President Obama to find a peaceful solution to the conflict.

    In the end, it was more of a retreat than a withdrawal. The US made concrete measurable commitments while the Taliban made promises, which they can now afford to renegade on.

    The scenes in Kabul airport was anything but orderly. More than 2000 marines had to be brought in to secure the Kabul airport as the Taliban rolled into Kabul for the first time since 2001. “The past 17 days have seen our troops execute the largest airlift in U.S. history, evacuating over 120,000 U.S. citizens, citizens of our allies, and Afghan allies of the United States,” the US president said in the statement. An attack by the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) on Kabul airport killed 13 U.S. service members and 170 Afghans.

    In the end, it was more of a retreat than a withdrawal. The US made concrete measurable commitments while the Taliban made promises, which they can now afford to renegade on.

     

    [1] Pg. 667, carter

     

    Feature Image Credit: www.npr.org

  • The Game of Thrones in Kabul: Taliban’s 2nd Innings

    The Game of Thrones in Kabul: Taliban’s 2nd Innings

    The trajectory of politics in the volatile region of Afghanistan and its neighbourhood is in flux. A month has gone by since the Taliban rebels swept into the capital and occupied the Presidential Palace in Kabul on August 15. Many faces in the interim government announced by the Taliban are globally designated, terrorists. Till now there are only scanty details about the Taliban’s plans for governance. As the Taliban is an integrated group of multiple tribal power centres, there are conflicting views given by different factions. The hard-line zealots are looking to reimpose their harshly interpreted version of the Sharia laws. The graffiti on the walls are being erased across Afghan towns. Music is muted. Schools and cultural institutions are currently shut. The Taliban has changed the name of the democratic state to the name during Taliban 1.0, an  Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, a theological state where democracy has no place.

    Surprising everyone, the Taliban announced their ministerial portfolios and postponed the swearing-in ceremony that was planned for September 9, the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 terror attacks. Mullah Hassan Akhund has been named the prime minister. Whether he is acceptable to all the factions is still in doubt. The Haqqani group, a virulent anti-Indian faction, has garnered powerful ministries. The Interior Ministry will be headed by Alhaj Mullah Sirajuddin Haqqani of the Haqqani Network, while Taliban co-founder Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar has been accredited with the portfolio of the deputy prime minister.

    Sirajuddin Haqqani is long designated as a global terrorist by the US.  The cabinet is likely to expand later. The leaders are yet to come up with some heavyweight names including the judiciary chief. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan will be under the supreme leadership of Sheikh Haibatullah Akhundzada. He was head of Sharia courts under the Taliban 1.0 regime from 1996 to 2001 and was responsible for the harsh and brutal interpretation and implementation of Sharia law.  Molvi Muhammad Yaqoob is in charge of the Ministry of Defence, while Molvi Ameer Khan Muttaqi is announced as the Foreign Minister.

     Four Haqqani leaders are allocated portfolios in the cabinet. The tussle between the Haqqani and Yaqoob factions is already public. The Haqqani network intends to retain complete control of Kabul and thus dominate Afghanistan while the Yaqoob faction led by Mullah Baradar, with their power centre in Kandahar, favours an inclusive government featuring the minorities as well. The Haqqani faction functions with the full support of Pakistan and is masterminded by the ISI. This factional feud could spill out to weaken the Taliban ultimately.

    The Taliban’s cabinet doesn’t reflect the ethnic diversity of Afghanistan, and nearly half the strength consists of members from the previous government in 1996-2001. A slew of challenges has already emerged for the new regime. The first is the problem of recognition and legitimacy by the general population and non-voter citizens across the state. The second challenge will be ensuring inclusive governance, claiming undisputed leadership across the territory, as well as dealing with Al Qaida and the Islamic State Khorasan. Economic reconstruction of the devastated economy, coupled with achieving diplomatic recognition by the global community is the major challenge.

    Afghanistan is known for its mosaic culture. In Article 4 of the Afghan Constitution, 14 major ethnic groups are recognized. Apart from the major populace belonging to Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek, there are ethnic minorities like Turkmen, Baluch, Pashai, Nuristani, Aymaq, Arab, Qirghiz, Qizilbash, Gujur,  Brahui. There are also micro-ethnic settlements across the state.

    Taliban has neither showed empathy towards the minorities nor respected the constitution. Out of the thirty-three ministers and high-level names in the Taliban’s cabinet, two appointees are Tajik (Qari Din Mohammad Hanif, Minister of Economic Affairs and Qari Faseehuddin, Army Chief), and only one name is Uzbek (Molvi Abdul Salam Hanafi, Second deputy to PM). Despite a considerable Hazara demography, no ministry is allocated to anyone belonging to Hazaras or even Shia Islam. .

    Women make up almost half of the 40 million Afghan population. Significantly, no female candidate is projected as a minister in the newly formed ministry. Even though Abdul Baqi Haqqani, the Higher Education Minister clarified that females will be permitted to pursue higher education, there are serious concerns over girls’ education. During the Taliban’s incumbency between 1996-2001, girls and women were barred from attending classes and working outside. The Taliban has renamed the Women’s Affairs Ministry the Ministry of Vice and Virtue.

    After the collapse of Amrullah Saleh led interim government in Panjshir, Afghanistan is being ruled by only one incumbent – The Taliban. But Amrullah Saleh and Ahmed Massoud have formed the Government in Exile in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. With this announcement, the global community is likely to recognize only one among the two- the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in Exile and the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

     

    In order to alter the negative global perception towards them, the Taliban will have to ensure civic rights, human rights and women’s right to work and study. Establishing political stability and non-violence should be clearly demonstrated. To continue ruling poverty-stricken, strife-torn and war-ravaged Afghanistan, the Taliban will have to work on better external engagements within their ideological frameworks. The United Nations and European Union will continue to engage the Taliban on humanitarian grounds, provided the Taliban works to ensure hope and optimism. Through an official communique to Secretary-General on September 15, the Taliban nominated Mohammad Suhail Shaheen and appealed for the UN representation of the Taliban.

    Aid and trade – these two remain the most significant challenges for the Taliban. Apart from the Islamic states like Pakistan, Iran, Qatar and Turkey, the Taliban has been engaging Russia and China for their support. Under these circumstances, Pakistan is expected to negotiate with the Taliban on Haqqani’s power and control in the provinces along the Durand line. Bringing Tehrik-e-Taliban (Pakistan) under control will be a challenge for Islamabad. Pakistan’s military establishment will seek to cut commercial channels between Afghanistan and India and gains in favour of Pakistan.  India continues its wait and watch policy towards considering diplomatic or political links with the Taliban.

    The tussle for power and dominance between the main factions may spawn severe political instability and civil war. The perennial inter-tribe rivalries across the provinces of Afghanistan will complicate the issues further. [TPF]

    Image Credit: inews.co.uk

  • The United States Must Airdrop Aid to the Blockaded Regions of Afghanistan

    The United States Must Airdrop Aid to the Blockaded Regions of Afghanistan

    With the Afghan economy is on the verge of collapse, the United Nations has warned that half of the population in Afghanistan needs humanitarian aid. While the U.S. military’s combat operations in Afghanistan have come to an end, Washington has pledged to remain engaged with the country through diplomacy, development, and humanitarian aid. After the sudden collapse of the U.S.-backed government on August 15, 2021, the Taliban swiftly seized 33 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces –  the last standing is Panjshir. As Panjshir leads the resistance, it has also become a safe refuge for many Afghans escaping the wrath of the Taliban.

    The Panjshir Valley is surrounded by magnificent mountains and a roaring river at its heart. It has historically been an unconquered territory, be it against the Soviet Union in the 1970s or the Taliban in the 1990s. The current resistance force is led by Mr. Ahmad Massoud, the son of the legendary anti-Soviet freedom fighter Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was tragically assassinated by al-Qaeda in collaboration with the Taliban two days before the horrific attacks of 9/11. Mr. Ahmad Massoud is now leading the National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan, alongside Vice President Mr. Amrullah Saleh, who has proclaimed himself as care-taker President in the absence of President Ashraf Ghani, who has fled the country.

    While people across the country suffer from the shortage of food and basic needs, the situation in Panjshir is dire as the NRF and Taliban are fighting tooth and nail. Notably, several of Massoud’s closest aides have been killed, allegedly by Pakistan’s drones, and there is an active blockade imposed on the valley by the Taliban. The NRF’s attempts to negotiate a peace deal with the Taliban, which included some level of autonomy for Panjshir under a decentralized Islamic democratic system were rebuffed. The Taliban insists on a centralized and puritanical theocracy with the group as the dominant power at the center.  While both sides have sustained casualties, reports indicate a devastating toll on the civilian population.

    The Panjshir valley has been surrounded by the Taliban from all entry points, and they have callously enforced an active blockade, inhibiting humanitarian relief from reaching the afflicted. Internet and telephone communication lines have been cut off for several days. Mr. Saleh has appealed to the international community for humanitarian assistance, but his pleas for help have fallen on deaf ears. The Taliban has confirmed the blockade, by saying that due to fighting goods and food items have not entered the province for some four days but promised to reopen the supply lines. The Taliban also claimed to have captured the entire province, including the capital Bazarak. However, the NRF reports resumption of fierce fighting across the province. This is at a time when Ahmad Massoud has called for a national uprising which has inspired some movements in other provinces. Additionally, several women have also participated in protesting for their rights in cities like Kabul, Herat, and Mazar e Sharif.

    Many amongst the ranks of the NRF are former members of the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). They have risked their lives fighting alongside American troops against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Islamic State Khorasan, and many feel abandoned while they continue to resist. While we do not know a lot about the intensity of the issue due to complete media blackout, some with access on the ground report of the catastrophic humanitarian crisis is unfolding in places like Panjshir and Andarab, a district in neighboring Baghlan province. Upwards of a quarter of a million civilians are trapped in these areas,  and desperately need “food supplies, including baby formula, rice, wheat, and other perishables” and medicine.

    While the U.S. military’s combat mission has ended in Afghanistan,  America and its allies can provide critical assistance through humanitarian aid as originally planned. Some small amount of aid from the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have reached Kabul, but a lot more needs to be done to prevent the catastrophe that the United Nations has warned about. One of the quickest ways to get aid across the country would be through airdropping. The US has conducted several airdrop missions in the past including one in 2014 in Iraq. The US should start with airdropping the much-needed supplies in areas such as Panjshir and other regions where the Taliban has imposed blockades. This can bring great relief to the people in need. Delays in delivering humanitarian aid could risk the lives of many people from starvation and medical attention.

    Image Credit: www.foreignpolicy.com 

  • The Fall of Kabul and dealing with the Taliban 2.0

    The Fall of Kabul and dealing with the Taliban 2.0

    The debacle of the democratic apparatus in Afghanistan was inevitable. After pumping billions in aid and significant bloodshed, the US government ended its longest war in defeat, the war in Afghanistan under the euphemism of ‘Global War on Terror’. Right after occupying the White House, the Biden administration has followed the path of its predecessors and commanded the complete withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. The 2020 – Doha peace agreement between the US government and the Taliban brought a scant number of outcomes. Even during the presence of international forces in Afghanistan, the Taliban leaders disrespected the peace agreement and violated significant features of the agreement – that is a ceasefire. Following the agreement, over 5000 prisoners belonging to the separatist groups- were released by the Afghan government, under pressure from the US. Quite naturally, these prisoners were back with their militant outfits, thus strengthening the Taliban’s fighting capability.

    As of now, India has not taken any part in the peace negotiations with the Taliban. One of the major reasons is in the past the Indian government has never recognised the Taliban as a legitimate actor and vouched for a peace negotiation that should be Afghan-led, Afghan controlled and Afghan-owned. Currently, there are speculations about the likely power structure and composition of the government in Afghanistan, but it is quite clear the Taliban will govern the country by Sharia law. At this time of fast transition, the countries in South Asia are seeking to gain diplomatic leverage in the situation.

    India has a huge stake in Afghanistan’s reconstruction. In 2016 Indian Prime Minister and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani inaugurated the Salma dam project in Afghanistan. This 200 million dollar project is part of the larger developmental approach of the Indian government to Afghanistan. But recently, the equipment of the Salma dam was captured by the Taliban. In this scenario, it is unlikely that the Dam project will receive further Indian logistical support in future. Similarly, uncertainty beleaguers the Chabahar Project. India was one of the largest bilateral donors to Afghanistan during the war on terror. It ranges from infrastructure building to the promotion of democracy and small development projects. Almost $3 billion has been invested in and on Afghanistan in capacity building, education, infrastructure and security counts. This developmental commitment has made India the most dependable country and strategic partner for Afghanistan so far. However, now that the Taliban is in full control, the Indian government needs to find a diplomatic solution on how to go ahead with the various projects and commitments in Afghanistan.

    Except for Panjshir province, the entire country is under Taliban control. The president, head of the state, has left the country. Led by interim President Amrullah Saleh and Ahamad Masoud, the Resistance Force from Panjshir Valley is fiercely fighting against the Taliban. Under such circumstances, the conservative approach of the Indian government, as it has begun to talk to the Taliban, could ruin the decades’ long reputation and developmental efforts in Afghanistan. India has legitimate concerns in Afghanistan and should protect its interests carefully. The absence of the US forces and elected Afghan government makes the task very difficult for the government of India. In the past, the Indian government cooperated with the elected Afghan government based on their shared interests and values of democracy, freedom, rule of law and respect for human rights. But the past approach may not work anymore under the Taliban leadership. In the past, the Ministry of External Affairs stated that it is in touch with ‘various stakeholders’ in Afghanistan and other regional countries. Indian officials believe that a ‘double’ peace’ i.e. one within Afghanistan and around the country is necessary for the region. To ensure safety for the Indians living in Afghanistan, the government has already evacuated all Indians employed by the Indian embassy. India has also started emergency E-visa facilities for Afghan citizens. With regard to the diplomatic relationship with the Taliban, the government is following a ‘wait and watch policy with its extended neighbour. The Taliban leadership has announced that they would like to have good relations with the Indian government and access to the Indian market through Pakistan. The Taliban also wants these two countries to resolve their issues as its interests are linked to the two countries. The government of India is yet to respond. The Afghan media personnel, translators, performance artists, civilians are being hunted down by the Taliban soldiers. In this scenario, India will carefully assess the situation and the reliability of the Taliban to make its further move.

    While India is still on the horns of a dilemma over the direct dialogue with the Taliban, India’s arch-rival Pakistan is busy re-establishing its hold and is trying to isolate India diplomatically from the region. Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognise the Taliban as a legitimate actor in the 90s. Last year, the government of Pakistan welcomed an Afghan Taliban delegation led by Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar. In the meeting, Pakistan showed their support for peace and blamed India as a spoiler of peace in the war-torn country. But reports suggest otherwise. According to the US Defense Intelligence Agency, Pakistan harbours Taliban leaders along with other insurgent groups such as the Haqqani network, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Laskar-e-Taiba. Such groups have the potential to disrupt the security and stability in South Asia. The report also says that the strategic objective of the Pakistan government is to counter the Indian influence in Afghanistan. In a recent interview, Pakistan foreign affairs minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi said that the violence in Afghanistan led to a refugee exodus to Pakistan but they cannot take more refugees. Last year, the High Council for National Reconciliation leader Abdullah Abdullah said that Pakistan holds the key role in the Afghan peace process and India should keep their profile low in the Afghan situation.

    As the Taliban emerges in its second avatar while reframing its extremist Islamic ideology, China is poised to become the critical player in the region.  Under a slew of conditions negotiated with the Taliban, China will enhance its role through rapid investments and enabling Afghanistan to integrate into its Belt and Road Initiative. An unstable, dry and war-torn Afghanistan doesn’t offer any attractive economic proposition at the moment. As the economic challenges loom on the Taliban government, it can’t simply sustain on drugs. The Taliban have to rely on China, Pakistan and some Central Asian republics to rebuild its economy. Afghanistan’s unexploited mineral wealth, worth a trillion or more, is a great opportunity for the Taliban to leverage economic gains by engaging China, Iran, Russia, and Turkey. An alliance of China, Pakistan, Iran or Turkey may lead to the marginalisation of India’s role and effectiveness in Afghanistan.

    Whether India will recognize the Taliban is not clear yet but India can’t simply meditate either. Under India’s presidency, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2593 on Afghanistan. Chairing a session India’s Foreign Secretary Harsh V Shringla has clarified that India won’t tolerate if Afghan territory turns into a sanctuary of terrorists and threat for the neighbouring states. Apart from human rights, Shringla emphasized Women’s participation in society.

    India along with its all partners should advocate for strict observation of the Taliban led governance. Having invested over $3 billion over the last two decades in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, India’s considerable contribution cannot be ignored. The recent meeting between India’s envoy Deepak Mittal and the Taliban’s foreign minister-designate Stanekzai at the Taliban’s request signals a possibility for a changed approach and environment from that of the Taliban 1.0. India’s immediate priority should be the safe evacuation of the Indian origin people and stranded Afghans.

     

    Image Credit: www.dawn.com

  • The Taliban Occupation of Afghanistan: Impact on India

    The Taliban Occupation of Afghanistan: Impact on India

    The swift and relatively unopposed takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban, in a matter of just days and not months as expected,has caught the United States and its Allies,as well as the international community, completely off-guard.It has led to a serious humanitarian crisis as countries scramble to get their own citizens, stranded in-country, out of harm’s way. An effort greatly complicated and impeded by the frenzy and sheer desperation of the tens of thousands of Afghans, who had worked with the Coalition, and are also attempting to flee to avoid retribution.


    Read More