Category: Research & Publications

  • Small States, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Subtle Power: A study of Qatar  and the United Arab Emirates

    Small States, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Subtle Power: A study of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates

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    Abstract

    This paper argues that Sovereign Wealth Funds can be an important foreign policy tool for small states. The author analyzes select investments of the Sovereign Wealth Funds of Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Dubai in the theoretical framework of subtle power. Subtle power is a means of exerting influence behind the scenes. This paper categorically analyzes sovereign wealth fund investments to understand how they contribute to the three sources of subtle power; physical and military protection, branding efforts, and diplomacy. The author does not dispute that these Sovereign Wealth Funds have financial motives, but adds nuance to the literature by arguing that they also hold political motivations. The paper finds that the structural difference in the governance model of Qatar and the UAE has resulted in a variation in the foreign policy roles of their Sovereign Wealth Funds. In the UAE’s case, Abu Dhabi’s Sovereign Wealth Fund takes the lead in matters related to physical security and diplomacy, whereas Dubai’s Sovereign Wealth Fund focuses on national branding efforts. Meanwhile, for Qatar, QIA acts as the primary instrument exuding subtle power across all three categories.

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  • Liquid Globalization and Intercultural Practical Philosophy

    Liquid Globalization and Intercultural Practical Philosophy

    This essay is based on a lecture given by the author at the German Jordanian University in Amman on the 18th of November 2021.

    Abstract

    We are witnessing the birth pains of a new global order. The previous order based on the hegemony of the Western states is in tatters and the newly industrialized nations are no longer seeking to imitate Western modernity but to rely on their own civilizational achievements. They are trying to combine a kind of modernity with an identity of their own. Nevertheless, opposing the declining West is not enough to initiate a global order, which is surpassing the previous one. The most successful challengers of Western modernity are relying on authoritarian or even totalitarian (IS, Taliban) conceptions of identity. But the alternative to the (neo-)liberal world order should not be an illiberal order. In order to design such an alternative, we need to conduct a discourse of the civilizational foundations of our different approaches by further developing intercultural philosophy. Intercultural philosophy has had already its height after the demise of the USSR but remained mainly a theoretical enterprise; it is of paramount importance in the conflicts about the new world order.   Assuming that we are witnessing a new phase of globalization, which can be characterized by the simultaneous processes of the rise (Zakaria) as well as the demise of the other (Herberg-Rothe), intercultural philosophy is becoming a practical philosophy designated to mitigate conflicts about interests.

    Intercultural Philosophy as a Practical Approach

    The Western model of society is viewed to be in crisis and for many people, nations and civilizations it is no longer an attractive role model.

    Intercultural philosophy has had already its height after the end of the Cold War but was mainly a theoretical enterprise. Assuming that we are witnessing a new phase of globalization, which can be characterized by the simultaneous processes of the rise (Zakaria, 2008) as well as the demise of the other (Herberg-Rothe and Foerstle, 2020), intercultural philosophy is becoming a practical philosophy designated to mitigate conflicts about interests and culture to cope with this process. The current phase of globalization, which in the footsteps of Zygmunt Bauman could be labelled hybrid globalization (Bauman, 2000), is accompanied by emotions (Moisi, 2010) like insecurity, uncertainty and dissolution of identities. Hybrid globalization is characterized by the ongoing process of globalization and local resistance against it. The Western model of society is viewed to be in crisis and for many people, nations and civilizations it is no longer an attractive role model. But all nations and civilizations need to find a balance between their civilizational traditions and coping with hybrid globalization. Mutual recognition of the civilizational foundations of the Western and Non-Western world may be a possible means to cope with this process. I’m assuming that the alternative to Western modernity and the global order which is based on it should not be illiberalism or even authoritarian rule but a new balance of the normative foundations of all civilizations (Katzenstein, 2009).

    What we need, therefore, is to initiate a virtuous circle as follows:

    1. Research on the subject of how conflicts are articulated in terms of culture and religion.
    2. Relating these concepts to different understandings of civilization.
    3. Mutual recognition of the civilizational foundations of Islam and Western thinking.
    4. Self-recognition is not only as religion or culture but as a civilization.
    5. Self-binding to civilizational norms in order to be recognized as equally valued civilization.

    Based on our interpretation of Clausewitz (Herberg-Rothe, 2007) we think that mutual recognition among the great civilizations of the earth is the prerequisite of settling disputes over diverging interests. 

    What we need, therefore, is the initiative of a discourse of mutual recognition of the great civilizations on earth and even a discourse, where the diverse understandings of central concepts like order, self-determination, emancipation, identity, dignity and so forth differ. At the same time, a closer look at the civilizations’ common grounds is essential, to eventually provide a basis for a meaningful dialogue. We think that we must find a balance between the Western model of the billiard game and the Eastern model of the concentric circles (Qin, 2016 and Yan, 2011).

    Additionally, most countries of the Non-Western world are no longer seeing the Western world as a role model they must follow but are seeking to find their own identity as a balance of their traditions and civilizational achievements – be it the Chinese dream of Xi Jinping, Hindu nationalism in India, and the revival of Confucianism in East Asia.

    We assume that there is a close linkage of struggles for recognition, the question of identity and increasing radicalization (Herberg-Rothe and Foerstle, 2020). The fundamental problem existed in the assumption that the uprooted, redundant, and excluded members of society would come to terms with their destiny on an individual level. We assume that these excluded are forming violent groups, in which they find a kind of stable identity through recognition by exercising violence. Only by recognizing the contributions of the civilizations of the world to the heritage of mankind, it is possible to enable a stable identity contrary to violent actions (Herberg-Rothe and Son, 2018). Additionally, most countries of the Non-Western world are no longer seeing the Western world as a role model they must follow but are seeking to find their own identity as a balance of their traditions and civilizational achievements – be it the Chinese dream of Xi Jinping, Hindu nationalism in India, and the revival of Confucianism in East Asia. Especially in China, the concept of harmony in Confucianism serves the purpose of balancing the other two C’s, communism and capitalism (Herberg-Rothe and Son, 2018).

    The denial of recognition versus mutual recognition

    The denial of recognition and the struggle for recognition play an ever-increasing role in intra-state conflicts in a globalized world as well as the international sphere, which is characterized by the “Rise of the Other” (Zakaria, 2008). We live in an increasingly globalized world, in which we assume that difficulties concerning recognition (between individuals, groups, ethnos, religious communities, nations or even civilizations) are a major source for radicalization. If mutual recognition is non-existent or cannot be built, conflicting interests are much more likely to escalate. There is a broad consensus (in the field of socialization research and increasingly also within social sciences in general) that the urge for recognition is the important factor for forming and stabilizing identity (personal, group, national, and civilizational) (Daase, 2015)

    Samuel P. Huntington was widely criticized for his assumption that we are facing a clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1996). What the liberal critics of Huntington were highlighting was that there should not be a clash of civilizations, but even more important that there could not be a clash of civilizations because in their view there was only one civilization, the Western one. The others were in their view religions or cultures, but no civilizations, because they did not undergo the process of secularization, which is in the Western discourse a dogma (Katzenstein, 2009).

    So, my first proposition for the mutual recognition of the civilizations of the earth is that most are based on religion, not in opposition to or separation from their related religions. For example, the Han dynasty created Confucianism as a civilization three centuries after Confucius, similarly Buddhist culture and civilization was constructed and expanded on a worldwide scale by Emperor Ashoka in India, nearly three centuries after Buddha. 

    Through the achievement of mutual recognition, the rapidly growing radicalization tendencies are supposed to be reduced and in the long run, peaceful coexistence is more likely. However, recognition requires awareness for differences and communalities (ontological perspective) or is otherwise produced within a process (epistemological approach). The outlook is thus the development of a third way in between universalization of only one culture or civilization (in the form of “We against the Rest”; Herberg-Rothe and Son, 2018), be it eurocentrism or any other kind of ethnocentrism and cultural relativism to stimulate peaceful cooperation and to limit the dramatic tendencies of radicalization throughout the world (Herberg-Rothe and Foerstle, 2020).

    Given the absence or non-maturity of Chinese, Russian, African, Islamic, or Indian IRTs, the mainstream IRT originated almost exclusively from the Anglo-Saxon world, for example, realism, neo-realism, neo-conservatism, liberal institutionalism, and theories of democratic peace (although in connection to Kant).

    In the wake of globalization, many pundits articulated whether the theoretical concepts developed from the era of nation-states (Beck, 1992) are still tenable for the portrayal of twenty-first century international relations. Furthermore, many concepts regarded as central in the IRT came to be perceived as a mere form of American political science (Acharya, 2000 and 2014). Given the absence or non-maturity of Chinese, Russian, African, Islamic, or Indian IRTs, the mainstream IRT originated almost exclusively from the Anglo-Saxon world, for example, realism, neo-realism, neo-conservatism, liberal institutionalism, and theories of democratic peace (although in connection to Kant). The reason is that in most Non-Western countries’ societies, cultures and civilizations are more important than the state, whereas in the Western understanding the state is the most important institution.

    My second proposition for the mutual recognition of the civilizations of the earth is, therefore, to be aware that in the Western world the state has the dominant role – international relations are relations between states – whereas in the Non-Western world the state is a variable of society, culture. In the process of globalization this separation between the Western World and all other civilizations is dissolving (Herberg-Rothe and Son,  2018)

    The problem of identity in a globalized world

    One’s identity is shaped through a difficult and open-ended interplay and mutual interdependency of personal performance and societal consideration. Recognition is thus the result of an exchange, during which the failure of a human being is feasible. No given script through societal framing is existent anymore, whereby risk and insecurity increase significantly. It is not necessarily the need for recognition that is “new” and for this reason just generated through modernity, rather the conditions are new in this context. An unsatisfactory identity-building leads to rage and an imminent loss of identity leads to fear – both hold enormously destructive potentials. The paradox of all rebellious attempts to create an identity is thereby that a conspicuous or provocative behaviour of young persons is often, citing Erik Erikson, just a “request for brotherly recognition” (Herberg-Rothe and Son, 2018). Although I share the critique of identity politics put forward by Francis Fukuyama in general, in which identity is related to a fixed core, my consequence is to conceptualize identity as a balance of conflicting tendencies within individuals, societies and communities (Herberg-Rothe, 2007; Herberg-Rothe and Son, 2018 and  Fukuyama, 2018)

    Through the social change in rendering globalization, the individual, as well as collectives, face increasing societal pressure. Zygmunt Bauman speaks of the transition from a “solid” into a “fluid” modernity (Bauman, 2000). Former stable identities (determined through solid social and spatial borders which offer, despite quite critical aspects of these borders, still a secured room for identity shaping) become insecure, if not destructed (Beck, 1992). The outcome of this is a high demand on individuals as well as collectives to cope with the obstacles of identity building in constant active work. The continually transforming social, cultural and political spaces and contexts hinder this process additionally. If the obstacles appear to be insuperable or if no realistic options for action exist, societies with a multiplicity of fragmented identities develop. 

    To sum up, the big identity question has such importance because radicalization drifts are an increasing phenomenon in heterogeneous societies.

    To sum up, the big identity question has such importance because radicalization drifts are an increasing phenomenon in heterogeneous societies. Globalization represents profound structural changes that are accompanied by momentous crises (Moisi, 2010). Anyway, existing social inequalities become more and more intensified and find expression in intra-societal tensions. Adjustment processes appear almost impossible, as the promises based on modernity are broadly seen as unrealistic or not reasonable. According to this, an alternative to cope with the rapidly changing transformation must be discovered (Herberg-Rothe and Son, 2018)

    The developments and assumptions regarding identity, recognition and radicalization serve as the basis for our research project. To enable unstable individuals or collectives to recover their identity, it is necessary, by focusing on the macro level, to foster mutual recognition between the world’s civilizations. Dialogue and with it an associated discourse of mutual recognition is supposed to contribute as a crucial component of avoidance of radicalization. The aim is to establish dialogues and to find practical approaches for inter-civilizational agreement. Under the overall scheme of mutual recognition versus radicalization, it is, for now, the purpose to elaborate differences and similarities of the world’s civilizations. The focus lies on the understanding of societal and international relations in order to initiate a dialogue in which the denial of recognition does not transform conflicts about interests into struggles for recognition, which are again the main source for radicalization processes (Herberg-Rothe and Foerstle, 2020).

    One can view this kind of balancing and harmonizing as a form of limited plurality or as articulated by Hannah Arendt, unity of multiplicity and multiplicity within unity.

    According to this, the focus lies on mutual understanding and recognition as powerful tools to prevent vanished and unstable identities in the globalized world, to see the last resort in radical thinking and acting. Yet the question arises, how much plurality and variety in thinking and acting is really desirable, respectively rated as positive in principle. It is therefore also an important element of our research, to find a way in between the fundamental contrast, on the one side of the universalism of values of just one civilization and cultural relativism on the other. Amitav Acharya’s concept of “universal pluralism” is in this respect ground-breaking, but still insufficient in our eyes (Acharya 2000 and 2014). We advocate the development of a process, in which the concepts of Clausewitz’s “floating balance” (Clausewitz, 1976), Confucian’s “harmony”, and Hegel’s “mutual recognition” are examined closely (Herberg-Rothe and Son, 2018). One can view this kind of balancing and harmonizing as a form of limited plurality or as articulated by Hannah Arendt, unity of multiplicity and multiplicity within unity. In this way, we aim to devise ways to effectively cope with or govern differences and contrasts facing the international society of the twenty-first century. All in all, we seek to adopt a harmonious mutual recognition of Western and East Asian thoughts and devise a better set of theories and methodologies to analyse the contemporary world.  It is our deepest conviction that the Western and like-minded states could only hold on to such values as freedom, equality, emancipation, and human rights if these could be harmoniously balanced with the contributions of other civilizations (Zhang, 2012) and cultures.

    Intercultural philosophy as a foundational approach for mutual recognition

    Intercultural philosophy can play an important role in this process of the mutual recognition of the civilizations of the earth. Since Karl Jaspers, the godfather of intercultural philosophy acknowledged the existence of four different civilizations, immense progress has been made concerning understanding of the different approaches (Katzenstein, 2009). Nevertheless, I strongly believe that all civilizations have posed the same question but did find different answers. So, intercultural philosophy is in my view possible beyond the acknowledgement of a mere multiplicity of philosophies, because we as humans are posing the same questions. For example, concerning being born, living and dying, between immanence and transcendence, between the individual and community, between our limited abilities and the desire for eternity, the relation of us as being to some degree animals and ethics which constitutes us as humans – our ethical convictions may be different, but all civilizations have an ethical foundation. I would even argue that it is ethics, which distinguishes us from animals, not our intellect. We might get aware of the full realization of this proposition when relating it to the development of artificial intelligence.

    Although I’m advocating the development of intercultural philosophy as a part of transnational governance and the mutual recognition of the civilizations of the earth, I would like to highlight the main problem, at least in my view.

    Aristotle already posed the decisive question, whether the whole is more than the sum of its parts? If I understand with my very limited knowledge of Islamic philosophy rightly it is based on the assumption that the whole is more than the sum of its parts – we might label this position a holistic approach. On the contrary Western thinking is characterized by the approach of exchanging the whole exactly through the sum of its parts. We might label this an atomistic approach – atoms are just differentiated by the number of electrons, neutrons and so on. Concerning holism, I would argue that the task might be how to distinguish the whole from mere hierarchies – concerning the concept of harmony in Confucianism I would argue that true harmony is related to a balance of hierarchical and symmetrical societal and international relations. Instead of the false assumption in Western approaches that we could transform all hierarchical relations into symmetrical ones, I think that we need to construct a balance between both (Herberg-Rothe and Foerstle, 2020). If I’m not misguided there is also a concept in Islam that might be comparable to that of balance and harmony. Harmony is not sameness but implies a lot of tensions: to be clear: harmony can be characterized by “unity with difference and difference with unity” (Herberg-Rothe and Son, 2018). I compare this perspective sometimes with a water wave in a sea: If there are no waves at all, the sea is dying, if the waves are Tsunamis, they are destructive for society.

    My colleague Peng Lu from Fujian university made the following proposition: In the 19th century, the Europeans conquered the whole world, in the twentieth century the defeated nations and civilizations needed to live with the victorious West, in the twenty-first century the civilizations of the earth finally need to learn to live with one another.  This is the task of the century.

    References: 

    Acharya, Amitav. The End of American World Order. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014.

    Acharya, Amitav, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

    Bauman, Zygmunt, Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000.

    Beck, Ulrich, Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity. Thousand Oaks: Sage publications, 1992.

    Clausewitz, Carl von, On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1976

    Daase, Christopher et. al. (eds.), Recognition in International Relations. Rethinking a Political Concept in a Global Context. New York: Palgrave, 2015.

    Fukuyama, Francis (2018), Against Identity Politics. The New Tribalism and the Crisis of Democracy. In: Foreign Affairs, Sept./Oct. Retrieved from: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/americas/2018-08-14/against-identity-politics-tribalism-francis-fukuyama; last access, 3.10.2018, 10.21.

    Herberg-Rothe, Andreas, Clausewitz‘s puzzle. The political theory of war. OUP: Oxford 2007.

    Herberg-Rothe, Andreas und Son, Key-young, Order wars and floating balance. How the rising powers are reshaping our world view in the twenty-first century. Routledge: New York 2018.

    Herberg-Rothe, Andreas und Foerstle, Miriam, The dissolution of identities in liquid globalization and the emergence of violent uprisings. In: African Journal of Terrorism and Insurgency Research – Volume 1 Number 1, April 2020 b, pp. 11-32.

    Huntington, Samuel. The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.

    Katzenstein, Peter J, Civilizations in world politics. Plural and pluralistic perspectives. Routledge: New York 2009.

    Moisi, Dominique, The Geopolitics of Emotion: How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation, and Hope are Reshaping the World, New York: Doubleday, 2010.

    Qin, Yaqing. “A Relational Theory of World Politics.” International Studies Review 18 (2016): 33-47.

    Yan, Xuetong. Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.

    Zakaria, Fareed, The Post-American World, New York/London: W. W. Norton, 2008.

    Zhang, Wei-Wei, The China Wave: Rise of A Civilizational State. Hackensack: World Century Publishing Corporation, 2012.

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  • Climate Change: A Review of the Rural Electrification Policies and Barriers to adopting Renewable Energy in Rural India

    Climate Change: A Review of the Rural Electrification Policies and Barriers to adopting Renewable Energy in Rural India

    Energy is crucial for a country’s growth and sustainable development. But over one-third of the world’s population, mostly consisting of people in rural areas of developing countries, do not have access to clean, affordable energy.

    The climate crisis is a battle that countries have been fighting for decades now. The policies and strategies developed by different countries have helped in small ways in achieving their energy and climate goals. One strategy among all countries is the development and improvement in the use of renewables. Various studies, across different fields, have shown us the need for countries to shift to this alternative set of energy sources that will sustain life in the long run. The use of renewable energy in both urban and rural areas should be monitored and developed to achieve the sustainable development goals that countries have vowed to achieve.

    Energy is crucial for a country’s growth and sustainable development. But over one-third of the world’s population, mostly consisting of people in rural areas of developing countries, do not have access to clean, affordable energy. This is an important factor contributing to the low standards of living in rural areas of developing countries.

    In India, more than two-thirds of the population live in rural areas whose primary source of income is agricultural activities. But a large proportion of the rural population does not have consistent access to energy. To this population, new alternative sources of energy remain unaffordable and inaccessible due to poverty and lack of adequate infrastructure, respectively. Hence, we find that the rural populations continue to use traditional sources of energy such as coal, fuelwood, agricultural waste, animal dung, etc. Not only do these cause pollution and quick erosion of natural resources, but they impact negatively on people’s health. The need for transitioning to the use of renewable energy, especially in the country’s rural areas is of prime importance. But, to achieve this, the government must bring out policies that will guide this transition. Moreover, it is important that the government positively supports companies – both private and public – that generate the required technology and research that transforms the available renewable energy sources into energy that the public can consume.

    Rural Electrification in India

    The Electricity Act of 2003 enabled the building of electricity infrastructure across the rural and remote regions of the country and thus, easy access to electricity for most of the people. The Indian Government launched the Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY) in 2005, to extend electricity to all unelectrified villages. The programme focused largely on developing electrification infrastructure across villages in India and providing free connections to all rural households living below the poverty line. Further, state governments received a 90% grant from the central government which aided in extending electrification infrastructure to over one lakh villages during the period 2005–2013. Moreover, the central government worked towards increasing implementation efficiencies by engaging central PSUs in some states.

    In 2015, the NDA Government launched the Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Gram Jyoti Yojana (DDUGJY) under which, the villages that remained un-electrified under the RGGVY, were electrified. The scheme has also been significant in supporting distribution networks in rural areas, largely concerning metering distribution transformers, feeders, and consumers in rural areas (Gill, Gupta, and Palit 2019).

    The central government further introduced standalone mini-grids programs, under the DDUGJY in 2016. Guided by the National mini-grid policy, State governments also contributed through various mini-grid policies to promote decentralised renewable energy solutions. Further, the Unnat Jyothi Affordable LEDs for All was introduced to encourage the efficient use of energy and under this scheme, LED bulbs were distributed to all households with a metered connection at subsidised rates. The Ujwal DISCOM Assurance Yojana was also introduced under the DDUGJY to allow a financial turnaround and operational improvement of Discoms. According to the UDAY scheme, discoms were expected to improve operational efficiency and bring AT&C losses down to 15%.

    While the schemes were successfully implemented then, the rate of rural household electrification was still slow. Evaluations of the schemes found various limitations, such as high upfront connection costs, poor quality of supply, poor maintenance services, to name a few. Additionally, some states had also started initiating their electricity-access programmes to accelerate the electrification process, such as the West Bengal Rural Electrification Programme, the Har Ghar Bijli scheme in Bihar, the Bijuli Bati mobile-based app to enable last-mile connectivity and household connections in Odisha (Gill, Gupta, and Palit 2019). To address this issue, the central government then launched the Pradhan Mantri Sahaj Bijli Har Ghar Yojana (PM Saubhagya) in September 2017, with the ambitious target of providing electricity connections to all un-electrified rural households by March 2019. Under this scheme, the government has electrified all of 597,464 census villages in the country (Bhaskar 2019).

     Barriers to adopting Renewable Energy in Rural Areas

    This section focuses on the issues that restrict the efficient adaptation of renewable energy in rural areas. As the government continues to promote renewable energy in rural communities, it should keep in mind these following limitations and develop mechanisms to overcome them as and when they arise. While employing renewables to supply electricity, the problem of grid integration arises. Most electricity grids and the technology used, are designed and placed around fossil fuels. However, when they transition now to more non-conventional forms of energy such as wind and solar, the designs and placements of power generation systems have to change rapidly. Thus, heavy emphasis should be placed on improving the research and infrastructure required to make this transition as smooth as possible. That is, the government should research the most optimal locations for wind turbines and solar panels, as not all lands in rural areas can be employed for this purpose. Otherwise, it may negatively impact the quality of agricultural lands. Upon conducting the required research, the infrastructure to connect all areas to the electricity grids must be developed and well-financed by the government to satisfy the energy demands of the rural population. For instance, in Germany, while the wind power potential is in the northern regions, major demand for it is in the southern region. Thus, the country’s energy transition process emphasizes upgrading the electricity grid infrastructure that would make it possible for power to flow from north to south (UNCTAD 2019). Further, the planning should also focus on balancing the energy mix in the power grid. The transition to renewables will not be a quick one, which implies that for the short term the power grid will be a mix of different sources of energy. Thus, the plans should design the grids in such a way that the proportion of each energy source balances one another so that there is no leakage or wastage in the system, especially given the fact that energy storage technology is still underdeveloped in the country.

    For many years now, there has been an emphasis on the potential of decentralised electricity comprising off-grid or mini-grid systems to help with rural electrification. The government introduced a national mini-grid policy in 2016 to promote decentralised renewable energy. With the increase in the use of solar energy, solar-powered mini-grid systems were found to be more economical and accessible to rural households (Comello et al. 2016). These systems could substantially improve the people’s standard of living and eliminate the use of harmful fuels such as kerosene oil for simple household appliances such as lamps and cooking stoves. However, an IEA report found evidence that this potential is limited, and would not be beneficial for large, productive, income-generating activities. Thus, mini-grids are often considered a temporary solution, until grid connectivity is achieved (IEA 2017).

    Whether a grid system or an off-grid system is implemented, high connection charges will automatically limit the rural population’s ability to connect to the grid.

    A major challenge that the government must keep in mind is affordability. Whether a grid system or an off-grid system is implemented, high connection charges will automatically limit the rural population’s ability to connect to the grid. On the one hand, better access to electricity will increase productivity and lead to the growth and development in the region but on the other hand, most of the rural communities live below the poverty line and will not be able to afford the connection, even if they have access to it. While decentralised energy sounds economical and sounds like an obvious solution, it is also limited in capacity.

    Another factor that the government must keep in mind for the adaptation of renewable energy in rural areas is the situation of state and private distribution companies (discoms) in India that play a pivotal role in the rural electrification process. While the government set the goals and adopted a strategy to electrify all rural households under the Saubhagya scheme, it was the discoms’ responsibility to implement these strategies and achieve the goals. A TERI report found that the discoms had difficulty carrying out the electrification process because the strategy adopted by the government had not considered the difference in demographics in the rural areas (Gill, Gupta, and Palit 2019). That is, each area differs in population size, density, and topography and the discoms found it hard to implement a similar strategy to all places alike. Moreover, the financial status of many state-run discoms has been stressed over the past year due to increasing losses and lack of adequate support from the respective State governments. Over the past year, dues to power generators have increased to Rs 1.27 trillion (Economic Times 2021). The annual 2021 budget’s outlay of over Rs 3 trillion, to be spent over five years, to improve the viability of state-run discoms, is a step in the right direction. The TERI report also found that discoms face institutional burdens in the electrification process (Gill, Gupta, and Palit 2019). The companies are most often strapped for time and must deal with huge amounts of paperwork. Simultaneously, they have to be physically present to install the necessary infrastructure and manage the labour employed in different states. In the end, it remains to be seen how the discoms will manage to monitor and review the electricity infrastructure in the rural areas, especially given the huge amounts of debt that they are trapped in.

    The government must also work towards increasing and incentivising private sector participation. While the private companies were interested in taking up tenders for the production of electricity through renewable energy sources in the past, the recent withdrawal of benefits such as accelerated depreciation has been a cause for concern. Companies like Suzlon Energy Ltd. face lower returns on their investment, thus deterring them from investing in future projects. Removal of benefits also discourages smaller companies that are looking to invest in this sector as it increases not only the cost but uncertainty about the government’s policies. Companies will refrain from investing if they do not anticipate a high return in the future. For grid connection systems to be successful and efficient in the long term, the government must ensure a strong governance structure, and a stable and enabling policy environment that constantly encourages fresh private sector participation. Concerning the rural electrification process, the government must encourage private sector participation because it would complement the public sector companies thus sharing the burden of production, installations, and technology as well as the process of maintenance and regular checks once the grid connection is complete.

    A shift to renewable energy in rural areas will no doubt have a positive impact on the health and well-being of the population. It will also improve the standard of living and in most cases, the productivity of the people. But the change has to be a gradual process. Even if renewable energy and electricity are affordable and accessible to the people, alternative cooking fuels and technology will take time to be accepted in practice as they may not have the same performance quality as traditional stoves and appliances that the people are used to. To overcome this hurdle, the government must ensure that the policies formed will guide the adjustment to renewables for many years to come. Moreover, the government must spread knowledge and awareness about the benefits of shifting to appliances that are sourced through renewable sources of energy. Besides, some rural households collect firewood for not just individual consumption but also to sell it (IEA 2017). This is a source of income for these households hence, the government should tread carefully when they implement programs that seek to reduce the collection and use of firewood. For years now, the government has promoted and subsidised the use of LPG within rural communities, as an alternative for other harmful sources of energy. While it has helped improve people’s health to some extent, it would be beneficial for the government to gradually nudge the decrease in the use of LPG and increase the use of renewable alternatives. Apart from the definite benefits to the environment, such a change would serve to reduce the rural-urban energy gap in India.

    The shift to renewable energy sources holds huge amounts of risks and uncertainty. But, despite this, there is a need to make long-term, accurate forecasts of energy demand and develop drafts of policies beforehand that would guide the process of supplying energy to satisfy the demand. Energy supply projects necessitate this because they have long gestation and implementation periods. With the climate crisis advancing rapidly, it would serve the government well to be prepared.

    International Collaboration

     International cooperation can play a crucial role in expanding the distribution of renewables. It can help countries benefit from shared infrastructure, technology, and lessons. The challenge thus lies in designing policies that will facilitate this technology and infrastructure transfer, especially in countries where the renewable energy sector is emerging. International organizations such as the Commission on Science and Technology for Development can play an important role in supporting such collaborations. Policies should also facilitate mechanisms that will help improve the current capabilities in developing countries.

    For instance, the Indo-German Energy Programme – Access to Energy in Rural Areas was signed to create a favourable environment for rural renewable energy enterprises so that they can provide easily accessible energy services to the rural population.

    The bilateral collaboration brought in local and international professional expertise to support private sector development, to identify and improve viable sources of finance, and to help design government schemes to achieve sustainable energy security and provide clean cooking energy solutions to the rural population. The GIZ – the German Corporation for International Cooperation – worked closely with India’s Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) to successfully implement the program. The program succeeded in training more than 10,000 professionals to qualify as energy auditors. It has also helped increase private sector investment and develop a calculation to determine the CO2 emissions for the Indian electricity supply grid.

    Way Forward

     Research and innovation are essential to improve renewable options for producing clean cooking fuel. There is also a need for location-based research to produce appropriate workable technologies. Long-term policies and outcomes are important to consider. So, conducting significant research will not only help understand the present conditions but will also help policymakers make informed decisions in the future. It is also important to educate and communicate to the rural population about the relative advantages of using modern energy sources over traditional sources. For instance, consumers may be unaware of the health impacts of using traditional sources of energy for cooking. Moreover, they may distrust conventional alternatives due to their unfamiliarity with them. Thus, the responsibility falls on the government to properly inform them of the need for the shift to renewables and curb the spread of misinformation.

    Further, alternative solutions will only succeed if they are established in cooperation with the local users. “The women in rural areas play an important role when it comes to energy transition” (IEA 2017). Several initiatives such as the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves, SEforALL, and ECOWAS address the joint issues of gender empowerment, energy poverty, health, and climate (IEA 2017). Training and capacity building are key to the shift to renewable sources of power. And in rural energy applications, this can be improved by taking into account the gender issues that plague society. There is a high possibility that rural engineers, once trained, might migrate to urban areas in search of more lucrative work. In response to this, the Barefoot College International Solar Training Programme takes a different approach to capacity-building in rural areas and trains the grandmothers in villages who are more certain to stay and help develop the community.

    a shift to clean energy in rural areas that houses the section of the population that lives below the poverty line will be more successful if it is seen as a strategy to broaden community development.

    Thus, a shift to clean energy in rural areas that houses the section of the population that lives below the poverty line will be more successful if it is seen as a strategy to broaden community development. This includes higher employment, better infrastructure, roads, and telecommunications.  This process requires careful design of policies and the establishment of a supportive environment that includes not just innovative business models but also maintenance systems that will sustain the development in the long run.

    Conclusion

     To summarize, rural electrification and the transition to renewable energy in rural areas have been a part of the government’s agenda for many years now, irrespective of the ruling party at the centre. Necessary policies have been introduced to guide the process. While it is great that the government recently achieved universal electrification, it remains to be seen whether the quality of power provided to these villages meets the needs of the population. Further, in this process, state-owned discoms have taken a serious financial hit and it is a tough road to recovery from here. Adding on, the COVID pandemic has slowed down the development and recovery of these discoms. The government should first increase budget outlays in the following years and create a system to monitor the use of these finances. Second, it could turn to privatisation. Privatising discoms on a larger scale would reduce the financial and risk burden on the government and ensure efficient functioning of the companies. Additionally, it is important that while policies are being designed, the deciding parties have a complete understanding of the socio-economic situation of the communities within which they will make changes. To do this, experts who have studied the layout of these rural areas extensively should be involved in the process, along with leaders from the respective districts who are bound to be more aware of the situation and the problems in their areas. More importantly, the government should keep the process of the transition to alternative energy sources transparent and keep an open line of communication with the rural population to earn their trust before they make significant changes. Finally, India is one of the largest consumers of different renewable sources of energy. While it is important to make changes to the policies in this sector, it is also imperative that the government tries to maintain stability in policies that support the companies which help satisfy the growing energy demand in the country.

     

    References

    1. Bhaskar, Utpal. 2019. “All villages electrified, but last-mile supply a challenge.” mint, December 29, 2019. https://www.livemint.com/industry/energy/all-villages-electrified-but-last-mile-supply-a-challenge-11577642738875.html.
    2. Comello, Stephen D., Stefan J. Reichelstein, Anshuman Sahoo, and Tobias S. Schmidt. 2016. “Enabling Mini-grid Development in Rural India.” Stanford University. https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/IndiaMinigrid_Working_Paper2.pdf
    3. Economic Times. 2021. “Discom debt at Rs 6 trillion; negative outlook on power distribution: ICRA.” The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/power/discom-debt-at-rs-6-trillion-negative-outlook-on-power-distribution-icra/articleshow/81431574.cms?from=mdr.
    4. Gill, Bigsna, Astha Gupta, and Debajit Palit. 2019. “Rural Electrification: Impact on Distribution Companies in India.” The Energy and Resources Institute. https://www.teriin.org/sites/default/files/2019-02/DUF%20Report.pdf.
    5. IEA. 2017. “Energy Access Outlook: From Poverty to Prosperity.” International Energy Agency. https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-access-outlook-2017.
    6. UNCTAD. 2019. “The Role of Science, Technology and Innovation in Promoting Renewable Energy by 2030.” United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/dtlstict2019d2_en.pdf.

    Feature Image: The Better India 

    Image 1: www.alliancemagazine.org

    Image 2: indiaclimatedialogue.net

  • The Democratic Warrior – Countering Unrestricted Violence with Clausewitz

    The Democratic Warrior – Countering Unrestricted Violence with Clausewitz

    This research paper was originally published in the “African Journal of Terrorism and Insurgency Research (AJoTIR)”, Volume 2, Number 1, April 2021. Pp. 89-106.

     

    Abstract

    We often find the application of indistinctive, brutal and extraordinary violence by all fighters and soldiers in terrorist, insurgency, and counter-insurgency acts in Africa. This article argues that we need a code of honour for those bearing arms to limit these unrestricted acts of violence, a code of honour that combines military duties with the demands of civil society in the model democratic warrior. The changes to the global system that followed the end of the Cold War are widely regarded as requiring a different kind of soldier for democratic societies. A number of writers have proposed that the new model should be that of the “warrior,” a concept that highlights the psychological and social distinctiveness of those who bear arms. Such men and (rarely) women are often conceived as operating according to a distinctive code of honour that sets them apart from civil society, usually in a positive way. But we know that the concept of honour may also lead to a terrible escalation. So, the task is to reconnect the concepts—warrior and honour—to civil society to de-escalate the ongoing brutal violence in civil wars. There is no honour in killing innocent people. On the contrary, it is perhaps the most egregious act against one’s honour and dignity to torture, violate, or kill the innocent. The concept of the democratic warrior seeks to reinstate honour and dignity to those bearing arms.Keywords: democracy, warrior, civil society, civil war, honour, dignity, terrorism, Clausewitz, wondrous trinity, containing violence.

    Introduction

    At first glance, the concept of the democratic warrior appears contradictory. Indeed, it combines seemingly conflicting value systems in a single concept. Like a magnet or Clausewitz’s favoured model of the unity of polar opposition between attack and defence, a methodology can be formulated to explain how this type of conflicted unity is not necessarily a logical opposition and can be a dynamic interrelationship on a continuum. At one end of the continuum is democratic equality and non-violent conflict resolution, while at the other end is the threat of (and sometimes) violently enforced limitation of war and violence; at one end is a civilized society, while at the other is a subsystem of society whose identity is defined by martial honour.

    The decisive bond that can link the two poles of this dynamic relationship, without eliminating their opposition, is the classical republican virtues, which can lay claim to relative validity in both spheres. Since Plato, the classical virtues have been prudence (wisdom), justice, fortitude, and temperance. Without a specific ethos aimed at the political functioning of the polity, a state can sustain itself only under the conditions of a dictatorship. If republican virtue, which is oriented toward the polity, cannot be directly reconciled with liberal democracy and its focus on the individual, it can take on a completely new significance as a bond linking a democratic society to democratic warriors. For Machiavelli, republican virtue already guarantees both external and internal freedom. In this respect, the necessary though not yet adequate condition of the democratic warrior is to also be a republican soldier. Add to this the limitation of war and violence in a global society to make democratic societies possible. A renewal of the republican virtue is the link between a liberal-democratic society and a warrior ethos.

    The “warrior” is by definition someone who chooses to bear arms and is proficient in their use. In this sense, whatever the distinctive characteristics of the warrior ethos, its institutionalization reflects the same preferences for professionalism, expertise, and individualism that are characteristic of modern society as a whole. Contemporary conditions, it is argued, no longer call for armed masses, but for experts whose willingness to serve in uniform will allow others the freedom not to serve.

    It must be admitted, however, that the concept of the warrior does not call forth associations with modernity, but rather of the “archaic combatant” (Röhl 2005), whose ethos, skills, and experiences set him apart from normal society and in opposition to its basic values, of which the most cherished is, of course, peace. The fact the warrior freely chooses his profession may be consistent with democratic values, but the existence of a “warrior class” uniquely skilled in the use of force, whose values are not those of society as a whole, is scarcely consistent with democratic interests. It is also true that those who serve in today’s democratic armies are called upon to do a great deal more than fight. Although phrases like “armed social worker” undervalue and denigrate the martial qualities that remain foundational to military life, it is true that only a small percentage of men and women in uniform actually fight, and that their duties entail a wide range of activities in which violence plays no part. To those who wish to uphold the warrior spirit, the diverse requirements of modern military missions are liable to hold scant appeal, which may undermine the sense of purpose and identity that drew them to the profession in the first place.

    The discussion that follows seeks to build a bridge between the distinctive ethos of the warrior and the moral and political requirements of democratic societies, using the concept of the “democratic warrior.” It seeks to do justice to the self-image of those who bear arms (a morally distinctive task) while connecting it to the various goals and practices of democratic societies, and the diverse uses to which they put their armed forces. We may begin by noting that a warrior, even in the most traditional terms, is not merely a combatant—a fighter—but has always performed and embodied a range of social, military, and political roles. Our starting point for considering what those roles must be is Clausewitz’s concept of the trinity, a metaphor intended to encompass all types of war, which, by extension, can provide a lens through which the ideal range of characteristics required of the democratic warrior can be envisioned. War itself, as Clausewitz avers, is compounded of primordial passions, an irreducible element of chance, and what he called an element of “subordination” to reason, by which its instrumental character is revealed. When Clausewitz set forth his trinity, he posited that the chief concern of the warrior must be the mastery of chance through intelligence and creativity; and so it remains. Yet there is no reason to suppose that such mastery means that war’s social and political requirements should be ignored. On the contrary, unless they too are mastered, the warriors sent forth by democratic societies cannot represent the values and interests of the communities that depend on them, and of which they remain apart (Herberg-Rothe 2007).

    Soldiers and Warriors

    In both German and English, the word “soldier” (soldat) originally referred to a paid man-at-arms. The term became common in early modern Europe and distinguished those who were paid to fight— primarily in the service of the increasingly powerful territorial states that were then coming to dominate the continent—from members of militias, criminal gangs, volunteer constabulary and local self-defence forces, and other forms of vernacular military organizations. The rise of the soldier was linked to the rise of the state. This connection distinguished him from the “mercenary,” who also fought for pay, but as a private entrepreneur, what we would today call a “contractor.” Standing armies comprised of soldiers were different from and militarily superior to, the feudal hosts of the past, whose fighters served out of customary social obligation and generally possessed neither the discipline nor the martial proficiency that the soldier embodied. Clausewitz highlights these developments briefly in the last book of On War, and portrays them as an advance in political organization and military efficiency (Clausewitz 1984, 587-91).

    The absolute monarchies that made the paid soldier the standard of military excellence in early modern Europe were generally indifferent to the social and political identities of those they paid to fight, though not always. Frederick the Great, for instance, lamented his reliance on foreign troops and believed that his own subjects made better soldiers. “With such troops,” he wrote, “one might defeat the entire world, were not victories as fatal to them as to their enemies” (quoted in Moran 2003, 49). It was, however, only with the French Revolution that a firm expectation was established that a soldier bore arms not merely for pay, but out of personal loyalty to the state, an identity that was in turn supposed to improve his performance on the battlefield. This connection, needless to say, was largely mythical. Most of the men who fought in the armies of the Revolution, and all major European wars since then, are conscripts who would not have chosen to bear arms on behalf of the state if the law had not compelled them to do so. Nevertheless, submission to conscription was itself regarded as an expression of the ideal of citizenship, a concept that, like honour, depends upon the internalization and subjective acceptance by individuals of norms arising within the larger society.

    The French Republic never referred to its soldiers as conscripts, always as volunteers. The success of its armies and those of Napoleon, although transient, insured that “defence of the Fatherland [became] the foundation myth of modern armies”(Sikora 2002). The myth of voluntary sacrifice by the “citizen-soldier” to defend the community proved central to the legitimization of conscript armies, even in societies where democratic values were slow to emerge. In the middle of the nineteenth century, as Frederick Engels observed, conscription was Prussia’s only democratic institution (Frevert 1997, 21).

    It had been introduced in reaction to Prussia’s defeat by Napoleon, whose triumph was owed to the fact that the resources of the entire French nation were at his disposal. The aim of the Prussian military reforms was to accomplish a similar mobilization of social energy for war, but without inciting the revolutionary transformation of society that had made such mobilization possible in France. Prussia was no sovereign nation of citizens, and while the reform of its armed forces helped it to regain its position among the leading states of Europe, their political effect was limited.

    Many of those who promoted reform, including Clausewitz, hoped conscription would contribute to the democratization of Prussia’s armed forces, and, indirectly, of society as a whole. But the moral influence could as easily run the other way, and, as Friedrich Meinecke observed, measures designed to bind army and society together had the effect, in Prussia, of militarizing society instead. Even the Great War did not fully succeed in stripping war of its moral glamour. The supposedly heroic massacre of German troops attacking the British at Langemarck (1914), for instance, remained a staple of right-wing mythology until the end of the Third Reich, by which “our grief for the bold dead is so splendidly surpassed by the pride in how well they knew how to fight and die (Hüppauf, 1993, 56). Alongside this kind of blood-drenched nostalgia, the industrialized warfare exemplified by battles like Verdun (1916) also asserted themselves. Under these circumstances, fighting and dying well acquired some of the aspects of industrialized labour, in which a soldier’s duty expresses itself, not through the mastery of chance as Clausewitz proposed, but through submission to what Ernst Jüngercalled “the storm of steel.”

    It was only after World War II that German soldiers became authentically democratic citizens in uniform. According to Wilfried von Bredow, the creation of the Bundeswehr in 1956 was “one of the Federal Republic of Germany’s most innovative and creative political reforms, fully comparable in its significance to the conception of the social market economy” (Bredow 2000). Its evolution as an integral part of German society has embodied a calculated break with the German past, one that has become even more apparent since the demise of the Soviet Union has shifted the mission of the German army away from national defence and toward expeditionary operations calculated to help maintain regional and global order. As the conscript armies of the past have given way to the professional and volunteer armies of the present, in Germany and elsewhere, the model of the democratic “citizen in uniform” has once again been required to adapt to new conditions.

    It is perhaps slightly paradoxical that as wars have become smaller and more marginal in relation to society as a whole, the ideal of the warrior as an apolitical professional fighter has regained some of its old prominences. Such individuals are thought to embody values different than those of society as a whole, to the point where their loyalties, like their special capabilities in battle, are thought to spring solely from their organization and mutual affiliation. John Keegan, a proponent of the new warrior, explains the rejection of the values of civil society in terms of the psychological impact of violence on those who experience and employ it. War, Keegan argues, reaches into the most secret depths of the human heart, where the ego eliminates rational goals, where pride reigns, where emotions have the upper hand, and instinct rules. One of Keegan’s models of the warrior is the Roman centurion. These officers were soldiers through and through. They entertained no expectation of rising to the governing class, their ambitions were entirely limited to those of success within what could be perceived, for the first time in history, as an esteemed and self-sufficient profession. The values of the Romans professional soldier have not diminished with the passage of time: pride in a distinctly masculine way of life, the good opinion of comrades, satisfaction in the tokens of professional success, and the expectation of an honourable discharge and retirement remain the benchmarks of the warrior’s life (Keegan 1995, 389-391).

    The enthusiasm of Keegan and others for the revival of the warrior ethos is the belief that “honour” can play an important role in limiting violence, far more effective than the proliferation of legal norms that lack the binding psychological validity required to stay the hand of those who actually take life and risk their own. Warriors use force within a customary framework of mutual respect for one another. This is part of what has always been meant by “conventional warfare”, a form of fighting that necessarily includes a dissociation from combatants considered to be illegitimate. How and whether these kinds of customary restraints can be successfully reasserted under contemporary conditions is one of the central problems with which the concept of the democratic warrior must contend. In opposition to Keegan, I think, that the warriors’ code of honour must be related back to civil society, although this is a task which requires bridging a gap and remains a kind of hybrid.

    Old and New Wars

    To judge what kind of “weapon carrier” will be needed in the twenty-first century, we must begin by looking at developments since the end of the East-West conflict. It has proven, broadly speaking, to be a period of rapid social, political, and economic development whose outstanding characteristics are marked by the decline or disappearance of familiar frameworks and inherited values. Thus, one speaks of denationalization, de-politicization, de-militarization, de-civilization, de-territorialization, and delimitation.

    Unsurprisingly, these changes are also supposed to be marked by “new” wars, characterized by the decline of statehood, the rise of privatized violence, the development of civil war economies, and the reappearance of types of combatants thought to be long gone— mercenaries, child soldiers, warlords, and so on. The new types of combatants are in turn associated with rising incidences of suicide bombing, massacre, and other forms of atavistic and irrational violence(Kaldor 1999, Münkler 2004).

    Political and academic discourses have produced a range of new concepts designed to capture these conditions, including privatized war, asymmetrical warfare, small wars, wild wars, low-intensity conflict, post-national wars; wars of globalization on the one hand, and of “global fragmentation” on the other. It is apparent, however, that each of these terms describes only one segment of a complex reality. To some extent, a new type of war is being discovered with each new war. At the same time, these different terms share a common assumption that war now consists mainly of conflicts involving non-state actors on at least one side, and, by extension, that the motivation and goals of such belligerents are likely to prove unfathomable in political terms. The result for some is an approaching anarchy (Kaplan 1994), whose remedy is a revived liberal interventionism, the only principle that seems able to guarantee a modicum of global order (Münkler 2007).

    It is possible, however, that the contemporary diffusion of conflict beyond the confines of the state system is no more than a transitional phase, with particular strong links to those parts of the world—Africa and Central Asia above all—where the challenges of post-imperial social and political adaptation are still especially pronounced. Neither does the fact that the parties to war are non-state actors necessarily mean that such wars lack a political or ideological basis. Such wars may not represent a clash between order and anarchy but between competing conceptions of order (Münkler 2004). While a revived interventionism may indeed be a suitable antidote to anarchy, it is unlikely to do more than aggravate indigenous conflicts over the politics of order – and as it seems at present, it is contributing to the escalation of violence throughout the world. Now, as in the past, violence is not simply a source of disorder. It is also a means of shaping order and providing the basis for community formation.

    It is possible to wonder, in other words, how new the “new wars” actually are. Widespread atavistic and vernacular violence were already prominent features of the Chinese civil war, the Russian civil war, the Armenian genocide, and many other episodes of “old wars”. Those who favour the concept note a number of formal changes that resulted from the disappearance of Soviet-American rivalry, above all a decline in external assistance. The proxy wars of the past have become the civil wars of the present, conducted by parties that must rely on their own efforts to obtain the necessary resources, including illegal trafficking in diamonds, drugs, and women; brutal exploitation of the population; extreme violence as a way of attracting humanitarian assistance that can then be plundered; and the violent acquisition of particularly valuable resources (robber capitalism). These changes may well amplify the social consequences of violence, but do not necessarily deprive it of its instrumental and political character (Schlichte 2006).

    The point of departure for the study by Isabelle Duyvesteyn, for example, is a very broad definition of politics based on Robert Dahl: “any persistent pattern of human relationship that involves, to a significant extent, power, rule or authority” (Duyvesteyn 2005, 9). Duyvesteyn refers especially to the fact that in the fast-developing states she has studied, the differences between economics and politics are not as clear cut as Westerners expect. Struggles that seem to be about the acquisition of resources can be motivated by power politics to obtain a separate constituency. Because the position of power in these conflicts is often determined by the reputation of the leader, what may appear to be personal issues can also be incorporated into a power-political context. Her hypothesis is not that economically, religiously, ethnically, or tribally defined conflicts are masks for politics, but rather that these conflicts remain embedded in a political framework that is understandable to the participants.

    It is also apparent today’s civil wars do not always trend irrevocably toward social and political fragmentation, becoming increasingly privatized until they reach the smallest possible communities, which are held together by only violence itself. The defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan, for instance, gave rise to a civil war between warlords and individual tribes that appeared to be tending in this direction for a time, only to acquire a new and recognizably ideological shape once the Taliban seized power. This new tendency was confirmed by the Talibans’ willingness to give shelter to al-Qaeda, a global and trans-national organization of almost unlimited ambition, whose attacks upon the United States have in turn embroiled Afghanistan in a conflict about the world order pitting the West against militant Islam. At present, we witness in “Sahelistan” a similar development, but this is not confined to a single state, but to the whole region.

    At a minimum, it seems clear that the new wars, to the extent that they are new, are not all new in the same way. In some, violence does indeed appear to gravitate downwards towards privatized war; in others, however, the movement is upwards, towards supra-state wars of world order. Although these trends are linked in practice, analytically they are distinct. States do still wage wars, but for the most part, they are now doing so not in pursuit of their own particular interests but for reasons related to world order. This is what accounts for the new interest in an American empire and hegemony (Walzer 2003). Nor is America the only state capable of seeking and exercising global influence.

    Russia, China, India and Europe (whose superficial fragmentation masks its concerted economic, regulatory and power-political influence) are all capable of challenging American influence in particular spheres of activity; and one day they may do so in all spheres (Zakaria 2009). In any event, the use of force by strong states in pursuit of world order, whether cooperatively or competitively, is likely to remain the dominant strategic reality for some time to come; a fact that should not be obscured by the simultaneous proliferation of privatized violence on the periphery of the world system.

    Clausewitz’s Trinity as a Coordinate System

    The argument about the newness of new wars is also an argument about the continuing salience of Clausewitz’s understanding of war as, in his words, a “wondrous trinity,” by which primordial violence and the exigencies of combat may finally be subjugated to reason and politics. It is apparent, however, that while the proportions of these three elements may vary, a good deal nowadays, perhaps more so than in some periods in the past, they do not escape the theoretical framework that Clausewitz established. At the same time, his trinity points us towards the essential characteristics of the “democratic warrior,” whose success requires that he masters the multiple sources of tensions that Clausewitz detected in the nature of war itself.

    Clausewitz’s trinity present war as embodying three elements in constant tension with each other: primordial violence, the fuel on which war feeds; the fight between two or more opponents, by which violence is given military effective form; and the community, whose interests, as represented by policy, give war its purpose, and whose existence provides the soldier with his essential identity: as one who fights for something larger than himself. The shifting proportions among these elements that modern war continues to display would not have surprised Clausewitz. On the contrary, he knew that all three would always be present in every war and that a “theory that ignores any one of them . . . would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless” (Clausewitz, On War, 1984, 89; see Herberg-Rothe 2007). Each requires exploration if the characteristics of the democratic warrior are to be understood.

    Violence and force

    The most crucial polarity in Clausewitz’s trinity is between the instrumentality of war and the autonomy of violence. Clausewitz noted the tendency of violence to become absolute, and therefore an end in itself, a tendency that was restrained both by the instrumental rationality of policy and, less obviously perhaps, by the skill of the combatants. Clausewitz also notes the paradoxical influences that can attend the use of force at a distance. If combatants are separated from each other in space and time, it may promote relative rationality in the use of force; or it may not, since it introduces the disinhibiting influence of impersonal killing, in which the humanity of the opponent is no longer perceived. Fighting “face-to-face” demands personal aggressiveness and even hatred, which can lead to increasing ferocity in the use of force. At the same time, however, it may make it easier to perceive the opponent as human. A similarly paradoxical logic may arise from the use of expensive weapons versus simple ones. Expensive weapons systems and the highly trained combatants required to use them can lead to a certain limitation of war because these cannot be so easily risked (as was the case, he argued, in the wars of the 18th century). In contrast, wars waged by relatively unskilled combatants employing cheap and simple weapons may be more likely to escalate – as is evident from many of the civil wars in Africa, particularly with child soldiers.

    The Fight

    The most basic reason that the violence of war is prone to escalate is that combatants share a common interest in not being destroyed. In most other respects, however, their interaction is asymmetrical, most profoundly so, as Clausewitz says, in the contrasting aims and methods of attack and defence, which he avers are two very different things. The shape of combat is also influenced by whether war is directed against the opposing will (in effect, a war to change the adversary’s mind)or if it aims at his “destruction.” Clausewitz specifies that by the destruction of the opposing armed forces, he simply means reducing them to such a condition that they can no longer continue the fight. Nevertheless, Clausewitz long favoredNapoleon’s approach to warfare, which emphasized direct attack against the main forces of the enemy. Other forms of fighting are also possible, however, whose aim is to exhaust the enemy’s patience or resources indirectly, rather than confront and defeat his armed forces in the field. The real war, in Clausewitz’s days and in ours, is generally a combination of direct and indirect methods, whose proportions will vary with the interests at stake and the resources available.

    Warring Communities

    When referring to warring communities, we must first differentiate between relatively new communities and those of long-standing. This is because in newly constructed communities, recourse to fighting is liable to play a greater relative role in its relations with adversaries; whereas, in the case of long-standing communities, additional factors come into play. Clausewitz argues that the length of time a group of communities has existed significantly reduces the tendency for escalation because their long-standing interactions will include elements other than war, and each party envision the other’s continued existence once peace is made, a consideration that may moderate the use of force.

    War’s character will also vary depending on whether it aims to preserve the existence of a community or, as in revolutionary crises, to form a new one; whether war is waged in the pursuit of interests, or to maintain and spread the values, norms, and ideals of the particular community (see Herberg-Rothe 2007). Closely related to this contrast, although not exactly congruent with it, is the question of whether the purpose of war lies outside itself or, especially in warring cultures, whether the violence of the fight has independent cultural significance. The social composition of each society and the formal composition of its armed forces (regular armies, conscripts, mercenaries, militias, etc), play an important role here. Summarizing these fundamental differences yields the coordinate system of war and violence shown in the diagram.

     

    Every war is accordingly defined in terms of its three essential dimensions: violence, combat, and the affiliation of the combatants with a community on whose behalf the combatants act. Historically, these three tendencies within the “wondrous trinity” display almost infinite combinations and multiple, cross-cutting tensions since every war is waged differently. Thus, every war has symmetrical and asymmetrical tendencies, for instance, even when it may appear that only one of these tendencies comes to the fore (Herberg-Rothe 2007).

    The tension between the coordinates of Clausewitz’s trinity may also be heightened by different forms of military organization. Those that feature strict hierarchies of command are perhaps most conducive to the transmission of political guidance to operating forces; whereas what is today called network-centric warfare is characterized by loose and diffuse organizational structures, in which the community’s political will and mandate can no longer be so readily imposed on combatants directly engaged with the enemy. As in the warfare of partisans, networked military organizations place a high value on the political understanding of the individual soldier. It is because of the relative independence of soldiers in network-centric warfare that this type of warfare does not require an “archaic combatant,” but a democratic warrior who has fully internalized the norms of the community for which he fights.

    The Democratic Warrior in the Twenty-first Century

    Even in Clausewitz’s day, war was not the only instrument of policy that state’s possessed, though it was undoubtedly the most central. Today, its centrality is less obvious, even as the complexity of its connections to other forms of state power has increased (Thiele 2009). Combining the different perspectives afforded by foreign, economic, developmental, judicial, domestic, and defence policy permits a global approach to conflict resolution while making the considerations surrounding the use of force more complicated than ever. States now pursue their security through many avenues at once, and all the agencies involved must consciously coordinate, connect, and systematically integrate their goals, processes, structures, and capabilities.

    Given the continuing expansion of the concept of security in recent years, a democratic army needs a specific task and function since its essential purpose—the use of force—can not be dispensed with. There have been those who thought it might be. When the East-West conflict ended, Francis Fukuyama announced the “end of history,” meaning an end to the practice of war and violence (Fukuyama 1992). The triumphant advance of democracy and free markets seemed unstoppable, to the point where it appeared as if the twenty-first century would be an age defined by economics and thus, to a large extent, by peace. These expectations have now been decisively overturned by ongoing massacres and genocide in Africa; by the return of war in Europe (as happened in the former Yugoslavia); by the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States and, the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; the war between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia in 2008, the civil war in Syria and Iraq and finally the prospect of war to suppress Iran’s nuclear program (itself a profoundly dangerous and destabilizing step, should it become reality).

    In a complete reversal of Fukuyama’s thesis, a struggle against a new brand of Islamic totalitarianism appears to have begun, in which violence has become “unbounded”—because terrorist attacks are potentially ever-present because no end to them is in sight and there is no reason to assume there is any limit to the scale of violence terrorists might employ, including the use of nuclear weapons should they come to possess them. These processes of growing disinhibition must be countered by a new containment policy that limits the expansion of war and violence in the world.

    Two basic assumptions underlie this conception. The first is that the escalation of violence in world society is so multifaceted and differentiated that a single counter-strategy will not suffice. Rather, an overarching perspective is required to decide which measures are suitable in individual cases—without being able to exclude the possibility of terrible errors and miscalculations. The second assumption is that in today’s global society—as has been the case throughout history—many contrary processes are at work. Thus, regard for only one counter-strategy can have paradoxical, unanticipated consequences.

    This can be clarified using the example of democratization. If a general effort at worldwide democratization was the only counter-strategy against the disinhibition of violence and war, the results would almost certainly be counterproductive, not least because the spreading of democracy might itself be a violent process. A one-sided demand for democratic reform without regard for local conditions might, in individual cases, contribute to the creation of anti-democratic movements. The historical experience bears this out. After the First World War, nearly all of the defeated states underwent an initial process of democratization under the tutelage and supervision of the victors. Yet, almost all ended in authoritarian or even totalitarian regimes.

    Thus, the concept of the democratic warrior is not based on imposing democracy by force, but on limiting war and violence to enable the organic development of democratic self-determination. A differentiated counter-strategy of curbing war and violence in the world, with a view to fostering good governance (as a first step toward democratic governance), is the common element shared by humanitarian intervention and the development of a culture of civil conflict management. To this must be added measures to limit the causes of war and violence, such as poverty, oppression, and ignorance. Last but not least, this new form of containment requires effective restraint not just in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but also of small arms, which continue to kill far more people than any other kind of arms.

    The containment of violence does not mean there will be entirely non-violent societies, much less a non-violent world society, in the foreseeable future. All else aside, the goal of completely eliminating violent conflict would ignore the fact that historically speaking, conflicts and their resolution have often furthered human development toward free and democratic ideals—as per the American struggle for independence and the French Revolution. The primary task of politics in the twenty-first century is therefore to radically limit violence and war so that non-violent structures and the mechanisms of the “social world” can have an impact. In this context, democratic warriors have a unique role to play; not as those who impose democracy by force, but as those who make diverse forms of culturally authentic self-determination possible, by curbing and containing war and violence.

    Conclusion

    It must be repeated, the concept of the democratic warrior appears to be contradictory. Indeed, it combines contradictory value systems in a single concept. Nevertheless, to adopt the metaphor favoured by Clausewitz (Herberg-Rothe 2007), the elements of tension in the democratic warrior’s identity can be conceived as the poles of a magnet, whose mutual opposition is not an illusion but is nevertheless a means to a larger, unitary end. It is what creates the magnet: the north pole of a magnet cannot exist alone. At one end of the continuum of the democratic warrior’s identity lies the values of democratic equality and non-violent conflict resolution; at the other, the realization that force itself may sometimes be necessary to limit war. At one end, is a civilized society, and at the other a subsystem of that same society, whose identity is defined by traditional concepts of honour and martial valour.

    As observed at the beginning of this essay, the bonds that link the two poles of this relationship, without eliminating their opposition, are the classical republican virtues, which lay claim to validity in both spheres. It was Plato who defined the classical virtues as intelligence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, which is also are characteristics in the Confucian tradition (Piper 1998 concerning Plato). Without them, a state can sustain itself only under dictatorship. With them, both external and internal freedoms are possible (Llanque 2008). They are the keys to the democratic warrior’s identity, providing the crucial link between the values of liberal-democratic society and those other values—courage, loyalty, self-sacrifice—that have always set the warrior apart.

     

     

    References

    Bredow, Wilfried von (2000), Demokratie und Streitkräfte (Wiesbaden: VS publishers, 2000).

    Clausewitz, Carl von (1984), On War. Ed. by Peter Paret and Michael Howard (Oxford: OUP).

    Duyvesteyn, Isabelle (2005), Clausewitz and African War (London: Routledge).

    Frevert, Ute (1997), Die kasernierte Nation (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2001).

    Frevert, Ute(ed.), (1997), Militär und Gesellschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert

    (Stuttgart: Klett–Cotta).

    Fukuyama Francis (1992), The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press).

    Herberg-Rothe, Andreas (2007), Clausewitz’s puzzle (Oxford: OUP). Herberg-Rothe, Andreas (2017), Der Krieg. 2.Edition. (Frankfurt:

    Campus).

    Herberg-Rothe, Andreas and Son, Key-young (2019), Order wars and floating balance. How the rising powers are reshaping our world view in the twenty-first century (New York: Routledge).

    Hüppauf, Bernd (1993), “Schlachtenmythen und die Konstruktion des ‘Neuen Menschen’,” in Keiner fühlt sich hier mehr als Mensch . . . : Erlebnis und Wirkung des ersten Weltkrieges, ed. Gerhard Hirschfeld, et al. (Essen: Klartext, 1993).

    Llanque, Marcus (2008) Politische Ideengeschichte. Ein Gewebe politischer Diskurse (Munich: Oldenbourg.

    Kaldor, Mary (1999), New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era

    (Stanford: Stanford University Press).

    Kaplan, Robert (1994), “The Coming Anarchy.”In: Atlantic Monthly no.

    273, 44–76.

    Keegan, John (1995), Kultur des Krieges (Berlin: Rowohlt).

    Kuemmel, Gerhard (2005), Streitkräfte im Einsatz: Zur Soziologie militärischer Interventionen (Baden-Baden: Nomos).

    Moran, Daniel (2003), “Arms and the Concert: The Nation in Arms and the Dilemmas of German Liberalism,” in The People in Arms: Military Myth and National Mobilization since the French Revolution, ed. Daniel Moran and Arthur Waldron(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

    Münkler, Herfried (2004), The New Wars (New York: Policy). Münkler, Herfried (2007), Empires (Cambridge:Polity Press).

    Pieper, Josef (1998), Das Viergespann—Klugheit, Gerechtigkeit, Tapferkeit, Maß (Munich: Kösel).

    Röhl, Wolfgang (2005), “Soldat sein mit Leib und Seele. Der Kämpfer als existenzielles Leitbild einer Berufsarmee in EinJob wie jeder andere. Zum Selbst- und Berufsverständnis von Soldaten, ed. Sabine Collmer and Gerhard Kümmel (Baden-Baden:Nomos, 2005) 9–21.

    Schlichte, Klaus (2006), “Staatsbildung oder Staatszerfall. Zum Formwandel kriegerischer Gewalt in der Weltgesellschaft,In: ”Politische Vierteljahresschrift 47, no. 4.

    Sikora, Michael (2003), “Der Söldner,” in Grenzverletzer. Figuren politischer Subversion, ed. Eva Horn, Stefan Kaufmann, and Ulrich Bröckling (Berlin: Kulturverlag Kadmos, 2002).

    Thiele, Ralph (2009), “Trendforschung in der Bundeswehr”. In: Zeitschrift für Sicherheits- und Außenpolitik 2, 1–11.

    Walzer, Michael (2003), “Is there an American Empire?” In: Dissent Magazine 1 (2003), URL; http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/archives/2003/fa03/walzer.htm  last accessed 16. 4. 2020.

    Zakaria, Faared (2009), The Post-American World (New York: W. W. Norton).

     

  • Dealing with China in 2021 and Beyond

    Dealing with China in 2021 and Beyond

                                                                                                                         TPF Occasional Paper
                                                                                                                                                                            February 2021

    The Current Situation

    As Eastern Ladakh grapples with a severe winter in the aftermath of a violent and tension-filled 2020, much analysis concerning happenings on the India-Tibet border during the previous year has become available internationally and within India. Despite variance in individual perspectives and prognoses, the one issue starkly highlighted is that 2020 marks a turning point in the India-China relationship, which, shorn of diplomatese, has taken a clear adversarial turn.

    Enough debate has taken place over the rationale and timing behind the Chinese action. It suffices to say that given the expansionist mindset of the Xi regime and its aspiration for primacy in Asia and across the world, it was a matter of time before China again employed leverages against India. In 2020 it was calibrated military pressure in an area largely uncontested after 1962, combined with other elements of hard power – heightened activity amongst India’s neighbours and in the Indian Ocean plus visibly enhanced collusivity with Pakistan This, despite platitudes to the contrary aired by certain China watchers inside India, who continued to articulate that existing confidence-building mechanisms (CBMs) would ensure peace on the border and good relations overall. Multiple incidents on the border over the last few years culminating in the loss of 20 Indian lives at Galwan have dispelled such notions.

    Currently, in terms of militarization, the LAC in Eastern Ladakh can vie with the Line of Control (LOC) on the Western border.

    As an immediate consequence, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the arena of conflict in East Ladakh is seeing the heaviest concentration of troops in history, supplemented by fighter jets, utility and attack helicopters, the latest artillery acquisitions, armoured formations, road building teams and an inventory of drones, backed by matching logistics. Currently, in terms of militarization, the LAC in Eastern Ladakh can vie with the Line of Control (LOC) on the Western border.

    Within the country, the perception of China as the principal foe has crystallised. At no other time since 1962 has China come in for such intense scrutiny. Indian public discourse is focused on China, towards interpreting its policies and implications for India and the world – all against the backdrop of international geopolitics churned further by the Covid pandemic.

    China and the World in 2021

    In 2017, President Xi Jinping had given a foretaste of things to come when spelling out his vision during the 19th Party Congress – that China has entered a “new era” where it should take the “centre stage in the world’[1]. In an insightful essay, Jake Sullivan (now National Security Adviser in the Biden administration) and Hal Brands have observed that ‘China has two distinct paths towards achieving this aim’ [2]. The first focuses on building regional primacy as a springboard to global power’ while the second ‘focuses less on building a position of unassailable strength in the Western Pacific than on outflanking the U.S. alliance system and force presence in that region by developing China’s economic, diplomatic, and political influence on a global scale’. In the same piece, the authors sombrely conclude that the US ‘could still lose the competition with China even if it manages to preserve a strong military position in the Western Pacific….softer tools of competition—from providing alternative sources of 5G technology and infrastructure investment to showing competent leadership in tackling global problems—will be just as important as harder tools in dealing with the Chinese challenge…’ [3] These observations are prescient.

    China and the Pandemic. A look at China’s conduct in this context and those of other nations over the last 12 months is instructive. The first aspect is its reaction to worldwide opprobrium for initially mishandling the Corona crisis – reprehensible wolf warrior diplomacy, crude attempts to divert the narrative about the origin of the Virus, unsuccessful mask diplomacy[4] and successfully delaying a WHO sponsored independent investigation into the matter for a full year without any guarantee of transparency. Secondly, it has exploited the covid crisis to strengthen its hold on the South China Sea commencing from March 2020 itself. Some examples are the renaming of 80 islands and geographical features in the Paracel and Spratly islands, commissioning research stations on Fiery Cross Reef and continued encroachment on fishing rights of Indonesia and Vietnam[5], in addition to a host of aggressive actions too numerous to mention, including ramming of vessels. Retaliatory actions from the US have continued, with the Trump administration in its final days sanctioning Chinese firms, officials, and even families for violation of international standards regarding freedom of navigation in January 2021[6]. The outgoing administration delivered the last blow on 19 January, by announcing that the US has determined that China has committed “genocide and crimes against humanity” in its repression of Uighur Muslims in its Xinjiang region[7]. As regards Taiwan, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute had recently forecast that China Taiwan relations will be heading for a crisis in a few weeks’ time,[8] (as borne out by serious muscle-flexing currently underway). If so, it would put the American system of alliances in the region since 1945 squarely to the test.

    Pushback in the Indo Pacific. With China constantly pushing the envelope in its adjoining seas, the Quadrilateral Dialogue, whose existence over the last decade was marked only by a meeting of mid-level officials in Manila in November 2017, has acquired impetus. Initially dismissed as ‘sea foam’ by China, the individual interpretations of roles by each constituent have moved towards congruence, with Australia openly voicing disenchantment with China. Though an alliance is not on the cards, it can be concluded that increased interoperability between militaries of India, Australia, Japan and the US is both as an outcome and driver of this Dialogue, deriving from respective Indo Pacific strategies of member nations. Further expansion of its membership and tie-ups with other regional groupings is the practical route towards an egalitarian, long-lasting and open partnership for providing stability in this contested region. Japan’s expression of interest in joining the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network of the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand[9], is a step in this direction. European nations like Germany, the Netherlands and France have recently declared their Indo Pacific strategies. France has provided the clearest articulation, with the French Ambassador in Delhi spelling out the prevailing sentiment in Europe about China, as ‘ a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival’[10], while further stating that  “when China breaks rules, we have to be very robust and very clear”[11] . A blunt message befitting an Indo Pacific power, reflecting the sentiments of many who are yet to take a position.

    BRI will see major reprioritisation – though its flagship program, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is unlikely to suffer despite disagreements on certain issues between the two countries.

    Slowing of a Behemoth. China’s other driver the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has considerably slowed in 2020. Lee YingHui, a researcher with Nanyang Technological Institute Singapore wrote last September  ‘..in June this year, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that about 20 per cent of the projects under its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) had been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same press briefing, Wang Xiaolong, director-general at the Foreign Ministry’s International Economic Affairs Department, also revealed that a survey by the ministry estimated that some 30 to 40 per cent of projects had been somewhat affected, while approximately 40 per cent of projects were deemed to have seen little adverse impact[12]. Given the parlous condition of economies of client states post Covid-19 with many including Pakistan requesting a renegotiation of loans[13], BRI will see major reprioritisation – though its flagship program, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is unlikely to suffer despite disagreements on certain issues between the two countries.

    Resilient Economy. China’s economy has rebounded fastest in the world, growing at 6.5 % in the final three months of 2020[14]. Despite the rate of annual growth being lowest in 40 years[15], its prominence in global supply chains has ensured some successes, such as the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with the EU in December 2020. The deal, which awaits ratification by the European Parliament is more a diplomatic than an economic win for China, being perceived as detrimental to President Biden’s efforts to rejuvenate the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. China has notched up another win with the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), where it along with 14 Asian countries from ASEAN and others (including Quad members like Australia and Japan)  have agreed on an ‘ integrated market’. Given India’s position on the RCEP, how this agreement pans out and implications for its members will be watched with interest.

    America in the New Year. The Biden Administration’s initial actions reaffirm the bipartisan consensus achieved last year on dealing with China. Comments of  Secretary of State Anthony Blinken that  ‘China presents the “most significant challenge” to the US while India has been a “bipartisan success story” and the new US government may further deepen ties with New Delhi,’[16] were indicative, as were those of Gen Lloyd Austin the Secretary of Defence during his confirmatory hearing[17].  President Biden’s first foreign policy speech on 04 February that ‘America is Back’ have provided further clarity. Earlier, Blinken and Austin had dialled Indian counterparts NSA Doval and Defence minister Rajnath Singh to discuss terrorism, maritime security, cybersecurity and peace and stability in the Indo Pacific.[18]Economically, American interest in joining or providing alternatives to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP, with an 11 nation membership, born out of President Trump’s withdrawal from its previous format, the TPP), will be another determinant in matters of trade with China. Harsh national security challenges will test the new administration’s resolve, as has already happened in the South China Sea over Taiwan where at the time of writing, the USS Theodore Roosevelt is conducting Freedom of Navigation operations[19]. Similar tests will occur over North Korea and Tibet, where the Senate’s passage of the Tibet Policy and Support Act 2020 mandates that decisions regarding the Dalai Lama’s succession be taken exclusively by the Tibetan people and the incumbent. Overall, a sense of how the world including the US will deal with China in 2021 is well captured by Commodore Lalit Kapur of the Delhi Policy Group when he states that ‘ …China has become too unreliable to trust, too powerful and aggressive to ignore and too prosperous, influential and connected to easily decouple from………[20] Going back to the views essayed by Sullivan and Brands, it appears that China is following both paths to achieve its objective, ie Great Power status.

    India and China

    The Early Years  India’s attempt, soon after independence to develop a relationship with China, its ‘civilisational neighbour’ was overshadowed by the new threat to its security as the PLA invaded Tibet in 1950 – effectively removing the buffer between the two large neighbours. Dalai Lama’s flight to India in March 1959, the border clash at Hot Springs in Ladakh six months later and the subsequent 1962 war shattered our illusions of fraternity.  Documents published recently pertaining to the period from 1947 to the War and beyond[21], reveal differences in perception within the Indian government in the run-up to 1962 despite the availability of sufficient facts. This combined with Chinese duplicity and disinformation, Indian domestic and international compulsions resulted in disjointed decision making, leading to the disastrous decision to implement the ‘Forward Policy’ with an unprepared military. A brief period of security cooperation with the US ensued including the signing of a Mutual Defence Agreement.[22] However, the US-China rapprochement of the early 70s and India’s professed non-alignment ensured its diminished status in the great power calculus.

    Reaching Out to China. India’s outreach to China commenced with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988 in the aftermath of the Chinese intrusion at Somdorung Chu in 1986 in Arunachal Pradesh, resulting in a full-fledged standoff which lasted till mid-1987. The consequent push towards normalisation of relations resulted in the September 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas,  the November 1996 Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, followed thereafter by the Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between India and China, of June 2003 and finally the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question of April 2005, signed during the visit of Chinese premier Wen Jiabao, which also saw the India China relationship elevated to a ‘Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity’.

    Despite partially successful attempts to broad base the engagement, territorial sovereignty continued to dominate the India China agenda, as can be observed by the number of agreements signed on border management – with minimal outcomes. It appears now that what can only be construed as diffidence in dealing with China on the border (and other issues) arose not because of misplaced optimism over such agreements, but for several other reasons. Some were structural weaknesses, such as lack of development of the border areas and poor logistics. Others arose because of want of a full-throated consensus on how strong a line to take with a  visibly stronger neighbour  – aggravated by growing economic disparity and the limitations imposed by self-professed non-alignment, especially so in the absence of a powerful ally like the Soviet Union, which had disintegrated by 1991. Also, American support could not be taken for granted, as was the case in the 60s.  Overall, the approach was one of caution. This, coupled with lack of long term border management specialists induced wishful myopia on the matter, which was dispelled periodically by border skirmishes or other impasses, before returning to ‘business as usual’.  

    The extent of Engagement Today. To objectively analyse the relationship, it is important to comprehend the extent of the India China engagement on matters other than security. In the context of trade and industry, a perusal of the website of the Indian embassy in Beijing provides some answers. There is a list of 24 agreements/ MoUs /protocols between the two countries on Science and Technology alone, covering fields as diverse as aeronautics, space technology, health and medicine, meteorology, agricultural sciences, renewable energy, ocean development, water resources, genomics, geology, and others. The Embassy brings out India’s concerns regarding trade including impediments to market access, noting that trade imbalances have been steadily rising, to reach $58.4 billion in 2018, reducing marginally to $56.95 in 2019, a first since 2005. The poor penetration of Indian banks in China, India’s second-largest shareholding (8%) in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and being the largest borrower from the New Investment Bank or NIB, a BRICS bank of which all members have equal shareholding provide an understanding of linkages between the countries in the banking sector[23]. Other areas of cooperation are in petroleum and railways.

    Economic Fallout Post April 2020. After the Galwan incident, India has taken strong measures on the economic front against China, from banning over 250 software applications to a partial ban on various categories of white goods,and the imposition of anti-dumping duties on many others. The Consolidated FDI Policy of the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade dated 15 October 2020, mandates Government scrutiny of every Chinese investment proposal before approval. However, the paradox in the India China relationship is well illustrated by trade figures for the first half of the Financial Year 20-21, where China surpassed the USA to become India’s largest trading partner. India reduced imports from China but exports to China grew by a robust 26.2 per cent at $10.16 billion[24]. Also, conditionalities for borrowing from the AIIB and NIB have resulted in India having to permit Chinese firms to bid for works connected with projects funded by these institutions. Consequently in January this year, the contract for construction of a 5.6 km long underground stretch of the Rapid Rail Transit System in the National Capital Region has been awarded to a Chinese company, Shanghai Tunnel Engineering Company Limited.[25] As noted earlier, decoupling is not easy. Incentives for companies to relocate to India have been announced, with some investment flowing in from Google and Facebook, and plans for Samsung to relocate a factory to NOIDA[26]. Finally, India’s exclusion from the RCEP will also have to be factored in when negotiating a long term trade policy with China.

    However, the paradox in the India China relationship is well illustrated by trade figures for the first half of the Financial Year 20-21, where China surpassed the USA to become India’s largest trading partner.

    Soft Power and Academia. Indian soft power in China remains subservient to harsh security concerns despite oft-quoted historical antecedents. Some elements like Indian cinema continue to be extremely popular. Student exchange programs have taken shape, especially under the aegis of Confucius Institutes which have secured a toehold in some Indian campuses. Following the trend worldwide, their programs are also under scrutiny[27].  The few Indian students in China (less than 25000)[28] have been hit hard by the coronavirus. Overall, given the current state of engagement, employing soft power as an effective tool has limited potential. Exchange of scholars from policy and security think tanks has been a good way of imbibing a sense of the other, resulting in greater awareness. While the trust deficit and reasons for the same have always been highlighted by the Indian side, it has been the general experience that China has been less forthcoming in its responses.

    Building Blocks for a China Policy

    In the middle term, unless there is a concerted and verifiable effort by China, trade with that country will be overshadowed by security issues  (the huge trade imbalance also becoming one of these !). The Indian economy has commenced its post-Covid recovery in the new year. The budget for FY 21-22, trade policies of others like the EU and the US, will impact economic policy, as will national security concerns.

    Immediate security priorities vis a vis China are a mix of the geopolitical and purely military. These can broadly be outlined – safeguarding Indian interests in the Indian Ocean region and the littorals, holding the line in the high Himalayas and ensuring sanctity over Indian skies. The first being both a geopolitical and security matter would leverage all elements of statecraft including the military. The balance two are a direct outcome of India’s military power. These, intertwined with India’s multilateral approach towards cooperation in world fora would form the basis of dealing with China.

    Countries in the neighbourhood other than Pakistan when in distress, look first towards India for relief – natural calamities, food shortages[29], and now the corona vaccine, where Indian generosity remains unsurpassed worldwide. India does not indulge in cheque book diplomacy, nor entice weaker neighbours into debt traps.

    Managing the Neighbourhood. In South Asia, India is primus inter pares due to size, geographical location, resources, capability and potential. Its soft power, economic reach ( while not comparable to China’s) and associated linkages with other countries are huge, at times even considered overwhelming. Countries in the neighbourhood other than Pakistan when in distress, look first towards India for relief – natural calamities, food shortages[29], and now the corona vaccine, where Indian generosity remains unsurpassed worldwide. India does not indulge in cheque book diplomacy, nor entice weaker neighbours into debt traps. Despite ethnic linkages and security concerns resulting sometimes in what is perceived by others as ‘interventionist politics’, India’s respect for its neighbours’ sovereignty is absolute. This is in contrast to China, whose recent interventions in Nepal have led to rallies in front of the Chinese embassy[30]. Its pressure on the NLD government in Myanmar over BRI projects had again not been viewed favourably in that country,[31] though the trajectory that the China-Myanmar relationship now follows remains to be seen, with China attempting to support Myanmar’s military in international fora after the coup[32]. Within South Asia, strengthening delivery mechanisms, sticking to timelines in infrastructure projects, improving connectivity and resolving the myriad issues between neighbours without attempting a zero-sum game with China is the way forward for India, which should play by its considerable strengths. Simultaneously, it must look at growing challenges such as management of Brahmaputra waters and climate change, and leverage these concerns with affected neighbours.

    Strengthening Military Capability. A more direct challenge lies more in the military field,  and in measures necessary to overcome these.  The justifiable rise in military expenditure during the current year would continue or even accelerate. The armed forces are inching towards a mutually agreed road map before implementing large scale organisational reforms. Conceptual clarity on integrated warfighting across the spectrum in multiple domains (including the informational ) is a sine qua non, more so when cyberspace and space domains are concerned. This mandates breaking up silos between the military and other specialist government agencies for optimisation and seamless cooperation. Also, while classical notions of victory have mutated, swift savage border wars as witnessed in Nagorno Karabakh remain live possibilities for India, with open collusion now established between China and Pakistan. As always, the study of the inventory, military capability of the adversary and his likely pattern of operations will yield valuable lessons. The armed forces have to prepare multiple options, to deal with a range of threats from full scale two front wars down to the hybrid, including responses to terrorist acts while ensuring sovereignty across the seas. Network-centric warfare will take centre stage, with information operations being vital for overall success, possibly even defining what constitutes victory.

    Progress has been achieved in these directions. As an example, the first Indian weaponised drone swarm made its debut on Army Day 2021, and visuals of a ‘wingman drone’ underdevelopment have been shown during the Aero India 2021 at Bangalore. The military would be planning for operationalisation, induction, deployment, staffing and human resource aspects of this weapon platform with the nominated service. An estimate of the time required to resolve these issues as also for full-scale production of such systems and larger variants will dictate procurement decisions with respect to other land and air platforms providing similar standoff kinetic effects, and surveillance capability. A concurrent requirement to develop sufficient capability to counter such systems would doubtless be under scrutiny. In this regard, the outcome of the PLA merging its cyber and electronic warfare functions for multiple reasons merits attention.[33] While the Navy’s requirements to dominate the Indian Ocean are well appreciated, a consensus on its future role and the need (or otherwise) for a third aircraft carrier would decide the nature, type and numbers of future naval platforms – unmanned underwater vehicles, submarines, shore/ carrier-based aircraft and others.  With decisions over the Tejas LCA induction finalised, induction of a state of the art platforms from the USA and France over the last few years and hope for the acquisition of new generation indigenous air defence systems[34] on the anvil, the IAF is set to gradually regain its edge. Overall, India’s military has to leverage the latest technology and develop the capability to fight in multiple domains, which its hard-earned experience in third-generation warfighting would complement. With restructuring planned concurrently, each decision will have to be fully informed and thought through – more so when mini faceoffs as has happened at Naku La in Sikkim this month continue to occur.

    A Way Forward

    Traditional Chinese thinking has simultaneously been dismissive and wary of India. In his seminal publication at the turn of the century, Stephen Cohen noted that ‘…from Beijing’s perspective India is a second rank but sometimes threatening state. It poses little threat to China by itself and it can be easily countered but Beijing must be wary of any dramatic increase in Indian power or an alliance between New Delhi and some hostile major state..’[35]  As brought out in this paper, outlines of a grounded long term China policy based on previous experiences and new realities are visible. Rooted primarily in the security dimension followed thereafter by the economic, its success will be predicated on peace and tranquillity on the border, without entering into the trap of competition in either of the two domains. As pointed out by the Minister for External Affairs in his talk to the 13th All India Conference for China Studies this month [36] the India-China relationship has to be based on ‘mutuality…  mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interests ..’. The EAM further noted that ‘expectations…. that life can carry on undisturbed despite the situation at the border, that is simply not realistic. There are discussions underway through various mechanisms on disengagement at the border areas. But if ties are to steady and progress, policies must take into account the learnings of the last three decades’[37].

    Rooted primarily in the security dimension followed thereafter by the economic, its success will be predicated on peace and tranquillity on the border, without entering into the trap of competition in either of the two domains.

    In the same talk, the EAM has laid down eight broad and eminently practical propositions as guidelines for future India-China relations. Most prominent of these is that peace and tranquillity on the border are a must if relations in other spheres are to develop. Also, the need to accept that a multipolar world can have a multipolar Asia as its subset. He stressed that reciprocity is the bedrock of a relationship, and sensitivities to each other’s aspirations, interests and priorities must be respected. Concurrently, management of divergences and differences between two civilizational states should be considered over the long term.

    A China policy crafted on these principles would ensure that India’s concerns vis a vis its neighbour is addressed, within the larger National goal of all-round growth and development of India and its citizens in the 21st Century.

     

    Notes:

    [1] ‘Xi JinPing Heralds New Era of Chinese Power’ Dipanjan Ray Chaudhury, Economic Times 18 October 2017

    [2] ‘China Has Two Paths To Global Domination’ Jake Sullivan,  Hal Brands, Foreign Policy, 22 May 2020

    [3] ibid

    [4] ‘China’s Mask Diplomacy is Faltering.But the US isn’t Doing any better’ Charlie Campbell Time Magazine 03 April 2020

    [5] ‘China’s Renewed Aggression in the South China Sea’ Gateway House Infographic 22 April 2020

    [6] ‘US imposes new sanction on Beijing over South China Sea’  Mint 15 January 2021

    [7] In parting shot, Trump administration declares China’s repression of Uighurs ‘genocide’ Humeyra Pamuk, Reuters 19 January 2021

    [8] ‘Pacific Panic: China-Taiwan relations to reach breaking point in ‘next few weeks’ skynews.com.au 18 January 2021

    [9] ‘Japan wants de facto ‘Six Eyes’ intelligence status: defence chief’ Daishi Abe and Rieko Miki Nikkei Asia 14 August 2020

    [10] ‘Emmanuel Bonne’s interview to the Times of India’ 10 January 2021  Website of the French Embassy in New Delhi

    [11] ‘When China breaks rules, we have to be very robust and clear: French diplomat’ Dinakar Peri, The Hindu 08 January 2021

    [12] ‘COVID-19: The Nail in the Coffin of China’s Belt and Road Initiative?’ Lee YingHui, The Diplomat 28 September 2020

    [13] ibid

    [14] ‘Covid-19: China’s economy picks up, bucking global trend’ BBC.com  18 January 2021

    [15] ibid

    [16] ‘New US govt may look to further deepen ties with India: Blinken’ Elizabeth Roche, The Mint 21 Jan 2021

    [17] ‘What Biden’s Defence Secretary Said About Future Relations With India, Pakistan’ Lalit K Jha, The Wire 20 January 2021

    [18] ‘US NSA speaks to Doval, Def Secretary dials Rajnath’ Krishn Kaushik and Shubhajit Roy Indian Express 27 January 2021

    [19] ‘As China Taiwan tension rises, US warships sail into region’ The Indian Express 25 January 2021

    [20] ‘India and Australia: Partners for Indo Pacific Security and Stability’  Lalit Kapur, Delhi Policy Group Policy Brief Vol. V, Issue 42 December 15, 2020

    [21] ‘India China Relations 1947-2000 A Documentary Study’ (Vol 1 to 5)  Avtar Singh Bhasin   Geetika Publishers New Delhi 2018

    [22] ‘The Tibet Factor in India China Relations’  Rajiv Sikri  Journal of International Affairs , SPRING/SUMMER 2011, Vol. 64, No. 2, pp 60

    [23] Website of the Embassy of India at Beijing   www.eoibeijing.gov.in

    [24] ‘What an irony! Mainland China beats US to be India’s biggest trade partner in H1FY21’  Sumanth Banerji        Business Today 04 December 2020

    [25] ‘Chinese company bags vital contract for first rapid rail project’  Sandeep Dikshit   The Tribune   03 January 2021

    [26] ‘Samsung to invest Rs 4,825 cr to shift China mobile display factory to India’ Danish Khan  Economic Times 11 December 2020

    [27]  ‘The Hindu Explains | What are Confucius Institutes, and why are they under the scanner in India?’

    Ananth Krishnan The Hindu August 09 2020

    [28] ‘23,000 Indian students stare at long wait to return to Chinese campuses’  Sutirtho Patranobis  Hindustan Times  08  September 2020

    [29] ‘Offering non-commercial, humanitarian food assistance to its neighbours: India at WTO’ Press Trust of India 19 December 2020

    [30] ‘Torch rally held in Kathmandu to protest against Chinese interference’ ANI News  30 December 2020

    [31] ‘Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visits Myanmar with aim to speed up BRI projects’  Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury  Economic Times  09 January 2021

    [32] ‘China blocks UNSC condemnation of Myanmar coup’ India Today Web Desk 03 February 2021

    [33] ‘Electronic and Cyber Warfare: A Comparative Analysis of the PLA and the Indian Army’ Kartik Bommankanti ORF Occasional Paper July 2019

    [34] ‘India successfully test fires new generation Akash NG missile’ Ch Sushil Rao  Times of India  25 January 2021

    [35] ‘ India  Emerging Power’  Stephen Philip Cohen   Brookings Institution Press 2001   pp 259

    [36] Keynote Address by External Affairs Minister at the 13th All India Conference of China Studies January 28, 2021

    [37] ibid

     

    Image Credit: Wion  and Trak.in

  • Creation of Statelessness in India: an Analysis of the Crisis and the way Forward

    Creation of Statelessness in India: an Analysis of the Crisis and the way Forward

    Introduction

    Over the last few decades, migration has become a global norm. Although a substantial part of the global population migrates for economic and personal reasons, it is undeniable that migration as a phenomenon is exacerbated by factors such as armed conflicts, ethnic or politico-social tensions, climate change and others. The effect that migration has on global economic, social and political transformations is widely recognized.[1] Naturally, in contrast to migration policies, all States have specific laws to regulate the acquisition of nationality by birth, descent and/or naturalization. While most of us realise the significance of the concept of nationality, we tend to overlook the fact that inclusion by nationality often brings the phenomenon of statelessness with it. In this context, the latest developments in the Indian laws regulating nationality raise several social and legal conundrums. However, the lack of any legal framework on statelessness or India’s abstinence from signing the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons or the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness is a clear indication of India’s unpreparedness to deal with the potential long-term consequences of its new laws.

    Deprivation of Citizenship and Statelessness in the Contemporary Era

    The concepts of nationality and citizenship have attracted great attention for raising several contemporary politico-legal and social issues. Citizenship confers an identity on an individual within a particular state. Consequently, a citizen is able to derive rights and is assigned obligations by virtue of this identity.[2] Political Philosopher, Hannah Arendt, terms this as “the right to have rights”.[3] Citizenship is what entitles a citizen to the full membership of rights, a democratic voice and territorial residence. While we understand the significance of being a citizen of a country, we often fail to ponder upon the consequences of losing it. Immanuel Kant argues that citizenship by naturalisation is a sovereign privilege and the obverse side of such privilege is the loss of citizenship or “denationalisation”.[4] Arendt has also identified the twin phenomena of “political evil” and “statelessness”.[5]

    This condition of statelessness is not only a harmful condition which makes the person vulnerable to violation of human rights, but it also works in delegitimising a person in the socio-legal order of a State.

    An introspect into the right to have the right to a nationality goes on to throw light on the issue of statelessness. Although history has proven the existence of both de facto and de jure statelessness, this chapter is only concerned with de jure statelessness, specifically within the Indian context. The Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons defines a “stateless person” as ‘a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law’.[6] This condition of statelessness is not only a harmful condition which makes the person vulnerable to violation of human rights, but it also works in delegitimising a person in the socio-legal order of a State.[7] The number of stateless persons globally in the year 2018 was 3.9 million.[8] This number is still regarded as a conservative under-estimation owing to the fact that most of the affected population reside precariously within the society and most countries do not calculate comprehensive statistics of stateless persons within their territory. UNHCR estimates at least a global figure of 10 million stateless persons globally.[9]

    Statelessness hinders the day-to-day life of a person by depriving them of access to the most rudimentary rights like education, employment or health care to name a few.  It may be attributed to multiple causes inter-alia discrimination, denationalization, lack of documentation, climate change, forced migration, conflict of laws, boundary disputes, state succession and administrative practices.[10] Discrimination based on ethnicity, race, religion or language has been a constant cause of statelessness globally. Currently, at least 20 countries uphold laws which can deny or deprive a person of their nationality in a discriminatory manner.[11] Statelessness tends to exaggerate impact of discrimination and exclusion that minority groups might already be facing. It widens the gap between communities thus deepening their exclusion.[12]  The phenomenon of statelessness has been the more prominent in South and South East Asian countries. The Hill Tamil repatriates in India from Sri Lanka and the Burmese refugees in Cambodia are examples of Asian Stateless populations who are vulnerable to human rights abuses. The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness are the two most important conventions addressing this issue. The former has 94 parties and 23 signatories, and the latter has 75 parties and only 5 signatories. Albeit international legal norms on the issue of statelessness have restrained the States’ denationalisation power, it has however not erased the use of discrimination as a tool for denationalization.[13] This has been particularly relevant in the case of naturalization of nationals from Muslim-majority countries.[14]  It can be argued that India’s Citizenship Amendment Act has also joined this bandwagon.

    Interplay of the NRC and Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019

    The Citizenship Amendment Act which was passed by the Indian Parliament on 11th December 2019 has caused a lot of uproar and outbreak of protests all over the country. This Act has attracted wide international condemnation[15] for being discriminatory[16], arbitrary and unconstitutional.[17] Before we go on to scrutinise the role of Citizenship Amendment Act in statelessness creation, an analysis of the National Register of Citizens (NRC) is warranted. The NRC process has been the source of several issues regarding migration, citizenship and polarisation of political support in the state of Assam. It has culled out a distinct space in mobilising the political discourse in Assam specifically during the 2014 and 2019 parliamentary elections.[18]

    The NRC is a register containing names of Indian Citizens. This register was prepared for the very first time in the year 1951 based on the data collected during census. This process was done subsequent to various groups[19] causing agitation in Assam over the non-regulation of immigrant inflow into the region. This resulted in resorting to laws like the Foreigners Act, 1946 and Foreigners (Tribunal) Order, 1939. The contrast in India’s approach to disregard the aforementioned laws to accommodate people escaping violence in West Pakistan[20] is to be noted here.  The NRC process in Assam determines illegal migrants based on their inability to prove the nexus between their documented ancestral legacy to the Indian State. The NRC process defined such illegal immigrants irrespective of their religious affinity. The cut-off date used to determine a person’s ability to prove ancestral legacy was set to March 24, 1971 which is in line with Bangladesh’s war of liberation.

    Despite the criticisms and drawbacks, the NRC process is  in fact a much needed exercise in the State of Assam. Owing to its shared border with Bangladesh, Assam has been the gateway for refugees, economic and illegal migrants who come to India.

    As Assam has been a hub for labour migration right from the colonial era, the ethnic Assamese have been insecure about the potential demographic shifts in favour of the ethnic Bengali migrants, for a long time.[21] This concern was exacerbated by the mass influx of Bengali migrants after the birth of Bangladesh. This mass migration which aggravated the already anti-immigrant sentiment culminated in a student-led movement in the 1970s and 1980s.[22] A series of protests broke out in the Assam to pressure the government to identify and expel illegal immigrants. In the year 1985, the Union government and the AASU signed the Assam Accord by which the government assured the establishment of a mechanism to identify “foreigners who came to Assam on or after March 25, 1971” and subsequently take practical steps to expel them.[23] Consequent to a Public Interest Litigation[24] filed in 2009. In the year 2014, the Supreme Court assumed the role of monitoring the process of updating the NRC to identify Indian citizens residing in Assam in accordance with the Citizenship Act of 1955. The very first draft of the process was published in December 2017 and 1.9 million people were left out of the register from a population of 3.29 million people in Assam.[25] In August 31, 2019, the final list was published which left out 4 million residents from the NRC.[26] Neither drafts of the NRC specifically mention the religion or community of the non-included applicants, although certain commentators[27] and media outlets[28] have alleged  that five out of nine Muslim-majority districts of Assam had the maximum number of rejections of applicants.[29] Out of the 4 million applications which were excluded from the final list, 0.24 applicants have been put on ‘hold’. These people belong to categories: D (doubtful) voters, descendants of D-voters, people whose cases are pending at Foreigners Tribunals and descendants of these persons.[30] The NRC process has for long attracted mixed reviews. Scholars have suggested that the process has been an arbitrary one that is aimed more at exclusion[31] than inclusion.[32] It has also been regarded as an expensive process, the brunt of which is borne substantially by the people of India.[33] Despite the criticisms and drawbacks, the NRC process is  in fact a much needed exercise in the State of Assam. Owing to its shared border with Bangladesh, Assam has been the gateway for refugees, economic and illegal migrants who come to India. This not only led to the cultural identity crises of Assamese people but it also significantly influenced the political operations in the State.[34] It is also important to note that, owing to the absence of a concrete refugee law in place and due to the general population’s lack of awareness about refugees in India, the distinction between refugees, illegal migrants and economic migrants often get muddled. This is reflected in the anti-migration narrative that brews in the State. Although we maintain that the NRC process is not necessarily a communal exercise, it does have seem to have such repercussions when read together with the Citizenship Amendment Act which was passed by the Indian Parliament last year.

    The Preamble of the Indian Constitution recognises the India as a secular state. This has also been reiterated in landmark Supreme Court decisions, whereby the principle of secularism has been recognised as one of the basic structures of the Constitution.Therefore, the fact that the Citizenship Amendment Act discriminates migrants based on their religion, makes is fundamentally unconstitutional.

    According to the Indian citizenship Act of 1955, an “illegal migrant” is a foreigner who enters India without a valid passport or such other prescribed travel documentation.[35] The Citizenship Amendment Act, amends this definition. The Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 is not just discriminatory, but it also goes against the basic principles of the Constitution of India. This Act provides that ‘any person belonging to Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi or Christian community for Afghanistan, Bangladesh or Pakistan’, who entered into India on or before December 31, 2014 who have been exempted by the central government by the Passport Act, 1920 or the Foreigners Act 1946, shall not be treated as an illegal migrant.[36] Further, the Act has reduced the aggregate period of residence to qualify for naturalization from 11 years to 5 years for the aforementioned communities.[37] This Act has attracted worldwide criticism from various human rights groups and international organizations. The alleged raison d’etre for the Act is two fold – the alleged religious persecution of minorities in the three Muslim-majority countries mentioned before and rectifying the misdeeds of partition.[38] However, on a careful scrutiny, both these reasons fail to stand the test of rationale and reasonableness. Firstly, it has to be noted that prima facie the Act violates Art.14 of the Indian Constitution by specifically enacting a law that discriminates based on a person’s religion. Documented evidence of persecution of the Islamic minority sects such as the Shias[39] [40], Baloch[41] and Ahmadis[42] [43] in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan is existent. Therefore, the contention that people belonging to Islamic sects would not have faced persecution in Muslim-majority countries is misconceived and simply wrong. Unlike Israel[44], India does not have a ‘Law of Return’. The Preamble of the Indian Constitution recognises the India as a secular state. This has also been reiterated in landmark Supreme Court decisions, whereby the principle of secularism has been recognised as one of the basic structures of the Constitution.[45] Therefore, the fact that the Citizenship Amendment Act discriminates migrants based on their religion, makes is fundamentally unconstitutional.

    Further, the Act seems to operate vis-à-vis three Muslim-majority countries. However, India hosts a large number of refugees and migrants from other neighbouring countries also, particularly Myanmar, Nepal, China and Sri Lanka.[46]There has been no clarification rendered as to the rationale behind including only Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh. Finally, unlike the cut-off date mentioned in the Assam Accord, the date of December 31, 2014 lacks rationale and therefore comes across as arbitrary. While the NRC process is already criticised for being exclusionary, the effect of NRC combined with the operation of provisions of the Citizenship Amendment Act seems to benefit the non-Muslim communities mentioned in the Act while disadvantaging the Muslim migrants whose names did not figure in the list. This essentially pushes the latter into a predicament of statelessness. It has to be noted here that this legislation is not merely discriminatory, but also wildly inconsistent with India’s obligations under International law.

    India’s Approach to Statelessness in the Past

    The outcome of NRC-CAA is not the first time India had to deal with the issue of statelessness. India has taken steps to mitigate the risks and consequences of statelessness in the past. The situation of enclave dwellers being a key example. Chittmahal or enclaves are pieces of land that belonged to East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), yet remained in India, and vice versa. After the India-Pakistan partition in 1947 and the boundary limitations thenceforth, the enclave dwellers were essentially cut-off from access to their country of nationality as they were surrounded by foreign land, eventually pushing them into a state of de facto statelessness. Therefore, crossing borders for daily engagements became an illegal activity.[47] The hostility that ensued from the Partition reflected in the control of these enclaves. In the year 1952, both countries tightened visa policies, making their borders rigid. This trapped the enclave dwellers in a state of virtual lockdown.[48]Despite the sovereignty shift in 1971, with the creation of the independent nation state of Bangladesh, the plight of enclave dwellers remained unaddressed. On the other hand, the Bangladeshi enclave dwellers in India also lived under the constant fear of being arrested under the Foreigners Act of 1946.[49] The very first headcount in enclaves was conducted by state authorities only in the year 2011.[50] After decades of failed negotiations between India and Bangladesh, a Land-Boundary Agreement  was finally implemented on 31 July 2015 at the Indo-Bangladesh border.[51] Despite this being a significant step towards progress, several scholars[52] have noted the continuity of the plight of erstwhile enclave-dwellers even after the Land-Boundary Agreement.[53] Since census had never been conducted in these area, the issue of identity crisis is quite prominent. Enclave dwellers are reported to own false voter ID cards and educational documents to “avoid becoming an illegal migrant”.[54] At this point, it is important to note the potential effects of an NRC process being implemented in the State of West Bengal (as promised by the ruling government) and its implications for enclave-dwellers. The identity crisis already existing within the enclaves, the errors in their identity cards, the threat of being suspected as a foreigner has been exacerbated by the looming NRC-CAA process.[55]

    Another group of people that was forced to face the plight of statelessness due to the post-colonial repercussions, are the Hill Tamils from Sri Lanka. The Shrimavo-Shastri Pact of 1964 and the subsequent Shrimavo- Gandhi Pact 1974 were significant steps taken towards addressing the problems of the Hill Tamils.[56] However, there are a group of Hill Tamils who are stateless or at a risk of becoming stateless in India. The change in legislation in Sri Lanka, their displacement to India and their lack of birth registration and documentation has continued to add to their plight.[57] Despite qualifying for citizenship by naturalization under Sec.5 of the Citizenship Act, the fact that the Amendment Act has overlooked the plight of Hill Tamils is disappointing.[58]

    In 1964, owing to the construction of the Kaptai hydroelectric project over the river Karnaphuli,  the Chakmas and Hajongs were displaced and forced to migrate to India from the Chittagong Hill Tracts of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).[59] Although the Indian government encouraged them to settle in the Area of North East Frontier Agency (now Arunachal Pradesh), they have not been granted citizenship. With neither States claiming them as nationals, these indigenous people have essentially been pushed into a state of de jure statelessness. In the case of Committee for Citizenship Rights of the Chakmas of Arunachal Pradesh (CCRCAP) v The State of Arunachal Pradesh, the apex court upheld the rights of the Chakmas to be protected by the State of Arunachal Pradesh under Art. 21 of the Indian Constitution and also said that they “have a right to be granted citizenship subject to the procedure being followed”.[60]Now, the Citizenship Amendment Act would help in materialising the right to be granted citizenship of the Chakmas as upheld by the Supreme Court.

    Just the fact that the CAA offers comfort and chaos respectively depending on the religious inclinations of the stateless populations in India, is a major red flag.

    India has undeniably taken various steps towards protection of refugee populations and mitigating the risks of statelessness under several circumstances. In the year 1995, India also became a member of the UNHCR Executive Committee and has been playing an important part in reformulating international legal instruments concerning refugees and stateless persons. However, despite assuming such a pivotal position in the Executive Committee, the fact that India lacks a framework regulating the treatment meted out to refugees and stateless persons, thereby resulting in the absolute reliance of socio-politically motivated ad-hoc governmental policies, is worth criticising. Just the fact that the CAA offers comfort and chaos respectively depending on the religious inclinations of the stateless populations in India, is a major red flag.

    International and National Legal Framework on Statelessness in India

    The definition and standard of treatment for a Stateless person is enumerated in the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.[61] This convention is the most comprehensive codification of the rights of stateless persons yet. It seeks to ensure the fundamental human rights of a person and freedom from discrimination against stateless persons. Although the Convention does not entitle a stateless person to acquire the nationality of a specific state, it does require state parties to take steps towards facilitating their naturalization and integration.[62] On the other hand, the 1961 Convention on Reduction of Statelessness provides a directive to States for the prevention and reduction of statelessness.[63] However, as India is a party to neither conventions, as in the case of refugees, we are left to resort to other international human rights instruments that India has signed and ratified.

    The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, although a non-binding instrument, has been recognised for contributing to customary international human rights. Art. 15 of the UDHR provides that ‘everyone has the right to a nationality’[64] and that ‘no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality’.[65] Although the principles enshrined under the UDHR are not legally binding, it is pertinent to note that the CAA directly contravenes the right to nationality mentioned above. Further, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 mandates the parties to the convention to ensure that the rights recognized in the Covenant be upheld without any discrimination of any kind in terms of race, colour, sex, language, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.[66] The Convention also guarantees the right of every child to acquire a nationality.[67]The Convention provides that State parties must ensure the protection of the rights of stateless people, without discrimination including under the law.[68] Despite having acceded to the Convention on April 10, 1979, by virtue of enacting the Citizenship Amendment Act and the operational effects of the NRC process combined with the Act is in clear violation of India’s obligations under the ICCPR.

    Art. 12(4) of the ICCPR can be used particularly in favour of India’s obligations to protect stateless persons. Art. 12(4) states that, ‘No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country’. The phrase ‘no one’ under this provision allows scope for inclusion of nationals and aliens within its ambit. Therefore, we ought to analyse the phrase ‘own country’ in order to determine the beneficiaries of this provision. The General Comments of the Human Rights Committee remain the most authoritative interpretation of the ICCPR that is available to State Parties. With regard to Art. 12(4) of the Covenant, the General Comment reiterates that the phrase ‘own country’ does not refer to the concept of nationality alone. It also includes individuals who by virtue of their special ties or claims in relation to a given country, cannot be considered an alien.[69]The General Comment specifically mentions that this interpretation is to be applied in case where nationals of a country are stripped of their nationality in violation of international law.[70] It also states that the interpretation of Art. 12(4) might be read to include with its scope, ‘stateless persons arbitrarily deprived of the right to acquire the nationality of the country of such residence’.[71] In order to understand the concept of special ties and claims as mentioned in the General Comment on Art. 12(4), we may also refer to the concept of ‘genuine and effective link’ as dealt by the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm Case.[72] The ICJ upheld that although different factors are taken into consideration in every case, the elements of “habitual residence of the individual concerned”, “the centre of his interests” i.e. “his family ties, his participation in public life, attachment shown by him for a given country and inculcated in his children, etc.”[73] are significant in determining a “genuine and effective link” between the individual and the State in question. In India, the people who are facing or at a risk of facing the plight of statelessness are long term residents in India who may be both religiously and ethnically similar to Indian communities and therefore maintain a socio-cultural relationship with India.[74] Under such circumstances, the individuals in question evidently qualify for protection from arbitrary deprivation of the right to enter their own country (India), under Art. Art. 12(4) of the ICCPR.

    Further, by denying citizenship or nationality to people based on religion, India risks effectively excluding stateless persons from the loop of human rights itself. This also goes on to violate India’s commitments under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. Besides Section 3 of the Indian Citizenship Act[75] which deprives a child Indian citizenship by birth in case of either of his parents being an illegal immigrant, the NRC process has also rendered several children Stateless. This violates India’s obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child (CRC), to which India has acceded. Article 7 of the Convention mandates state parties to provide nationality to the children immediately after birth.[76]Thus, the Indian citizenship policy runs contrary to a number of international legal obligations of India. Article 51(c) of the Indian Constitution mandates the government to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations.

    Despite the very evident gap in India’s legal framework on statelessness, Indian Courts have not dealt with the issue in detail. Nevertheless, the Courts have taken innovative approaches to avoid the occurrence of statelessness by applying principles of equity and justice.[77] In the case of Namgyal Dolkar vs. Government of India[78], in 2011, the Delhi High Court upheld, as per Sec.3 of the Citizenship Act that people born in India cannot be denied citizenship and the right to nationality based on their description in the identity certificate. In the case of Sheikh Abdul Aziz vs. NCT of Delhi[79], a ‘foreigner’ in India was detained in Kashmir for entering the country illegally. He was later shifted to the Tihar Central Jail to await deportation proceedings. The deportation proceedings were not executed for several years. In the year 2014, on the basis of the Delhi High Court’s direction to identify the nationality of the Individual, the state identified him to be stateless. Consequently, the State declared that the petitioner could approach the passport office to acquire identification papers and thereby apply for a long-term visa later on.[80] While this case indicates the role of Indian judiciary in identifying and providing relief to stateless persons, it also serves as an illustration of the attitude of the State towards stateless persons. This can be alluded to the fact that a concrete legal framework or mechanism to deal with stateless persons and the data and awareness on stateless persons is practically non-existent. The impact of such lacuna is also evident in the NRC-CAA process in Assam.

    Plight of Stateless People in Assam

    Although the Indian Ministry of External Affairs has communicated that the people excluded from the final draft of NRC would not be put in detention centres until their case is decided by the Foreigners Tribunal[81], the future of people whose cases are rejected by the Tribunal has been left mysteriously evaded. The Detention centres in Assam were originally intended for short-term detention of undocumented immigrants. In the case of Harsh Mander vs. Union of India[82], the Supreme Court of India dealt with important legal questions on the condition of detention centres and indefinite detention of ‘foreigners’. The government of Assam presented a plan to secure the monitored release foreigners who had been in detention centres more than five years on paying a hefty deposit and signing a bond. Ironically, this case which was filed to draw the attention of the apex court to the inhumane conditions in detention centres in Assam, turned into exhortation[83] to the government to work proactively on deporting individuals.[84] Although India does not have any legislation to protect stateless people from being deported to regularise their status or grant them citizenship, it does have legislation in place to deport illegal migrants. The Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunal) Act 1983, which gave the migrants a right to appeal and placed the burden of proof on the government was declared ultra vires by the Supreme Court of India in 2005 and is no longer valid.[85] In the Harsh Mander case, the Supreme Court directed “the Union of India to enter into necessary discussions with the Government of Bangladesh to streamline the procedure of deportation”[86]. Deportation, however, is not a unilateral exercise. Such processes usually follow negotiations and bilateral agreements for the readmission of nations of relevant country.[87] There has been no documented of India entering into diplomatic talks with Bangladesh regarding the issue of statelessness. Also, as recently as October 2017, it has been reported that the Bangladesh Information Minister, Hasanull Haq Inu denied any unauthorised migration from Bangladesh to Assam in the past 30 years.[88] According to the data produced before the Parliament, over 117,000 people have been declared foreigners by the Foreigners Tribunal in Assam up to March 31, 2019, of whom only four have been deported until now. Across the six detention centres in Goalpara, Kokrajhar, Silchar, Dibrugarh, Jorhat and Tezpur in Assam, 1005 people reportedly remain jailed according to the data produced before the Assam Legislative Assembly on July 29, 2019.[89] As detention camps are located within the jail premises, persons marked as illegal immigrants are locked up along with those jailed for criminal offences or who are undertrial. The country’s largest detention camp in the Goalpara district of western Assam, in addition to 10 proposed camps in the state.[90] In the case of P. Ulaganathan vs. The Government of India[91], the Madras High Court deciding on a case concerning the plight of Sri Lankan Hill Tamils in India who have been held in detention camps for about 35 years, upheld that, “keeping them under surveillance and severely restricted conditions and in a state of statelessness for such a long period certainly offends their rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India”.[92] In the absence of any bilateral agreement dealing with deportation of the stateless persons who are allegedly Bangladeshi nationals, the detention of illegal immigrants seems short-sighted and ill-planned. Additionally, the lack of adequate documentation also makes it unlikely for the individuals to be deported to neighbouring countries in the near future. In addition to the apex court’s ratio in the P. Ulaganathan case on long periods of detention of stateless people, such an indefinite period of detention also violates India’s obligations under the ICCPR to uphold right to life,[93]right to dignity in detention[94] and the right against arbitrary deprivation of the right to enter his own country.[95]In their Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention, the UN High Commissioner on Refugees emphasize the importance of setting a definite period of detention. The Guideline states that, without a cap on the period of detention, it can become prolonged and indefinite, especially for stateless asylum-seekers.[96] In the absence of any legal regulation of detention of the people who are rendered stateless in India, the UNHCR guidelines on detention might serve as a good starting point. Although the guidelines explicitly state that they only apply to asylum seekers and stateless persons who are seeking asylum, it also states that the standards enshrined therein may apply mutatis mutandis to others as well.[97]

    Conclusion: The Way Forward

    Customary international law has placed certain limitations on a state’s power of conferment of citizenship. Article 1 of the Hague Convention 1930, states that “it is for each state to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be recognised by other states in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, International custom, and the principles of law generally recognised with regard to nationality”.[98] As explained above, this is not the case with regard to the NRC-CAA process in India. Firstly, in order to deal with the problem of statelessness in India, it is absolutely necessary to identify and acknowledge the gravity of it. The data on the number of stateless persons in India is practically non-existent. It is important for the government to undertake efforts to facilitate data collection on stateless persons in India. This would not only help in mapping the extent of the problem, but it would also facilitate legal professionals, researchers, humanitarian works and practitioners to reach out and offer help where necessary.

    Also, the presence of half-information and non-existence on specific data on the number of stateless persons and government policies vis-à-vis their treatment has allowed room for over-reliance on media sources and resulting confusion and frenzy. It might be important for the government to establish information hubs accessible to the common public to demystify data on statelessness and the rights that stateless persons are entitled to in India.  A database of legal professionals, human rights activists and government representatives should be available in all such places. This would go a long way in reducing unlawful and illegal detention. It would also force the government into exercising transparency in their detention policies.

    the combined effect of NRC and the Citizenship Amendment Act seems to be exclusionary and discriminatory. The Act is violative of the Indian constitutional principles and India’s international legal obligations.

    The absolute lack of a national and international legal framework on statelessness operating in India is a major drawback. While the rights enshrined under the international bill of human rights and other human rights instruments that India is a party to may be referred, it is not sufficient to fill the lacuna. This absence of a concrete legal framework may leave room for adverse predicaments such as arbitrary detention, human rights abuses, trafficking and forced displacement. Especially considering the number of people who have been disenfranchised by the latest draft of the NRC, the need for a law promising the basic human rights of the people who are rendered stateless is dire. India has also abstained from ratifying the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR 1976 and has thereby denied its people the access to the Individual Complaints Mechanism of the UNHRC. The International Court of Justice which is also vested with the power to address ICCPR violations, cannot investigate into the issue of India’s discriminatory and exclusionary Citizenship law as it is a sovereign act of the State.[99] Without the same being disputed by one or more States, the ICJ cannot exercise its power in this case.[100]

    Finally, as explained above, the combined effect of NRC and the Citizenship Amendment Act seems to be exclusionary and discriminatory. The Act is violative of the Indian constitutional principles and India’s international legal obligations. While reviewing the purpose and objective of the Citizenship Amendment Act is important, it is also important for the government to undertake negotiations with the Bangladesh government on the plight of the people who would soon be stateless. The indefinite detention of “foreigners” without a long-term plan in place, would result in grave human rights violations and would also be an expensive affair for India.

    Image Credit: opiniojuris.org 

     

     

    Notes

    [1] See generally IOM, WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2020 (IOM, Geneva, 2019), available at https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf , [accessed on 15 Feb 2020].

    [2] See generally Emmanuel Kalechi Iwuagwu, The Concept of Citizenship: Its Application and Denial in the Contemporary Nigerian Society, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH IN ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES, Vol. 8 No. 1.

    [3] Seyla Benhabib, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS – ALIENS, RESIDENTS AND CITIZENS, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004) P. 49-52

    [4] Ibid at P. 49

    [5] Ibid at P. 49, 50

    [6] Art. 1, Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 1954.

    [7] David Owen, On the Right to Have Nationality Rights: Statelessness, Citizenship and Human Rights, NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 2018, (65),  P. 301.

    [8] Supra note 1, P. 47.

    [9] Lily Chen et al, UNHCR Statistical Reporting on Statelessness, UNHCR STATISTICS TECHNICAL SERIES 2019, available at https://www.unhcr.org/5d9e182e7.pdf, [accessed on 17 Feb 2020].

    [10] See generally Nafees Ahmad, The Right to Nationality and the Reduction of Statelessness- The Responses of the International Migration Law Framework, GRONINGEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 5 No. 1.

    [11] UNHCR, “This is our Home”- Stateless Minorities and their search for citizenship, UNHCR STATELESSNESS REPORT 2017, available athttps://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/wp-content/uploads/UNHCR_EN2_2017IBELONG_Report_ePub.pdf, P. 1, [accessed on 17 Feb 2020].

    [12] Ibid

    [13] Mathew J. Gibney, Denationalization and Discrimination, JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 2019, available at https://doi:10.1080/1369183X.2018.1561065 [accessed on 17 Feb 2020].

    [14] Antje Ellermann, Discrimination in Migration and Citizenship, JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 2019, available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1561053?needAccess=true, P. 7, [accessed on 17 Feb 2020].

    [15] Human Rights Watch, India: Citizenship Bill Discriminates Against Muslims, (11 Dec, 2019),  available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/12/11/india-citizenship-bill-discriminates-against-muslims, [accessed on 18 Feb 2020].

    [16]OHCHR, Press briefing on India, (13 Dec, 2019), available at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25425&LangID=E, [accessed on 18 Feb 2020].

    [17] USCIRF, USCIRF Raises Serious Concerns and Eyes Sanctions Recommendations for Citizenship Amendment Bill in India, Which Passed Lower House Today, (09 Dec, 2019), available at https://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/press-releases-statements/uscirf-raises-serious-concerns-and-eyes-sanctions, [accessed on 18 Feb 2020].

    [18] Manogya Loiwal, India Today, Assam NRC and BJP’s challenge: The votebank politics of NRC,  (31 Aug, 2019), available at https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/assam-nrc-bjp-challenge-votebank-politics-1593711-2019-08-31, [accessed on 18 Feb 2020].

    [19]All Assam Students Union (AASU) and All Assam Gan Sangram Parishad (AAGSP) were the major groups involved in this movement.

    [20] Sanjay Barbora, National Register of Citizens: Politics and Problems in Assam, E-JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY 2019, (3)2, available at  http://app.insoso.org/ISS_journal/Repository/Article_NRC.pdf, P. 14, [accessed on 19 Feb 2020].

    [21]Harrison Akins, The Religious Freedom Implications of the National Register of Citizens in India, USCIRF ISSUE BRIEF:INDIA 2019, available at https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2019%20India%20Issue%20Brief%20- %20Religious%20Freedom%20Implications.pdf, P.1, [accessed on 19 Feb 2020].

    [22] Ibid at P.2.

    [23] Assam Accord, Clause 5.8, available at https://assamaccord.assam.gov.in/portlets/assam-accord-and-its-clauses, [accessed on 19 Feb 2020].

    [24] Assam Public Works v Union of India and Ors. [Writ Petition (Civil) No. 274 of 2009]

    [25] Alok Prasanna Kumar, National Register of Citizens and the Supreme Court, LAW & SOCIETY 2018, (53)29, available at https://www.academia.edu/37909102/National_Register_of_Citizens_and_the_Supreme_Court, P. 11, [accessed on 19 Feb 2020].

    [26]Tora Agarwala, The Indian Express, Assam Citizenship List: Names missing in NRC final draft, 40 ;akh ask what next,  (30 Jul 2018), available at https://indianexpress.com/article/north-east-india/assam/assam-citizenship-list-names-missing-in-nrc-final-draft-40-lakh-ask-what-next-5283663/, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [27] Amit Ranjan, Assam’s National Register of Citizenship: Background, Process and Impact of the Final Draft, ISAS WORKING PAPER 2018, No. 306, available at https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ISAS-Working-Papers-No.-306-Assams-National-Register-of-Citizenship.pdf, P.2, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [28] Sangeeta Barooah Pisharoty, The Wire, Both the BJP and the Trinamool Congress are Stirring the Communal Pot in Assam, (05 Aug 2018), available at https://thewire.in/politics/bjp-tmc-nrc-assam-communalism

    [29] Supra note 27, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [30]Abhishek Saha, The Indian Express, Assam NRC List: No person will be referred to Foreiners’ Tribunal or sent to detention centre based on final draft, (30 Jul 2018),  https://indianexpress.com/article/north-eastindia/assam/assam-nrc-list-final-draft-foreigners-tribunal-detention-centre-5282652/, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [31] Ditilekha Sharma, Determination of Citizenship through Lineage in the Assam NRC is Inherently Exclusionary, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY, Apr 2019, available at https://www.epw.in/node/154137/pdf, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [32] Angshuman Choudhury, National Register of Citizens (NRC): A Synonym for Deep Anxiety, THE CITIZEN , 2019, available at https://www.academia.edu/40257016/National_Register_of_Citizens_NRC_A_Synonym_for_Deep_Anxiety, P. 3, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [33] Anusaleh Shariff, ‘National Register of Indian Citizens’ (NRIC) – Does the Assam Experience help Mainland States?, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY, 2019, available at  https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337366837_’National_Register_of_Indian_Citizens’_NRIC_-_Does_the_Assam_Experience_help_Mainland_States, P. 18, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [34] Supra note 27 at P. 8-11.

    [35] The Citizenship Act 1955, No.57 of 1955, Sec. 2(1) (b).

    [36] The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, No. 47 of 2019, Sec. 2.

    [37] The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, No. 47 of 2019, Sec. 6.

    [38] Narendar Nagarwal, Global Implications of India’s Citizenship Amendment Act 2019, (Jan 2020), available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338673204_Global_Implications_of_India’s_Citizenship_Amendment_Act_2019, P. 3, [accessed on 2 Mar 2020].

    [39] Human Rights Watch, “We are the Walking Dead” – Killings of Shia Hazara in Balochistan, Pakistan, Jun 2014, available athttps://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/pakistan0614_ForUplaod.pdf, [accessed on 2 Mar 2020].

    [40] Anon, The State of Minorities in Afghanistan, SOUTH ASIA STATE OF MINORITIES REPORT 2018, available at http://www.misaal.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/afghanistan.pdf, P. 282, [accessed on 2 Mar 2020].

    [41] Human Rights Watch, “We can Torture, Kill, or Keep Your for Years” – Enforced Disappearances by Pakistam Security Forces in Balochistan, Jul 2011, available at https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/pakistan0711WebInside.pdf, [accessed on 2 Mar 2020].

    [42]UK: Home Office, Country of Origin Information Report, Aug 2019, available at  https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=search&docid=5209feb94&skip=0&query=Ahmediyas%20&coi=PAK, P. 142, [accessed on 2 Mar 2020].

    [43] Human Rights Watch, History of the Ahmadiyya Community, n.d., available at https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/bangladesh0605/3.htm, [accessed on 2 Mar 2020].

    [44] The Law of Return, 1950 in Israel established Israel as Jewish State based on the Zionist Philosophy which is also reflected in their citizenship policies.

    [45] Keshavananda Bharati v State of Kerela, AIR 1973 SC 1461

    [46] Supra note 38.

    [47] Deboleena Sengupta, What Makes A Citizen: Everyday Life in India-Bangladesh Enclaves, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY (53), 15 Sep 2018, available at https://www.epw.in/engage/article/chhit-spaces-a-look-at-life-and-citizenship-in-india-bangladesh-enclaves [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [48] Prachi Lohia, Forum Asia, Erstwhile enclaves in India: A post-LBA Analysis, 10 Dec 2019, available at https://www.forum-asia.org/uploads/wp/2019/12/Enclave-Report-Final-2.pdf, P. 7, [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [49] Ibid

    [50] Ibid

    [51] For the current state of erstwhile enclave-dwellers in India, see supra note 48 and also Prasun Chaudhari, The TelegraphThe same old story in Chittmahal, (12 May 2019), available at https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/the-same-old-story-in-chhitmahal/cid/1690343 [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [52] Supra note 48.

    [53] Sreeparna Banerjee et al., The 2015 India-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement: Identifying Constraints and Exploring Possibilities in Cooh Behar, ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER, Jul 2017, P.5, available at https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/ORF_OccasionalPaper_117_LandBoundary.pdf  [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [54] Ibid.

    [55] Supra note 48, P. 45.

    [56] V. Suryanarayanan, Challenge of Statelessness- The Indian Response, IIC Occasional Publication  (88), , (n.d.), available at http://www.iicdelhi.nic.in/writereaddata/Publications/636694277561224320_Occasional%20Publication%2088.pdf, P. 3, [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [57] See UNHCR, Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: UPR 27th Sessions, Aug 2016, available at https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=search&docid=5a12b5420&skip=0&query=stateless&coi=IND, P. 2, [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [58] Supra note 56, P. 16.

    [59] Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group, Executive Summary of the Report on ‘The State of Being Stateless: A Case Study of the Chakmas of Arunachal Pradesh, (n.d.), available at http://www.mcrg.ac.in/Statelessness.pdf [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [60] Committee for Citizenship Rights of the Chakmas of Arunachal Pradesh (CCRCAP) v The State of Arunachal Pradesh, [WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.510 OF 2007]

    [61] Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 1954, Art. 1, 7.

    [62] Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 1954, Art. 32.

    [63]  See generally Convention on Reduction of Statelessness 1961.

    [64] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1945, Art. 15(1).

    [65] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1945, Art. 15(2).

    [66] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Art. 2.

    [67] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Art. 24

    [68] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Art. 26

    [69] CCPR General Comment No. 27: Article 12(Freedom of Movement), (Nov 2, 1999), ¶ 20 available at https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/45139c394.pdf

    [70] Ibid

    [71] Supra note 69.

    [72] Liechtenstein v. Guatemala (Nottebohm Case) 1955

    [73] Ibid, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. reports 1955, Rep 4.

    [74] Unnati Ghia, Suddenly Stateless: International law Implications of India’s New Citizenship Law, OPINIO JURIS, Feb 5, 2020, available at http://opiniojuris.org/2020/02/05/suddenly-stateless-international-law-implications-of-indias-new-citizenship-law/ [accessed on 16 Mar 2020].

    [75] The Citizenship Act, 1955, Act  No.  57  of  1955,  Sec. 3.

    [76] Convention  on  the  Rights  of  the  Child 1989, Art. 7.

    [77] Sitharamam Kakarala, India and the Challenge of Statelessness – A Review of the Legal Framework relating to Nationality, 2012, available at  http://nludelhi.ac.in/download/publication/2015/India%20and%20the%20Challenges%20of%20Statelessness.pdf, P. 61, [accessed on 5 Mar 2020].

    [78] Namgyal Dolkar vs. Government of India, [Writ Petition (Civil) 12179/2009]

    [79] Sheikh Abdul Aziz v. NCT of Delhi, [Writ Petition (Criminal) 1426/2013]

    [80] Aneesha Mathur, The Indian Express, ‘Stateless man’ to get visa, ID to stay in India, (29 May 2014), available at https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/stateless-man-to-get-visa-id-to-stay-in-india/, [accessed on 5 Mar 2020].

    [81]Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Statement by MEA on National Register of Citizens in Assam, (02 Sep 2019), available at https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/31782/Statement+by+MEA+on+National+Register+of+Citizens+in+Assam, [accessed on 5 Mar 2020].

    [82] Harsh Mander v Union of India, [Writ Petition (Civil) No.1045/2018].

    [83] Colin Gonsalves, Human Rights Law Network, Stateless and Marginalised in Assam, (18 Sep 2019), available at https://hrln.org/reporting_publications/nrc-violates-constitutional-morality-principles-of-international-law/, [accessed on 6 Mar 2020].

    [84] Supra note 82.

    [85] Sarbananda Sonawal v. Union of India, [Writ Petition (civil) 131 of 2000]

    [86] Supra note 82.

    [87] See generally, the Shrimavo-Shastri Accord, 1964 (1992).

    [88]Sanjib Baruah, The Indian Express, Stateless in Assam, (19 Jan 2018), available at https://epaper.indianexpress.com/c/25513604, [accessed on 10 Mar 2020].

    [89]The Economic Times, 1.17 lakh people declared as foreigners by tribunals in Assam,  (16 Jul 2019), available at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/1-17-lakh-people-declared-as-foreigners-by-tribunals-in-assam/articleshow/70244101.cms?from=mdr, [accessed on 10 Mar 2020].

    [90] Nazimuddin Siddique, Inside Assam’s Detention Camps: How the Current Citizenship Crisis Disenfranchises Indians, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY (55)7, Feb 2020, available at  https://www.epw.in/engage/article/inside-assams-detention-camps-how-current, [accessed on 10 Mar 2020].

    [91] P.Ulaganathan vs The Government Of India, [Writ Petition (MD)No.5253 of 2009]

    [92] Ibid

    [93] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Art. 6.

    [94] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Art. 10.

    [95] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Art. 12(4)

    [96] UNHCR, Detention Guidelines – Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention 2012, available at https://www.unhcr.org/publications/legal/505b10ee9/unhcr-detention-guidelines.html, P. 26, [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [97] Ibid, P. 8.

    [98] Nafees Ahmad, The Right to Nationality and the Reduction of Statelessness – The Responses of the International Migration Law Framework, GRONINGEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (5)1, Sep 2017, available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320244117_The_Right_to_Nationality_and_the_Reduction_of_Statelessness_-_The_Responses_of_the_International_Migration_Law_Framework, P. 3, [accessed on 16 Mar 2020].

    [99] Supra note 74.

    [100] International Court of Justice, Frequently Asked Questions, available at https://www.icj-cij.org/en/frequently-asked-questions , [accessed on 16 Mar 2020].

  • Conference Report- India and the Indian Ocean Region: Dynamics of Geopolitics, Security, and Global Commons

    Conference Report- India and the Indian Ocean Region: Dynamics of Geopolitics, Security, and Global Commons

    TPF Team                                                                                                    August 19, 2019/Conference

    The Peninsula Foundation held its first international conference titled “India and the Indian Ocean Region: Dynamics of Geopolitics, Security and Global Commons” on the 12thand 13thof July at the Women’s Christian College, Chennai. Fifteen papers authored by research scholars from various institutions and backgrounds were presented during the course of the two-day conference comprising five sessions.The inaugural address was delivered by the Chief Guest, Vice Admiral N Ashok Kumar AVSM VSM, Vice Chief of Naval Staff (VCNS). In an eloquent speech, the VCNS highlighted the growing importance of the Indian Ocean Region and the need to debate and discuss issues relating to chokepoints and the trade routes. He spoke about historical evidence of the criticality of the trade routes in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), and related it to the present context of ship movements in vital sea lanes of communications (SLOCs) that are vital for economic growth of countries in the Asia-Pacific Region. India’s geographic location gives it a dominant strategic position, as seventy-five percent of international shipping links go through the IOR. He pointed out that China is deeply focussed on safeguarding its interests in the IOR since more than seventy percent of its energy requirements are dependent on Indian Ocean sea lanes. Stressing on the importance of the IOR, the VCNS highlighted the vulnerability of chokepoints and the need to ensure freedom of the seas.

                The keynote address was delivered by Professor Kanti Prasad Bajpai, Vice Dean and Wilmar Professor of Asian Studies at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. He focused on the contemporary understanding of the term ‘region’ and its context with regards to geopolitics and international relations, stating that when we refer to a region in the geopolitical context, we essentially refer to a zone of conflict, a war-zone or an area of potential conflict. Thus, South Asia often implies the India-Pakistan conflict, Middle East or West Asia the Arab-Israeli conflict, or the conflict between North and South Korea when talking about Korea as a region. Similarly, the Indian Ocean region is one of geopolitical contest amongst the great powers. It is a strategically important region where interdependence is inevitable amongst the nations that have vested interests in the IOR.

                Professor Bajpai further elucidated the fundamentals of trade development in the region and substantiated a case for the IOR as a strategic zone, citing the consistency with which external powers compete to control the region. He highlighted the three forms of culture that govern or define power positions in the IOR: classical culture, popular culture and strategic culture. India, aspiring to position itself as an important player in the region, has to evaluate the choices that are available to it: accept one dominant power to manage the region in a rule-based order or actively participate in the dialogue for a negotiated order that can be achieved through multilateral trade agreements. In conclusion, Professor Bajpai raised questions to be addressed in the upcoming sessions. The inaugural session ended with a special lecture on the cultural legacies of the Asia-Pacific Region, delivered by Indian classical dancer and Padma Bhushan awardee, Dr Padma Subrahmanyam.

    Session One: ‘Indian Ocean: Culture, Civilizations and Connectivity’

                The topic of the first session chaired by Cmde. C. Uday Bhaskar, Director of the Society for Policy Studies (SPS), was ‘Indian Ocean: Culture, Civilizations and Connectivity’. The speakers discussed the history, culture and impact of trade on the IOR. G Padmaja, an independent researcher, emphasised India’s maritime heritage and argued that policies do not move beyond mere talk with respect to the IOR. Dr Vijay Sakhuja, Trustee of The Peninsula Foundation, stated that the IOR is the busiest trade route in terms of development and commodity exchange. He elucidated the importance of digital shipping and the scope of 5G technology and reliance on Artificial Intelligence in driving the trading ecosystem. The third speaker Dr D Dhanuraj, Chairman, Centre for Public Policy Research (CPPR), explored the idea of the modern political economy influencing the flow of men and commodities, and talked about the possibility of India reclaiming its rights over the IOR.

    Session Two: ‘Power Politics in the IOR: Geostrategies and Geo-economics’

                Through his paper “Competing Pivots in the Indian Ocean Region”, Dr Lawrence Prabhakar, Associate Professor, Madras Christian College, highlighted that the region can be constructed and contested through a maritime mandala that goes beyond security and economic factors to include cultural, governance, transnational and other aspects. Dr Arvind Kumar, HOD, Department of Geopolitics, Manipal University, in his paper “Stability of Trade and Commerce: Energy Corridor” discussed the potential of energy resources in the IOR and the need to include energy security as a significant feature in global trade and growth drive. In his paper titled “China’s BRI: Responses in the IOR and Implications for Regional Order”, Dr Jabin Jacob, Associate Professor, Shiv Nadar University, focussed on smaller nations affected by the Belt and Road Initiative and the responses by the Chinese government. Chairperson Dr TCA Raghavan, DG, ICWA, summarised the session by observing that the actions of regional states cannot be categorised as malicious but are rather reactions to Indian and Chinese policies over time.

    Session Three: India’s Strategic Interests in the IOR

                In the final session of the day, speakers discussed maritime security, power projections and evolving ties with littoral states in the region.  The session was chaired by Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha (retd), Trustee, India Foundation. Cmde Somen Bannerjee, of Vivekananda International Foundation, pointed out in his paper titled “Maritime Security and Power Projections” that China is set to become the biggest power in the IOR in the next fifteen years. He also discussed the need for India to strategize power projection as a necessary course of action in order to secure importance on the global stage.  Through his paper, “Strategic Partnerships: India & ASEAN”, Ambassador Antonio Chiang brought to attention the strategic partnership between Taiwan and China, and the implications of China’s rise to power on Taiwan. Group Captain PB Nair spoke about the role of the Indian Air Force (IAF) in the context of the IOR, providing assistance in navigating sea routes, and the significance of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology in carrying out sea operations.

    Day Two: Panel Discussion on India’s Approaches in the IOR

                Day Two commenced with a panel discussion on India’s strategic approaches in the IOR, its aspirations and the contradictions. The panel consisted of Dr TCA Raghavan, Ambassador Antonio Chiang, Lt Gen S.L. Narasimhan, Cmde Uday Bhaskar and Professor Kanti Bajpai. The session, moderated by Air Marshal M Matheswaran, addressed three main points: the power struggle in Asia, India’s inadequate investment with regard to being a rising power, and India’s engagement with multilateral institutions.

                The discussion focussed on the ramifications of Chinese economic power and military strength in the region, its effect on India’s policies, as well as the need for utilization of soft power and soft balancing techniques by smaller countries to level the international playing field.

                With regard to India’s investment activities, Dr TCA Raghavan mentioned that ineptness in domestic spheres would spill over and reflect in international projects.

                On the topic of India’s engagement in multilateral institutions, Professor Kanti Bajpai noted that while it cannot be said that India doesn’t deliver, there is a certain level of ambiguity about what the expectations are. The delay in finalising the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was discussed; Lt Gen S L Narasimhan explored the reason behind India’s hesitancy to the agreement, stating that RCEP only covered the free movement of goods and not of services. Thus, India being a service-strong nation would be at a disadvantage.

                With regard to China’s technological advancements and its potential economic superpower status, Ambassador Chiang stated that intellectual power would be a game-changer for India. He noted that China resorts to hard and fast action for solving problems as opposed to the kind of strategic decision-making employed by India.

    Session Four: International Cooperation and Global Commons

                Session Four of the conference was chaired by Dr Joshua Thomas, Deputy Director at the North Eastern Regional Centre of the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR). The first speaker, Dr Suba Chandran, spoke on the topic of “Cultural Legacies & Competing Zones of Influence: India, China and External Powers.” His talk addressed two questions: who the actors are and their nature of influence, and how India can respond.  Embracing our shared religious and cultural history and strengthening the education system in India were among the measures suggested by Dr Chandran to build bridges and enable India to assume a more central position of power in the region. Rear Admiral S Shrikande presented a paper on the subject of “International Institutions: SLOCs, Chokepoints, Freedom of Navigation”, and shared insights on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The final speaker of the session, Rear Admiral K Swaminathan, spoke on India’s role as a net security provider in the region, and mentioned several instances of the Indian Navy providing assistance to neighbours in times of need and contributing to preserving international security. While Dr Chandran spoke about cultural connectivity across countries in the IOR through a ‘Bring East Policy’, the naval officers emphasised on the need for connectivity, capacity and credibility in the international sphere.

    Session Five: Transnational Issues, Threats and Challenges in the IOR

                In his paper titled “International and Regional Cooperation in Disaster Management”, Air Vice Marshal Ashutosh Dixit underlined the vital role played by the UN and Armed forces in mitigating the risks of disasters. While the UN plays a multifaceted role of being the interface between local and international responders, it is most often the armed forces that promptly and efficiently mobilize resources to the disaster-struck nation, as their reach has no limitations. Dr Arabinda Acharya, Associate Professor, National Defense University, Washington DC, in his paper “Non Traditional Security Threats: Piracy, Maritime Terrorism, Climate Change, Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, Illegal Immigration, and Smuggling of Arms and Drugs” explored challenges to good order at sea and proposed investment in resources to thwart non-state actors on land so as to reduce their power at sea. Through his paper, “India and the Blue Economy: Evolving Partnerships,” Dr R P Pradhan, Associate Professor at BITS Pilani, Goa Campus, emphasised the critical role of the Big Push Theory in developing the blue economy. Investing in strategic assets such as seaports similar to China, Indonesia, South Korea, etc. is vital for realising India’s aspirations for a larger role in the regionIn his closing remarks, Lt General SL Narasimhan, Director General, Centre for Contemporary Chinese Studies, Ministry of External Affairs, emphasised the need for states and regional organizations to collaborate rather than compete in order to address challenges that transcend national borders.

                Lastly, in his valedictory address, Dr TCA Raghavan identified crucial points with respect to the theme of the conference, including the difference between military and diplomatic thinking, and strategic and tactical strength. Dr Raghavan stressed the need for developing dialogue forums and intergovernmental organisations in the Arabian Sea littoral with countries such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Iran, among others, to focus on pressing issues in the region.

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