Category: Poverty & Social Welfare

  • The Rivers Linking Scheme: Will it Work or End up a Disaster?

    The Rivers Linking Scheme: Will it Work or End up a Disaster?

    I keep hearing that Modiji is going to unveil the often-spoken and then shelved Rivers Link Up Scheme as his grand vision to enrich the farmers and unite India. In a country where almost two-thirds of the agricultural acreage is rainfed, water is wealth. Telangana has shown the way. Once India’s driest region has in just eight years been transformed into another granary of India. Three years ago he had promised to double farmer’s incomes by 2022 and has clearly failed. He now needs a big stunt. With elections due in 2024, he doesn’t even have to show any delivery. A promise will do for now.

    This is also a Sangh Parivar favourite and I am quite sure the nation will once again set out to undertake history’s greatest civil engineering project by seeking to link all our major rivers. It will irretrievably change India. If it works, it will bring water to almost every parched inch of land and just about every parched throat in the land.

    On the other hand, if it doesn’t work, Indian civilization as it exists even now might then be headed the way of the Indus valley or Mesopotamian civilizations destroyed by a vengeful nature, for interfering with nature is also a two-edged sword. If the Aswan High Dam turned the ravaging Nile into a saviour, the constant diversion of the rivers feeding Lake Baikal has turned it into a fast-receding and highly polluted inland sea ranking it as one of the world’s greatest ecological disasters. Even in the USA, though the dams across mighty Colorado have turned it into a ditch when it enters Mexico, California is still starved for water.

    I am not competent to comment on these matters and I will leave this debate for the technically competent and our perennial ecological Pooh-Bahs. But the lack of this very debate is cause for concern. It is true that the idea of linking up our rivers has been afloat for a long time. Sir Arthur Cotton was the first to propose it in the 1800s. The late KL Rao, considered by many to be an outstanding irrigation engineer and a former Union Minister for Irrigation, revived this proposal in the late 60s by suggesting the linking of the Ganges and Cauvery rivers. It was followed in 1977 by the more elaborate and gargantuan concept of garland canals linking the major rivers, thought up by a former airline pilot, Captain Dinshaw Dastur. Morarji Desai was an enthusiastic supporter of this plan.

    The return of Indira Gandhi in 1980 sent the idea back into dormancy, where it lay all these years, till President APJ Abdul Kalam revived it in his eve of the Independence Day address to the nation in 2002. It is well known that Presidents of India only read out what the Prime Ministers give them and hence the ownership title of Captain Dastur’s original idea clearly was vested with Atal Behari Vajpayee.

    That India has an acute water problem is widely known. Over sixty per cent of our cropped areas are still rain-fed, much too abjectly dependent on the vagaries of the monsoon. The high incidence of poverty in certain regions largely coincides with the source of irrigation, clearly suggesting that water for irrigation is integral to the elimination of poverty. In 1950-51 when Jawaharlal Nehru embarked on the great expansion of irrigation by building the “temples of modern India” by laying great dams across our rivers at places like Bhakra Nangal, Damodar Valley and Nagarjunasagar only 17.4% or 21 million hectares of the cropped area of 133 million hectares was irrigated. That figure rose to almost 35% by the late 80s and much of this was a consequence of the huge investment by the government in irrigation, amounting to almost Rs.50, 000 crores.

    Ironically enough this also coincided with the period when water and land revenue rates began to steeply decline to touch today’s nothing level. Like in the case of power, it seems that once the activity ceased to be profitable to the State, investment too tapered off.

    The scheme is humongous. It will link the Brahmaputra and Ganges with the Mahanadi, Godavari and Krishna, which in turn will connect to the Pennar and Cauvery. On the other side of the country, it will connect the Ganges, Yamuna with the Narmada traversing in part the supposed route of the mythical Saraswathi. This last link has many political and mystical benefits too.

    There are many smaller links as well such as joining the Ken and Betwa rivers in MP, the Kosi with the Gandak in UP, and the Parbati, Kalisindh and Chambal rivers in Rajasthan. The project when completed will consist of 30 links, with 36 dams and 10,800 km of canals diverting 174,000 million cubic meters of water. Just look at the bucks that will go into this big bang. It was estimated to cost Rs. 560,000 crores in 2002 and entail the spending of almost 2% of our GNP for the next ten years. Now it will cost twice or more than that, but our GDP is now three times more, and it might be more affordable, and hence more tempting to attempt.

    The order to get going with the project was the output of a Supreme Court bench made up of then Chief Justice BN Kirpal, and Justices KG Balakrishnan and Arjit Pasayat, which was hearing a PIL filed by the Dravida Peervai an obscure Tamil activist group. The learned Supreme Court sought the assistance of a Senior Advocate, Mr Ranjit Kumar, and acknowledging his advice recorded: “The learned Amicus Curiae has drawn our attention to Entry 56 List of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution of India and contends that the interlinking of the inter-State rivers can be done by the Parliament and he further contends that even some of the States are now concerned with the phenomena of drought in one part of the country, while there is flood in other parts and disputes arising amongst the egalitarian States relating to sharing of water. He submits that not only these disputes would come to an end but also the pollution levels in the rivers will be drastically decreased, once there is sufficient water in different rivers because of their interlinking.”

    The only problem with this formulation is that neither the learned Amicus Curiae nor the learned Supreme Court is quite so learned as to come to such sweeping conclusions.

     

    Feature Image Credit: Hindustan Times

     

    This article was published earlier in deccanchronicle.com

  • Indian Philosophy and religion: Abolishing the caste system as an attempt in Intercultural Philosophy

    Indian Philosophy and religion: Abolishing the caste system as an attempt in Intercultural Philosophy

    We start the year 2023 with an examination of philosophy and society and through it the social evil of caste. The origin of the caste system in Hindu society lies buried in many myths and misconceptions. Caste is often linked by many to the core of Hindu philosophy. This is a deeply flawed understanding. The caste system has been and continues to be a tool of power and economic exploitation by oppressing large segments of the population. It is largely an invention by the clergy to establish their power and domination through rituals and codes and by ascribing to them a forced religious sanctity. As it also becomes convenient to the rulers, caste and class are prevalent in all societies. Philosophy and true religion, as Andreas points out in this working paper,  have had nothing to do with caste or class.                                        – TPF Editorial Team

     

    Introduction

    Intercultural philosophy is absolutely necessary in order to cope with the current and new phase of hybrid globalization, which is dissolving all kinds of traditional identities. Whereas the current reaction to this process is the development of ideologies centred on the idea of “we against the rest”, whoever the “Rest” might be, we need to construct positive concepts of identity, which does not exclude but include the other. These can be based on the mutual recognition of the civilizations of the world and their philosophies. According to Karl Jaspers the godfather of intercultural philosophy, between the sixth and third century BC the development of great cities, and the development in agriculture and sciences led to a growth of the populace that forced humankind to develop new concepts of thinking. He labelled this epoch as the axial age of world history in which everything turned around. He even argued that in this time the particular human being or human thinking was born with which we still live today – my thesis is that all human religions, civilizations and philosophies share the same problems and questions but did find different solutions.

    A vivid example might be the relationship between happiness and suffering. In the philosophy of the Greek philosopher Aristotle, to achieve eudemonia or happiness in your earthly life was the greatest aim whereas in a popular understanding of Karma, life is characterized by suffering and the aim is to overcome suffering by transcending to Nirvana. You see, the problem is the same, but there are different solutions in various philosophies. Although Jaspers didn’t share the reduction of philosophy and civilization to the European or even German experience and included mainly the Chinese and Indian civilization, he nevertheless excluded the African continent and both Americas, Muslim civilization as well as the much older Egyptian civilization. So, although he enlarged our knowledge and understanding of civilizations his point of reference was still “Western modernity” and within it, the concept of functional differentiation played the major role.

    Another solution is embodied in the belief of the three monotheistic religions, that an omnipotent god is the unifying principle despite all human differentiations and even the differences between the living and the dead, love and hate, between war and peace, men and women, old and young, linear and non-linear understanding of time, beginning and ending, happiness and suffering.  In this belief system, we are inevitably confronted with unsurpassable contrasts, conflicts and contradictions – but an all-powerful and absolute good god is the one who is uniting all these contrasts.

    In principle in Chinese philosophy, we have the same problem – but instead of an all-powerful God, we as humans have the task to live in harmony with the cosmic harmony. So, I really think that we humans share the same philosophical problems – how to explain and overcome death, evil, suffering, and the separation from transcendence. Although Karl Jaspers could be seen as the founding father of intercultural philosophy, I think he put too much emphasis solely on the functional differentiation that an ever-growing populace could live together without violence. In my view, the questions of life and death are running deeper. I would not exclude functional differentiation as one of the driving forces of human development but at least we also need an understanding of human existence that is related to transgressing the contrasts of life.

    In this draft, I would like to give some impressions concerning this same problem based on my limited knowledge of Indian philosophy and religion and try to show that both are opposing the caste system as well as any kind of dogmatism. An Indian student asked me in the run-up to this draft how one could understand Indian philosophy if one had not internalized the idea of rebirth since you are a baby. From her point of view, the whole thinking on the Indian subcontinent is thus determined by the idea of rebirth – this problem will still occupy us in the question of whether the terrible caste system in India is compatible with the original intentions of the Indian religions, whether it can be derived from them or contradicts them. I will try to give a reason for the assumption that Indian philosophy is quite universal and at the same time open to different strands of philosophical thought, retaining its core.

    In its essence, it is about Karma, rebirth, and Moksha. An understanding of Atman and Brahman is essential. Atman is the soul, indestructible, and is part of Brahman (omnipresent God). When Atman continues to reform and refine itself through rebirths aspiring to become one with Brahman, that is Moksha. To attain Moksha is the purpose of each life. Moksha is being one with God…a state where there is no more rebirths. Of course, differences are there in interpreting Atman and Brahman, depending on the Advaita and Dwaita schools of philosophy. Ultimately both narrow down to the same point – Moksha. Karma is the real part. True Karma is about doing your work in life as duty and dispassionately. Understanding that every life form has a purpose, one should go about it dispassionately. Easier said than done. Understanding this is the crux. In an ideal life where one has a full understanding of Karma and performs accordingly, he/she will have no rebirth. Indian philosophy is careful to separate the religious and social practices of the common folks and the high religion.  Hence Caste and hierarchy are not part of the philosophical discourse, although many make the mistake of linking them. Caste, like in any other religion, is a clergy-driven issue for power and economic exploitation.

    Indian Philosophy (or, in Sanskrit, Darshanas), refers to any of several traditions of philosophical thought that originated in the Indian subcontinent, including Hindu philosophy, Buddhist philosophy, and Jain philosophy. It is considered by Indian thinkers to be a practical discipline, and its goal should always be to improve human life. In contrast to the major monotheistic religions, Hinduism does not draw a sharp distinction between God and creation (while there are pantheistic and panentheistic views in Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, these are minority positions). Many Hindus believe in a personal God and identify this God as immanent in creation. This view has ramifications for the science and religion debate, in that there is no sharp ontological distinction between creator and creature. Philosophical theology in Hinduism (and other Indic religions) is usually referred to as dharma, and religious traditions originating on the Indian subcontinent, including Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism, and Sikhism, are referred to as dharmic religions. Philosophical schools within dharma are referred to as darśana.

    Religion and science

    One factor that unites dharmic religions is the importance of foundational texts, which were formulated during the Vedic period, between ca. 1600 and 700 BCE. These include the Véda (Vedas), which contain hymns and prescriptions for performing rituals, Brāhmaṇa, accompanying liturgical texts, and Upaniṣad, metaphysical treatises. The Véda appeals to a wide range of gods who personify and embody natural phenomena such as fire (Agni) and wind (Vāyu). More gods were added in the following centuries (e.g., Gaṇeśa and Sati-Parvati in the fourth century CE). Ancient Vedic rituals encouraged knowledge of diverse sciences, including astronomy, linguistics, and mathematics. Astronomical knowledge was required to determine the timing of rituals and the construction of sacrificial altars. Linguistics developed out of a need to formalize grammatical rules for classical Sanskrit, which was used in rituals. Large public offerings also required the construction of elaborate altars, which posed geometrical problems and thus led to advances in geometry.

    Classic Vedic texts also frequently used very large numbers, for instance, to denote the age of humanity and the Earth, which required a system to represent numbers parsimoniously, giving rise to a 10-base positional system and a symbolic representation for zero as a placeholder, which would later be imported in other mathematical traditions. In this way, ancient Indian dharma encouraged the emergence of the sciences.

    The relationship between science and religion on the Indian subcontinent is complex, in part because the dharmic religions and philosophical schools are so diverse.

    Around the sixth–fifth century BCE, the northern part of the Indian subcontinent experienced extensive urbanization. In this context, medicine became standardized (āyurveda). This period also gave rise to a wide range of philosophical schools, including Buddhism, Jainism, and Cārvāka. The latter defended a form of metaphysical naturalism, denying the existence of gods or karma. The relationship between science and religion on the Indian subcontinent is complex, in part because the dharmic religions and philosophical schools are so diverse. For example, Cārvāka proponents had a strong suspicion of inferential beliefs, and rejected Vedic revelation and supernaturalism in general, instead favouring direct observation as a source of knowledge. Such views were close to philosophical naturalism in modern science, but this school disappeared in the twelfth century. Nevertheless, already in classical Indian religions, there was a close relationship between religion and the sciences.

    Opposing dogmatism: the role of colonial rule

    The word “Hinduism” emerged in the nineteenth century, and some scholars have argued that the religion did so, too. They say that British colonials, taken aback by what they experienced as the pagan profusion of cults and gods, sought to compact a religious diversity into a single, subsuming entity. Being literate Christians, they looked for sacred texts that might underlay this imputed tradition, enlisting the assistance of the Sanskrit-reading Brahmins. A canon and an attendant ideology were extracted, and with it, Hinduism. Other scholars question this history, insisting that a self-conscious sense of Hindu identity preceded this era, defined in no small part by contrast to Islam.  A similar story could be told about other world religions. We shouldn’t expect to resolve this dispute, which involves the weightings we give to points of similarity and points of difference. And scholars on both sides of this divide acknowledge the vast pluralism that characterized, and still characterizes, the beliefs, rituals, and forms of worship among the South Asians who have come to identify as Hindu.

    Here I would like to mention some of the scriptures in Hinduism: The longest of these is the religious epic, the Mahabharata, which clocks in at some 180000 thousand words, which is ten times the size of the Iliad and the Odyssey of Homer combined. Then there’s the Ramayana, which recounts the heroic attempts of Prince Rama to rescue his wife from a demon king. It has as many verses as the Hebrew bible. The Vedas which are the oldest Sanskrit scriptures include hymns and other magical and liturgical; and the Rig-Veda, the oldest, consists of nearly 11 000 lines of hymns of praise to the gods.

    But the Rig Veda does not only contain hymns of praise of God but a philosophical exposition which can be compared with Hegel’s conceptualization of the beginning in his “Logic”, which is not just about logic in the narrow sense but about being and non-being:

    In the Rig Veda we find the following hymn:

    Nasadiya Sukta (10. 129)

    There was neither non-existence nor existence then;
    Neither the realm of space nor the sky which is beyond;
    What stirred? Where? In whose protection?

    There was neither death nor immortality then;
    No distinguishing sign of night nor of day;
    That One breathed, windless, by its own impulse;
    Other than that there was nothing beyond.

    Darkness there was at first, by darkness hidden;
    Without distinctive marks, this all was water;
    That which, becoming, by the void was covered;
    That One by force of heat came into being.

    Who really knows? Who will here proclaim it?
    Whence was it produced? Whence is this creation?
    Gods came afterwards, with the creation of this universe.
    Who then knows whence it has arisen?

    Whether God’s will created it, or whether He was mute;
    Perhaps it formed itself, or perhaps it did not;
    Only He who is its overseer in highest heaven knows,

    Only He knows, or perhaps He does not know.

    —Rigveda 10.129 (Abridged, Tr: Kramer / Christian)

    Nasadiya Sukta begins rather interestingly, with the statement – “Then, there was neither existence nor non-existence.” It ponders over the when, why and by whom of creation in a very sincere contemplative tone and provides no definite answers. Rather, it concludes that the gods too may not know, as they came after creation. And maybe the supervisor of creation in the highest heaven knows, or maybe even he does not know.

    The philosophical character of this hymn becomes obvious when stating that there was something or someone who created even the gods. This question might be similar to the one that created the big bang thirteen billion years ago. In my view, the Rigveda is the most elaborate Veda opposing any kind of dogmatism, any ideology. Instead, it gives reason for the assumption which is of paramount importance in an ever-changing world, that there is no absolute knowledge, there is an increasing sense of unsureness, and we can’t rely on fixed rules – but that we are responsible for our actions.

    Müller made the term central to his criticism of Western theological and religious exceptionalism (relative to Eastern religions) focusing on a cultural dogma which held “monotheism” to be both fundamentally well-defined and inherently superior to differing conceptions of God.

    The second problem is related to the question of whether this hymn should be interpreted as monotheistic, dualistic or polytheistic. Some scholars like Frederik Schelling have invented the term Henotheism (from, greek ἑνός θεοῦ (henos theou), meaning ‘of one god’) is the worship of a single god while not denying the existence or possible existence of other deities. Schelling coined the word, and Frederik Welcker (1784–1868) used it to depict primitive monotheism in ancient Greeks. Max Müller (1823–1900), a German philologist and orientalist, brought the term into wider usage in his scholarship on the Indian religions, particularly Hinduism whose scriptures mention and praise numerous deities as if they are one ultimate unitary divine essence.  Müller made the term central to his criticism of Western theological and religious exceptionalism (relative to Eastern religions) focusing on a cultural dogma which held “monotheism” to be both fundamentally well-defined and inherently superior to differing conceptions of God.

    Mueller in the end emphasizes that henotheism is not a primitive form of monotheism but a different conceptualization. We find a similar passage in the gospel of John in which it is stated:

    1In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. 2 He was with God in the beginning. 3 Through him all things were made; without him, nothing was made that has been made. 4 In him was life, and that life was the light of all mankind. 5 The light shines in the darkness, and the darkness has not overcome it.

    It is clearly written that in the beginning there was the word – not God. In the original Greek version of this gospel, the term logos is used, and Hegel made this passage the foundation of his whole philosophy. Closely related to the Rig Veda is the concept of Atman. Ātman (Atma, आत्मा, आत्मन्) is a Sanskrit word which means “essence, breath, soul” and which is for the first time discussed in the Rig-Veda.  Nevertheless, this concept is most cherished in the Upanishads, which are written precisely between the 8th to 5th centuries B.C., the period in which according to Jaspers the axial age began. Again, this concept is an attempt to reconcile the various differentiations which were necessary for the function of a society with an ever-increasing population.

    I want to highlight that Hinduism – in its Vedic and classic variants – did not support the caste system; but that it rigorously opposed it in practice and principle. Even after the emergence of the caste system, Hindu society still saw considerable occupational and social mobility. Moreover, Hinduism created legends to impress on the popular mind the invalidity of the caste system – a fact further reinforced by the constant efflorescence of reform movements throughout history. The caste system survived despite this because of factors that ranged from the socio-economic to the ecological sphere, which helped sustain and preserve the balance among communities in a non-modern world.

    It would be absolutely necessary to demolish the myth that the caste system is an intrinsic part of Hinduism as a religion as well as a philosophy.  Although, there is a historically explainable link between both but not one which I would label a necessary or logical connection. Of course, the proponents of the caste system tried to legitimize the caste system by using references from the ancient scriptures – but as we maintain we must not understand Hinduism just in relation to Dharma if we would understand it just as jati or birth-based social division.

    The myth of the caste system being an intrinsic part of Hinduism is a discourse in the meaning in which Foucault has used this concept as just exercising power.

    I’m not sure whether this interpretation represents the major understanding in India, but I think it might be essential in a globalized world to debunk this only seemingly close relation, which has just a historical dimension and would therefore be a vivid example just of a discursive practice. The myth of the caste system being an intrinsic part of Hinduism is a discourse in the meaning in which Foucault has used this concept as just exercising power.

    This discourse is believed by orthodox elements in Hinduism as well as propagated by elements outside of Hinduism who are trying to proselyte Hindus. I would like to treat this problem a little bit more extensively because it might be used for other religions and civilizations, too, in which suppression and dominance are seemingly legitimized by holy scriptures but by taking a closer look this relation is just a discourse of power.

     Nevertheless, there is a very old text of Hinduism in which the caste system is legitimized. It is called  Manusmṛiti (Sanskrit: मनुस्मृति), also spelt as Manusmruti, is an ancient legal text. It was one of the first Sanskrit texts to have been translated into English in 1794, by Sir William Jones, and was used to formulate the Hindu law by the British colonial government.

    Over fifty manuscripts of the Manusmriti are now known, but the earliest discovered, most translated and presumed authentic version since the 18th century has been the “Calcutta manuscript with Kulluka Bhatta commentary”.

    How did caste come about?

    Manusmriti, widely regarded to be the most important and authoritative book on Hindu law and dating back to at least 1,000 years before Christ was born, seems to “acknowledge and justify the caste system as the basis of order and regularity of society”. The caste system divides Hindus into four main categories – Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and the Shudras. Many believe that the groups originated from Brahma, the Hindu God of creation.

    At the top of the hierarchy were the Brahmins who were mainly teachers and intellectuals and are believed to have come from Brahma’s head. Then came the Kshatriyas, or the warriors and rulers, supposedly from his arms. The third slot went to the Vaishyas, or the traders, who were created from his thighs. At the bottom of the heap were the Shudras, who came from Brahma’s feet and did all the menial jobs. The main castes were further divided into about 3,000 castes and 25,000 sub-castes, each based on their specific occupation. Outside of this Hindu caste system were the achhoots – the Dalits or the untouchables.

    How does caste work?

    For centuries, caste has dictated almost every aspect of Hindu religious and social life, with each group occupying a specific place in this complex hierarchy. Rural communities have long been arranged on the basis of castes – the upper and lower castes almost always lived in segregated colonies, the water wells were not shared, Brahmins would not accept food or drink from the Shudras, and one could marry only within one’s caste. The system bestowed many privileges on the upper castes while sanctioning repression of the lower castes by privileged groups.

    New research shows that hard boundaries between the social groups were only set by British colonial rulers who made caste India’s defining social feature when they used censuses to simplify the system, primarily to create a single society with a common law that could be easily governed.

    Often criticized for being unjust and regressive, it remained virtually unchanged for centuries, trapping people into fixed social orders from which it was impossible to escape. Despite the obstacles, however, some Dalits and other low-caste Indians, such as BR Ambedkar who authored the Indian constitution, and KR Narayanan who became the nation’s first Dalit president, have risen to hold prestigious positions in the country. Historians, though, say that until the 18th Century, the formal distinctions of caste were of limited importance to Indians, social identities were much more flexible, and people could move easily from one caste to another. New research shows that hard boundaries between the social groups were only set by British colonial rulers who made caste India’s defining social feature when they used censuses to simplify the system, primarily to create a single society with a common law that could be easily governed.

    So, the caste system in its strict interpretation is an invention of British rules – of course, it existed already in some form around three thousand years ago. However, it is disputed whether in ancient times it was more of a kind of functional differentiation in the meaning of Karl Jaspers, whereas since colonial times it became a separation boundary between the various groups. I assume that the colonial rulers transformed an existing variety of functional differentiations of identities into strictly separated castes for reasons of securing their rule. As in other colonial rules like in Africa, the colonizers were puzzled by the plurality of social groups, their ability to change from one group to the other and transformed social groups based on functional differentiation into castes and classes to facilitate their own rule. Overcoming the caste system thus involves overcoming colonialism.

  • India’s Self-Inflicted Economic Catastrophe

    India’s Self-Inflicted Economic Catastrophe

    Noted economist Jayati Ghosh reviews India’s economic recovery from the impact of the pandemic. She asserts that the major economic problems of unemployment, poverty, and inadequate healthcare are due to poor strategies and policies implemented by the government. In her analysis, COVID-19’s devastating impact on India has been compounded by the BJP government’s disastrous decision to impose nationwide lockdowns without providing any support to workers. Instead, the BJP used the pandemic to consolidate its power and suppress dissent. Even with existing socio-political constraints, she says India can do much better as there is scope for different economic strategies.

    This article was published earlier in Project Syndicate. The views expressed are the author’s own.

                                                                                                                                                                          -TPF Editorial Team

    Nearly 80% of the estimated 70 million people around the world who fell into extreme poverty at the onset of COVID-19 in 2020 were from India, a recent World Bank report has revealed. But even this shocking figure could be an underestimate, as the lack of official data makes it difficult to assess the pandemic’s human costs.

    What accounts for this alarming rise in Indian poverty? COVID-19 was undoubtedly India’s worst health calamity in at least a century. But the pandemic’s economic and social consequences go beyond the direct effects on health and mortality. As I argue in my recent book, The Making of a Catastrophe: The Disastrous Economic Fallout of the COVID-19 Pandemic in India, very significant policy failures – owing to government action and inaction – were responsible for widespread and significant damage to Indian livelihoods and for the country’s decline in terms of many basic indicators of economic well-being.

    But the devastating impact of the pandemic on India has been compounded by economic policies that reflected the country’s deeply-embedded inequalities.

    This judgment may seem excessively harsh. After all, India’s government did not cause the pandemic, and many other countries experienced economic setbacks after they failed to control the virus. But the devastating impact of the pandemic on India has been compounded by economic policies that reflected the country’s deeply-embedded inequalities.

    To be sure, the pandemic did not create India’s many economic vulnerabilities. But it did highlight India’s many societal fissures and fault lines. And while the country already suffered from glaring inequalities of income, wealth, and opportunities long before COVID-19, the government’s pandemic response has taken them to unimaginable extremes.

    Even as Indian workers faced poverty, hunger, and ever-greater material insecurity due to the pandemic, money and resources continued to flow from the poor and the middle class to the country’s largest corporations and wealthiest individuals. The intersecting inequalities of caste, gender, religion, and migration status have become increasingly marked and oppressive. The result has been a major setback to social and economic progress.

    At the beginning of the pandemic, the central government imposed a prolonged nationwide lockdown with little notice. It then adopted containment strategies that were clearly unsuited to the Indian context, with immediately devastating effects on employment and livelihoods.

    The grim state of affairs reflects the priorities of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) response. At the beginning of the pandemic, the central government imposed a prolonged nationwide lockdown with little notice. It then adopted containment strategies that were clearly unsuited to the Indian context, with immediately devastating effects on employment and livelihoods.

    Instead of using the breathing space provided by the lockdown to bolster local health systems, the central government left state authorities to manage as best they could with minimal and inadequate resources. And when the resulting economic disaster threatened to spiral out of control, the government eased restrictions to “unlock” the economy even as the number of cases mounted, thereby putting more people at risk.

    At a time when governments worldwide were significantly increasing public spending to fight the pandemic and mitigate its economic impact, the Indian government preferred to control expenditures (after adjusting for inflation) as its revenues declined.

    But at the heart of India’s self-inflicted economic catastrophe is the government’s decision to provide very little compensation or social protection, even as COVID-19 lockdowns deprived hundreds of millions of their livelihoods for several months. At a time when governments worldwide were significantly increasing public spending to fight the pandemic and mitigate its economic impact, the Indian government preferred to control expenditures (after adjusting for inflation) as its revenues declined.

    But in a country where median wages are too low to provide more than the most basic subsistence, losing even a week’s income could lead millions to the brink of starvation. Given that more than 90% of all workers in India are informal – without any legal or social protection – and that around half of those are self-employed, the effect was immediate and devastating.

    The government’s decision not to increase spending aggravated the shock of the lockdown, generating a humanitarian crisis that disproportionately affected women and marginalized groups, including millions of migrant workers who were forced to return home under harrowing conditions.

    But the effects of the official response to the pandemic are only one side of the story. COVID-19 safety measures have been a natural fit for the country’s still-pervasive caste system, which has long relied on forms of social distancing to enforce the socioeconomic order and protect those at the top. It also further entrenched India’s persistent patriarchy.

    Instead of taking appropriate countermeasures, like providing greater support to the population, the BJP used the pandemic to consolidate its power and suppress dissent. This, in turn, limited the central government’s ability to generate the widespread social consensus and public trust needed to contain the virus.

    Even within India’s deep-seated social and political constraints, there is scope for a different economic strategy that would enable a just, sustainable, and more equitable recovery.

    None of this was inevitable. Even within India’s deep-seated social and political constraints, there is scope for a different economic strategy that would enable a just, sustainable, and more equitable recovery. To ensure that most Indians, not just the stock market or large companies, benefit from growth, India’s voters must reject the BJP’s policies, which threaten to impoverish them further.

    Feature Image Credit: textilevaluechain.in

  • Right to Work: Feasible and Indispensable for India to be a Truly Civilized and Democratic Nation

    Right to Work: Feasible and Indispensable for India to be a Truly Civilized and Democratic Nation

    Executive Summary of
    Report of People’s Commission on Employment and Unemployment
    Set up by Desh Bachao Abhiyan

    Introduction

    When society faces a problem and is unable to resolve it, it implies that something basic is wrong. One needs to look for its basic causes to solve the problem. The causes may lie in the system that has evolved over time and which conditions the dominant social and political thinking in society. The onus of finding the solution and rectifying the problem is on the rulers. Their failure to do so over time implies a lack of motivation/commitment to solve the problem.

    All this applies to the issue of employment generation and unemployment in India which has been growing over time and affects the vast majority of the citizens.

    The Basic Issue

    Gandhi said that India is the only country capable of giving a civilizational alternative. The time has come to take this seriously since unemployment has become a critical issue that needs to be urgently tackled. The issue is multi-dimensional since it is a result of multiple causes and has widespread implications. It impacts the growth of the economy, inequality, poverty, etc. It has a gender dimension and impacts the marginalized sections adversely reflecting a lack of social justice. It is entrenched among the youth. The more educated they are greater the unemployment they face. Consequently, it has political and social implications, like, social relations.

    The rapidly growing incomes of the top 1% in the income ladder indicate that the economy has the resources but they are mal-distributed. The rich at the top has created a system that enables them to capture most of the gains from development with little trickling down to the rest.

    This Report presents a framework that spells out the causes, consequences, and possible remedies. Further, it looks at the historical process underlying the evolution of policies so as to understand how they can be changed.

    If any form of distortion persists over a long period, as unemployment in India, its origins lie in society’s perceptions and priorities. In India, these can be traced to the adoption of state capitalism and persisting feudal tendencies of the elite policy makers who in their own self-interest adopted a trickle-down model of development.

    Further, Capitalism has globally taken the form of marketization which promotes `profit maximisation’. But is it then legitimate to keep workers unemployed? It implies loss of output and therefore reduces the size of the economy which leads to a lower level of profits. So, by the logic of individual rationality, the system should create productive employment for all.

    The market’s notion of `efficiency’ is status quoist since it seeks to perpetuate the historical injustice in society. `Consumer sovereignty’ implies that individuals should be left free to do whatever they wish. The collectivity should not intervene in their choices no matter how socially detrimental they may be. It promotes the notion that if I have the money I can do what I like. The ratio of incomes is 10,000 times and more between the big businessmen and the poor workers. The market sees nothing wrong in this; in fact, society has come to celebrate it.

    Marketization is determining society’s choices through its principles penetrating all aspects of society. One of these principles is the `dollar vote’. The policy makers accept it and prioritize the choices of the well-off over those of the marginalized. The well-off dictate the social judgments of policy makers. Consequently, not only equality is not on the agenda even equity is not.

    With marketization stripping off the social aspect of life, individuals become automatons. Their individual distress and situation in life are no one’s or society’s concern. Unemployment becomes just a switching off of a machine. No social concern need to be attached to it. In fact, capitalists welcome unemployment as an efficient’ device to discipline labour and neo-classical economics considers it as natural. Inflation further weakens large numbers of workers as they lose purchasing power.

    In essence, whether or not society should aim to give productive employment to all reflects its view of individuals. Society needs to choose what is more important – profits or the welfare of the marginalized majority. The Gandhian view, largely rejected by the Indian elite, was `last person first’ which defined what the priority should be.

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  • Rural Agriculture and the new wave of Migrant Workers to Rural Space

    Rural Agriculture and the new wave of Migrant Workers to Rural Space

    Abstract

    Home, belongingness, and identity bring comfort to human existence, but local communities are challenged and become highly volatile by the sudden influx of people from different regions in search of livelihood and survival. Some migrate in their quest to find new opportunities in education, employment, and better living conditions from their home state, but some are displaced due to loss of livelihood, low employment, and lack of safety. This article analyses internal migration toward Tamil Nadu. The migrant population in Tamil Nadu accounts for 18.85 lakh according to the 2011 census, whereas other state migrants account for only 6.2% (Radhakrishnan & Vasanth, 2019). Most migration in the past has been towards the cities for chances of better livelihood and stable jobs. However, migrant workers travelling towards rural areas have been increasingly found working as agricultural labourers. S. Irudaya Rajan, a professor at the Centre for Developmental studies in his work, points out the importance of migrants to this economy as there is a constant outflow of the young population, with reservation wages in this region being high (Radhakrishnan & Vasanth, 2019). A report by the Federation of Tamil Nadu Agricultural Association suggests that over 8,67,582 farmers have stopped agricultural practices, and the market has been taken over by private players who require agricultural labourers (Sreemathi, 2019). This demand can attract migrant workers to rural areas. This article examines the migration pattern in Tamil Nadu to understand the inflow and outflow population, the reasons behind the outflow of farmers from the system and the new wave of migrant workers to rural Tamil Nadu.    

    Introduction

    Millions of people move every year hoping for a better livelihood and future, but the reality may be bitter for some. Nine million people have been migrating annually between states as per the Railway’s data from 2011 to 2016. Around 30% of the Indian population represents the varied level of the migrant population (Migration, 2022). Various factors have contributed to migration. The pull factors which attract people towards the destination include better living conditions, better employment, quality education, absence of violence and high wage rates. The push factors, on the other hand, include the lack of welfare activity, discrimination towards a community, lack of employment and lower wage rates. In both instances, economic ambition occupies the centre space. Thus, it is crucial to form a developmental economy for the residing population and the migrating one. The pull factors usually replace the push factors when the socio-economic condition in the country facilitates good life. People have been moving towards cities, hoping to find better employment and livelihood in the globalised world, making cities the hub for development. In Tamil Nadu, the movement toward the city area was triggered by early industrialisation in the 1980s, when manufacturing capacity accounted for around 26% of its GDP, higher than the national average of 15% (Mahambare & Dhanaraj, 2021). The 1990s liberalisation policy created mobility and development by expanding the economic horizons to telecom, software and banking (Migration to Chennai, 2010). This socio-economic mobility has greatly impacted the state’s rural economy and continues to be one of the few contributors to migration from agriculture. In recent times, farmers are selling out their lands and changing their occupations or working as agricultural labourers. The agricultural sector requires a considerable labour population. This demand for labour forces along with the lockdown during the Covid pandemic has fuelled a new wave of migrant workers in rural areas in south India. However, it is essential to study the causes of the movement of the traditional population from the industry, which helps understand the patterns that need to be avoided.

    Migration out of Agriculture

    Agriculture has long been a community practice in Tamil societies, but the migration of farmers continues to challenge the status quo. A report by the Federation of Tamil Nadu Agricultural Association mentions that over 8,67,582 farmers have stopped agricultural practices (Sreemathi, 2019). Lower wage rates, discrimination, heavy workload, lack of welfare and crop failure are the main reasons for displacement. Since the agricultural sector is seasonal, the wages are decided by workdays, seasons, and piece/ quantity rate, which leads to an unsteady wage rate based on the season, with fewer or no jobs in some seasons. People, thus, prefer to work non-farm jobs for a steady income throughout the year. Some have been living as labourers for generations on the farm since only a handful of the population possess larger farmlands. A study by Sato Keiko (2011) traces this class difference, farmland size, and the employment status of migrants from a rural village in Madurai. He points out that the village’s upper-class children with larger farms migrated to the city and acquired white-collar jobs. The middle class and the marginal groups, on the other hand, usually landed in blue-collar jobs.  Interestingly, he notes that the aspiration to educate and climb the socio-economic ladder has recently been high among the latter (Keiko, 2011). This aspiration leads them to migrate to cities and take up factory jobs, which are comparatively better than being engaged as farm labourers. Educational aspiration attempts to shake the traditional class structure and disparity that exists with it. 

    Additionally, only 27.1% adolescent population and 24.18% of the youth population were involved as agricultural labourers in 2014 (Sivakumar, 2014). Another reason for the migration is crop failure induced by unpredictable heavy rainfall and drought. Farmers who cannot profit or make ends meet when the crop collapses, end up falling into debt.  

    More than 85% of people working in the state under MGNREGA are women, higher than the national average of 56% and 28% of the Dalit population (Ramakrishnan, 2017)

    The Mahatma Gandhi Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) Scheme has been argued to be one of the major reasons behind the declining numbers of farm labourers When the scheme started, it provided the rural population with a higher income of Rs. 100 compared to farm jobs which offered Rs. 40 a day (In Tamil Nadu labourers, 2010). MGNREGA acts as a precursor for the high wage rate in agriculture as it competes with the scheme to attract more people for work. In 2020, the wage rate for agriculture labourers had increased to Rs. 392, and the notified MGNREGA stood at Rs. 273, which was lower than the farm wage (Aditi, 2021). However, along with steady wages and less workload, MGNREGA has continued to be a source of economic empowerment for women. It enables pathways to formal financial institutions and personal saving habits – “I would be working like a bonded labourer again under any big landowning agriculturist, if there was no Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS)” (Ramakrishnan, 2017). These interviews collected by Ramakrishnan, senior journalist for The Hindu, shed light on the women’s attitude and discontent toward farm jobs. More than 85% of people working in the state under MGNREGA are women, higher than the national average of 56% and 28% of the Dalit population (Ramakrishnan, 2017). These marginal groups are frequently abused and sexually harassed by employers and landowners. In this regard, MGNREGA has provided them with a space to work with dignity. However, some experts like Vijayanand, former Secretary of the Union Minister of Panchayat Raj, opposed the arguments favouring MGNREGA arguing that the scheme did not provide jobs throughout the year and phased out the jobs in accordance with the lean season (Radhakrishnan, 2017). 

    Involvement of Migrants in Agriculture

    Tamil Nadu is a growing economy which renders a stay to 18.85 lakhs migrants, of which 6.2 % are from other states. The origin states of these migrant workers are Bihar, West Bengal, Odisha, Jharkhand, Chattishgarh and states of Northeast India. Some tribal communities migrated from areas with rich mineral resources like the Santal areas of West Bengal, MP and a few other areas in Jharkhand and Chattisgarh because of the prevalent mining practice and dam building. Also, tribal people were displaced because of the settlement of non-tribals in the region and deforestation. In some areas, low human development indicators have led to their displacement. Apart from these push factors, Tamil Nadu has a lot to offer in terms of its higher wage rates, better living conditions and political, religious and social freedom (Sami, Crossin, Jayapathy, Martin, et al., 2016). Once they migrate to Tamil Nadu through contractors, migrants are channelled to Chennai, Coimbatore, Tiruvallur, Tiruppur, Kancheepuram and Chengalpattu to work in manufacturing factories and construction sites. These migrants fill the state’s requirement for 3D jobs, as Dr Irudaya Rajan from the Tiruvananthapuram Centre for Developmental Studies mentioned (Radhakrishnan & Vasanth, 2019). These jobs are mostly dirty, demeaning and dangerous. Since the wage expectation of the state youth is high, the desperation to take up these jobs is low and job positions are thus occupied by migrant workers (Vasanth & Radhakrishnan, 2019).

    The Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) data from 2018 to 2020 shows a sharp increase in employment in agriculture from 42.5 % in 2018 -19 to 45.6% in 2019-20 (CMIE, 2021)

    In the pre-Covid job market, population movement was constantly moving from rural villages to urban spaces in search of white and blue-collar jobs. However, Covid has shifted the employment market. The Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) data from 2018 to 2020 shows a sharp increase in employment in agriculture from 42.5 % in 2018 -19 to 45.6% in 2019-20 (CMIE, 2021). Most people who changed jobs were formerly employed in construction and manufacturing. While the existing population migrates to cities in search of skilled labour, migrant workers find the farm jobs more appealing. Tamil Nadu provides an average salary of Rs. 392 per day for farm workers, which is higher than the national average of Rs. 348. Most states from which the migrants are displaced have far fewer wage rates; for instance, Jharkhand offered Rs. 258 in 2020 while the wage rate was Rs. 234 in Chhattisgarh (Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 2021). While their movement is unexpected, these migrant populations can contribute to the agricultural sector and rural development, but that cannot be done without good government policies. The GDP contribution of agriculture reduced from 55.3% in the 1950s to 21.8% in the 2000s (Gothoskar, 2021). Most government budgets have little concern for the agricultural economy. Thus, it is essential to implement policies for the existing agrarian population and the migrants. Also, there has been increasing distress caused by the growing movement of the migrants to farmland which continues to be heavily unorganised. Dr Irudaya Rajan, in his interviews, warns that this unexpected surplus labour availability in rural areas cannot accommodate everyone in the existing jobs, which may result in increased poverty and starvation (Nirupama, 2020).

    Furthermore, it backfires on the urban economy once industries open up completely and face a shortage of labour (Viswanathan, 2020). To know the current situation of migrant workers, state-level data collection is needed. Tamil Nadu collected the migrant database only once in 2015, following the fall of the Moulivakkam multistorey building. While Thangam Thennarasu, the Tamil Nadu Minister of Industries, mentioned collecting data on migrant workers in a press release, the agriculture sector was not mentioned (Kumar, 2021). Data collection is vital in formulating policies to accommodate the migrant workers in rural economies and avoid unexpected problems. 

    Measures to be taken

    Since the Agricultural sector offers seasonal employment, other sources of organised employment or schemes to assure livelihood during times of distress should be in place. While farming requires work like ploughing and harvesting, which is to be done all year-round, the revenue can be earned only in a particular season. If affected by climate calamities and crop failure, people are most likely to end up in debt. Hence, it is essential to employ migrants during the off-season and distress times in sustainable jobs. Most agricultural products are exported as raw materials or semi-processed to other countries, and therefore, the MSMEs in the rural areas can be focused on enhancing the exporting sector of agriculture.

    MOUS between states: The Tamil Nadu government has fewer memorandums of understanding (MOUs) on migrants, with focus mainly placed on Sri Lankan refugees. Thus, signing MOUs with the source state can improve the conditions of migrants and help governments to maintain a database of migrants (Sreelakshmi,2021). The databases can help in formulating policies.

    Welfare policies – Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY), a central-run health insurance scheme for people working in the unorganised sector and for those below the poverty line, has to be implemented appropriately, and the records should be maintained. Quality schooling for children of migrants working in rural spaces should be provided. Some states have offered regional language subject notebooks and learning kits through MOUs. Tamil Nadu should recruit staff in the favoured language. Further, skill enhancement training for the migrants should be provided.

    Conclusion

    Agriculture and rural development go hand in hand since 70% of rural households depend upon agriculture for their livelihood. Still, there is an increased pattern of traditional farmers moving out of the business and choosing other industries or being employed as agricultural labourers. This shift, accompanied by the Covid lockdown, has triggered an increased flow of migrant population back to farms as agricultural labourers. Unlike industries, the agricultural sector is unorganised and seasonal, making it highly vulnerable. Thus, it becomes essential to build a safety net for the traditional population and the migrants. These migrants, without proper policies and data entries, can be stranded; lacking identity, rights and political representation. Further, this sudden labour surplus cannot be accommodated immediately, creating a labour shortage in urban areas.  It is, thus, important to record migrant workers who return, the sector they are involved in, their security nets and most importantly, their availability in rural agriculture.

    Reference

    Aditi R. (2021, May 16). MGNREGA workers in Tamil Nadu allege underpayment and wage disparity. The times of India. Retrieved from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chennai/mgnrega-workers-in-tamil-nadu-allege-underpayment-and-wage-disparity/articleshow/82673961.cms

    Dhanaraj Sowmya & Mahambare Vidya (2021, March 31). Tamil Nadu left Punjab, Bengal far behind. Here’s what it needs to do now. The Print. Retrieved from https://theprint.in/opinion/tamil-nadu-left-punjab-bengal-far-behind-heres-what-it-needs-to-do-now/631213/

    Directorate of Economics and Statistics. (2021). Agricultural wages India: 2019 – 20. Ministry of Agriculture & Farmers welfare. 

    Gothaskar Sujata. (2021, May 12). To Fully Understand the Migrant Worker Crisis, We Need a Larger Perspective. The Wire. Retrieved from https://thewire.in/rights/migrant-worker-crisis-larger-perspective-farm-land-industry

    In Tamil Nadu labourers choosing NREGA over farms. (2010, Nov 29). NDTV. Retrieved from https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/in-tamil-nadu-labourers-choosing-nrega-over-farms-440546

    Keiko Sato. (2011). Employment structure and Rural-Urban Migration in a Tamil Nadu Village: Focusing on difference by economic class. Southeast Asia Studies. Vol.49. Pg.22-51.

    Kumar Vijay. (2021, July 26). Tamil Nadu to create a databank of migrant workers. The Hindu. Retrieved from https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/databank-of-migrant-workers-soon-says-tamil-nadu-industries-minister/article35530808.ece

    Migration to Chennai follows industrial growth, but quality. (2010, April 13). The Times of India. Retrieved from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chennai/migration-to-chennai-follows-industrial-growth-but-quality-of-life/articleshow/5798687.cms

    Radhakrishnan V & Vasanth B. A. (2019, September 08). Migrants in Tamil Nadu: case of much ado about nothing? The Hindu. Retrieved from https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/migrants-in-tamil-nadu-case-of-much-ado-about-nothing/article29364682.ece

    Ramakrishnan T. (2017, February 05). Job scheme, a mixed bag for rural labourers. The Hindu. Retrieved from https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/Job-scheme-a-mixed-bag-for-rural-labourers/article17197043.ece

    Sami Bernard. Crossin Sebastian, Jayapathy, Martin. P. O. (2016). A survey on Interstate migrants in Tamil Nadu. LISSTAR & Indian Social Institute. 

    Sivakumar B. (2014, November 02). Most of Tamil Nadu’s adolescents, youth live in rural areas, shows census. The times of India. Retrieved from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chennai/most-of-tamil-nadus-adolescents-youth-live-in-rural-areas-shows-census/articleshow/45008956.cms

    Sreelakshmi Anjana. (2021, November 07). Distress Migration: A case study KBK districts in Odisha. The Peninsula Foundation. Retrieved from https://admin.thepeninsula.org.in/2021/11/07/distress-migration-a-case-study-of-kbk-districts-in-odisha/

    Sreemathi M. (2021, November 23). Migrants now enter agri fields in Nellai. The New Indian Express. Retrieved from https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/tamil-nadu/2021/nov/23/migrants-now-enter-agri-fields-in-nellai-2386930.html

    Viswanathan Nirupama. (2020, May 20). We have not factored in Tamil Nadu’s migrant workers in our realm of things: Expert. The new Indian Express. Retrieved from https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/tamil-nadu/2020/may/20/we-have-not-factored-in-tamil-nadus-migrant-workers-in-our-realm-of-things-expert-2145578.html

    Vyas Mahesh. (2021, August 09). Migration from factories to farms. Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy. Retrieved from https://www.cmie.com/kommon/bin/sr.php?kall=warticle&dt=20210809122441&msec=850

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  • Indian Economy at 75: Trapped in a Borrowed Development Strategy

    Indian Economy at 75: Trapped in a Borrowed Development Strategy

    In 1947, at the time of Independence, India’s socio-economic parameters were similar to those in countries of South East Asia and China. The level of poverty, illiteracy, and inadequacy of health infrastructure was all similar. Since then, these other countries have progressed rapidly leaving India behind in all parameters. ‘Why is it so?’ should be the big question for every Indian citizen in this time of our 75th anniversary celebrations.

     

    Introduction

    India at 75 is a mixed bag of development and missed opportunities. The country has achieved much since Independence but a lot remains to be done to become a developed society. The pandemic has exposed India’s deficiencies in stark terms. The uncivilized conditions of living of a vast majority of the citizens became apparent. According to a report by Azim Premji University, 90% of the workers said during the lockdown that they did not have enough savings to buy one week of essentials. This led to the mass migration of millions of people, in trying conditions from cities to the villages, in the hope of access to food and survival.

    Generally, technology-related sectors, pharmaceuticals and some producing essentials in the organized sectors have done well in spite of the pandemic. So, a part of the economy is doing well in spite of adversity but incomes of at least 60% of people at the bottom of the income ladder have declined (PRICE Survey, 2022). The great divide between the unorganized and organized parts of the economy is growing. The backdrop to these developments is briefly presented below.

    Structure and Growth of the Economy

    In 1947, at the time of Independence, India’s socio-economic parameters were similar to those in countries of South East Asia and China. The level of poverty, illiteracy, and inadequacy of health infrastructure was all similar. Since then, these other countries have progressed rapidly leaving India behind in all parameters. So, India has fallen behind relatively in spite of improvements in health services and education, diversification of the economy and development of the industry.

    In 1950, agriculture was the dominant sector with a 55% share of GDP which has now dwindled to about 14%. The share of the services sector has grown rapidly and by 1980 it surpassed the share of agriculture and now it is about 55% of GDP. The Indian economy has diversified production `from pins to space ships’.

    Agriculture grows at a trend rate of a maximum of 4% per annum while the services sector can grow at even 12% per annum. So, there has been a shift in the economy’s composition from agriculture to services, accelerating the growth rate. The average growth rate of the economy between the 1950s and the 1970s was around 3.5%. In the 1980s and 1990s, it increased to 5.4% due to the shift in the composition. There was no acceleration in the growth rate of the economy in the 1990s compared to the 1980s. This rate again increased in the period after 2003 only to decline in 2008-09 due to the global financial crisis. Subsequently, the rate of growth has fluctuated wildly both due to global events and the policy conundrums in India.

    There was the taper tantrum in 2012-13 which cut short the post-global financial crisis recovery. Demonetization in November 2016 adversely impacted growth. That was followed by the structurally flawed GST. These policies administered shocks to the economy. Then came the pandemic in 2020. The economy’s quarterly growth rate had already fallen from 8% in Q4 2017-18 to 3.1% in Q4 2019-20, just before the pandemic hit.

    1980-81 marked a turning point. Prior to that, a drought would lead to a negative rate of growth in agriculture and of the economy as a whole. For instance, due to the drought in 1979-80, the economy declined by 6%. But, that was the last one. After that, a decline in agriculture has not resulted in a negative growth rate for the economy. The big drought of 1987-88 saw the economy grow at 3.4%. After 1980-81, the economy experienced a negative growth rate only during the pandemic which severely impacted the services sector, especially the contact services.

    Employment and Technology Related Issues

    Agriculture employs 45% of the workforce though its share in the economy (14%) has now become marginal. It has been undergoing mechanisation with increased use of tractors, harvester combines, etc., leading to the displacement of labour. Similar is the case in non-agriculture. So, surplus labour is stuck in agriculture leading to massive disguised unemployment.

    India is characterized by disguised unemployment and underemployment.Recent data points to growing unemployment among the educated youth. They wait for suitable work. The result is a low labour force participation rate (LFPR) in India (in the mid-40s) compared to similar other countries (60% plus).The gender dimension of unemployment and the low LFPR is worrying with women the worst sufferers.

    India’s employment data is suspect. The reason is that in the absence of unemployment allowance, people who lose work have to do some alternative work otherwise they would starve. They drive a rickshaw, push a cart, carry a head load or sell something at the roadside. This gets counted as employment even though they have only a few hours of work and are underemployed. So, India is characterized by disguised unemployment and underemployment.

    Recent data points to growing unemployment among the educated youth. They wait for suitable work. The result is a low labour force participation rate (LFPR) in India (in the mid-40s) compared to similar other countries (60% plus). It implies that in India maybe 20% of those who could work have stopped looking for work. No wonder for a few hundred low-grade government jobs, millions of young apply. The gender dimension of unemployment and the low LFPR is worrying with women the worst sufferers.
    These aspects of inadequate employment generation are linked to automation and the investment pattern in the economy. New technologies that are now being used in the modern sectors are labour displacing. For instance, earlier in big infrastructure projects like the construction of roads, one could see hundreds of people working but now big machines are used along with a few workers.

    Further, the organized sectors get most of the investment so little is left for the unorganized sector. This is especially true for agriculture. Thus, neither the organized sector nor agriculture is generating more work. Consequently, entrants to the job market are mostly forced to join the non-agriculture unorganized sector, which in a sense is the residual sector, where the wages are a fraction of the wages in the organized sector. The unorganized sector also acts as a reserve army of labour keeping organized sector wages in check

    Lack of a Living Wage

    To boost profits, the organized sector is increasingly, employing contract labour rather than permanent employees. This is true in both the public and private sectors. So, not only the workers in the unorganized sector, even the workers in the organised sector do not earn a living wage. Thus, most workers have little savings to deal with any crisis. They are unable to give their children a proper education and cannot afford proper health facilities. Most of the children drop out of school and can only do menial jobs requiring physical labour. They cannot obtain a better-paying job and will remain poor for the rest of their lives.

    The Delhi socio-economic survey of 2018 pointed to the low purchasing power of the majority of Indians. It showed that in Delhi, 90% of households spent less than Rs. 25,000 per month, and 98% spent less than Rs. 50,000 per month. Since Delhi’s per capita income is 2.5 times the all India average, deflating the Delhi figures by this factor will approximately yield all India figures. So, 98 per cent of the families would have spent less than Rs.20,000 per month, and 90 per cent less than Rs.10,000 per month. This effectively implies that 90 per cent of families were poor in 2018, if not extremely poor (implied by the poverty line). During the pandemic, many of them lost incomes and were pauperized and forced to further reduce their consumption.

    Unorganized Sector Invisibilized

    In the unorganized sector, labour is not organized as a trade union and therefore, is unable to bargain for higher wages, when prices rise. It constitutes 94% of the workforce and has little social security. No other major world economy has such a huge unorganized sector. No wonder when such a large section of the population faces a crisis in their lives, the economy declines, as witnessed during the pandemic. India’s official rate of growth fell more sharply than that of any other G20 country.

    The micro sector has 99% of the units and 97.5% of the employment of MSME and is unlike the small and medium sectors. The benefits of policies made for the MSME sector do not accrue to the micro units.

    Policymakers largely ignore the unorganized sector. The sudden implementation of the lockdown which put this sector in a deep existential crisis points to that. The micro sector has 99% of the units and 97.5% of the employment of MSME and is unlike the small and medium sectors. The benefits of policies made for the MSME sector do not accrue to the micro units.

    Invisibilization of the unorganized sector in the data is at the root of the problem. Data on this sector become available periodically, called the reference years. In between, it is assumed that this sector can be proxied by the organized sector. This could be taken to be correct when there is no shock to the economy and its parameters remain unchanged.

    Demonetization and the flawed GST administered big shocks to the economy and undermined the unorganized sector. Its link with the organized sector got disrupted. Thus, the methodology of calculating national income announced in 2015 became invalid.

    The implication is that the unorganized sector’s decline since 2016 is not captured in the data. Worse, the growth of the organized sector has been at the expense of the unorganized sector because demand shifted from the latter to the former. It suited the policymakers to continue using the faulty data since that presented a rosy picture of the economy. This also lulled them into believing that they did not need to do anything special to check the decline of the unorganized sector.

    Policy Paradigm Shift in 1947

    Growing unemployment, weak socio-economic conditions, etc., are not sudden developments. Their root lies in the policy paradigm adopted since independence.
    In 1947, the leadership, influenced by the national movement understood that people were not to blame for their problems of poverty, illiteracy and ill-health and could not resolve them on their own. So, it was accepted that in independent India these issues would be dealt with collectively. Therefore, the government was given the responsibility of tackling these issues and given a key role in the economy.

    Simultaneously, the leadership, largely belonging to the country’s elite, was enamoured of Western modernity and wanted to copy it to make India an ’advanced country’. The two paths of Western development then available were the free market and Soviet-style central planning. India adopted a mix of the two with the leading role given to the public sector. This path was chosen also for strategic reasons and access to technology which the West was reluctant to supply. But, this choice also led to a dilemma for the Indian elite. It had to ally with the Soviet Union for reasons of defence and access to technology but wanted to be like Western Europe.

    Both the chosen paths were based on a top-down approach. The assumption was that there would be a trickle down to those at the bottom. People accepted this proposition believing in the wider good of all. Resources were mobilized and investments were made in the creation of big dams and factories (called temples of modern India) that generated few jobs. They not only displaced many people trickle down was minimal. For instance, education spread but mostly benefitted the well-off.

    The Indian economy diversified and grew rapidly. An economy that for 50 years had been growing at about 0.75% grew at about 4% in the 1950s. But, the decline in the death rate led to a spurt in the rate of population growth. So, the per capita income did not show commensurate growth, and poverty persisted. Problems got magnified due to the shortage of food following the drought of 1965-67 and the Wars in 1962 and 1965. The Naxalite movement started in 1967, there was BOP crisis and high inflation in 1972-74 due to the growing energy dependence and the Yom Kippur war. Soon thereafter there was political instability and the imposition of an Emergency in 1975. The country went from crisis to crisis.

    Planning failed due to crony capitalism. The prevailing political economy enabled the business community to systematically undermine policies for their narrow ends by fueling the growth of the black economy.

    The failure of trickle-down and the cornering of the gains of development by a narrow section of people led to growing inequality and people losing faith in the development process. Different sections of the population realized that they needed a share in power to deliver to their group. Every division in society — caste, region, community, etc. — was exploited. The leadership became short-termist and indulged in competitive populism by promising immediate gains.

    The consensus on policies that existed at independence dissipated quickly. Election time promises to get votes were not fulfilled. For instance, PM Morarji Desai said that promises in the Janata Dal manifesto in 1977 were the party’s programme and not the government’s. Such undermining of accountability of the political process has undermined democracy and trust and aggravated alienation.

    Black Economy and Policy Failure

    The black economy has grown rapidly since the 1950s with political, social and economic ramifications. Even though it is at the root of the major problems confronting the country, most analysts ignore it.

    So, the black economy controls politics and to retain power it undermines accountability and weakens democracy.

    It undermines elections and strengthens the hold of vested interests on political parties. The compromised leadership of political parties is open to blackmail both by foreign interests and those in power. When in power it is willing to do the bidding of the vested interests. So, the black economy controls politics and to retain power it undermines accountability and weakens democracy.

    The black economy controls politics and corrupts it to perpetuate itself. The honest and the idealist soon are corrupted as happened with the leadership that emerged from the anti-corruption JP movement in the mid-1970s. Many of them who gained power in the 1990s was accused of corruption and even prosecuted. Proposals for state funding of elections will only provide additional funds but not help clean up politics.

    The black economy can be characterized as ’digging holes and filling them’. It results in two incomes but zero output. There is activity without productivity with investment going to waste. Consequently, the economy grows less than its potential. It has been shown that the economy has been losing 5% growth since the mid-1970s. So, if the black economy had not existed, today the economy could have been 8 times larger and each person would have been that much better off. Thus, development is set back. In 1988, PM Rajiv Gandhi lamented that out of every rupee sent only 15 paisa reaches the ground. P Chidambaram as FM said, `expenditures don’t lead to outcomes’.

    The black economy leads to the twin problem of development. First, black incomes being outside the tax net reduce resource availability to the government. If the black incomes currently estimated at above 60% of GDP could be brought into the tax net, the tax/GDP ratio could rise by 24%. This ratio is around 17% now and is one of the lowest in the world. Further, as direct tax collections rise, the regressive indirect taxes could be reduced, lowering inflation.

    India’s fiscal crisis would also get resolved. The current public sector deficit of about 14% would become a surplus of 10%. This would eliminate borrowings and reduce the massive interest payments (the largest single item in the revenue budget). It would enable an increase in allocations to public education and health to international levels and to infrastructure and employment generation.

    In brief, curbing the black economy would take care of India’s various developmental problems, whether it be lack of trickle-down, poverty, inequality, policy failure, employment generation, inflation and so on. It causes delays in decision-making and a breakdown of trust in society.

    Due to various misconceptions about the black economy, many of the steps taken to curb it have been counterproductive, like demonetization. Dozens of committees and commissions have analysed the issues and suggested hundreds of steps to tackle the problem. Many of them have been implemented, like reduction in tax rates and elimination of most controls but the size of the black economy has grown because of a lack of political will.

    Policy Paradigm Shift in 1991

    Failure of policies led to crisis after crisis in the period leading up to 1990. The blame was put on the policies themselves and not the crony capitalism and black economy that led to their failure. The policies prior to 1990 have been often labelled as socialist. Actually, the mixed economy model was designed to promote capitalism. At best the policies may be labelled as state capitalist and they succeeded in their goal. Private capital accumulated rapidly pre-1990. The Iraq crisis of 1989-90 led to India’s BOP crisis and became the trigger for a paradigm change in policies in favour of capital. The earlier more humane and less unequal path of development was discarded.

    Marketization has led to the ’marginalization of the marginals’, greater inequality and a rise in unemployment.

    In 1991, a new policy paradigm was ushered in. Namely, ’individuals are responsible for their problems and not the collective’. Under this regime, the government’s role in the economy was scaled back and individuals were expected to go to the market for resolving their problems. This may be characterized as ’marketization’. This brought about a philosophical shift in the thinking of individuals and society.

    Marketization has led to the ’marginalization of the marginals’, greater inequality and a rise in unemployment. These policies have promoted ’growth at any cost’ with the cost falling on the marginalized sections and the environment, both of which make poverty more entrenched. So, the pre-existing problems of Indian society have got aggravated in a changed form.

    Poverty is defined in terms of the ’social minimum necessary consumption’ which changes with space and time. Marketization has changed the minimum due to the promotion of consumerism and environmental decay imposing heavy health costs.
    The highly iniquitous NEP is leading to an unstable development environment. The base of growth has been getting narrower leading to periodic crises. Additionally, policy-induced challenges like demonetization, GST, pandemic and now the war in Ukraine have aggravated the situation. These social and political challenges can only grow over time as divisions in society become sharper.

    Weakness in Knowledge Generation

    Why does the obvious not happen in India? No one disagrees that poverty, illiteracy and ill health need to be eliminated. In addition to the problems due to the black economy and top-down approach, India has lagged behind in generating socially relevant knowledge to tackle its problems and make society dynamic.

    Technology has rapidly changed since the end of the Second World War. It is a moving frontier since newer technologies emerge leading to constant change and the inability of the citizens to cope with it. The advanced technology of the 1950s is intermediate or low technology today.

    Literacy needs to be redefined as the ability to absorb the current technology so as to get a decent job. Many routine jobs are likely to disappear soon, like, driver’s jobs as autonomous (self-driving) vehicles appear on the scene. Most banking is already possible through net banking and machines, like, ATMs. Banks themselves are under threat from digital currency.

    So, education is no more about the joy of learning and expanding one’s horizon. No wonder, the scientific temper is missing among a large number of the citizens.

    India’s weakness in knowledge generation is linked to the low priority given to education and R&D. Learning is based substantially on `rote learning’ which does not enable absorption of knowledge and its further development. So, education is no more about the joy of learning and expanding one’s horizon. No wonder, the scientific temper is missing among a large number of the citizens. Dogmas, misconceptions and irrationalities rule the minds of many and they are easily misled. This is politically, socially and economically a recipe for persisting backwardness.

    In spite of policy initiatives regarding education, like, the national education policy in 1968 and 1986, there is deterioration. This is because the milieu of education is all wrong. Policy is in the hands of bureaucrats, politicians or academics with bureaucratized mindsets. So, policies are mechanically framed. Like the idea that ’standards can be achieved via standardization’.

    Learning requires democratization. So, institutions need to be freed from the present feudal and bureaucratic control. Presently, institutions treat dissent as a malaise to be eliminated rather than celebrated. Courses are sought to be copied from foreign universities. JNU is told to be like Harvard or Cambridge. This is a contradiction in terms; originality cannot be copied. Courses copied from abroad tend to be based on the societal conditions there and not Indian conditions. Gandhi had said that the Indian education system is alienating and for many it still is.

    The best minds mostly go abroad and even if they return, they bring with them an alien framework not suited to India. So, as a society, we need to value ideas, prioritize education and R&D and generate socially relevant knowledge.

    Learning is given low priority because ideas are sought to be borrowed from abroad. So, the rulers have little value for institutions that could generate new ideas and inadequate funds are allotted to them. The best minds mostly go abroad and even if they return, they bring with them an alien framework not suited to India. So, as a society, we need to value ideas, prioritize education and R&D and generate socially relevant knowledge.

    Conclusion

    The growth at any cost strategy has been at the expense of the workers and the environment. This has narrowed the base of growth and led to instability in society — politically, socially and economically.

    India is a diverse society and the Indian economy is more complex than any other in the world. This has posed serious challenges to development in the last 75 years but undeniably things are not what they were. The big mistake has been to choose trickle-down policies that have not delivered to a vast number of people who live in uncivilized conditions. Poverty has changed its form and the elite imply that the poor should be grateful for what they have got. They should not focus on growing inequality, especially after 1991, when globalization entered the marketization phase which marginalizes the marginals.

    The growth at any cost strategy has been at the expense of the workers and the environment. This has narrowed the base of growth and led to instability in society — politically, socially and economically. The situation has been aggravated by the recent policy mistakes — demonetization, flawed GST and sudden lockdown. The current war in Ukraine is likely to lead to a new global order which will add to the challenges. The answer to ’why does the obvious not happen’ in India is not just economic but societal. Unless that challenge is met, portents are not bright for India at 75.

    This paper is based substantially on, `Indian Economy since Independence: Persisting Colonial Disruption’, Vision Books, 2013 and `Indian Economy’s Greatest Crisis: Impact of Coronavirus and the Road Ahead’, Penguin Random House, 2020.

    This article was published earlier in Mainstream Weekly.

    Feature Image Credit: Financial Express

    Other Images: DNA India, news18.com,  economictimes, rvcj.com

  • Valuing Folk Crop Varieties for Agroecology and Food Security

    Valuing Folk Crop Varieties for Agroecology and Food Security

    India’s Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) has recently, through an office memorandum, excluded the new generation genetically modified (GM) plants – also known as genetically edited (GE) plants – from the ambit of India’s biosafety rules. The use of GMO plant seeds like Monsanto’s Bt Cotton gave promising results initially but over a longer period it has resulted in many problems leading to large number of marginal farmer suicides. Based on this bitter experience the Government of India has brought in place very stringent bio-safety rules. However, with new biotech breakthroughs like Genome Editing techniques, there is a huge pressure from corporate giants like Monsanto, Bayer etc to open up agricultural markets in major countries like India and the global south. There is a fear that American capitalism driven biotech companies may destroy indigenous bio-diversities that could result in food insecurity in the long run. India adopted ‘Green Revolution’ in a big way to increase its food production. It lead to the use of High Yield Variety seeds and mono-cultural farming in a big way. Half a century later, there is a need to review the after effects of the ‘Green Revolution’ as the country is plagued by over use of fertilisers, pesticides, water scarcity, increasing salinity, and battling loss of nutrition in farmlands due to the loss of traditional crop diversity. India was home to a vast gene pool of 110000 varieties of native rice before the Green revolution, of which less than 600 are surviving today. The use of GMO crops will lead to further destruction of Indian food diversity. Genome editing, a newer technology, should be examined carefully from a policy perspective. The European Union treats all GMO and GE as one and therefore it has a single stringent policy. Dr Debal Deb has done a pioneering work in saving many of the indigenous rice varieties and campaigns against the industrial agriculture. His is a larger and vital perspective of Agricultural ecology. The Peninsula Foundation revisits his article of 2009 to drive home the importance of preserving and enhancing India’s bio-diversity and agricultural ecology as pressures from capitalist biotech predators loom large for commercial interests.

    – TPF Editorial Team

    On May 25, 2009, Hurricane Aila hit the deltaic islands of the Sunderban of West Bengal. The estuarine water surged and destroyed the villages. Farmer’s homes were engulfed by the swollen rivers, their properties vanished with the waves, and their means of livelihood disappeared, as illustrated by the empty farm fields, suddenly turned salty. In addition, most of the ponds and bore wells became salinized.

    Since Aila’s devastation, there has been a frantic search for the salt-tolerant rice seeds created by the ancestors of the current Sunderban farmers. With agricultural modernization, these heirloom crop varieties had slipped through the farmers’ hands.

    But now, after decades of complacency, farmers and agriculture experts alike have been jolted into realizing that on the saline Sunderban soil, modern high-yield varieties are no match for the “primitive,” traditional rice varieties. But the seeds of those diverse salt-tolerant varieties are unavailable now; just one or two varieties are still surviving on the marginal farms of a few poor farmers, who now feel the luckiest. The government rice gene banks have documents to show that they have all these varieties preserved, but they cannot dole out any viable seeds to farmers in need. That is the tragedy of the centralized ex situ gene banks, which eventually serve as morgues for seeds, killed by decades of disuse.

    The only rice seed bank in eastern India that conserves salt-tolerant rice varieties in situ is Vrihi, which has distributed four varieties of salt-tolerant rice in small quantities to a dozen farmers in Sunderban. The success of these folk rice varieties on salinized farms demonstrates how folk crop genetic diversity can ensure local food security. These folk rice varieties also promote sustainable agriculture by obviating the need for all external inputs of agrochemicals.

    Folk Rice Varieties, the Best Bet

    Not only the salinization of soil in coastal farmlands but also the too-late arrival of the monsoon this year has caused seedlings of modern rice varieties to wither on all un-irrigated farms and spelled doom for marginal farmers’ food security throughout the subcontinent. Despite all the brouhaha about the much-hyped Green Revolution, South Asia’s crop production still depends heavily on the monsoon rains and too much, too late, too early, or too scanty rain causes widespread failure of modern crop varieties. Around 60 per cent of India’s agriculture is unirrigated and totally dependent on rain.

    In 2002, the monsoon failure in July resulted in a seasonal rainfall deficit of 19 percent and caused a profound loss of agricultural production with a drop of over 3 percent in India’s GDP (Challinor et al. 2006). This year’s shortfall of the monsoon rain is likely to cause production to fall 10 to 15 million tons short of the 100 million tons of total production forecast for India at the beginning of the season (Chameides 2009). This projected shortfall also represents about 3 percent of the expected global rice harvest of 430 million tons.

    In the face of such climatic vagaries, modern agricultural science strives to incorporate genes for adaptation — genes that were carefully selected by many generations of indigenous farmer-breeders centuries ago. Thousands of locally-adapted rice varieties (also called “landraces”) were created by farmer selection to withstand fluctuations in rainfall and temperature and to resist various pests and pathogens. Most of these varieties, however, have been replaced by a few modern varieties, to the detriment of food security.

    Until the advent of the Green Revolution in the 1960s, India was believed to have been home to about 110,000 rice varieties (Richharia and Govindasamy 1990), most of which have gone extinct from farm fields. Perhaps a few thousand varieties are still surviving on marginal farms, where no modern cultivar can grow. In the eastern state of West Bengal, about 5600 rice varieties were cultivated, of which 3500 varieties of rice were shipped to the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) of the Philippines during the period from 1975 to 1983 (Deb 2005). After an extensive search over the past fourteen years for extant rice varieties in West Bengal and a few neighboring states, I was able to rescue only 610 rice landraces from marginal farms. All others–about 5000–have disappeared from farm fields. The 610 extant rice varieties are grown every year on my conservation farm, Basudha. Every year, these seeds are distributed to willing farmers from the Vrihi seed bank free of charge.

    Vrihi (meaning “rice seed” in Sanskrit) is the largest non-governmental seed repository of traditional rice varieties in eastern India. These varieties can withstand a much wider range of fluctuations in temperature and soil nutrient levels as well as water stress than any of the modern rice varieties. This year’s monsoon delay has not seriously affected the survivorship and performance of the 610 rice varieties on the experimental farm, nor did the overabundant rainfall a few years earlier.

    Circumstances of Loss

    If traditional landraces are so useful, how could the farmers afford to lose them? The dynamics are complex but understandable. When government agencies and seed companies began promoting “miracle seeds,” many farmers were lured and abandoned their heirloom varieties. Farmers saw the initial superior yields of the high input–responsive varieties under optimal conditions and copied their “successful” neighbors. Soon, an increasing number of farmers adopted the modern, “Green Revolution” (GR) seeds, and farmers not participating in the GR were dubbed backward, anti-modern, and imprudent. Seed companies, state agriculture departments, the World Bank, universities, and national and international development NGOs (non-governmental organizations) urged farmers to abandon their traditional seeds and farming practices–both the hardware and software of agriculture. After a few years of disuse, traditional seed stocks became unviable and were thereby lost. Thus, when farmers began to experience failure of the modern varieties in marginal environmental conditions, they had no other seeds to fall back on. Their only option was, and still is, to progressively increase water and agrochemical inputs to the land. In the process, the escalating cost of modern agriculture eventually bound the farmers in an ever-tightening snare of debt. After about a century of agronomists’ faith in technology to ensure food security, farming has become a risky enterprise, with ever greater debt for farmers. Over 150,000 farmers are reported to have committed suicide between 1995 and 2004 in India (Government of India 2007), and the number grew by an annual average of 10,000 until 2007 (Posani 2009).

    The government gave ample subsidies for irrigation and fertilizers to convert marginal farms into more productive farms and boosted rice production in the first decade that GR seeds were used. Soon after, however, yield curves began to decline. After 40 years of GR, the productivity of rice is declining at an alarming rate (Pingali 1994). IRRI’s own study revealed yield decreases after cultivation of the “miracle rice variety” IR8 over a 10-year period (Flinn et al 1982). Today, just to keep the land productive, rice farmers in South Asia apply over 11 times more synthetic nitrogen fertilizers and 12.8 times more phosphate fertilizers per hectare than they did in the late 1960s (FAI 2008). Cereal yield has plummeted back to the pre-GR levels, yet many farmers cannot recall that they had previously obtained more rice per unit of input than what they are currently getting. Most farmers have forgotten the average yields of the traditional varieties and tend to believe that all traditional varieties were low-yielding. They think that the modern “high-yielding” varieties must yield more because they are so named.

    In contrast, demonstration of the agronomic performance of the 610 traditional rice varieties on Basudha farm over the past 14 years has convinced farmers that many traditional varieties can out-yield any modern cultivar. Moreover, the savings in terms of water and agrochemical inputs and the records of yield stability against the vagaries of the monsoon have convinced them of the economic advantages of ecological agriculture over chemical agriculture. Gradually, an increasing number of farmers have been receiving traditional seeds from the Vrihi seed bank and exchanging them with other farmers. As of this year, more than 680 farmers have received seeds from Vrihi and are cultivating them on their farms. None of them have reverted to chemical farming or to GR varieties.

    Extraordinary Heirlooms

    Every year, farmer-researchers meticulously document the morphological and agronomic characteristics of each of the rice varieties being conserved on our research farm, Basudha. With the help of simple equipment–graph paper, rulers, measuring tape, and a bamboo microscope (Basu 2007)–the researchers document 30 descriptors of rice, including leaf length and width; plant height at maturity; leaf and internode color; flag leaf angle; color and size of awns; color, shape and size of rice seeds and decorticated grains; panicle density; seed weight; dates of flowering and maturity; presence or absence of aroma; and diverse cultural uses.

    Vrihi’s seed bank collection includes numerous unique landraces, such as those with novel pigmentation patterns and wing-like appendages on the rice hull. Perhaps the most remarkable are Jugal, the double-grain rice, and Sateen, the triple-grain rice. These characteristics have been published and copyrighted (Deb 2005) under Vrihi’s name to protect the intellectual property rights of indigenous farmers.

    A few rice varieties have unique therapeutic properties. Kabiraj-sal is believed to provide sufficient nutrition to people who cannot digest a typical protein diet. Our studies suggest that this rice contains a high amount of labile starch, a fraction of which yields important amino acids (the building blocks of proteins). The pink starch of Kelas and Bhut moori is an essential nutrient for tribal women during and after pregnancy, because the tribal people believe it heals their anemia. Preliminary studies indicate a high content of iron and folic acid in the grains of these rice varieties. Local food cultures hold Dudh-sar and Parmai-sal in high esteem because they are “good for children’s brains.” While rigorous experimental studies are required to verify such folk beliefs, the prevalent institutional mindset is to discard folk knowledge as superstitious, even before testing it– until, that is, the same properties are patented by a multinational corporation.

    Traditional farmers grow some rice varieties for their specific adaptations to the local environmental and soil conditions. Thus, Rangi, Kaya, Kelas, and Noichi are grown on rainfed dryland farms, where no irrigation facility exists. Late or scanty rainfall does not affect the yield stability of these varieties. In flood-prone districts, remarkable culm elongation is seen in Sada Jabra, Lakshmi-dighal, Banya-sal, Jal kamini, and Kumrogorh varieties, which tend to grow taller with the level of water inundating the field. The deepest water that Lakshmi-dighal can tolerate was recorded to be six meters. Getu, Matla, and Talmugur can withstand up to 30 ppt (parts per thousand) of salinity, while Harma nona is moderately saline tolerant. No modern rice variety can survive in these marginal environmental conditions. Traditional crop varieties are often recorded to have out-yielded modern varieties in marginal environmental conditions (Cleveland et al. 2000).

    Farmer-selected crop varieties are not only adapted to local soil and climatic conditions but are also fine-tuned to diverse local ecological conditions and cultural preferences. Numerous local rice landraces show marked resistance to insect pests and pathogens. Kalo nunia, Kartik-sal, and Tulsi manjari are blast-resistant. Bishnubhog and Rani kajal are known to be resistant to bacterial blight (Singh 1989). Gour-Nitai, Jashua, and Shatia seem to resist caseworm (Nymphula depunctalis) attack; stem borer (Tryporyza spp.) attack on Khudi khasa, Loha gorah, Malabati, Sada Dhepa, and Sindur mukhi varieties is seldom observed.

    Farmers’ agronomic practices, adapting to the complexity of the farm food web interactions, have also resulted in selection of certain rice varieties with distinctive characteristics, such as long awn and erect flag leaf. Peasant farmers in dry lateritic areas of West Bengal and Jharkhand show a preference for long and strong awns, which deter grazing from cattle and goats (Deb 2005). Landraces with long and erect flag leaves are preferred in many areas, because they ensure protection of grains from birds.

    Different rice varieties are grown for their distinctive aroma, color, and tastes. Some of these varieties are preferred for making crisped rice, some for puffed rice, and others for fragrant rice sweets to be prepared for special ceremonies. Blind to this diversity of local food cultures and farm ecological complexity, the agronomic modernization agenda has entailed drastic truncation of crop genetic diversity as well as homogenization of food cultures on all continents.

    Sustainable Agriculture and Crop Genetic Diversity

    Crop genetic diversity, which our ancestors enormously expanded over millennia (Doebley 2006), is our best bet for sustainable food production against stochastic changes in local climate, soil chemistry, and biotic influences. Reintroducing the traditional varietal mixtures in rice farms is a key to sustainable agriculture. A wide genetic base provides “built-in insurance” (Harlan 1992) against crop pests, pathogens, and climatic vagaries.

    Traditional crop landraces are an important component of sustainable agriculture because their long-term yield stability is superior to most modern varieties. An ample body of evidence exists to indicate that whenever there is a shortage of irrigation water or of fertilizers–due to drought, social problems, or a disruption of the supply network– “modern crops typically show a reduction in yield that is greater and covers wider areas, compared with folk varieties” (Cleveland et al. 1994). Under optimal farming conditions, some folk varieties may have lower mean yields than high-yield varieties but exhibit considerably higher mean yields in the marginal environments to which they are specifically adapted.

    All these differences are amply demonstrated on Basudha farm in a remote corner of West Bengal, India. This farm is the only farm in South Asia where over 600 rice landraces are grown every year for producing seeds. These rice varieties are grown with no agrochemicals and scant irrigation. On the same farm, over 20 other crops, including oil seeds, vegetables, and pulses, are also grown each year. To a modern, “scientifically trained” farmer as well as a professional agronomist, it’s unbelievable that over the past eight years, none of the 610 varieties at Basudha needed any pesticides–including bio-pesticides–to control rice pests and pathogens. The benefit of using varietal mixtures to control diseases and pests has been amply documented in the scientific literature (Winterer et al. 1994; Wolfe 2000; Leung et al. 2003). The secret lies in folk ecological wisdom: biological diversity enhances ecosystem persistence and resilience. Modern ecological research (Folke et al. 2004; Tilman et al. 2006; Allesina and Pascual 2008) supports this wisdom.

    If the hardware of sustainable agriculture is crop diversity, the software consists of biodiversity-enhancing farming techniques. The farming technique is the “program” of cultivation and can successfully “run” on appropriate hardware of crop genetic and species diversity. In the absence of the appropriate hardware however, the software of ecological agriculture cannot give good results, simply because the techniques evolved in an empirical base of on-farm biodiversity. Multiple cropping, the use of varietal mixtures, the creation of diverse habitat patches, and the fostering of populations of natural enemies of pests are the most certain means of enhancing agroecosystem complexity. More species and genetic diversity mean greater complexity, which in turn creates greater resilience–that is, the system’s ability to return to its original species composition and structure following environmental perturbations such as pest and disease outbreaks or drought, etc.

    Ecological Functions of On-Farm Biodiversity

    Food security and sustainability at the production level are a consequence of the agroecosystem’s resilience, which can only be maintained by using diversity on both species and crop genetic levels. Varietal mixtures are a proven method of reducing diseases and pests. Growing companion crops like pigeonpea, chickpea, rozelle, yams, Ipomea fistulosa, and hedge bushes provide alternative hosts for many herbivore insects, thereby reducing pest pressure on rice. They also provide important nutrients for the soil, while the leaves of associate crops like pigeonpea (Cajanus cajan) can suppress growth of certain grasses like Cyperus rotundus.

    Pest insects and mollusks can be effectively controlled, even eliminated, by inviting carnivorous birds and reptiles (unless they have been eliminated from the area by pesticides and industrial toxins). Erecting bamboo “T’s” or placing dead tree branches on the farm encourages a range of carnivorous birds, including the drongo, bee eaters, owls, and nightjars, to perch on them. Leaving small empty patches or puddles of water on the land creates diverse ecosystems and thus enhances biodiversity. The hoopoe, the cattle egret, the myna, and the crow pheasant love to browse for insects in these open spaces.

    Measures to retain soil moisture to prevent nutrients from leaching out are also of crucial importance. The moisturizing effect of mulching triggers certain key genes that synergistically operate to delay crop senescence and reduce disease susceptibility (Kumar et al. 2004). The combined use of green mulch and cover crops nurtures key soil ecosystem components–microbes, earthworms, ants, ground beetles, millipedes, centipedes, pseudoscorpions, glow worms, and thrips — which all contribute to soil nutrient cycling.

    Agricultural sustainability consists of long-term productivity, not short-term increase of yield. Ecological agriculture, which seeks to understand and apply ecological principles to farm ecosystems, is the future of modern agriculture. To correct the mistakes committed in the course of industrial agriculture over the past 50 years, it is imperative that the empirical agricultural knowledge of past centuries and the gigantic achievements of ancient farmer-scientists are examined and employed to reestablish connections to the components of the agroecosystem. The problems of agricultural production that arise from the disintegration of agorecosystem complexity can only be solved by restoring this complexity, not by simplifying it with technological fixes.

    Further Reading and Resources: in situ conservation and agroecology

    References

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    Basu, P (2007). Microscopes made from bamboo bring biology into focus. Nature Medicine 13(10): 1128. http://www.nature.com/nm/journal/v13/n10/pdf/nm1007-1128a.pdf.

    Challinor A, Slingo J, Turner A and Wheeler T (2006). Indian Monsoon: Contribution to the Stern Review. University of Reading. www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/Challinor_et_al.pdf.

    Chameides B (2009). Monsoon fails, India suffers. The Green Grok. Nicholas School of the Environment at Duke University. www.nicholas.duke.edu/thegreengrok/monsoon_india.

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    Flinn JC, De Dutta SK and Labadan E (1982). An analysis of long term rice yields in a wetland soil. Field Crops Research 7(3): 201–216.

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    Leung H, Zhu Y, Revilla-Molina I, Fan JX, Chen H, Pangga I, Vera Cruz C and Mew TW (2003). Using genetic diversity to achieve sustainable rice disease management. Plant Disease 87(10): 1156–1169.

    Pingali PI (1994). Technological prospects for reversing the declining trend in Asia’s rice productivity. In: Agricultural Technology: Policy Issues for the International Community (Anderson JR, ed), pp. 384–401. CAB International.

    Posani B (2009). Crisis in the Countryside: Farmer suicides and the political economy of agrarian distress in India. DSI Working Paper No. 09-95. Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science. London. http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/DESTIN/pdf/WP95.pdf

    Richharia RH and Govindasamy S (1990). Rices of India. Academy of Development Science. Karjat.

    Note: The only reliable data are given in Richharia and Govindasamy (1990), who estimated that about 200,000 varieties existed in India until the advent of the Green Revolution. Assuming many of these folk varieties were synonymous, an estimated 110,000 varieties were in cultivation. Such astounding figures win credibility from the fact that Dr. Richharia collected 22,000 folk varieties (currently in custody of Raipur University) from Chhattisgarh alone – one of the 28 States of India. The IRRI gene bank preserves 86,330 accessions from India [FAO (2003) Genetic diversity in rice. In: Sustainable rice production for food security. International Rice Commission/ FAO. Rome. (web publication) URL: http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/y4751e/y4751e0b.htm#TopOfPage ]

    Singh RN (1989). Reaction of indigenous rice germplasm to bacterial blight. National Academy of Science Letters 12: 231-232.

    Tilman D, Reich PB and Knops JMH (2006). Biodiversity and ecosystem stability in a decade-long grassland experiment. Nature 441: 629-632.

    Winterer J, Klepetka B, Banks J and Kareiva P (1994). Strategies for minimizing the vulnerability of rice to pest epidemics. In: Rice Pest Science and Management. (Teng PS, Heong KL and Moody K, eds.), pp. 53–70. International Rice Research Institute, Manila.

    Wolfe MS (2000). Crop strength through diversity. Nature 406: 681–682.

    This article was published earlier in Independent Science News and is republished under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.

    Feature Image Credit: www.thebetterindia.com

  • Changing Socio-Economic Situation of UP over the past Decade

    Changing Socio-Economic Situation of UP over the past Decade

    Elections have been announced and UP will be crucial. Parties have been campaigning for them for at least the last 6. The media has been awash with advertisements portraying a rosy picture of UP. They needed this unprecedented blitzkrieg to overcome the negativity due to the poor of the COVID second wave. Anyway, the and the government try to present a positive image of their work. Other state governments followed the UP, to the delight of media which is garnering much revenue.

    What is the reality on the ground in UP? Farmers, workers and have been protesting. Why this protest if the situation is as rosy as is projecting? Where does lie? Citizens need to know, to make up their minds about who to vote for. Since there has been growth. Even when it is small but positive, will be visible in socio-economic parameters, like, education, longevity, etc. There will be more roads, bridges, agricultural production, and so on.

    So, it is no brainer that the last 5 years would show progress compared to the immediately preceding 5 years and the ones before that, etc.. The meaningful comparison has to be based on changes in the ratios and growth rates between the earlier period and the present one. That tells us whether matters will improve faster or stagnate. Also, comparisons with all India figures would yield a picture of where UP stands compared to other states.

    If the present regimes 5 years are compared to the 5 years earlier this would be unfair since the last two years have been unusual – hit by the pandemic and the lockdown. The economy as a whole experienced a downturn and so did UP. A meaningful comparison would be between the pre-pandemic three years and the 5 years before them.

    Growth has Decreased

    A difficulty arises regarding measuring the growth of the economy since the Indian economy’s data is suspect, especially after demonetization. A disjuncture has been created between the organized and unorganized sectors while the data is largely from the former. So, the latter goes largely unrepresented and this causes a large error in the growth rates.

    Ignoring this aspect for the moment, let us analyse the official data, assuming it to be correct. It shows that out of the 20 major states, UP’s position remains at 19 in the last 10 years. In effect, there is no relative improvement in UP’s situation at the all India level.

    This is because the official growth rate was 11.8% in 2016-17 and has fallen to 6.3% in 2018-19 before the pandemic. The decline is also visible in the real income per person. Between 2012-13 and 2016-17, it increased by 27.63%. If we take the average over three years it increased by 16.6%. Leaving out the pandemic year of 2020-21, it rose by 9.23% (including the pandemic year it was 0.43%, that is it hardly grew). Including inflation also the per-person income growth slowed down. It was 25% during 2017–21 as compared to an increase of 65% during 2012–17.

    Slower Structural Transformation

    UP’s income (GSDP) was Rs.19 lakh crore out of GDP of Rs.190 lakh crore in 2019-20 – 10% of the country’s income. But its population share is estimated at 17%. The situation has not changed in the last 5 years and that is why the per-person income capita income rank or UP remains at 19th out of the 20 major states.

    One of the factors underlying the slow growth of UP is that it has structurally not transformed as much as has happened for the country as a whole. In UP, the share of agriculture is 24% while that of services is 50%. The all-India figures are 19.7% and 54.3% respectively. So, UP’s structural transformation is lagging behind that of all of India. Since agriculture cannot grow as fast as the services sector, the state’s growth rate is bound to be less than that for the nation. This feature is also the reason for weak employment generation in UP because agriculture cannot absorb more workers, in fact, it is characterized by mechanization and disguised unemployment.

    UP employed 57.13 lakh under MGNREGS, in May 2020 which was the highest in India. This points to high rural unemployment in UP. The large scale migration of workers from other states to UP in 2020 is an indication of the weak employment generation in UP which forced many to look for work elsewhere. No wonder the state faced the biggest impact of Coronavirus in India both in terms of employment and health aspects.

    Unfortunately, data invisibilizes the unorganized sector and hence the poor. The country has suffered policy induced crisis due to demonetisation, implementation of GST, NBFC crisis and the pandemic induced lockdown. This has deeply impacted the unorganized sectors of the economy and they have suffered massive losses during 2016-17 to 2020-21. The total loss for the unorganized sector in UP is estimated at 10% of the national loss during this period and amounts to Rs. 7.1 lakh crore. That is an average loss per annum of Rs. 1.78 lakh crore. This loss is far more than what the social welfare schemes of the government give. In any case, the schemes are mired in corruption and inefficiency and do not reach everyone uniformly. So, the poor are the net losers in spite of the government schemes.

    Government’s Efforts Slowing

    Are the government schemes expanding? How much are they able to help UP develop and catch up with the other states of India?

    No doubt, the absolute budgetary expenditures rise with inflation and growth. So, on most items more is spent than in earlier years. But to know whether these expenditures will help improve the situation or not, one has to compare the expenditures as a ratio of the state’s income (GSDP). On this score, the Budget data shows:

    a) Development expenditure peaked in 2015-16 at 16.66% and declined to 13.28% in 2019-20. This signifies that development is decelerating.

    b) Non-Development expenditure rose from 6.81% in 2015-16 to 8.49% in 2018-19 and was at 7.12% in 2019-20. This reflects the expenditure on grandiose show schemes of the state government which resulted in a decline in developmental expenditures mentioned above.

    c) No wonder expenditure on Education, etc. peaked in 2016-17 at 4.21% and fell to 3.07% in 2018-19 and was at 3.3% in 2019-20. The target should have been 6% of GSDP on public education. Instead of moving towards that goal, there is retrogression.

    d) Similarly, health expenditure peaked in 2016-17 at 0.84% and fell to 0.79% in 2019-20. It should have been raised to at least 3% of GSDP and instead, it fell. The impact of this was visible during the pandemic with poor health facilities in large parts of the hinterland and unnecessary deaths.

    e) Budgetary Capital outlay peaked in 2015-16 at 5.66% and fell to 3.55% in 2019-20. This slows down infrastructure development and adversely impacts private investment.

    In brief, as the economy expands, there will be development in a state – more hospitals, schools, colleges and so on. Further, development may be skewed and leave the poor behind as is the case in recent times. The real picture becomes clear when one looks at the ratios and compares them with other states. In these respects, UP has lagged behind both its past performance and other states. The virtual campaigning required due to the spread of Omicron would marginalize the less tech-savvy parties and give BJP an advantage in painting a glorious image of itself, in spite of its recent indifferent performance.

    This article was published earlier in hwnews.in

    Feature Image Credit: www.dnaindia.com

  • Distress Migration: A case study of KBK districts in Odisha

    Distress Migration: A case study of KBK districts in Odisha

    The former districts of Koraput, Balangir and Kalahandi, also known as KBK districts, were reorganised into 8 districts of Koraput, Malkangiri, Nabarangpur, Rayagada, Balangir, Subarnapur, Kalahandi and Nuapada in 1992. These districts form the South-West part of Odisha comprising the great Deccan Plateau and the Eastern Ghats. These highland districts highly rich in mineral resources, flora and fauna remain as one of the most backward regions in Odisha

    Among the different forms of migration, distressed migrants remain the most impoverished and unrecognised. These migrants form the lowest strata of the society; disadvantaged by caste, poverty and structural inequalities. In Odisha, the underdeveloped region of KBK is one among the main sources of distressed migrants. They move to cities in search of employment and better wages, while in cities they are even more disadvantaged due to social, economic and linguistic barriers. Administrative and political apathy over their issues has only enhanced their distress.

    This paper attempts to address three questions:

    1. What are the characteristics of distressed migrants in KBK district, Odisha?
    2. What are the existing policies of the state to curb this form of migration?
    3. What form of government intervention is required to address this distress?

    The analysis is carried out through a review of published articles, government reports, e-books and newspaper reports.

    Defining distress migration

    Migration is a multifaceted concept driven by diverse factors. Migration can be internal or international, voluntary or involuntary, temporary or permanent. Depending on the pattern and choice of migration, each migratory trend could be characterised into different forms. Distress migration is one such form of migration.

    Involuntary migration is often associated with displacement out of conflict, environmental distress, climatic change etc. That is any sudden threat or event forces people to migrate. However, involuntary migration may also arise out of socio-economic factors such as poverty, food insecurity, lack of employment opportunities, unequal distribution of resources etc. This component of involuntary migration is addressed by the concept of distress migration (Avis, 2017).

    To understand distressed rural-urban migration in India, the broad definition used by Mander and Sahgal (2010) in their analysis of rural-urban migration in Delhi can be employed. They have discussed distress migration as:

    “Such movement from one’s usual place of residence which is undertaken in conditions where the individual and/or the family perceive that there are no options open to them to survive with dignity, except to migrate. Such distress is usually associated with extreme paucity of alternate economic options, and natural calamities such as floods and drought. But there may also be acute forms of social distress which also spur migration, such as fear of violence and discrimination which is embedded in patriarchy, caste discrimination, and ethnic and religious communal violence” ( Mander and Sahgal, 2010)

    In brief, the definition states that distress migration is caused by an array of issues. Environmental disasters, economic deprivation, gender or social oppression, lack of alternate employment opportunities and inability to survive with dignity are mentioned as the main drivers of distress migration (Avis, 2017).

    Thus, distress migration is a form of temporary migration driven by environmental and socio-economic factors and not based on an informed or voluntary choice.

    Profile of KBK districts

    The former districts of Koraput, Balangir and Kalahandi, also known as the KBK districts, were reorganised into 8 districts of Koraput, Malkangiri, Nabarangpur, Rayagada, Balangir, Subarnapur, Kalahandi and Nuapada in 1992. These districts form the South-West part of Odisha comprising the great Deccan Plateau and the Eastern Ghats. These highland districts highly rich in mineral resources, flora and fauna remain as one of the most backward regions in Odisha. The region is termed backward on account of rural backwardness, high poverty rates, low literacy rates, underdeveloped agriculture and poor development of infrastructure and transportation (Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 2021).

    The districts are home to primitive tribal communities such as Gonds, Koyas, Kotias etc. dependent on forest produce and subsistence agriculture for a living. KBK region registered a workforce participation rate of 48.06 % in the 2011 census. There was a significant occupation change noticed from the 2011 census.  The region witnessed a fall in cultivators from 33% in 2001 to 26.7% in 2011. However, the fall in cultivators was compensated with an increase in agricultural labourers from 44.24 % in 2001 to 48.87% in 2011. Employment in household industries also witnessed a downfall between the period of 2001 to 2011 (Sethy, 2020).

    The rise in agricultural labourers has a negative impact on the communities. As agriculture is underdeveloped owing to the arid nature of the region, crop failure, extreme calamities, low net irrigated area and falling government expenditure, these workers are pushed into abject poverty. In search of alternate employment options, these workers migrate to other areas of employment in rural or urban pockets. Such a form of seasonal migration during the lean period in agriculture is a predominant phenomenon in these districts. Their dependence on non-timber forest produce is hindered by the rapid deterioration and deforestation of forests for development projects and mining.

    Characteristics of distressed migrants in KBK region

    1. Who Are These Distressed Migrants?

    In the KBK region, distress migration has been a popular coping strategy during lean periods of agriculture. And this strategy is majorly adapted by disadvantaged and marginalised sections of the region. They are disadvantaged by caste, chronic poverty, landlessness, low levels of literacy and skills, increased dependence on forest and agriculture and debt-ridden (Meher, 2017; Mishra D.K., 2011; Tripathy, 2015, 2021).

    1. Why Do They Migrate

    Distressed migration in the region is induced by many interlinked factors. One such factor is that the region is highly under-developed in terms of social and economic infrastructure. Such under-development puts the communities at a disadvantage with low levels of literacy and skills. Their dependence on agriculture and forest produce for livelihood rises. However, agriculture is under-developed and forests are subjected to high levels of deforestation. With low levels of income, crop failure and non-availability of alternate employment opportunities, the communities are subjected to absolute levels of poverty, food and employment insecurities (Kujur, 2019).

    Landlessness is also identified as one significant push factor. As the region is highly dominated by tribal communities, they are more attached to and dependent on the forest cover. Globalisation and industrialisation resulted in deforestation and encroachment of farmlands for industrial and mining purposes. Eventually, a major proportion of land remains with a smaller group of wealthy people (Mishra D.K., 2011).   Relocation and involuntary displacement also result in the loss of their livelihood that is dependent on the local environment (Jaysawal & Saha, 2016).

    With falling income, people approach local moneylenders to meet their basic sustenance needs. With low incomes from agriculture and forest produce, families approach these informal creditors to meet emergency needs like marriage, birth and death rituals or medical treatment as well as to meet basic consumption needs with the expectation of cash flow from labour contractors during the lean season. Moneylenders exploit them by charging higher interest rates. Thus, the non-availability of formal credit facilities pushes them into a debt trap and further to adopt migration (KARMI, 2014; Mishra D.K., 2016).

    The region is also subject to extreme calamities and drought. Small and marginal farmers, poor in income and land, choose to migrate as they are unable to cope with the regular droughts and climate change. A study on historical analysis of the effect of climate on migration in Western Odisha mentions that the migratory trend saw a rise after the mega drought in 1965. Up until then, large-scale migration from the region was not a phenomenon (Panda, 2017).

     

    1. Channel of Migration

    Sardars provide an advance amount and in exchange, the debtor or any family member agrees to work for them for a stipulated period, usually six months. Hence, there exists a form of debt bondage. Large-scale family migration through this system is seen in the KBK region. The major stream of such bonded labour migration is witnessed towards brick kilns in Andhra Pradesh

    In the region, seasonal migration occurs through the channels of agents, locally known as Sardars, on a contractual basis. This form of migration is known as Dadan labour migration. The poor migrant labourers are known as Dadan and they are recruited by Sardars, who are usually local people who are familiar with residents in the region (KARMI, 2014). During the period of Nukhai, they go around the villages and contact prospective labourers. These Sardars are the intermediary between the employer and the migrant labourer. Sardars provide an advance amount and in exchange, the debtor or any family member agrees to work for them for a stipulated period, usually six months. Hence, there exists a form of debt bondage. Large-scale family migration through this system is seen in the KBK region. The major stream of such bonded labour migration is witnessed towards brick kilns in Andhra Pradesh. They are also a major source of labour in the areas of construction, handlooms and other forms of informal sector work across South India (Daniels, 2014). The problems they face in the destination are manifold. They are subjected to poor working conditions, poor housing and sanitation facilities and limited access to education and health facilities. They are recognised as cheap labour with limited bargaining power owing to their social, cultural and linguistic exclusion in the destination state. Upon entering the contract their freedom to move and freedom to express is denied (Acharya, 2020).

    1. Pull Factors to Migrate

    The hope of availability of better job opportunities and wages is the main pull factor. However, upon the analysis of the nature of migration, push factors have a higher weightage in inducing such distress migration. Migration to brick kilns and other informal sectors from the KBK region can be termed as distress migration as in this case, distress is caused mainly by socioeconomic factors. It is not an informed or voluntary choice. Debt migration remains the only coping strategy that they could adopt.

    Government intervention to curb such distress

    1. Policies Addressing Debt-Bondage Migration:

    The first attempt of the state government to address Dadan migration or debt migration is the enactment of the Dadan Labour (Control and Regulation) Act (ORLA) in 1975. The act had provisions for the registration of labourers and agents, ensuring compliance of minimum wages and favourable working conditions and appointing inspection officers and dispute redressal committees (Daniels, 2014).  However, the act remained on paper and no evidence of enactment was published until it was repealed in 1979 upon the enactment of the Interstate Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979 (Nanda, 2017).

    The ISMW act has been criticised to be inadequate and failing to regulate and facilitate safe migration. According to the act, only those interstate migrant workmen who are recruited by licensed agents come under the ambit of the act. However, most agents involved in Dadan migration are not licensed and hence, these workers cannot avail of any of the provisions of the act (Singh, 2020). Though registration of labour contractors is mandatory in the origin state, there is no information about the names of these contractors and hence, further monitoring of the migration process is avoided (NCABL, 2016). Lack of adequate enforcement, under-staffing and poor infrastructure are identified as the reasons for poor implementation of the act in the state (Daniels, 2014).

    A positive attempt against distress migration was the Memorandum of Undertaking (MoU) initiated between the labour department of Odisha and Andhra Pradesh to ensure labour welfare measures of migrant workers in Brick Kilns. After the MoU, the state of undivided Andhra Pradesh took up various progressive measures in education, health, housing and PDS for migrant workers in Brick Kilns. ILO necessitated the need for states to enter into inter-state MoUs to effectively address the bonded labour migration. However, no further MoU was signed with other states like Tamil Nadu, Chhattisgarh etc. which are also among the major host states for migrants from the region (NCABL, 2016).

    The Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act enacted in 1976 governs the provisions for identification, rescue and rehabilitation of bonded labourers across the country. The act has its loopholes in implementation. There is no information on whether vigilance committees have been set up in every district or whether the surveys have been periodically conducted or to what extent the act has been functioning in the state (Post News Network, 2019). The centrally sponsored scheme for Rehabilitation of Bonded Labour also has its setbacks. There have been reported cases of delay and denial of financial aid by district officials ( Mishra .S., 2016). In 2016, with restructuring and revamping of the Rehabilitation scheme, rescued workers could only avail the full amount of financial aid with the prosecution of the accused employers. With no database on the employer, the rates of prosecution have been low and the rescued bonded labour do not receive their funds (NACBL, 2016)

    1.  Ensuring Accessibility of Health Facilities in Destination

    The Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana or RSBY launched by the central government in 2008 provides health insurance to BPL families. The scheme incorporates provisions to split smart cards so those migrant workers could avail health insurance in destination states. After signing of the MoU between Andhra Pradesh and Odisha, the two states took steps to spreading awareness among the migrant workers about how to use the smart cards (Inter-State Migrant Workman Act (ISMW), Labour Directorate, n.d.)

    1. Ensuring Education of Migrant Workers Children

    The state of Odisha has established seasonal hostels to ensure the education of children of migrant workers.  The children are enrolled in seasonal hostels during October-June, that is until their parents return home (Odisha Primary Education Programme Authority, n.d.).  The state has ensured the education of migrant children at their destination state by sending Odiya textbooks and Odiya teachers to residential schools in Andhra Pradesh (Inter-State Migrant Workman Act (ISMW), Labour Directorate, n.d.).

    1. Alternate Employment Opportunities: MGNREGA

    Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) was introduced in 2006 to provide guaranteed employment to rural poor with the objective of uplifting them from poverty and restricting distress migration.  A study analysing the performance of MGNREGA through secondary sources of data suggests that based on physical criteria of 100 Days of Wage Employment, Person-days generated, ST and Women person-days and financial performance in terms of total expenditure, total wages, average cost and average wage rate per day person, the performance of MGNREGA in KBK districts is better compared to Non- KBK districts.  But the region is lagging in rural employability criteria based on average days of employment provided per household and job cards issued (Sahoo et al., 2018).  Labour in the region is not interested to work under MGNREGA due to its dismal implementation in the state. Workers complain about the delay in receiving payments and instances of the creation of non-existent workers’ names among MGNREGA’s beneficiaries (KARMI, 2014).  Uncertain and low wages make these labourers favour migration to Brick Kilns in hope of better wages (Deep, 2018).

    1. Development Policies in KBK Region

    The KBK region has a high incidence of poverty owing to regional disparities in development and social exclusion based on caste. The main initiatives implemented by the state government for the upliftment of the KBK region are the Special Area Development Programme, Revised Long Term Action Plan (RLTAP), Biju KBK Plan, Backward Regions Grants Fund, Gopabandhu Gramin Yojana (GGY), Special Central Assistance (SCA) for tribal sub-plan (TSP) areas, Western Odisha Development Council (WODC) and Grants under Article 275(1) of the Constitution. Development projects to reduce poverty and regional disparities are obstructed by economic, social and institutional factors (Mishra, 2020).

     

    The state of Odisha has done positive interventions in the education of migrant children and health facilities of the migrant population. However, the distress migration is still prevalent owing to the social and economic exclusion and debt bondage situations in the region. Land grabbing in the name of development left the tribal communities poor and in distress. Structural inequalities induced by caste discrimination are enhanced with such landlessness.

     

     

     

    Policy Recommendations

    The state of Odisha has done positive interventions in the education of migrant children and health facilities of the migrant population. However, the distress migration is still prevalent owing to the social and economic exclusion and debt bondage situations in the region. Several initiatives and schemes have been enacted to address distress migration; however, their failure in reducing distress can be linked to dismal governance, poor implementation and misappropriation of schemes.

    The state must ensure migration to be safe and a viable coping strategy. From this study it is suggested the state of Odisha follow a multipronged approach to address the distress.

    Origin state (Odisha) interventions

    •         Short Term Interventions:
    1. The system of debt bondage should be completely abolished by the proper implementation of legislation. Different loopholes in implementation such as the delay in the release of funds, prosecution of accused and identification and registration of middlemen should be addressed. Apart from the financial aid, the state should intervene in providing a comprehensive livelihood plan for the rescued labourers. Abolishing the bonded labour system is essential to reduce distress and make migration safe.
    2. Informal sources of credit should be eliminated and formal credit and microfinance facilities should be made available. Such facilities would reduce the exploitation and prevent the creation of absurd debt. Formal credit provides opportunities for small and marginal farmers to indulge in productive investments. This enables them to cope with extreme climatic changes.
    3. Land grabbing in the name of development left the tribal communities poor and in distress. Structural inequalities induced by caste discrimination are enhanced with such landlessness. The provision of land ownership enables the communities to enjoy land-based benefits which further supports them to sustain their livelihood. Ownership of land also provides the indigenous community with a sense of social and economic significance.
    •         Long term interventions
    1. The state should engage in enhancing the skills of the people in the region. Vocational skill training and development schemes can be introduced. This could expand the opportunities available for employment and distribute labour across all the economic sectors.
    2. Rural development should be given higher priority. The state of Odisha has already initiated many schemes for the development of the KBK region. However, the state should study the economic and social factors that stagnate the process of development in the region. Chronic poverty, poor infrastructural and rural connectivity and dismal education and health facilities are some of the important areas that require attention.

    Host state intervention

    1.   The host state needs to create a database of migrants entering their state. A statistically significant database on migrants solves a huge array of issues faced by the migrant in the destination state. A comprehensive database helps in identifying and recognising migrants. It also allows for understanding the different characteristics of migrants and the sectors in which they are employed. This would be beneficial for monitoring and ensuring safe and favourable working conditions. A database also helps in ensuring the availability and accessibility of social security and entitlements in host states.

     

    1.   Migrant labour is as important to the destination state as it is to the origin state. Both origin and host state should cooperate towards making migration a viable livelihood strategy.

    Another important area where both the origin and host state should intervene together is creating awareness among workers about the existing provisions and rights available to them. Access to the same should be made easy.

    Conclusion

    The highly backward districts of the KBK region remain a major source of distressed migrants. Years of state initiative in reducing distress have had negligible impact. The area remains underdeveloped and migration is the only viable choice of employment. Migration can only be a viable coping strategy for seasonal migrants when the channel of migration is made legal and safe. The major drawback in any initiative attempted to resolve distress is the poor implementation. Administrative apathy, corruption and misappropriation of schemes have stagnated the progress of every initiative.

     

    References

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    2. Avis, W. R. (2017). Scoping study on defining and measuring distress migration.
    3. Bhatta Mishra, R. (2020). Distress migration and employment in indigenous Odisha, India: Evidence from migrant-sending households. World Development136, 105047.
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    24. Sahoo, M., Pradhan, L., & Mishra, S. (2018). MGNREGA and Labour Employability-A Comparative Analysis of KBK and Non-KBK Regions of Odisha, India. Indian Journal of Economics and Development6(9), 1-8.
    25. Sethy, P. (2020). Changing Occupational Structure of Workers in KBK Districts of Odisha. Center for Development Economic6(06), 17-28.
    26. Singh, V. K. (2020, April 22). Opinion | The ‘nowhere people’ of COVID-19 need better legal safeguards. The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/the-nowhere-people-of-covid-19-need-better-legal-safeguards/article31400344.ece
    27. Tripathy, S. N. (2015). Evaluating the role of micro-finance in mitigating the problems of distress out-migrants: A study in KBK districts of Odisha. The Micro Finance Review, Journal of the Centre for Micro Finance Research.
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  • Bonded Labour in India: Prevalent, Yet Overlooked

    Bonded Labour in India: Prevalent, Yet Overlooked

    In 1976, India stood out as the first country in South Asia to enact legislation prohibiting bonded labour. However, the system has not been uprooted owing to the different barriers posed by socio-cultural norms and administrative and legislative incompetency. The country’s most vulnerable and disadvantaged sections of society are at risk of being trapped into such a form of modern slavery. The prevalence of this system over the decades necessitates the need to understand the root causes of the emergence of such bonded labour situations and why it is still prevalent in the country.

    Bonded labour in India

    The Bonded Labour System Abolition Act (1976) defines a bonded labour system as a relationship evolved out of a debtor-creditor agreement. It is identified as a form of forced labour where the debtor comes into an agreement, oral or written, with the creditor and receives a loan amount in exchange for his labour or that of his family members. The obligation need not just be an economic consideration such as a loan or an advance amount received from the creditor. People also become bonded with social, customary, hereditary or caste obligations and often agree to enter service with no wages or for nominal wages. The labourer finds it difficult to settle the debt amount as the provided wages are too low even to meet their basic sustenance needs. Eventually, they end up in the same form of labour again and again. Thus their choice to join such a system is out of distress or coercion to some extent. They may also be restricted from switching to another job or to ask for the provision of minimum wages given the conditions of the contract and the lack of awareness of their rights.

    Indebtedness is identified as a major trigger for people to join as bonded labour, especially migrants from poor rural households. However, the need for money arises out of the existing disadvantages in society that these communities are subjected to. Caste, unequal distribution of resources, increased dependence on agriculture, low levels of education and food insecurity pushes them into such unfree labour choices.

    We can identify that this system was prevalent in the country from the pre-colonial era characterised by class hierarchies. Such class hierarchies and high caste exploitations are continuing to function even in this democratic era and consequently, has pushed certain groups of the society to be economically weaker; weak in terms of assets, income and bargaining power. Globalisation and industrialisation have only resulted in the further exclusion of such groups of labour from mainstream jobs.  Indebtedness is identified as a major trigger for people to join as bonded labour, especially migrants from poor rural households. However, the need for money arises out of the existing disadvantages in society that these communities are subjected to. Caste, unequal distribution of resources, increased dependence on agriculture, low levels of education and food insecurity pushes them into such unfree labour choices. Owing to these social and economic factors, marginalised communities in the lower strata of the society, especially the women and children, are trapped in such a system.

    Over the years, the system of bonded labour has existed and evolved under different names and forms across India. Bonded labour arising out of traditionally accustomed social relations is one of the oldest forms and is still prevalent in the country. For example, the system of “jajamani” wherein the workers receive food grains in exchange for working as barbers and washermen for the upper caste. Labourers in agriculture, seasonal inter and intrastate migrants and child labour in informal sectors of brick kiln, rice mills, quarries, domestic work etc. are the other areas where debt bondage is currently more persistent. There has been a considerable shift from traditional debt bondage relation to aneo-bondage labour system among migrant workers. The former was characterised by an element of patronage amongst the considerable amount of exploitation. However the latter is at a higher tone of exploitation and eliminates patronage relations. This has made employers deny the responsibility of employee’s welfare and the labourers have lost the minimum livelihood security which they had secured under the patronage system. The neo-bondage system is further manipulated by the role of intermediaries.

    Thus, with structural transformation in the economy, the system of bonded labour has evolved into a much worse form of exploitation in the country and specifically marginal and backward communities are the main victims of this system.

    Interventions to abolish bonded labour

    Upon identifying the prevalence and exploitation of bonded labour in the pre-independence era, constitutional provisions prohibiting forced labour were assigned under Article 23. Under the Directive Principle of State Policy, Article 42 and 43 ensured fair and humane working conditions and living wages to workers.

    Post-independence, legislation against bonded labour was enacted at a regional level.  Orissa, Rajasthan and Kerala were the first states to enact state legislation against bonded labour.  In 1954, India ratified the International labour organization (ILO) Convention on forced labour (C029). Despite the constitutional provisions, regional and international interventions in bonded labour, construction and implementation of a uniform law took time.

    In 1976, the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act was enacted to abolish any form of bonded labour system arising out of debt, customary or hierarchical obligations. In brief, the act has identified and defined bonded labour, provided for extinguishment of past or existing debt, established duties of district magistrate in implementing the provisions of the act, sanctioned the state governments to form a vigilance committee in each district to guide and ensure competent implementation of the act by the magistrate and stated the penal actions against those compelling people into bonded labour. The act was amended in 1985 to bring contract and migrant workers under its ambit.

    In 1978, a new centrally sponsored scheme for Rehabilitation of Bonded Labour was enacted to provide financial assistance to the state government for rehabilitating rescued bonded labourers, to conduct surveys, evaluation studies and awareness campaigns across districts. In 2016, the government restructured the scheme. The restructuring involved an increase in the provision of funds to bonded labour for rehabilitation and to states for conducting surveys. Under the restructured scheme, rescued bonded labour is only provided with the full amount of financial assistance after the conviction of the accused and a Bonded Labour Rehabilitation Fund corpus was to be created at every district.

    The interplay of caste-based exploitation and subsequent impoverishment in terms of resources and assets combined with underdeveloped rural areas devoid of standard education, health and employment opportunities push marginalised people into bonded labour.

    Why and how does the system still sustain?

    Many factors contributing to the prevalence of bonded labour continue to prevail despite after years of legislative action to abolish the same. The interplay of caste-based exploitation and subsequent impoverishment in terms of resources and assets combined with underdeveloped rural areas devoid of standard education, health and employment opportunities push marginalised people into bonded labour. Such an environment accompanied by the inept implementation of legislations and schemes further aids in sustaining bonded labour systems.

    BLS(A) act 1976 failed to be effectively implemented owing to apathy, corruption, lack of administrative and political will. The vigilance committees were often defunct and working for the employer. The act was criticised on the grounds that it stated only mediocre and minor punitive actions and the rates of prosecution were also low. Moreover, some states remain in denial of accepting the existence of bonded labour. This indifference results in the loss of comprehensive data on bonded labour hindering the further implementation of provisions of the act.

    The Central Sector Scheme for Rehabilitation of Bonded Labour also has its loopholes. After the restructuring of the scheme, financial aid is provided only after the accused is convicted and convictions are rare owing to poor implementation of the BLS(A) Act and the absence of a review of cases. Thus, in most cases the rescued labourers do not receive the full financial aid they are entitled to immediately after the rescue. Often, it takes years to receive the full amount or may not even receive any.

    The situation is even grave as the rescued labourers have asymmetric knowledge of the rights and entitlements they can avail themselves of. Even when they are fully aware, most of them lack the will to attain these entitlements due to the dismal behaviour of officials and delayed processes.

    Moving towards Abolishment

    First and foremost, recognition and acceptance of the prevalence of bonded labour should be ensured. Only then the bonded labourers could be identified, rescued and rehabilitated effectively. The collection of comprehensive data is essential for further implementation of the provisions of the legislation. Also apart from the vigilance committee, a new committee composed of the magistrate, members of the marginalised communities, NGO’s and other civil bodies working in the field would enable to get a more comprehensive view of the issues in the sector.

    From a long term perspective, there is a need to address the caste induced structural inequalities. One way through which this could be attained is through land redistribution.

    Mere financial aid is not sufficient for the rescued labourers to foster a livelihood plan. The Human rights law network suggests the same and recommends a comprehensive rehabilitation package providing for education and job security.

    From a long term perspective, there is a need to address the caste induced structural inequalities. One way through which this could be attained is through land redistribution. Apart from this, the government should also focus on skill development and training of rural poor, especially migrants caught up in bonded labour. Varied skills can enhance their employment opportunities and provide more freedom to move towards other areas of work.

     

     

    References

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    17. THE BONDED LABOUR SYSTEM (ABOLITION) ACT, 1976. (ACT NO. 19 OF 1976). (India). https://labour.gov.in/sites/default/files/TheBondedLabourSystem(Abolition)Act1976.pdf

     

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