The Peninsula Foundation

Category: New World Order

  • What International Order?

    What International Order?

    The recently concluded BRICS summit confirms the process of inevitable transformation of the international order. The US-led West, since the fall of the USSR, has increasingly demonstrated intolerance to their view of the world. The ongoing conflicts in UKraine and Gaza has exposed their duplicity and the entire Global South have come to realise the anamolies in international order and the so-called rules-based system. The West’s unabashed support to Israel’s genocide and babarism in Gaza, despite their peoples’ opposition makes the claims of democracy and humanism in the West sound hollow. Thierry Meyssan dealt incisively with this duplicity of the West, primarily the Ango-Saxon powers, in his speech last year in Magdeburg (Germany), at the conference organized by the magazine Compact, “Amitie avec la Russie”, on November 4, 2023.

    We reproduce the text of Thierry Meyssan’s speech, translated by Roger Lagasse’, and published earlier in voltairenet.org

    In it, he explains what, in his view, constitutes the fundamental difference between the two conceptions of the world order now clashing from the Donbass to Gaza: that of the Western bloc and that to which the rest of the world refers. The question is not whether this order should be dominated by one power (unipolar) or by a group of powers (multipolar), but whether or not it should respect the sovereignty of each. He draws on the history of international law, as conceived by Tsar Nicholas II and Nobel Peace Prize winner Léon Bourgeois.

    – Team TPF

    BRICS Summit 2024 in Kazan, Russia, October 23,2024. Sputnik . Photo hosting agency brics-russia2024.ru

    What International Order?

    Thierry Meyssan

    We’ve seen NATO’s crimes, but why affirm our friendship with Russia? Isn’t there a risk of Russia behaving tomorrow like NATO does today? Are we not substituting one form of slavery for another?

    To answer this question, I would draw on my successive experience as advisor to five heads of state. Everywhere, Russian diplomats have told me: you’re on the wrong track: you’re committed to putting out one fire here, while another has started elsewhere. The problem is deeper and broader.

    I would therefore like to describe the difference between a world order based on rules and one based on international law. This is not a linear story, but a struggle between two worldviews – a struggle we must continue.

    In the 17th century, the Treaties of Westphalia established the principle of state sovereignty. Each is equal to the others, and no one may interfere in the internal affairs of others. For centuries, these treaties governed relations between the present-day Länder, as well as between European states. They were reaffirmed by the Congress of Vienna in 1815 when Napoleon I was defeated.

    On the eve of the First World War, Tsar Nicholas II convened two International Peace Conferences (1899 and 1907) in The Hague to “seek the most effective means of assuring all peoples the benefits of a real and lasting peace”. Together with Pope Benedict XV, he prepared them on the basis of canon law, not the law of the strongest. After two months of deliberation, 27 states signed the final proceedings. The president of the French Radical [Republican] Party, Léon Bourgeois, presented his thoughts [1] on the mutual dependence of states and their interest in uniting despite their rivalries.

    At the instigation of Léon Bourgeois, the Conference created an International Court of Arbitration to settle disputes by legal means rather than by war. According to Bourgeois, states would only agree to disarm when they had other guarantees of security.

    The final text instituted the notion of “the duty of States to avoid war”… by resorting to arbitration.

    At the instigation of one of the Tsar’s ministers, Frédéric Fromhold de Martens, the Conference agreed that, during armed conflict, populations and belligerents must remain under the protection of the principles resulting from “the usages established between civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience”. In short, the signatories undertook to stop behaving like barbarians.

    This system only works between civilized states that honour their signatures and are accountable to public opinion. It failed, in 1914, because states had lost their sovereignty by entering into defense treaties that required them to go to war automatically in certain circumstances that they could not assess for themselves.

    Léon Bourgeois’s ideas gained ground, but met with opposition, including from his rival in Georges Clemenceau’s Radical Party. Clemenceau did not believe that public opinion could prevent wars. Nor did the Anglo-Saxons, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and British Prime Minister Lloyd George. At the end of the First World War, these three men substituted the might of the victors for the fledgling international law. They shared the world and the remnants of the Austro-Hungarian, German and Ottoman empires. They blamed Germany alone for the massacres, denying their own. They imposed disarmament without guarantees. To prevent the emergence of a rival to the British Empire in Europe, the Anglo-Saxons began to pit Germany against the USSR, and secured France’s silence by assuring her that she could plunder the defeated Second Reich. In a way, as the first President of the Federal Republic, Theodor Heuss, put it, they organized the conditions for the development of Nazism.

    As they had agreed among themselves, the three men reshaped the world in their own image (Wilson’s 14 points, the Sykes-Picot agreements, the Balfour Declaration). They created the Jewish homeland of Palestine, dissected Africa and Asia, and tried to reduce Turkey to its minimum size. They organized all the current disorders in the Middle East.

    Yet it was on the basis of the ideas of the late Nicholas II and Léon Bourgeois that the League of Nations (League) was established after the First World War, without the participation of the United States, which thus officially rejected any idea of International Law. However, the League also failed. Not because the United States refused to join, as some say. That was their right. But firstly, because it was incapable of re-establishing strict equality between states, as the United Kingdom was opposed to considering colonized peoples as equals. Secondly, it did not have a common army. And finally, because the Nazis massacred their opponents, destroyed German public opinion, violated the Berlin signature and did not hesitate to behave like barbarians.

    As early as the Atlantic Charter in 1942, the new U.S. President, Franklin Roosevelt, and the new British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, set themselves the common goal of establishing a world government at the end of the conflict. The Anglo-Saxons, who imagined they could rule the world, did not, however, agree amongst themselves on how to go about it. Washington did not wish London to meddle in its affairs in Latin America, while London had no intention of sharing the hegemony of the Empire over which “the sun never set”. During the war, the Anglo-Saxons signed numerous treaties with Allied governments, including those in exile, which they hosted in London.

    Incidentally, the Anglo-Saxons failed to defeat the Third Reich, and it was the Soviets who overthrew it and took Berlin. Joseph Stalin, First Secretary of the CPSU, was opposed to the idea of a world government, and an Anglo-Saxon one at that. All he wanted was an organization capable of preventing future conflicts. In any case, it was Russian conceptions that gave birth to the system: that of the United Nations Charter, at the San Francisco conference.

    In the spirit of the Hague Conferences, all UN member states are equal. The Organization includes an internal tribunal, the International Court of Justice, responsible for settling disputes between its members. However, in the light of previous experience, the five victorious powers have a permanent seat on the Security Council, with a veto. Given that there was no trust between them (the Anglo-Saxons had planned to continue the war with the remaining German troops against the USSR) and that it was unknown how the General Assembly would behave, the various victors wanted to ensure that the UN would not turn against them (the USA had committed appalling war crimes by dropping two atomic bombs against civilians, while Japan… was preparing its surrender to the Soviets). But the great powers did not understand the veto in the same way. For some, it was a right to censor the decisions of others; for others, it was an obligation to take decisions unanimously.

    Except that, right from the start, the Anglo-Saxons didn’t play ball: an Israeli state declared itself (May 14, 1948) before its borders had been agreed, and the UN Secretary-General’s special envoy to oversee the creation of a Palestinian state, Count Folke Bernadotte, was assassinated by Jewish supremacists under the command of Yitzhak Shamir. Moreover, the seat on the Security Council allocated to China, in the context of the end of the Chinese Civil War, was given to Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang and not to Beijing. The Anglo-Saxons proclaimed the independence of their Korean zone of occupation as the “Republic of Korea” (August 15, 1948), created NATO (April 4, 1949), and then proclaimed the independence of their German zone of occupation as “Federal Germany” (May 23, 1949).

    The USSR considered itself fooled, and slammed the door (“empty seat” policy). The Georgian Joseph Stalin had mistakenly believed that the veto was not a right of censure, but a condition of unanimity of the victors. He thought he could block the organization by boycotting it.

    The Anglo-Saxons interpreted the text of the Charter they had drafted and took advantage of the Soviets’ absence to place “blue helmets” on the heads of their soldiers and wage war on the North Koreans (June 25, 1950) in the “name of the international community” (sic). Finally, on August 1, 1950, the Soviets returned to the UN after an absence of six and a half months.

    The North Atlantic Treaty may be legal but NATO’s rules of procedure violate the UN Charter. It places the Allied armies under Anglo-Saxon command. Its Commander-in-Chief, the SACEUR, is necessarily an American officer. According to its first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, the Alliance’s real aim was neither to preserve the peace nor to fight the Soviets, but to “keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans under control” [2]. In short, it was the armed wing of the world government that Roosevelt and Churchill wanted to create. It was in pursuit of this goal that President Joe Biden ordered the sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipeline linking Russia and Germany.

    At the Liberation, MI6 and OPC (the future CIA) secretly set up a stay-behind network in Germany. They placed thousands of Nazi leaders in this network, helping them to escape justice. Klaus Barbie, who tortured French Resistance coordinator Jean Moulin, became the first commander of this shadow army. The network was then incorporated into NATO, where it was greatly reduced. It was then used by the Anglo-Saxons to interfere in the political life of their supposed allies, who were in reality their vassals.

    Joseph Goebbels’ former collaborators created the Volksbund für Frieden und Freiheit. With the help of the USA, they persecuted German communists. Later, NATO’s stay-behind agents were able to manipulate the extreme left to make it detestable. A case in point is the Bader gang. But as these men were arrested, the stay-behind came and murdered them in prison, before they could stand trial and speak out. In 1992, Denmark spied on Chancellor Angela Merkel on NATO instructions, just as in 2022, Norway, another NATO member, helped the USA sabotage Nord Stream…

    Returning to international law, things gradually returned to normal, until in 1968, during the Prague Spring, the Ukrainian Leonid Brezhnev did in Central Europe what the Anglo-Saxons were doing everywhere else: he forbade the USSR’s allies to choose an economic model other than their own.

    With the dissolution of the USSR, things began to get worse. The US Undersecretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, drew up a doctrine according to which, to remain masters of the world, the United States had to do everything in its power to prevent the emergence of a new rival, starting with the European Union. It was in application of this idea that Secretary of State James Baker imposed the enlargement of the European Union to include all the former states of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR. By expanding in this way, the Union deprived itself of the possibility of becoming a political entity. It was again in application of this doctrine that the Maastricht Treaty placed the EU under NATO’s protection. And it is still in the application of this doctrine that Germany and France are paying for and arming Ukraine.

    Then came Czech-US professor Josef Korbel. He proposed that the Anglo-Saxons should dominate the world by rewriting international treaties. All that was needed, he argued, was to substitute Anglo-Saxon law, based on custom, for the rationality of Roman law. In this way, in the long term, all treaties would give the advantage to the dominant powers: the United States and the United Kingdom, linked by a “special relationship”, in the words of Winston Churchill. Professor Korbel’s daughter, Democrat Madeleine Albright, became Ambassador to the UN, then Secretary of State. Then, when the White House passed into Republican hands, Professor Korbel’s adopted daughter, Condoleeza Rice, succeeded her as National Security Advisor, then Secretary of State. For two decades, the two “sisters” [3]patiently rewrote the main international texts, ostensibly to modernize them, but in fact to change their spirit.

    Today, international institutions operate according to Anglo-Saxon rules, based on previous violations of international law. This law is not written in any code, since it is an interpretation of custom by the dominant power. Every day, we substitute unjust rules for International Law and violate our own signature.

    For example:

    • When the Baltic States were created in 1990, they made a written commitment to preserve the monuments to the sacrifices of the Red Army. The destruction of these monuments is therefore a violation of their own signature.
    • Finland made a written commitment in 1947 to remain neutral. Joining NATO is therefore a violation of its own signature.
    • On October 25, 1971, the United Nations adopted Resolution 2758 recognizing Beijing, not Taiwan, as the sole legitimate representative of China. As a result, Chiang Kai-shek’s government was expelled from the Security Council and replaced by that of Mao Zedong. Consequently, China’s recent naval manoeuvres in the Taiwan Strait do not constitute aggression against a sovereign state, but the free deployment of its forces in its own territorial waters.
    • The Minsk agreements were intended to protect Russian-speaking Ukrainians from harassment by “integral nationalists”. France and Germany vouched for them before the Security Council. But, as Angela Merkel and François Hollande have said, neither of them had any intention of implementing them. Their signatures are worthless. If it had been otherwise, there would never have been a war in Ukraine.

    The perversion of International Law reached a peak with the appointment, in 2012, of the American Jeffrey Feltman as Director of Political Affairs. From his office in New York, he oversaw the Western war on Syria. Using the institutions of peace to wage war [4].

    Until the United States threatened it by stockpiling weapons on its border, the Russian Federation respected all the commitments it had signed or that the Soviet Union had signed. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obliges the nuclear powers not to spread their nuclear arsenals around the world. The United States, in violation of its signature, has been stockpiling atomic bombs in five vassal countries for decades. They train allied soldiers in the handling of these weapons at the Kleine Brogel base in Belgium, the Büchel base here in Germany (Rhineland-Palatinate), the Aviano and Ghedi bases in Italy, the Volkel base in the Netherlands and the Incirlik base in Turkey.

    Then they say, by virtue of their coups de force, that this has become the custom.
    Now, the Russian Federation, considering itself under siege after a US nuclear bomber flew over the Gulf of Finland, has also played with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and installed atomic bombs on the territory of Belarus. Of course, Belarus is not Cuba. Placing Russian nuclear bombs there changes nothing. It’s just a message sent to Washington: if you want to re-establish the Law of the Strongest, we can accept that too, except that, from now on, we’re the strongest. Note that Russia has not violated the letter of the Treaty, as it is not training the Belarusian military in these weapons, but it has taken liberties with the spirit of the Treaty.

    As Léon Bourgeois explained in the last century, to be effective and lasting, disarmament treaties must be based on legal guarantees. It is therefore urgent to return to international law, failing which we will plunge headlong into a devastating war.

    Our honour and our interest lie in re-establishing international law. It’s a fragile construction. If we want to avoid war, we must re-establish it, and we can be sure that Russia thinks as we do, that it will not violate it.

    Or we can support NATO, which brought its 31 defence ministers together in Brussels on October 11 to listen to their Israeli counterpart announce, via videoconference, that he was going to raze Gaza to the ground. And none of our ministers, including Germany’s Boris Pistorius, dared to speak out against the planning of this mass crime against civilians. The honour of the German people has already been betrayed by the Nazis, who ultimately sacrificed you. Don’t let yourselves be betrayed again, this time by the Social Democratic Party and the Greens.

    We don’t have to choose between two overlords, but to protect peace, from the Donbass to Gaza, and, ultimately, to defend International Law.

     

    Source: “What international order?”, by Thierry Meyssan, Translation Roger Lagassé, Voltaire Network, 7 November 2023, www.voltairenet.org/article219965.html

    Republished under Creative Commons CC-BY-NC-ND

    Feature Image Credit: ‘Imagine a World free from the Oppression of a US-led global Order’ – www.scmp.com

     

  • China has achieved escape velocity: it is now unstoppable

    China has achieved escape velocity: it is now unstoppable

    The 21st century is shaping up to be the Asian, Eurasian, and Chinese century.

    While the Hegemon spent at least $7 trillion – and counting – on unwinnable Forever Wars, China is spending $1 trillion in an array of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects across the Global South: the emphasis is digital/transportation connectivity corridors. Geoeconomic imperatives intertwined with rising geopolitical influence.

    The four-day, twice-a-decade plenum of the Communist Party of China that took place last week in Beijing, designing an economic road map all the way to 2029, was a stunning affair in more ways than one.

    Let’s start with continuity – and stability. There’s no question after the plenum that Xi Dada, or The Big Panda, will stay on the helm until 2029 – the end of the current five-year economic drive.

    And if Xi is healthy enough, he will stay until 2035: the fateful and uber-game-changing target year for China to exhibit a GDP per capita of $30,000, with massive worldwide reverberations.

    Here, we see the confluence between the progression of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” and the defining contours, if not of a Pax Sinica, at least of the non-Hegemon-centric, multi-nodal world (italics mine).

    The proverbial U.S. Think Tankland/Sinophobia axis has been hysterical on China not being able to sustain a 5% a year growth rate for the next few years – the target once again stressed at the plenum.

    The Chinese themselves have not bothered about the growth rate for a long time, since in 2018 they switched to a strategy of so-called qualitative development, that is, not at the expense of traditional industries, but on the basis of high technologies and the creation of new areas, such as the production of new energy sources and artificial intelligence.

    A Russian analysis by the Center for Geopolitical Forecasts makes a crucial point: “The Chinese themselves have not bothered about the growth rate for a long time, since in 2018 they switched to a strategy of so-called qualitative development, that is, not at the expense of traditional industries, but on the basis of high technologies and the creation of new areas, such as the production of new energy sources and artificial intelligence.”

    That’s the rationale behind Made in China 2025 – which is being implemented at breakneck speed: high-tech development leading the way towards a “high-level socialist market economy”, to be consolidated by 2025 and fully constructed by 2035.

    The next step will be to attain the status of “modernized socialist power” by 2049, at the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

    The plenum proved once more that “socialism with Chinese characteristics” – or, for the recalcitrant, Chinese-modified capitalism – is “people-centric”. The supreme values are national interest and the people’s interests – attested by the fact that large private corporations remain under the strategic control of the CPC.

    It’s idle to try to find in the final communique at the end of the plenum any restrictions on private capital on the path to “universal prosperity”. The key point is that the role of capital should always be subordinated to the concept of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”.

    Watch the reform ship steadily sailing

    Everything is explained here in nearly didactic terms, chronicling the birth of the “Decision of the CPC Central Committee on further comprehensive deepening of reforms to promote Chinese modernization”.

    What is now already referred to colloquially all across China as “The Decision” spreads across 15 parts and 60 articles, divided into three main sections, proposing more than 300 important reforms.

    “The Decision”, in full, has not yet been published; only the road map of how Beijing planners got there. Of course, this is no mere policy paper; it’s a quintessentially CPC-style dissertation in which the details of economic and political measures are obscured by clouds of images and metaphors.

    Take a look, for instance, at this passage:

    “To ensure that the reform ship sails forward steadily, the ‘Decision’ proposes that further comprehensive deepening of reform must implement the “six principles”: adhere to the party’s overall leadership, adhere to the people-centred approach, adhere to the principle of maintaining the integrity and promoting innovation, adhere to system building as the main line, adhere to the comprehensive rule of law, and adhere to a systematic approach.”

    Most of the “Decision” – 6 parts in a total of 13 – is about economic reform. Will China pull it off? Of course, it will.

    Just look at the precedents. In 1979, the Little Helmsman Deng Xiaoping started to transform a nation of farmers and peasants into a well-oiled machine of efficient industrial workers. Along the way, GDP per capita was multiplied by no less than 30 times.

    Now, the ramifications of Made in China 2025 are turning a nation of factory workers into a nation of engineers. Of 10,5 million university graduates a year, a third are engineers.

    The emphasis on AI has led, among other examples, to the automobile industry being able to produce a $9,000 EV in complete automation and make a profit. China is already a global leader in EVs (BYD building plants in Brazil, Thailand, Turkey, Hungary), solar power, drones, telecom infrastructure (Huawei, ZTE), steel, shipbuilding – and soon, also semiconductors (thank you, Trump sanctions).

    While the Hegemon spent at least $7 trillion – and counting – on unwinnable Forever Wars, China is spending $1 trillion in an array of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects across the Global South: the emphasis is digital/transportation connectivity corridors. Geoeconomic imperatives intertwined with rising geopolitical influence.

    Hegemon hysteria aside, the fact is the Chinese economy will grow by a whopping $1.7 trillion only in 2024. That is more than in all but the last three years – because of the Covid effect.

    And Beijing borrowed exactly zero yuan for this growth. The U.S. economy, by comparison, may grow by $300 billion in 2024, but Washington had to borrow $3.3 trillion for that to happen.

    Researcher Geoff Roberts has compiled a very useful list of what China is doing right.

    And when it comes to the nitty gritty, the numbers are staggering. Here are just a few, apart from GDP growth:

    • Foreign goods trade is up 6.1% to $2.9 trillion year-on-year.
    • The trade surplus is at $85 billion, up 12% compared to 2023.
    • ASEAN trade is up by 10.5% to $80 billion; China is the number one trade partner of individual ASEAN members.
    • China had a record crop of 150 million tons of cereal grains.
    • The courier sector handled 80 billion parcels, up 23% year-on-year.
    • SMIC is the world’s number two pure-play foundry after Taiwan’s TSMC.
    • China Telecom paid $265 million for 23% of QuantumCTek, the patenter of Micius, the world’s first quantum communications satellite.
    • Commercial aerospace launched 39% of China’s 26 rockets.
    • Invention patents rose 43% to 524,000. China is the first country with 4 million domestic invention patents in force.
    • Baidu’s 1,000 robotaxis in Wuhan will break even in Q4 and will be profitable next year.
    • China has 47% of the world’s top AI talent. It added no less than 2000 AI courses to school and college curricula since 2019.
    • On world-class institutions doubling as research leaders, 7 out of 10 are Chinese, including the top one: the Chinese Academy of Sciences, ahead of Harvard.

    Exceptionalist China “experts” believe their own fantasy that the U.S. allied with occupied Japan, Germany and South Korea would be able to match and surpass China’s pull with the Global Majority, because they have more resources and more capital.

    Nonsense. Even more nonsense is to believe that the Hegemon’s NATO “partners” – as in vassals – will follow the leader in creating cutting-edge technology.

    The high-speed train that matters has already left the station. The 21st century is shaping up to be the ‘Asian, Eurasian, and Chinese’ century.

     

    Feature Image Credit: The Diplomat

    The article is republished from the Strategic Culture Foundation.

  • The Perils and Promise of the Emerging Multipolar World

    The Perils and Promise of the Emerging Multipolar World

    The world economy is experiencing a deep process of economic convergence, according to which regions that once lagged the West in industrialisation are now making up for lost time.

    We are therefore entering a post-hegemonic, multipolar world.

    The World Bank’s release on May 30 of its latest estimates of national output (up to the year 2022) offers an occasion to reflect on the new geopolitics. The new data underscore the shift from a U.S.-led world economy to a multipolar world economy, a reality that U.S. strategists have so far failed to recognize, accept, or admit.

    The World Bank figures make clear that the economic dominance of the West is over. In 1994, the G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, U.K., U.S.) constituted 45.3% of world output, compared with 18.9% of world output in the BRICS countries (Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Russia, South Africa, United Arab Emirates). The tables have turned. The BRICS now produce 35.2% of world output, while the G7 countries produce 29.3%.

    As of 2022, the largest five economies in descending order are China, the U.S., India, Russia, and Japan. China’s GDP is around 25% larger than the U.S.’ (roughly 30% of the U.S. GDP per person but with 4.2 times the population). Three of the top five countries are in the BRICS, while two are in the G7. In 1994, the largest five were the U.S., Japan, China, Germany, and India, with three in the G7 and two in the BRICS.

    The core U.S.-led alliance, which includes the U.S., Canada, U.K., European Union, Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, was 56% of world output in 1994, but now is only 39.5%. As a result, the U.S. global influence is waning.
    As the shares of world output change, so too does global power. The core U.S.-led alliance, which includes the U.S., Canada, U.K., European Union, Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, was 56% of world output in 1994, but now is only 39.5%. As a result, the U.S. global influence is waning. As a recent vivid example, when the U.S.-led group introduced economic sanctions on Russia in 2022, very few countries outside the core alliance joined. As a result, Russia had little trouble shifting its trade to countries outside the U.S.-led alliance.
    The world economy is experiencing a deep process of economic convergence, according to which regions that once lagged the West in industrialization in the 19th and 20th centuries are now making up for lost time. Economic convergence actually began in the 1950s as European imperial rule in Africa and Asia came to an end. It has proceeded in waves, starting first in East Asia, then roughly 20 years later India, and for the coming 20-40 years in Africa.

    These and some other regions are growing much faster than the Western economies since they have more “headroom” to boost GDP by rapidly raising education levels, boosting workers’ skills, and installing modern infrastructure, including universal access to electrification and digital platforms. The emerging economies are often able to leapfrog the richer countries with state-of-the-art infrastructure (e.g., fast intercity rail, 5G, modern airports and seaports) while the richer countries remain stuck with aging infrastructure and expensive retrofits. The IMF’s World Economic Outlook projects that the emerging and developing economies will average growth of around 4% per year in the coming five years, while the high-income countries will average less than 2% per year.

    It’s not only in skills and infrastructure that convergence is occurring. Many of the emerging economies, including China, Russia, Iran, and others, are advancing rapidly in technological innovations as well, in both civilian and military technologies.

    China’s capacity for innovation and low-cost production is underpinned by enormous R&D spending and its vast and growing labor force of scientists and engineers.

    China clearly has a large lead in the manufacturing of cutting-edge technologies needed for the global energy transition, including batteries, electric vehicles, 5G, photovoltaics, wind turbines, fourth generation nuclear power, and others. China’s rapid advances in space technology, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and other technologies is similarly impressive. In response, the U.S. has made the absurd claim that China has an “overcapacity” in these cutting-edge technologies, while the obvious truth is that the U.S. has a significant under-capacity in many sectors. China’s capacity for innovation and low-cost production is underpinned by enormous R&D spending and its vast and growing labor force of scientists and engineers.

    Despite the new global economic realities, the U.S. security state still pursues a grand strategy of “primacy,” that is, the aspiration of the U.S. to be the dominant economic, financial, technological, and military power in every region of the world. The U.S. is still trying to maintain primacy in Europe by surrounding Russia in the Black Sea region with NATO forces, yet Russia has resisted this militarily in both Georgia and Ukraine. The U.S. is still trying to maintain primacy in Asia by surrounding China in the South China Sea, a folly that can lead the U.S. into a disastrous war over Taiwan. The U.S. is also losing its standing in the Middle East by resisting the united call of the Arab world for recognition of Palestine as the 194th United Nations member state.

    Yet primacy is certainly not possible today, and was hubristic even 30 years ago when U.S. relative power was much greater. Today, the U.S. share of world output stands at 14.8%, compared with 18.5% for China, and the U.S. share of world population is a mere 4.1%, compared with 17.8% for China.
    The trend toward broad global economic convergence means that U.S. hegemony will not be replaced by Chinese hegemony. Indeed, China’s share of world output is likely to peak at around 20% during the coming decade and thereafter to decline as China’s population declines. Other parts of the world, notably including India and Africa, are likely to show a large rise in their respective shares of global output, and with that, in their geopolitical weight as well.

    We are therefore entering a post-hegemonic, multipolar world. It too is fraught with challenges. It could usher in a new “tragedy of great power politics,” in which several nuclear powers compete—in vain—for hegemony. It could lead to a breakdown of fragile global rules, such as open trade under the World Trade Organization. Or, it could lead to a world in which the great powers exercise mutual tolerance, restraint, and even cooperation, in accord with the U.N. Charter, because they recognize that only such statecraft will keep the world safe in the nuclear age.

     

    This article was published earlier in commondreams

    Feature Image Credit: The World Financial Review

  • Xi Jinping: Assessing his Foreign Policy

    Xi Jinping: Assessing his Foreign Policy

    All foreign policies must aim at attaining purpose, credibility, and efficiency. Purpose defines the main objectives that the country wishes to achieve through its international relations. Credibility comes from international recognition of its actions in this field. And efficiency allows implementation, at the lowest possible cost, of the desired purpose. These three notions, although interwoven and influencing each other, keep their own specificity.

             How does Xi Jinping’s foreign policy qualify in these three areas?

    Purpose

    Its purpose, in tune with that of the Chinese Communist Party before his arrival to power, is sufficiently clear. By 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic, China should have achieved a prominence commensurate to its glorious past. According to former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, China marches towards the perception of its global destiny with a clear strategy in mind. Such destiny is none other than the resurrection of its historical glory (Rudd, 2017). Projects such as the Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation, Made in China 2025, and the Belt and Road Initiative, converge in defining concrete goals that lead in that direction. This includes China’s “Great Unification” with Taiwan, the consolidation of a hegemonic position within the South China Sea, making China the epicentre of an Asian-led world economic order, and creating a global infrastructure and transportation network with China at its head. Xi Jinping visualizes the next ten to fifteen years as a window of opportunity to shift China’s correlation of power with the United States. Hence, Beijing seeks the convergence of energies and political determination towards this window of opportunity. The strategic compass of Xi’s foreign policy could not be more precise. Few countries show a clearer sense of its purpose.

    Credibility

             His foreign policy credibility presents a more mixed result. Vis-à-vis the Western World and several of its neighbours, China’s credibility is at a very low point. However, the situation is different in relation to the Global South, where Xi’s foreign policy promotes four interconnected initiatives to expand China’s influence. Besides the Belt and Road, whose objective is creating a China-led global infrastructure and transportation network, there is also the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative. The first, the Global Development Initiative, aims to contrast the unequal distribution of benefits that characterize the West-led development projects with the inclusiveness and balanced nature of this China-led multilateral development project [Hass, 2023]. The other two initiatives, global security and global civilization, present rational and balanced options clearly differentiated from America’s overbearing approach to these areas. In the former case, China’s proposal promotes harmonious solutions to differences among countries through dialogue and consultation [Chaziza, 2023]. The Global Civilization Initiative, on its side, fosters cooperation and interchange between different civilizations, whereby the heterogeneity of cultures and the multiplicity of identities is fully respected [Hoon and Chan, 2023].

    The Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka is one of thousands project that China has helped finance in recent years – Image Credit: The Brussels Times (The so-called China’s debt-trap is a narrative trap).

           However, three dark areas emerge in Beijing’s credibility with respect to the Global South. Number one is the frustration prevailing in many of these smaller and underdeveloped nations, resulting from the contradiction between China’s openness as a lender and its severity as a creditor. This has given rise to the suspicion of a hidden agenda on its part and has led to the coining of the phrase “debt trap diplomacy”. Number two derives from the arrogance shown by Beijing towards the rights of several of its weakest neighbours, disregarding international law. This seems to delineate a tributary vision of its relations with them. Although this only affects China’s neighbourhood, it projects a haughtiness that contradicts its formulations about a more harmonious, equitable and inclusive world order. Number three is the apparent contradiction between Beijing’s proclamation regarding the value of the heterogeneity of cultures and the diversity of identities and its treatment of non-Han Chinese minorities at home. A feature susceptible to reproducing itself abroad. All the above generates a distance between words and deeds that casts a shadow of doubt concerning China’s sincerity. Hence, even within the Global South, China’s credibility shows a mixed result.

    Efficiency

    Finally, there is the area of efficiency. It is a very complex one, particularly given China’s over-ambitious purpose. It must be said that until 2008, Beijing succeeded in rising as a significant power without alarming neighbours or the rest of the world. It even attained the geopolitical miracle of doing so without alarming the United States. Indeed, few countries have made such a systematic and conscious effort to project a constructive international image as China has done to this date. This included the notion of “peaceful rise”, which implied a path different from that followed by Germany before World War I and Japan during World War II when they tried to overhaul the international political landscape. China’s path, on the contrary, relied upon reciprocity and the search for mutual benefit with other countries. It was a brilliant soft power marketing strategy that gave China huge goodwill dividends (Cooper Ramo, 2007).

    “Observe carefully; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership” – Deng Xioping

    Regarding its reunification with Taiwan, it relied on “one country, two systems” and the economic benefits of their interconnection as the obvious means to propitiate their joining together. Regarding its maritime disputes in the South China Sea, after having deferred the resolution of this issue to a more propitious moment, it proposed a Code of Conduct to handle it in the least contentious possible manner. In general, similar approach was evident in Beijing’s handling of various contentious issues.  Beijing’s leadership followed Deng Xiaoping’s advice to his successors: “Observe carefully; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership” (Kissinger, 2012, p. 441).

    “Like Europe, it has many twenty-first century qualities. Its leaders preach a doctrine of stability and social harmony. Its military talks more about soft than hard power. Its diplomats call for multilateralism rather than unilateralism. And its strategy relies more on trade than war to forge alliances and conquer new parts of the world” – Mark Leonard on China in 2008

    Writing in 2008, before the change towards a more assertive foreign policy materialized, Mark Leonard said about China: “Like Europe, it has many twenty-first century qualities. Its leaders preach a doctrine of stability and social harmony. Its military talks more about soft than hard power. Its diplomats call for multilateralism rather than unilateralism. And its strategy relies more on trade than war to forge alliances and conquer new parts of the world” (Leonard, 2008, p. 109). This phrase encapsulates well how China was perceived worldwide, including by the Western World. Not surprisingly, a 2005 world survey on China by the BBC stated that most countries in five continents held a favourable view of that nation. Even more significant was the fact that even China’s neighbours viewed it favourably (Oxford Analytica, 2005). It was a time when all doors opened to China.

    2008 represented a turning point. The convergence of several events that year changed China’s perception of its foreign policy role, making it more assertive. Among such events the most significant was the global economic crisis of 2008, the worst crisis since 1929, resulting from America’s financial excesses; other important events were the sweeping efficiency with which China avoided contagion; the fact that China’s economic growth was the fundamental factor in preserving the world from a major economic downturn; and the boost to Chinese self-esteem after the highly successful Beijing Olympic games of that year. In sum, the time in which China had to keep hiding its strengths seemed to have ended.

    Although this turning point materialized under Hu Jintao, changes accelerated dramatically after Xi Jinping’s ascend to power. He not only sharpened the edges of the country’s foreign policy but made it more aggressive, even reckless. Xi’s eleven years’ tenure in office has translated into a proliferation of international trouble spots. His overreach and overbearing style misfired, generating a concerted and strong reaction against China. As a result, the costs linked to attaining China’s purpose have skyrocketed. This deserves a more detailed analysis of China’s foreign policy efficiency under Xi.

    Intimidatory policies and actions

             Xi Jinping’s intimidatory policies and actions on international affairs have been extensive, bringing with them immense resistance.

    After dusting off a plan that had remained on paper for years, Xi decided to build seven artificial islands on top of the South China Sea coral reefs. After assuring President Obama they would not be militarized, he proceeded otherwise. Contravening international maritime law, he assigned 12 nautical miles of Territorial Sea and 200 miles of Exclusive Economic Zone to these artificial outposts.

    Under the protection of the People’s Liberation Navy, an oil rig was built in the waters claimed by Vietnam as its EEZ. Disrespecting the International Court of Justice’s ruling about the Philippines’ waters in the South China Sea, China has forcefully enforced its exclusionary presence in them. China’s Coast Guard is now authorized to use lethal force against foreign vessels operating within maritime areas under its jurisdiction claims. This, notwithstanding that China’s claimed jurisdiction, goes far beyond what is recognized by the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea or the International Court of Justice while disputed by several other countries.

    The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began to ignore the median line in the Taiwan Strait, which it had respected for decades. Frequent and increasingly bold incursions within Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone and reiterated calls to the PLA to prepare for war in Taiwan have become the new normal. The Senkaku-Diaoyu islands, disputed with Japan, have been declared one of China’s core interests, thus closing the door to a negotiated solution. This has translated into the systematic incursion of Chinese maritime law enforcement ships and planes into the territorial and contiguous maritime space of these islands, currently occupied by Japan. Beijing unilaterally imposed an Air Defence Identification Zone over two-thirds of the East China Sea, forcing foreign aircraft to identify themselves under threat of “defensive measures” by the PLA Air Force.

             Since 2017, China has reneged on the quite borders with India and engaged in a series of border skirmishes. It has resorted to intrusions into border regions under dispute resulting in a major skirmish in Ladakh with significant casualties, the first since 1987. In 2023, China released an official standard map showing India’s state of Arunachal Pradesh in Northeast India and Askai Chin plateau in the Indian territory of Ladakh in the west, as official parts of its territory, despite India’s objections. At the same time, it renamed 11 places in Arunachal Pradesh with Chinese names. When South Korea decided to deploy the US Army’s THAAD (Terminal High-Altitude Area Defence) ballistic missile defence, as protection against the growing North Korean threat, China put in motion an economic boycott of South Korean products and services. When Australia and New Zealand protested against Chinese interference in their domestic political systems, Beijing openly threatened to impose economic sanctions on governments or private actors criticising China’s behaviour. A few years later, it effectively banned most Australian exports when Canberra proposed an international scientific investigation on the origins of COVID-19. When Canada detained Huawei’s heiress, Meng Wanzhou, answering an American judicial request, Beijing jailed and presented accusations against two Canadian businessmen based in China (releasing them hours after Meng was released).

    Antagonizing Americans and Europeans

             Xi’s rhetoric in relation to the U.S. has been highly aggressive. Reversing the terms of Deng Xiaoping’s advice to his successors to hide China’s strengths while bidding for right time, Xi has alerted America about its intent to challenge and displace it as the foremost power soon. He has repeatedly referred; to the primacy of China in the emerging world order as its most important objective, to the next ten to fifteen years as the inflexion point when a change in the correlation of power between the two countries should be taking place, to the need to overcome the U.S.’ technological leadership, to the necessity for the PLA to ready itself to wage and win wars, and to the next ten years as a time of confrontation and dangerous storms.

    Xi Jinping starts his European tour in Paris on May6, 2024, his first in five years as China-EU trade relation have hit a low. Picture Source: Sky News.

             China’s actions have also antagonized the Europeans. These relate to China’s refusal to use the term “invasion” when referring to Russia’s actions in Ukraine; supporting the arguments provided by Russia concerning the causes of the war; placing the responsibility of the conflict on the US and the NATO; abstaining from voting in the U.N. on the West’s resolutions against Russia; demonstrating its strong strategic relations with Russia that is described as “partnership without limits”; the conduct of military exercises with Russia while war rages on in Ukraine; and providing indirect support for Russia’s war effort through surveillance drones, computer chips, and other critical components for its defence industry. Though all of the above are sovereign decisions of China, Europe, as China’s major trading partner, expects some support to their position and a neutral approach to the conflict from China.

    For the most part, Beijing’s above foreign policy actions were duly accompanied by a bellicose so-called “wolf warrior diplomacy”. It aggressively reacted to perceived criticism of the Chinese government.

    Domestic actions impacting its Image Abroad

    However, with its aggressive display in the international arena, some domestic actions have negatively permeated abroad. Brushing aside Deng Xiaoping’s commitment to respect Hong Kong’s autonomy for a period of fifty years, Xi reclaimed complete jurisdiction over such territory since his arrival to power. Within a process of actions and reactions, accelerated by the progressive strangulation of Hong Kong’s liberties, Beijing finally imposed a National Security Law over the territory. This ended the Hong Kong Basic Law, which guaranteed its autonomy. By burying the principle of “one country, two systems” established by Deng, Beijing was, at the same time, closing out any possibility of Taiwan’s willing accession to the People’s Republic. Henceforward, only force may accomplish that result.

    On the other hand, the brutal Sinicization of Xinjiang Province has shaken the liberal conscience of Western countries, with particular reference to Europe. The Uyghur population re-education camps have been compared to the Soviet’s Gulag. Beijing’s combative reaction to any foreign criticism in this regard, has compounded China’s image crisis in Europe.

    Any remaining trace of the so-called peaceful emergence of China has completely disappeared under Xi Jinping. Under his rudder, China has brought to the limelight a revisionist and tributary vision of the international order. Not surprisingly, interwoven policies and decisions emanating from different geographical points have been converging to contain China. In an unnecessary way, Beijing under Xi has been instrumental in multiplying the barriers to realising its purpose.

    Keeping China at bay

    The number of initiatives to keep China at bay has multiplied. Its list includes the following. The U.S., Japan, Australia and India created a strategic quadrilateral forum known as the Quad, which is none other than a factual alliance aimed at the containment of China. More formally, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States gave birth to a strategic military alliance with the same goal. On its side, Japan and Australia signed a security cooperation agreement.

    Leaving aside its restrained post-war defence policy, Japan doubled its defence budget to 2 per cent of its GDP. This will transform Japan to number three position worldwide regarding military expenditure, just behind the U.S. and China. Within the same context, Japan and the U.S. established a joint command of its military forces while agreeing to create a shared littoral force equipped with the most modern anti-ship missiles. Meanwhile, Japan is set to arm itself with state-of-the-art missiles. Overcoming their longstanding mutual mistrust, Japan and South Korea, jointly with the U.S., established a trilateral framework to promote a rules-based Indo-Pacific region. On the same token, Japan, the Philippines, and the U.S. held a first-ever trilateral summit aimed at defence cooperation and economic partnership. They pledged to protect freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China and East China Seas. Several joint naval exercises have taken place in the South China Sea to defend the principle of freedom of navigation, with France participating in the latest one.

    After several fruitless years of attempting to mollify China’s position concerning their maritime dispute in the South China Sea, the Philippines decided to renew its Mutual Defence Treaty with the U.S., which had elapsed in 2016. Meanwhile, most Southeast and East Asian countries on China’s periphery are rapidly increasing their military spending while  still continuing to support the U.S. security umbrella. Although pledging to remain neutral, even Vietnam, a traditional de facto ally of China, decided to upgrade its diplomatic relations with Washington to the highest level.

    America’s several decades policy of “strategic ambiguity” in relation to Taiwan evaporates as a result of China’s increasing threats and harassment to the island. On top of unambiguous support to Taipei by the President and the Congress, the Pentagon has formulated a military doctrine for  Taiwan’s defence in case of invasion. The idea of defending Taiwan if invaded is also taking shape in Japan.

    The European Union adhered to the U.S., the United Kingdom and Canada in sanctioning the Chinese authorities involved in human rights abuses in Xinjiang (the first such European sanction since Tiananmen in 1989). Equally, and for the same reasons, the European Parliament refused to ratify the long-time negotiated investment agreement between China and the European Union. China’s aggressive reaction to such a decision only toughened the European position further. Significantly, European contacts with Taiwan have increased as its democratic nature, and China’s harassment of it are providing a new light on the subject. In that context, the European Parliament officially received Taiwan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs.

    A gigantic containment Bloc

    France and Germany sent warships to navigate the South China Sea in defiance of Beijing’s claimed ownership of 90 per cent of the Sea. NATO’s updated “Strategic Concept” document, which outlines primary threats to the alliance, identified China for the first time as a direct threat to its security: “The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values (…) It strives to subvert the rules-based international order, including in the Space, Cyber and Maritime domains (…)The deepening strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests” (NATO, 2022). Not surprisingly, NATO’s last summit included the heads of state and governments of Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea.

    As a result of Xi Jinping’s actions and policies, China is now being subjected to a gigantic geostrategic containment force—a true block integrated by nations and organizations from four continents. For a country like China, which traditionally identified with political subtlety and enjoyed universal goodwill until not so long ago, this change in its strategic environment is not a small development. Xi’s calculations that acting boldly had become possible as China was powerful enough, its economy big enough, its neighbours dependent on it, and the U.S. resolve as uncertain have proved wrong and grossly misfired. At this point, China’s conundrum might leave China with few options short of war. According to former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, the 2020s have become the “decade of living dangerously”, as, within it, a war between China and the U.S. will most probably erupt (Rudd, 2022, chapter 16).

    In sum

    An evaluation of Xi Jinping’s foreign policy, using the notions of purpose, credibility, and efficiency as bases, would present the following result. Its purpose is crystal clear, which translates into a high mark. Credibility, on its part, shows mixed results: Not entirely unsatisfactory nor satisfactory. In terms of efficiency, though, Xi Jinping has openly failed. The lack of efficiency associated with his outreach adversely affects the attainment of China’s foreign policy purpose, creating countless barriers to its fulfilment. This lack of efficiency affects the country’s credibility as well. The downturn has been dramatic when comparing the current situation of China’s foreign policy to the one that prevailed before 2008 and, more precisely, to Xi Jinping’s ascension to power.

     

     

    References:

    Chaziza, M. (2023) “The Global Security Initiative: China’s New Security Architecture for the Gulf”, The Diplomat, May 5.

    Cooper Ramo, J. (2007). Brand China. London: The Foreign Policy Centre.

    Hass, R. (2023) “China’s Response to American-led ‘Containment and Suppression’”, China Leadership Monitor, Fall, Issue 77.

    Hoon, C.Y. and Chan, Y.K., (2023) “Reflections on China’s Latest Civilisation Agenda”, Fulcrum, 4 September.

    Kissinger, H. (2012). On China. New York: Penguin Books.

    Leonard, M. (2008). What Does China Think? New York: Public Affairs.

    NATO (2022). “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept”, June 29.

    Oxford Analytica (2005). “Survey on China”, September 20th.

    Rudd, K. (2022). The Avoidable War. New York: Public Affairs.

    Rudd, K. (2017). “Xi Jinping offers a long-term view of China’s ambitions”, Financial Times, October 23.

     

    Feature Image: bloomberg.com – Xi Jinping on visit to Belgrade, Serbia on 07 May 2024 (Xi says China will “never forget” the U.S. bombing of its Embassy)

  • The United States as an Empire in Decline: A Talk by Jeremy Kuzmarov

    The United States as an Empire in Decline: A Talk by Jeremy Kuzmarov

    The Peninsula Foundation organised a webinar titled ” World Order Turmoil: The Reality of American Empire” on the 19th of January 2024. The main talk was given by the Chief Guest Jermey Kuzmarow and further comments was provided by the Discussant, Mohan Guruswamy. The event led to excellent discussions with critical comments from both the speakers. The discussions were moderated by Air Marshal M Matheswaran, President-TPF.

    Jeremy Kuzmarov is Managing editor of CovertAction Magazine and author of five books on U.S. foreign policy. His website can be accessed here. Mohan Guruswamy is our Governing Council member and a Distinguished Fellow and a prolific writer on economics, security, and geopolitics.

     

    Given below is the text of jeremy Kuzmarow’s talk, along with questions and answers.

     

    (Source: tunnelwall.blogspot.com)

    In September, I attended a talk sponsored by the Tulsa Committee on Foreign Relations by an inside-the-beltway pundit named Ali Wyne, a former senior fellow at the pro-NATO Atlantic Council and David Rockefeller fellow at the elitist Trilateral Commission.

    Wyne told the audience in so many words that the sun had not yet set on the American empire; that the Biden administration was outmaneuvering the evil Putin in Ukraine; and that the U.S. was still a beacon of hope for the rest of humanity.

    Toward the end, Wyne personalized the talk, discussing how his family had migrated to the U.S. from Pakistan with nothing, and that through hard work he was able to achieve the American dream.

    But Wyne seemed oblivious to the fact that that dream is increasingly unreachable for the majority of people in an increasingly stratified society marred by a decline in civilian manufacturing and public services and skyrocketing education costs.

    Wyne also failed to point out that the American dream historically was achieved at the expense of Third World nations that were looted by U.S. corporations, and by endless wars that killed millions of people.

    Wyne’s delusional worldview is underscored in a new book by Fadi Lama, Why the West Can’t Win: From Bretton Woods to a Multipolar World (Atlanta: Clarity Press, 2023), which shows that the American Century has ended and that a new multipolar world order has been established in which economic dynamism lies primarily in the East.

    Lama is an international adviser for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and geopolitical consultant with a Ph.D. in mechanical engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech).

    He points out at the beginning of his book that in 1500, prior to the era of Western colonialism, there was a relatively fair political-economic world order with a close equilibrium between population and wealth generation. But by the end of World War II, the West accounted for only 30% of global population but 60% of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

    When many colonized nations gained their independence, the West imposed a neo-colonial framework that enabled their resources to be exploited by Western multinational corporations.

    Some countries on the front lines of the Cold War, such as West Germany, Japan and South Korea, were allowed unhindered development as part of a geopolitical strategy designed to keep them within the Western orbit and curb the advance of Communism. However, being pseudo-independent states, when the political necessity was removed, they were cut back to size.

    The liberation of China in the 1949 Communist-led revolution (an event known in the U.S. as the “loss of China”) was a historical turning point that began to reverse the Western monopolization of wealth and power and set the stage for the re-empowerment of the Global South.

    By 2017, China—known as the “sick man of Asia” in the 19th century following its de facto colonization of Great Britain following the Opium War—was the world’s number one economy with its real goods production amounting to 24% of global real goods production.

    Under CCP leadership, China regained its sovereignty and lifted 770 million people out of poverty, with homelessness now being practically non-existent.

    According to Lama, China’s staggering economic success resulted from a centralized political system in which commercial banking was dominated by the public sector. Central bank financial and monetary policies were further put under the control of the Chinese government, which implemented policies serving the national interest rather than those of the Western financial oligarchy.

    China’s economic success contrasts markedly with the growing economic stagnation in Western countries and the U.S. resulting from the neo-liberal economic model in which the private sector is elevated above the public sector.

    By 2014, the top 0.1% in the U.S. owned as many assets as the bottom 90%, an obscene inequality ratio accompanied by a dramatic rise in poverty, which had been reduced massively in China under more socialist-oriented policies.

    China’s superior state-centric economic model is currently being followed by Russia which has withstood record U.S. sanctions under Vladimir Putin’s leadership through a renewed commitment to economic autarky (self-sufficiency) and investment in local industries and technologies.

    Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. strategic planners saw a golden opportunity to reduce Russia’s status to that of a fourth-rate power and to enable the plunder of its bountiful natural resources.

    The overzealous policies backfired, however, pushing Russia into alliance with China that signifies the birth of a new multi-polar world order that holds the potential to restore the global economic parity from 1500—before Western colonization took root.

    Lama emphasizes the fact that Russia now provides food aid in Afghanistan and Africa and fertilizer to poor countries, and has forged growing relations with both China and Iran, the latter having gained independence from Western colonial tutelage in 1979 when the Shah was overthrown.

    Lama finds significant economic synergy and growing win-win cooperation in the economic, cultural, scientific and military fields between China, Russia and Iran, which he says are “de facto allies in the struggle for a ‘Fair World.’”

    Russia and China today are leading the way in space exploration, clean energy technologies as well as cutting-edge missile technologies at a time that U.S. weapons systems are proving to be extraordinarily costly and inefficient owing to a Byzantine Pentagon contracting system and under-skilled workforce due to the skyrocketing costs of higher education.

    Today’s shifting power balance can be compared with 1997 when “‘the empire’ had control over three of the top four energy reserves: Venezuela was a U.S. vassal, Russian energy resources were under control of the Money Powers (Western financial oligarchs) via their proxy Russian oligarchs, and Saudi Arabia was a compliant U.S. tributary. Of the top four, only Iranian reserves were out of the Money Powers’ control.”

    By 2022, Lama writes, “the Empire had lost control of the top three reserves, Venezuela, Iran and Russia, while Saudi Arabia is no longer as compliant as it was in 1997.”

    What happened in the interim was a period of heightened military intervention and imperial overreach resulting in a counter-mobilization that signifies the end of the era of Western empires dating back to the 16th century.

    Bretton Woods: From Military to Financial Colonialism

    The imperial framework after World War II was established through the Bretton Woods economic system, which Lama says was designed to “lock countries into a financial structure controlled by the West.”

    Lama writes that this structure “requires central bank governors be independent of their governments, but dependent on rules established by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), at the top of the pyramid in the Bretton Woods system.

    Established in 1930 to handle reparations payments imposed on Germany at the Versailles Conference after World War I, BIS had helped finance Hitler’s rise to power and was owned by central banks, setting policies for them that directly influenced the global economy.

    Franklin D. Roosevelt had proposed liquidating the BIS due to its cooperation with Nazi Germany, though the resolution that he sponsored to that effect at the July 1944 Bretton Woods Conference at which the post-World War II monetary and political global structure was being set, was revoked after Roosevelt’s death.

    John Maynard Keynes addressing the July 1944 Bretton Woods Conference in New Hampshire. [Source: centerforfinancialstability.org

    According to Lama, when some newly decolonized countries tried to adopt an alternative economic arrangement to Bretton Woods, their leaders (Togo’s Sylvanus Olympio, Egypt’s Nasser; Indonesia’s Sukarno; Democratic Republic of Congo’s Lumumba; Iran’s Mossadegh; Ecuador’s Jaime Roldos; Panama’s Omar Torrijos) were eliminated by wars, coups or assassinations [over a 25-year span].

    Economic hit men would descend on developing countries offering loans for infrastructure projects whose real purpose was to plunge these countries into debt so they would become dependent on foreign creditors and their economies could be restructured along neo-liberal lines and in the service of multi-national corporations.

    A pillar of the Bretton Woods system was that the U.S. dollar was established as the international trade currency, which was convertible into gold at the fixed rate of $35 per ounce of gold.

    With the decline of U.S. competitiveness in the 1960s, the Nixon administration froze the convertibility of the U.S. dollar in gold and, instead, made it convertible to oil, provided that oil was sold only in U.S. dollars.

    This led to a dramatic increase in the price of oil and petrodollar arrangement with Saudi Arabia by which the U.S. provided military protection and weapons to the Saudis in exchange for the promise of them trading their oil in U.S. dollars and using income from oil to buy U.S. Treasury bills. Interest on these sales was then spent by the U.S. Department of the Treasury on infrastructure projects in Saudi Arabia to be executed by U.S. companies.

    The fact that other countries had to hold reserves in U.S. dollars to cover their oil imports allowed the U.S. to incur high trade deficits bred by deindustrialization in the neo-liberal era without causing a depreciation of the U.S. dollar.

    However, this is no longer sustainable in the long term and Russia and China are spearheading a shift in the global economy by which oil and other commodities are no longer being traded in U.S. dollars, ushering in the end of the American Century.

    The Money Power

    Lama’s book includes discussion of the growth of the Western financial oligarchy, or what he calls the Money Power, who are the major shareholders of the leading hedge funds (BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street) and have become the absolute rulers over society.

    According to Lama, the Money Power is well placed to control elections in Western democracies and control mass media in all its forms, print, TV and social media platforms.

    They support free trade agreements designed to usurp what little is left of national sovereignty and a neo-liberal vulture economy in which all aspects of the economy are privatized in order to maximize corporate profits.

    The U.S. decline has been fueled by the Money Power’s recognition that maintaining a strong manufacturing base was no longer necessary when trade deficits could be offset by currency manipulation owing to Nixon’s convertibility of the U.S. dollar to oil and the trade in oil around the world in U.S. dollars.

    The U.S. economy is increasingly dominated by the financial sector which flourishes at the expense of other vital economic sectors, leading to the high wealth concentration and impoverishment of society made worse by austerity measures entailing cutbacks in social and other government services.

    Russophobia, Sinophobia and the End of an Era

    The intense Russophobia cultivated in the U.S. media over the last decade is the result of the Money Power’s lust for Russia’s immense wealth, which it was starting to gain access to in the 1990s before Vladimir Putin reasserted national control over Russia’s economy.

    The anti-Russia propaganda has had the greatest impact on the educated classes, as 77% of Americans with post-graduate degrees considered Russia an enemy in a March 2022 poll, compared to 66% with high school education or less.

    Russophobia has been combined with an ascendant Islamophobia and Sinophobia, whose purpose is to mobilize public support for confronting the troika of powers (Russia, Iran and China), which threaten Western hegemony.

    According to Lama, if a date were to be identified for the end of the U.S. empire, it would be January 8, 2020, when Iran avenged the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani by attacking a U.S. air base in Iraq and displaying Iran’s weapons capability.

    Afterwards, the U.S. Central Command (Centcom) significantly relocated its headquarters from Doha, Qatar, just 125 miles from Iranian shores, to safety in Tampa, Florida.

    While the current U.S. war in Gaza has created a renewed pretext for expanded U.S. military intervention in the Middle East, Lama’s book makes clear that the U.S. could not win a war against Iran for regime change.

    Contrary to Wyne’s analysis, the U.S. has also been outmaneuvered in Ukraine, whose army is in a state of disrepair after a failed counteroffensive. It is further being outmaneuvered by China, which is winning hearts and minds through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that provides low-interest loans to countries for infrastructural development with no strings attached.

    In sum, the Great Game for world domination appears to be up and the Money Power has lost. That is why they are behaving so erratically in manufacturing crisis after crisis as they desperately attempt to sustain a fading world order defined by profound inequality and injustice. For the rest of my talk, I will try and further answer some of the questions that were posed prior to the seminar:

    Question 1) This dealt with consistent U.S. war making as a tool in which the US tried to sustain its hegemony, and growing pushback with the rise of BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Rise of China? How will all this shape the future world order?

    Answer: There is the threat of a world war breaking out provoked by the U.S. as the U.S. cannot tolerate geopolitical competition or being relegation to a second rate power, and will respond violently—as it is already doing. Currently, the U.S. is provoking wars simlutaneously with Russia, China and the Middle East, with catastrophic consequences already for the people of Ukraine, Russia and Gaza. The great Australian journalist John Pilger produced a documentary in 2016 warning about the U.S. military buildup in the Asia Pacific and coming war with China, which would be catastrophic for everyone involved.

    It is instructive to look back in history to the 1930s when Japan challenged U.S. and Western empires in the Asia Pacific with the establishment of the Greater Economic Co-Prosperity Sphere. This challenge and effort by Japan to establish an alternative yen bloc in Southeast Asia and to supplant the Western colonial powers led directly to the Pacific War. Records from the time reveal how the U.S. manuevered Japan into firing the first shot (an explicit goal of U.S. policy as outlined by Secretary of State Henry Stimson) by imposing a naval buildup in the South China sea and crippling oil embargo that threatened to cut off Japan’s oil supply and undermine its empire in the Asia-Pacific.

    There is evidence that FDR knew about the impending Pearl Harbor attacks but allowed them to take place because the American public would only support military intervention if America were attacked and the attack was made to look like a sneak attack by a dastardly enemy.

    History could easily repeat itself today; the U.S. military is in fact preparing for war in the Asia Pacific; building a new military base in Micronesia in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, and training soldiers in jungle warfare in Hawaii while studying military battles in the Pacific War, like the Battle of Guadalcanal.

    Gen. Charles A. Flynn, the commander of U.S. Army Pacific, was quoted in The New York Times stating that China had been on “an incremental, insidious and irresponsible path for decades.” Now more than ever, the “total Army,” he said, needs to prioritize relevant Pacific experience.

    U.S. soldiers being trained to fight a 21st Century Pacific War—this time against China. [Source: nytimes.com]

    After provoking a war with China, like with Japan in World War II, the U.S. would surely make it look like China started it and that it was somehow innocent. This has been a feature of US imperial wars going back to the era of the Indian Wars.

    Question 2: The first half of the 20th century was essentially a contest of empires. The two World Wars were fundamentally European wars or a contest of colonial empires. While the European empires were destroyed, the gain was for the U.S. as it emerged as the most powerful actor.

    Answer: Agreed. I would add that the U.S. defeated the Japanese empire in the Pacific theater of World War II, which enabled the U.S. to establish a chain of military bases in the Asia Pacific as a linchpin of U.S. imperialism. U.S. strategic planners had long considered the Asia Pacific key to world domination because of its economic vitality and rich resources and geography and this is why the U.S. cannot accept any rival powers there, including Japan, and now China.

    Question 3: Did the U.S. foresee this and plan its rise to a position as the pre-eminent power ensuring the destruction of the European powers?

    Answer: Yes, absolutely. As one example of dispacing European empires, I was just reading a book about U.S. policy in Congo in the 1960s by David Gibbs, The Political Economy of Third World Intervention. The book showed how U.S. mining tycoons (Maurice Templesman and Harold Hochschild) came to oppose Belgian colonialism so American corporations could replace Belgian ones in controlling and profiting from Congo’s lucrative mineral wealth. Templesman and Hochschild financed CIA front organizations and supported the murder of Patrice Lumumba who wanted to nationalize Congo’s mines after independence. They cultivated very close ties with Joseph Mobutu; Lumumba’s replacement and murderer, who cultivated the image of a Pan-Africanist devoted to African culture, but who sold out Congo and its economy to foreign interests. The CIA funded Mobutu’s security apparatus so he could crush a secessionist movement in the diamond rich Katanga province backed by the Belgians. The goal was for Mobutu to consolidate his control over Congo and for U.S. corporations to take over the mines from Belgians in Katanga. Here is U.S. neocolonialism at work, and muscling out of the Europeans.

    Question 4: The U.S.-led post-1945 world order rests on its control of the three pillars – political, economic, and security ( Allies/Vassals, Economic Control through Bretton Woods systems + USD as the global reserve currency, and the UN Security Council+NATO). Is Western Europe an Ally of the US or is it an unequal relationship?

    Answer: I would say its an ally of the U.S. to a point, as we see from the example of the Belgians in Congo. Many Europeans are starting to question alliance with the U.S. and whether the US has the best interests of European countries in mind. The U.S. involvement in Ukraine and destruction of the Nordstream II pipeline, for example, has been deterimental to European economies, including especially that of Germany that relied on cheap Russian natural gas imports. With the destruction of the pipeline, they were forced to purchase natural gas at a much higher cost from the Middle East and from U.S. natural gas suppliers in Texas and elsewhere who were financing politicians in the U.S. that supported the copious military aid to Ukraine along with the weapons contractors. European countries historically benefited from trade with Russia, so the war in Ukraine has generally hurt their economies and it is not clear for how much longer their populations will put up with this and just go along with the New Cold War.

    Question 5: Decolonisation was superficial as the U.S.-led West retained much of the colonial and imperial controls. Is it right to say that the U.S., in effect, has been an expanding empire since the American-Spanish War? The Cold War was a check on the American expansion.

    Answer: Decolonization was indeed superficial as the U.S. used clandestine and sometimes not so clandestine means toinfluence and control postcolonial leaders across much of the Third World and to sustain neocolonial economic relationships where Third World countries exported raw materials to the West and purchased products that were manufactured there, or had their resources owned and controlled by U.S. corporations.

    I would suggest that the U.S. was an expanding empire from the formation of the country. Historian Richard Van Alstyne wrote an important book in 1960 entitled The Rising American Empire. The book shows how the American founding fathers all conceived of the U.S. as an empire and had ambitions of eclipsing the British and Roman empires at their height. Van Alstyne also addresses how the pacification of the Native Americans and takeover of their resources and land and massacre of those who resisted previewed what the U.S. would do to other peoples around the world.

    As far as the Cold War, my book, The Russians are Coming, Again with John Marciano shows that rather than being a check on U.S. expansion, the Cold War served to validate heightened U.S. intervention across the Third World under the pretext of fighting and combatting communism. In fact the real communist threat, as Noam Chomsky has emphasized, was a threat to U.S. business interests and ability to encourage development of an alternative state-centered model of governance that would prevent corporate pillage and the kind of neoloconial arrangements that prevailed quite widely in this period and beyond.

    Question 6: The end of the Cold War and American unipolar dominance unleashed the push for the American Empire—through GWOT and a series of wars.

    Answer: Absolutely: We have the U.S. empire on steroids with the Global War on Terror. It has given a pretext for the U.S. to invade and bomb many Middle-Eastern countries. And it has been totally ridden with contradictions, as the U.S. has supported leading terrorist states like Saudi Arabia and committed large scale terrorist acts based on standard definitions of terrorism as acts of violence targeting civilians with the purpose of affecting a political goal or political change.

                                                                                                                                                              Source: goodreads.com

    Question 7: NATO Expansion – conflict with Russia and anti-China strategy – a clear case of imperial overstretch and suicidal?

    Answer: Yes I think so. Back in 1996, George Kennan, the father of the containment strategy and original Cold War, warned about NATO expansion, stating: that NATO expansion would amount to a “strategic blunder of epic proportions” and the “most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era,” as it would “inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion, restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations,” and “impel Russian foreign policy in a direction decidedly not to our liking.”

    Kennan’s prediction proved to be true and look where we are today: in a new Cold War, with the U.S. having torn up the arms control treaties of the 1980s; initiated a proxy war with Russia that could lead to a full-blown war between the two countries and nuclear conflict. If the latter transpires, the NATO expansion surely will have been suicidal. Already it is diverting badly needed resources towards the military and a senseless new arms race, much like in the original cold war, where it produced heavy deficits and Third World type living conditions in the U.S. with astronimical inequality levels, underfunded edcuation and health care system, and abysmally poor public services, including in areas like mental health treatment, and programs to assist the homeless. One consequence is the extremely high crime rates in the U.S. and overcrowded prisons.

    George F. Kennan: if only U.S. leaders in the 1990s and 2000s had listened to him [Source: artsandculture.google.com

    As far as China, the provocations by the Biden administration may be even more insane than with regards to Russia, as a) the U.S. depends on Chinese purchasing of U.S. debt; b) the U.S. economy is quite dependant on China’s; and c) China has superior military technology capabilities that would give it the edge in any war with the U.S.

    Charles Freeman is a retired diplomat who served as Nixon’s translator when he famously visited China in theearly 1970s to reestablish U.S. diplomatic relations during the Cold War. Freeman told me when I interviewed him that China was in no way a military threat to the U.S., but the U.S. sees it as a threat because its economy has been growing and slowly surpassing that of the U.S. The U.S., however, should not view China as a threat of any kind, and should consider its economic growth an opportunity for the U.S. if it tried to harness China’s economic growth to its own. This would mesh well with the win-win strategy advocated for by Chinese Premer Xi Jinping in which China and the U.S. would cooperate to mutual economic benefit.

    Charles Freeman [Source: globaltimes.cn]

    Instead, the U.S. has sought to a) encircle China militarily, b) arm Taiwan to the teeth in violation of the “One China” policy and incite Taiwanese separatist elements, c) try and undermine Chinese interests throughout Southeast Asia, and d) provoke it by launching drone surveillance missions over its borders and in Chinese controlled waters off Taiwan, and e) sailing U.S. naval ships in Chinese waters.

    This is in addition to a) the propaganda directed against China in the U.S., b) the persecution of Chinese scientists; c) support for separatist elements in Xinjiang and Tibet; and d) the waging of an economic war on China and efforts to sabotage China’s economy—a policy that had been pursued by the FDR administration against Japan that directly provoked war with it.

    Question 8: Are current wars in Ukraine and Gaza—a sign of major turbulence in the World Order?

    Answer: Yes absoutely. These wars were both easily avoidable and were a direct result of U.S. foreign policy and its extremism.

    1. In the case of Ukraine, the U.S. was intent on using Ukraine as a battering ram directed against Russia. The U.S. orchestrated the 2014 Maidan coup and empowered and armed far right, Russophobic elements who triggered the war with Russia by a) attacking the ethnic Russian population in Eastern Ukraine; and b) reneging on any commitments in the Minsk peace agreements that would have given greater autonomy to the Luhansk and Donetsk provinces. The U.S. aim was similar to Afghanistan in the 1980s where they wanted to draw the Russians into a military quagmire and trap and discredit Putin and cripple his regime by ratcheting up economic sanctions against him (which it was believed would create disaffection with his rule and trigger a movement for regime change). This strategy was born of desperation because Putin was succeeding in strengthening Russia and blocking the neoconservative designs to control Eurasia and its rich oil and gas reserves, which was only possible with a weakened Russia.
    2. Gaza: The U.S. has long used Israel as an outpost of its power in the Middle East, recently establishing secret military bases in the Negev. The neocons in Washington have long sought regime change in Iran and see Israel as their vehicle to help achieve that. They also wanted regime change in Syria and to ensure Israeli control over the Golan Heights, where oil reserves have been discovered. U.S. weapons have emboldened hardliners in Israel and enabled Israeli aggression in Gaza and now Lebanon with disastrous human costs for the civilian population that people are comparing to a new Holocaust.

    Question 9:  With the rise of China, India, and the BRICS—is this a Power Transition moment?

    Answer: Yes. We are seeing major historical changes in real-time. China’s achievements through the One Belt, One Road initiative were so impressive they led to a copycat effort by the Biden and Boris Johnson admiinistrations that never really got off the ground. The SCO is enabling countries also to get around the World Bank and IMF by offering loans with no strings attached. China’s rise is epitlmized by its trading alliance with Russia and influence throughout Africa, where China is clearly winning the Great Game. While Chinese labor practices may be bad in many places, China is bringing tangible benefits to African countries through the building of impressive infrastructure, whereas all the U.S. offers is drone bases and IMF structural adjustment programs that push economic austerity measures and reinforce social inequality.

    Question 10: Is this a sign of the end of Western dominance of the last 500 years?

    Answer: I believe that yes, we are seeing major historical shifts. It may take some more time as empires often do have lasting power and can linger on even when their legitimacy has been eroded, but change is coming about.

    Question 11: In its entire history, the USA has been at war for all but 15-20 years. Is the USA a war-mongering state?

    Answer: Sadly, yes. It goes back to the founding of the country as a settler colonial state rooted in the military conquest and genocide of the Native Americans. The colonial mentality is so deep that the U.S. names a lot of its weapons systems after native tribes that were vanquished, like the Apache helicopter for example. The Operation to kill Osama bin Laden was called Operation Geronimo after the Apache chief who was vanquished in the 19th century. Noam Chomsky once asked; imagine the nazis had won World War II, and named weapons: “gypsys” and ‘Jews.”

    [Source: telegraph.co.uk]

    This reflects something rotten at the core of imperialism and a deep imperial mentality that is hard to vanquish and is passed on generation after generation. This mentality and the war like culture in the U.S. is seen in a hero worship of soldiers and the military at sporting events, and in the denigration and marginalization of peace activists in popular and intellectual culture.

    That the military culture is a largely top down phenomenon though should be emphasized as since Vietnam, the U.S. government has dared not reintroduce the draft, lest it face a societal revolt remniscent of the 1960s counter-culture movement. So a lot of Americans see through the lies and are not so hawkish—that’s why the government has to distance the public from the wars; lie to them repeatedly about what they are all about; and develop new technologies and AI that could ensure a reliance on machines in fighting wars rather than the American people who often see through the lies and will protest an unjust war—particularly if there are a large number of U.S. ground troops potentially being put in harms way (like in Vietnam).

    Question 12: What is the future of 21st century world order? Barry Posan says the era of Superpower is over. Has the multipolar world emerged? what would be its shape?

    Answer: I think we are indeed seeing the birth of a new multipolar world order in which the center of economic power in the world increasingly lies in the East and in which China is a powerhouse and Southeast Asia is a key motor of economic growth in the Global economy. The U.S. is sliding more towards authoritarianism and potentially even a civil war, and may be further weakened by domestic unrest as it loses its economic supremacy and the U.S. dollar ceases to be a main currency of global trade. U.S. military interventions may focus more on South America and Mexico (which some Republicans want to bomb now to stem the immigration tide) and the U.S. army may have to be deployed more often to contain domestic unrest and right wing estremists/neofascists and to control armies of homeless people who are a product of a failed economic model.

    Related to the last question about U.S. adaptation to the new realities, a great danger is that the U.S. won’t accept reality, and will attempt to violently reimpose its hegemony, triggering a new Pacific War or world war that would result in millions of deaths.

    The recent escalation of conflict in Ukraine and the Middle East as well as U.S. saber rattling towards China and over Taiwan, makes this threat all too real and ominous.

    Feature Image Credit: iai.tv

  • From Global Democratisation to the Battle of World Powers? Contradictory Developments in the Present

    From Global Democratisation to the Battle of World Powers? Contradictory Developments in the Present

    Shortly after the democratic revolutions of 1989-1991, Francis Fukuyama wrote his highly influential essay on the end of history- that is, the end of violent history through global democratization.

    Members of the United Nations Security Council sit during a meeting on Syria at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City, NY, U.S. April 5, 2017. REUTERS/Shannon Stapleton – RC141DE9DE00. Image credit: world101.cfr.org

    The world has changed so dramatically since the end of the Cold War that it is necessary to look back in order to understand today’s global political situation. In total, there are five different discourses that will be discussed here as representative of historical developments. They range from Fukuyama’s thesis of global democratization to various versions of coming anarchy and global (“new”) civil wars (Kaplan, Kagan, Kaldor, Münkler), Huntington’s clash of civilizations, the concept of global governance and the “rise of the others” (Zakaria, Zhang), a multipolar world of nation-states, and the re-nationalization of world politics. My central thesis is that all five discourses are present in contemporary political conflicts and that we cannot neglect any of them.

    But if you look at the history of democracy, you can almost discover a law of motion of democratic revolutions based on Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the French Revolution. It starts with a democratic revolt against a dictator or colonial rule. Then the revolutionaries become radicalized, civil war breaks out, a new, this time totalitarian ruler takes power, and only after his overthrow does democracy prevail.

    Shortly after the democratic revolutions of 1989-1991, Francis Fukuyama wrote his highly influential essay on the end of history- that is, the end of violent history through global democratization. And his thoughts were very timely. What better confirmation could there be when, in just a few years, the old dictatorships from Berlin to Vladivostok, which only called themselves communist but were not, but rather geriocracies, were swept away in a wave of democratisation. The Arab Spring seemed to confirm his thoughts, as here, too, long-standing dictatorships were overrun by democratic movements virtually overnight, as in Egypt and Tunisia. But even then, there were counter-movements that contradicted the assumed linear process of global democratization. Fukuyama, therefore, had to defend his original thesis and argue that, despite all the setbacks, democracy was still at the end of history. In a way, he was echoing Hannah Arendt’s theory of revolution. The reverses of democratization in Russia, many Arab countries, and the global civil wars have often been cited as cultural – Russia, China, and Middle Eastern Islam were still too culturally authoritarian to allow for genuine democratization. But if you look at the history of democracy, you can almost discover a law of motion of democratic revolutions based on Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the French Revolution. It starts with a democratic revolt against a dictator or colonial rule. Then the revolutionaries become radicalized, civil war breaks out, a new, this time totalitarian ruler takes power, and only after his overthrow does democracy prevail. The French overthrew their king and got the emperor, Napoleon; the Russians revolted against the czar and got Stalin; the Chinese fought against their emperor and got Mao Tse-tung; the Germans overthrew their emperor after their military defeat and got the leader Adolf Hitler. Resistance to colonial rule also often followed this law of democratic movement: the colonial rulers were driven out and replaced by new rulers.

    In the same year that the Soviet Union collapsed, the terrible civil wars in the former Yugoslavia began, the first Chechen war, followed by countless “markets of violence” and so-called new wars, which in a narrower sense were new civil wars and wars of state collapse. Mass rape became a weapon of war to demoralize the enemy, and an almost complete dissolution of the boundaries of violence took on a life of its own, seeming to make any rational resolution of conflicts impossible. Warlords, drug lords, terrorists, child soldiers, and “archaic” warriors who seemed to belong to the past dominated warfare worldwide. Against this backdrop, Western armies were transformed into intervention armies that were supposed to maintain a minimum of order on the borders of the U.S. “liberal empire” in order to prevent global anarchy (Robert Kaplan) or a “world civil war” (Enzensberger) – at least according to Western discourse. From the perspective of the countries affected by these wars of intervention, however, they were wars to maintain their immediate exploitation (especially in Africa), to keep corrupt regimes that collaborated with Western states alive (Arabian Peninsula), or to eliminate those that opposed the West (Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan). In the open spaces of violence and violent markets, high-value illegal goods were traded: Drugs, blood diamonds, human beings (women and child slaves), weapons and rare earths.

    Linked to these wars of intervention was the apparent cultural triumph of the West, which is associated with the term globalisation, but was, in fact, initially an Americanization, the so-called McDonaldization or Mac World. However, this cultural globalization of the American way of life, combined with U.S. wars of intervention, led to a backlash as many societies saw their cultural identity threatened. Taken together, these two factors triggered Samuel Huntington’s concept of the clash of civilizations.

    In their liberal hubris, his Western critics argued that there could be no clash of civilizations because only the West had produced a civilization – the others were religions or cultures, but not civilizations.

     His book has often been misunderstood as a guide to action for the coming war – but in fact, he had written the book to prevent that clash, and he argued for the U.S. to withdraw from small wars around the world because he saw the liberal identity of the U.S. at risk. Perhaps more importantly, he saw non-Western religions not just as cultures but as civilizations that had grown out of their respective religions. In their liberal hubris, his Western critics argued that there could be no clash of civilizations because only the West had produced a civilization – the others were religions or cultures, but not civilizations.

    While globalization initially had the effect of Americanization, in the medium term, it facilitated the “rise of the others” (Zakaria), the great empires and civilizations that had perished under European colonization and Euro-American hegemony. As a result of their initial economic success (Malaysia, Singapore, the Asian Tigers, China, India, the Pacific Rim countries), they no longer sought to imitate Western culture in order to be recognized as equals, but to develop their own identity, which they considered superior to the West. From the point of view of Western discourse, the “others” were, at best, immature children or barbarians – now the West suddenly sees itself in the role of other civilizations, seeing themselves as superior to the West. One expression of this changed self-image was Zahng Weiwei’s book China – The Civilizational State. We are now experiencing a paradoxical situation in which the West is consumed by fear of decline and the dissolution of its own sense of superiority, leading to the rise of right-wing populist and radical right-wing movements; large parts of the Asian world population are filled with hope for a better life, and the Islamic-Arab world is desperate in the face of unfulfilled promises, leading to the radicalization of young people in Islamist movements.

    The concept of global governance was invented at the beginning of the 21st century as a reaction to advancing globalization. The assumption, correct in itself, was that the absence of a democratic world state did not necessarily mean that there was no possibility of at least regulating global problems, subjecting them to rules, if not solving them. Global governance was based on the idea of cooperation between nation-states, non-governmental organizations, globally active institutions, the emerging global civil society, globally active corporations, and global players. However, the resurgence of big states has pushed global governance into the background, just like globalization itself. Some states want to reverse globalization, at least in the economic and political spheres. This applies at least to Western democracies, whose citizens often see themselves as the losers of globalization.

    The relative loss of importance of the Western states and the institutions they helped to create, such as the U.N., cannot be overlooked – the overstretched role of the U.S. as the world’s policeman is due, on the one hand, to its own lack of investment in development and education, and on the other to the rise of others.

    What we are currently experiencing is not simply a multipolar world of great powers, even if there are signs of a renaissance of great power politics. Instead, we are witnessing a contradictory process of the five discourses alluded to here: Democratization, failed states, the clash of civilizations, further globalization, and the renaissance of great power politics. The still existing, but also partly former, Global South is still dependent on cooperation, even if new forms of cooperation are emerging, such as the expansion of the BRICS, which compete politically but cooperate economically. The relative loss of importance of the Western states and the institutions they helped to create, such as the U.N., cannot be overlooked – the overstretched role of the U.S. as the world’s policeman is due, on the one hand, to its own lack of investment in development and education, and on the other to the rise of others. What remains unpredictable is whether the emerging states of the Global South and the former superpower Russia will make the same mistake as the West in its centuries-long quest for hegemony, namely, to see itself as superior to all others. Eurocentrism would be replaced by an equally problematic ethnocentrism, and a nationalist dynamic would be set in motion that would be difficult for states to control. Even if all current developments point to the contrary and we see a return of tribalism in the form of “us versus them – whoever the others are” discourses, the only option left is to revive intercultural dialogue if we do not want to experience “another bloody century” (Colin S. Gray).

     

    Feature Image Credit: chinausfocus.com

  • The Morals of Hamas and Israel — A Dharmic Perspective

    The Morals of Hamas and Israel — A Dharmic Perspective

    In this analysis of the catastrophic destruction unleashed by Israel on Gaza in response to the Hamas’ attack on October 7th, Dr Seshadri Kumar poses very pertinent and valuable questions to the Indian policymakers and the audience in general.

    This article was published earlier in medium.com

    I have seen a number of Indians try to draw a moral equivalence between the attacks by Hamas on Israeli civilians that precipitated the ongoing war in Palestine and the retaliatory attacks of the Israeli Defense Forces on Gaza civilians. Both are equally wrong, these people say. Cruelty and barbarism are wrong, whatever the circumstances, they say. And they also say, therefore, that the Palestinians deserve the brutal bombardment that Israel is inflicting on them because they acted brutally by attacking first. Basically, they asked for it. The fact that the Palestinians are Muslims, a minority that is hated by the majority of Hindus (and, as I am finding out, Christians as well) in India, helps in developing this response.

    But are these two actions equivalent? Most of my friends are Indians, and Hindus at that, so I will draw upon Hindu mythology, which is revered in India, to answer this.

    First, one must understand what the Palestinians have gone through. The very creation of Israel was an injustice to the Arabs living in Palestine, as they were forcibly removed from their homes and forced to be refugees. Initially, all the other Arab countries supported them and fought many wars with Israel. But they lost every time, and the Palestinians lost more and more land each time.

    But the Bible is not history, and even if Jews used to live in that land centuries ago, brutally uprooting people living in Palestine in 1948 was a gross human rights violation. By this logic, the Chola kings of South India were once in control of Sri Lanka, Cambodia, and Thailand, so India is entitled to invade those countries and expel their populations from their lands.

    Some people say that the land that forms the state of Israel was once populated by Jews if we go by the Bible, and therefore Israel has a right to that land. But the Bible is not history, and even if Jews used to live in that land centuries ago, brutally uprooting people living in Palestine in 1948 was a gross human rights violation. By this logic, the Chola kings of South India were once in control of Sri Lanka, Cambodia, and Thailand, so India is entitled to invade those countries and expel their populations from their lands.

    After a lot of conflict over decades, the Israelis gave two parcels of land to the Palestinians to live in and self-govern, but the Jews control the lifelines to both areas — the West Bank, ruled by Fatah, and the Gaza Strip, ruled by Hamas.

    Palestinians are routinely terrorized and humiliated by Israel. Their demand for a Palestinian homeland has come to nought despite years of negotiations. Israel is a brutal occupation force in Palestine.

    If all this were not enough, even the small area still occupied by Arabs is constantly encroached upon by Jews. Jews build settler colonies in Palestinian areas, taking away more and more of the little land the Muslims own. Muslim families living in Jerusalem are often forced at gunpoint from their own homes to make way for Jews. The number of Jewish settlers in Palestinian areas was just over half a million in 2010; today, it is just under three-quarters of a million. This increase has happened because of explicit support and encouragement of forced settlement policies by various governments in Israel, including the current Likud-led government of Benjamin Netanyahu and by the US. Another reason for this is that Jews anywhere have an automatic right to become Israeli citizens, and this has led to a huge influx of Jewish immigrants into Israel. Any protest by Palestinians is met with disproportionate retaliation. Children who throw stones are met with machine gunfire. A single rocket is replied to by a hail of bombs from aircraft. Collective punishment of Palestinians is and has been the norm. Israel has been deliberately provoking the Palestinians more and more, and the US has been openly partisan, as when President Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.

    If this were still not bad enough, the Palestinians seem to be losing all their Arab friends. There seems to be Palestine fatigue in the Arab world. Egypt normalized relations with Israel long ago. More recently, other countries, including the UAE, Sudan, Bahrain, and Morocco, have normalized relations. Even Saudi Arabia is on the cusp of normalizing relations with Israel. Clearly, there is nobody left to stand up for the Palestinians.

    A peaceful resolution is clearly not getting the Palestinians anywhere. Despite condemnation by the UN, Israel is continuing its settlement policy. At this rate, the Palestinians will all be begging for a living on the streets.

    How should Palestinians fight for their rights? Talks have failed. How should they “fight” Israel? By engaging in a direct military confrontation with the far superior Israeli army, using primitive weapons, and without an air force — to end up with a guaranteed defeat?

    So, if you say you are sympathetic to the plight of the Palestinians, you are giving them only three options:

    1. Have round after round of negotiations, which don’t get anywhere.
    2. Fight a direct war with a far superior army and an air force, which will lead to complete defeat.
    3. Watch Israeli civilians encroach on what Palestinians still consider their land, until nothing is left, and end up as slave labour for the Jews.

    It is worth noting that the Palestinians living in the West Bank, under Fatah rule, have not indulged in violence all these years. Yet, what has it gained them? Israel withdrew all its settlements from the Gaza Strip in 2010 but is briskly building new Jewish settlements in the West Bank. This is what Fatah got by being peaceful.

    People become terrorists when they have no other option. Asymmetric warfare is the weapon of the weak. When one has a just cause, and all acceptable and peaceful ways of securing one’s rights have come to nought, then one adopts unacceptable and violent ways. In other words, the ends justify the means.

    Hindus can understand this by reading the great Hindu epic, the Mahabharata. The Mahabharata is the story of a conflict between two sets of cousins, the Kauravas and the Pandavas, for control of a kingdom, Hastinapura. In the Mahabharata, the principle that any means are acceptable in order for a just end to prevail, referred to as the principle of Brihaspati, the preceptor of the Gods, is invoked by both sides.

    The operative portion of the story in the Mahabharata starts when King Vichitravirya dies. He has two sons: the elder, Dhritarashtra, is blind, and therefore is passed over for the kingship. His younger brother, Pandu, is crowned king. But King Pandu is cursed by a dying sage during a hunting accident, loses interest in the kingdom, and abdicates, upon which Dhritarashtra is crowned king by default. The children of Dhritarashtra are called the Kauravas, and the children of Pandu are called the Pandavas. Both the Pandavas and Kauravas therefore have a legitimate claim to the kingdom — the former are the children of the last legitimate king, who was the younger brother, whereas the latter are the children of the elder brother who is the current king, albeit by default.

    Duryodhana, the eldest of the Kauravas, believes that the entire kingdom should belong to him, and that the Pandavas do not have a legitimate claim to “even a needlepoint of land.” The Pandavas, on the other hand, are amenable to a split of the kingdom, with half going to their cousins and half ruled by them.

    Duryodhana hates the Pandavas because they are rival claimants to the kingdom. He tries to have them poisoned and then and burned to death. When all that fails, Dhritarashtra tries to achieve peace by partitioning the kingdom. Duryodhana then cheats the Pandavas for their share of the kingdom by winning a rigged game of dice. The condition of the game is that the Pandavas must go into exile for 13 years. When the Pandavas return from exile, Duryodhana refuses to return their portion of the kingdom to them. He justifies all his actions to his father by quoting Brihaspati — that one may take any steps necessary for the elimination of a powerful adversary.

    The Pandavas decide to fight for their right in the great war of Kurukshetra when Duryodhana refuses to return to their kingdom.

    In the setting of the Mahabharata, there are rules by which one is expected to fight on the battlefield. One must not attack someone who is not fighting them. One must not attack an unarmed opponent. One must not strike below the waist. No fighting at night, except by prior agreement. These rules are referred to as the “dharma” (right conduct) of battle. Violation of these rules would be called “adharma.” (Violation of dharma was viewed in the same way as we view human rights violations today.)

    Now the Pandavas can regain their kingdom only by defeating the Kauravas in battle. But the Kauravas are invincible in battle. They have great warriors who have never been defeated in war: Bhishma, the grand-uncle of the Pandavas and Kauravas, a student of the great Parashurama, the greatest warrior the world has known; Drona, the martial teacher of both the Pandavas and Kauravas, another disciple of Parashurama; Karna, the son of the Sun god, born with impregnable armor, and yet another disciple of Parashurama; and many other great warriors such as Bhurishravas. Duryodhana himself is invincible when fighting with his favourite weapon, the mace or bludgeon.

    While the Pandavas themselves have great warriors, notably Bhima, the second of the five Pandavas, the strongest man of his time; and Arjuna, the third of the Pandavas, the greatest archer of his time; even these cannot kill the undefeated warriors on the Kaurava side.

    But the Pandavas also have on their side Krishna, who is an incarnation of the God Vishnu in human form, who wants to help the Pandavas win because he is on the side of justice and fairness, and he believes that the Pandavas are on the side of dharma.

    Krishna knows that the Pandavas can never beat the Kauravas in a fair fight. So, he resorts to dishonourable tactics, or adharma, to win.

    Bhishma has taken a vow that he will never fight a woman. There is a warrior on the Pandava side, Shikhandi, who was born a woman, but who underwent a gender change and became a man. However, Bhishma still considers this warrior a woman, and his code of chivalry will not allow him to fight Shikhandi. But Shikhandi is incapable of killing Bhishma. So Krishna instructs Arjuna to position himself behind Shikhandi and shoot arrows at Bhishma. Bhishma will not shoot at Arjuna because Shikhandi stands in between, and so allows himself to be killed by Arjuna. This is clearly a violation of dharma by the Pandavas — attacking a foe who is not fighting you.

    Drona is told a lie that his son, Aswatthama, has been killed. On hearing this, Drona loses all interest in life and goes into meditation. When he is thus unarmed and defenceless, a warrior named Dhrishtadyumna chops off his head. Another violation of dharma.

    Karna, similarly, is killed by Arjuna when his chariot is stuck in the mud, and he is unable to fight Arjuna. Dharma would have required Arjuna not to attack Karna when he was unarmed and not engaged in battle with him. But upon Krishna’s urging, Arjuna kills Karna from behind when he is engaged in removing his wheel from the mud.

    Similarly, Bhurishravas is engaged in a fight with another warrior when Arjuna cuts his hand off with an arrow from behind. A disillusioned Bhurishravas goes into meditation, at which point his opponent beheads him while he is unarmed and in meditation.

    In the final battle of the war, Duryodhana and Bhima are fighting with their maces, and Bhima is finding the going tough, because Duryodhana is unbeatable with the mace. At this point, Krishna signals to Bhima to strike Duryodhana below the navel, a violation of the rules of war. Bhima strikes Duryodhana’s thighs and mortally wounds him. More adharma.

    Krishna justifies every one of these transgressions of dharma by saying that the ends justify the means. A dying Duryodhana accuses the Pandavas of violating the rules of war to defeat him. Krishna recalls all of Duryodhana’s evil deeds, and says that without violating the rules of war, without adharma, the Pandavas could never have avenged the great wrongs done to them. Adharma was required to defeat adharma.

    And so, the Mahabharata is a deeply pessimistic story, because it says that the virtuous can never defeat the wicked by following fair play in war. They must resort to trickery, unfair and illegitimate tactics — adharma — in order for dharma to prevail. After trying to follow dharma their entire lives, even not retaliating when their wife Draupadi was disrobed in the great assembly of Hastinapura by the Kauravas during the game of dice, after patiently enduring multiple assassination attempts, after being deprived of their kingdom by fraud, after enduring 13 years in exile, the Pandavas finally come to the realization that they can get their rightful inheritance only through evil and unfair means, through adharma. Even to ensure the victory of virtue, one must embrace vice.

    Similarly, the Palestinians have not gotten justice for 75 years by appealing to dharma, and today Hamas is pursuing the path of adharma. The injustice of the Palestinians began in 1948 with the nakba, the forced expulsion of more than 700,000 Palestinians from the new state of Israel and the destruction of more than 500 villages. Some 5000 Palestinians were massacred by Israel at the time. The injustice has only grown worse in the last 75 years.

    If the present adharma of Hamas is wrong, then the actions of the Pandavas in the Mahabharata were also wrong. And if what the Pandavas did was right, then what Hamas has done is also right. In both cases, adharma was committed to securing justice and fairness. Hindus must decide which course of action they find morally right — but they must choose consistently.

    A system where dharma is never respected and followed can only result in adharma. We have no choice but to accept this reality.

    Had Dhritarashtra upheld dharma when the Pandavas pleaded for their rights with him, they would never have had to engage in adharma to get their rights. If we claim to value dharma, then we must be consistent in upholding it. Otherwise, we are engaging in adharma ourselves.

    Had the world listened to the anguished cries of the Palestinians over the last 75 years, a just solution would have been worked out for them and some of them (i.e., Hamas) would not need to engage in terrorism today. But by turning a deaf ear and a blind eye to their suffering, the West has forced Hamas to engage in the only way that the West pays attention to — terrorism.

    It is not enough to say that you condemn both the violence against civilians by Hamas and the state terrorism of Israel equally. By doing so, you are only enabling the powerful terrorist state of Israel, because your condemnation means nothing to them — they have been engaging in state terrorism for 75 years and getting away with it scot-free. The only people to face consequences for their terrorism are the weak — in this case, Hamas, and in decades past, the PLO. They are blacklisted, their assets are frozen, they are put on Interpol arrest lists, whereas the terrorists who rule the state of Israel roam the world as royalty.

    The world is not equal and fair. The powerful have more privileges. And so, if you value human rights and freedom, you must not condemn equally. If you genuinely care about justice, you must side with the weak, not be even-handed.

    Be like Krishna. Not like Dhritarashtra.

    Feature Image Credit: www.lapresalatina.com

     

  • Trump followed four years later by Trump: Would America’s trustiness and system of alliances survive?

    Trump followed four years later by Trump: Would America’s trustiness and system of alliances survive?

    Ambassador Alfredo Toro Hardy examines, in this excellently analysed paper, the self-created problems that have contributed to America’s declining influence in the world. As he rightly points out, America helped construct the post-1945 world order by facilitating global recovery through alliances, and mutual support and interweaving the exercise of its power with international institutions and legal instruments. The rise of neoconservatism following the end of the Cold War, particularly during the Bush years from 2000 to 2008, led to American exceptionalism, unipolar ambitions, and the failure of American foreign policy.  Obama’s Presidency was, as Zbigniew Brezinski said, a second chance for restoring American leadership but those gains were nullified in Donald Trump’s 2016-20 presidency leading to the loss of trust in American Leadership. In a final analysis that may be questionable for some, Ambassador Alfredo sees Biden’s administration returning to the path of liberal internationalism and recovering much of the lost trust of the world.  His fear is that it may all be lost if Trump returns in 2024.                               – Team TPF

     

    TPF Occasional Paper   9/2023    

    Trump followed four years later by Trump: Would America’s trustiness and system of alliances survive?

     

     

    According to Daniel W. Drezner: “Despite four criminal indictments, Donald Trump is the runaway frontrunner to win the GOP nomination for president. Assuming he does, current polling shows a neck-and-neck race between Trump and Biden in the general election. It would be reckless for other leaders to dismiss the possibility of a second Trump term beginning on January 20, 2025. Indeed, the person who knows this best is Biden himself. In his first joint address to Congress, Biden said that in a conversation with world leaders, he has ‘made it known that America is back’, and their responses have tended to be a variation of “but for how long?”. [1]

    A bit of historical context

    In order to duly understand the implications of a Trump return to the White House, a historical perspective is needed. Without context, it is difficult to comprehend the meaning of the “but for how long?” that worries so many around the world. Let’s, thus, go back in time.

    Under its liberal internationalist grand vision, Washington positioned itself at the top of a potent hegemonic system. One, allowing that its leadership could be sustained by the consensual acquiescence of others. Indeed, through a network of institutions, treaties, mechanisms and initiatives, whose creation it promoted after World War II, the United States was able to interweave the exercise of its power with international institutions and legal instruments. Its alliances were a fundamental part of that system. On the other side of the Iron Curtain, though, the Soviet Union established its own system of alliances and common institutions.

                In the 1970s, however, America’s leadership came into question. Two reasons were responsible for it. Firstly, the Vietnam War. The excesses committed therein and America’s impotence to prevail militarily generated great discomfort among several of its allies. Secondly, the crisis of the Bretton Woods system. As a global reserve currency issuer, the stability of the U.S. currency was fundamental. In a persistent way, though, Washington had to run current account deficits to fulfil the supply of dollars at a fixed parity with gold. This impacted the desirability of the dollar, which in turn threatened its position as a reserve currency issuer. When a run for America’s gold reserves showed a lack of trust in the dollar, President Nixon decided in 1971 to unhook the value of the dollar from gold altogether.

                Notwithstanding these two events, America’s leadership upon its alliance system would remain intact, as there was no one else to face the Soviet threat. However, when around two decades later the Soviet Union imploded, America’s standing at the top would become global for the same reason: There was no one else there. Significantly, the United States’ supremacy was to be accepted as legitimate by the whole international community because, again, it was able to interweave the exercise of its power with international institutions and legal instruments.

    Inexplicable under the light of common sense

                In 2001, however, George W. Bush’s team came into government bringing with them an awkward notion about the United States’ might. Instead of understanding that the hegemonic system in place served their country’s interests perfectly well, the Bush team believed that such a system had to be rearranged in tandem with America’s new position as the sole superpower. As a consequence, they began to turn upside down a complex structure that had taken decades to build.

    The Bush administration’s world frame became, indeed, a curious one. It believed in unconditional followers and not in allies’ worthy of respect; it believed in ad hoc coalitions and “with us or against us” propositions where multilateral institutions and norms had little value; it believed in the punishment of dissidence and not in the encouragement of cooperation; it believed in preventive action prevailing over international law.

    In proclaiming the futility of cooperative multilateralism, which in their perspective just constrained the freedom of action of America’s might, they asserted the prerogatives of a sole superpower. The Bush administration’s world frame became, indeed, a curious one. It believed in unconditional followers and not in allies’ worthy of respect; it believed in ad hoc coalitions and “with us or against us” propositions where multilateral institutions and norms had little value; it believed in the punishment of dissidence and not in the encouragement of cooperation; it believed in preventive action prevailing over international law. Well-known “neoconservatives” such as Charles Krauthammer, Robert Kagan, and John Bolton, proclaimed America’s supremacy and derided countries not willing to follow its unilateralism.

                But who were these neoconservatives? They were the intellectual architects of Bush’s foreign policy, who saw themselves as the natural inheritors of the foreign policy establishment of Truman’s time. The one that had forged the fundamental guidelines of America’s foreign policy during the Cold War, in what was labelled as the “creation”. In their view, with the United States having won the Cold War, a new creation was needed. Their beliefs could be summed up as diplomacy if possible, force if necessary; U.N. if possible, ad hoc coalitions, unilateral action, and preemptive strikes if necessary. America, indeed, should not be constrained by accepted rules, multilateral institutions, or international law. At the same time, the U.S.’ postulates of freedom and democracy, expressions of its exceptionalism, entailed the right to propitiate regime change whenever necessary, in order to preserve America’s security and the world order.

    Bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, while deriding and humiliating so many around the world, America’s neoconservatives undressed the emperor. By taking off his clothes, they made his frailties visible for everyone to watch.

    Inexplicable, under the light of common sense, the Bush team disassociated power from the international structures and norms that facilitated and legitimized its exercise. As a consequence, America moved from being the most successful hegemonic power ever to becoming a second-rate imperial power that proved incapable of prevailing in two peripheral wars. Bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, while deriding and humiliating so many around the world, America’s neoconservatives undressed the emperor. By taking off his clothes, they made his frailties visible for everyone to watch.

                At the beginning of 2005, while reporting a Pew Research Center poll, The Economist stated that the prevailing anti-American sentiment around the world was greater and deeper than at any other moment in history. The BBC World Service and Global Poll Research Partners, meanwhile, conducted another global poll in which they asked, “How do you perceive the influence of the U.S. in the world?”. The populations of some of America’s traditional allies gave an adverse answer in the following percentages: Canada 60%; Mexico 57%; Germany 54%; Australia 52%; Brazil 51%; United Kingdom 50%. With such a negative perception among Washington’s closest allies, America’s credibility was in tatters.[2]

             Is the liberal international order ending? what is next? dailysabah.com

     While Bush’s presidency was reaching its end, Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote a pivotal book that asserted that the United States had lost much of its international standing. This felt, according to the book, particularly disturbing. Indeed, as a result of the combined impact of modern technology and global political awakening, that speeded up political history, what in the past took centuries to materialize now just took decades, whereas what before had taken decades, now could materialize in a single year. The primacy of any world power was thus faced with immense pressures of change, adaptation and fall. Brzezinski believed, however, that although America had deeply eroded its international standing, a second chance was still possible. This is because no other power could rival Washington’s role. However, recuperating the lost trust and legitimacy would be an arduous job, requiring years of sustained effort and true ability. The opportunity of this second chance should not be missed, he insisted, as there wouldn’t be a third one. [3]

    A second chance

                Barak Obama did certainly his best to recover the space that had been lost during the preceding eight years. That is, the U.S.’s leading role within a liberal internationalist structure. However, times had changed since his predecessor’s inauguration. In the first place, a massive financial crisis that had begun in America welcomed Obama, when he arrived at the White House. This had increased the international doubts about the trustiness of the country. In the second place, China’s economy and international position had taken a huge leap ahead during the previous eight years. Brzezinski’s notion that no other power could rival the United States was rapidly evolving. As a result, Obama was left facing a truly daunting challenge.

                To rebuild Washington’s standing in the international scene, Obama’s administration embarked on a dual course of action. He followed, on the one hand, cooperative multilateralism and collective action. On the other hand, he prioritized the U.S.’ presence where it was most in need, avoiding unnecessary distractions as much as possible. Within the first of these aims, Obama seemed to have adhered to Richard Hass’ notion that power alone was simple potentiality, with the role of a successful foreign policy being that of transforming potentiality into real influence. Good evidence of this approach was provided through Washington’s role in the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in relation to Iran, in the NATO summits, in the newly created G20, and in the summits of the Americas, among many other instances. By not becoming too overbearing, and by respecting other countries’ points of view, the Obama Administration played a leading influence within the context of collective action. Although theoretically being one among many, the United States always played the leading role.[4]

    Within this context, Obama’s administration followed a coalition-building strategy. The Trans-Pacific Partnership represented the economic approach to the pivot and aimed at building an association covering forty per cent of the global economy. There, the United States would be the first among equals. As for the security approach to the pivot, the U.S. Navy repositioned its forces within the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans.

                To prioritize America’s presence where it was most needed, Obama turned the attention to China and the Asia-Pacific. While America was focusing on the Middle East, China enjoyed a period of strategic opportunity. His administration’s “pivot to Asia” emerged as a result. This policy had the dual objective of building economic prosperity and security, within that region. Its intention was countering, through facts, the notion that America was losing its staying power in the Pacific. Within this context, Obama’s administration followed a coalition-building strategy. The Trans-Pacific Partnership represented the economic approach to the pivot and aimed at building an association covering forty per cent of the global economy. There, the United States would be the first among equals. As for the security approach to the pivot, the U.S. Navy repositioned its forces within the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans. From a roughly fifty-fifty correlation between the two oceans, sixty per cent of its fleet was moved to the Pacific. Meanwhile, the U.S. increased joint exercises and training with several countries of the region, while stationing 2,500 marines in Darwin, Australia. As a result of the pivot, many of China’s neighbours began to feel that there was a real alternative to this country’s overbearing assertiveness.[5]

                Barak Obama was on a good track to consolidating the second chance that Brzezinski had alluded to. His foreign policy helped much in regaining international credibility and standing for his country, and the Bush years began to be seen as just a bump on the road of America’s foreign policy. Unfortunately, Donald Trump was the next President. And Trump coming just eight years after Bush, was more than what America’s allies could swallow.

    Dog-eat-dog foreign policy

                The Bush and Trump foreign policies could not be put on an equal footing, though. The abrasive arrogance of Bush’s neoconservatives, however distasteful, embodied a school of thought in matters of foreign policy. One, characterized by a merger between exalted visions of America’s exceptionalism and Wilsonianism. Francis Fukuyama defined it as Wilsionanism minus international institutions, whereas John Mearsheimer labelled it as Wilsionanism with teeth. Although overplaying conventional notions to the extreme, Bush’s foreign policy remained on track with a longstanding tradition. Much to the contrary, Trump’s foreign policy, according to Fareed Zakaria, was based on a more basic premise– The world was largely an uninteresting place, except for the fact that most countries just wanted to screw the United States. Trump believed that by stripping the global system of its ordering arrangements, a “dog eat dog” environment would emerge. One, in which his country would come up as the top dog. His foreign policy, thus, was but a reflection of gut feelings, sheer ignorance and prejudices.[6]

                Trump derided multilateral cooperation and preferred a bilateral approach to foreign relations. One, in which America could exert its full power in a direct way, instead of letting it dilute by including others in the decision-making process. Within this context, the U.S.’ market leverage had to be used to its full extent, to corner others into complying with Washington’s positions. At the same time, he equated economy and national security and, as a consequence, was prone to “weaponize” economic policies. Moreover, he premised on the use of the American dollar as a bullying tool to be used to his country’s political advantage. Not only China but some of America’s main allies as well, were targeted within this approach. Dusting off Section 323 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act, which allowed tariffs on national security grounds, Trump imposed penalizations in every direction. Some of the USA’s closest allies were badly affected as a result.

                Given Trump’s contempt for cooperative multilateralism, but also aiming at erasing Obama’s legacy, an obsessive issue with him, he withdrew the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, and from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in relation to Iran. He also withdrew his country from other multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations’ Human Rights Commission and, in the middle of the Covid 19 pandemic, from the World Health Organization. Trump threatened to cut funding to the U.N., waged a largely victorious campaign to sideline the International Criminal Court, and brought the World Trade Organization to a virtual standstill. Even more, he did not just walk away from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, in relation to Iran, but threatened its other signatories to impose sanctions on them if, on the basis of the agreement, they continued to trade with Iran.

    Trump followed a transactional approach to foreign policy in which principles and allies mattered little, and where trade and money were prioritized over security considerations.

                Trump followed a transactional approach to foreign policy in which principles and allies mattered little, and where trade and money were prioritized over security considerations. In 2019, he asked Japan to increase fourfold its annual contribution for the privilege of hosting 50,000 American troops in its territory, while requesting South Korea to pay 400 percent more for hosting American soldiers. This, amid China’s increasing assertiveness and North Korea’s continuous threats. In his relations with New Delhi, a fundamental U.S. ally within any containment strategy to China, he subordinated geostrategic considerations to trade. On the premise that India was limiting American manufacturers from access to its market, Trump threatened this proud nation with a trade war.[7]

                Irritated because certain NATO member countries were not spending enough on their defence, Trump labelled some of Washington’s closest partners within the organization as “delinquents”. He also threatened to reduce the U.S.’ participation in NATO, calling it “obsolete”, while referring to Germany as a “captive of Russia”. At the same time, Trump abruptly cancelled a meeting with the Danish Prime Minister, because she was unwilling to discuss the sale of Greenland to the United States. This, notwithstanding the fact that this was something expressively forbidden by the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, represents the cornerstone of European stability. The European Union, in his view, was not a fundamental ally, but a competitor and an economic foe. Deliberately, Trump antagonized European governments, including that of London at the time, by cheering Brexit. Meanwhile, he imposed tariffs on steel and aluminium on many of its closest partners and humiliated Canada and Mexico by imposing upon them a tough renegotiation of NAFTA. One, whose ensuing accord did not bring significant changes. Moreover, he fractured the G7, a group integrated by Washington’s closest allies, leaving the United States standing alone on one side with the rest standing on the other.

    In June 2018, Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, expressed his bewilderment at seeing that the rules-based international order was being challenged precisely by its main architect and guarantor– the United States. Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf summoned up all of this, by expressing that under Trump the U.S. had become a rogue superpower.

                Unsurprisingly, thus, America’s closest allies reached the conclusion that they could no longer trust it. Several examples attested to this. In November 2017, Canberra’s White Paper on the security of Asia expressed uncertainty about America’s commitment to that continent. In April 2018, the United Kingdom, Germany and France issued an official statement expressing that they would forcefully defend their interests against the U.S.’ protectionism. On May 10, 2018, Angela Merkel stated in Aquisgran that the time in which Europe could trust America was over. On May 31, 2018, Justin Trudeau aired Canada’s affront at being considered a threat to the United States. In June 2018, Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, expressed his bewilderment at seeing that the rules-based international order was being challenged precisely by its main architect and guarantor– the United States. In November 2019, in an interview given to The Economist, Emmanuel Macron stated that the European countries could no longer rely on the United States, which had turned its back on them. Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf summoned up all of this, by expressing that under Trump the U.S. had become a rogue superpower.[8]

    The return of liberal internationalism

    Politically and geopolitically Biden rapidly went back to the old premises of liberal internationalism. Cooperative multilateralism and collective action were put back in place, and alliances became, once again, a fundamental part of America’s foreign policy. 

               As mentioned, George W. Bush followed a few years later by Donald Trump was more than what America’s allies could handle. Fortunately for that country, and for its allies, Trump failed to be re-elected in 2020, and Joe Biden came to power. True, the latter’s so-called foreign policy for the middle classes kept in place some of Trump’s international trade policies. However, politically and geopolitically he rapidly went back to the old premises of liberal internationalism. Cooperative multilateralism and collective action were put back in place, and alliances became, once again, a fundamental part of America’s foreign policy.  Moreover, Biden forcefully addressed some of his country’s main economic deficiencies, which had become an important source of vulnerability in its rivalry with China. In sum, Biden strengthened the United States’ economy, its alliances, and its international standing.

                Notwithstanding the fact that Biden had to fight inch by inch with a seemingly unconquerable opposition, while continuously negotiating with two reluctant senators from his own party, he was able to pass a group of transformational laws. Among them, are the Infrastructure Investment and Job Act, the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act. Together, these legislations allow for a government investment of a trillion dollars in the modernization of the country’s economy and its re-industrialization, including the consolidation of its technological leadership, the updating of its infrastructures and the reconversion of its energy matrix towards clean energy. Private investments derived from such laws would be gigantic, with the sole CHIPS Act having produced investment pledges of more than 100 billion dollars. This projects, vis-à-vis China’s competition, an image of strength and strategic purpose. Moreover, before foes and friends, these accomplishments prove that the U.S. can overcome its legislative gridlocks, in order to modernize its economy and its competitive standing.

                Meanwhile, Washington’s alliances have significantly strengthened. In Europe, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Washington’s firm reaction to it had important consequences. While the former showed to its European allies that America’s leadership was still indispensable, the latter made clear that the U.S. had the determination and the capacity to exercise such leadership. Washington has indeed led in response to the invasion, in the articulation of the alliances and the revitalization of NATO, in sanctions on Russia, and in the organization of the help provided to Ukraine. It has also been Kyiv’s main source of support in military equipment and intelligence, deciding at each step of the road what kind of armament should be supplied to the Ukrainian forces. In short, before European allies that had doubted Washington’s commitments to its continent, and of the viability of NATO itself, America proved to be the indispensable superpower.

                Meanwhile, American alliances in the Indo-Pacific have also been strengthened and expanded, with multiple initiatives emerging as a result. As the invasion of Ukraine made evident the return of geopolitics by the big door, increasing the fears of China’s threat to regional order, Washington has become for many the essential partner. America’s security umbrella has proved to be for them a fundamental tool in containing China’s increasing arrogance and disregard for international law and jurisprudence. Among the security mechanisms or initiatives created or reinforced under its stewardship are an energized Quad; the emergence of AUKUS; NATO’s approach to the Indo-Pacific region; the tripartite Camp David’s security agreement between Japan, South Korea and the U.S.; a revamped defence treaty with The Philippines; an increased military cooperation with Australia; and Hanoi’s growing strategic alignment with Washington. On the economic side, we find the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity and the freshly emerged Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment & India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor.

    Enough would be enough

                Although the Global South has proved to be particularly reluctant to fall back under the security leadership of the superpowers, Washington has undoubtedly become the indispensable partner for many in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Thanks to Biden, the United States has repositioned itself on the cusp of a potent alliance system, regaining credibility and vitality. What would happen, thus, if he is defeated in the 2024 elections and Trump regains the White House? In 2007, Brzezinski believed, as mentioned, that although America had deeply eroded its international standing, a second chance was still possible. Actually, with Biden (and thanks in no small part to the Russian invasion and China’s pugnacity), the U.S. got an unexpected third chance. But definitively, enough would be enough. Moreover, during Trump’s first term in office, a professional civil service and an institutional contention wall (boosted by the so-called “adults in the room”), may have been able to keep at bay Trump’s worst excesses. According to The Economist, though, that wouldn’t be the case during a second term, where thousands of career public servants would be fired and substituted by MAGA followers. The deconstruction of the so-called “deep State” would be the aim to be attained, which would translate into getting rid of anyone who knows how to get the job done within the Federal Government. Hence, for America’s allies, Trump’s nightmarish first period would pale in relation to a second one. Trump followed four years later by Trump, no doubt about it, would shatter America’s trustiness, credibility, international standing, and its system of alliances. [9]

    Notes:

    [1] “Bracing for Trump 2.0”, Foreign Affairs, September 5, 2023

    [2] The Economist, 19th February, 2005; Walt, Stephen M, Taming American Power, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2005, p.72.

    [3] Second Chance, New York: Basic Books, 2007, p. 191, 192, 206.

    [4] Hass, Richard, “America and the Great Abdication”, The Atlantic, December 28, 2017.

    [5] Campbell, Kurt, The Pivot, New York: Twelve, 2016, pp. 11-28.

    [6] Steltzer, Irwin, Neoconservatism, London: Atlantic Books, 2004, pp. 3-28; Fukuyama, Francis, “After the Neoconservatives”, London: Profile Books, 2006, p. 41; Zakaria, Farid, “The Self-Destruction of American Power”, Foreign Affairs, July-August 2019.

    [7] World Politics Review, “Trump works overtime to shake down alliances in Asia and appease North Korea”, October 14, 2019.

    [8] White, Hugh, “Canberra voices fears”, The Strait Time, 25 November, 2017; Breuninger, Kevin, “Canada announces retaliatory tariffs”, CNBC, May 31, 2018; The Economist, “Emmanuel Macron warns Europe”, November 7th, 2019; Kishore Mahbubani, Has China Won? New York: Public Affairs, 2020, p. 56; Cooley, Alexander and Nexon, Daniel, Exit from Hegemony , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, p. 70.

    [9]  The Economist, “Preparing the way: The alarming plans for Trump’s second term”, July 15th, 2023.

     

    Feature Image Credit: livemint.com

    Cartoon Credit: seltzercreativegroup.com

  • BRICS: On 1 January 2024, the World’s Centre of Gravity will Shift

    BRICS: On 1 January 2024, the World’s Centre of Gravity will Shift

    As is often the case in history, the actions of a dying empire create common ground for its victims to look for new alternatives, no matter how embryonic and contradictory they are. The diversity of support for the expansion of BRICS is an indication of the growing loss of the political hegemony of imperialism.

    On the last day of the BRICS summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, the five founding states (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) welcomed six new members: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The BRICS partnership now encompasses 47.3 per cent of the world’s population, with a combined global Gross Domestic Product (by purchasing power parity, or PPP,) of 36.4 per cent. In comparison, though the G7 states (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) account for merely 10 per cent of the world’s population, their share of the global GDP (by PPP) is 30.4 per cent. In 2021, the nations that today form the expanded BRICS group were responsible for 38.3 percent of global industrial output while their G7 counterparts accounted for 30.5 percent. All available indicators, including harvest production and the total volume of metal production, show the immense power of this new grouping. Celso Amorim, advisor to the Brazilian government and one of the architects of BRICS during his former tenure as foreign minister, said of the new development that ‘[t]he world can no longer be dictated by the G7’.

    Certainly, the BRICS nations, for all their internal hierarchies and challenges, now represent a larger share of the global GDP than the G7, which continues to behave as the world’s executive body. Over forty countries expressed an interest in joining BRICS, although only twenty-three applied for membership before the South Africa meeting (including seven of the thirteen countries in the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, or OPEC). Indonesia, the world’s seventh largest country in terms of GDP (by PPP), withdrew its application to BRICS at the last moment but said it would consider joining later. Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo’s comments reflect the mood of the summit: ‘We must reject trade discrimination. Industrial down streaming must not be hindered. We must all continue to voice equal and inclusive cooperation’.

    The facts are clear: the Global North’s percentage of world GDP fell from 57.3 per cent in 1993 to 40.6 per cent in 2022, with the US’s percentage shrinking from 19.7 per cent to only 15.6 per cent of global GDP (by PPP) in the same period – despite its monopoly privilege. In 2022, the Global South, without China, had a GDP (by PPP) greater than that of the Global North.

    BRICS does not operate independently of new regional formations that aim to build platforms outside the grip of the West, such as the Community of Latin America and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Instead, BRICS membership has the potential to enhance regionalism for those already within these regional fora. Both sets of interregional bodies are leaning into a historical tide supported by important data, analysed by Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research using a range of widely available and reliable global databases. The facts are clear: the Global North’s percentage of world GDP fell from 57.3 per cent in 1993 to 40.6 per cent in 2022, with the US’s percentage shrinking from 19.7 per cent to only 15.6 per cent of global GDP (by PPP) in the same period – despite its monopoly privilege. In 2022, the Global South, without China, had a GDP (by PPP) greater than that of the Global North.

    The West, perhaps because of its rapid relative economic decline, is struggling to maintain its hegemony by driving a New Cold War against emergent states such as China. Perhaps the single best evidence of the racial, political, military, and economic plans of the Western powers can be summed up by a recent declaration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU): ‘NATO and the EU play complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security. We will further mobilise the combined set of instruments at our disposal, be they political, economic, or military, to pursue our common objectives to the benefit of our one billion citizens’.

    Why did BRICS welcome such a disparate group of countries, including two monarchies, into its fold? When asked to reflect on the character of the new full member states, Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva said, ‘What matters is not the person who governs but the importance of the country. We can’t deny the geopolitical importance of Iran and other countries that will join BRICS’. This is the measure of how the founding countries made the decision to expand their alliance. At the heart of BRICS’s growth are at least three issues: control over energy supplies and pathways, control over global financial and development systems, and control over institutions for peace and security.

    A larger BRICS has now created a formidable energy group. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are also members of OPEC, which, with Russia, a key member of OPEC+, now accounts for 26.3 million barrels of oil per day, just below thirty per cent of global daily oil production. Egypt, which is not an OPEC member, is nonetheless one of the largest African oil producers, with an output of 567,650 barrels per day. China’s role in brokering a deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia in April enabled the entry of both of these oil-producing countries into BRICS. The issue here is not just the production of oil, but the establishment of new global energy pathways.

    The Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative has already created a web of oil and natural gas platforms around the Global South, integrated into the expansion of Khalifa Port and natural gas facilities at Fujairah and Ruwais in the UAE, alongside the development of Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030. There is every expectation that the expanded BRICS will begin to coordinate its energy infrastructure outside of OPEC+, including the volumes of oil and natural gas that are drawn out of the earth. Tensions between Russia and Saudi Arabia over oil volumes have simmered this year as Russia exceeded its quota to compensate for Western sanctions placed on it due to the war in Ukraine. Now these two countries will have another forum, outside of OPEC+ and with China at the table, to build a common agenda on energy. Saudi Arabia plans to sell oil to China in renminbi (RMB), undermining the structure of the petrodollar system (China’s two other main oil providers, Iraq and Russia, already receive payment in RMB).

    Both the discussions at the BRICS summit and its final communiqué focused on the need to strengthen a financial and development architecture for the world that is not governed by the triumvirate of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Wall Street, and the US dollar. However, BRICS does not seek to circumvent established global trade and development institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World Bank, and the IMF. For instance, BRICS reaffirmed the importance of the ‘rules-based multilateral trading system with the World Trade Organisation at its core’ and called for ‘a robust Global Financial Safety Net with a quota-based and adequately resourced [IMF] at its centre’. Its proposals do not fundamentally break with the IMF or WTO; rather, they offer a dual pathway forward: first, for BRICS to exert more control and direction over these organisations, of which they are members but have been suborned to a Western agenda, and second, for BRICS states to realise their aspirations to build their own parallel institutions (such as the New Development Bank, or NDB). Saudi Arabia’s massive investment fund is worth close to $1 trillion, which could partially resource the NDB.

    BRICS’s agenda to improve ‘the stability, reliability, and fairness of the global financial architecture’ is mostly being carried forward by the ‘use of local currencies, alternative financial arrangements, and alternative payment systems’. The concept of ‘local currencies’ refers to the growing practice of states using their own currencies for cross-border trade rather than relying upon the dollar. Though approximately 150 currencies in the world are considered to be legal tender, cross-border payments almost always rely on the dollar (which, as of 2021, accounts for 40 per cent of flows over the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications, or SWIFT, network).

    Other currencies play a limited role, with the Chinese RMB comprising 2.5 per cent of cross-border payments. However, the emergence of new global messaging platforms – such as China’s Cross-Border Payment Interbank System, India’s Unified Payments Interface, and Russia’s Financial Messaging System (SPFS) – as well as regional digital currency systems promise to increase the use of alternative currencies. For instance, cryptocurrency assets briefly provided a potential avenue for new trading systems before their asset valuations declined, and the expanded BRICS recently approved the establishment of a working group to study a BRICS reference currency.

    Following the expansion of BRICS, the NDB said that it will also expand its members and that, as its General Strategy, 2022–2026 notes, thirty per cent of all of its financing will be in local currencies. As part of its framework for a new development system, its president, Dilma Rousseff, said that the NDB will not follow the IMF policy of imposing conditions on borrowing countries. ‘We repudiate any kind of conditionality’, Rousseff said. ‘Often a loan is given upon the condition that certain policies are carried out. We don’t do that. We respect the policies of each country’.

    In their communiqué, the BRICS nations write about the importance of ‘comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council’

    In their communiqué, the BRICS nations write about the importance of ‘comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council’. Currently, the UN Security Council has fifteen members, five of whom are permanent (China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US). There are no permanent members from Africa, Latin America, or the most populous country in the world, India. To repair these inequities, BRICS offers its support to ‘the legitimate aspirations of emerging and developing countries from Africa, Asia, and Latin America, including Brazil, India, and South Africa to play a greater role in international affairs’. The West’s refusal to allow these countries a permanent seat at the UN Security Council has only strengthened their commitment to the BRICS process and to enhance their role in the G20.

    The entry of Ethiopia and Iran into BRICS shows how these large Global South states are reacting to the West’s sanctions policy against dozens of countries, including two founding BRICS members (China and Russia). The Group of Friends in Defence of the UN Charter – Venezuela’s initiative from 2019 – brings together twenty UN member states that are facing the brunt of illegal US sanctions, from Algeria to Zimbabwe. Many of these states attended the BRICS summit as invitees and are eager to join the expanded BRICS as full members.

    We are not living in a period of revolutions. Socialists always seek to advance democratic and progressive trends. As is often the case in history, the actions of a dying empire create common ground for its victims to look for new alternatives, no matter how embryonic and contradictory they are. The diversity of support for the expansion of BRICS is an indication of the growing loss of the political hegemony of imperialism.

    This article was published earlier in tricontinental.org and is republished under the Creative Commons.

     

  • BRICS++: The West tries playing ‘catch-up’, but it’s too late

    BRICS++: The West tries playing ‘catch-up’, but it’s too late

    Until recently, the West has largely derided the BRICS project. But it finally is awaking to the fact that the BRICS initiative possesses the potential to turn both geo-politics, and the international monetary system, upside-down.

    The seismic Geo-Political event of this era is the explosion of BRICS membership and of even bigger potential BRICS membership. This movement has crossed a key threshold. It has transited from ‘vanilla’ multipolarity to being an anti-colonial expression — a shift that should not be underestimated. It is an ethos drawing energy from deep layers of passionate feeling that was stifled in the immediate post-war years, but which is re-surfacing to invest the multi-polar framework with evident dynamism.

    There are currently eight nations that have formally applied for membership and 17 others that have expressed interest in joining. If Saudi Arabia and Russia are both members, that is two of the three largest energy producers in the one camp.

    If Russia, China, Brazil and India are all members, there will be four of the seven largest countries in the world measured by landmass — possessing 30% of the Earth’s dry surface and related natural resources — as BRICS members.

    Almost 50% of the world’s wheat and rice production, as well as 15% of the world’s gold reserves, are in the BRICS.

    Meanwhile, China, India, Brazil, and Russia are four of the nine highest-population countries on the planet with a combined population of 3.2 billion people or 40% of the Earth’s population.

    “China, India, Brazil, Russia and Saudi Arabia have a combined GDP of $29 trillion or 28% of nominal global GDP. If one uses purchasing power parity to measure GDP, then the BRICS share is over 54%. Russia and China have two of the three largest nuclear arsenals in the world”.

    “By every measure then — population, landmass, energy output, GDP, food output and nuclear weapons — BRICS is not just another multilateral debating society. They are a substantial and credible alternative to Western hegemony”, Jim Rickards asserts.

    With a new trading currency framework likely to be fore-shadowed in August at the BRICS summit, the currency will descend upon a highly receptive audience. It will fall into an increasingly sophisticated network of capital and communications. This network will greatly enhance its chances of success.

    The key mistake is the failure to distinguish between the respective roles of a payment (trading) currency and a reserve currency. Payment currencies are used in trade for goods and services. Nations can trade in whatever payment currency they want; it doesn’t have to be dollars. However, in so doing – in a large way – the demand for the dollar incrementally is drained away. Ultimately this loss of foreign demand for dollars circumscribes the ability of the US to go on spending well above its income.

    What has defined a reserve currency has been a large, well-developed sovereign bond market. No country in the world comes close to the US Treasury bond market in terms of breadth and convertibility.

    And Western finance personnel, therefore, snort in derision at the prospects of the US dollar ever losing its hegemony. But they forget perhaps that there was no US bond market until WW1 when  Woodrow Wilson authorized Liberty Bonds to help finance the war. There were bond rallies and Liberty Bond parades in every major city. It became a patriotic duty to buy Liberty Bonds. The effort worked, and it birthed the US bond market.

    In short, the way to create an instant reserve currency is to create an instant bond market using your own citizens as willing buyers. As Jim Rickards earlier noted, were the BRICS to ‘use a patriotic model’ (by drawing on today’s anti-colonial spirit sweeping the BRICS countries) it would be possible to create international reserve assets denominated in the BRICS+ (trading) currency.

    Also, the recent Bank for International Settlements (BIS)-led experiments in real-time and digital Central Bank foreign exchange transactions promises to transform such a project – and to lessen substantially the need for a large reserve-asset reservoir.

    Until recently, the West has largely derided the BRICS project. But it finally is awaking to the fact that the BRICS initiative possesses the potential to turn both geo-politics and the international monetary system, upside-down.

    This month, the Chair of the Eurasia Group, Cliff Kupchan, wrote in Foreign Policy that “6 Swing States Will Decide the Future of Geopolitics”

    “Middle powers today have more agency than at any time since World War II. These are countries with significant leverage in geopolitics. Much more interesting [however] are the six leading middle powers of the global south: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey. These swing states of the global south are not fully aligned with either superpower and are therefore free to create new power dynamics. These six also serve as a good barometer for broader geopolitical trends”.

     

    “… the question remains whether the BRICS states are going to become a more formal institution under China’s direction … that prospect is a clear challenge to the West…But the threat is unlikely to materialize. These countries may have tacked away from the United States — but that’s different from joining a Chinese-directed, Russian-assisted body actively opposing the United States. As of now, BRICS has not shown the ability to develop and implement a common agenda, so there is very little institutional strength for China to co-opt”

    The blinkers are on. The Western Establishment just doesn’t ‘get it’. Kupchan’s article’s conclusion: “the US has been playing catch-up – and not doing very well at even that”. It needs a well-crafted strategy toward each of the key Swing States (to halt their ‘tacking away’ from the US, towards the Russia-China axis), he warns. Arm-twisting, threats and coercion, presumably, as usual.

    ‘Catching-up’?  The horse already has bolted. The stable is empty.

     

    Feature Image: Indian Express

    This article was published earlier in Al Mayadeen English.