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  • Recalibrating India’s Act East Policy: New Realities in Myanmar and Bangladesh

    Recalibrating India’s Act East Policy: New Realities in Myanmar and Bangladesh

    On 23 September 2024, Reuters published a news item quoting unnamed sources that said that India had ‘ invited political and military opponents of Myanmar’s ruling junta to attend a seminar in New Delhi. Even as the lack of corroboration of such a report puts it in the realm of conjecture, it is worthwhile mulling over the motivations or otherwise for such a seminal event to be even contemplated, especially in the light of implications for India’s Act East Policy.

     

    TPF Occasional Paper: 10/2024

    Recalibrating India’s Act East Policy: New Realities in Myanmar and Bangladesh

    Maj Gen Alok Deb (Retd)

    On 23 September 2024, Reuters published a news item quoting unnamed sources that said that India had ‘ invited political and military opponents of Myanmar’s ruling junta to attend a seminar in New Delhi’[i]. The item went on to specify that the shadow National Unity Government (NUG) and ethnic minority rebels from the states of Chin, Rakhine and Kachin bordering India had been invited to a seminar in mid-November, to be hosted by the Delhi-based Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), a foreign policy think tank funded by the Government of India. The piece was also carried by some major Indian newspapers with its origin attributed to Reuters. At the time of writing, there has been no acknowledgement or rebuttal of this report by any government agency. Neither has the ICWA posted this on its website as a forthcoming event. Even as the lack of corroboration of such a report puts it in the realm of conjecture, it is worthwhile mulling over the motivations or otherwise for such a seminal event to be even contemplated, especially in the light of implications for India’s Act East Policy.

    A Summary of India’s Act East Policy

    India’s ‘Act East’ policy of 2014 is an initiative that takes off from its earlier ‘Look East’ policy. ‘Act East’ envisages initiatives at multiple levels with the nations of ASEAN and the wider Indo-Pacific region. These initiatives are to be taken forward through a process of continuous engagement at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels, thereby providing enhanced connectivity in its broadest sense, including political, economic, cultural and people-to-people relations.[ii]

    To successfully implement the ‘Act East’ policy, the Indian government is working to make the North East its strategic gateway to ASEAN. Accordingly, it has increased the allocation for the region’s development by more than four times over the last 10 years.[iii]  The North East is also poised to benefit from initiatives from countries like Japan which earlier this year had proposed developing an industrial hub in Bangladesh with supply chains to the North East, Nepal and Bhutan.[iv]

    As the North East becomes India’s gateway to ASEAN,  the centrality of Myanmar to our Act East becomes apparent. It is the key link in the road connectivity between India’s North East and other ASEAN nations whereby the free flow of inland goods, services and other initiatives to and from these nations to India can be ensured. The success or otherwise of Act East is thus directly affected by the security environment in Myanmar. Instability here will negatively impact our North Eastern states sharing borders with that country. The internal situation in Myanmar therefore becomes an area of prime concern for India, warranting close attention.

    For similar reasons, another neighbour, Bangladesh, is equally important for the success of India’s Act East Policy. India’s North East has benefitted from good ties with Bangladesh, both security-wise and economically. Militancy in the North East has reduced over the last decade and a half. With Bangladesh agreeing to provide access to its ports in the Bay of Bengal for the movement of Indian goods, the North Eastern states have a shorter route to the sea. Additionally, states bordering Bangladesh such as Assam and Meghalaya have developed trade links with that country for mutual benefit. The  BBIN (Bangladesh Bhutan India Nepal) Motor Vehicle Agreement for the Regulation of Passenger, Personal and Cargo Vehicular Traffic was signed in 2015 to ‘ promote safe, economically efficient and environmentally sound road transport in the sub-region and … further help each country in creating an institutional mechanism for regional integration’  is another mechanism for implementing our Act East and Neighbourhood First policies[v]. The role of Bangladesh here is pivotal.

    State of the Civil War in Myanmar

    Fighting in Myanmar is now in its fourth year. The military junta continues to suffer reverses on the battlefield. Large portions of Rakhine State and certain portions of Chin State are now under the control of the Arakan Army (AA). International Crisis Group has recently averred that ‘..in just a few months, the Arakan Army has created the largest area in Myanmar under the control of a non-state armed group – in terms of both size and population – and is now on the verge of securing almost all of Rakhine’[vi].

    In Shan state to the North, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (TBA) of three Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) had by December 2023, captured over 20,000 square kilometres of territory, including key border crossings and trade routes between China and Myanmar in Operation 1027[vii].  On 07 March 2024, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) launched Operation 0307 and successfully captured certain military posts across  Kachin State close to the Chinese border. This forced the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military) to redeploy, further thinning out forces[viii]. Fighting also continues in other states and regions across the country, notably Sagaing and Kayah.

    Associated Press deduces that ‘.. the announcement of the measure on state television amounts to a major, though tacit, admission that the army is struggling to contain the nationwide armed resistance against its rule..’.The Junta has since conscripted Rohingya youth and deployed them against the Rakhines. 

    Notwithstanding these losses, there is no let-up in the Tatmadaw’s efforts to combat the rebels. The Junta has resorted to conscription to stem rising attrition, activating an old law in this regard. Associated Press deduces that ‘.. the announcement of the measure on state television amounts to a major, though tacit, admission that the army is struggling to contain the nationwide armed resistance against its rule..’ [ix] To further contextualise, the same article stated the rebel National Unity Government’s (NUG) claim that more than 14,000 troops have defected from the military since the 2021 seizure of power. The Junta has since conscripted Rohingya youth and deployed them against the Rakhines. The Chins fear that they too will be acted upon similarly.[x]

    To overcome the asymmetry of force especially in artillery and airpower, the rebels have acquired large numbers of drones. These are being used to bomb military positions, contributing significantly towards the successes of the CNA’s operations[xi].  To summarise, Myanmar’s civil war continues to see-saw with no signs of ebbing. The Junta continues to make periodic peace overtures to the NUG with conditionalities that the latter is unwilling to accept[xii]. With the multiplicity of actors and issues involved, there are no clear indications of how and when the conflict will be resolved.

    Impact of the  Myanmar Conflict on India’s North-East

    The impact of Myanmar’s internal situation on India’s border states has progressively worsened. Initially, after the Junta takeover, it was Mizoram which bore the brunt. The state government citing common ethnicity and humanitarian concerns accepted the influx of Chins from Myanmar as a moral responsibility and initiated rehabilitation measures. These refugees along with earlier refugees from Bangladesh recently joined Kukis from Manipur, number around 44000 and continue to remain in refugee camps.[xiii] The Central government has had to reconcile its policy of preventing infiltration across borders with the societal realities of Mizoram. A positive outcome of this approach is that there has been no violence in Mizoram.

    In Manipur, by September 2024, the 18-month-long ethnic conflict had resulted in over 225 deaths and some 60,000 people displaced.[xiv] The administration has been derided by both sides, more so with recent warnings about impending threats to law and order[xv] followed by retractions[xvi]. People of either community have been uprooted from their homes and moved to safe areas separated by buffer zones guarded by security forces.  So great is the mutual suspicion that on the clamour of the Meiteis to replace the Assam Rifles, two battalions of this central force have been withdrawn and replaced by the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), against the wishes of the Kukis[xvii].

    Voices for an independent ‘Kukiland’ for the Kuki Zo peoples are being raised,[xviii] which are variously interpreted as a demand for greater autonomy within Manipur or for a separate union territory. The current happenings also dredge up the old ghost of ‘Zale’n-gam’ or Kuki nation, comprising the Chin Kuki Zomi peoples (including Mizos) residing across India, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Zale’n- gam has few takers and appears restricted to a YouTube channel[xix]. Today both sides fight each other with a variety of weapons including improvised rockets and drones. Hostage-taking is the latest tactic that has been adopted.[xx]

    Tension between the Nagas of Manipur and other communities is discernible with some reports of violence against the former.[xxi] As of now Nagas have kept out of the Kuki-Meitei dispute; also, other than the insurgent National Socialist Council of Nagaland ( Isak Muviah) faction (NSCN-IM) that is observing a ceasefire with the Centre, no other party has demanded integration of all Naga inhabited areas in India ( Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur) and Myanmar – the idea of  Greater Nagalim.

    At the state level, the responses of Mizoram and Manipur to the Myanmar crisis vary. This can be best seen in their reactions to the Centre’s recent notification to fence the entire 1643 Km Myanmar border and its earlier decision to end the Free Movement Regime that permits movement on both sides of the border for up to a distance of 16 km.[xxii]  While the Mizoram government and tribes living in both states oppose the decisions, the Manipur government clamours for its implementation. Currently, only around 30 Km of the border has been fenced.

    Since the Tatmadaw now has limited control over its border areas, it has become imperative for India to commence a structured dialogue with other warring parties in Myanmar’s border regions. This, with a view to restoring the situation in Manipur (and on the border) through mutually acceptable solutions at least for the short to medium term, is necessary. Only then can a modicum of security on the border be guaranteed. This involves navigating a maze of ethnic, religious, historical and societal issues with great sensitivity. The importance of such a dialogue cannot be overemphasised, more so because of recent developments in Bangladesh.

    The Impact of Bangladesh’s ‘Second Liberation’

    The events of 5 August 2024  that witnessed the overthrow of Sheikh Hasina’s government have proved to be yet another watershed in India-Bangladesh relations. India has invested more in the India-Bangladesh relationship than with any other neighbour in South Asia. A glance at the website of our Ministry of External Affairs[xxiii], where details of various agreements and summaries from the last Prime Ministerial meeting in Delhi in June 2024 are provided, will suffice to show just how strong and all-encompassing this relationship has become.

    Persons or organisations associated with the previous regime have either fled the country or been placed under arrest and assets confiscated. A few have been killed by mobs. Bank accounts of others have been frozen. Jamaat e Islami which collaborated with the Pakistan Army in 1971 has been resurrected. Extremists with proven murder charges against them have been freed from prison, as have political prisoners.

    At the time of writing, it is two months since the interim government headed by Chief Advisor Mohammed Yunus assumed charge.  The country continues to make efforts to reestablish the rule of law. All wings of the armed forces have been given magisterial powers[xxiv]. The functioning of the judiciary, higher civil services, local administration, police, security agencies, banking, economy, and higher education, is under review. Persons or organisations associated with the previous regime have either fled the country or been placed under arrest and assets confiscated. A few have been killed by mobs. Bank accounts of others have been frozen.[xxv] The Jamaat e Islami which collaborated with the Pakistan Army in 1971 has been resurrected. Extremists with proven murder charges against them have been freed from prison, as have political prisoners. Commissions have been set up to suggest reforms in the constitution, electoral system, police, judiciary, public administration and in tackling corruption.  Elections do not seem to be on the horizon yet. The advisers ( as the ministers are currently known) are new faces, not well known in India.

    While this paper does not attempt to be a study of India-Bangladesh relations, the polarised politics in that country coupled with a perception that the misdeeds of Sheikh Hasina’s government were conducted with impunity because of Indian backing, is sure to impact India’s portrayal here.

    With the removal of Sheikh Hasina, the India-Bangladesh relationship is undergoing a major reset. Statements of certain public figures and sentiments of a section of the population in that country suggest that a different perspective on the evolution of Bangladesh as a nation from 1971 onwards is emerging. While this paper does not attempt to be a study of India-Bangladesh relations, the polarised politics in that country coupled with a perception that the misdeeds of Sheikh Hasina’s government were conducted with impunity because of Indian backing, is sure to impact India’s portrayal here. This will make it an arduous task for both countries to go back to the trusted, cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship that existed. As mentioned, the list of achievements for both countries is far too numerous –  settlement of land and oceanic borders,  road, rail and riverine connectivity (including use of ports), economy and business ( both government and private), education including educational scholarships, technology, disaster management, border management, maritime security, military to military cooperation, improved people to people contacts, culture and health. As per records, of the 16 lakh visas issued by India for Bangladesh nationals in 2023, 4.5 lakhs were for medical treatment alone[xxvi]. Economies are so embedded that everyday necessities like onions are exported regularly to Bangladesh ( approximately 6 to 7 lakh tonnes annually).

    Even as the new regime provides assurances on the security of minorities and acknowledges India as an important neighbour, the enthusiasm with which it has interacted with official interlocutors from a host of nations worldwide especially China, Pakistan and the US is noteworthy and indicates where its newfound priorities might lie.

    A parallel reality, however, is that negative perceptions about India have historically found space in sections of Bangladesh’s polity. These have received a huge fillip after the change of regime with even settled agreements prone to misunderstanding. A recent example pertains to a tripartite agreement dating back to the Hasina period whereby electricity is to be imported from Nepal via India to Bangladesh. The agreement was signed in Kathmandu in the first week of  October 2024. Newspaper reports from Bangladesh indicate that there is palpable resentment over the condition that Indian transmission systems inside Indian territory be utilised for this purpose since it increases costs per unit of electricity in Bangladesh.[xxvii] Another issue currently bedevilling relations is the state of minorities in Bangladesh who have faced attacks on their homes, businesses and religious places with some loss of life, since the protests in July. India’s concerns in this regard have been conveyed at the highest level. Even as the new regime provides assurances on the security of minorities and acknowledges India as an important neighbour, the enthusiasm with which it has interacted with official interlocutors from a host of nations worldwide especially China, Pakistan and the US is noteworthy and indicates where its newfound priorities might lie.

    Larger Implications for India

    Bangladesh and Myanmar are pivotal for India’s Act East policy from the security, economic and connectivity angles. The issues pertaining to Myanmar and Manipur have been brought out earlier. A common concern affecting both nations and  India is the Rohingya crisis. Despite international pressure and requests from Bangladesh for China to intercede with Myanmar on its behalf, there has been no positive response from Myanmar. Bangladesh, which currently hosts close to one million refugees,[xxviii] has publicly expressed its inability to accommodate any more Rohingyas and asked for a speedy ‘third country settlement’ [xxix]. A detailed report of the International Crisis Group (ICG) in October 2023[xxx]provides details of activities of militant organisations like the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) which are involved in drug running from Myanmar along with Bangladeshi syndicates for sale of the product in that country. Their participation in violent crime and other illegal activity has become a pressing concern within Bangladesh. Rohingyas have infiltrated into India as well, and have been identified as far North as Jammu. The security implications of such migration for both Bangladesh and India are apparent. The insensitivity of the Myanmar Junta on this account is heightening security risks for India and Bangladesh and merits diplomatic intervention.

    With the situation in Bangladesh evolving by the day, it is prudent for India to take a strategic pause as it weighs its options for pursuing its Act East policy. While giving the new regime in Bangladesh its due, India has to consider the impact of resurgent forces aided by inimical powers that aim to derail the India-Bangladesh relationship beyond repair. Even as both countries attempt to reestablish strong ties, the old adage preached by educated Bangladeshis in the context of support to Sheikh Hasina’s regime that ‘India should not put all its eggs in one basket’ resonates. While Myanmar geographically cannot provide the singular advantages that Bangladesh can, it is time for India to press for securing Myanmar’s cooperation to complete pending projects in that country, such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Port Project (KMMPP) via Sittwe and Paletwa, that provides an alternate route to our North East, as well as the Trans Asian Highway (TAH) that provides connectivity with the rest of ASEAN, amongst others.

    To summarise, two possible reasons for inviting rebel Myanmar groups to Delhi could be: first, the relative viability of either Bangladesh or Myanmar to help implement the Act East policy in light of the emerging situation in Bangladesh and the state of the civil war in Myanmar. The second, ensuring security on the India-Myanmar border, to prevent aggravating the situation in India’s border states.

     

    Notes:

    [i] ‘Exclusive: India extends unprecedented invite to Myanmar’s anti-junta forces, sources say’ Wa Lone and Devjyot Ghoshal Reuters September 23, 2024

    [ii] ‘Govt aims to make Northeast gateway of ‘Act East Policy’: President Murmu’ Press Trust of India 27 June 2024.

    [iii] Ibid.

    [iv] ‘Japan to tie landlocked Northeast India with Bangladesh’  Saleem Samad  The Daily Messenger 05 March 2024.

    [v] Press Information Bureau Government of India Ministry of Shipping note dated  10 June 2015

    ‘Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) Motor Vehicle Agreement for the Regulation of Passenger, Personal and Cargo Vehicular Traffic amongst BBIN’

    [vi]   ‘Breaking Away: The Battle for Myanmar’s Rakhine State Asia Report N°339 | 27 August 2024’ International Crisis Group (Executive Summary).

    [vii]   ‘As Myanmar’s Junta Loses Control in the North, China’s Influence Grows’  Jason Tower, United States Institute for Peace, August 1, 2024.

    [viii] Ibid.

    [ix]   ‘Facing setbacks against resistance forces, Myanmar’s military government activates conscription law ‘ Associated Press, February 12, 2024.

    [x] ‘India’s ‘Forgotten Partition’ and the Myanmar Refugee Crisis’  Swapnarka Arnan The Diplomat  11 May 2024.

    [xi] ‘We killed many … drones are our air force’: Myanmar’s rebels take on the junta from above. Aakash Hassan and Hannah Ellis-Petersen  The Observer 20 January 2024.

    [xii] ‘Armed Groups Snub Myanmar Junta ‘Peace’ Offer’  The Irrawaddy 28 September 2024

    [xiii] ‘Centre provides 1,379 MT rice to Mizoram for Manipur, Myanmar, B’desh refugees’ Morung Express 25 September 2024.

    [xiv] ‘Ethnic violence in India’s Manipur escalates, six killed’  Tora Agarwala Reuters  September 7, 2024

    [xv] ‘900 Kuki militants infiltrated Manipur from Myanmar, says Security Advisor’ India Today NE September 20 2024.

    [xvi] ‘Input on infiltration by 900 Kuki militants could not be substantiated on the ground, says Manipur security advisor’ Vijaita Singh The Hindu 26 September 2024.

    [xvii] ‘Kukis call removal of Assam Rifles from 2 Manipur areas ‘biased, appeasement’, Meiteis call it ‘victory’  Ananya Bhardwaj  The Print 04 August 2024.

    [xviii]‘ Manipur: Kuki-Zo organizations hold rallies, demand separate ‘Kukiland’ for peace  by Northeast News

    August 31, 2024.

    [xix] YouTube channel titled ‘Zalengam Media’.

    [xx] ‘Kuki militants seek release of ‘secessionist’ in Manipur’ Prawesh Lama and Thomas Ngangom Hindustan Times Sep 30, 2024.

    [xxi] ‘Keep us out of your war, Manipur Naga body warns two warring communities’  The Hindu Bureau 06 February 2024

    [xxii] ‘Government sanctions ₹31,000 crore to fence Myanmar border’   The Hindu

    Published – September 18, 2024

    [xxiii] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India website mea.gov.in.

    [xxiv] ‘Navy, the air force also granted magistracy powers’  The Daily Star September 30 2024

    [xxv] ‘Bank accounts of Joy Putul Bobby frozen’ Dhaka Tribune 30 Sep 2024.

    [xxvi] ‘Indian High Commission in Dhaka, facing protests & threats, returns 20,000 visa applicants’ passports ‘ Ananya Bhardwaj  The Print   29 September 2024.

    [xxvii] ‘Bangladesh delegation in Nepal to sign the contract to import 40 MW electricity’ Dhaka Tribune 30 September 2024.

    [xxviii] Operational Data Portal of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, for Bangladesh.

    [xxix] ‘Bangladesh calls for faster resettlement process for Rohingya’ Ruma Paul  Reuters  September 8, 2024

    [xxx] ‘Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: Limiting the Damage of a Protracted Crisis’ International Crisis Group Autumn Update 04 October 20223.

     

    Feature Image Credit: What does Sheikh Hasina’s resignation mean for India-Bangladesh relations? – aljazeera.com 

    Map Credit: National Online Project

    Bangladesh Parliament Image: The Shattered Identity of a Nation: From Liberation to Chaos – borderlens.com

    Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Statue: Bangabandhu to Toppled Statue: Mujibur Rahman’s contested legacy post Bangladesh upheaval – Economic Times

     

  • MYANMAR: READING THE TEA LEAVES

    MYANMAR: READING THE TEA LEAVES

    On 21 November 2023, India’s Ministry of External Affairs advised Indian citizens to avoid nonessential travel to Myanmar, given the evolving security situation in that country. It further advised that those already living in Myanmar should take precautions and avoid travel to regions affected by violence[i]. Earlier in the same month, UN Secretary-General António Guterres had expressed deep concern at the expansion of conflict in Myanmar[ii] . Both messages highlight the increasingly fragile situation in Myanmar, where two million people are displaced and over 286,000 similarly affected after the current upsurge in fighting[iii].

     

    Operation 1027 and its Implications

    The map published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies lists the number and type of violent events countrywide until July 2023. Since then, there has been a spike in the level of violence. Most prominent has been the coordinated attack on 27 October on Tatmadaw (Myanmar Army) posts in the Northern portion of Myanmar’s Shan state (see map), near the Chinese border by three Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), assisted by other Peoples’ Defence Militias (PDFs). As per Richard Horsey of the International Crisis Group[i], the attacks, dubbed ‘Operation 1027’ (after the date they commenced), involved several thousand experienced, well-armed fighters attacking multiple army posts simultaneously. These troops owed allegiance to three major EAOs – the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army ( AA), comprising different ethnicities ( Kokang, Ta’ang and Arakanese, respectively). Of the three, the first two are based in Shan state in the East, while the AA, as the name denotes, is based in Rakhine on Myanmar’s West coast, bordering some portion of the Chittagong Division of Bangladesh. Within two weeks, these three armies dubbed the Three Brotherhood Alliance, had seized several towns along the Chinese border, overrun military bases and captured large stocks of munitions. Specifically, to quote the Asia Times…the key border posts of Chin Swe Haw and Mong Ko were seized along with 80 military and police bases. More than 120 military bases have since been overrun, and sizeable amounts of arms and ammunition seized, including reportedly several 14.5 heavy machine guns (HMGs)…‘[ii]. ISP Myanmar, a Myanmarese think tank based in Thailand, notes that resupply columns are being ambushed on the main artery from Mandalay, around the area of Kyaukme, as shown on the map below[iii].

    Operation 1027 has created significant disruptions in the Myanmar-China border trade. The current offensive aims to eradicate online gambling and scam call operations from various casinos in the northern portion of  Shan and Kayin states bordering China and Thailand, an objective shared by the Myanmar Government, which is under pressure from China on this matter. Nationals from these countries, along with Chinese criminals, have been identified for their involvement in such illegal activity in concert with local pro-government militias. The rebels’ aim could likely be to gain China’s favour and wrest territory from Tatmadaw’s control[i]. To avoid the bloodshed, many Myanmar nationals are attempting to cross into China. China, whose proposed projects under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) run through these regions in Northern Shan state, has since called for a ceasefire on this border[ii]. Noteworthy for military analysts, however, is the well-coordinated planning and execution displayed in these successful attacks, demonstrating the growing strength and assertiveness of the EAOs and PDFs operating over large swathes of territory.

     In concert with Operation 1027, EAOs have been equally active in other parts of Myanmar. The Sagaing region North of Mandalay bordering Manipur and Nagaland is witnessing fresh fighting[iii]. A Myanmar Army spokesman is quoted as having admitted that troops were under “heavy assaults from a significant number of armed rebel soldiers” in Shan state in the North, Kayah state in the East and Rakhine state in the West[iv]. In Rakhine, a year-long ceasefire between the Arakan Army and Tatmadaw collapsed, and fighting recommenced. In Kayah state bordering Thailand, a video clip (verified by Reuters) shows wounded Tatmadaw soldiers surrendering to the rebels who offer medical treatment to them. Fighting rages around the state capital, Loikaw, from which the UN has evacuated its personnel[v]. Heavy fighting has taken place in Chin state. The Junta has declared martial law in certain towns in Shan, Chin and Kayah states and Sagaing region.

    Members of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army pose for a photograph in front of the seized army’s infantry battalion in Kunlong township in Shan state, Myanmar, on 12 November. (AP). Courtesy: Rezaul H Laskar, Hindustan Times 15 November 2023.

    India’s Concerns

    With the Sagaing region bordering Nagaland and Manipur and Chin state bordering Manipur and Mizoram, the upsurge in violence has become a pressing concern for India, which is already grappling with the crisis in Manipur that has a linkage with Myanmar. In the current crisis in mid-November, Chin rebels overran two Tatmadaw posts on the India-Myanmar border in villages close to the Myanmar border township of Rikhawdar. This is adjacent to India’s Land Customs Station (LCS) at Zokhawthar. The Tiau River forms the boundary crossed by a Bailey bridge (picture below).

    Picture:  Courtesy Reuters

    A fresh flow of refugees (estimates from four to five thousand) has now crossed over to the Indian side to escape the fighting as the Tatmadaw attempts to retake these posts. This influx is in addition to those who crossed over earlier during the coup in February 2021. The capitulation of the Tatmadaw in these bases has also resulted in a unique situation; 74 Myanmar soldiers fled to India with their weapons and surrendered to the Indian authorities, who, at the request of the Myanmar Government, facilitated their return[i].

    All the above issues highlight the highly volatile climate in Myanmar, necessitating the Indian government’s advisory. Sufficient reportage exists to show that the rebel forces under the National Unity Government (NUG) are steadily gaining ground; Gen Min Aung Hlaing, Chairman of the State Administrative Council (SAC) and  de facto head of state conceded early this year that only 198 of the 330 townships are “100 per cent stable,” while the remainder required “security attention.”[ii] This is close to fifty per cent of the country. Clearly, the civil war is entering a more intense phase.

    State of the NUG

     The dynamism of the NUG can be gauged by its creative methods to raise revenues to support its war aims. Some of these mechanisms, based essentially on the buyers’ ( including the diaspora’s) good faith, are zero-interest bonds, real estate auctions of land (including government land taken from civilians – a lakeside villa appropriated by Gen Hlaing was auctioned some time ago), proposed condominiums for later construction, auctioning of mining rights and leases, lotteries, donations and tax collection. It provides primary education, health, justice and law and order in areas under its control. It has launched a digital currency that is run through the open-source blockchain Stellar network73, used through its digital wallet app, NUGPay. It uses commercial quadcopter drones for logistics, has commenced weapons production to include 60mm and 90mm mortars, and is experimenting with 3D printing[iii].

    The NUG’s success in creating such an infrastructure despite the SAC’s depredations and the victories of its forces on the ground over the last two years is testimony to the support it enjoys among the ordinary people, bolstered by sophisticated information operations. The latter includes a Policy Paper of 2021[iv], which enunciates NUG’s efforts to become more inclusive. A beginning has been made by appointing a Rohingya, Aung Kyaw Moe, to a ministerial post. His appointment as the NUG’s Deputy Human Rights Minister is a signal to others, including the UN whose Special Rapporteur for human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, stated this year that ..’ Min Aung Hlaing, who led the genocidal campaign, is now at the head of an illegal and illegitimate military junta that is attacking civilian populations throughout Myanmar. He must be brought to justice and made to answer his crimes…‘[v]. The NUG Policy Paper promises to bring perpetrators of crimes against Rohingyas to justice and grant citizenship rights to all based on parentage or birth in Myanmar. It also speaks of developing a comprehensive repatriation plan for Rohingyas who have fled Myanmar. Resolving this issue will remove a significant obstacle in ties with Bangladesh, which shelters over one million Rohingyas while looking to curb activities of militant organisations like the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). The ARSA operates from both sides of the border, using tunnels to move cadres to and fro and has frequently resorted to terrorism.

    Crystal Gazing

    What, then does the future hold for the SAC? The regime is facing multiple sanctions from the West. Citing ongoing violence, it had earlier announced the postponement of elections planned for August 2023 and continues with the state of emergency. It, however, seeks to exploit its geography as an Indian Ocean littoral and land bridge between South and South East Asia to gain strategic advantage. Trade with Russia has increased, and MOUs on cooperation in various infrastructure projects, including nuclear and natural energy, have been signed. Though the CMEC is now moving at a snail’s pace with many impediments and under constant security threats, none of its projects have been cancelled[vi] as has happened elsewhere. Russia and China are also the leading suppliers of advanced weapon systems to Myanmar. Military cooperation has been extended to naval exercises; this month, Myanmar held a three-day maritime security exercise’ with the Russian Navy from 06 November in the Andaman Sea for the first time. Again, on 28 November, two Chinese warships and a resupply vessel have docked in Yangon on a ‘goodwill visit’ to be followed up with exercises. Despite such signalling, there is no guarantee how much support these two countries would provide in an increasingly uncertain climate.

    India’s policy has been one of non-interference in Myanmar’s affairs. It has been feeling its way through the deepening crisis in that country that originated with the coup over two years ago. Government-to-government cooperation continues, with visits by senior Indian dignitaries on essential occasions. Though India does not support the NUG, looking beyond and planning for multiple outcomes is prudent.

    India’s priority is to have peace on the border with Myanmar. Instability here has directly impacted the internal security and societal dynamics of at least two border states. For securing the border, an advanced intelligent fencing system of 100 km along the border ‘is in the pipeline’ while a little over 6 Km has been physically fenced around the border township of Moreh in Manipur[vii]. Fencing the entire 1643 km long border is unlikely to find favour for multiple reasons – costs, physical difficulty, and social and political implications, especially when ethnic kin live on both sides with a Free Movement Regime (FMR) in place that permits movement up to 16 Km inside.

    The other way of securing the border will be through cooperation between the three affected parties – India, the SAC and insurgent groups operating in the vicinity. It is here that India’s leverages can come into play – the goodwill built up with local communities by sheltering and providing succour to those who have come across, and non-interference with activities of the Tatmadaw, including assisting as in the case of the fleeing soldiers. Considering that peace on the border will benefit all three parties, communication at the local level with the insurgents through intermediaries and parallel government-to-government interaction can ensure that guarantees for the same are obtained. This can be combined with rehabilitation projects for those displaced, with Indian assistance.

    Looking beyond the immediate, the difficulty in providing any prognosis for Myanmar should not obscure the fact that it remains among India’s most important neighbours and a vital cog of our Act East policy. With peace prevailing, its role in the development of our North East will only increase, as an overall assessment of the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project’s potential shows. A stable, peaceful and multi-ethnic Myanmar will always remain a  priority for India. In the interim, the need is to contemplate multiple outcomes and plan for eventualities, favourable or otherwise.

     

    Notes

    [i] ‘29 Myanmarese soldiers repatriated from Mizoram amid border tension’ Statesman News Service Aizawl 20 November 2023.

    [ii] ‘Sustaining Funding for Myanmar’s Spring Revolution’    Stimson Policy Paper  Zachary Abuza   May 17, 2023

    [iii] Ibid.

    [iv] ‘ Policy Position on the Rohingya in Rakhine State’ Republic of the Union of Myanmar National Unity Government June 03 2021.

    [v] ‘UN expert demands accountability for the Rohingya and an end to ‘paralysis of indifference’’ United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner,  press release 24  August 2023.

    [vi] ‘The Dwindling Prospects For Russian and Chinese-Backed Infrastructure Projects in Myanmar’ Syah Vaghji

    The Diplomat November 09, 2023

    [vii] Government of India Ministry of Home Affairs Annual Report 2022-23  Chapter 3  Border Management para 3.21

     

    Feature Image: Brotherhood Alliance fighters are seen at the entrance of a regime Army base in Kunlong on Nov 12, 2023/MNDAA – www.irrawaddy.com

     

  • India and Myanmar: Two Years after the Coup

    India and Myanmar: Two Years after the Coup

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    Relegated to the sidelines with the ongoing Ukraine war and other crises like Taiwan, Myanmar has resurfaced in world headlines. In a recent dispatch, Associated Press (AP) reported that on 11 April 2023 ‘a fighter jet dropped bombs directly onto a crowd of people who were gathering at 8 am for the opening of a local office of the country’s opposition movement outside Pazigyi village in Sagaing region’s Kanbalu township….’ 1 . Subsequent information indicates that the number of dead including women and children is over 170. If so, this is the deadliest aerial attack carried out by the Myanmar military on its own people in the bloody aftermath of the military coup two years ago.

    With various Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) and Peoples’ Defence Forces (PDFs) battling the Tatmadaw, martial law has been declared in 47 townships in Myanmar, cutting across states and regions. 2 More than 154,000 people have been displaced in the first two months of 2023, with total numbers of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) since the military takeover now at 1.3 million. Heavy fighting rages in Kachin State, the South East and North West of the country, 3 and overall 3000 civilian deaths since February 2021 are estimated 4 . Targeted assassination of military appointed government officials continues, the latest victim being the deputy director-general of the Union Election Commission who was shot dead on 22 April this year 5 . In 2022, up to 30,000 civilian infrastructures, including schools are reported to have been destroyed during military operations 6 . This situation has compelled the Tatmadaw to again postpone elections earlier scheduled for August 2023. The state of emergency has been extended.

    Important Developments Post February 2021

    The above statistics provide a telling perspective of the current violence in Myanmar. Yet there are other noteworthy developments in the country post the February 2021 coup. First of these is the increasing relevance of the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) around which civilian support appears to have coalesced.

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    Featured Image Credits: CNBC Indonesia

  • What Putin nemesis Alexei Navalny is, and what he is not

    What Putin nemesis Alexei Navalny is, and what he is not

    Anatol Lieven highlights America’s blundering tendency to view world personalities in typically American lens, ignoring the realities of them being citizens of their countries and focusing on their national interests . He uses the examples of Russia’s Navalny and Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi to make his point emphatically. His analysis is relevant to other countries as well. 

    This article was published earlier in Responsible Statecraft. 

    It is very human and natural to admire courage and resolution — these are qualities that Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny possesses to a quite remarkable degree. It is also natural to sympathize with suffering — and Navalny has suffered and very nearly died for his beliefs and goals. And of course it is natural to feel disgust with the increasingly criminal behavior of the Putin administration in Russia.

    However, admiration, sympathy and disgust are emotions, not arguments or analysis, and should be employed with great caution in the formulation of state policy.

    In his confirmation hearings, now-Secretary of State Anthony Blinken pledged Biden administration support for Navalny and called him “a voice for millions and millions of Russians.” Statements by the U.S. embassy in Moscow on the Navalny movement have come very close to calling for the end of the present Russian government.

    Recent weeks have seen a tremendous outpouring of American sympathy for Navalny and his movement against the Putin administration. In his confirmation hearings, now-Secretary of State Anthony Blinken pledged Biden administration support for Navalny and called him “a voice for millions and millions of Russians.” Statements by the U.S. embassy in Moscow on the Navalny movement have come very close to calling for the end of the present Russian government. The semi-official American Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is openly and passionately supportive of Navalny’s movement. Richard Haas, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, proposed that Navalny be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

    Such overt U.S. support is not wise. In the first place, it may actually hurt the cause of progressive reform in Russia. The Russian government, like those of Iran and China, has relentlessly propagated the idea that the opposition is being backed if not bankrolled by Washington in order to weaken their countries; and indeed, Russian liberals have done themselves terrible damage by allowing themselves to be cast as representatives of the West, not of the Russian people.

    The second, very familiar problem is the hypocrisy involved. In the latest volume of President Obama’s memoirs, “A Promised Land,” he describes how Hillary Clinton — who relentlessly presented herself in public as an advocate of spreading democracy — argued that Washington should support Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s brutal 2011 crackdown on Arab Spring opposition protests on the grounds that he was a U.S. ally and his fall would lead to chaos and Islamist revolution. In her early public statements, as well, she warned against hastening Mubarak’s exit.

    In proposing Navalny for the Nobel Peace Prize, Haas seems to have forgotten the last time the honor was given to an opposition politician.

    An even greater problem presents itself when one looks at the actual politics of some of the opposition figures who draw such waves of American and Western enthusiasm. In proposing Navalny for the Nobel Peace Prize, Haas seems to have forgotten the last time the honor was given to an opposition politician. The award to Aung San Suu Kyi in 1991 was supposed to be for “her non-violent struggle for democracy and human rights… one of the most extraordinary examples of civil courage in Asia in recent decades.”

    After Suu Kyi joined the government in Myanmar she’s been damned in the West for her failure to prevent or condemn the savage state persecution of Myanmar’s Rohingya minority, and most of her human rights awards (though not the Nobel prize itself) have been revoked.

    After Suu Kyi joined the government in Myanmar she’s been damned in the West for her failure to prevent or condemn the savage state persecution of Myanmar’s Rohingya minority, and most of her human rights awards (though not the Nobel prize itself) have been revoked. What her previous Western admirers are not doing — what they almost never do — is to ask themselves why they so completely misunderstood her before.

    But she is a Burmese politician, not a Western democratic leader, and in building her up as a liberal heroine, the Western media and activists willfully ignored not just the political realities of Myanmar, but her own Burmese nationalist antecedents.  

    (Just in the last 48 hours, Suu Kyi has been detained in an apparent military takeover of her democratically elected government and Biden is predictably mulling over his options for reviewing sanctions and taking “appropriate action.”)

    Like Navalny, Suu Kyi is indeed an exceptionally brave and determined human being and in her way a fine leader; just as Navalny might make a fine Russian president. But she is a Burmese politician, not a Western democratic leader, and in building her up as a liberal heroine, the Western media and activists willfully ignored not just the political realities of Myanmar, but her own Burmese nationalist antecedents.

    There are two factors at work here. The first is a basic human one. Courage, like hard work and self-sacrifice, is a quality that it is humanly impossible not to admire, but the possession of it says absolutely nothing at all about the goals to which they are put. All the leaders of the ghastly totalitarian revolutions of the 20th century were exceptionally brave and determined men.

    The second factor relates to some enduring and seemingly incorrigible flaws in most Western reporting and analysis. One of them is the tendency to personalize issues, whereby “Putin” is used as a synonym for the whole Russian state, and “Navalny” is now being presented as a synonym for the entire, enormously disparate Russian opposition. The merest glance at the groups represented at the pro-Navalny demonstrations reveals that together with genuine liberal democrats, there are also numerous Communists and extreme nationalists whose anti-Western positions are much more extreme and reckless than those of Putin himself. As Aleksandr Baunov of the Carnegie Moscow Centre has written:

    “Saturday’s protests were undeniably anti-regime, anti-elite and anti-corruption but not necessarily liberal, pro-Western and pro-democracy. It’s not surprising that such protests frighten not only the authorities, but also successful members of society: even those who don’t consider themselves supporters of the regime.”

    In their blind demonization of Putin, and consequent sanctification of Navalny, Western commentators seem to be implicitly assuming that should Navalny win power (which he almost certainly will not), Russia’s foreign policy would change radically in a pro-Western direction. This is nonsense. Navalny’s supporters are backing him out of (entirely justified) fury at Russian state corruption, lawlessness, and economic failure, not to change foreign policy. Every independent opinion poll has suggested that Putin’s foreign and security policies have enjoyed overwhelming public support; and above all, there is very little in Navalny’s own record to suggest that he would change them.

    As a 2013 essay by Robert Coalson in The Atlantic documented, Navalny supported the Russian war with Georgia in 2008. He has expressed strongly ethno-nationalist attitudes towards the Caucasian minorities in Russia, and previously made opposition to illegal immigration a key part of his platform. In October 2014 he suggested to a reporter that if he became president he would not return Crimea, which was annexed by Russia earlier that year, to Ukraine (though he also said in that same interview that, “It’s not in the interests of Russians to seize neighboring republics, it’s in their interests to fight corruption, alcoholism and so on — to solve internal problems.”

    Rather like Donald Trump concerning American interventionism, Navalny has strongly condemned Russian military intervention in the Middle East on the grounds of cost and irrelevance to real Russian interests; but (as with Trump), that does not necessarily say much about what he would actually do if in power. Apart from anything else, Russia, like the U.S., has a foreign and security establishment “Blob” with firmly established and deeply held collective views on Russia’s vital interests.

    It is to remind Americans that he is a Russian politician, not an American one; that he will respond to Russian realities, not Washington fantasies; and that in the end, U.S. administrations will have to deal with whatever government is in power in Moscow.

    To recall this is not to condemn Navalny. It is to remind Americans that he is a Russian politician, not an American one; that he will respond to Russian realities, not Washington fantasies; and that in the end, U.S. administrations will have to deal with whatever government is in power in Moscow. Russian governments will defend Russian interests, along lines that are mostly quite predictable if one knows Russian history and culture. The sooner we realize this, and stop setting up plaster saints in the hope that they will perform miracles, the better for U.S. foreign policy overall.

     

    Feature Image – Protesters gather near a monument of Russian playwright Alexander Griboyedov during a protest against the jailing of opposition leader Alexei Navalny in St. Petersburg, Russia, Sunday, Jan. 31, 2021. www.arabnews.com
    Image –     Navalny and Putin: www.hilltimes.com
    Image – Aung San Suu Kyi: www.mmtimes.com

  • US-China Tensions Could Spill Into Lancang-Mekong River Basin

    US-China Tensions Could Spill Into Lancang-Mekong River Basin

     The Lancang-Mekong River is the 12th longest river and runs through six countries i.e. China (upper riparian), Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam (the lower riparian)and finally discharges into South China.

    A recent US government-funded study has noted that in 2019 China held back large amounts of water upstream in dams on the Mekong River which caused a  severe drought in the downstream countries,[1] prompting a US ambassador in the region accusing China of “hoarding” water and “harming the livelihoods of millions of people in downstream countries”.[2] Likewise, another report by Stimson Centre, a Washington-based think tank, has corroborated the above and pointed that in 2019 “upstream dams at Nuozhadu and Xiaowan had restricted around 20 billion cubic meters of water between July and November” and that current “satellite images show those dams are once again poised to restrict a similar amount of water from July 2020 through the end of this year … Portions of the Mekong mainstream are once again dropping to historically low levels,”[3]

    China has dismissed the reports and the Global Times in an article cited a report by the Tsinghua University and clarified that the “river dams in China [instead] helped alleviate drought along Lancang-Mekong”; furthermore, in November 2019, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) had concluded that “the drought was caused by insufficient rainfall during the wet season with a delayed arrival and earlier departure of the monsoon rain and an El Niño event that led to abnormally high temperatures and high evapotranspiration”.[4]

    At the heart of this problem is that China has built as many as 11 dams on the 4,800 kilometres long Lancang-Mekong River that originates in the Tibetan Plateau.

    At the heart of this problem is that China has built as many as 11 dams on the 4,800 kilometres long Lancang-Mekong River that originates in the Tibetan Plateau.  The Lancang-Mekong River is the 12th longest river and runs through six countries i.e. China (upper riparian), Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam (the lower riparian)and finally discharges into South China.

    China has been reluctant to share hydrological data particularly during the dry seasons and releases water during rainy seasons causing flooding in lower riparian countries. This is despite the 2002 MoU under which China had agreed to provide daily river flow and rainfall data from two monitoring stations in Yunnan Province during the wet season, and the periodic MRC Heads of Government meeting over a Summit which is held every four years.

    Earlier this year, the Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi had assured that his country would “give positive consideration to share the full-year hydrological information with Mekong countries and enhance cooperation under the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) framework to ensure reasonable and sustainable use of water resources”.[5]

    Perhaps a recent statement by the MRC may temporarily obviate suspicions over China not sharing hydrological information on the Lancang-Mekong River which notes that it welcomes China’s sharing of data “ throughout the year” as also for the “ establishment of an information-sharing platform for water resources cooperation led by China and Myanmar”.[6] Also, during the 3rd Mekong-Lancang Cooperation (MLC) Leaders’ Meeting, the Global Center for Mekong Studies (GCMS) has been tasked to study the potential benefits from “aligning and synergizing the MLC and the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor with a vast market”.[7]

    It has been observed that although the 1995 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin is legally binding, it “does not have a compliance mechanism such as punitive measures on the party that violates the spirit and principles of the Agreement.

    In 1995, the upper and lower riparian countries had adopted Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin which lays out “principles and norms of regional cooperation in managing the river basin”. A formal dialogue process under the MRC was instituted to address issues relating to Mekong River and the Member States agreed to “promote common procedures and practices throughout the region for data collection, storage and analysis to support data sharing and integration of existing data management systems based on the voluntary participation of countries and institutions.”[8] In 2001, they adopted the “Procedures for Data and Information Exchange and Sharing,” or PDIES to enable the Member States to share data ‘to provide real-time water level information and more accurate flood forecasting.

    It has been observed that although the 1995 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin is legally binding, it “does not have a compliance mechanism such as punitive measures on the party that violates the spirit and principles of the Agreement. The conflict resolution mechanism is also not clearly stipulated”.[9] This is one of the many reasons for discord among the Parties which needs to be addressed by the MRC whose mandate includes dispute resolution.

    Be that as it may, the lower Mekong countries have set up the Mekong Water Data Initiative, and at the 10th Ministerial Meeting of the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) in 2017 to ‘create a robust, integrated, and transparent platform for collecting, sharing, and managing data on the Mekong River system.’[10]

    there are fears that the Lancang-Mekong River issue is slowly shaping into a major ASEAN-China bilateral issue similar to the contestation in the South China Sea.

    At another level, there are fears that the Lancang-Mekong River issue is slowly shaping into a major ASEAN-China bilateral issue similar to the contestation in the South China Sea; and the current situation is being described as “becoming a geopolitical issue, much like the South China Sea, between the United States and China,”[11] Perhaps the biggest worry is that the Lancang-Mekong River should not attract contestation between the US and China which surely is going to make the region more turbulent. It would thus be prudent that ASEAN and China work on a Code of Conduct to manage the river affairs or add more robustness in the existing dialogue mechanism over the Lancang-Mekong River.

     
    End Notes
    [1] “China could have choked off the Mekong and aggravated a drought, threatening the lifeline of millions in Asia”, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/28/china-choked-off-the-mekong-which-worsened-southeast-asia-drought-study.html  (accessed 12 September 2020).
    [2] “Water wars: Mekong River another front in U.S.-China rivalry”, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/07/25/asia-pacific/mekong-river-us-china/  (accessed 12 September 2020).
    [3] “The next US-China battleground: Chinese dams on the Mekong River?”,https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3095581/next-us-china-battleground-chinese-dams-mekong-river  (accessed 12 September 2020).
    [4] “River dams in China helped alleviate drought along Lancang-Mekong, research finds”, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1194654.shtml  (accessed 10 September 2020).
    [5] “River dams in China helped alleviate drought along Lancang-Mekong, research finds”, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1194654.shtml  (accessed 10 September 2020).
    [6] “Lancang-Mekong cooperation provide stronger impetus for regional development and prosperity”, http://www.lmcchina.org/eng/hzdt_1/t1812281.htm  (accessed 12 September 2020)
    [7] “Full text of Co-chairs’ Statement on Cooperation of Synergizing the MLC and the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor of the Third MLC Leaders’ Meeting”, http://www.lmcchina.org/eng/zyxw_5/t1808947.htm  (accessed 12 September 2020).
    [8] “Joint Statement To Strengthen Water Data Management and Information Sharing in The Lower Mekong”,
    https://www.lowermekong.org/news/joint-statement-strengthen-water-data-management-and-information-sharing-lower-mekong (accessed 14 April 219)
    [9] “Code of Conduct for the Mekong”,https://vannarithchheang.com/2018/04/04/code-of-conduct-for-the-mekong/  (accessed 12 September 2020).
    [10] “Mekong River Commission keen to improve data sharing and management in the Lower Mekong Basin”, https://mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/mrc-keen-data-management-in-mekong-basin/  (accessed 12 September 2020.
    [11] “Water wars: Mekong River another front in U.S.-China rivalry”, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/07/25/asia-pacific/mekong-river-us-china/  (accessed 12 September 2020).
     
    Image: Mekong Riverside, Phnom Penh-Cambodia

  • International River Basin, Regional Cooperation and the aspect of Transboundary Water Conflict

    International River Basin, Regional Cooperation and the aspect of Transboundary Water Conflict

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