The Peninsula Foundation

Category: International & Transnational Affairs

  • ‘World War 3 has already started’ between US and Russia/China, argues French scholar

    ‘World War 3 has already started’ between US and Russia/China, argues French scholar

    Ben Norton reviews the interview given by the prominent French Scholar, Emmanuel Todd. The interview was in French and published in the major French newspaper ‘Le Figaro’. Emmanuel Todd argues the Ukraine proxy war is the start of WWIII, and is “existential” for both Russia and the US “imperial system”, which has restricted the sovereignty of Europe, making Brussels into Washington’s “protectorate”. 

    America is fragile. The resistance of the Russian economy is pushing the American imperial system toward the precipice. No one had expected that the Russian economy would hold up against the “economic power” of NATO. I believe that the Russians themselves did not anticipate it –  Emmanuel Todd

    A prominent French intellectual has written a book arguing that the United States is already waging World War Three against Russia and China.

    He also warned that Europe has become a kind of imperial “protectorate”, which has little sovereignty and is essentially controlled by the US.

    Emmanuel Todd is a widely respected anthropologist and historian in France.

    In 2022, Todd published a book titled “The Third World War Has Started” (“La Troisième Guerre mondiale a commencé” in French). At the moment, it is only available in Japan.

    But Todd outlined the main arguments he made in the book in a French-language interview with the major newspaper Le Figaro, conducted by the journalist Alexandre Devecchio.

    According to Todd, the proxy war in Ukraine is “existential” not only for Russia, but also for the United States.

    The US “imperial system” is weakening in much of the world, he observed, but this is leading Washington to “strengthen its hold on its initial protectorates”: Europe and Japan.

    This means that “Germany and France had become minor partners in NATO”, Todd said, and NATO is really a “Washington-London-Warsaw-Kiev” bloc.

    US and EU sanctions have failed to crush Russia, as Western capitals had hoped, he noted. This means that “the resistance of the Russian economy is pushing the American imperial system toward the precipice”, and “the American monetary and financial controls of the world would collapse”.

    The French public intellectual pointed to UN votes concerning Russia, and cautioned that the West is out of touch with the rest of the world.

    “Western newspapers are tragically funny. They don’t stop saying, ‘Russia is isolated, Russia is isolated’. But when we look at the votes of the United Nations, we see that 75% of the world does not follow the West, which then seems very small”, Todd observed.

    He also criticized the GDP metrics used by Western neoclassical economists for downplaying the productive capacity of the Russian economy, while simultaneously exaggerating that of financialized neoliberal economies like in the United States.

    In the Le Figaro interview, Todd argued (all emphasis added):

    This is the reality, World War III has begun. It is true that it started ‘small’ and with two surprises. We went into this war with the idea that the Russian army was very powerful and that its economy was very weak.

    It was thought that Ukraine was going to be crushed militarily and that Russia would be crushed economically by the West. But the reverse happened. Ukraine was not crushed militarily even if it lost 16% of its territory on that date; Russia was not crushed economically. As I speak to you, the ruble has gained 8% against the dollar and 18% against the euro since the day before the start of the war.

    So there was a sort of misunderstanding. But it is obvious that the conflict, passing from a limited territorial war to a global economic confrontation, between the whole of the West on the one hand and Russia backed by China on the other hand, has become a war world. Even if military violence is low compared to that of previous world wars.

    The newspaper asked Todd if he was exaggerating. He replied, “We still provide weapons. We kill Russians, even if we don’t expose ourselves. But it remains true that we Europeans are above all economically engaged. We also feel our true entry into war through the inflation and shortages”.

    Todd understated his case. He didn’t mention the fact that, after the US sponsored the coup that overthrew Ukraine’s democratically elected government in 2014, setting off a civil war, the CIA and Pentagon immediately began training Ukrainian forces to fight Russia.

    The New York Times has acknowledged that the CIA and special operations forces from numerous European countries are on the ground in Ukraine. And the CIA and a European NATO ally are even carrying out sabotage attacks inside Russian territory.

    Nevertheless, in the interview, Todd continued:

    Putin made a big mistake early on, which is of immense sociohistorical interest. Those who worked on Ukraine on the eve of the war considered the country not as a fledgling democracy, but as a society in decay and a ‘failed state’ in the making.

    I think the Kremlin’s calculation was that this decaying society would crumble at the first shock, or even say ‘welcome Mom’ to holy Russia. But what we have discovered, on the contrary, is that a society in decomposition, if it is fed by external financial and military resources, can find in war a new type of balance, and even a horizon, a hope. The Russians could not have foreseen it. No one could.

    Todd said he shares the view of Ukraine of US political scientist John Mearsheimer, a realist who has criticized Washington’s hawkish foreign policy.

    Mearsheimer “told us that Ukraine, whose army had been taken over by NATO soldiers (American, British and Polish) since at least 2014, was therefore a de facto member of NATO, and that the Russians had announced that they would never tolerate a NATO member Ukraine,” Todd said.

    For Russia, this is there a war that is “from their point of view defensive and preventative,” he conceded.

    “Mearsheimer added that we would have no reason to rejoice in the eventual difficulties of the Russians because, since this is an existential question for them, the harder it was, the harder they would hit. The analysis seems to hold true.”

    Germany and France had become minor partners in NATO and were not aware of what was going on in Ukraine on the military level. French and German naivety has been criticized because our governments did not believe in the possibility of a Russian invasion. True, but because they did not know that Americans, British and Poles could make Ukraine be able to wage a larger war. The fundamental axis of NATO now is Washington-London-Warsaw-Kiev.

    However, Todd argued that Mearsheimer “does not go far enough” in his analysis. The US political scientist has overlooked how Washington has restricted the sovereignty of Berlin and Paris, Todd said:

    Germany and France had become minor partners in NATO and were not aware of what was going on in Ukraine on the military level. French and German naivety has been criticized because our governments did not believe in the possibility of a Russian invasion. True, but because they did not know that Americans, British and Poles could make Ukraine be able to wage a larger war. The fundamental axis of NATO now is Washington-London-Warsaw-Kiev.

    Mearsheimer, like a good American, overestimates his country. He considers that, if for the Russians the war in Ukraine is existential, for the Americans it is nothing but a power “game” among others. After Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, one debacle more or less… What does it matter?

    The basic axiom of American geopolitics is: ‘We can do whatever we want because we are sheltered, far away, between two oceans, nothing will ever happen to us’. Nothing would be existential for America. Insufficiency of analysis which today leads Biden to a series of reckless actions.

    America is fragile. The resistance of the Russian economy is pushing the American imperial system toward the precipice. No one had expected that the Russian economy would hold up against the “economic power” of NATO. I believe that the Russians themselves did not anticipate it.

    The French public intellectual went on in the interview to argue that, by resisting the full force of Western sanctions, Russia and China pose a threat to “the American monetary and financial controls of the world”.

    This, in turn, challenges the US status as the issuer of the global reserve currency, which gives it the ability to maintain a “huge trade deficit”:

    If the Russian economy resisted the sanctions indefinitely and managed to exhaust the European economy, while it itself remained backed by China, the American monetary and financial controls of the world would collapse, and with them the possibility for United States to fund its huge trade deficit for nothing.

    This war has therefore become existential for the United States. No more than Russia, they cannot withdraw from the conflict, they cannot let go. This is why we are now in an endless war, in a confrontation whose outcome must be the collapse of one or the other.

    Todd warned that, while the United States is weakening in much of the world, its “imperial system” is “strengthening its hold on its initial protectorates”: Europe and Japan.

    He explained:

    Everywhere we see the weakening of the United States, but not in Europe and Japan because one of the effects of the retraction of the imperial system is that the United States strengthens its hold on its initial protectorates.

    If we read [Zbigniew] Brzezinski (The Grand Chessboard), we see that the American empire was formed at the end of the Second World War by the conquest of Germany and Japan, which are still protectorates today. As the American system shrinks, it weighs more and more heavily on the local elites of the protectorates (and I include all of Europe here).

    The first to lose all national autonomy will be (or already are) the English and the Australians. The Internet has produced human interaction with the United States in the Anglosphere of such intensity that its academic, media and artistic elites are, so to speak, annexed. On the European continent we are somewhat protected by our national languages, but the fall in our autonomy is considerable, and rapid.

    As an example of a moment in recent history when Europe was more independent, Todd pointed out, “Let us remember the war in Iraq, when Chirac, Schröder and Putin held joint press conferences against the war” – referring to the former leaders of France (Jacques Chirac) and Germany (Gerhard Schröder).

    The interviewer at Le Figaro newspaper, Alexandre Devecchio, countered Todd asking, “Many observers point out that Russia has the GDP of Spain. Aren’t you overestimating its economic power and resilience?”

    Todd criticized the overreliance on GDP as a metric, calling it a “fictional measure of production” that obscures the real productive forces in an economy:

    War becomes a test of political economy, it is the great revealer. The GDP of Russia and Belarus represents 3.3% of Western GDP (the US, Anglosphere, Europe, Japan, South Korea), practically nothing. One can ask oneself how this insignificant GDP can cope and continue to produce missiles.

    The reason is that GDP is a fictional measure of production. If we take away from the American GDP half of its overbilled health spending, then the “wealth produced” by the activity of its lawyers, by the most filled prisons in the world, then by an entire economy of ill-defined services, including the “production” of its 15 to 20 thousand economists with an average salary of 120,000 dollars, we realize that an important part of this GDP is water vapor.

    War brings us back to the real economy, it allows us to understand what the real wealth of nations is, the capacity for production, and therefore the capacity for war.

    Todd noted that Russia has shown “a real capacity to adapt”. He attributed this to the “very large role for the state” in the Russian economy, in contrast to the US neoliberal economic model:

    If we come back to material variables, we see the Russian economy. In 2014, we put in place the first important sanctions against Russia, but then it increased its wheat production, which went from 40 to 90 million tons in 2020. Meanwhile, thanks to neoliberalism, American wheat production, between 1980 and 2020, went from 80 to 40 million tons.

    …

    Russia has therefore a real capacity to adapt. When we want to make fun of centralized economies, we emphasize their rigidity, and when we glorify capitalism, we praise its flexibility.

    …

    The Russian economy, for its part, has accepted the rules of operation of the market (it is even an obsession of Putin to preserve them), but with a very large role for the state, but it also derives its flexibility from training engineers, who allow the industrial and military adaptations.

    This point is similar to what economist Michael Hudson has argued – that although Moscow’s economy is no longer socialist, like that of the Soviet Union was, the Russian Federation’s state-led industrial capitalism clashes with the financialized model of neoliberal capitalism that the United States has tried to impose on the world.

     

    The Peninsula Foundation is happy to republish this article with the permission of the author, Ben Norton.

    The article was published earlier in geopoliticaleconomy.com

    Feature Image Credit: newstatesman.com

    Portrait Sketch of Emmanuel Todd: Fabien Clairefond

     

  • Ukraine War Tolls Death Knell for NATO

    Ukraine War Tolls Death Knell for NATO

    President Vladimir Putin addressed an expanded meeting of the Russian Defence Ministry Board, Moscow on Dec. 21, 2022

    The defining moment in US President Joe Biden’s press conference at the White House last Wednesday, during President Zelensky’s visit, was his virtual admission that he is constrained in the proxy war in Ukraine, as European allies don’t want a war with Russia.

    To quote Biden, “Now, you say, ‘Why don’t we just give Ukraine everything there is to give?’  Well, for two reasons. One, there’s an entire Alliance that is critical to stay with Ukraine.  And the idea that we would give Ukraine material that is fundamentally different than is already going there would have a prospect of breaking up NATO and breaking up the European Union and the rest of the world… I’ve spent several hundred hours face-to-face with our European allies and the heads of state of those countries, making the case as to why it was overwhelmingly in their interest that they continue to support Ukraine… They understand it fully, but they’re not looking to go to war with Russia.  They’re not looking for a third World War.”

    Biden realised at that point that “I probably already said too much” and abruptly ended the press conference. He probably forgot that he was dwelling on the fragility of Western unity.

    The whole point is that the western commentariat largely forgets that Russia’s core agenda is not about territorial conquest — much as Ukraine is vital to Russian interests —but about NATO expansion. And that has not changed.

    Every now and then President Putin revisits the fundamental theme that the US consistently aimed to weaken and dismember Russia. As recently as last Wednesday, Putin invoked the Chechen war in the 1990s — “the use of international terrorists in the Caucasus, to finish off Russia and to split the Russian Federation… They [US]claimed to condemn al-Qaeda and other criminals, yet they considered using them on the territory of Russia as acceptable and provided all kinds of assistance to them, including material, information, political and any other support, notably military support, to encourage them to continue fighting against Russia.”

    Putin has a phenomenal memory and would have been alluding to Biden’s careful choice of William Burns as his CIA chief. Burns was Moscow Embassy’s point person for Chechnya in the 1990s! Putin has now ordered a nationwide campaign to root out the vast tentacles that the US intelligence planted on Russian soil for internal subversion. Carnegie, once headed by Burns, has since shut down its Moscow office, and the Russian staff fled to the West!

    The leitmotif of the expanded meeting of the Board of the Defence Ministry in Moscow on Wednesday, which Putin addressed, was the profound reality that Russia’s confrontation with the US is not going to end with the Ukraine war. Putin exhorted the Russian top brass to “carefully analyse” the lessons of the Ukraine and Syrian conflicts.

    Importantly, Putin said, “We will continue maintaining and improving the combat readiness of the nuclear triad. It is the main guarantee that our sovereignty and territorial integrity, strategic parity and the general balance of forces in the world are preserved. This year, the level of modern armaments in the strategic nuclear forces has already exceeded 91 per cent. We continue rearming the regiments of our strategic missile forces with modern missile systems with Avangard hypersonic warheads.”

    Equally, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu proposed at Wednesday’s meeting a military build-up “to bolster Russia’s security,” including:

    • Creation of a corresponding group of forces in Russia’s northwest to counter Finland and Sweden’s induction as NATO members;
    • Creation of two new motorised infantry divisions in the Kherson and Zaporozhya regions, as well as an army corps in Karelia, facing the Finnish border;
    • Upgrade of 7 motorised infantry brigades into motorised infantry divisions in the Western, Central and Eastern military districts, and in the Northern Fleet;
    • Addition of two more air assault divisions in the Airborne Forces;
    • Provision of a composite aviation division and an army aviation brigade with 80-100 combat helicopters within each combined arms (tank) army;
    • Creation of 3 additional air division commands, eight bomber aviation regiments, one fighter aviation regiment, and six army aviation brigades;
    • Creation of 5 district artillery divisions, as well as super-heavy artillery brigades for building artillery reserves along the so-called strategic axis;
    • Creation of 5 naval infantry brigades for the Navy’s coastal troops based on the existing naval infantry brigades;
    • Increase in the size of the Armed Forces to 1.5 million service personnel, with 695,000 people serving under contract.

    Putin summed up: “We will not repeat the mistakes of the past… We are not going to militarise our country or militarise the economy… and we will not do things we do not really need, to the detriment of our people and the economy, the social sphere. We will improve the Russian Armed Forces and the entire military component. We will do it calmly, routinely and consistently, without haste.”

    If the neocons in the driving seat in the Beltway wanted an arms race, they have it now. The paradox, however, is that this is going to be different from the bipolar Cold War era arms race.

    If the US intention was to weaken Russia before confronting China, things aren’t working that way. Instead, the US is getting locked into a confrontation with Russia and the ties between the two big powers are at a breaking point. Russia expects the US to roll back NATO’s expansion, as promised to the Soviet leadership in 1989.

    The neocons had expected a “win-win” in Ukraine: Russian defeat and a disgraceful end to Putin’s presidency; a weakened Russia, as in the 1990s, groping for a new start; consolidation of western unity under a triumphant America; a massive boost in the upcoming struggle with China for supremacy in the world order; and a New American Century under the “rules-based world order”.

    But instead, this is turning out to be a classic Zugzwang in the endgame — to borrow from German chess literature — where the US is under obligation to make a move on Ukraine but whichever move it makes will only worsen its geopolitical position.

    Biden has understood that Russia cannot be defeated in Ukraine; nor are Russian people in any mood for an insurrection. Putin’s popularity is soaring high, as Russian objectives in Ukraine are being steadily realised. Thus, Biden is getting a vague sense, perhaps, that Russia isn’t exactly seeing things in Ukraine as a binary of victory and defeat, but is gearing up for the long haul to sort out NATO once and for all.

    The transformation of Belarus as a “nuclear-capable” state carries a profound message from Moscow to Brussels and Washington. Biden cannot miss it. (See my blog NATO nuclear compass rendered unavailing, Indian Punchline, Dec. 21, 2022

    Logically, the option open to the US at this point would be to disengage. But that becomes an abject admission of defeat and will mean the death knell for NATO, and Washington’s transatlantic leadership goes kaput. And, worse still, major west European powers — Germany, France and Italy — may start looking for a modus vivendi with Russia. Above all, how can NATO possibly survive without an “enemy”?

    Clearly, neither the US nor its allies are in a position to fight a continental war. But even if they are, what about the emerging scenario in the Asia-Pacific, where the “no limits” partnership between China and Russia has added an intriguing layer to the geopolitics?

    The neocons in the Beltway have bitten more than what they could chew. Their last card will be to push for a direct US military intervention in the Ukraine war under the banner of a “coalition of the willing.”

    This commentary was published earlier on the author’s website – indianpunchline.com

    Feature Image Credit: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

  • The “loss and damage” agenda at COP27

    The “loss and damage” agenda at COP27

    The dialogues on Climate Change Action have failed to produce effective measures. At the heart of the problem is the refusal of the developed countries to accept the reality that they were the beneficiaries of the industrial revolution, colonialism, and imperialism and have contributed the maximum to the current problems humanity faces on account of climate change. Hence, two-thirds of the world’s assertion that developed nations bear the costs of implementing corrective measures is very valid and logical.

    The 27th Conference of Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was hosted by the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt from 06 November to 18 November (extended to 20 November). This conference comes at a time when the world witnessed massive heatwaves, flooding in Pakistan, wildfires across Spain and California, and droughts in East Africa. The mission of the conference is to take collective action to combat climate change under the Paris agreement and the convention. After a decade of climate talks, the question is, “are countries ready to take collective action against climate change”?

    Developed Nations’ Responsibility and Accountability

    Financial compensation remains a huge contestation point between developed and developing countries. Developing countries or the Global South face the adverse effects of climate change and demand compensation for the historical damage caused by colonialism and resource extraction that aided in the development of the Global North. This includes countries in the EU and the United States. Developed countries bear the most responsibility for emissions leading to global temperature rise — between 1751 and 2017, the United States, the EU and the UK were responsible for 47% of cumulative carbon dioxide emissions compared to just 6% from the entire African and South American continents. At COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, Global North nations agreed to pledge $100 billion (€101 billion) annually by 2020 to help developing countries adapt to the impacts of climate change, for example, by providing farmers with drought-resistant crops or paying for better flood defences. But according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which tracks funding, in 2020 wealthy countries pledged just over $83 billion.

    Developed countries bear the most responsibility for emissions leading to global temperature rise — between 1751 and 2017, the United States, the EU and the UK were responsible for 47% of cumulative carbon dioxide emissions compared to just 6% from the entire African and South American continents.

    Such compensation for loss and damage has been a focal point in all climate summits since 1991. In terms of institutional developments, the COP19 conference in 2013 established the Warsaw Mechanism for Loss and Damage, which is supposed to enhance global understanding of climate risk, promote transnational dialogue and cooperation, and strengthen “action and support”. At COP25, the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage (SNLD) was set up to provide research and technical assistance on the issue of loss and damage from human-induced climate change. The meeting did not discuss the working process of the network and hence it was taken up in COP26, where no elaborate changes were made. Although in COP26, the Glasgow facility to finance solutions for loss and damage was brought by G77 countries, developed countries such as the US and the EU bloc did not go beyond agreeing to a three-year dialogue.

    Developed countries constantly focus on holding dialogues rather than coming up with solutions for climate risk mitigation.

    The US’s stance on financing vulnerable countries to find solutions against climate change is constantly shifting. The trend indicates that the US wants to focus on curbing global warming rather than dwell on past losses and damages that have already occurred. The Global North is reluctant to acknowledge the mere definition of loss and damage, as an acknowledgement will make them liable for 30 years’ worth of climate change impact.  Developed countries constantly focus on holding dialogues rather than coming up with solutions for climate risk mitigation. In a statement prior to COP27, U.S. climate envoy John Kerry expressed concern about how the shifting focus on loss and damage “could delay our ability to do the most important thing of all, which is [to] achieve mitigation sufficient to reduce the level of adaptation.”

    USA’s leads Evasive Tactics

    The Bonn Summit held in June 2022 which set a precedent for the COP27 agenda ended in disagreement as the US and EU refused to accept funding for loss and damage as an agenda. Although, during the conclusion of COP27, the countries were successful in agreeing to establish a fund for loss and damage. Governments also agreed to establish a ‘transitional committee’ to make recommendations on how to operationalize both the new funding arrangements and the fund at COP28 next year. The first meeting of the transitional committee is expected to take place before the end of March 2023.

    Parties also agreed on the institutional arrangements to operationalize the Santiago Network for Loss and Damage, to mobilise technical assistance to developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. Governments agreed to move forward on the Global Goal on Adaptation, which will conclude at COP28 and inform the first Global Stocktake, improving resilience amongst the most vulnerable. New pledges, totalling more than USD 230 million, were made to the Adaptation Fund at COP27. These pledges will help many more vulnerable communities adapt to climate change through concrete adaptation solutions.

    Despite a groundbreaking agreement, the most common question asked by the public is “are the climate summits any good?”

    The question arises due to the absence of effective leadership to monitor or condemn nations over the destruction of the environment. The summits have created a sense of accountability for all nations, irrespective of the stage of vulnerability. While vulnerable states bear a higher cost due to climate change, all states collectively pledge to reduce carbon emissions and achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. While a monitoring mechanism is absent, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil societies actively advocate for climate change mitigation measures and also criticise both state and non-state actors for their lack of initiatives against the cost. Incidentally, COP27 partnered with Coca-Cola for sponsorship and many activists slammed the move as Coca-Cola is one of the top five polluters in 2022, producing around 120 billion throwaway plastic bottles a year.

    Apart from that, many other funding networks and initiatives have been introduced to support vulnerable countries against climate change. Under Germany’s G7 presidency, the G7 along with the vulnerable 20 countries or V20  launched the Global Shield against Climate Risks during COP27. The Shield gathers activities in the field of climate risk finance and preparedness together under one roof. Under the Shield, solutions to provide protection will be devised that can be implemented swiftly if climate-related damages occur. At COP27, Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced Germany’s contribution of 170 million euros to the Shield. Of this, 84 million euros are earmarked for the central financing structure of the Shield, the other funds for complementary instruments of climate risk financing, which will be implemented towards concrete safeguarding measures over the next few years.

    On 20 September, Denmark became the first developed country in the world to provide financial compensation to developing countries for ‘loss and damage’ caused by climate change. The country pledged approximately EUR 13 million (100 million Danish krone) to civil society organisations based in developing nations working on climate change-related loss and damage. Germany and Denmark are so far the only financial supporters of the initiative launched at COP27.

    What can India do?

    India has launched Mission LiFE, an initiative to bring a lifestyle change that reduces the burden on the environment. During the event, the MoEFCC – UNDP Compendium ‘Prayaas Se Prabhaav Tak – From Mindless Consumption to Mindful Utilisation’ was launched. It focuses on reduced consumption, circular economy, Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, and sustainable resource management. India has also signed the Mangrove Alliance for Climate (MAC), determined to protect mangroves and create a carbon sink of 3 billion CO2 by expanding the forest cover.

    India has maintained a stance where it has neither advocated for nor against financial compensation for loss and damage. However, it has always called on developed countries to provide finance for developing technology or sharing technical know-how to reduce climate risk. Such an approach can help other countries to push for financial aid to develop technology instead of using their own resources.

    Further, India holds a unique position among developing countries as an emerging economy. With its diplomatic prowess under the Modi government, India can play an ideal role in negotiating with developed countries. India has maintained a stance where it has neither advocated for nor against financial compensation for loss and damage. However, it has always called on developed countries to provide finance for developing technology or sharing technical know-how to reduce climate risk. Such an approach can help other countries to push for financial aid to develop technology instead of using their own resources. India is also focused on phasing out the use of fossil fuels and not just the use of coal, which is another consistent move that adds to the country’s credentials. With the weaponization of energy by Russia since the onset of the Ukraine war, India’s call for action has garnered intensive support from both developed and developing nations. With the support of the Global South, India can assume a leadership role in establishing south-south cooperation with respect to climate risk mitigation and shift to renewable energy such as solar power.

    Conclusion

    Climate funds are important for designing and implementing solutions as developing and vulnerable countries find it difficult to diversify resources from developmental activities. The question largely remains whether the COP27 countries will adhere to the agreement concluded at the summit. There is no conclusive evidence on when the fund will be set up and the liability if countries fail to contribute to the fund. Eventually, it comes down to the countries- both state and non-state actors to effectively reduce fossil fuel consumption and reduce wastage, as many countries still focus on exploiting African gas reserves to meet their energy requirements. Ambitious goals with no actual results are a trend that is expected to continue till the next summit, and with such a trend the world has a long way to go to curb the temperature at 1.5 degree Celsius at pre-industrial levels.

    Feature Image Credit: www.cnbc.com

    Article Image: aljazeera.com 

  • Putin’s statements suggest the Ukraine conflict could last for years

    Putin’s statements suggest the Ukraine conflict could last for years

    Most likely, the fighting will continue into 2023, and quite probably beyond, until either Moscow or Kiev is exhausted, or one side claims a decisive victory. For the US, Ukraine is a matter of principle; for the Kremlin, the matter is simply existential – the conflict with the West is not about Ukraine, but about the fate of Russia itself.

    Last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin commented, during a meeting with soldiers’ mothers, that he now regards the Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015 as a mistake. This confession was stark in the context of the possibility of peace negotiations to end the fighting in Ukraine.

    Russian President Vladimir Putin commented, during a meeting with soldiers’ mothers, that he now regards the Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015 as a mistake.

    It is worth remembering that in 2014, Putin acted on a mandate from the Russian parliament to use military force “in Ukraine,”not just in Crimea. In fact, Moscow did save the cities of Donetsk and Lugansk from being overrun by Kyiv’s army, and defeated Ukraine’s forces, but rather than clearing the whole region of Donbass, Russia stopped, and agreed to a cease-fire brokered in Minsk by Germany and France.

    Putin explained to the mothers that at the time, Moscow did not know for sure the sentiments of the Donbass population affected by the conflict, and hoped that Donetsk and Lugansk could somehow be reunited with Ukraine on the conditions laid down in Minsk. Putin might have added – and his own actions, as well as conversations with then-Ukrainian President Pyotr Poroshenko, confirm it – that he was prepared to give the new Kyiv authorities a chance to settle the issue and rebuild a relationship with Moscow. Until rather late in the game, Putin also hoped that he could still work things out with the Germans and the French, and the US leadership.

    Admissions of mistakes are rare among incumbent leaders, but they are important as indicators of lessons they have learned.

    Admissions of mistakes are rare among incumbent leaders, but they are important as indicators of lessons they have learned. This experience has apparently made Putin decide not that the decision to launch the special military operation last February was wrong, but that eight years before, Moscow should not have put any faith in Kyiv, Berlin, and Paris, and instead should have relied on its own military might to liberate the Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine.

    In other words, agreeing to a Minsk-style ceasefire now would be another mistake which would allow Kyiv and its backers to better prepare to resume fighting at the time of their choosing.

    The Russian leader realizes, of course, that many nations in the non-West, those who refused to join the anti-Russian sanctions coalition and profess neutrality on Ukraine, have called for an end to hostilities. From China and India to Indonesia and Mexico, these countries, while generally friendly toward Russia, see their economic prospects being impaired by a conflict that pits Russia against the united West. The Western media also promote the message that global energy and food security is suffering because of Moscow’s actions. Russia’s arguments and protestations to the contrary have only limited impact since Russian voices are rarely heard on Middle Eastern, Asian, African, or Latin American airwaves.

    Be that as it may, Moscow cannot ignore the sentiments of the larger part of humanity, which is now increasingly referred to in Russian expert circles as the Global Majority. Hence, official Russian statements that Moscow is open for dialogue without preconditions. However, any Russian delegation to talks would have to take into account the recent amendments to the country’s Constitution, which name the four former Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson, and Zaporozhye as part of the Russian Federation. As Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has put it, Russia will only negotiate on the basis of existing geopolitical realities. It should be noted that the Kremlin has not retracted the objectives of the military operation, which include the demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine, which means ridding the state and society of ultra-nationalist, anti-Russian elements.

    As for Kyiv, it has gone back and forth on the issue. Having nearly reached a peace agreement with Moscow in late March, it later reversed course to continue fighting (the Russians believe this was done on Western advice). Having achieved operational successes on the battlefield this past fall, Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky had all contacts with the Kremlin formally banned and formulated extreme demands which he addressed to Putin’s successors, whenever they may emerge. For the West, this was bad from the perspective of public relations, and Zelensky was asked to make it appear as if he was open for talks, but in reality, nothing changed.

    The reality is that the principal parties involved in the conflict in Ukraine, namely Washington and Moscow, do not consider the present, or the near future, as a good time for negotiations.

    The reality is that the principal parties involved in the conflict in Ukraine, namely Washington and Moscow, do not consider the present, or the near future, as a good time for negotiations. From the US perspective, despite the unprecedented sanctions imposed on Russia by the West and the recent setbacks that the Russian Army has experienced in Kharkov and Kherson, Moscow is far from being defeated on the battlefield or destabilized domestically. From the Kremlin’s perspective, any truce or peace that leaves Ukraine as an ‘anti-Russia’, hostile state, is tantamount to a defeat with highly negative consequences.

    Instead, both sides believe they can win. The West, of course, has vastly superior resources in virtually every field that it can use in Ukraine. But Russia is working to mobilize its own substantial reserves in both manpower and the economy.

    Where Moscow has an advantage is in escalatory dominance. For the US, Ukraine is a matter of principle; for the Kremlin, the matter is simply existential – the conflict with the West is not about Ukraine, but about the fate of Russia itself.

     

    It looks as if the war will continue into 2023, and possibly beyond that. Talks will probably not start before either side is prepared to concede due to exhaustion, or because both parties have reached an impasse. In the meantime, the death toll will continue to mount, pointing to the essential tragedy of major power politics. In the fall of 1962, then-US President John F. Kennedy was ready to walk to the edge of the nuclear precipice in order to prevent the Soviet Union from turning Cuba into its missile base. Sixty years later, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a military action to make sure that Ukraine does not become an unsinkable aircraft carrier for America.

    Whatever Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev thought about his right to counter US missiles pointed at Moscow from Turkey with weapons of his own targeting Washington and New York from Cuba (with Havana’s consent), and whatever successive US presidents thought about their right to expand the NATO military bloc to include Ukraine (at Kyiv’s wish), there is always a horrendous price to pay for the failure to take into account the rival power’s security interests.

     

    There is a lesson to be learned from this. Whatever Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev thought about his right to counter US missiles pointed at Moscow from Turkey with weapons of his own targeting Washington and New York from Cuba (with Havana’s consent), and whatever successive US presidents thought about their right to expand the NATO military bloc to include Ukraine (at Kyiv’s wish), there is always a horrendous price to pay for the failure to take into account the rival power’s security interests. Cuba went down in history as a narrow success for common sense. Ukraine is an ongoing story, with its outcome still hanging in the balance.

    Feature Image: rt.com

    Image: Khrushchev and Kennedy – rferl.org

    Image: Robert and Jack Kennedy – bostonglobe.com – The most important lesson of the Cuban Missile crisis.

  • Xi’s third term, the 20th Party Congress and Implications for India

    Xi’s third term, the 20th Party Congress and Implications for India

    The historic 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) concluded on October 23rd. The week-long extravagant event – beginning on October 16th – has brought new faces of the Chinese political elite to the forefront along with a few surprises. Xi’s report before the 20th National Party Congress (NPC) at the opening ceremony and his appointments to the highest posts in the country are very telling of what his third term could look like for the world. Most importantly, the implications for India cannot be clearer – politically, economically, diplomatically, and militarily. India will need to acquaint herself with these new appointments and developments and come up with a strategy to level the playing field.

    What the report says and implies

    Xi’s report to the 20th NPC was in stark contrast to the report delivered in 2017 to the 19th NPC. In 2017, Xi was triumphant of all that China had achieved and hoped to achieve in the future – particularly on the economic front and of its growing international influence. He was proud of China’s assertive foreign policy and soft power. That sentiment has not necessarily changed in the 20th NPC report. However, Xi’s report did strike a sombre tone, predicting a tough future for China – “…strategic opportunities, risks, and challenges are concurrent and uncertainties and unforeseen factors are rising. Various “black swan” and “grey rhino” events may occur at any time.” His speech and report come across as a rallying call meant to safeguard the primacy and authority of the CPC and their way of life against external interference.

    “China’s overall development objectives for the year 2035 are as follows: Significantly increase economic strength, scientific and technological capabilities, and composite national strength; substantially grow the per capita GDP to be on par with that of a mid-level developed country”.              – Xi Jinping in his address to the 20th Party Congress.

    The importance of “national security” (mentioned 81 times) and China’s external and regional challenges is given highest priority and significance. Other key phrases that find frequent mention in the report are “military”, “strategic/strategy” and “risks”. There is a concerted focus on military modernisation and ramping R&D. Simultaneously, Xi is also realistic of the economic challenges ahead of China – “…many bottlenecks hindering high-quality development, and China’s capacity for scientific and technological innovation is not yet strong enough. Many major issues need to be resolved in order to guard against financial risks and ensure that food, energy, and industrial and supply chains are secure and reliable.” Interestingly, China’s economy was not in the spotlight. There was a glaring omission of the development of and plans for the BRI; mentioned only twice in the entire report. Predictably, there was no change in China’s policy towards Taiwan except a veiled threat directed at the US for its interference in its neighbourhood. It appears that Xi’s plans for his third term are to focus on China’s security and strategic challenges through assertive diplomacy.

    Xi stacks the deck in his favour

    Xi Jinping’s appointment as General Party Secretary of the CPC for a third term was the least surprising outcome from the 20th NPC; owing to constitutional amendments made in his previous term i.e., the removal of the constraint of a term limit. He also retains his position as Chairman of the party’s Central Military Commission (CMC). His appointments to the state’s top bodies have broken with the CPC’s age norm of ‘7-up, 8-down’; officials eligible to serve another term at 67 years have been given the boot while people like Zhang Youxia (VC of the CMC), at 72 years, has been given another term when he should ideally have been retired.

    The reshuffling of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) appears to have only one important criterion – loyalty to Xi Jinping. The move is also an indication of the concentration of power that now rests with Xi and his men. With the introduction of the “Two Establishes” and “Two Safeguards”, Xi elevated himself to be on par with Mao Zedong and above Deng Xiaoping, Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin. Indeed, the inclusion of Xi Jinping’s Thoughts on Socialism with Chinese characteristics in the Party Constitution along with the “Two Establishes” and “Two Safeguards” has cemented Xi Jinping as the core of the CPC. His appointments to the PBSC reflect this. Premier Li Keqiang, widely believed to be a dissenter and protégé of former President Hu Jintao was dropped. Hu Chunhua, slated for a position in the PBSC and considered for the premiership was unable to secure a position in the 7-member powerful body and was even dropped from the Politburo. Other members to be removed were Wang Yang, Han Zheng and Li Zhangshu. Both Wang Yang and Han Zheng were closely linked to Li Keqiang and former President Jiang Zemin respectively. The new members of PBSC are Li Qiang, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang and Li Xi. Zhao Leji and ideology tsar Wang Huning were the only members to retain their seats; having closely aligned themselves with Xi Jinping in the period between the 19thNPC and 20th NPC. The composition of the 20th PBSC indicates Xi’s success in removing all factional opposition present within the Party. All the members who were left off the PBSC were a part of the Communist Youth League and rose within its ranks to become powerful men. Their removal, along with Hu Jintao being escorted out during the 20th National Congress is both a signal to Xi’s loyalists and opposition.

    Similarly, the selection of people into the 24-member Politburo and Central Committee are all Xi loyalists and will have a direct impact on China’s domestic and foreign policies going forward. Xi’s prioritisation of security and S&T is reflected in some of the new appointments to the Politburo – Chen Wenqing (an intelligence officer and former minister of the Ministry of State Security), engineers with specialisation in aerospace Ma Xingrui and Yuan Jiajin, Li Ganjie (nuclear engineering), Zhang Youxia (VC of the CMC), Hei Weidong (VC of the CMC and Commander of CMC’s Joint Command Center), Chen Jining (environmental sciences), and Yin Li (public health expert). Notably, both the PBSC and Politburo have no women participation.

    The backgrounds of the appointees to these bodies are also an indicator of the growing premium Xi is placing on technocrats. Beyond party and political loyalty, they are expected to fall in line with his policy agenda and thus, have backgrounds in aerospace, technology, finance, economics, engineering, and advanced manufacturing in sectors like semiconductors. 

    The backgrounds of the appointees to these bodies are also an indicator of the growing premium Xi is placing on technocrats. Beyond party and political loyalty, they are expected to fall in line with his policy agenda and thus, have backgrounds in aerospace, technology, finance, economics, engineering, and advanced manufacturing in sectors like semiconductors. The number of officials with backgrounds in S&T in the Central Committee is at par with Jiang Zemin’s first term in 1992. According to a study by the Brookings Institution, 81 seats in the 20th Central Committee – around 40% – are occupied by Chinese officials with technical expertise. The belief that technocrats generally lack political factions, prefer working in silos and are solution-oriented also works in Xi’s favour.

     

    A stronger and more loyal CMC

    The new CMC appointees stand out for several reasons. For one, Xi has broken with the established retired norms by placing Army veteran Zhang Youxia as VC of the CMC. Further, the placement of He Weidong as the second VC of the CMC is unusual since he has essentially jumped two grades without serving as either a member of the CMC or Central Committee of the CPC. Second, Xi appears to have rewarded those that he has personal and familial connections with.

    Zhang Youxia’s father, Zhang Zongxun was a founding member of the PLA and served with Xi’s father, Xi Zongxun in the 1940s. General Zhang’s decorated career, combat experience (Sino-Vietnamese war in the 1980s) and position as head of the Equipment Development Department of the CMC make him one of Xi’s most trusted allies in the PLA. On the other hand, General He Weidong’s catapult to second VC is significant given his operational experience with both the Western Theatre Command (WTC) and Eastern Theatre Command (ETC) ground forces. Reportedly, both Xi and He are also close friends owing to the time they both spent in Fujian province and Zhejiang province during Xi’s days working in the provincial government.

    The other new appointment with operational and combat experience is General Liu Zhenli. He takes over as Chief of the Joint Staff Committee of the CMC and was previously Chief of Staff and Commander of the PLA Army and Chief of Staff of the PAP. His experience in the Sino-Vietnam border skirmishes in the 1980s as well as his stint with the PAP makes him an important addition to the CMC.

    Finally, General Li Shangfu’s (potentially Minister of National Defense) elevation to the CMC is notable in that it signals a close linkage between the aerospace domain and the military. Li is a technocrat and is widely regarded as the man behind China’s manned and unmanned space program. His time as Deputy Commander of the PLA Strategic Support Force and his current appointment as Director of the Equipment Development Department reflects Xi’s aim of achieving the centenary goal of the PLA Army and modernising its military and national defence.

    The other two members to retain their position in the CMC are Admiral Miao Hua and General Zhang Shengmin. They both rose through the ranks in the Political Work Department as political commissars. Admiral Miao will continue to head the Political Work Department. He is also a close ally of Xi from when they both served in the Fujian province in the 1990s and 2002. No doubt his work as a political commissar in the PLA Navy makes him a strong candidate for a second term in the CMC. Similarly, General Zhang continues to head the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection as he serves in the PLA Rocket Force. His appointment is particularly significant given the fact that he replaced Du Jincai who was being investigated with then VC’s Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou on corruption. Zhang Shengmin’s retainment signals, one, Xi’s trust in him and two, that his anti-corruption campaign is far from over.

    Other appointments such as Airforce General Xu Qilang and PLA Generals Wei Fenghe and Li Zuocheng to the State Commission indicate an overwhelming prioritisation of the WTC and ETC, meaning India and Taiwan – China’s two biggest security challenges. The appointment of several serving chiefs of the ground forces will have far-reaching implications for the LAC and India’s national security.

    The combination of technocrats and veterans in the CMC is a nod towards Xi’s vision for the Chinese military – “…continue integrated development of the military through mechanization, informatization, and the application of smart technologies and work faster to modernize military theory, organizational forms, personnel, and weaponry and equipment. We will enhance the military’s strategic capabilities for defending China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests…”.

    However, the success of these appointments remains to be seen given the relatively limited operational experience some of the members have.

     What do we make of China’s economy?

    The “common prosperity for all” is another major tenet at the heart of China’s domestic economic policy. Whilst outlining all the strides the CPC has made in the last five years to the 20th NPC, Xi is also aware of the economic challenges China faces – the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, the rise of unilateralism and protectionism, a sluggish global economy and regional conflicts and disturbances. To combat these challenges, China is pursuing the “dual circulation” strategy and “high-quality development”. Notably, these two mechanisms have made their way to the Party Constitution. The dual circulation strategy is aimed at improving domestic demand, building secure and resilient supply chains, and reducing China’s dependency on foreign trade for its economic growth.

    China is pursuing the “dual circulation” strategy and “high-quality development”. Notably, these two mechanisms have made their way to the Party Constitution. The dual circulation strategy is aimed at improving domestic demand, building secure and resilient supply chains, and reducing China’s dependency on foreign trade for its economic growth.

    Along with a faster recovery of its industrial production equipment manufacturing and high-tech manufacturing, China’s GDP grew by 3.9% in the third quarter. However, this does not take away from the fact that, presently, China’s exports have diminished. The strict zero-covid policy that China continues to enforce is severely impacting its industries. The recent US Chips Act and export controls targeted at China are affecting foreign enterprises in the country as well as its tech industry.

    Further, the absence of market-reform oriented economists like Premier Le Keqiang, Vice Premier Liu He, head of the Central Bank Yi Gang, financial regulator Guo Shuqing and Finance Minister Liu Kun from the PBSC and Politburo will surely be felt. Li Qiang, the potential candidate for the Premiership does not have an economic background and it is likely that most of the heavy lifting will fall to He Lifeng (tapped for Vice Premier) in the Politburo. He is a supporter of Xi’s “self-reliance” policies and economic nationalism. He will have big shoes to fill as Liu He, the outgoing Vice Premier, had a powerful portfolio that included economic policy and the financial sector. The Harvard-trained economist was also Xi’s go-to man for trade negotiations with Washington.

    India’s continued economic growth is evidence contrary to what China dictates. Even as China seeks membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and uses the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), there are signs of decoupling with the Chinese economy emerging. Already, the US-imposed export controls are impacting China’s production and manufacturing. While China proposes a more “secure” and inward-looking economic policy, achieving this goal will take a long time. This is an opportunity for India to exploit. India becoming the next manufacturing hub for the world will challenge China’s position in Asia and thus, presents an obstacle for the latter.

    China’s wolf-warrior diplomacy to continue

    With Yang Jiechi’s retirement, the position of head of China’s Central Foreign Affairs Commission is set to move to Wang Yi, another seasoned career diplomat. His appointment to the Politburo, at 69 years of age, is yet another display of Xi’s disregard for the Party age norms. But it also indicates that Xi looks to Wang’s expertise as China enters its most challenging period of international engagements. Wang has been the face of China’s foreign policy for quite some time and is another ‘wolf-warrior diplomat’. His appointment signals the continuity of the wolf-warrior diplomacy that China practices. With Wang Yi at the helm, it is expected that Qin Gang, the current ambassador to the US, will become the next Foreign Minister. The other potential appointee to the position is Liu Haixing who is a career diplomat specialising in European affairs and served multiple postings in China’s embassy in France. He is also the Deputy Director of the Office of the National Security Commission (NSC). Other diplomats on the roster are Liu Jianchao and Qi Yu. Liu Jianchao was recently made Director of the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCID) this June and it is unlikely to change so soon. He also previously served at the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission (FAC). Qi Yu, serving as Party Secretary of the Foreign Ministry has no diplomatic experience.

    The choice between Liu Haixing and Qin Gang will also dictate the future direction of China’s foreign policy. The choice of diplomats to the Central Committee also indicates the importance Xi places on public relations. China’s need to sway public opinion, both domestically and internationally, is reflected in the choice of Liu Jianchao and Qin Gang. Both have ample experience serving as spokespersons for the Party and the PRC respectively. Further, Liu Jianchao’s and Liu Haixing’s elevation to the Central Committee also indicates the importance of serving in Party Commissions. Their time at the FAC and NSC, respectively, within the last five years has earned them a fast-tracked promotion to the Central Committee. The path to the top is even closer for Liu Haixing given the fact that his senior, Cai Qi who served in the NSC, now sits in the PBSC.

    The road ahead for India

    The appointments to the PBSC, Politburo and CMC are a reflection of China’s assertiveness on the international stage. The military appointees are of particular importance to India. The overwhelming emphasis on ground forces and service chiefs with experience in the WTC could mean more skirmishes along the LAC and a concerted focus towards engaging in hybrid warfare. The LAC is a priority security concern for India as well and the nationalistic fervour that Xi exemplified in his speech to the 20th NPC is no different from what Prime Minister Modi engages in. That said, India’s military forces must be prepared for an escalation along the LAC at any point in time.

    The Central Committee of 205 members, the majority of whom hold doctorates, includes 47 military leaders. This is reflective of China’s governance structure that is techno-military focused along with the necessary expertise in political, economic, and social domains.

    However, leaving aside the anti-Chinese rhetoric of the West, it is important for India to recognise the competence; educational qualifications, experience, and expertise; and the varied techno-military-politico composition of the Chinese leadership. CCP’s Central Committee consists of 205 full committee members from which are chosen the top leadership forming the Politburo of 24 members inclusive of the apex standing committee of seven members and the Central Military Commission of seven members. All 205 members are highly qualified in various disciplines such as economics, education, politics, philosophy, sciences, engineering, medicine, aerospace, nuclear, space, telecommunications, sociology, history, management, international relations, law, jurisprudence, geopolitics etc. The majority hold doctorates in their chosen fields. Xi Jinping holds a degree in Chemical Engineering and a doctorate in Marxian philosophy and Political Science. In addition, the leadership has a significant presence of military leadership, both serving and veterans that includes 27 Generals and 17 Lieutenant Generals out of the 205 members.

    China’s economic downturn and security-oriented economic policy that Xi has propounded is an opportunity for India to become the next manufacturing hub in Asia. However, India must remain cautious of what competition with China could look like for the neighbourhood.

    The changes to the diplomatic cadre in the 20th NPC do not take away from the fact that India’s standing and position are stronger and more sure-footed than it has ever been. Our diplomacy in the face of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war showcases that. India’s strategic autonomy, respect for international law and norms and growing strategic partnerships with the Indo-Pacific countries are an advantage to her engagement with Beijing.

    Feature Image Credit: orcasia.org

  • The Great Game in Ukraine is Spinning out of Control

    The Great Game in Ukraine is Spinning out of Control

    Former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski famously described Ukraine as a “geopolitical pivot” of Eurasia, central to both US and Russian power.  Since Russia views its vital security interests to be at stake in the current conflict, the war in Ukraine is rapidly escalating to a nuclear showdown.  It’s urgent for both the US and Russia to exercise restraint before disaster hits.

    The current conflict is, in essence, the Second Crimean War.  This time, a US-led military alliance seeks to expand NATO to Ukraine and Georgia, so that five NATO members would encircle the Black Sea.

    Since the middle of the 19th Century, the West has competed with Russia over Crimea and more specifically, naval power in the Black Sea.  In the Crimean War (1853-6), Britain and France captured Sevastopol and temporarily banished Russia’s navy from the Black Sea.  The current conflict is, in essence, the Second Crimean War.  This time, a US-led military alliance seeks to expand NATO to Ukraine and Georgia, so that five NATO members would encircle the Black Sea.

    The US has long regarded any encroachment by great powers in the Western Hemisphere as a direct threat to US security, dating back to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which states: “We owe it, therefore, to candour and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those [European] powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.”

    In 1961, the US invaded Cuba when Cuba’s revolutionary leader Fidel Castro looked to the Soviet Union for support.  The US was not much interested in Cuba’s “right” to align with whichever country it wanted – the claim the US asserts regarding Ukraine’s supposed right to join NATO.  The failed US invasion in 1961 led to the Soviet Union’s decision to place offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba in 1962, which in turn led to the Cuban Missile Crisis exactly 60 years ago this month.  That crisis brought the world to the brink of nuclear war.

    Yet America’s regard for its own security interests in the Americas has not stopped it from encroaching on Russia’s core security interests in Russia’s neighbourhood.  As the Soviet Union weakened, US policy leaders came to believe that the US military could operate as it pleases.  In 1991, Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz explained to General Wesley Clark that the US can deploy its military force in the Middle East “and the Soviet Union won’t stop us.” America’s national security officials decided to overthrow Middle East regimes allied to the Soviet Union and encroach on Russia’s security interests.

    In 1990, Germany and the US gave assurances to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev that the Soviet Union could disband its own military alliance, the Warsaw Pact, without fear that NATO would enlarge eastward to replace the Soviet Union. It won Gorbachev’s assent to German reunification in 1990 on this basis.  Yet with the Soviet Union’s demise, President Bill Clinton reneged by supporting the eastward expansion of NATO.

    America’s dean of statecraft with Russia, George Kennan, declared that NATO expansion “is the beginning of a new cold war.”   

    Russian President Boris Yeltsin protested vociferously but could do nothing to stop it.  America’s dean of statecraft with Russia, George Kennan, declared that NATO expansion “is the beginning of a new cold war.”

    Under Clinton’s watch, NATO expanded to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999.  Five years later, under President George W. Bush, Jr. NATO expanded to seven more countries: the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), the Black Sea (Bulgaria and Romania), the Balkans (Slovenia), and Slovakia.  Under President Barack Obama, NATO expanded to Albania and Croatia in 2009, and under President Donald Trump, to Montenegro in 2019.

    Russia’s opposition to NATO enlargement intensified sharply in 1999 when NATO countries disregarded the UN, attacked Russia’s ally Serbia, and stiffened further in the 2000s with the US wars of choice in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. At the Munich Security Conference in 2007, President Putin declared that NATO enlargement represents a “serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust.”

    “And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended?  And what happened to the assurances [of no NATO enlargement] our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact?”  – Putin at the Munich Security Conference in 2007.

    Putin continued: “And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended?  And what happened to the assurances [of no NATO enlargement] our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact?” Where are those declarations today? No one even remembers them. But I will allow myself to remind this audience of what was said. I would like to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He said at the time that: “the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee. Where are these guarantees?”

    In 2007, with the NATO admission of two Black Sea countries, Bulgaria and Romania, the US established the Black Sea Area Task Group (originally the Task Force East).  Then in 2008, the US raised the US-Russia tensions still further by declaring that NATO would expand to the very heart of the Black Sea, by incorporating Ukraine and Georgia, threatening Russia’s naval access to the Black Sea, Mediterranean, and the Middle East.

    Also in 2007, with the NATO admission of two Black Sea countries, Bulgaria and Romania, the US established the Black Sea Area Task Group (originally the Task Force East).  Then in 2008, the US raised the US-Russia tensions still further by declaring that NATO would expand to the very heart of the Black Sea, by incorporating Ukraine and Georgia, threatening Russia’s naval access to the Black Sea, Mediterranean, and the Middle East.  With Ukraine’s and Georgia’s entry, Russia would be surrounded by five NATO countries in the Black Sea: Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine.

    Russia was initially protected from NATO enlargement to Ukraine by Ukraine’s pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych, who led the Ukrainian parliament to declare Ukraine’s neutrality in 2010.  Yet in 2014, the US helped to overthrow Yanukovych and bring to power a staunchly anti-Russian government.  The Ukraine War broke out at that point, with Russia quickly reclaiming Crimea and supporting pro-Russian separatists in the Donbas, the region of Eastern Ukraine with a relatively high proportion of Russian population.  Ukraine’s parliament formally abandoned neutrality later in 2014.

    Ukraine and Russian-backed separatists in the Donbas have been fighting a brutal war for 8 years.  Attempts to end the war in the Donbas through the Minsk Agreements failed when Ukraine’s leaders decided not to honour the agreements, which called for autonomy for the Donbas.  After 2014, the US poured in massive armaments to Ukraine and helped to restructure Ukraine’s military to be interoperable with NATO, as evidenced in this year’s fighting.

    The Russian invasion in 2022 would likely have been averted had Biden agreed with Putin’s demand at the end of 2021 to end NATO’s eastward enlargement.  The war would likely have been ended in March 2022, when the governments of Ukraine and Russia exchanged a draft peace agreement based on Ukrainian neutrality.  Behind the scenes, the US and UK pushed Zelensky to reject any agreement with Putin and to fight on.  At that point, Ukraine walked away from the negotiations.

    The nuclear threat is not empty, but a measure of the Russian leadership’s perception of its security interests at stake. 

    Russia will escalate as necessary, possibly to nuclear weapons, to avoid military defeat and NATO’s further eastward enlargement.  The nuclear threat is not empty, but a measure of the Russian leadership’s perception of its security interests at stake.   Terrifyingly, the US was also prepared to use nuclear weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis, and a senior Ukrainian official recently urged the US to launch nuclear strikes “as soon as Russia even thinks of carrying out nuclear strikes,” surely a recipe for World War III.  We are again on the brink of nuclear catastrophe.

    President John F. Kennedy learned about nuclear confrontation during the Cuban missile crisis.  He defused that crisis not by force of will or US military might, but by diplomacy and compromise, removing US nuclear missiles in Turkey in exchange for the Soviet Union removing its nuclear missiles in Cuba.  The following year, he pursued peace with the Soviet Union, signing the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

    In June 1963, Kennedy uttered the essential truth that can keep us alive today: “Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy–or of a collective death-wish for the world.”  

    It is urgent to return to the draft peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine of late March, based on the non-enlargement of NATO.  Today’s fraught situation can easily spin out of control, as the world has done on so many past occasions – yet this time with the possibility of nuclear catastrophe.  The world’s very survival depends on prudence, diplomacy, and compromise by all sides.

     

    This article is republished with the permission of the author. It was published earlier in www.other-news.info

    Image Credit: Scroll.in

  • China’s Expanding Presence in the Pacific Islands

    China’s Expanding Presence in the Pacific Islands

    The Pacific Island Countries (PICs) have received increasing attention recently as they continue to be centres of geopolitical tension between China and western powers – the USA, Australia, and New Zealand. The island nations are generally grouped into three distinct regions, namely – Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia, on the basis of their physical and human geography. They possess some of the largest Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in the world spanning about 30 million sq km (11.6 million sq miles) of the ocean despite their small size and limited population. 

    The Chinese efforts to secure a strong military presence in the Pacific Island Countries could not only enable it to achieve ‘Blue Navy Status’ but also counter this overwhelming US military presence surrounding it.

    The economic potential of these Exclusive Economic Zones, which are rich in fisheries, energy, minerals and other marine resources, is so immense that these nations prefer to be regarded as the Big Ocean States, rather than the Small Island States. In the past, the islands have functioned as launchpads and laboratories, playing crucial roles in power rivalries due to their location and geography¹. With China endeavouring to spread its power and influence to achieve Great Power status, it is natural that it set its sights on areas which have been traditionally dominated by Western powers. Increased Chinese presence in the Pacific Islands is aimed at ending the United States unchallenged influence in the region and to enable suitable backups in a potential conflict over Taiwan. The US presently has 53 overseas military bases across Japan and South Korea, in close proximity to the Chinese mainland as opposed to China’s only overseas military base in Djibouti. Thus, the Chinese efforts to secure a strong military presence in the Pacific Island Countries could not only enable it to achieve ‘Blue Navy Status’ but also counter this overwhelming US military presence surrounding it.

    Economic Factors and China’s Strategy

    The economic attractiveness of the Pacific Islands also includes access to its trade and shipping routes.  On the diplomatic front, these nations tend to serve as a vote bank at forums like the United Nations and can help Beijing in its ambition to further isolate Taiwan. Additionally, stronger relations would help in advancing China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative while also enhancing its image as a reliable partner and viable alternative to other major powers, especially the US and Australia.

    China has had ties with the Pacific Islands since the 1970s but many island nations’ official diplomatic recognition of Taiwan continued to be a major hurdle throughout these years. Through continued economic assistance, China has succeeded in getting diplomatic recognition from 10 out of the 14 Pacific Islands. Presently, only four countries namely Tuvalu, Palau, Marshall Islands and Nauru recognise Taiwan, with Kiribati being the latest nation to withdraw its recognition in September 2019. The success of the Chinese approach can be seen in the fact that they have successfully secured Belt and Road cooperation MOUs with all the 10 PICs and have signed the Belt and Road cooperation plans with Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Vanuatu. As per the fact sheet released by the Chinese government, China and the PICs have continued to expand cooperation in more than 20 different areas, which include trade, investment, ocean affairs, environmental protection, disaster prevention and mitigation, poverty alleviation, health care, education, tourism, sports and culture. 

    Significant progress in China – PIC relations was seen with the establishment of the China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum in 2001, which functions as the highest-level dialogue mechanism between the countries in the fields of economy and trade. In November 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Fiji where he held a group meeting with the PIC head of states. An agreement was signed to establish a strategic partnership and these ties were elevated to a comprehensive strategic partnership featuring mutual respect and common development in November 2018, during President Xi Jinping’s visit to PNG. One of the more recent developments is the China-Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in October 2021, which resulted in the Joint Statement of China-Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers’ Meeting.

    Attention towards climate change action has given China a strong foothold amidst rising frustration among the PICs about the Western powers’ proclivity to focus on geopolitical concerns without sparing sufficient attention to the island country’s paramount needs and concerns. 

    The major success of the Chinese strategy with regards to the Pacific Island nations can be found in their harnessing of pressing issues like climate change, environment, agricultural development, infrastructure and rising sea levels which have been largely neglected by traditional powers. From providing yearly financial assistance to the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) since 1998, the Chinese government has taken efforts to address and assist the PICs in tackling climate change and achieving sustainable development. April 2022 saw the launch of the China-Pacific Island Countries Climate Change Cooperation Centre in the Shandong Province of China. The Chinese have strengthened renewable energy cooperation with the PICs and have facilitated the construction of hydro-power stations in countries like PNG and Fiji. This attention towards climate change action has given China a strong foothold amidst rising frustration among the PICs about the Western powers’ proclivity to focus on geopolitical concerns without sparing sufficient attention to the island country’s paramount needs and concerns. 

    Infrastructure Strategy – BRI Model

    Infrastructure development has been another avenue where the Chinese have shown significant enthusiasm. Several important connectivity projects have been executed in the PICs including the Independence Boulevard in PNG, Malakula island highway in Vanuatu, renovation of Tonga national road, and Pohnpei highway in Micronesia. Aside from providing much needed support in a variety of fields, the Chinese approach to the Pacific islands as a collective entity has helped acknowledge the group as having a combined identity and decision-making capability. Addressing issues which have only been previously discussed on a bilateral basis also provides the PIC with enhanced political strength and purpose, because despite all their differences, most of the countries share similar needs and requirements. 

    Chinese efforts to establish a strong military presence in the region were in 2018, when the Australian press reported that China had requested the right to establish a permanent military presence in Vanuatu, situated less than 2,000 kilometres from Australian territory. However, no formal agreement was drafted. The then Prime Minister of Vanuatu strongly denied that any such talks had taken place and assured the local and international community that there would be no Chinese military presence in the country. A similar report was released by the Australian press in the same year alleging that China held a keen interest in refurbishing a port on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea which had previously functioned as the site of an Allied naval base during World War II. The claims were dismissed when the PNG government contracted Australia and the United States to redevelop the port instead. 

    The Chinese efforts finally materialized in the form of the China – Solomon Islands Security Pact in April 2022. As per the terms of the pact, permission is granted to the Chinese navy to dock and refuel in the Solomon Islands, laying the groundwork for a facility that could be expanded over time. The pact allows the Solomon Islands to seek Chinese assistance when required to maintain social order and stability. The pact has been understood by several scholars as a way for China to establish a permanent military presence gradually under the guise of performing this role. The security pact came at a time when international attention was already on the growing closeness of China and the Pacific Island nations following the leak of two draft documents “China-Pacific Island Countries (PICs) Common Development Vision”, and “China-Pacific Islands Five-Year Action Plan on Common Development (2022-2026)” at the start of 2022. 

    USA’s Response

    In the face of China’s rising threat, the United States released its Indo-Pacific Strategy in February 2022 which emphasized the importance of the Pacific Islands to the United States. Along with the “Partners in the Blue Pacific” initiative, it reiterated its commitment to cement itself as a dominant power in the region. However, definitive action on a large scale was taken only in late May when the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, embarked on a 10-day visit to the region attempting to secure a comprehensive framework agreement with engagements on multiple fronts with the PICs. Although the attempt was unsuccessful, Wang, during his visit, travelled to eight countries (the Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Samoa, Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste) and held virtual meetings with three additional nations (Cook Islands, Niue and the Federated States of Micronesia), ultimately signing 52 bilateral treaties. Although the Chinese foreign minister stressed the country’s commitment and intent for long-term engagement in the region, news of the framework agreement sparked great controversy. The Pacific Island nations could not reach a unanimous decision on signing this agreement and decided to deliberate the matter at the PIF meeting. However, this decision to postpone discussions was disadvantageous to China as the PIF has membership from both New Zealand and Australia both of which were sure to put up strong opposition to the signing of this agreement. Perhaps foreseeing this, the agreement was soon withdrawn after which China immediately released a Position Paper on Mutual Respect and Common Development ² with Pacific Island Countries, which offers 15 “visions and proposals” for deepening China’s engagement in the region. The security issues (China sought to train local police forces, conduct mapping of sensitive marine areas, and play a role in the cyber security of the nations) that had caused much controversy were only mentioned briefly within the paper with much of the focus pointed notably towards political and economic issues. Wang, as part of his visit, also hosted the second round of the China-Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers Meeting in Fiji where he delivered the Secretary General of the Chinese Communist, Party Xi Jinping’s written remarks on China’s continued support. 

    Swift responses came about on May 31, when US President Biden and New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern issued a joint statement that highlighted the two countries’ shared commitment to the Pacific Islands. The statement also expressed their concern over the China – Solomon Islands Security Pact and warned against “the establishment of a persistent military presence in the Pacific by a state that does not share our values or security interest.” ⁴ Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong embarked on a similar visit to Fiji, Samoa and Tonga in early June to reinforce Canberra’s commitments to its neighbours. 

    Despite these advancements, public response to the Chinese visit and in a broader sense, to China’s growing footprint in the region was largely negative. Domestic response in Kiribati was lukewarm due to the wariness stemming from rumours that surfaced in 2021 about China’s plans to upgrade a World War II airstrip in the country, which is likely to damage the country’s already strained fish stocks. The announcement that Fiji would become a founding member of the U.S. led Indo- Pacific Economic Framework by President Frank Bainimaram immediately prior to Wang’s visit reflected wariness about China’s future presence in the area. Additionally, despite signing the security pact, Solomon Islands Prime Minister Sogavare’s support for Beijing gave rise to worries that China would now be in a position “to prop up an unpopular regime and undermine the democratic processes in the name of maintaining social order” among his critics. However, the most vocal voice of protest was that of David Panuelo, the president of the Federated States of Micronesia, who called upon his fellow Pacific Island leaders to reject China’s offers of a comprehensive framework agreement calling it “the single-most game-changing proposed agreement in the Pacific in any of our lifetimes.” ³ The lack of transparency during Wong’s visit drew further criticism with the strict regulation of foreign journalists and ban on direct questions. It eventually led the Media Association of the Solomon Islands to issue a boycott notice to its members, urging them to skip the press event in protest of these restrictions.

    Concerns have also arisen due to China’s reputation for extremely stringent terms of lending and what the West accuses as ‘debt trap’ policy. 60 percent of all Chinese loans are offered at commercial rates rather than concessional rates with extremely short repayment periods – usually less than 10 years. Additionally, the confidentiality clauses (borrowing countries cannot reveal terms of the loan provided or in some cases the very existence of the loan), stabilization clause (lender can demand immediate repayment of loan in case of significant change in the borrowing country’s laws like labour or environment policies), cross-default clause (contract can be terminated and full and immediate repayment can be demanded if the borrowing country defaults on any of its other lenders), political clause ( termination or acceleration of repayment if the borrower acts against China) as well as holding Chinese projects in the country as collateral which are characteristic of Chinese loans are also worrying. The lack of public access to the China – Solomon Islands security pact document and similar documents is also unsettling. 

    Demand for addressing Climatology threats and not Geopolitics

    Chinese interest in the region has served as an efficient bargaining chip for the Pacific Islands to secure their key security interests.

    The geopolitical competition brewing in the region has been a topic of discussion at the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). Its members include Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Palau, Tuvalu and Nauru in addition to the other Pacific Island Nations. Kiribati’s withdrawal from the Forum on July 9 led to debates on China’s influence on this decision among the opposition parties in the country. However, the government cited the failure to adhere to previous engagements, which in turn threatened equal respect and position accorded to the members of the forum as a reason for this move. The PIF meetings conducted between July 11 and July 14 gave ample opportunity for traditionally influential powers like the US and Australia to promise stronger support for the region. US Vice President Kamala Harris addressed the forum as a special invitee announcing two new embassies in Kiribati and the Solomon Islands. She also pledged to triple current aid levels (up to 60 million dollars per year for 10 years) to help combat illegal fishing, enhance maritime security and tackle climate change, after decades of stalled funding as well as a return of peace corps volunteers to Fiji, Tonga, Samoa and Vanuatu. Australia’s remarks ran along similar lines i.e.; pledges of greater support for the climate change agenda of its neighbours.

    Chinese interest in the region has served as an efficient bargaining chip for the Pacific Islands to secure their key security interests. Using this geopolitical competition to its favour could be the way forward for these island nations whose very existence is threatened by rising sea levels. As Dame Meg Taylor, former secretary-general of the Pacific Islands Forum states, the process is already underway. “In general, Forum members view China’s increased actions in the region as a positive development, one that offers greater options for financing and development opportunities — both directly in partnership with China, and indirectly through the increased competition in our region.”

    The most recent PIF meeting concluded with the island nations declaring a climate emergency and making it clear that climate action would be the most preferred front for engagement with all powers including China, US and Australia. Although the western powers, especially Australia had previously pledged to take climate action, the Pacific Island nations had expressed disappointment that the targets for phasing out of carbon emissions had not been met. Thus, greater realignment towards taking definitive climate action would be the next step in relations with the Pacific Islands.  As Fiji’s Bainimarama put it, “Geopolitical point-scoring means less than little to anyone whose community is slipping beneath the rising seas. With jobs being lost to the pandemic, and families being impacted by the rapid rise in the price of commodities, their greatest concern isn’t geopolitics — it’s climate change.”

    It is vital that the Pacific Island Countries band together to maintain solidarity, leverage the opportunities afforded to them due to competition brought about by China’s increased interest in the region and show solidarity in light of the unifying, clarifying priority for all Pacific leaders, which is survival. 

    The effects of climate change are already manifesting in “countries like Vanuatu, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Tonga which are no longer facing category five (severe tropical) cyclones once every 10 years, it’s once every two or three years.” Rising sea levels have allowed salt water to rise through the ground in countries like the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu, which pollute the existing fresh water sources. As former Kiribati President Anote Tong explains in an interview to The Drum, “climate change is not some hypothetical future threat – his islands may not be habitable by 2060.” Thus, it is vital that the Pacific Island Countries band together to maintain solidarity, leverage the opportunities afforded to them due to competition brought about by China’s increased interest in the region and show solidarity in light of the unifying, clarifying priority for all Pacific leaders, which is survival. 

    REFERENCES : 

    1. Dirk H. R. Spennemann (1992) The politics of heritage: Second world war remains on central Pacific Islands, The Pacific Review, 5:3, 278-290, DOI: 10.1080/09512749208718990 
    2. “China’s Position Paper on Mutual Respect and Common Development with Pacific Island Countries.” China’s Position Paper on Mutual Respect and Common Development with Pacific Island Countries, www.fmprc.gov.cn, 30 May 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202205/t20220531_10694923.html.
    3. Panuelo, D. (2022). DocumentCloud. Retrieved 1 August 2022, from https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/22037013-letter-from-h-e-david-w-panuelo-to-pacific-island-leaders-may-20-2022-signed
    4. The United States Government. (2022, May 31). United States – Aotearoa new zealand joint statement. The White House. Retrieved August 1, 2022, from https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/31/united-states-aotearoa-new-zealand-joint-statement/ 
  • The West’s False Narrative about Russia and China

    The West’s False Narrative about Russia and China

    The relentless Western narrative that the West is noble while Russia and China are evil is simple-minded and extraordinarily dangerous.

    The world is on the edge of nuclear catastrophe in no small part because of the failure of Western political leaders to be forthright about the causes of the escalating global conflicts.  The relentless Western narrative that the West is noble while Russia and China are evil is simple-minded and extraordinarily dangerous.  It is an attempt to manipulate public opinion, not to deal with very real and pressing diplomacy.

    The essential narrative of the West is built into US national security strategy.  The core US idea is that China and Russia are implacable foes that are “attempting to erode American security and prosperity.”  These countries are, according to the US, “determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence.”

    The irony is that since 1980 the US has been in at least 15 overseas wars of choice (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Panama, Serbia, Syria, and Yemen just to name a few), while China has been in none, and Russia only in one (Syria) beyond the former Soviet Union.  The US has military bases in 85 countries, China in 3, and Russia in 1 (Syria) beyond the former Soviet Union.

    US security strategy is not the work of any single US president but of the US security establishment, which is largely autonomous, and operates behind a wall of secrecy.  

    President Joe Biden has promoted this narrative, declaring that the greatest challenge of our time is the competition with the autocracies, which “seek to advance their own power, export and expand their influence around the world, and justify their repressive policies and practices as a more efficient way to address today’s challenges.”  US security strategy is not the work of any single US president but of the US security establishment, which is largely autonomous, and operates behind a wall of secrecy.

    The overwrought fear of China and Russia is sold to a Western public through manipulation of the facts.  A generation earlier George W. Bush, Jr. sold the public on the idea that America’s greatest threat was Islamic fundamentalism, without mentioning that it was the CIA, with Saudi Arabia and other countries, that had created, funded, and deployed the jihadists in Afghanistan, Syria, and elsewhere to fight America’s wars.

    Or consider the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1980, which was painted in the Western media as an act of unprovoked perfidy.  Years later, we learned that the Soviet invasion was actually preceded by a CIA operation designed to provoke the Soviet invasion! The same misinformation occurred vis-à-vis Syria.  The Western press is filled with recriminations against Putin’s military assistance to Syria’s Bashar al-Assad beginning in 2015, without mentioning that the US supported the overthrow of al-Assad beginning in 2011, with the CIA funding a major operation (Timber Sycamore) to overthrow Assad years before Russia arrived.

    Or more recently, when US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi recklessly flew to Taiwan despite China’s warnings, no G7 foreign minister criticized Pelosi’s provocation, yet the G7 ministers together harshly criticized China’s “overreaction” to Pelosi’s trip.

    The Western narrative about the Ukraine war is that it is an unprovoked attack by Putin in the quest to recreate the Russian empire.  Yet the real history starts with the Western promise to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not enlarge to the East, followed by four waves of NATO aggrandizement: in 1999, incorporating three Central European countries; in 2004, incorporating 7 more, including in the Black Sea and the Baltic States; in 2008, committing to enlarge to Ukraine and Georgia; and in 2022, inviting four Asia-Pacific leaders to NATO to take aim at China.

    Nor do the Western media mention the US role in the 2014 overthrow of Ukraine’s pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych; the failure of the Governments of France and Germany, guarantors of the Minsk II agreement, to press Ukraine to carry out its commitments; the vast US armaments sent to Ukraine during the Trump and Biden Administrations in the lead-up to war; nor the refusal of the US to negotiate with Putin over NATO enlargement to Ukraine.

    Of course, NATO says that is purely defensive so that Putin should have nothing to fear.  In other words, Putin should take no notice of the CIA operations in Afghanistan and Syria; the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999; the NATO overthrow of Moammar Qaddafi in 2011; the NATO occupation of Afghanistan for 15 years; nor Biden’s “gaffe” calling for Putin’s ouster (which of course was no gaffe at all); nor US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stating that the US war aim in Ukraine is the weakening of Russia.

    The US has a mere 4.2% of the world population, and now a mere 16% of world GDP (measured at international prices).  In fact, the combined GDP of the G7 is now less than that of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), while the G7 population is just 6 per cent of the world compared with 41 per cent in the BRICS. 

    At the core of all of this is the US’s attempt to remain the world’s hegemonic power, by augmenting military alliances around the world to contain or defeat China and Russia.  It’s a dangerous, delusional, and outmoded idea.  The US has a mere 4.2% of the world population, and now a mere 16% of world GDP (measured at international prices).  In fact, the combined GDP of the G7 is now less than that of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), while the G7 population is just 6 per cent of the world compared with 41 per cent in the BRICS.

    There is only one country whose self-declared fantasy is to be the world’s dominant power: the US.  It’s past time that the US recognized the true sources of security: internal social cohesion and responsible cooperation with the rest of the world, rather than the illusion of hegemony.  With such a revised foreign policy, the US and its allies would avoid war with China and Russia, and enable the world to face its myriad environment, energy, food and social crises.

    European leaders should pursue the true source of European security: not US hegemony, but European security arrangements that respect the legitimate security interests of all European nations

    Above all, at this time of extreme danger, European leaders should pursue the true source of European security: not US hegemony, but European security arrangements that respect the legitimate security interests of all European nations, certainly including Ukraine, but also including Russia, which continues to resist NATO enlargements into the Black Sea.  Europe should reflect on the fact that the non-enlargement of NATO and the implementation of the Minsk II agreements would have averted this awful war in Ukraine.  At this stage, diplomacy, not military escalation, is the true path to European and global security.

    Feature Image Credit: Big Stock

    This article was published earlier in Pearls and Irritations.

  • Beyond Unipolarity and the Euro–American Horizons of IR Thought: Reflections on the Emergent World Order

    Beyond Unipolarity and the Euro–American Horizons of IR Thought: Reflections on the Emergent World Order

    Abstract

    Amidst the continuing conflict in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a notable pronouncement of the end of the US-led unipolar world and the rise of multipolar world order. Against this backdrop of the debate on polarity, my research paper seeks to address the following questions. To what extent have global institutions, mainstream IRT (International Relations Theory) and academia as well as policies reflected if not reinforced Euro-American norms and interests? Does this purported shift to multipolarity require a shift in institutional and theoretical practices reflecting the broad concerns of the Global South? Using global and regional case studies like India (especially in regard to the representation within academia and the glass ceiling affecting institutional practices like Young Professionals Programme), I draw from critical and post-colonial theoretical IR frameworks to argue for a comprehensive reform of the prevalent global institutional and theoretical structures. 

    Introduction

    The Euro-American hegemony runs very deep, pervading a range of institutions, norms, global practices, knowledge and even academic teaching practices.

    The month of February this year witnessed one of the most defining moments of the post-Cold war era. Marking a major escalation of the simmering conflict that began with the insurgency in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine resulting in thousands of casualties and millions of refugees.[1] This conflict inevitably has given rise to a wide range of debates in the global arena, including global governance, institutions, conflict and security. In this regard, one of the most interesting debates that have seen a resurgence is the question of the future of the world order. 

    The notion of a shift to multipolar world order has emerged as a prominent theme in the wake of this crisis. This is best exemplified by Vladimir Putin in his address to the St Petersburg International Economic Forum Plenary session, “a multipolar system of international relations is now being formed. It is an irreversible process; it is happening before our eyes and is objective in nature.” It is indeed widely recognised that the brief period of unipolarity, dominated by the US, following the end of the Cold War, has given way to the era of multipolar world order, characterised by ‘new powerful and increasingly assertive centres.’ [2] However, even as this shift to multipolarity seems almost deterministic, there persist legitimate questions on the conduciveness of the current world order to the emergence of these multiple power-centres. 

    Against this backdrop, my work shall be organised as follows. I commence with a discussion on the shift towards multipolarity, providing the conceptual capital of notions like power and polarity. This shall be followed by my argument that the current global order, exemplified in its norms, institutions, and intellectual resources, fall severely short of the expectations required of the multipolar world order. To illustrate this point, I draw from the case study of India, in particular. I conclude by providing some prescriptions necessary for the transition to multipolarity to be meaningful. Towards this pursuit, I draw from critical post-colonial theoretical frameworks, employing secondary literature review as the overarching method.

    Shifts towards multipolarity

    Before proceeding to the premise of the shift towards multipolarity, a few conceptual clarifications are in order. Polarity in this context is understood as the modes of distribution of power in the international system. Typically, it is classified as unipolar (e.g. US hegemony in the post-Cold-War era), bipolar (e.g. Russia-US dominance during the Cold War era) and multipolar (e.g. Europe during the pre-World War era). [3] While there are myriad debates on what constitutes power in the global landscape, I draw from the useful typology provided most famously by Joseph Nye – hard, soft, and smart power. Hard power is often described as the typical carrot and stick approach, involving coercion and is often measured in terms of “population size, territory, geography, natural resources, military force, and economic strength.” On the other hand, soft power is described as the ability to influence state preference using intangible attributes like “attractive personality, culture, political values, institutions, and policies” resulting in the perception of legitimacy or moral authority. Smart power is often understood as the instrumental deployment of a combination of both to secure political ends.[4] 

    The end of the Cold War era, prematurely lauded as the end of history by a scholar, resulted in a brief unipolar moment of US hegemony. As Putin puts it, the US was the predominant power with a limited group of allies which resulted in “all business practices and international relations … interpreted solely in the interests of this power.”[2]  However, a range of factors in the twenty-first century led to a crisis in American leadership. The interventionist atrocities carried out in the wake of the September 11 attacks as well as the crisis of global capitalism during the financial crisis of 2008 led to a crisis in American leadership.[5] This period also saw the emergence of new powers like the BRICS nations, who posed a serious challenge to the notion of unipolarity.[3] 

    As Amitav Acharya and Burry Buzan argue, this diffusion of power has resulted in the ‘rise of the rest’ characterised by the absence of a single superpower. Instead, a number of great and regional powers have emerged with their respective institutions and models of growth. Such a world order is also shaped by a greater role accorded to non-state actors including global organisations, corporations, and social movements as well as non-state actors.[6] Thus, the current global landscape is often termed as multipolar, multi-civilizational and multiplex offering myriad opportunities and benefits for states.[7] The crisis in Ukraine has only bolstered this multipolar moment even further. Consider India as a case in point. The likes of the U.S. (and even China) have competed for India’s affection and India’s seemingly pro-Russia stance has not prevented Delhi’s deeper engagement with her counterparts in the West. These initiatives can only enhance India’s great power status, resulting in potentially a higher degree of multipolarity.[8]

    Thus, even as there is an increasing scholarly and policy-based consensus on the shift towards multipolarity, there remain important reservations on whether the current global arena is equipped to deal with the seismic shifts posed by the emergent world order. In other words, does this purported shift to multipolarity require a shift in institutional and theoretical practices reflecting the broad concerns of the Global South? In the next section, I answer in the affirmative, arguing that the dominant norms, institutions, and intellectual resources are broadly skewed towards the preservation of Euro-American hegemony. 

    The maintenance of Euro-American hegemony: norms, institutions, and academia

    The exercise of U.S. hegemonic power involved the projection of a set of norms and their embrace by elites in other nations.

    Drawing from Persaud, I argue that dominant powers forge an “academic/foreign policy/security ‘complex’ dedicated to the maintenance of a hegemonic world order.” [9] Such a complex is constituted by an intricate network of norms, institutions and theoretical/ intellectual practices which seek to uphold the status quo. In this section, I examine each of these aspects in detail.

    Consider norms, in the first instance. Norms can be defined broadly as the “collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors.”[10] When certain norms which serve certain interests are considered as general interests, it results in hegemony. The dominant powers socialise and hegemonise other countries into an ideological worldview that best serves their interests. In other words, actors have to orient themselves according to a ‘logic of appropriateness’ framed by these intersubjective notions. In the post World War era, the Roosevelt-led US administration projected a series of norms and principles guided by liberal multilateralism, to shape the post-war international order. Such a form of ‘institutional materiality’ posited a clear separation between the political and the economic realm. The embrace of these norms outside the US occurred through various modes of socialisation including external inducement (e.g. Britain and France), direct intervention and internal reconstruction (e.g. Germany and Japan) as well as military and economic dominance.[11] 

    The exercise of U.S. hegemonic power involved the projection of a set of norms and their embrace by elites in other nations. Socialisation did occur since U.S. leaders were largely successful in inducing other nations to buy into this normative order. But the processes through which socialisation occurred varied from nation to nation. In Britain and France, shifts in norms were accomplished primarily by external inducement; in Germany and Japan, they resulted from direct intervention and internal reconstruction. In all cases, the spread of norms of liberal multilateralism was heavily tied to U.S. military and economic dominance. [11]

    Such norms are often manipulated (and flouted) to their advantage. For example, consider the liberal norm of conditional sovereignty, linked to human rights, spearheaded by the likes of the US and many countries in Western Europe. Assuming the primacy of the individual over the state, it has legitimised intervention on ‘humanitarian’ grounds. However, the execution of these norms has been far more uniform as best exemplified in their differential application in the wake of the atrocities in Kosovo and Rwanda. An intra-state conflict resulting in a humanitarian crisis in Kosovo precipitated a successful multilateral intervention. However, the same decisiveness was starkly absent with regard to a similar (if not greater) conflict in Rwanda which resulted in almost 800,000 casualties and more than two million refugees. Multiple studies have traced the rationale of intervention to the “strategic interests in Europe’s future and the NATO alliance.” Rwanda on the other hand was considered peripheral to the national interests of either Western Europe or the US.[12] This substantiates the argument that the norm of ‘humanitarian intervention’ is often tied more to brutal national interests rather than the protection of human rights.

    A range of global norms, ranging from economic norms, dealing with the management of finance, to those dealing with water governance has been shown to be skewed towards the interests of great powers rather than participative in nature.

    Consider another instance. The Liberal International Order (LIO) asserts the concept of ‘conditional sovereignty’ where sovereign nation-states are bound to look after their entire populations. A failure to that end invites interference and comments from other nation-states and external agencies. This norm has been pushed forward and spearheaded by first-world countries like the US and Western Europe, much to their advantage. Contrary to this, the neo-Westphalian order is a proponent of the ‘classical sovereignty’ model where nation-states are sovereign within their own territory to administer in any manner they want, obviously with a necessary reverence to human rights, but others are not authorized to interfere in the same. China and other authoritarian regimes have been advocating for the same. So, while the LIO talks about the equality of every individual, the neo-Westphalian order focuses more on the equality of all nation-states.[13] Similarly, a range of global norms, ranging from economic norms, dealing with the management of finance, to those dealing with water governance has been shown to be skewed towards the interests of great powers rather than participative in nature. 

    Similarly, Cox and Gill have argued how global governance through institutions play a critical role in maintaining hegemony.[14] The multilateral institutions which the US had created both in the political and economic realm have played a critical role in the sustenance of Euro-American (and especially the U.S.) dominance. In other words, even as the international world order shifts to a multipolar one, it has not exactly been accompanied by multilateralism.[15] While multilateralism puts forward the interests of multiple states, most so-called multilateral institutions reflect and reinforce prevailing power configurations. 

    Consider the United Nations, for instance. It cannot be a mere coincidence that the UN has been ineffectual against most of the contemporary global challenges like climate change, the pandemic etc. when it has not been responsive to the reality of the increasing number of power centres in the multipolar world order.[16] The most glaring evidence is the UNSC. Despite an increasing number of voices on the rise of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the P5 includes only one representative from Asia (which is China) and no members from either Africa or Latin America. In addition, while there has been more than a threefold rise in UN membership, the number of non-permanent seats has only risen from 11 to 15. Even at the administrative levels, the lack of non-western representation is indeed a concern. Besides the absence of a UNSC permanent seat, it is also disheartening to see that it has been years since the Young Professionals Program has been held for the likes of India.

    These same institutions are often undermined by the likes of the US, under the facade of NATO. Consider the harrowing intervention in Libya. The NATO intervention on supposedly ‘humanitarian’ grounds in 2011 led to the death of Muamar Gaddafi, violating the legal structures of the UN charter in the process and resulting in a proxy war. The result has been a prolonged state of near-anarchy characterised by arbitrary detentions, executions, mass killings and kidnappings. [17]

    The WTO is plagued with similar issues. While it ostensibly reflects the ‘global’ norm of neoliberal free trade, it is “structured and ordered to promote monopolistic competition rather than genuine free trade. These institutional roadblocks include the exclusion of developing countries from several informal decision-making sessions, lack of transparency, coercive decision-making in meetings involving developing countries, astronomical costs involved in Dispute settlement Understanding and so on. The result is that the Western countries have an overwhelming advantage against their counterparts from the Global South. [18]

    Lastly, as highlighted earlier, the international policy making apparatus cannot be divorced from the intellectual resources churned by IR academia. Zvobgo, in an insightful piece, has argued how the big three of IR theory – realism, liberalism and constructivism – are built on Eurocentric, raced and racist foundations.[19] The role of imperial policymakers in shaping contemporary IR knowledge has been well acknowledged. Kwaku Danso and Kwesi Aninghave argued about the prevalence of methodological whiteness, which projects White experience as a universal experience.[20] It is no coincidence that the principles of the Westphalian treaty are not significantly different from those underlying the current UN charter. Acharya has argued that racism was integral to the emergence of the US-led world order exemplified in the scant focus on colonialism in UNDHR as well as the “privileging of sovereign equality’ over ‘racial equality.’[21] 

    These forms of methodological whiteness have had devastating impacts across the world. The projection and the forceful projection of the Weberian state as the fundamental unit of security and conflict management has resulted in disastrous policy-level consequences in Africa which have always been characterised by a range of hybrid political systems beyond the nation-state.[20] Similarly, much of the problematic policies carried out today based on the binaries of ‘developed’ v/s ‘developing’ nations have direct continuities with the legacy of empire and race reflected in dichotomies like ‘civilised v/s uncivilised’. 

    There also exists historical amnesia of racism in academia, whether in terms of representation or teaching practices. For example, in the US, only 8% of the faculty identify themselves as Black or Latino. Similarly, the configurations of colonialism and racism in building the modern world order are either glossed over or overlooked in most academia.[19] Indian academia is a case in point. As Behera argues, despite the strong tradition of Indian independent IR thought as well as the long history of colonialism, Indian IR has imbibed a definite set of givens including  “the infallibility of the Indian state modelled after the Westphalian nation-state as well as a thorough internalization of the philosophy of political realism and positivism.[22] Rohan Mukherjee, for instance, has highlighted an unpublished survey of IR faculty within India wherein the majority self-identified as either liberal or realist.[23]

    Thus, the Euro-American hegemony runs very deep, pervading a range of institutions, norms, global practices, knowledge and even academic teaching practices. In the next section, I conclude by outlining certain prescriptions for a future world order which responds to and is far more conducive to the inevitable multipolar shifts. 

    Conclusion

    India has umpteen intellectual resources from Gita and the Sangam literature to stellar modern political philosophers like Gandhi, Tagore and so on, which need to be strategically combined with contemporary IR notions and questions of security, justice and so on.

    This paper first established the backdrop of the shift towards multipolarity within the world order by outlining the myriad modes of power through which the ‘Rest’ has caught up with the ‘West.’ In the succeeding section, I demonstrated how a range of norms, institutions and intellectual practices had been historically constructed to maintain Euro-American hegemony as well as promote the interests of the West. In such a world order, certain parochial interests have masqueraded themselves as common or global interests. In the concluding section, I outline certain prescriptions which have become necessary for a more equitable, multi-civilisational world order. 

    Institutions like the UN require urgent and seismic reforms reflecting the interests of emerging power centres. The number of seats within the Permanent and non-permanent seats must be expanded to include more nation-states from Asia, Africa and Latin America. A revitalisation of the UNGA is highly overdue and requires a focussed and timely debate on the problems of the highest priority at any given time through rationalization of its agenda. [24] Similarly, the proposed WTO reforms, which seeks to move away from multilateralism to impose plurilateralism, should be opposed at all costs. [25]

    As Zvobjo puts it eloquently, how IR is taught perpetuates the inequalities which are detailed above. Besides the dominant IR triumvirate, there needs to be an increased focus on critical perspectives as well as increased engagement with the uncomfortable questions of race, empire, colour, and caste.[19] This should be complemented by more diversity in terms of representation within academia. In India specifically, there needs to be increased efforts to construct Indian or South Asian IR notions. India has umpteen intellectual resources from Gita and the Sangam literature to stellar modern political philosophers like Gandhi, Tagore and so on, which need to be strategically combined with contemporary IR notions and questions of security, justice and so on. However, as Mallavarapu reminds us, care needs to be taken to ensure they can address existing inequities in the world order without succumbing or falling prey to jingoism or nativism.[26]

    References

    [1] Alex Leeds Matthews, Matt Stiles, Tom Nagorski, and Justin Rood, ‘The Ukraine War in data’, Grid, August 4, 2022

    https://www.grid.news/story/global/2022/08/04/the-ukraine-war-in-data-12-million-people-driven-from-their-homes/

    [2] Address to participants of 10th St Petersburg International Legal Forum, President of Russia, June 30, 2022

    http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68785

    [3]Andrea Edoardo Varisco, ’Towards a Multi-Polar International System: Which Prospects for Global Peace?’, E-International Relations, June 3, 2013.

    https://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/03/towards-a-multi-polar-international-system-which-prospects-for-global-peace/

    [4]Aigerim Raimzhanova, ‘Power in IR: hard, soft and smart’, Institute for Cultural Diplomacy and the University of Bucharest, December 2015

    http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/content/pdf/participant-papers/2015-12_annual/Power-In-Ir-By-Raimzhanova,-A.pdf

    [5]Ashraf, N. (2020). Revisiting international relations legacy on hegemony: The decline of American hegemony from comparative perspectives. Review of Economics and Political Science

    [6] Kukreja, Veena. “India in the Emergent Multipolar World Order: Dynamics and Strategic Challenges.” India Quarterly 76, no. 1 (2020): 8-23.

    [7] Ashok Kumar Beheria, ‘Ask an Expert’, IDSA, April 1, 2020. 

    https://idsa.in/askanexpert/world-moving-towards-multipolarity-akbehuria

    [8]Derek Grossman, ‘Modi’s Multipolar Moment Has Arrived’, RAND blog, June 6, 2022

    https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/06/modis-multipolar-moment-has-arrived.html

    [9]Persaud, Randolph B. “Ideology, socialization and hegemony in Disciplinary International Relations.” International Affairs 98, no. 1 (2022): 105-123.

    [10]Shannon, Vaughn P. “International Norms and Foreign Policy.” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics (2017).

    [11]Ikenberry, G. John, and Charles A. Kupchan. “Socialization and hegemonic power.” International organization 44, no. 3 (1990): 283-315.

    [12] Tracy Kuperus, ‘Kosovo And Rwanda: Selective Interventionism?’, Centre for Public Justice

    https://www.cpjustice.org/public/page/content/kosovo_and_rwanda

    [13] Falit Sijariya, ‘Democratizing Norms: Jaishankar’s Comments and the Challenge to US Hegemony’, April 22, 2022

    https://thegeopolitics.com/democratizing-norms-jaishankars-comments-and-the-challenge-to-us-hegemony/

    [14] Overbeek, Henk. “Global governance, class, hegemony.” Contending Perspectives on Global Governance: Coherence and Contestation 39 (2005).

    [15] Tourangbam, Monish. “The UN and the Future of Multilateralism in a Multipolar World.” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 14, no. 4 (2019): 301-308.

    [16] The UN Turns Seventy-Five. Here’s How to Make it Relevant Again, Council on Foreign Relations, Sep 14, 2020.

    https://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global-memos/un-turns-seventy-five-heres-how-make-it-relevant-again

    [17] Ademola Abbas, ‘Assessing NATO’s involvement in Libya’, United Nations University, 27 October 2011

    https://unu.edu/publications/articles/assessing-nato-s-involvement-in-libya.html

    Lansana Gberi, ‘Forgotten war: a crisis deepens in Libya but where are the cameras?’, Africa Renewal, December 2017 – March 2018

    https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2017-march-2018/forgotten-war-crisis-deepens-libya-where-are-cameras

    [18] Ed Yates, ‘The WTO Has Failed as a Multilateral Agency in Promoting International Trade’,E-International Relations, April 29, 2014

    https://www.e-ir.info/2014/04/29/the-wto-has-failed-as-a-multilateral-agency-in-promoting-international-trade/

    [19] Kelebogile Zvobgo, ‘Why Race Matters in International Relations’, Foreign Policy, June 19, 2020

    https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/19/why-race-matters-international-relations-ir/

    [20]Danso, Kwaku, and Kwesi Aning. “African experiences and alternativity in International Relations theorizing about security.” International Affairs 98, no. 1 (2022): 67-83.

    [21]Acharya, Amitav. “Can Asia lead? Power ambitions and global governance in the twenty-first century.” International affairs 87, no. 4 (2011): 851-869.

    [22]Behera, Navnita Chadha. “Re-imagining IR in India.” In Non-Western international relations theory, pp. 102-126. Routledge, 2009.

    [23]Rohan Mukherjee https://mobile.twitter.com/rohan_mukh/with_replies

    [24]United Nations Reform: Priority Issues for Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, January 2006

    https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/reform/priority.html

    [25]Abhijit Das, ‘Reform the WTO: do not deform it’, the Hindu Business Line, December 1, 2021

    https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/reform-the-wto-do-not-deform-it/article37792701.ece

    [26]Shahi, Deepshikha, and Gennaro Ascione. “Rethinking the absence of post-Western International Relations theory in India:‘Advaitic monism’as an alternative epistemological resource.” European Journal of International Relations 22, no. 2 (2016): 313-334.

    Feature Image Credits: Foreign Affairs

  • Xi is Not Mao

    Xi is Not Mao

    The ongoing conflicts and crises across the world, be it in Ukraine or in the South China Sea, reflect a serious flaw in the current international order and in the politics of relations amongst nations. The singular focus on the demonisation of leaders, aided by perception management through devious media control, reflects a significant danger to global safety and stability. The current hyper noise in US-China relations is driven by hyperbole about Xi and other leaders. It is time to take a step back and review the information holocaust.

    Rebecca E Karl’s perceptive article highlights the vagaries of flawed picture portrayals of China and Xi that can be very far from the truth. This article was published earlier in Dissent Magazine.

    – Editorial Team

    Mao and Xi’s historical projects couldn’t be more different, and it is high time to move beyond the bad history that conflates them.

    Commentary on China these days often presents lazy thinking that leads to some ridiculous historical statements. That President Xi Jinping is a would-be Mao Zedong or that China is facing a “new Cultural Revolution” are examples of this laziness. In a charitable light, such assertions stem from a broad misunderstanding of the logics of contemporary China and its role in the world today. In a less charitable light, they are driven by ideological fealty to some of the most outdated and frankly racist aspects of Cold War Western anti-communism. My premise in the following comments: China today is not Maoist, and Xi is not Mao redux. China today is also not communist in any genuine sense of that term, even though the Communist Party presides over the country with an increasingly iron grip.

    The difference between Mao and now could not be starker. Mao’s twentieth-century anti-capitalist and anti-feudal revolution in politics and culture sought to transform China’s domestic social relations by mobilizing masses of people against the systems of domination that constrained their everyday lives. He sought to demonstrate to the non-capitalist world the superiority of socialism as a mode of material and cultural production. Those experiments must be judged a failure on both counts. Xi’s twenty-first-century goal, by contrast, is to release economic forces from the burden of sustaining socialist relations in order to build China’s global wealth and power. To that end, he has pursued domestic stability and has repressed potentially insurgent political, social, and cultural impulses along with challenges from internal peripheries—all while enhancing the power and privileges of the Communist Party itself. To date, his efforts to redefine and defend capitalist logics in China seem to have found success.

    China today is not Maoist, and Xi is not Mao redux. China today is also not communist in any genuine sense of that term, even though the Communist Party presides over the country with an increasingly iron grip.

    Mao and Xi’s historical projects couldn’t be more different, and it is high time to move beyond the bad history that conflates them. We need to grapple with how the past several decades of social and political realignment, not just in China but around the world, are leading to a global future not yet foretold.

    The “new Cold War” rhetoric that permeates public discourse these days is dangerous, to be sure, yet it appeals to a version of the world that is long gone. Socialism has disappeared, and capitalism has prevailed. The fundamental antagonism between these two irreconcilable social and ideological systems—the antagonism that informed a struggle between two different cultural imaginings of the future—has not existed since at least the mid-1990s, when the post-1989 Chinese capitalist order came into full view and took material and ideological root in China and the world. (And, as anyone in Asia or Africa knows, the concept of the “cold” war was always of questionable utility in places that hosted a continuous series of hot wars.)

    Indeed, the huge dissension within the “West,” the United States included, about how to even specify these problems—or whether to specify them at all—gives the lie to the fiction of unified nation-states facing off across elemental ideological divides.

    We live in a capitalist world, but that doesn’t reduce the stakes of current conflicts. Will we blow each other up in militarized one-upmanship? Will we so pollute our environments that we destroy the natural world’s capacity to sustain life? Will we tear each other and ourselves apart in the attempt to come to human solutions to human-made problems? Will the speed of disease and pathology outstrip our ability to lock down and vaccinate, or will we look the other way as the necropolitical selection of those who live and die proceeds apace? These are apocalyptic stakes, but they do not break down analytically on fundamental lines of systemic antagonism. The definition of and solutions to these problems do not depend on such outmoded analytics as the “West” and the “rest,” or the United States and China. Indeed, the huge dissension within the “West,” the United States included, about how to even specify these problems—or whether to specify them at all—gives the lie to the fiction of unified nation-states facing off across elemental ideological divides.

    We need to confront the possibility that our leaders—whoever they may be, whether so-called democrats or so-called authoritarians, so-called liberals, leftists, or rightists—all are leading us into disaster.

    What we need to confront today is that our accustomed systems of analysis based in the imaginary unities of nation-states are exhausted. We need to confront the possibility that our leaders—whoever they may be, whether so-called democrats or so-called authoritarians, so-called liberals, leftists, or rightists—all are leading us into disaster. Those of us outside China must oppose attempts by our governments and ventriloquist media to create ever more unequal and violent capitalist relations that ratchet up tensions between peoples and nations. At the same time, we must try to support those within China who are opposing their own government’s and ventriloquist media’s commitments to suppressing the critical voices and anti-capitalist practices in their midst. The stakes are high, and now is the time to rise to the occasion of critical engagement rather than sink into facile historical analogies. What we face today are not conflicts between civilizations but conflicts over what kind of civilization we wish to inhabit moving forward. Neither the Chinese state nor Western ones have the kinds of answers that we need these days, but there are activist elements in all of our societies striving to find solutions. It is to such activists that we must look for hope.

    Feature Image Credit: Nikkei Asia