The Peninsula Foundation

Category: International & Transnational Affairs

Belt & Road: What are China’s Real Intentions?

Mohan Guruswamy May 22, 2019/Analysis

Almost two years after China hosted a well-attended and hugely-touted conference to promote its One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative, it held the second summit last month. It is apparent the grand design outlined at the first summit hasn’t quite shaped up as intended. Questions were asked about its real intentions, economic benefits and usurious tendencies.

The Chinese have begun backtracking a bit. Already, Malaysia has renegotiated the terms of the rail project with a much-reduced outlay, lower interest rates and increased local participation. It may be mentioned that the original deal was signed by paying the disgraced former Malaysian PM Najib Razak a sizeable bribe. Even Pakistan, Beijing’s so-called “all-weather” friend and ally, has begun questioning the terms of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) after deriving lessons from what happened to Sri Lanka when the birds came home to roost at Hambantota.

The second edition of the Belt and Road Initiative Summit got under way in Beijing on Thursday last week. It seems that India’s opposition to it might have also been addressed somewhat when the BRI map showing routes rather curiously shows the whole of Jammu and Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh as part of India. Is this a signal, or just artistic licence? The map even portrayed India as a part of BRI, despite India having boycotted the summit for the second time.

Typically, many Indian commentators have started seeing meaning in it. Maps be damned, we can see meaning in BRI only when the norms and terms conform to accepted international norms, such as those of lending agencies like the World Bank.

The BRI is seen as China’s big play to seek world domination. Both the fears and the optimism are unfounded. The BRI is a project meant to very simply get out the Chinese reserves invested in Western banks into investments where these will fetch a much higher rate of return; and to take up the slack from the huge overcapacity problem that plagues the Chinese economy.

Speaking at the first BRI (then OBOR) conference, President Xi Jinping had announced that Beijing would advance 380 billion yuan ($55 billion) to support it. This was a far cry from the huge figures, sometimes as high as $750 billion to $1 trillion, that were bandied about. Exaggerating the size of the lollipop is an integral aspect of China’s economic diplomacy.

While economists are generally sceptical about China’s goals and intentions, strategists — mostly the garden-variety Indian military types — have endowed this project with sinister overtones. I was on a television show when a prominent “security analyst” and the anchor raised the issue of the so-called “string of pearls”. To them it seemed that every port or airport where a Chinese company is the contractor had a military purpose. Most of these folks have not progressed beyond Mahan and Mackinder, whose theories were fashioned in a much earlier era when coaling and oil refuelling points were very critical.

The “string of pearls” is a bogus idea. It was cooked up by consultants working for a company called Booz Allen Hamilton, which was linked to the US department of defence and the Central Intelligence Agency, and was given a lot of traction by some well-known Indian “strategic thinkers”. I was once at a conference where Adm. Dennis Blair, a former US Navy chief and later President Barack Obama’s Director of National Intelligence, was asked about it. He called it a “stupid notion”, and said no one who has run a large navy or held a responsible position in a navy will ever say an oceanside blockade is possible. He explicitly and loudly said to Indian strategists who harped on the “string of pearls” that no navy could encircle a country with just a few ports.

The question that we need to ponder over a bit is how long will these “ports” survive after any outbreak of hostilities? The Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy have enough airpower at hand to sort them out, and our Navy can effectively blockade hostile ports in the neighbourhood. It may be noted that the IAF has operationalised an airbase in Thanjavur and will fly SU30 MKIs from there. The Navy deploys MiG-29K fighters as well as P-8i Poseidon maritime surveillance and attack aircraft, and has a formidable fleet of combat vessels. We have not been exactly sleeping or need to be overly worried. The same Sri Lanka that once hosted a Chinese Jinn class nuclear submarine ostensibly on a goodwill mission last year turned away a conventional submarine of the PLA Nany wanting to pick up supplies.

Now to the economics of BRI. There is a reality most of our commentators do not see or understand. By 2013, China had accumulated foreign exchange reserves of about $3.5 trillion. The capital it claims it is prepared to subscribe for the NDB, AIIB and Silk Road Fund would amount to only around seven per cent of its total foreign exchange reserves invested in Western banks. As these China-promoted institutions will provide infrastructure lending rather than grants, the return on capital from these investments could be significantly higher than the returns China gets from its foreign exchange reserves now invested in low-yielding US government bonds. It’s very simple. China needs to get value for its money and also help its demand-starved industries. They have found a typically Chinese solution to it, and are making a virtue out of a necessity.

Look at it from another angle. The US dollar is also steadily depreciating in the long term against other major currencies. With no interest and with depreciation factored in China’s huge reserves, accumulated by extracting surpluses in its sweatshops, are steadily shrinking in value. The question which Beijing seeks to grapple is this. One way is to put these funds to work in investment-starved countries in Africa and Asia and assures themselves of returns for a long time to come. In some, the birds have come home to roost quite early. The grandiose Hambantota port project in Sri Lanka, which once had the same bunch of Indian “strategic thinkers” in a tizzy, hosts no ships and doesn’t earn very much. China is now pressuring Sri Lanka to service the debt and is seeking to extract some more in lieu of that. Much of the Hambantota investment has been recouped by China via material and labour supplied to complete the project. That’s why one prominent European commentator then called OBOR “One Belt, One Road and One Trap”.

Like Sri Lanka, some other intended beneficiaries have now begun to ask questions about the utility and intentions of OBOR. Pakistan’s Dawn newspaper has said: “But the main thrust of the plan actually lies in agriculture, contrary to the image of CPEC as a massive industrial and transport undertaking, involving power plants and highways. The plan acquires its greatest specificity, and lays out the largest number of projects and plans for their facilitation, in agriculture.” It then questions the benefits that will arise from linking mostly dry and barren Xinjiang, and in particular the predominantly Turkestani Muslim Kashgar prefecture with its restive four million people, to an increasingly water-starved and already much troubled Pakistan. Once when a Pakistani interlocutor at a Track-2 session asked me what then would be the economic gains to Pakistan, I replied they could sell tea and samosas to the traffic!

Much is being made about the overland link between China and Europe by rail and road links. Most commentators seem to miss that the Trans-Siberian Railway line from Vladivostok to Moscow is almost a hundred years old. Its capacity can be beefed up. Yet overland freight costs will always be much more expensive than sea freight costs. Business is about cutting costs and taking the least expensive option. No one with common sense will prefer to shift by land what can be shipped. Others make much of the so-called Malacca dilemma. The Arctic route is now opening up, and the real Malacca dilemma soon will be the rapid decrease in freighters through it. There is always the option of a canal for freighters across the Kra Isthmus, a project that will bring China and Japan much closer to India.

Mohan Guruswamy is a Trustee and a Distinguished Fellow of TPF. He is a prolific commentator on economic and security issues, and specialises on China.

This article was published earlier in Deccan Chronicle.

May 23, 2019
New challenges of global terrorism

G Parthasarathy May 23, 2019/Opinion

The people of Sri Lanka have shown courage, wisdom and resilience in recovering from the traumatic effects of the country’s brutal ethnic conflict between 1983 and 2010. An estimated 47,000 Tamil civilians, 27,000 LTTE members, 50,000 Sinhala civilians, 23,790 Sri Lankan soldiers and 1,500 members of the Indian Peace Keeping Force laid down their lives, during the conflict.

he Sri Lankan ethnic conflict, however, did not affect the lives of “Indian Tamils” in Southern Sri Lanka, whose ancestors had migrated, as plantation workers, during British rule. There have, however, been recent incidents of religious tensions between the Sinhala Buddhist clergy and radicalised elements in the Muslim minority. Sri Lanka’s relatively small Christian minority, which is peaceful and relatively affluent, had steered clear of getting drawn into any ethnic conflict.

In these circumstances, the world was shocked to learn that in the midst of holy Easter Sunday church services on April 21, churches in Colombo, Negombo and even the eastern port of Tamil dominated Batticaloa, were hit by bomb explosions.

Three hotels housing a large number of western tourists in Colombo were also targeted. As many as 253 innocent people perished in the carnage.

The “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” (ISIS) soon claimed responsibility for the attack, contradicting President Trump’s claims that the terrorist outfit had been “100 per cent” crushed in Syria. It soon emerged that the mastermind behind the blasts was a rabidly fundamentalist Sri Lankan Tamil, Maulvi Mohammad Zahran Hashim, who was from the town of Kathankudy, in Sri Lanka’s Tamil dominated eastern province.

Indian intelligence agencies had provided timely warnings to the Sri Lankan Government about an impending terrorist strike by the ISIS. These warnings were not seriously taken note of by the Sri Lanka Government. It is, however, imperative that India keeps in touch discreetly with the Sri Lankan Government. We are evidently seeing the beginnings of long-term internal and regional problems and challenges, as ISIS members disperse and regroup, after being ousted from Iraq and Syria, like Al Qaeda and the Taliban did, after American militarily intervention in Afghanistan.

As the ISIS targets in Sri Lanka were the country’s peaceful Christian community and western (Christian) tourists, the bomb attacks sent ripples across the West, as the attacks came soon after the massacre of Muslims in New Zealand, during their Sunday prayers.

Radicalisation drive

Sri Lanka’s Muslim community, which has done well economically in the Island, has lived in peace with both Buddhist Sinhalas and Hindu Tamils. Recent studies, however, indicate that some years before the bombings, sections of Tamil Muslims from the eastern province were getting radicalised in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab countries.

Zahran Hashim was one of those so influenced by radical Islamist practices and beliefs. Cutting across ethnic differences, Hashim made common cause with Sinhala Muslims, including two sons of a Muslim business tycoon in Colombo, who had been deeply influenced by the ISIS. Both the sons died in suicide bomb blasts, even as the wife of another bomber detonated explosives in a suicide bombing the same day, resulting in the deaths of three police personnel.

The Sri Lanka bomb blasts were thus executed by young radicalised Sri Lankan Muslims, cutting across the ethnic divide. Moreover, there are now signs that an estimated 75-100 Indian Muslims, who were with the ISIS in Syria, have dispersed and chosen escape routes, including through Afghanistan and Pakistan. Hashim has also reportedly established close institutional links with a counterpart group in Coimbatore and with people in other parts of Tamil Nadu and Kerala.

There are now indications that after being forced out of Iraq and Syria, ISIS fighters have now dispersed across Asia, Africa and even to parts of Europe. While the Osama bin Laden-led Al Qaeda made it clear that its struggle was against “Jews and Crusaders,” the ISIS targets all non-Muslims, as was evident from its brutal killings of Indians in Iraq. Moreover, the Al Qaeda operated primarily out of Afghanistan and Pakistan, apart from select Arab countries. Al Qaeda’s leadership was predominantly Arab. It had very few members from other parts of the world.

The ISIS poses a much more serious challenge to India than the Al Qaeda ever did, primarily because it has recruited its fighters from countries across Europe, Asia and Africa. President George Bush praised India because not a single Indian joined or backed Al Qaeda. But, things are different with ISIS, which regards India as a part of the “Islamic State of Khorasan”. Over 100 Indians are estimated to have joined the ISIS.

Extending its reach

The reach of ISIS across India is evident from its links with extremists in Kashmir, apart from those established in the recent past, in Tamil Nadu and Kerala. Radicalisation in our southern States poses new and serious security challenges. ISIS also acknowledges its links with associates, across India’s maritime frontiers in Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Myanmar, Indonesia, Maldives, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It also has a growing presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

India will also have to take note of the distinct possibility of ISIS attempting to take advantage of tensions arising out of the Rohingya refugee crisis. A senior Myanmar official recently revealed that even as ISIS was losing influence in Iraq and Syria, its supporters were moving into Myanmar’s Rakhine State, where Rohingyas reside. Many Rohingya refugees, now in Bangladesh, could well make common cause with ISIS and with members of Pakistani backed militant outfits like the Jamat-ul-Mujahideen, to destabilise the situation along the common borders of India, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Pakistan has had an abiding interest in destabilising the Sheikh Hasina-led Government in Bangladesh.

Apart from having to deal with continuing Pakistan sponsored terrorism, India will now also have to keep a watch on challenges that would likely arise from the ISIS, with its emerging presence in the southern States. Like in Sri Lanka, ISIS activities could target selected sections of the population in India, while seeking to radicalise them. They will pose a challenge to internal security in India. Finally, Pakistan could be expected to use the challenges posed by ISIS, to absolve itself of responsibility on actions of its trained jihadis, on Indian soil and in Bangladesh. These issues will hopefully receive careful attention after the general elections.

The writer is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan. He is a Trustee and Visiting Distinguished fellow of TPF.

This article was published earlier in The Hindu: BusinessLine.

Image Credit-Getty through Vox.

May 23, 2019
Undertones of a Potential India-Pakistan Water War

Renuka Paul and M Matheswaran (March 9, 2019/Analysis)

Last week saw India-Pakistan tensions touch a crescendo as India, for the first time, executed a punitive strike into Pakistan. While Pakistan’s retaliatory strike was thwarted by IAF’s air defence mechanism it also resulted in a MiG 21 aircraft being shot down and the Indian pilot taken as prisoner. While international pressure forced Pakistan to release him within 48 hours, it also led to quick de-escalation. In the bargain, India’s pressure on Pakistan became diluted significantly. The genesis of this spike in tensions between the two nuclear powered neighbours, relates to the event of February 14^th, 2019 when Pakistan based Jaish-e-Mohammad launched a terror attack in Pulwama, Jammu and Kashmir that killed over 40 Indian paramilitary personnel.

Blaming Pakistan for the incident, New Delhi has revoked the ‘Most Favoured Nation’ status granted to Islamabad, imposed 200 percent duty on imports from Pakistan and vowed to end the flow of unutilized water from India’s shareflowing to Pakistan. On February 26th, India carried out “non-military, pre-emptive” airstrikes to destroy terrorist camps in Balakot, Pakistan. The tough and unprecedented (since 1971) retaliatory measure of crossing Pakistan’s airspace makes sense given the political pressure due to the upcoming elections and the media fuelled public sentiments. This changed discourse proves that Pakistan’s approach of employing Islamic proxies to cause destructions and using nuclear weapons as a safeguard to deter Indian response does not hold true any longer. Moreover, the international community including China and Saudi Arabia, usual Pakistan allies, has condemned the terror activities.

Some argue that the strongest threat India has made since the Pulwama incident is the decision to alter the course of water flowing into Pakistan towards Punjab and Kashmir instead. The recent claim, however, seems irrelevant as it is in fact a two-year-old announcement that the excess of Indian waters that flow into Pakistan will be used for hydroelectric projects. But what this has sparked is a boost to those advocating abrogation of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) and has highlighted a potential water conflict in the subcontinent.

Post partition, in 1948, Pakistan argued that it needs Kashmir partly for its water security as it is nearly 65-percent dependent on the Indus river system. Following escalated issues, India partially cut off water supply to Pakistan by shutting off water from Ferozepur Headworks to Dipalpur Canal, portions of Lahore and main branches of the Upper Bari Doab Canal. To de-escalate the situation and to prevent further water crisis, the World Bank, after years of negotiations, brokered the IWT in 1960. According to this deal, India is allocated the eastern rivers- Ravi, Beas and Sutlej- while Pakistan has the western rivers- Indus, Chenab and Jhelum- and it mandates a bilateral meet twice a year to share data regarding flow, flooding etc. However, over the years the undertones of looming water dispute is evident. Being the upper riparian state, India has a clear advantage that sustains Pakistan’s insecurities. For instance, it has built multiple dams and barrages over river Jhelum. While 1.50 MAF water is allowed to India from Jhelum under IWT, constant disputes exist regarding the amount of water diverted (stop the flow or flood).

In 2008, Lashkar-e-Taiba chief Hafiz Saeed accused India of water terrorism, followed by Pakistan government in 2010 claiming that India chokes water supply consistently. In the aftermath of Uri attacks in 2016, Modi proclaimed that “blood and water cannot flow simultaneously” and dismissed the bilateral meet of IWT committees. In addition, New Delhi set up dozens of small and medium hydroelectric and irrigation projects like Wular barrage, Baglihar Dam, etc that obstruct Pakistan’s water share. Though India cannot unilaterally end the treaty, it can reduce the water flow to Pakistan utilizing the provisions of IWT that allows India to use water from Western rivers for non-consumptive needs like irrigation, hydroelectricity production, etc. Islamabad responded that revocation of IWT “can be taken as an act of war” and garnered international support to stop India’s project efforts.

Given that Pakistan is allotted 80 percent of the water from the Indus river system, many in India call for ending IWT. However, the potential consequences of retraction from IWT are manifold. As signatory to the international agreement, backing out from IWT will invite international condemnation affecting India’s global image and its bid for UNSC seat. Moreover, the trust relation with neighbours (Nepal and Bangladesh) with whom India shares water treaties will be affected. Additionally, India does not have the infrastructure to use the extra water and this could result in the flooding of Kashmir. Even the underutilized water that belongs to India (from eastern rivers) is free flowing to Pakistan. Despite continued claims of diverting the water that flows to Pakistan to other parts in India, New Delhi is yet to materialize these claims.

Experts argue that this is to avoid water crisis within the country. Water disputes within states in India are common. For instance, it was only after 40 years of interventions that Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Haryana signed an agreement in 2018 on the Shahpur Jandi dam project for access to and use of the water from these rivers. There is also the risk of China following India’s steps and reducing water flow to the Brahmaputra river. They have already done so by building the Lalho project on the Xiabuqu river, a tributary of Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra as known in India). Realizing the disadvantages of withdrawing from IWT, India has looked at other alternatives.

New Delhi is engaging in water power play by further limiting Pakistan’s water supply through Afghanistan – India investing on the $236 million Shahtoot Dam on Kabul river in Afghanistan is an example. Using water as a political weapon is not new. Turkey completely stopped water flow from Euphrates to Syria, Israel cut fresh water supply to Gaza, and so on. In the absence of a water sharing agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, India is investing in river and dam projects on Afghanistan’s eastern rivers- Kabul and Kunar- that eventually flow into Pakistan. However, this seems to set a dangerous precedent and will further worsen the distributional conflicts in the region. In parallel, India has also taken up multiple projects utilizing the provisions under the treaty that can potentially reduce the water flow to Pakistan. Though it takes time, given the costs and objections involved, this seems to be a move in the right direction.

With political tensions and water stress rising in both nations, water diplomacy needs to be an important factor to be considered in Indo-Pak negotiations. Moreover, issues like climate change and global warming were irrelevant when IWT was brokered and left out of its gambit. Intermittent floods and droughts could be controlled through mutual coordination. Therefore, water should be seen as a factor for cooperation and not conflict.

Renuka Paul is a Research Analyst with The Peninsula Foundation. She holds a Masters in Public Policy from Mumbai University. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Air Marshal M Matheswaran AVSM VM PhD (Retd) is the Founder President and Trustee of TPF.

March 9, 2019
Nuclear Stability in Asia and South Asia: the Dynamics of a Fragile Stability

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M. Matheswaran

India-Pakistan-China relations determine South Asia’s strategic stability. Recent events and disputes have heightened regional tensions, and have drawn the world’s attention on the region’s potential for conflict. The fact that all three nuclear weapon states have long-standing border disputes has been used by the non-proliferation lobbies to consistently highlight South Asia as a nuclear flash point. The intractable Kashmir dispute continues to be cited as the potential trigger for any nuclear escalation. These concerns were brought to the fore as the world witnessed the two nuclear armed adversaries fight it out on the Himalayan heights of Kargil in May 1999. While India fought the war firmly, and displayed significant escalation control and management of international opinion, it must be acknowledged that both countries kept the conflict below the nuclear threshold, thus questioning the nuclear flash point theory.

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*This article was published in Indian Foreign Affairs Journal – Apr-Jun 2018.

January 2, 2019
An analysis of the draft space activities bill (2017), as an effective impetus to private sector space activities in India.

P.Joseph Mario Ritvik January 1, 2019/Report

Space activities in India, since the early 1960s, were pursued only by Department of Space (DOS), as nodal agency for space activities in India. As per ‘Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules 1961, the DOS has been responsible for the space activities in India, for more than five decades, with the major objective of bringing the benefits of space technology and its applications to societal needs and national development.

Internationally, the outer space activities are governed by relevant chapters of international law in general and by United Nations’ (UN) Treaties and principles evolved under UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) in particular.

The obligations of a State Party under international treaties on outer space activities are expected to be complied/ discharged through national mechanisms, namely domestic space legislations.

India is a State Party to major treaties of UN on outer space activities and has been performing space activities in compliance with the obligations of UN Treaties on Outer Space activities purely under Governmental control.

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January 1, 2019
UNCLOS and Marine Pollution

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SRUTHY SREEKUMAR
January, 2019

In order to appreciate the momentous significance of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, it is necessary to address the historical background of this event. An indispensable dimension of the law of the sea has historically been the so-called freedom of the seas which related to fisheries and navigation in the earlier period and was extended to scientific research, laying of pipelines and air navigation in later years. However, during the age of discovery around the fifteenth century, the powerful maritime states of Spain and Portugal claimed sovereignty over large areas of ocean space. For example, Portugal claimed sovereignty over the Indian Ocean and a large portion of the Atlantic Ocean. Spain claimed sovereignty over the Pacific and England over the North Sea. However, Grotius and other leading publicists persistently advocated the freedom of the seas which was generally accepted by nations of the international community as complying with their national interests. At the same time, it was generally recognized by the eighteenth century that coastal States were entitled to a belt of sea adjacent to their coasts up to a seaward limit of three miles advocated by Bynkershoek. Bearing in mind the foregoing, the ensuing discussion outlines the development of the concept of the law of the sea with particular reference to enforcement powers of the coastal state in the territorial sea.

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January 1, 2019
India and China Talks: No Give, No Take

The Indian and Chinese Special Representatives, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, had the 21st round of talks ostensibly to discuss the “Border Issue” on November 24 at the picturesque town of Dujiangyan in Sichuan province. Though this was the first appearance of Wang Yi at these talks, there is now a monotonous regularity in this and no resolution of the vexatious border issue seems to be in sight, let alone be discussed. Since the border issue now seems very intractable, the two representatives have broadened the scope of the talks to discuss other bilateral issues. Nevertheless, while it is clearly understood that the resolution of the border territories dispute may never be on the horizon, but at least agreeing on where the interim lines of control lie the military vigil on the borders will ease off into a less tense standstill. Sadly for us, there was a time when with a little bit of give and take this contentious and now protracted problem seemed solvable.

In 1960 Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai suggested something akin to a status quo as a permanent solution. This was repeated in 1982 by Chairman Deng Xiaoping to India’s Ambassador in Beijing, G Parthasarathy. Once again it was offered during Rajiv Gandhi’s tenure as Prime Minister to the then Indian Ambassador AP Venkateshwaran and senior advisor to then Chinese PM Zhao Ziyang. But when Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing in 1988, both countries decided to keep a permanent solution aside and focus on immediate “doable’s”. All along India felt that the internal political situation will not allow the government of the day the room to go with it. It hasn’t changed much, with the historical issues even less understood and inflamed public opinions prevailing on both sides.

What is commonly referred to as the “Border Dispute” between India and China has now manifested itself into two distinct disputes. The first is the dispute over two large and separated tracts of territories. One is Aksai Chin, a virtually uninhabited high altitude desert expanse of about 37000 square kilometers. The other is what is now the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, a diversely populated hill region with a population of around 1.4 million people spread out over 84,000 square kilometers, which China claims as Lower Tibet.

Aksai Chin lies between the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and China’s Xinjiang province, both regions that are also riven by separatist conflicts. Arunachal Pradesh borders Tibet, which also has a separation conflict with China. India claims that these borders were agreed upon by British India, and independent or semi-independent authorities, in Xinjiang and Tibet in the early days of the last century. China doesn’t agree with these. Both countries agree that these are legacies of history and cannot be solved in the immediate or near term and best be left to the future to resolve.

But what causes the frequent frictions between the two is that they do not have agreed Lines of Actual Control (LAC) to separate the jurisdictions under the control of the armies of the two countries. The perceptions of the LAC differ at many places. At some places it might be by just a few meters, and elsewhere by tens of kilometers.

To minimize the inflammability due to actively patrolling of security personnel of both sides, the two countries have a Border Defence Cooperation Agreement that sets out norms of behavior for both sides. The important things being that nothing of a permanent nature will be built on these disputed areas, and that the patrols take all precautions not to confront each other. Which simply means, if they come face to face they will both withdraw. The corollary to this is that the patrols will not tail each other. The agreement also requires local commanders to frequently meet and exchange views and sort out local differences across the table.

Despite the adverse geographical and climatic conditions, and the overarching tensions between Asia’s biggest economies, the troops on the ground are able to show surprising bonhomie and friendliness. But periodically, either due to misunderstanding or local level posturing by either side, there are frictions that threaten to erupt into a conflict with use of arms. But it has not happened since 1967 when the two armies fought a fierce localized battle in the Sikkim sector, quite close to where the recent Dokolam dispute took place.

The two countries have been engaged in frequent talks at various levels since 1981. After Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988, both countries had agreed to set up a task force to find a solution to the “border issue”. Chairman Deng welcoming his “ young friend” suggested they “forget the past” as they stood in the centre of the cavernous Great Hall of the People and the handshake lasted three long minutes.

For three long decades since then the two countries have been meeting to discuss the border issue, but so far we have seen unwillingness by both sides to forget the past. Since 2003 these talks were elevated to a high level political dialogue between Special Representatives, in India’s case the National Security Advisor and in China’s case an official at the level of State Councilor. The first meeting at this level took place between Indian NSA Brajesh Mishra and Chinese State Councilor Dai Bing Guo. We are now having the 20thround of this dialog between India’s National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, and China’s State Councilor, Yang Jeichi.

A former Indian NSA once told me that the talks are high in style and hospitality, with the Indian side trying hard to match the Chinese, but there has been little traction. This is because of the versions of the claims that have been internalized and now form public opinion in both countries. Both countries are gripped by strong nationalism bordering on jingoism, which makes give and take, so vital in the resolution of such vexatious disputes, extremely difficult.

But the Border Management and Cooperation Agreement is a major outcome of these talks and that has by and large worked. The next logical step of these talks should be to agree on an LAC. But unfortunately even that is now being weighed down by aggressive nationalism driven by social media that equates “giving up” with national loss of face. This is something increasingly very important to both countries. We will not be seen giving up anything, even our obduracy and historical short sightedness.

Both countries are now very different then what they were in the last century. Both, India and China, are relatively prosperous and militarily powerful, but not so powerful to take by force what they desire. The new geopolitics and the new interdependent economics also will not permit a major dislocation in the world order. But the rise of new nationalisms has also led to a hardening of hearts. Neither now seems capable of giving or taking. So once again when Ajit Doval and Wang Yi met, both sides did not give away anything and we will have to wait for another time for that.

Mohan Guruswamy is a Distinguished Fellow and Trustee of TPF. This article was earlier published in ‘The Citizen’.

December 17, 2018
Changing Paradigms of Political Canvas in Sri Lanka

The intransigent ethno-political emotional divide amongst the Sri Lankan society of 1980s manifested into a bloodiest insurgency with the Tamil separatists almost succeeding in carving out a separate Tamil Elam in the North and Eastern regions of the island nation. The political divide at that juncture was result of a racial cleavage between the Sinhala majority and oppressed Tamil minority which prompted the later to rebel in the face of socio-economic denials of all kinds.

It was India who came to rescue of the Sri Lankan government of the day in 1987 to ensure territorial integrity of the country even at the cost of negative political repercussions within India. The India had to pay the price of this political outreach to Sri Lanka with life of Rajiv Gandhi, the prime minister who went out of way to help them in their hour of crisis. The deeply indebted Sinhala dominated Sri Lanka of 80s seem to be chartering a different trajectory now with self serving opportunist afflictions due to inducements of easy money from extra regional players, especially China.

While encashing the apparent Chinese benevolence, the gullible Sri Lankan politicians seem to have ignored the basic dictum that ‘there are no free lunches’ in this world. And the slip is showing wherein the Sri Lankan political dispensation seems to have compromised on their territorial integrity by leasing out Habantota port and 15000 acres of land in lieu of repayment of Chinese loans. A precedence has been set for more such sovereign compromises in times to come for which India had fought a bloody battle against their own co ethnic insurgents.

The motive of the ongoing political drama appears to be focused on facilitating the Chinese cause even if it amounts to tempering with the constitutional jurisprudence. Indeed, there is a paradigm shift in political thinking with its doctrine of development through Chinese support which has obvious inherent centrifugal tendencies as against focus on internal economic consolidation. Instead of reclaiming the lost politico-economic ground to China post Habantota episode, a major part of Sri Lankan polity seem to be under compulsion to toe the Chinese lines due to debt diplomacy so cleverly orchestrated by the Chinese.

The close scrutiny of Sri Lankan political conduct in the past hinges on the non accommodation of rival ethnic, social or political groups within the Sri Lankan society which seem to continue even today in some form or other. Earlier it was based on ethnic rivalry between Sinhala and Tamils, and now it is intra Sinhala dispensation vying for more political and money power in a political set up with opportunist tendencies. Despite a vibrant democratic political dispensation to take care of well being of its subjects, the island nation has witnessed spells of changing political priorities and concomitant societal upheavals in the recent times. The military driven turbulent ethno- political complexion of 80s gave way to consolidation of socio-political synergies alongside resolving the internal security issues for almost three decades.

Subsequently, in the aftermath of subjugation of Tamil insurgency in 2009, the priorities changed to the much needed economic development of the nation. However, the tourist predominant economy had woeful inadequacies of infrastructure and public conveniences to tap the potential of the nation at par with other international tourist destinations close by. To do that, there was no money due to prolonged war effort which in turn prompted Sri Lankan polity to look outwards paving way for externally influenced politico-economic opportunism.

Chinese concept of BRI suited both China as well as the Sri Lanka as a mutually beneficial mechanism to take care of each other’s interests. The BRI concept envisages development of communication and transportation net work, industrial and power corridors as part of Chinese grand game for their global economic expansion. As far as China is concerned all the countries in the Indian Ocean are important for Chinese geo political matrix as a response mechanism for the security of her economic interests. Chinese conduct when hyphenated with their ‘’String of Pearls in the Indian Ocean’’, and their defiant politico-military stance in the South China Sea speaks of their seriousness and sensitivities of their interest in the Indo Pacific region. Sri Lanka happens to be in a pivotal position to serve the Chinese geo political interests.

In the given circumstances, close affiliation with the China is a win -win situation for Sri Lanka for their economic buoyancy and a politically strong anchor to stand by their side in the time of crisis. However, there are also apprehensions of negative fallouts of new found political bonhomie with an outsider with prospects of disturbing existing stable regional political equilibrium fully aligned with socio- cultural emotional bind of Indian legacy. Accordingly, there is an emerging pattern of an internal political divide amongst Sri Lankan parties and individuals believing in encashing the pragmatic opportunism as against continuation of stability through India centric regional cohesiveness.

The Mahindra Rajpaksha during his premiership was given loans worth $ 6 billion for various infrastructural projects including Hambantota port. Later the dept trap diplomacy of China got highlighted in their demand of ownership of the port plus land adjacent to it. It, surely, has exposed the dubious ways of China which has prompted number of recipients of Chinese benevolence to revisit their commitments with them as regards to BRI scheme. Sri Lankan civil society is ceased with this Chinese conduct and there is a resistance to encouraging Chinese intrusion into Sri Lankan affairs beyond a point.

The opponent Ranil Wickremasinghe, is known to be a proponent of the Indian lobby who had, recently , cancelled housing project of more than 50,000 houses in North and Eastern Tamil areas given earlier to China in favour of Indian companies. The Rajapaksha was brought back as the prime minister by the president through an untenable political move leaving the country in a political chaos. The parliament was dissolved paving way for fresh elections. However, the Supreme Court ruled against this unconstitutional move by the president. It was probably done as Rajapakshe, like his previous tenure, would facilitate better relationship with the China looking at their current political compulsions and national interests.

What is happening in the Sri Lankan political canvas seem to have imprints of pro India vs pro China lobbies. The fact that there is an outstanding loan of almost $ 5 billion despite handing over the Hambantota port to them, China may be pulling the strings to bring in a political dispensation favourable to them to do their bidding. The way the democratic norms are being flouted do indicate a desperate situation precipitated by the looming economic catastrophe waiting to happen.

The military geography of Sri Lanka has bestowed her with a unique location to take care of the most vulnerable security concerns of China with 70% of trade and 90% of energy supplies passing through the Indian Ocean. Therefore, it is obvious that China is here to stay as a permanent feature and to do that they seem to have acquired a substantial political space in the Sri Lanka. Whereas, the Sri Lanka seem to have lost out on her autonomy to some extent as there is a probability of China dictating their terms when they find the policies are not in sync with Chinese interests.

The likely Chinese naval presence at Hambantota port barely few hundred miles from Indian shores is a security concern for India. The Chinese politico-military afflictions in Sri Lanka is likely to prompt the western powers also to further enhance their military presence closer to the Indian shores. It, obviously, would impact the Indian security matrix with the extra regional players milling around in the areas of Indian influence all this time. The new nomenclature of ‘Indo Pacific ‘ referring to erstwhile IOR and Asia Pacific is manifestation new US maritime doctrine as a response mechanism to Chinese geo political expansion. The increase in the US sponsored military diplomacy in the region and revival of Quad are all indicative of new global strategic grand games being unfolded closer to the Indian shores.

India has no choice but to upgrade her military capabilities to take care of the inimical developments around her periphery both on land as well as maritime domain. It warrants looking beyond defensive doctrines and acquire offensive capabilities for optimum power projection in the areas of concern, besides defence of the island territories and international maritime obligations. Given the distances from the main land and bottle necks for shipping, China would always be militarily vulnerable in the Indian Ocean. It stands to an advantage for India which need to be factored in the design of the military doctrine and its political strategic outreach.

The Sri Lanka needs to recall that they stand integrated today due to unflinching support by India in their hour of crisis and sacrifices made by the Indian soldiers to hold their country together. They should also appreciate that the India continues to be the stabilizing factor for Sri Lanka and a friend in need. China on other hand is here to exploit the Sri Lankan geographical space for their geo political motives sans any benevolent emotional connect. In fact, China has already usurped their strategically located land through their manipulative ways. If the Sri Lankan polity has not understood their game plan then they should be prepared for more such disintegrating moves as part of their dubious debt diplomacy. The Sri Lanka is in economic crisis and stands vulnerable which is reflective in their recent political conduct. In that, there seem to be tell tale signs of Chinese complicity in the ongoing happenings in the Sri Lankan political space which is not a good news.

India, obviously, has not been pro active enough to sense the aspirations of her neighbours and propensity of China to exploit the political deficit on the strength of her deep pockets and liberal military outreach. The Sri Lanka has a great significance for Indian security and we need to take all the possible measures to neutralize the Chinese foot prints in the island nation. India fortunately has a large influence in the Sri Lankan society and reckonable political leverages which needs to be nurtured and exploited in our national interests. India as a responsible regional country need to go all out to extend a helping hand to Sri Lanka in her testing times as their political stability is essential to the Indian strategic interests.

Lt Gen Rameshwar Yadav is an Indian Army veteran and former Director General, Infantry. The views expressed are his own. This article was published earlier in https://cenjows.gov.in/article-detail?id=122

November 29, 2018