Category: International & Transnational Affairs

  • Nuclear Stability in Asia and South Asia: the Dynamics of a Fragile Stability

    Nuclear Stability in Asia and South Asia: the Dynamics of a Fragile Stability

    Download Here for Full Report

    M. Matheswaran

    India-Pakistan-China relations determine South Asia’s strategic stability. Recent events and disputes have heightened regional tensions, and have drawn the world’s attention on the region’s potential for conflict. The fact that all three nuclear weapon states have long-standing border disputes has been used by the non-proliferation lobbies to consistently highlight South Asia as a nuclear flash point. The intractable Kashmir dispute continues to be cited as the potential trigger for any nuclear escalation. These concerns were brought to the fore as the world witnessed the two nuclear armed adversaries fight it out on the Himalayan heights of Kargil in May 1999. While India fought the war firmly, and displayed significant escalation control and management of international opinion, it must be acknowledged that both countries kept the conflict below the nuclear threshold, thus questioning the nuclear flash point theory.

     

    Download Here to read more…

     

    *This article was published in Indian Foreign Affairs Journal – Apr-Jun 2018.

  • An analysis of the draft space activities bill (2017), as an effective impetus to private sector space activities in India.

    An analysis of the draft space activities bill (2017), as an effective impetus to private sector space activities in India.

    P.Joseph Mario Ritvik                                                            January 1, 2019/Report

    Space activities in India, since the early 1960s, were pursued only by Department of Space (DOS), as nodal agency for space activities in India. As per ‘Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules 1961, the DOS has been responsible for the space activities in India, for more than five decades, with the major objective of bringing the benefits of space technology and its applications to societal needs and national development.

    Internationally, the outer space activities are governed by relevant chapters of international law in general and by United Nations’ (UN) Treaties and principles evolved under UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) in particular.

    The obligations of a State Party under international treaties on outer space activities are expected to be complied/ discharged through national mechanisms, namely domestic space legislations.

    India is a State Party to major treaties of UN on outer space activities and has been performing space activities in compliance with the obligations of UN Treaties on Outer Space activities purely under Governmental control.

    Download Full Report to read more..

  • UNCLOS and Marine Pollution

    UNCLOS and Marine Pollution

    Download Full Report

    SRUTHY SREEKUMAR
    January, 2019

    In order to appreciate the momentous significance of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, it is necessary to address the historical background of this event.  An indispensable dimension of the law of the sea has historically been the so-called freedom of the seas which related to fisheries and navigation in the earlier period and was extended to scientific research, laying of pipelines and air navigation in later years. However, during the age of discovery around the fifteenth century, the powerful maritime states of Spain and Portugal claimed sovereignty over large areas of ocean space. For example, Portugal claimed sovereignty over the Indian Ocean and a large portion of the Atlantic Ocean. Spain claimed sovereignty over the Pacific and England over the North Sea.  However, Grotius and other leading publicists persistently advocated the freedom of the seas which was generally accepted by nations of the international community as complying with their national interests. At the same time, it was generally recognized by the eighteenth century that coastal States were entitled to a belt of sea adjacent to their coasts up to a seaward limit of three miles advocated by Bynkershoek. Bearing in mind the foregoing, the ensuing discussion outlines the development of the concept of the law of the sea with particular reference to enforcement powers of the coastal state in the territorial sea.

    Download Full Report to read more…

     

  • India and China Talks: No Give, No Take

    India and China Talks: No Give, No Take

    The Indian and Chinese Special Representatives, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, had the 21st round of talks ostensibly to discuss the “Border Issue” on November 24 at the picturesque town of Dujiangyan in Sichuan province. Though this was the first appearance of Wang Yi at these talks, there is now a monotonous regularity in this and no resolution of the vexatious border issue seems to be in sight, let alone be discussed.  Since the border issue now seems very intractable, the two representatives have broadened the scope of the talks to discuss other bilateral issues. Nevertheless, while it is clearly understood that the resolution of the border territories dispute may never be on the horizon, but at least agreeing on where the interim lines of control lie the military vigil on the borders will ease off into a less tense standstill. Sadly for us, there was a time when with a little bit of give and take this contentious and now protracted problem seemed solvable.

    In 1960 Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai suggested something akin to a status quo as a permanent solution. This was repeated in 1982 by Chairman Deng Xiaoping to India’s Ambassador in Beijing, G Parthasarathy. Once again it was offered during Rajiv Gandhi’s tenure as Prime Minister to the then Indian Ambassador AP Venkateshwaran and senior advisor to then Chinese PM Zhao Ziyang. But when Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing in 1988, both countries decided to keep a permanent solution aside and focus on immediate “doable’s”. All along India felt that the internal political situation will not allow the government of the day the room to go with it. It hasn’t changed much, with the historical issues even less understood and inflamed public opinions prevailing on both sides.

    What is commonly referred to as the “Border Dispute” between India and China has now manifested itself into two distinct disputes. The first is the dispute over two large and separated tracts of territories. One is Aksai Chin, a virtually uninhabited high altitude desert expanse of about 37000 square kilometers. The other is what is now the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, a diversely populated hill region with a population of around 1.4 million people spread out over 84,000 square kilometers, which China claims as Lower Tibet.

    Aksai Chin lies between the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and China’s Xinjiang province, both regions that are also riven by separatist conflicts. Arunachal Pradesh borders Tibet, which also has a separation conflict with China. India claims that these borders were agreed upon by British India, and independent or semi-independent authorities, in Xinjiang and Tibet in the early days of the last century. China doesn’t agree with these. Both countries agree that these are legacies of history and cannot be solved in the immediate or near term and best be left to the future to resolve.

    But what causes the frequent frictions between the two is that they do not have agreed Lines of Actual Control (LAC) to separate the jurisdictions under the control of the armies of the two countries. The perceptions of the LAC differ at many places. At some places it might be by just a few meters, and elsewhere by tens of kilometers.

    To minimize the inflammability due to actively patrolling of security personnel of both sides, the two countries have a Border Defence Cooperation Agreement that sets out norms of behavior for both sides. The important things being that nothing of a permanent nature will be built on these disputed areas, and that the patrols take all precautions not to confront each other. Which simply means, if they come face to face they will both withdraw. The corollary to this is that the patrols will not tail each other. The agreement also requires local commanders to frequently meet and exchange views and sort out local differences across the table.

    Despite the adverse geographical and climatic conditions, and the overarching tensions between Asia’s biggest economies, the troops on the ground are able to show surprising bonhomie and friendliness. But periodically, either due to misunderstanding or local level posturing by either side, there are frictions that threaten to erupt into a conflict with use of arms. But it has not happened since 1967 when the two armies fought a fierce localized battle in the Sikkim sector, quite close to where the recent Dokolam dispute took place.

    The two countries have been engaged in frequent talks at various levels since 1981. After Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988, both countries had agreed to set up a task force to find a solution to the “border issue”. Chairman Deng welcoming his “ young friend” suggested they “forget the past” as they stood in the centre of the cavernous Great Hall of the People and the handshake lasted three long minutes.

    For three long decades since then the two countries have been meeting to discuss the border issue, but so far we have seen unwillingness by both sides to forget the past. Since 2003 these talks were elevated to a high level political dialogue between Special Representatives, in India’s case the National Security Advisor and in China’s case an official at the level of State Councilor. The first meeting at this level took place between Indian NSA Brajesh Mishra and Chinese State Councilor Dai Bing Guo. We are now having the 20thround of this dialog between India’s National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, and China’s State Councilor, Yang Jeichi.

    A former Indian NSA once told me that the talks are high in style and hospitality, with the Indian side trying hard to match the Chinese, but there has been little traction. This is because of the versions of the claims that have been internalized and now form public opinion in both countries. Both countries are gripped by strong nationalism bordering on jingoism, which makes give and take, so vital in the resolution of such vexatious disputes, extremely difficult.

    But the Border Management and Cooperation Agreement is a major outcome of these talks and that has by and large worked. The next logical step of these talks should be to agree on an LAC. But unfortunately even that is now being weighed down by aggressive nationalism driven by social media that equates “giving up” with national loss of face. This is something increasingly very important to both countries. We will not be seen giving up anything, even our obduracy and historical short sightedness.

    Both countries are now very different then what they were in the last century. Both, India and China, are relatively prosperous and militarily powerful, but not so powerful to take by force what they desire.  The new geopolitics and the new interdependent economics also will not permit a major dislocation in the world order.  But the rise of new nationalisms has also led to a hardening of hearts. Neither now seems capable of giving or taking. So once again when Ajit Doval and Wang Yi met, both sides did not give away anything and we will have to wait for another time for that.

     

    Mohan Guruswamy is a Distinguished Fellow and Trustee of TPF. This article was earlier published in ‘The Citizen’.

     

  • Changing Paradigms of Political Canvas in Sri Lanka

    Changing Paradigms of Political Canvas in Sri Lanka

    The intransigent ethno-political emotional divide amongst the Sri Lankan society of 1980s manifested into a bloodiest insurgency with the Tamil separatists almost succeeding in carving out a separate Tamil Elam in the North and Eastern regions of the island nation. The political divide at that juncture was result of a racial cleavage between the Sinhala majority and oppressed Tamil minority which prompted the later to rebel in the face of socio-economic denials of all kinds.

    It was India who came to rescue of the Sri Lankan government of the day in 1987 to ensure territorial integrity of the country even at the cost of negative political repercussions within India. The India had to pay the price of this political outreach to Sri Lanka with life of Rajiv Gandhi, the prime minister who went out of way to help them in their hour of crisis. The deeply indebted Sinhala dominated Sri Lanka of 80s seem to be chartering a different trajectory now with self serving opportunist afflictions due to inducements of easy money from extra regional players, especially China.

    While encashing the apparent Chinese benevolence, the gullible Sri Lankan politicians seem to have ignored the basic dictum that ‘there are no free lunches’ in this world. And the slip is showing wherein the Sri Lankan political dispensation seems to have compromised on their territorial integrity by leasing out Habantota port and 15000 acres of land in lieu of repayment of Chinese loans. A precedence has been set for more such sovereign compromises in times to come for which India had fought a bloody battle against their own co ethnic insurgents.

    The motive of the ongoing political drama appears to be focused on facilitating the Chinese cause even if it amounts to tempering with the constitutional jurisprudence. Indeed, there is a paradigm shift in political thinking with its doctrine of development through Chinese support which has obvious inherent centrifugal tendencies as against focus on internal economic consolidation. Instead of reclaiming the lost politico-economic ground to China post Habantota episode, a major part of Sri Lankan polity seem to be under compulsion to toe the Chinese lines due to debt diplomacy so cleverly orchestrated by the Chinese.

    The close scrutiny of Sri Lankan political conduct in the past hinges on the non accommodation of rival ethnic, social or political groups within the Sri Lankan society which seem to continue even today in some form or other. Earlier it was based on ethnic rivalry between Sinhala and Tamils, and now it is intra Sinhala dispensation vying for more political and money power in a political set up with opportunist tendencies. Despite a vibrant democratic political dispensation to take care of well being of its subjects, the island nation has witnessed spells of changing political priorities and concomitant societal upheavals in the recent times. The military driven turbulent ethno- political complexion of 80s gave way to consolidation of socio-political synergies alongside resolving the internal security issues for almost three decades.

    Subsequently, in the aftermath of subjugation of Tamil insurgency in 2009, the priorities changed to the much needed economic development of the nation. However, the tourist predominant economy had woeful inadequacies of infrastructure and public conveniences to tap the potential of the nation at par with other international tourist destinations close by. To do that, there was no money due to prolonged war effort which in turn prompted Sri Lankan polity to look outwards paving way for externally influenced politico-economic opportunism.

    Chinese concept of BRI suited both China as well as the Sri Lanka as a mutually beneficial mechanism to take care of each other’s interests. The BRI concept envisages development of communication and transportation net work, industrial and power corridors as part of Chinese grand game for their global economic expansion. As far as China is concerned all the countries in the Indian Ocean are important for Chinese geo political matrix as a response mechanism for the security of her economic interests. Chinese conduct when hyphenated with their ‘’String of Pearls in the Indian Ocean’’, and their defiant politico-military stance in the South China Sea speaks of their seriousness and sensitivities of their interest in the Indo Pacific region. Sri Lanka happens to be in a pivotal position to serve the Chinese geo political interests.

    In the given circumstances, close affiliation with the China is a win -win situation for Sri Lanka for their economic buoyancy and a politically strong anchor to stand by their side in the time of crisis. However, there are also apprehensions of negative fallouts of new found political bonhomie with an outsider with prospects of disturbing existing stable regional political equilibrium fully aligned with socio- cultural emotional bind of Indian legacy. Accordingly, there is an emerging pattern of an internal political divide amongst Sri Lankan parties and individuals believing in encashing the pragmatic opportunism as against continuation of stability through India centric regional cohesiveness.

    The Mahindra Rajpaksha during his premiership was given loans worth $ 6 billion for various infrastructural projects including Hambantota port. Later the dept trap diplomacy of China got highlighted in their demand of ownership of the port plus land adjacent to it. It, surely, has exposed the dubious ways of China which has prompted number of recipients of Chinese benevolence to revisit their commitments with them as regards to BRI scheme. Sri Lankan civil society is ceased with this Chinese conduct and there is a resistance to encouraging Chinese intrusion into Sri Lankan affairs beyond a point.

    The opponent Ranil Wickremasinghe, is known to be a proponent of the Indian lobby who had, recently , cancelled housing project of more than 50,000 houses in North and Eastern Tamil areas given earlier to China in favour of Indian companies. The Rajapaksha was brought back as the prime minister by the president through an untenable political move leaving the country in a political chaos. The parliament was dissolved paving way for fresh elections. However, the Supreme Court ruled against this unconstitutional move by the president. It was probably done as Rajapakshe, like his previous tenure, would facilitate better relationship with the China looking at their current political compulsions and national interests.

    What is happening in the Sri Lankan political canvas seem to have imprints of pro India vs pro China lobbies. The fact that there is an outstanding loan of almost $ 5 billion despite handing over the Hambantota port to them, China may be pulling the strings to bring in a political dispensation favourable to them to do their bidding. The way the democratic norms are being flouted do indicate a desperate situation precipitated by the looming economic catastrophe waiting to happen.

    The military geography of Sri Lanka has bestowed her with a unique location to take care of the most vulnerable security concerns of China with 70% of trade and 90% of energy supplies passing through the Indian Ocean. Therefore, it is obvious that China is here to stay as a permanent feature and to do that they seem to have acquired a substantial political space in the Sri Lanka. Whereas, the Sri Lanka seem to have lost out on her autonomy to some extent as there is a probability of China dictating their terms when they find the policies are not in sync with Chinese interests.

    The likely Chinese naval presence at Hambantota port barely few hundred miles from Indian shores is a security concern for India. The Chinese politico-military afflictions in Sri Lanka is likely to prompt the western powers also to further enhance their military presence closer to the Indian shores. It, obviously, would impact the Indian security matrix with the extra regional players milling around in the areas of Indian influence all this time. The new nomenclature of ‘Indo Pacific ‘ referring to erstwhile IOR and Asia Pacific is manifestation new US maritime doctrine as a response mechanism to Chinese geo political expansion. The increase in the US sponsored military diplomacy in the region and revival of Quad are all indicative of new global strategic grand games being unfolded closer to the Indian shores.

    India has no choice but to upgrade her military capabilities to take care of the inimical developments around her periphery both on land as well as maritime domain. It warrants looking beyond defensive doctrines and acquire offensive capabilities for optimum power projection in the areas of concern, besides defence of the island territories and international maritime obligations. Given the distances from the main land and bottle necks for shipping, China would always be militarily vulnerable in the Indian Ocean. It stands to an advantage for India which need to be factored in the design of the military doctrine and its political strategic outreach.

    The Sri Lanka needs to recall that they stand integrated today due to unflinching support by India in their hour of crisis and sacrifices made by the Indian soldiers to hold their country together. They should also appreciate that the India continues to be the stabilizing factor for Sri Lanka and a friend in need. China on other hand is here to exploit the Sri Lankan geographical space for their geo political motives sans any benevolent emotional connect. In fact, China has already usurped their strategically located land through their manipulative ways. If the Sri Lankan polity has not understood their game plan then they should be prepared for more such disintegrating moves as part of their dubious debt diplomacy. The Sri Lanka is in economic crisis and stands vulnerable which is reflective in their recent political conduct. In that, there seem to be tell tale signs of Chinese complicity in the ongoing happenings in the Sri Lankan political space which is not a good news.

    India, obviously, has not been pro active enough to sense the aspirations of her neighbours and propensity of China to exploit the political deficit on the strength of her deep pockets and liberal military outreach. The Sri Lanka has a great significance for Indian security and we need to take all the possible measures to neutralize the Chinese foot prints in the island nation. India fortunately has a large influence in the Sri Lankan society and reckonable political leverages which needs to be nurtured and exploited in our national interests. India as a responsible regional country need to go all out to extend a helping hand to Sri Lanka in her testing times as their political stability is essential to the Indian strategic interests.

    Lt Gen Rameshwar Yadav is an Indian Army veteran and former Director General, Infantry. The views expressed are his own. This article was published earlier in https://cenjows.gov.in/article-detail?id=122