The Peninsula Foundation

Category: International & Transnational Affairs

  • Economic prospect of Vietnam under new leadership

    Economic prospect of Vietnam under new leadership

    The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has projected a positive outlook for the post-pandemic global economic recovery for 2021. This is notwithstanding the uncertainty associated with numerous mutations of the Coronavirus emerging in different parts of the world and successes with the vaccine which is now into full-fledged production to meet global demands. Furthermore, according to the IMF, the world economy could grow by 6% in 2021, up from the 5.5% forecast in January 2021. Another significant development in the post-pandemic economic recovery would be a “generational shift towards higher government spending” with projections of over US$ 10 trillion being allocated by the governments across the world to absorb the “shock of the COVID pandemic”. In this context, the Vietnamese government can be expected to make significant post-Pandemic investments.

    Prime Minister Chinh who was an earlier member of the national steering committee for anti-corruption also announced that the government would “drastically and persistently push for anti-corruption.”

    Earlier this month, the Vietnamese National Assembly elected Pham Minh Chinh as the new Prime Minister of the country. In his inaugural speech, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh said that his administration’s economic policies would continue as hitherto i.e. “socialism with a market orientation” and will centre on “economic reforms, developing digital economy and focusing on solving difficulties for industries and businesses.” Prime Minister Chinh who was an earlier member of the national steering committee for anti-corruption also announced that the government would “drastically and persistently push for anti-corruption.”

    There is a strong element of continuity in the Vietnamese government policies concerning economic reforms, investments, and addressing the bottlenecks in economic growth since the last five-year plan. The projections for economic growth during 2021-2025 are high and pegged at 6.5%-7%. This compares well with the last five-year plan which witnessed 5.9% growth. The per capita GDP is also projected to improve from US$ 2,750 at the end of 2020 to $4,700-$5,000 by 2025.

    While these are indeed very promising economic indicators, according to risk consultancy Eurasia Group, Prime Minister Chinh will also have to deal with additional challenges such as reforms required for “new trade deals” necessitating additional infrastructure, respond to existing bottlenecks impacting on the manufacturing sector as also sustained and reliable energy requirements.

    Prime Minister Chinh would have to skillfully manoeuvre Vietnam’s relations with the US and China who are among its top trading partners.

    At another level, Prime Minister Chinh would have to skillfully manoeuvre Vietnam’s relations with the US and China who are among its top trading partners. As far as the US is concerned, US imports from Vietnam increased to $64.8 billion in the first 10 months of 2020, and the trade deficit increased to $56.6 billion in 2020. Hanoi has now won over the US in the context of being labelled as a “currency manipulator”. The Biden Administration’s first foreign-exchange policy report has removed Vietnam from the list of countries that are known to prevent “effective balance of payments adjustments or gaining unfair competitive advantage in international trade”. This suggests that the US is not taking a confrontationist approach.

    Similarly, Vietnam’s trade with China is an inescapable part of its economic growth. China is its top trading partner and the bilateral trade in 2020 was US$ 133 billion. The future projections for Vietnam –China bilateral trade are quite promising given that China would continue to be the strongest economy in the coming years which will have numerous spinoffs for Vietnam. Perhaps it merits attention that China is the seventh-largest foreign investor in Vietnam.

    By all counts, Prime Minister Chinh would continue to pursue the national mantra of “socialism with a market orientation” and engage and promote pragmatic economic policies, open the national economy to global markets and importantly balancing relations with China and the US. The US-China trade war has been a trigger for a large number of countries particularly Japan shifting businesses into Vietnam. This has led to Vietnam being labelled as a “mini-China” and is best represented by the fact that Vietnam’s “factory-heavy growth model, sizable population, low labour and land costs, rapid gross domestic product and geographical placement” make it the preferred destination for setting up a business and attracting investments.

    While that may be so, Vietnam would have to diversify from manufacturing cheap goods for exports to investing in its service industry as also in innovation and tech startups. Vietnam is likely to witness a surge in the digital economy and this segment could expand to US$52 billion by 2025. In particular, e-commerce and digital banking are significant growth sub-sectors.

    it is not unthinkable to anticipate Chinese companies too making a beeline and moving production to Vietnam to lessen the risks of the US-China trade war which has now taken a very strong geopolitical and geostrategic turn.

    Today, Vietnam can boast of three comprehensive strategic partnerships, fourteen strategic partnerships, and 13 comprehensive partnerships with different countries. Besides, the conditions are ripe for Vietnam to attract investors beyond Asia and the EU-Vietnam FTA is an important trigger for encouraging European firms to explore investment opportunities in Vietnam. Also, it is not unthinkable to anticipate Chinese companies too making a beeline and moving production to Vietnam to lessen the risks of the US-China trade war which has now taken a very strong geopolitical and geostrategic turn. Under the circumstances, Vietnam would have to diversify its strategic relations and not be left hostage to one partner.

    Featured Image: Hanoi to Ho Chi Minh

  • Clausewitz or Sun Tzu: Re-Claiming the primacy of policy

    Clausewitz or Sun Tzu: Re-Claiming the primacy of policy

    World War I teaches the lesson that a limited conflict can escalate into a nightmare of millions of deaths and unspeakable suffering for which no rational explanation could be found. Military aims and strategies gained priority over meaningful political goals. Although the generals of the German Empire believed that they were relying on Clausewitz’s theory, they actually perverted it. Tactics replaced strategy, strategy replaced politics, politics replaced policy, and policy was militarized.

    The same occurred in the interval between the first and second wars in Iraq (1991 and 2003), which have seen a remarkable shift from Clausewitz to Sun Tzu in the discourse about contemporary warfare. Clausewitz enjoyed an undreamed-of renaissance in the USA after the Vietnam War and seemed to have attained the status of master thinker. On War enabled many theorists to recognise the causes of America’s traumatic defeat in Southeast Asia, as well as the conditions for gaining victory in the future. More recently, however, he has very nearly been outlawed. The reason for this change can be found in two separate developments. First of all, there has been an unleashing of war and violence in the ongoing civil wars and massacres, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, in the secessionist wars in the former Yugoslavia, in Syria and Yemen and in the persistence of inter-communal violence along the fringes of Europe’s former empires. These developments seemed to indicate a departure from interstate wars, for which Clausewitz’s theory appeared to be designed, and the advent of a new era of civil wars, non-state wars, and social anarchy. Sun Tzu’s The Art of War seemed to offer a better understanding of these kinds of war, because he lived in an era of never ending civil wars.

    The second reason for the change from Clausewitz to Sun Tzu is connected with the ‘Revolution in military affairs’ (RMA). The concepts of Strategic Information Warfare (SIW) and 4th generation warfare have made wide use of Sun Tzu’s thought to explain and illustrate their position. The ‘real father’ of ‘shock and awe’ in the Iraq war of 2003 was Sun Tzu, argued one commentator. Some pundits even claimed triumphantly that Sun Tzu had defeated Clausewitz in this war, because the US army seemed to have conducted the campaign in accordance with principles of Sun Tzu, whereas the Russian advisers of the Iraqi army had relied on Clausewitz and the Russian defence against Napoleon’s army in his Russian campaign of 1812. The triumphant attitude has long been abandoned, since it is now apparent that there is much to be done before a comprehensive approach of the Iraq War will be possible. Yet it seems fair enough to say that, if Sun Tzu’s principles are seen to have been of some importance for the conduct of the war, he must also share responsibility for the problems that have arisen afterwards.

    Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, as well as the theoreticians of Strategic Information Warfare, network centric warfare and 4th generation warfare, lack the political dimension with respect to the situation after the war. They concentrate too much on purely military success and undervalue the process of transforming military success into true victory.

    And this is exactly the problem. Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, as well as the theoreticians of Strategic Information Warfare, network centric warfare and 4th generation warfare, lack the political dimension with respect to the situation after the war. They concentrate too much on purely military success and undervalue the process of transforming military success into true victory. The three core elements of Sun Tzu’s strategy could not easily be applied in our times: a general attitude to deception of the enemy runs the risk of deceiving one’s own population, which would be problematic for any democracy. An indirect strategy in general would weaken deterrence against an adversary who could act quickly and with determination. Concentration on influencing the will and mind of the enemy may merely enable him to avoid fighting at a disadvantageous time and place, and make it possible for him to choose a better opportunity as long as he is in possession of the necessary means – weapons and armed forces.

    One can win battles and even campaigns with Sun Tzu, but it is difficult to win a war by following his principles. The reason for this is that Sun Tzu was never interested in shaping the political conditions, because he lived in an era of seemingly never-ending civil wars. The only imperative for him was to survive while paying the lowest possible price and avoiding fighting, because even a successful battle against one foe might leave one weaker when the moment came to fight the next one. As always in history, if one wishes to highlight the differences to Clausewitz, the similarities between the two approaches are neglected. For example, the approach in Sun Tzu’s chapter about ‘Moving swiftly to overcome Resistance’ would be quite similar to one endorsed by Clausewitz and was practised by Napoleon.

    But the main problem is that Sun Tzu is neglecting the strategic perspective of shaping the political-social conditions after the war and their impact ‘by calculation’ on the conduct of war. As mentioned before, this was not a serious matter for Sun Tzu and his contemporaries, but it is one of the most important aspects of warfare of our own times.
    Finally, one has to take into account the fact that Sun Tzu’s strategy is presumably successful against adversaries with a very weak order of the armed forces or the related community, such as warlord-systems and dictatorships, which were the usual adversaries in his times. His book is full of cases in which relatively simple actions against the order of the adversary’s army or its community lead to disorder on the side of the adversary, to the point where these are dissolved or lose their will to fight entirely. Such an approach can obviously be successful against adversaries with weak armed forces and a tenuous social base, but they are likely to prove problematic against more firmly situated adversaries.

    Clausewitz: a new Interpretation

    Nearly all previous interpretations have drawn attention to the importance of Napoleon’s successful campaigns for Clausewitz’s thinking. In contrast, I wish to argue that not only Napoleon’s successes but also the limitations of his strategy, as revealed in Russia and in his final defeat at Waterloo, enabled Clausewitz to develop a general theory of war. Clausewitz’s main problem in his lifelong preoccupation with the analysis of war was that the same principles and strategies that were the decisive foundation of Napoleon’s initial successes proved inadequate in the special situation of the Russian campaign and eventually contributed to his final defeat at Waterloo. Although Clausewitz was an admirer of Napoleon for most of his life, in his final years he recognised the theoretical significance that arose from the different historical outcomes that followed from the application of a consistent, but nevertheless single military strategy. He finally tried desperately to find a resolution that could reconcile the extremes symbolised by Napoleon’s success at Jena and Auerstedt, the limitations of the primacy of force revealed by the Russian campaign, and Napoleon’s final defeat at Waterloo.

    Therefore there can be found four fundamental contrasts between the early and later Clausewitz that need to be emphasised, because they remain central to contemporary debates about his work:

    a.   The primacy of military force versus the primacy of politics.
    b.   Existential warfare, or rather warfare related to one’s own identity, which engaged
    Clausewitz most strongly in his early years, as against the instrumental view of war that
    prevails in his later work.
    c.   The pursuit of military success through unlimited violence embodying ‘the principle
    of destruction’, versus the primacy of limited war and the limitation of violence in war,
    which loom increasingly large in Clausewitz’s later years.
    d.   The primacy of defence as the stronger form of war, versus the promise of decisive
    results that was embodied in the seizure of offensive initiative.

    Clausewitz’s final approach is condensed in his Trinity, which comes at the end of the first chapter of book I. The Trinity, with all its problems by its own, is the real legacy of Clausewitz and the real beginning of his theory, as he emphasised himself: ‘At any rate, the (…) concept of war [the Trinity, AH-R] which we have formulated casts a first ray of light on the basic structure of theory and enables us to make an initial differentiation and identification of its major components.’
    Clausewitz describes the trinity as follows: ‘War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical Trinity – composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to pure reason.’

    The first chapter of On War, and the Trinity as Clausewitz’s result for theory at its end, are an attempt to summarise these quite different war experiences, and to analyse and describe a general theory of war on the basis of Napoleon’s successes, the limitations of his strategy, and his final defeat.

    Although Summers referred to Clausewitz’s concept of the Trinity in his very influential book about the war in Vietnam, he falsified Clausewitz’s idea fundamentally. 

    Clausewitz’s Trinity is quite different from so-called ‘trinitarian war’. This concept is not derived from Clausewitz himself but from the work of Harry G. Summers Jr. Although Summers referred to Clausewitz’s concept of the Trinity in his very influential book about the war in Vietnam, he falsified Clausewitz’s idea fundamentally. Clausewitz explains in his paragraph about the Trinity that the first of its three tendencies mainly concerns the people, the second mainly concerns the commander and his army, and the third mainly concerns the government. On the basis of this ‘mehr’ (mainly), we cannot conclude that ‘trinitarian war’ with its three components of people, army, and government is Clausewitz’s categorical conceptualisation of how the three underlying elements of his Trinity may be embodied.

    Since Summers put forward this conception it has been repeated frequently, most influentially by Martin van Creveld. On the contrary, it must be concluded that these three components of ‘trinitarian war’ are only examples of the use of the more fundamental Trinity for Clausewitz. These examples of its use can be applied meaningfully to some historical and political situations, as Summers demonstrated for the case of the war in Vietnam with the unbridgeable gap between the people, the army and the government of the USA. Notwithstanding the possibility of applying these examples of use, there can be no doubt that Clausewitz defined the Trinity differently and in a much broader, less contingent and more conceptual sense.

    Looking more closely at his formula, we can see that he describes war as a continuation of politics, but with other means than those that belong to politics itself.

    Clausewitz’s concept of the Trinity is explicitly differentiated from his famous formula of war, described as a continuation of policy by other means. Although Clausewitz seems at first glance to repeat his formula in the Trinity, this is here only one of three tendencies which all have to be considered if one does not want to contradict reality immediately, as Clausewitz emphasised. Looking more closely at his formula, we can see that he describes war as a continuation of politics, but with other means than those that belong to politics itself. These two parts of his statement constitute two extremes: war described either as a continuation of politics, or as something that mainly belongs to the military sphere. Clausewitz emphasises that policy uses other, non-political means. This creates an implicit tension, between war’s status as a continuation of policy, and the distinctive nature of its ‘other’ means.

    In the present discourse on the new forms of war Clausewitz stands representatively for the “old form” of war. One of the most common criticisms is that Clausewitz’s theory only applies to state-to-state wars. Antulio Echevarria, to the contrary, stated that “Clausewitz’s theory of war will remain valid as long as warlords, drug barons, international terrorists, racial or religious communities will wage war.” In order to harmonize this position with Clausewitz’s very few statements concerning state policy, his concept of politics must be stretched a long way. In this interpretation, it must mean something like the political-social constitution of a community. This interpretation is based on an often-neglected chapter in On War, in which Clausewitz deals with the warfare of the “semi barbarous Tartars, the republics of antiquity, the feudal lords and trading cities of the Middle Ages, 18th Century kings and the rulers and peoples of the 19th Century.” All these communities conducted war “in their own particular way, using different methods and pursuing different aims”. Despite this variability, Clausewitz stresses that war is also in these cases a continuation of their policy by other means.

    However, this makes it impossible to express the difference between the policy of states and the values, intentions and aims of the various communities waging war. Therefore, it would make sense to supplement the primacy of politics as a general category by the affiliation of the belligerents to a warring community. If these communities are states, one can speak of politics in the modern sense; if they are racial, religious or other communities, the value systems and goals of these communities (i.e. their “culture”) are the more important factors. Based upon this proposal, we could replace Clausewitz’s meaning of state with the notion of it being that of the intentions, aims or values of the “warring community,” thus remaining much more faithful to his understanding of what a state embodies. Otherwise, we would implicitly express a modern understanding of Clausewitz’s concept of state.

    Whereas Sun Tzu was generalising strategic principles for use against weak adversaries, which may lead to success in particular circumstances, Clausewitz developed a wide-ranging political theory of war by reflecting on the success, the limitations, and the failure of Napoleon’s way of waging war. 

    Taken into account this small change in understanding what Clausewitz was endorsing when speaking of “state policy” his trinity is the starting point for a general theory of war and violent conflict. Whereas Sun Tzu was generalising strategic principles for use against weak adversaries, which may lead to success in particular circumstances, Clausewitz developed a wide-ranging political theory of war by reflecting on the success, the limitations, and the failure of Napoleon’s way of waging war. Although he might have reflected merely a single strategy, he was able by taking into account its successes, limits, and failure to develop a general theory of war, which transcended a purely and historically limited military strategy.

    Clausewitz formulates also a crucial reminder. He stressed that, in his Russian campaign, Napoleon Bonaparte—who Clausewitz sarcastically called the “God of War”—won each individual battle of the war. At the end of this war, he was nevertheless the defeated one and had to return to Paris like a beggar, without his destroyed army. Altogether, in almost twenty years of war, Napoleon lost only three large battles—and nevertheless lost everything, since he provoked by the primacy of military success more resistance than his still very large army, the largest which the world at that time had seen, could fight. Despite his military genius, Napoleon was missing a fundamental characteristic: He was not a great statesman. Both qualities collected would have been necessary, in order to arrange from military strength a durable order of peace.

     

    Feature Image Credit: Battle of Jena – Wikimedia Commons

    Sun Tzu Image: Sun Tzu – The Art of War

    Clausewitz Image: historynewsnetwork.org

  • China’s New Coast Guard Act: Vietnam could lead Response

    China’s New Coast Guard Act: Vietnam could lead Response

    China’s new Coast Guard Act has put the ‘cat among the pigeons’ and the South China Sea claimants Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan are visibly worried. The Act has also attracted international attention; for some, it is an act of war and for others, it violates the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

    The Act came into effect last month on 01 February. In its administrative content, the Act is the culmination of at least two reorganizations of the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) that began in 2013 involving administrative and operational control of five closely associated national maritime law enforcement agencies, also referred to as the Five Dragons , that were brought under one umbrella. In 2018, CCG became part of the People’s Armed Police Force.

    Under the new Act, it is feared, the CCG would conduct operations just like the PLA Navy and would be directly controlled by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. The CCG is empowered with powerful ‘security and control measures’ and has the rights to take necessary actions to “restrain foreign military vessels and foreign vessels used for non-commercial purposes in waters under China’s jurisdiction from violating the laws or regulations of China” which is potentially in contravention to the 1982 UNCLOS.

    The Act has also attracted international attention; for some, it is an act of war and for others, it violates the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

    Under Article 20, the CCG may demolish “buildings, structures, and various fixed or floating devices” built by foreigners “in the sea areas and islands under our jurisdiction”, and Article 47 authorizes the agency to “directly use weapons if there is no time for warning or if there is a risk of serious harm after giving a warning.”

    It is the latter that prompted Japan to label the Act as “blatantly threatening” and “aimed directly at the Senkakus” raisingspeculation that the Japanese Coast Guard, which hitherto could “fire weapons directly at foreign vessels in cases of self-defence and emergency escape” may now “ fire on foreign official vessels under laws by regarding vessels aiming to land on the Senkaku Islands as committing violent crimes”.

    However, it is fair to say that some of the provisions contained in the Chinese Coast Guard Act are not extraordinary. Navies, Coast Guards and law enforcement agencies of many countries are administratively controlled by the ministries of national defence and routinely operate with the national navies albeit pursue different rules of engagements. Many maritime law enforcement agencies are also known to intercept and even sink foreign fishing vessels especially when these engage in IUU fishing. These naturally attract diplomatic protests from the affected countries including China.

    Be that as it may, the ASEAN and China signed the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) in the South China Sea in 2016 under which both sides are committed to “maintaining regional peace and stability, maximum safety at sea, promoting good neighbourliness and reducing risks during mutual unplanned encounters in air and at sea, and strengthening cooperation among navies”. This agreement is for the navies and draws upon the CUES (voluntary and non-binding) adopted by the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS).

    The new Chinese Coast Guard Act may have created an opportunity for ASEAN and China to conceptualize CUES that is tailored to the mandate of the Coast Guards i.e. law enforcement. The issue can also be on the agenda of the Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agency Meeting (HACGAM), a grouping of 22 Member States and multilateral organisations, which aims at cooperative and proactive efforts to address maritime issues confronting the region.

    Among the ASEAN member countries, Vietnam is well placed to lead the initiative for at least three reasons.  First, it is a claimant and some of the features in the South China Sea are under its control; second, it has a larger Coast Guard when compared to the capabilities of the other ASEAN claimants; and third, the Vietnamese Communist Party maintains close contacts with their counterparts in China and this could be a useful channel to facilitate a dialogue.

    However, it remains to be seen if Beijing would allow debate and discussion on the Coast Guard Act particularly when it also involves contested areas such as the South China Sea. For that deft diplomacy by Vietnam could be a good idea.

    Feature Image: www.japantimes.co.jp

  • What Putin nemesis Alexei Navalny is, and what he is not

    What Putin nemesis Alexei Navalny is, and what he is not

    Anatol Lieven highlights America’s blundering tendency to view world personalities in typically American lens, ignoring the realities of them being citizens of their countries and focusing on their national interests . He uses the examples of Russia’s Navalny and Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi to make his point emphatically. His analysis is relevant to other countries as well. 

    This article was published earlier in Responsible Statecraft. 

    It is very human and natural to admire courage and resolution — these are qualities that Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny possesses to a quite remarkable degree. It is also natural to sympathize with suffering — and Navalny has suffered and very nearly died for his beliefs and goals. And of course it is natural to feel disgust with the increasingly criminal behavior of the Putin administration in Russia.

    However, admiration, sympathy and disgust are emotions, not arguments or analysis, and should be employed with great caution in the formulation of state policy.

    In his confirmation hearings, now-Secretary of State Anthony Blinken pledged Biden administration support for Navalny and called him “a voice for millions and millions of Russians.” Statements by the U.S. embassy in Moscow on the Navalny movement have come very close to calling for the end of the present Russian government.

    Recent weeks have seen a tremendous outpouring of American sympathy for Navalny and his movement against the Putin administration. In his confirmation hearings, now-Secretary of State Anthony Blinken pledged Biden administration support for Navalny and called him “a voice for millions and millions of Russians.” Statements by the U.S. embassy in Moscow on the Navalny movement have come very close to calling for the end of the present Russian government. The semi-official American Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is openly and passionately supportive of Navalny’s movement. Richard Haas, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, proposed that Navalny be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

    Such overt U.S. support is not wise. In the first place, it may actually hurt the cause of progressive reform in Russia. The Russian government, like those of Iran and China, has relentlessly propagated the idea that the opposition is being backed if not bankrolled by Washington in order to weaken their countries; and indeed, Russian liberals have done themselves terrible damage by allowing themselves to be cast as representatives of the West, not of the Russian people.

    The second, very familiar problem is the hypocrisy involved. In the latest volume of President Obama’s memoirs, “A Promised Land,” he describes how Hillary Clinton — who relentlessly presented herself in public as an advocate of spreading democracy — argued that Washington should support Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s brutal 2011 crackdown on Arab Spring opposition protests on the grounds that he was a U.S. ally and his fall would lead to chaos and Islamist revolution. In her early public statements, as well, she warned against hastening Mubarak’s exit.

    In proposing Navalny for the Nobel Peace Prize, Haas seems to have forgotten the last time the honor was given to an opposition politician.

    An even greater problem presents itself when one looks at the actual politics of some of the opposition figures who draw such waves of American and Western enthusiasm. In proposing Navalny for the Nobel Peace Prize, Haas seems to have forgotten the last time the honor was given to an opposition politician. The award to Aung San Suu Kyi in 1991 was supposed to be for “her non-violent struggle for democracy and human rights… one of the most extraordinary examples of civil courage in Asia in recent decades.”

    After Suu Kyi joined the government in Myanmar she’s been damned in the West for her failure to prevent or condemn the savage state persecution of Myanmar’s Rohingya minority, and most of her human rights awards (though not the Nobel prize itself) have been revoked.

    After Suu Kyi joined the government in Myanmar she’s been damned in the West for her failure to prevent or condemn the savage state persecution of Myanmar’s Rohingya minority, and most of her human rights awards (though not the Nobel prize itself) have been revoked. What her previous Western admirers are not doing — what they almost never do — is to ask themselves why they so completely misunderstood her before.

    But she is a Burmese politician, not a Western democratic leader, and in building her up as a liberal heroine, the Western media and activists willfully ignored not just the political realities of Myanmar, but her own Burmese nationalist antecedents.  

    (Just in the last 48 hours, Suu Kyi has been detained in an apparent military takeover of her democratically elected government and Biden is predictably mulling over his options for reviewing sanctions and taking “appropriate action.”)

    Like Navalny, Suu Kyi is indeed an exceptionally brave and determined human being and in her way a fine leader; just as Navalny might make a fine Russian president. But she is a Burmese politician, not a Western democratic leader, and in building her up as a liberal heroine, the Western media and activists willfully ignored not just the political realities of Myanmar, but her own Burmese nationalist antecedents.

    There are two factors at work here. The first is a basic human one. Courage, like hard work and self-sacrifice, is a quality that it is humanly impossible not to admire, but the possession of it says absolutely nothing at all about the goals to which they are put. All the leaders of the ghastly totalitarian revolutions of the 20th century were exceptionally brave and determined men.

    The second factor relates to some enduring and seemingly incorrigible flaws in most Western reporting and analysis. One of them is the tendency to personalize issues, whereby “Putin” is used as a synonym for the whole Russian state, and “Navalny” is now being presented as a synonym for the entire, enormously disparate Russian opposition. The merest glance at the groups represented at the pro-Navalny demonstrations reveals that together with genuine liberal democrats, there are also numerous Communists and extreme nationalists whose anti-Western positions are much more extreme and reckless than those of Putin himself. As Aleksandr Baunov of the Carnegie Moscow Centre has written:

    “Saturday’s protests were undeniably anti-regime, anti-elite and anti-corruption but not necessarily liberal, pro-Western and pro-democracy. It’s not surprising that such protests frighten not only the authorities, but also successful members of society: even those who don’t consider themselves supporters of the regime.”

    In their blind demonization of Putin, and consequent sanctification of Navalny, Western commentators seem to be implicitly assuming that should Navalny win power (which he almost certainly will not), Russia’s foreign policy would change radically in a pro-Western direction. This is nonsense. Navalny’s supporters are backing him out of (entirely justified) fury at Russian state corruption, lawlessness, and economic failure, not to change foreign policy. Every independent opinion poll has suggested that Putin’s foreign and security policies have enjoyed overwhelming public support; and above all, there is very little in Navalny’s own record to suggest that he would change them.

    As a 2013 essay by Robert Coalson in The Atlantic documented, Navalny supported the Russian war with Georgia in 2008. He has expressed strongly ethno-nationalist attitudes towards the Caucasian minorities in Russia, and previously made opposition to illegal immigration a key part of his platform. In October 2014 he suggested to a reporter that if he became president he would not return Crimea, which was annexed by Russia earlier that year, to Ukraine (though he also said in that same interview that, “It’s not in the interests of Russians to seize neighboring republics, it’s in their interests to fight corruption, alcoholism and so on — to solve internal problems.”

    Rather like Donald Trump concerning American interventionism, Navalny has strongly condemned Russian military intervention in the Middle East on the grounds of cost and irrelevance to real Russian interests; but (as with Trump), that does not necessarily say much about what he would actually do if in power. Apart from anything else, Russia, like the U.S., has a foreign and security establishment “Blob” with firmly established and deeply held collective views on Russia’s vital interests.

    It is to remind Americans that he is a Russian politician, not an American one; that he will respond to Russian realities, not Washington fantasies; and that in the end, U.S. administrations will have to deal with whatever government is in power in Moscow.

    To recall this is not to condemn Navalny. It is to remind Americans that he is a Russian politician, not an American one; that he will respond to Russian realities, not Washington fantasies; and that in the end, U.S. administrations will have to deal with whatever government is in power in Moscow. Russian governments will defend Russian interests, along lines that are mostly quite predictable if one knows Russian history and culture. The sooner we realize this, and stop setting up plaster saints in the hope that they will perform miracles, the better for U.S. foreign policy overall.

     

    Feature Image – Protesters gather near a monument of Russian playwright Alexander Griboyedov during a protest against the jailing of opposition leader Alexei Navalny in St. Petersburg, Russia, Sunday, Jan. 31, 2021. www.arabnews.com
    Image –     Navalny and Putin: www.hilltimes.com
    Image – Aung San Suu Kyi: www.mmtimes.com

  • Dealing with China in 2021 and Beyond

    Dealing with China in 2021 and Beyond

                                                                                                                         TPF Occasional Paper
                                                                                                                                                                            February 2021

    The Current Situation

    As Eastern Ladakh grapples with a severe winter in the aftermath of a violent and tension-filled 2020, much analysis concerning happenings on the India-Tibet border during the previous year has become available internationally and within India. Despite variance in individual perspectives and prognoses, the one issue starkly highlighted is that 2020 marks a turning point in the India-China relationship, which, shorn of diplomatese, has taken a clear adversarial turn.

    Enough debate has taken place over the rationale and timing behind the Chinese action. It suffices to say that given the expansionist mindset of the Xi regime and its aspiration for primacy in Asia and across the world, it was a matter of time before China again employed leverages against India. In 2020 it was calibrated military pressure in an area largely uncontested after 1962, combined with other elements of hard power – heightened activity amongst India’s neighbours and in the Indian Ocean plus visibly enhanced collusivity with Pakistan This, despite platitudes to the contrary aired by certain China watchers inside India, who continued to articulate that existing confidence-building mechanisms (CBMs) would ensure peace on the border and good relations overall. Multiple incidents on the border over the last few years culminating in the loss of 20 Indian lives at Galwan have dispelled such notions.

    Currently, in terms of militarization, the LAC in Eastern Ladakh can vie with the Line of Control (LOC) on the Western border.

    As an immediate consequence, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the arena of conflict in East Ladakh is seeing the heaviest concentration of troops in history, supplemented by fighter jets, utility and attack helicopters, the latest artillery acquisitions, armoured formations, road building teams and an inventory of drones, backed by matching logistics. Currently, in terms of militarization, the LAC in Eastern Ladakh can vie with the Line of Control (LOC) on the Western border.

    Within the country, the perception of China as the principal foe has crystallised. At no other time since 1962 has China come in for such intense scrutiny. Indian public discourse is focused on China, towards interpreting its policies and implications for India and the world – all against the backdrop of international geopolitics churned further by the Covid pandemic.

    China and the World in 2021

    In 2017, President Xi Jinping had given a foretaste of things to come when spelling out his vision during the 19th Party Congress – that China has entered a “new era” where it should take the “centre stage in the world’[1]. In an insightful essay, Jake Sullivan (now National Security Adviser in the Biden administration) and Hal Brands have observed that ‘China has two distinct paths towards achieving this aim’ [2]. The first ‘focuses on building regional primacy as a springboard to global power’ while the second ‘focuses less on building a position of unassailable strength in the Western Pacific than on outflanking the U.S. alliance system and force presence in that region by developing China’s economic, diplomatic, and political influence on a global scale’. In the same piece, the authors sombrely conclude that the US ‘could still lose the competition with China even if it manages to preserve a strong military position in the Western Pacific….softer tools of competition—from providing alternative sources of 5G technology and infrastructure investment to showing competent leadership in tackling global problems—will be just as important as harder tools in dealing with the Chinese challenge…’ [3] These observations are prescient.

    China and the Pandemic. A look at China’s conduct in this context and those of other nations over the last 12 months is instructive. The first aspect is its reaction to worldwide opprobrium for initially mishandling the Corona crisis – reprehensible wolf warrior diplomacy, crude attempts to divert the narrative about the origin of the Virus, unsuccessful mask diplomacy[4] and successfully delaying a WHO sponsored independent investigation into the matter for a full year without any guarantee of transparency. Secondly, it has exploited the covid crisis to strengthen its hold on the South China Sea commencing from March 2020 itself. Some examples are the renaming of 80 islands and geographical features in the Paracel and Spratly islands, commissioning research stations on Fiery Cross Reef and continued encroachment on fishing rights of Indonesia and Vietnam[5], in addition to a host of aggressive actions too numerous to mention, including ramming of vessels. Retaliatory actions from the US have continued, with the Trump administration in its final days sanctioning Chinese firms, officials, and even families for violation of international standards regarding freedom of navigation in January 2021[6]. The outgoing administration delivered the last blow on 19 January, by announcing that the US has determined that China has committed “genocide and crimes against humanity” in its repression of Uighur Muslims in its Xinjiang region[7]. As regards Taiwan, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute had recently forecast that China Taiwan relations will be heading for a crisis in a few weeks’ time,[8] (as borne out by serious muscle-flexing currently underway). If so, it would put the American system of alliances in the region since 1945 squarely to the test.

    Pushback in the Indo Pacific. With China constantly pushing the envelope in its adjoining seas, the Quadrilateral Dialogue, whose existence over the last decade was marked only by a meeting of mid-level officials in Manila in November 2017, has acquired impetus. Initially dismissed as ‘sea foam’ by China, the individual interpretations of roles by each constituent have moved towards congruence, with Australia openly voicing disenchantment with China. Though an alliance is not on the cards, it can be concluded that increased interoperability between militaries of India, Australia, Japan and the US is both as an outcome and driver of this Dialogue, deriving from respective Indo Pacific strategies of member nations. Further expansion of its membership and tie-ups with other regional groupings is the practical route towards an egalitarian, long-lasting and open partnership for providing stability in this contested region. Japan’s expression of interest in joining the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network of the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand[9], is a step in this direction. European nations like Germany, the Netherlands and France have recently declared their Indo Pacific strategies. France has provided the clearest articulation, with the French Ambassador in Delhi spelling out the prevailing sentiment in Europe about China, as ‘ a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival’[10], while further stating that  “when China breaks rules, we have to be very robust and very clear”[11] . A blunt message befitting an Indo Pacific power, reflecting the sentiments of many who are yet to take a position.

    BRI will see major reprioritisation – though its flagship program, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is unlikely to suffer despite disagreements on certain issues between the two countries.

    Slowing of a Behemoth. China’s other driver the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has considerably slowed in 2020. Lee YingHui, a researcher with Nanyang Technological Institute Singapore wrote last September  ‘..in June this year, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that about 20 per cent of the projects under its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) had been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same press briefing, Wang Xiaolong, director-general at the Foreign Ministry’s International Economic Affairs Department, also revealed that a survey by the ministry estimated that some 30 to 40 per cent of projects had been somewhat affected, while approximately 40 per cent of projects were deemed to have seen little adverse impact[12]. Given the parlous condition of economies of client states post Covid-19 with many including Pakistan requesting a renegotiation of loans[13], BRI will see major reprioritisation – though its flagship program, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is unlikely to suffer despite disagreements on certain issues between the two countries.

    Resilient Economy. China’s economy has rebounded fastest in the world, growing at 6.5 % in the final three months of 2020[14]. Despite the rate of annual growth being lowest in 40 years[15], its prominence in global supply chains has ensured some successes, such as the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with the EU in December 2020. The deal, which awaits ratification by the European Parliament is more a diplomatic than an economic win for China, being perceived as detrimental to President Biden’s efforts to rejuvenate the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. China has notched up another win with the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), where it along with 14 Asian countries from ASEAN and others (including Quad members like Australia and Japan)  have agreed on an ‘ integrated market’. Given India’s position on the RCEP, how this agreement pans out and implications for its members will be watched with interest.

    America in the New Year. The Biden Administration’s initial actions reaffirm the bipartisan consensus achieved last year on dealing with China. Comments of  Secretary of State Anthony Blinken that  ‘China presents the “most significant challenge” to the US while India has been a “bipartisan success story” and the new US government may further deepen ties with New Delhi,’[16] were indicative, as were those of Gen Lloyd Austin the Secretary of Defence during his confirmatory hearing[17].  President Biden’s first foreign policy speech on 04 February that ‘America is Back’ have provided further clarity. Earlier, Blinken and Austin had dialled Indian counterparts NSA Doval and Defence minister Rajnath Singh to discuss terrorism, maritime security, cybersecurity and peace and stability in the Indo Pacific.[18]Economically, American interest in joining or providing alternatives to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP, with an 11 nation membership, born out of President Trump’s withdrawal from its previous format, the TPP), will be another determinant in matters of trade with China. Harsh national security challenges will test the new administration’s resolve, as has already happened in the South China Sea over Taiwan where at the time of writing, the USS Theodore Roosevelt is conducting Freedom of Navigation operations[19]. Similar tests will occur over North Korea and Tibet, where the Senate’s passage of the Tibet Policy and Support Act 2020 mandates that decisions regarding the Dalai Lama’s succession be taken exclusively by the Tibetan people and the incumbent. Overall, a sense of how the world including the US will deal with China in 2021 is well captured by Commodore Lalit Kapur of the Delhi Policy Group when he states that ‘ …China has become too unreliable to trust, too powerful and aggressive to ignore and too prosperous, influential and connected to easily decouple from………[20] Going back to the views essayed by Sullivan and Brands, it appears that China is following both paths to achieve its objective, ie Great Power status.

    India and China

    The Early Years  India’s attempt, soon after independence to develop a relationship with China, its ‘civilisational neighbour’ was overshadowed by the new threat to its security as the PLA invaded Tibet in 1950 – effectively removing the buffer between the two large neighbours. Dalai Lama’s flight to India in March 1959, the border clash at Hot Springs in Ladakh six months later and the subsequent 1962 war shattered our illusions of fraternity.  Documents published recently pertaining to the period from 1947 to the War and beyond[21], reveal differences in perception within the Indian government in the run-up to 1962 despite the availability of sufficient facts. This combined with Chinese duplicity and disinformation, Indian domestic and international compulsions resulted in disjointed decision making, leading to the disastrous decision to implement the ‘Forward Policy’ with an unprepared military. A brief period of security cooperation with the US ensued including the signing of a Mutual Defence Agreement.[22] However, the US-China rapprochement of the early 70s and India’s professed non-alignment ensured its diminished status in the great power calculus.

    Reaching Out to China. India’s outreach to China commenced with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988 in the aftermath of the Chinese intrusion at Somdorung Chu in 1986 in Arunachal Pradesh, resulting in a full-fledged standoff which lasted till mid-1987. The consequent push towards normalisation of relations resulted in the September 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas,  the November 1996 Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, followed thereafter by the Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between India and China, of June 2003 and finally the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question of April 2005, signed during the visit of Chinese premier Wen Jiabao, which also saw the India China relationship elevated to a ‘Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity’.

    Despite partially successful attempts to broad base the engagement, territorial sovereignty continued to dominate the India China agenda, as can be observed by the number of agreements signed on border management – with minimal outcomes. It appears now that what can only be construed as diffidence in dealing with China on the border (and other issues) arose not because of misplaced optimism over such agreements, but for several other reasons. Some were structural weaknesses, such as lack of development of the border areas and poor logistics. Others arose because of want of a full-throated consensus on how strong a line to take with a  visibly stronger neighbour  – aggravated by growing economic disparity and the limitations imposed by self-professed non-alignment, especially so in the absence of a powerful ally like the Soviet Union, which had disintegrated by 1991. Also, American support could not be taken for granted, as was the case in the 60s.  Overall, the approach was one of caution. This, coupled with lack of long term border management specialists induced wishful myopia on the matter, which was dispelled periodically by border skirmishes or other impasses, before returning to ‘business as usual’.  

    The extent of Engagement Today. To objectively analyse the relationship, it is important to comprehend the extent of the India China engagement on matters other than security. In the context of trade and industry, a perusal of the website of the Indian embassy in Beijing provides some answers. There is a list of 24 agreements/ MoUs /protocols between the two countries on Science and Technology alone, covering fields as diverse as aeronautics, space technology, health and medicine, meteorology, agricultural sciences, renewable energy, ocean development, water resources, genomics, geology, and others. The Embassy brings out India’s concerns regarding trade including impediments to market access, noting that trade imbalances have been steadily rising, to reach $58.4 billion in 2018, reducing marginally to $56.95 in 2019, a first since 2005. The poor penetration of Indian banks in China, India’s second-largest shareholding (8%) in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and being the largest borrower from the New Investment Bank or NIB, a BRICS bank of which all members have equal shareholding provide an understanding of linkages between the countries in the banking sector[23]. Other areas of cooperation are in petroleum and railways.

    Economic Fallout Post April 2020. After the Galwan incident, India has taken strong measures on the economic front against China, from banning over 250 software applications to a partial ban on various categories of white goods,and the imposition of anti-dumping duties on many others. The Consolidated FDI Policy of the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade dated 15 October 2020, mandates Government scrutiny of every Chinese investment proposal before approval. However, the paradox in the India China relationship is well illustrated by trade figures for the first half of the Financial Year 20-21, where China surpassed the USA to become India’s largest trading partner. India reduced imports from China but exports to China grew by a robust 26.2 per cent at $10.16 billion[24]. Also, conditionalities for borrowing from the AIIB and NIB have resulted in India having to permit Chinese firms to bid for works connected with projects funded by these institutions. Consequently in January this year, the contract for construction of a 5.6 km long underground stretch of the Rapid Rail Transit System in the National Capital Region has been awarded to a Chinese company, Shanghai Tunnel Engineering Company Limited.[25] As noted earlier, decoupling is not easy. Incentives for companies to relocate to India have been announced, with some investment flowing in from Google and Facebook, and plans for Samsung to relocate a factory to NOIDA[26]. Finally, India’s exclusion from the RCEP will also have to be factored in when negotiating a long term trade policy with China.

    However, the paradox in the India China relationship is well illustrated by trade figures for the first half of the Financial Year 20-21, where China surpassed the USA to become India’s largest trading partner.

    Soft Power and Academia. Indian soft power in China remains subservient to harsh security concerns despite oft-quoted historical antecedents. Some elements like Indian cinema continue to be extremely popular. Student exchange programs have taken shape, especially under the aegis of Confucius Institutes which have secured a toehold in some Indian campuses. Following the trend worldwide, their programs are also under scrutiny[27].  The few Indian students in China (less than 25000)[28] have been hit hard by the coronavirus. Overall, given the current state of engagement, employing soft power as an effective tool has limited potential. Exchange of scholars from policy and security think tanks has been a good way of imbibing a sense of the other, resulting in greater awareness. While the trust deficit and reasons for the same have always been highlighted by the Indian side, it has been the general experience that China has been less forthcoming in its responses.

    Building Blocks for a China Policy

    In the middle term, unless there is a concerted and verifiable effort by China, trade with that country will be overshadowed by security issues  (the huge trade imbalance also becoming one of these !). The Indian economy has commenced its post-Covid recovery in the new year. The budget for FY 21-22, trade policies of others like the EU and the US, will impact economic policy, as will national security concerns.

    Immediate security priorities vis a vis China are a mix of the geopolitical and purely military. These can broadly be outlined – safeguarding Indian interests in the Indian Ocean region and the littorals, holding the line in the high Himalayas and ensuring sanctity over Indian skies. The first being both a geopolitical and security matter would leverage all elements of statecraft including the military. The balance two are a direct outcome of India’s military power. These, intertwined with India’s multilateral approach towards cooperation in world fora would form the basis of dealing with China.

    Countries in the neighbourhood other than Pakistan when in distress, look first towards India for relief – natural calamities, food shortages[29], and now the corona vaccine, where Indian generosity remains unsurpassed worldwide. India does not indulge in cheque book diplomacy, nor entice weaker neighbours into debt traps.

    Managing the Neighbourhood. In South Asia, India is primus inter pares due to size, geographical location, resources, capability and potential. Its soft power, economic reach ( while not comparable to China’s) and associated linkages with other countries are huge, at times even considered overwhelming. Countries in the neighbourhood other than Pakistan when in distress, look first towards India for relief – natural calamities, food shortages[29], and now the corona vaccine, where Indian generosity remains unsurpassed worldwide. India does not indulge in cheque book diplomacy, nor entice weaker neighbours into debt traps. Despite ethnic linkages and security concerns resulting sometimes in what is perceived by others as ‘interventionist politics’, India’s respect for its neighbours’ sovereignty is absolute. This is in contrast to China, whose recent interventions in Nepal have led to rallies in front of the Chinese embassy[30]. Its pressure on the NLD government in Myanmar over BRI projects had again not been viewed favourably in that country,[31] though the trajectory that the China-Myanmar relationship now follows remains to be seen, with China attempting to support Myanmar’s military in international fora after the coup[32]. Within South Asia, strengthening delivery mechanisms, sticking to timelines in infrastructure projects, improving connectivity and resolving the myriad issues between neighbours without attempting a zero-sum game with China is the way forward for India, which should play by its considerable strengths. Simultaneously, it must look at growing challenges such as management of Brahmaputra waters and climate change, and leverage these concerns with affected neighbours.

    Strengthening Military Capability. A more direct challenge lies more in the military field,  and in measures necessary to overcome these.  The justifiable rise in military expenditure during the current year would continue or even accelerate. The armed forces are inching towards a mutually agreed road map before implementing large scale organisational reforms. Conceptual clarity on integrated warfighting across the spectrum in multiple domains (including the informational ) is a sine qua non, more so when cyberspace and space domains are concerned. This mandates breaking up silos between the military and other specialist government agencies for optimisation and seamless cooperation. Also, while classical notions of victory have mutated, swift savage border wars as witnessed in Nagorno Karabakh remain live possibilities for India, with open collusion now established between China and Pakistan. As always, the study of the inventory, military capability of the adversary and his likely pattern of operations will yield valuable lessons. The armed forces have to prepare multiple options, to deal with a range of threats from full scale two front wars down to the hybrid, including responses to terrorist acts while ensuring sovereignty across the seas. Network-centric warfare will take centre stage, with information operations being vital for overall success, possibly even defining what constitutes victory.

    Progress has been achieved in these directions. As an example, the first Indian weaponised drone swarm made its debut on Army Day 2021, and visuals of a ‘wingman drone’ underdevelopment have been shown during the Aero India 2021 at Bangalore. The military would be planning for operationalisation, induction, deployment, staffing and human resource aspects of this weapon platform with the nominated service. An estimate of the time required to resolve these issues as also for full-scale production of such systems and larger variants will dictate procurement decisions with respect to other land and air platforms providing similar standoff kinetic effects, and surveillance capability. A concurrent requirement to develop sufficient capability to counter such systems would doubtless be under scrutiny. In this regard, the outcome of the PLA merging its cyber and electronic warfare functions for multiple reasons merits attention.[33] While the Navy’s requirements to dominate the Indian Ocean are well appreciated, a consensus on its future role and the need (or otherwise) for a third aircraft carrier would decide the nature, type and numbers of future naval platforms – unmanned underwater vehicles, submarines, shore/ carrier-based aircraft and others.  With decisions over the Tejas LCA induction finalised, induction of a state of the art platforms from the USA and France over the last few years and hope for the acquisition of new generation indigenous air defence systems[34] on the anvil, the IAF is set to gradually regain its edge. Overall, India’s military has to leverage the latest technology and develop the capability to fight in multiple domains, which its hard-earned experience in third-generation warfighting would complement. With restructuring planned concurrently, each decision will have to be fully informed and thought through – more so when mini faceoffs as has happened at Naku La in Sikkim this month continue to occur.

    A Way Forward

    Traditional Chinese thinking has simultaneously been dismissive and wary of India. In his seminal publication at the turn of the century, Stephen Cohen noted that ‘…from Beijing’s perspective India is a second rank but sometimes threatening state. It poses little threat to China by itself and it can be easily countered but Beijing must be wary of any dramatic increase in Indian power or an alliance between New Delhi and some hostile major state..’[35]  As brought out in this paper, outlines of a grounded long term China policy based on previous experiences and new realities are visible. Rooted primarily in the security dimension followed thereafter by the economic, its success will be predicated on peace and tranquillity on the border, without entering into the trap of competition in either of the two domains. As pointed out by the Minister for External Affairs in his talk to the 13th All India Conference for China Studies this month [36] the India-China relationship has to be based on ‘mutuality…  mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interests ..’. The EAM further noted that ‘expectations…. that life can carry on undisturbed despite the situation at the border, that is simply not realistic. There are discussions underway through various mechanisms on disengagement at the border areas. But if ties are to steady and progress, policies must take into account the learnings of the last three decades’[37].

    Rooted primarily in the security dimension followed thereafter by the economic, its success will be predicated on peace and tranquillity on the border, without entering into the trap of competition in either of the two domains.

    In the same talk, the EAM has laid down eight broad and eminently practical propositions as guidelines for future India-China relations. Most prominent of these is that peace and tranquillity on the border are a must if relations in other spheres are to develop. Also, the need to accept that a multipolar world can have a multipolar Asia as its subset. He stressed that reciprocity is the bedrock of a relationship, and sensitivities to each other’s aspirations, interests and priorities must be respected. Concurrently, management of divergences and differences between two civilizational states should be considered over the long term.

    A China policy crafted on these principles would ensure that India’s concerns vis a vis its neighbour is addressed, within the larger National goal of all-round growth and development of India and its citizens in the 21st Century.

     

    Notes:

    [1] ‘Xi JinPing Heralds New Era of Chinese Power’ Dipanjan Ray Chaudhury, Economic Times 18 October 2017

    [2] ‘China Has Two Paths To Global Domination’ Jake Sullivan,  Hal Brands, Foreign Policy, 22 May 2020

    [3] ibid

    [4] ‘China’s Mask Diplomacy is Faltering.But the US isn’t Doing any better’ Charlie Campbell Time Magazine 03 April 2020

    [5] ‘China’s Renewed Aggression in the South China Sea’ Gateway House Infographic 22 April 2020

    [6] ‘US imposes new sanction on Beijing over South China Sea’  Mint 15 January 2021

    [7] In parting shot, Trump administration declares China’s repression of Uighurs ‘genocide’ Humeyra Pamuk, Reuters 19 January 2021

    [8] ‘Pacific Panic: China-Taiwan relations to reach breaking point in ‘next few weeks’ skynews.com.au 18 January 2021

    [9] ‘Japan wants de facto ‘Six Eyes’ intelligence status: defence chief’ Daishi Abe and Rieko Miki Nikkei Asia 14 August 2020

    [10] ‘Emmanuel Bonne’s interview to the Times of India’ 10 January 2021  Website of the French Embassy in New Delhi

    [11] ‘When China breaks rules, we have to be very robust and clear: French diplomat’ Dinakar Peri, The Hindu 08 January 2021

    [12] ‘COVID-19: The Nail in the Coffin of China’s Belt and Road Initiative?’ Lee YingHui, The Diplomat 28 September 2020

    [13] ibid

    [14] ‘Covid-19: China’s economy picks up, bucking global trend’ BBC.com  18 January 2021

    [15] ibid

    [16] ‘New US govt may look to further deepen ties with India: Blinken’ Elizabeth Roche, The Mint 21 Jan 2021

    [17] ‘What Biden’s Defence Secretary Said About Future Relations With India, Pakistan’ Lalit K Jha, The Wire 20 January 2021

    [18] ‘US NSA speaks to Doval, Def Secretary dials Rajnath’ Krishn Kaushik and Shubhajit Roy Indian Express 27 January 2021

    [19] ‘As China Taiwan tension rises, US warships sail into region’ The Indian Express 25 January 2021

    [20] ‘India and Australia: Partners for Indo Pacific Security and Stability’  Lalit Kapur, Delhi Policy Group Policy Brief Vol. V, Issue 42 December 15, 2020

    [21] ‘India China Relations 1947-2000 A Documentary Study’ (Vol 1 to 5)  Avtar Singh Bhasin   Geetika Publishers New Delhi 2018

    [22] ‘The Tibet Factor in India China Relations’  Rajiv Sikri  Journal of International Affairs , SPRING/SUMMER 2011, Vol. 64, No. 2, pp 60

    [23] Website of the Embassy of India at Beijing   www.eoibeijing.gov.in

    [24] ‘What an irony! Mainland China beats US to be India’s biggest trade partner in H1FY21’  Sumanth Banerji        Business Today 04 December 2020

    [25] ‘Chinese company bags vital contract for first rapid rail project’  Sandeep Dikshit   The Tribune   03 January 2021

    [26] ‘Samsung to invest Rs 4,825 cr to shift China mobile display factory to India’ Danish Khan  Economic Times 11 December 2020

    [27]  ‘The Hindu Explains | What are Confucius Institutes, and why are they under the scanner in India?’

    Ananth Krishnan The Hindu August 09 2020

    [28] ‘23,000 Indian students stare at long wait to return to Chinese campuses’  Sutirtho Patranobis  Hindustan Times  08  September 2020

    [29] ‘Offering non-commercial, humanitarian food assistance to its neighbours: India at WTO’ Press Trust of India 19 December 2020

    [30] ‘Torch rally held in Kathmandu to protest against Chinese interference’ ANI News  30 December 2020

    [31] ‘Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visits Myanmar with aim to speed up BRI projects’  Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury  Economic Times  09 January 2021

    [32] ‘China blocks UNSC condemnation of Myanmar coup’ India Today Web Desk 03 February 2021

    [33] ‘Electronic and Cyber Warfare: A Comparative Analysis of the PLA and the Indian Army’ Kartik Bommankanti ORF Occasional Paper July 2019

    [34] ‘India successfully test fires new generation Akash NG missile’ Ch Sushil Rao  Times of India  25 January 2021

    [35] ‘ India  Emerging Power’  Stephen Philip Cohen   Brookings Institution Press 2001   pp 259

    [36] Keynote Address by External Affairs Minister at the 13th All India Conference of China Studies January 28, 2021

    [37] ibid

     

    Image Credit: Wion  and Trak.in

  • India, China, and Arunachal Pradesh

    India, China, and Arunachal Pradesh

    The satellite picture below brilliantly depicts the geographical separation of Arunachal Pradesh (called Lower Tibet by the Chinese) and Tibet. The McMahon Line more or less runs along the crest line of the Himalayas.

    The Chinese have never been quite explicit on how much of Arunachal they seek.  I once saw an official map displayed in a travel agents office in Lhasa that showed only the Tawang tract as Chinese territory. In other maps they have their border running along the foothills, which means all of Arunachal.

    The Chinese have based their specific claim on the territory on the premise that Tawang was administered from Lhasa, and the contiguous areas owed allegiance to the Dalai Lama, the spiritual and temporal ruler of Tibet. Then the Chinese must also consider this. Sikkim till into the 19th century a vassal of Tibet and Darjeeling was forcibly taken from it by the British! By extending this logic could they realistically stake a claim for Sikkim and Darjeeling? Of course not. It would be preposterous. History has moved on. The times have changed. For the 21st century to be stable 20th century borders must be stable, whatever be our yearnings.

    At the crux of this issue is the larger question of the national identities of the two nations and when and how they evolved. The Imperial India of the Mughals spanned from Afghanistan to Bengal but did not go very much below the Godavari in the South. The Imperial India of the British incorporated all of today’s India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, but had no Afghanistan, not for want of trying. It was the British who for the first time brought Assam into India in 1826 when they defeated Burma and formalized the annexation with the treaty of Yandabo.

    It was only in 1886 that the British first forayed out of the Brahmaputra valley when they sent out a punitive expedition into the Lohit valley in pursuit of marauding tribesmen who began raiding the new tea gardens. Apparently the area was neither under Chinese or Tibetan control for there were no protests either from the Dalai Lama or the Chinese Amban in Lhasa. Soon the British stayed put.

    Tibet remained in self imposed isolation and the race to be first into Lhasa became the greatest challenge for explorers and adventurers in the second half of the 19th century. Not the least among these were the spies of the Survey of India, the legendary pundits. The most renowned of these was the Sarat Chandra Das whose books on Tibet are still avidly read today. As the adventurers, often military officers masquerading as explorers began visiting Tibet the British in India began worrying. Reports that the most well-known of Czarist Russia’s military explorers, Col. Grombchevsky was sighted in Tibet had Lord Curzon, the Governor General of India most worried.

    In 1903 Curzon decided to send a military expedition into Tibet led by Grombchevsky’s old antagonist, Col. Francis Younghusband. A brigade strong mixed force of Gurkhas and Tommies went over the Nathu La into the Chumbi valley and advanced unhindered till Shigatse. A Tibetan military force met them there but offered what can only be described as passive resistance. Not a shot was fired back as the British Indian troops rained bullets on them. It was a forerunner to Jallianwalla Bagh. From Shigatse Younghusband made a leisurely march into Lhasa. The British got the Tibetans to agree to end their isolation and having extracted trade concessions withdrew in 1904, the way they came.

    In 1907 Britain and Russia formally agreed that it was in their interests to leave Tibet “in that state of isolation from which, till recently, she has shown no intention to depart.” It may be of interest to the reader to know that the Great Game nevertheless continued. In 1907 Col. Mannerheim then of the Russian Army, later Field Marshal Mannerheim and first President of Finland, led a horseback expedition from Kyrgyzstan to Harbin on China’s northeast to identify a route for the cavalry.

    The next important year was 1913 when the Tibetans declared independence after the collapse of the Qing dynasty and the establishment of a Republic in China under Sun Yat Sen. They attacked and drove the Chinese garrisons in Tibet into India over the Nathu La. Also in 1913 the British convened the Simla Conference to demarcate the India-Tibet border. The British proposed the 1914 McMahon Line, as we know it. The Tibetans accepted it. The Chinese Amban however initialed the agreement under protest. But his protest seemed mostly about the British negotiating directly with Tibet as a sovereign state and not over the McMahon Line as such.

    Things moved on then. In 1935 at the insistence of Sir Olaf Caroe ICS, then Deputy Secretary in the Foreign Department, the McMahon Line was notified. In 1944 JP Mills ICS established British Indian administration in NEFA, but excluding Tawang which continued to be administered by the Lhasa appointed head lama at Tawang despite the fact that it lay well below the McMahon Line. This was largely because Henry Twynam, the Governor of Assam lost his nerve and did not want to provoke the Tibetans. In 1947 the Dalai Lama (the same gentleman who is now in Dharamshala) sent the newly independent India a note laying claim to some districts in NEFA/Arunachal.

    On October 7, 1950 the Chinese attacked the Tibetans at seven places on their frontier and made known their intention of reasserting control over all of Tibet. As if in response on February 16, 1951 Major Relangnao ‘Bob’ Khating IFAS raised the India tricolor in Tawang and took over the administration of the tract. The point of this narration is to bring home the fact that India’s claim over Arunachal Pradesh doesn’t rest on any great historical tradition or cultural affinity. We are there because the British went there. But then the Chinese have no basis whatsoever to stake a claim, besides a few dreamy cartographic enlargements of the notion of China among some of the hangers-on in the Qing emperor’s court. The important thing now is that we have been there for over a hundred years and that settles the issue.

    Arunachal Pradesh has a very interesting population mix. Only less than 10% of its population is Tibetan. Indo-Mongoloid tribes account for 68% of the population. The rest are migrants from Nagaland and Assam. As far as religious affinities go Hindus are the biggest group with 37%, followed by 36% animists, 13% Buddhists. Recent census figures suggest a spurt in Christianity, possibly induced by pocketbook proselytizing. In all there are 21 major tribal groups and over 100 ethnically distinct sub-groupings, speaking over 50 distinct languages and dialects. The population of about a million is spread out over 17 towns and 3649 villages. With the exception of a few villages of Monpas who live north of the McMahon Line, it is an ethnically compact and contiguous area.

    In fact in future boundary negotiations India could make a case for inclusion of the few Monpa villages left behind north of the McMahon Line? Many knowledgeable observers suggest that the area south of the Huangpo/Brahmaputra from the Pemako gorge till it enters the Subansiri division of Arunachal would be a logical boundary as the raging and hence un-fordable and unbridgeable river ensures hardly any Chinese administrative presence in the area.

    It is true that historically India never had a direct border with Tibet till the British took Kumaon and Garhwal from Nepal in 1846 and extended its domain over Arunachal in 1886. On the other hand the formidable Himalayas were always culturally a part of India and formed a natural barrier against ingress from the north, whether Tibetan or Chinese. But times have moved and technology and mankind’s great engineering powers now make it possible for even the most hostile terrain to be subjugated. The Himalayas are no longer the barrier they once were. As China and India emerge as the world’s great economies and powers can India possibly allow China a strategic trans-Himalayan space just a few miles from the plains?

    The view from the Chinese side about what exactly constitutes China is no less confused. Apparently like the British, the Manchu’s who ruled China from the 17th to the early 20th century had a policy of staking claim to the lands that lay ahead of their frontiers in order to provide themselves with military buffers. In a recent article in the China Review magazine, Professor Ge Jianxiong, Director of the Institute of Chinese Historical Geography at Fudan University in Shanghai writes: “to claim that Tibet has always been a part of China since the Tang dynasty; the fact that the Qinghai-Tibetan plateau subsequently became a part of the Chinese dynasties does not substantiate such a claim.” Ge also notes that prior to 1912 when the Republic of China was established the idea of China was not clearly conceptualized. Even during the late Qing period (Manchu) the term China would on occasion refer to the Qing state including all the territory that fell within the boundaries of the Qing Empire. At other times it would be taken to refer to only the eighteen interior provinces excluding Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang.

    Professor Ge further adds that the notions of “Greater China” were based entirely on the “one-sided views of Qing court records that were written for the courts self-aggrandizement.” Ge criticizes those who feel that the more they exaggerate the territory of historical China the more “patriotic” they are. In this context I would like to recall a recent conversation I had with the then Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Yuxi. Ambassador Sun said that while he was soundly castigated in India for his unintended comment, he gained a major constituency in China. The mandarins in the Beijing would do well to take heed to Ge Jianxiong’s advice: “If China really wishes to rise peacefully and be on solid footing in the future, we must understand the sum of our history and learn from our experiences.” The same holds true for the babus in South Block and ‘the having writ move on’ media pundits. If we don’t then we know who will be laughing!

     

    Image Credit: Tawang Monastery

  • Understanding the Catalonian Crisis through the Relative Deprivation theory

    Understanding the Catalonian Crisis through the Relative Deprivation theory

    On 1st October 2017, people in Catalonia, a semi-autonomous region in Spain, held a referendum in which 90 percent of those who participated sought to break away from the Spanish state and create the independent Republic of Catalonia. This referendum which endorsed independence was declared illegal by the Spanish government. This declaration was based on a ruling by the Constitutional Court, and the results of the referendum were also not taken seriously by the international community. Since then, Catalonia has remained politically deadlocked. While the Spanish government and the leaders of the separatist movement in Catalonia have participated in discussions and formal talks have been opened in 2020, there has been no resolution to this festering political crisis.

    A deep sense of relative deprivation has entered the minds of the Catalan people wherein they feel that the Spanish identity has been given more prominence in comparison to their Catalan identity.

    This desire for independence as expressed by the people of Catalonia did not emerge suddenly but had been simmering for an extended period. The social mobilisation occurred because of the frustration that they have as a result of a lack of representation of their culture and language within the Spanish state. The hostility shown to demands of more autonomy and representation has also led to more anger. A deep sense of relative deprivation has entered the minds of the Catalan people wherein they feel that the Spanish identity has been given more prominence in comparison to their Catalan identity.

    While there is a long history of oppression and centralisation, the recent turmoil, however, started in 2010 when the Spanish Constitutional Court quashed a law passed by the regional parliament of Catalonia which updated the autonomous government’s statute. This statute dating to 1979 mapped the relations between Catalonia and the rest of Spain. The court rejected articles in the statute that put the Catalan language above the Spanish language and any articles that referred to Catalonia as a nation rather than as a region.

    This article seeks to understand the reason behind the Catalonian crisis using the relative deprivation model put forth by Ted Gurr. This model has been used to clarify how cultural and linguistic suppression of the Catalan people has led to collective turmoil.

    Relative Deprivation Model of Gurr

    Gurr’s relative deprivation model states that when a sense of deprivation emerges in a group in relation to another group, then it can lead to collective violence or dissatisfaction. Gurr uses a psychological approach to explain why anger or frustration caused by a sense of deprivation is a motivating instrument that can make people more inclined towards aggression.

    The term relative deprivation is used by Gurr who defines it as “actor’s perception of discrepancy between their value expectations (the goods and conditions of the life to which they believe they are justifiably entitled) and their value capabilities (the amounts of those goods and conditions that they think they can get and keep)”. Thus, if there is a discrepancy between what people in a group believe they should get and what they do get then, it leads to frustration, disturbance, and a sense of deprivation. The greater the gap between the expectations of the people and reality, the higher the magnitude for aggression and civil strife. One important thing to note here is that the sense of deprivation is always in relation or comparison to another group.

    Gurr further states that the magnitude of the civil strife or dissatisfaction is dependent on the intensity of the sense of deprivation among the people of the group. As per the relative deprivation theory, there are certain factors or societal variables that have an impact on the relationship between deprivation and the ensuing civil strife. These societal variables include:  (a) coercive potential (of the government to put off the conflict), (b) institutionalisation (the extent to which societal structures may offer non-violent means for expressing dissatisfaction to the social group with the perceived deprivation), (c) social facilitation (that further facilitate strife) and lastly, (d) legitimacy of the political regime in which all this occurs.

    Applying the Relative Deprivation Model to the Catalonian situation

     By applying this theory to the Catalonian crisis, it is easy to see how the deprivation of the Catalan culture, language, and history frustrated the Catalan people and led to the unprecedented social mobilisation for independence from the Spanish state. The people of Catalonia are unsatisfied and angry with the way their culture and particularly, their language, is being slowly eroded as compared to the relevance and status accorded to the Spanish language.

    The Catalan people consider their language to be the principal element of their identity and believe that it is the ‘rallying cry of their solidarity’. The sidelining of their language is seen as an affront to their identity.

    Language is seen as a crucial distinguishing feature by the Catalan people and the speakers of Castilian Spanish. Many people living in Catalonia also want the Catalan language to be officially recognised by the European Union and put on par with the Spanish language even outside the country settings, which has not happened. The reversal of the statute that allowed for the exercise of Catalan language over the Spanish language in the region has brought the identity discord in the open. The Catalan people consider their language to be the principal element of their identity and believe that it is the ‘rallying cry of their solidarity’. The sidelining of their language is seen as an affront to their identity.

    The economic state of affairs further accentuates their anger over the under-representation of their language in museums, government offices, libraries, and all official channels of the central government in Madrid. Catalonia is one highly prosperous part of Spain but many in Catalonia feel that they are bearing the brunt of the high taxes and austerity measures for the rest of the country’s needs with whom they have little in common.

    Conclusion:

    Ted Gurr’s relative deprivation theory states that when a group of people feel that they are deprived of something, whether economically, socially or politically, in comparison to another group of people, they will feel frustrated and that frustration can lead to violence. The Catalonian crisis, when understood using this model, provides an incredibly accurate picture of how the suppression of one’s language and history can result in political strife.

    The Catalonian situation is quite similar to that of Scotland in the United Kingdom. People in Scotland are also quite proud of their distinct language (Gaelic), traditions and also have a strong sense of independent spirit which they believe is curtailed by the Westminster government. Scotland’s Prime Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, recently indicated that she would pursue another referendum for independence in the coming year as support for an independent government has increased steadfastly in 2020 with the pandemic exposing the cracks in the current system.

    For both Catalonia and Scotland, the model followed in the erstwhile USSR in terms of accommodation of identities can provide a way forward or represent a comparatively better model of governance. Under Lenin’s leadership, striking flexibility with respect to the various countries encompassed within the Soviet Union in terms of expression of their individual nationalities was displayed. Lenin used a degree of accommodation towards peripheral nationalist tendencies displayed by the non-Russian states as he believed it to be a pragmatic solution. While political autonomy remained elusive to the non-Russian states, the accommodation of their national identities meant that they were somewhat satisfied. The Soviet state itself encouraged the use of local languages in schools and universities and even in the local administrative offices.

     

    References:

    “A Year Later: An Update on the Catalonian Independence Movement.” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 27 Nov. 2018, jtl.columbia.edu/a-year-later-an-update-on-the-catalonian-independence-movement/.

    “Catalonia: From Secessionism to Secession?” E-International Relations, www.e-ir.info/2016/01/15/catalonia-from-secessionism-to-secession/.

    “Catalonia: Past and Future.” Jacobin, www.jacobinmag.com/2017/10/catalonia-independence-franco-spain-nationalism.

    Gurr, Ted. “A causal model of civil strife: A comparative analysis using new indices.” American political science review 62.4 (1968): 1104-1124.

    Gurr, Ted Robert. “Why Men Rebel Redux: How Valid Are Its Arguments 40 Years On?” E-international Relations 17 (2011).

    Huddleston, R. Joseph. “The Roots of the Catalan Independence Crisis.” Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs Magazine, 30 Oct. 2017, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/spain/2017-10-30/roots-catalan-independence-crisis.

    Marinzel, Anastazia. “Catalonia: The quest for independence from Spain.” (2014).

    “Scotland: Nicola Sturgeon Aims for 2021 Independence Vote.” The Indian Express, 1 Dec. 2020, indianexpress.com/article/world/scotland-nicola-sturgeon-aims-for-2021-independence-vote-7075166/

     

    Image Credit: “Catalonia is not Spain” by SBA73 is licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0

  • Quad 2.0: Can it be a win-win for the four Democracies

    Quad 2.0: Can it be a win-win for the four Democracies

    China’s GDP expanded from USD 6 trillion in 2010 to USD 14.3 trillion in 2019. It has had exponential growth over the last three decades, with an average GDP growth rate of 9.23% from 1989 to 2020. Although the impact of the COVID pandemic pushed its GDP into decline and negative (-6.80%) in the first quarter of 2020, it has rebounded with a growth of 5% in the third quarter. It’s military spending, officially, is more than three times that of India, unofficially maybe five times or more. China has become one of the key players in the Indo-Pacific as a significant part of its economic activities depend on this region.

    The Indo-Pacific has replaced the Trans-Atlantic as the epicentre of global politics. Its importance to the global order is multifarious. In economic terms, one half of the world’s commercial influx goes through the Indo-Pacific sea routes and the Indian Ocean carries two-thirds of global oil shipments. Besides, a few of the biggest military spenders are part of the region. China’s hostile actions and policies have agitated the US, Japan, Australia and India. A shared concern over the expansion of China’s political and military clout was fundamental to the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad 2.0), on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Manila, in 2017.

    Quad is seen as cooperation between four large democracies that share the idea of an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific

    There is growing speculation over what the re-emergence of the Quad means. On the one hand, it is seen as cooperation between four large democracies that share the idea of an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific; on the other, a strategic alliance towards keeping China’s assertive actions in check.

    The Quad: Overcoming Intransigence

    The Quad is a mechanism that enables a dialogue on regional security issues between the four countries. Its revival, this year, reflects an intersection of strategic interests: that of an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific and a rules-based international order. The Quad came together in November for the naval exercise – Exercise Malabar – in two phases, in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. The exercise, in its 24th edition, is the biggest so far and has sent significant strategic signalling to China.

    The Quad should be considered less as a formal alliance and more as a mechanism built on existing bilateral and trilateral partnerships between the four countries. It first emerged as a cooperative response to the 2004 tsunami, when the four navies were involved in providing humanitarian and disaster relief. Despite strong support from Japan and the US to formalise the group, it disbanded with Australia and India backing out in 2007, due to concerns about China’s reaction to the grouping. This gave rise to multilateral partnerships among the four countries.

    Between the four democracies, there are three trilateral and six bilateral partnerships. Trilaterally, Japan, India and Australia first came together in 2015 to discuss shared concerns over maritime security in the Indo-Pacific Region and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. More recently, the three countries agreed to develop a supply chain resilience program for the Indo-Pacific Region amid growing recognition of their excessive, economic reliance on China.

    Bilaterally, the US and India signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) on October 27 that gives India access to American geospatial intelligence that will be useful for precision guidance of its missiles. Further, India-Australia ties have strengthened over the last few years with their initial 2+2 dialogue in 2017 and with Australian participation in India’s Milan exercise in 2018, focusing on interoperability between navies in the region.

    China and the Quad

    Over the years, the Indo-Pacific has emerged as a region of strategic importance. As China expands into the region, its actions have created tensions with the Quad members.

    Sino-Indian relations:  India-China relations have touched rock-bottom since the clashes on the LAC in Ladakh.  China’s intrusions and violations along the LAC have been backed up by significant massing of PLA forces, for the first time in 40 years. India’s strong actions at the LAC and subsequent sanctions and banning of Chinese IT applications have signalled that India is not shy of escalating its response. China’s actions are seen as part of its coercive strategy to India’s refusal to back China on BRI, and its vehement opposition to CPEC. It sees India’s closeness to the USA and its coordination in the Quad as a threat to China’s strategic interests.

    China’s increasing influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has raised India’s concerns. It has always been wary of ties between Beijing and Islamabad, which intensified with the launch of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in 2013. The Chinese-operated Gwadar port off the Arabian Sea in Pakistan, which can be used by the Chinese navy to establish a submarine presence in the region, did not rest well with India. Such a port would also help China with its ‘Malacca Dilemma’. Other ports of such concern are Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Kyaukphyu in Myanmar. Though China claims these ports are of economic significance, these are also militarily strategic ports that give it an advantage in the IOR.

    In light of these issues, a revived and active Quad will benefit India’s strategic interests. The partnership could affect China in two ways. First, China would face increased competition in the IOR from India that now works with strong allies. Second, with the recent imposition of the technology ban, China stands to lose a large market for its products.

     Japan-China relations: Over the past few years, the situation in the South China Sea (SCS) has worsened with China’s land reclamation activities and militarisation of islands. Japan sees the South China Sea as key to its security because of its crucial sea lanes vital to its trade and economic health. It is also wary of China’s ability to influence the energy supply chains, which East Asia is dependent on, and the PLA’s movement in the Indo-Pacific region that could affect regional security.

    Despite its renewed trade with China and the recent signing of the RCEP, increased tensions in the SCS has forced Japan to support revival of the Quad. China’s increased naval and air activities in the South China Sea makes the Quad and its possible expansion into Quad Plus even more relevant for Japan.

    China-Australia relations: Australia backed out of the Quad in 2007 primarily because it was concerned about how China would view it, and the possible impact it might have on their bilateral trade. By 2017, China became Australia’s top export destination, and this trend has continued through 2019, pushing Australia into a dangerous economic dependency with China. Further, Australia’s 2016 White Paper called out China for its coercive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific, identifying the South China Sea and the Southern Pacific as vital strategic regions.

    Australia’s economic dependence on China is high and this is unlikely to change despite the strong statements from prime minister Morrison.  Australia’s strong stand against China is also seen as emanating from American pressure. Australia actively supports Quad as it sees an increasingly powerful China working to change the world order. Australia is also a member of the newly signed RCEP, the new economic grouping that will be dominated by China. While Australia has hedged its economic interests by signing the RCEP, its strategic and security priorities are linked to the Quad.

    China-US relations:  China’s rising military power is now seen as a threat to American power and the liberal world order. Since 2011, American strategies and policies have focussed more on the Indo-Pacific. This shift in focus has strengthened its ties with Japan, Australia and India. Tensions between the US and China have increased since then and the 2018 trade war not only aggravated their relations but also kept the rest of the world on an edge.

    With a strong Quad partnership, the US expects to regain and strengthen its influence in the Indo-Pacific. For China already hit hard by the US trade war, more setbacks will accentuate the problems. Moreover, with a more focused Quad led by the US, China’s efforts to project its power and influence in the Indo-Pacific region will come under pressure.

     Conclusion

     A few aspects about the Quad remain unclear. First, its intent is still uncertain because the respective countries have to evaluate their relations with China if they want to make the bloc official. Second, if it were to be official, to what extent would it serve the interests of the member countries? Third, is the Quad a concert of democracies to contain China? Last, will it coordinate with other members in the Indo-Pacific region, that is will Quad translate into Quad Plus?

    China’s actions have managed to bring the four countries closer.  China, however, has scored a success when the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership), the world’s largest plurilateral trade agreement was signed on November 15th. Both Japan and Australia are members of the RCEP. Many see this as a setback for India and America, and an important building block in a new world order, in which China calls the shots all over Asia. It puts in doubt the viability of SCRI (Supply Chain Resilience Initiative), an effort by Quad members to create an alternative to Chinese domination of supply chains.

    The nature of China’s challenge to the global order and the Indo-Pacific is geoeconomics in design, as evidenced by its Belt and Road Initiative and its recent success in RCEP. The Quad will need to go beyond security cooperation.

    While security and military cooperation will help in checking China’s aggressive approach, it must be recognised that this alone will be an incomplete strategy. The nature of China’s challenge to the global order and the Indo-Pacific is geoeconomics in design, as evidenced by its Belt and Road Initiative and its recent success in RCEP. The Quad will need to go beyond security cooperation.

    The conclusion of RCEP maybe China’s gain, but it is important to recognise the fact that ASEAN is the main driver of RCEP. In attempting to balance China, ASEAN and Japan have kept the door open for India to re-join the RCEP. It is possible that the US, under the Biden presidency, may revive the TPP (now proposed by Japan as CATPP, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership), which could balance the RCEP. The Quad, in this context, will continue to be very relevant for peace and security in the Indo-Pacific.

     

  • Vietnam-US Relations under Biden Likely to Remain Unchanged

    Vietnam-US Relations under Biden Likely to Remain Unchanged

    Communist Party Chief and State President Nguyen Phu Trong and Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc have sent a congratulatory message to U.S. President-elect Joe Biden. Both leaders have also expressed hope that their comprehensive partnership will “continue to develop in a stable, effective manner, benefiting people of both countries and promoting peace, security, stability, cooperation and development in the region and the world”. Meanwhile, Vice President Dang Thi Ngoc Thinh sent a congratulatory message to the U.S. Vice president-elect Kamala Harris. The Vietnamese leaders also invited Biden and Harris to visit Vietnam.

    The Biden administration could even explore new “areas in which to deepen ties with Vietnam in the economic, political, military, and people-to-people spheres”.

    While these messages and invitations are part of customary diplomacy, strategic commentators across domains believe that US-Vietnam relations will continue as hitherto under President-elect Joe Biden’s Presidency. They argue that the US acknowledges Vietnam’s geopolitical and geostrategic heft, and the new administration will continue to give top priority to cooperation with Vietnam. The Biden administration could even explore new “areas in which to deepen ties with Vietnam in the economic, political, military, and people-to-people spheres”.

    As far as economic relations, the Vietnam-US bilateral trade has grown significantly from US$ 450 million in 1994 to US$ 75.7 billion in 2019. However, in the last few months, a thorny issue has come up. In October 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative announced an investigation of Vietnam for its large trade surplus with the US. The trade deficit widened to US$ 44.3 billion in the first nine months in 2020, as against US$ 33.96 billion in 2019. It has also been noted that some of it is because of US companies exiting China and setting up new supply chains in Vietnam. However, it is unlikely that trade deficit would have an adverse impact on bilateral relations, which would continue to remain “relatively good under Biden unless complicated by an unexpected upsurge in trade tensions.”

    As far as strategic issues, US-Vietnam defence diplomacy had received impetus under President Trump. The bilateral cooperation in security and defence matters between the two militaries has been at an all-time high. In particular, naval cooperation has been top of the agenda and USS Carl Vinson, a US aircraft carrier, made a historic port call to Da Nang in March 2018. This was significant, given that there had been no such port call by an aircraft carrier to Vietnamese ports since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. Another visit of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt followed this in March 2020, clearly showcasing growing defence cooperation between the US and Vietnam.

    Perhaps what merits attention is that Vietnam strictly adheres to ‘three-no policy’ i.e. no military alliances; no foreign troops stationed on Vietnamese soil; and no partnering with a foreign power to combat another.

    It is important to keep in mind that such port visits are a significant element of naval diplomacy by any navy. Vietnam has welcomed naval, coast guard, and marine patrol vessels from friendly countries. For instance, in 2018 a Japanese submarine and in 2019 a Canadian warship visited Vietnamese ports; likewise, many other navies have made goodwill visits. It dispatches Vietnamese military personnel and vessels for International Fleet Reviews and other similar events. Also, in 2019, Vietnam signed the Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) with the European Union (EU) which will provide it “new opportunities for Vietnam to portray itself as a cooperative and pro-active power through land and maritime missions” and “participate and contribute to EU’s Common Security and Defence (CSDP) missions and operations”

    Perhaps what merits attention is that Vietnam strictly adheres to ‘three-no policy’ i.e. no military alliances; no foreign troops stationed on Vietnamese soil; and no partnering with a foreign power to combat another. In this context, it is useful to recall the visit to Hanoi by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in October 2020. The surprise visit was labelled as an occasion to celebrate the 25th anniversary of diplomatic normalisation of bilateral relations, Pompeo’s tour was also to share with the Vietnamese leaders the US “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) strategy and seek their support.

    There is every reason to believe that Vietnam is unlikely to gravitate towards the US, notwithstanding the fact that its relations with China have been quite rancorous particularly over territorial disputes in the South China Sea, military-naval buildup on the reclaimed features and harassment by Chinese Coast Guard ships of Vietnamese fishing vessels operating in the Paracel Islands including intentional ramming. Vietnam is unlikely to offer affirmation to the US FOIP or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD), a grouping of Australia, India, Japan and US to balance against China.

    We can expect Vietnam to exercise strategic autonomy and its position of ‘not taking sides’ pivoting on its ‘three-no policy’ could prove to be an incentive for the Biden Administration to pursue an enhanced and constructive engagement with Vietnam.

    There are clear signs of contestation between the US and China, which might create Blocks (with the US or with China) that might upset the peace and stability in the region. We can expect Vietnam to exercise strategic autonomy and its position of ‘not taking sides’ pivoting on its ‘three-no policy’ could prove to be an incentive for the Biden Administration to pursue an enhanced and constructive engagement with Vietnam.

    Image Credit: Atlantic Sentinel

  • As the US exits Afghanistan, who is there to tame Taliban?

    As the US exits Afghanistan, who is there to tame Taliban?

    Sometimes, the best way to triumph over an enemy is to quit the game. In an attempt to honour his election campaign promise of bringing the American soldiers back home, President Trump announced the complete withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan and Iraq. About eight thousand six hundred remaining boys in boots will return from Afghanistan by Christmas this year. The Taliban, whom American forces have been fighting for the last two decades, is now a closed-door dialogue partner of the White House. The arch-rivals in the eerie battleground are now facing off each other in opulent hotels.

    In Doha, the Afghan government caught up with the Taliban at the much-awaited intra-Afghan peace talk, held in September. 

    In the two-decade-long war, America has paid enormously in currency, diplomacy, and defence. It has cost the US exchequer almost $2 trillion. Several efforts to bring peace have gone in vain. Ultimately, Washington has successfully brought the Taliban and the Afghan government to talk to each other. The two belligerent parties are now engaged in the tete-a-tete. In Doha, the Afghan government caught up with the Taliban at the much-awaited intra-Afghan peace talk, held in September. Despite several attempts, an agreement between the Taliban and the Afghan government could not take place earlier as the bellicose force never recognized the legitimacy of the elected government in Afghanistan. In the eyes of the Taliban, the incumbent in Kabul remains a puppet government of the Western powers. What contrasts the most between the present administration and the earlier Talibani rule is their diametrically opposite ideologies. Whereas the present system in Afghanistan runs democratically, the Taliban believes in the Islamic Sharia law. The battle is now between democracy and theocracy.

    The ongoing peace process is a continuum of American mediation between the Taliban and the Afghan government since February 2020.  White House is nearing an imminent peace deal with the Taliban as they are no longer deeply interested in Afghanistan. Washington’s priority is now countering China’s growing influence.

    In the previous peace talks, the western states sat with the Taliban, disdaining the Afghan government. Even Russia’s attempts failed to produce any fruitful results in favour of Afghanistan. One of the major reasons for the failure is about diluting the Afghan government authority. The Afghan government never endorsed the efforts of foreign nations in the Afghan peace negotiations, in which the Afghan government itself is side-lined. Afghan government affirmed that any kind of peace deal would not be entertained as the legitimate government was not a part of it as it was a clear violation of Afghan sovereignty.  Afghan government took the issue to the United Nations and accused Pakistan of bypassing it in peace talks with the Taliban.

    a large area of Afghanistan and its people are under the Taliban’s control. The Taliban is collecting taxes from the citizens to exercise their undisputed rule.

    Unlike the previous attempts, the intra-Afghan dialogue has raised much hope among the Afghans, the Government, and the international community. But both parties are likely to face many tough challenges to achieve the desired outcome.  The Taliban has already violated the agreement with the United States that resulted in the death of Afghan civilians and army personnel but stresses that it is continuing with the ceasefire. It is possible that by claiming to maintain the ceasefire the Taliban is trying to put pressure on the Afghan government. Despite this hostile situation, the Afghan government has agreed to negotiate with the Taliban mainly for two reasons. First, most of the International Security Assistance Forces and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces have left Afghanistan. The Afghan security forces have neither the training nor the institutional mechanism to provide security to its people. Second, a large area of Afghanistan and its people are under the Taliban’s control. The Taliban is collecting taxes from the citizens to exercise their undisputed rule.

    Unlike the previous peace processes, the current one does not rely much on foreign countries. But the peace deal is likely to affect Afghanistan’s external relations adversely. If the Taliban reverts to its Islamic radicalism, Afghanistan may lose billions of foreign aid it has been receiving since the last decade for the reconstruction of the country. The Afghan government worries that the premature departure of American troops may have a negative impact on international assistance.

    Although both parties agreed to negotiate on the peace deal, there is dissatisfaction within the cadres of the parties. In the recent elections, the two Presidential contestants each claimed electoral victory. A power-sharing arrangement was concluded where Ashraf Ghani is the President and Abdullah Abdullah exercises power as the chairperson of the High Council for National Reconciliation. On the Taliban side, many leaders do not support the peace process as they believe that they could win the Afghan war by military means. They consider  Pentagon’s departure from Afghanistan as a sign of their victory.

    The Taliban continues to maintain its contact with the Al-Qaeda, according to a UN security council report. The US -Taliban agreement of February demands a complete divorce between the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda.  UN reports and the violation of ceasefire show that the Taliban is not adhering to the agreement. Once the peace deal is completed, the Taliban could take advantage of the absence of US troops in Afghanistan and renege on their commitments by maintaining close ties with the Al Qaeda, Haqqani Network, and the other extremist groups. The training camps of these Islamist terrorist groups are being used by Pakistan based terror outfits like Lashkar and Jaish-e-Mohammed. When Soviet troops left Afghanistan in 1989, insurgency and terrorism increased in Kashmir. It saw a drastic fall when Washington waged war on Taliban and other Islamist extremist groups.

    If the Sharia law returns to Afghanistan, all the democratic rights and the freedom that the Afghan people have seen since the last decade, are likely to be lost.

    The consequences would be grave if the peace deal doesn’t fetch the desired results. The peace deal is necessary for the Afghan government in maintaining peace and stability in Afghanistan. If the Sharia law returns to Afghanistan, all the democratic rights and the freedom that the Afghan people have seen since the last decade, are likely to be lost. Even if a peace deal fructifies, it may not ensure peace for every section of society. During the previous Taliban rule, the fundamental rights of women- ranging from education to employment, were denied. Women had to live a sub-human life. At present, women hold 28 percent of the total seats in the parliament. So, if the Sharia law is enacted again, it will deny the basic rights of Afghan women. Millions of Afghan refugees in neighbouring Iran, Pakistan, and elsewhere in European countries cannot hope to return home. The host countries, however, have started sending back the Afghan refugees forcefully amid instability.

    Afghanistan is a country of over a hundred ethnic groups, tribes, non-Muslims, and other communities. Most ethnic groups have a conflict with each other. In recent times, the Taliban attacked the non-Muslim communities, especially Hindus and Sikhs. The Ministry of External Affairs of India facilitated the travels of a few Hindu families to India. Even after the Afghan government concludes a peace deal with the Taliban, conflicts may continue and peace may still be elusive. The effectiveness of the peace deal will depend on the commitments of each party.

    European countries do not have the military or economic strength to prosecute overseas conflicts. The internal mechanism of NATO is weaker than before. And after the Brexit deal, the fragmented European union lacks the political will to intervene in the war-torn state. China’s interests in Afghanistan are mostly commercial. Infrastructures or projects under Belt and Road Initiative can’t be built amid the carnage. China has the political, financial, and military strength to fill the void, after the complete withdrawal of the US forces. The Chinese financial contribution in Afghanistan is a clear sign that the country has a long-term strategy in the region. This apart, China has security concerns as well in Afghanistan. The rise of extremist movements in Afghanistan is likely to impact security in China, especially in Xinjiang province. In recent years, China has increased its military ties with Afghanistan. In the absence of the American troops, Afghanistan may consider China as possible support.

    Once the US exits, Kabul will have an option to raise the peace issue in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO can be the main military and economic block in Asia. Except for Turkmenistan, all the bordering countries of Afghanistan and other major players in South Asia have either members-status or observer status at the SCO. It can certainly play a very effective role as the peacemaker providing its members, each with considerably different stakes in Afghanistan can get their act together.

    The Taliban in the Afghan government would provide political leverage to Pakistan over India.

    If the Taliban assumes power, India-Afghanistan bonhomie will turn frosty. Unlike other countries, the Indian government never supported the Taliban. India has been a staunch supporter of Afghan-led, Afghan controlled and Afghan-owned peace deal. Pakistan has always been supportive of the Taliban as it serves its strategic interests. The Taliban in the Afghan government would provide political leverage to Pakistan over India. Seeing that it has been left out of the Afghan peace talks, it appears that India is coming around to talk to the Taliban.

    Afghans are exhausted from bloodshed in the last few decades. The region has turned into a breeding ground for Islamic State in Khorasan, Al-Qaeda, and other terrorist groups. A stable and democratic Afghan government is necessary for maintaining peace in the South Asian region. As the effectiveness of SAARC continues to be hampered by India-Pakistan animosity, other South Asian states, Organization of Islamic Cooperation member states, and other Islamic states like Saudi Arabia or Turkey should act to restrain the Taliban and pave the way for peace in Afghanistan.

     

    Image: US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo meets with Taliban’s Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar and members of his negotiating team. Credit: www.voanews.com