The Peninsula Foundation

Category: Internal Security

  • Between the Devil & the Deep Blue Sea: Tackling India’s Internal Security Challenges

    Between the Devil & the Deep Blue Sea: Tackling India’s Internal Security Challenges

    Our ability to develop and prosper, both as a society and a nation, are wholly dependent on the smooth functioning of our democratic institutions and their ability to faithfully uphold the tenets laid down in our Constitution.

    Our progress since Independence has not been without bumps along the road. Not only has the detritus of Partition haunted us, but we have also had to confront antagonistic neighbours intent on grabbing territory, creating divisions and curtailing our economic development and influence around the world. They have tried to do this by resorting to conventional operations, grey zone warfare, including using terrorist groups. In addition, we’ve had to overcome our internal troubles as well, what V.S. Naipaul referred to as a “million mutinies”, rebellions and insurgencies, for the most part, along our border regions. Undertaken by our disaffected citizens, in most cases with external support, aspiring to establish their own independent homelands because of ideological or religious motivations or out of a sense of frustration at being treated as second-class citizens within their own country.

    The response of the State and Central Governments to these internal challenges has invariably been to initially attempt some sort of half-hearted political accommodation or initiative aimed at preserving the status quo and giving themselves political advantage. Once this fails, as it is bound to, the Central Armed Police Forces or the Army are brought in, depending on the levels of violence, to neutralise the insurgency and regain political and administrative control. This can take anywhere from a decade to three or more. The Mizoram Insurgency, for example, commenced in 1966 and was successfully terminated with the agreement being signed between opposing sides in 1986, while the Punjab Insurgency lasted from the mid-80s to the mid-90s, though there are efforts to restart it.

    Unfettered exploitation of natural resources and minerals from those resource-rich regions by large corporations and their political acolytes has led to the displacement of tribals from their homelands and added to their economic woes. Given that the political, security and administrative establishments are wholly compromised and corrupt, the tribals have alleged that they have had little choice but to take up arms in an effort to break the nexus and get their rightful dues.

    We’ve had similar problems in our North-eastern States of Assam, Nagaland, Manipur and Tripura, which continue to persist in fits and starts, aided, and abetted by China. We have also faced a long-running Maoist rebellion in our hinterland, organised and conducted by tribals from those regions. Unfettered exploitation of natural resources and minerals from those resource-rich regions by large corporations and their political acolytes has led to the displacement of tribals from their homelands and added to their economic woes. Given that the political, security and administrative establishments are wholly compromised and corrupt, the tribals have alleged that they have had little choice but to take up arms in an effort to break the nexus and get their rightful dues.

    The issue we seem to have failed to comprehend is the transformation that has taken place in understanding what constitutes the basic elements of national security.

    Fortunately, good sense prevailed within the political and security establishment, and the military, other than limited support in casualty evacuation and surveillance by the Air Force was completely kept out of ant-Maoist operations. The military’s job is not to protect marauding corporates but our sovereignty from the depredations of inimical elements, both internal and external. The dynamics of the Military’s involvement in countering the Maoist insurgency would have undoubtedly had serious repercussions within the military’s functioning, and over a period of time, would have adversely impacted our existing governance structures, much in the manner that some of our neighbours have been so affected. The issue we seem to have failed to comprehend is the transformation that has taken place in understanding what constitutes the basic elements of national security. Until the end of the Cold War and before the advent of globalisation, national security had purely military and economic connotations with the stress on territorial control. This was achieved by controlling the flow of information, goods and services and the movement of people through various means, including physical barriers. The advent of the Info-Tech revolution and the consequent move towards globalisation made it increasingly difficult for governments to control access to and the free flow of information, ideas, digital services, and finances.

    As Professors, Wilson and Donan, note in their book, ‘Border Identities: Nation and State at the International Frontiers’ (UK, Cambridge: University Press, 1998), “International borders are becoming so porous that they no longer fulfil their historical role as barriers to the movement of goods, ideas and people and as markers of the extent of the power of the state.”

    Perforce, governments the world over have been forced into the realisation, for many at great cost, that it has become impossible to lock up people or ideas and isolate them from the global discourse. Thus, in the context of the security of the state, more than just ensuring territorial integrity, it is the security of the people through sustainable human development that is non-negotiable. We are today at a stage where, while traditional physical threats continue to pose serious challenges, especially from China and Pakistan, it is the non-military threats that are more dominant. These arise, on one side, from the host of cross-border insurgencies that afflict us because of ethnic, ideological, economic or religious conflicts, and on the other side, because of policies that emanate from politics of exclusion and economic exploitation. In both cases endemic corruption due to the nexus between the political-bureaucracy-security establishment and criminal elements involved in the smuggling of drugs and weapons and human trafficking remains the common thread. As a result, we not only face the threat of violence but also have to confront the increasing spread of religious radicalization.

    For example, in the Northeast, as my colleagues, Lt Gen J S Bajwa (Retd), Maj Gen N G George (Retd) and I, have pointed out in our paper, ‘Makeover of Rainbow Country: Border Security and connecting the Northeast’ (Manekshaw Paper No 62, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, 2016), “we are faced with a trans-border insurgency affecting our states that has metamorphosed into a serious law and order issue due to trans-national criminal syndicates having established linkages with armed gangs that are opposed to the existing political status-quo. This has also been accentuated with these groups being used by China and Pakistan for meeting their own nefarious designs…. Criminal syndicates have extended their reach to include complete control and dominance over all smuggling activities, be it of small arms, psychotropic drugs, livestock, or human trafficking. This economic clout has enabled them to subvert elements within the political parties, the bureaucracy, and the security establishment….”. Thus, it appears that the defining characteristic of on-going insurgencies is that they are nothing more than “businesses”, using all means at their disposal to make a profit. Thus, we see that has been that they have never crossed the threshold of violence or mass mobilisation that would lead to the next logical phase; from insurgency to civil war, where insurgent forces take on the military in conventional operations. These regions are further adversely impacted by poor governance, ineffective policing, agonisingly slow judicial processes, and unchecked criminal activity. The ability of the local populace to oppose the injustices heaped on them has been very subtly neutralised using the Security Forces and Police with wide ranging powers, including in some regions the use of AFSPA, to maintain the status quo. Our ability to develop and prosper, both as a society and a nation, are wholly dependent on the smooth functioning of our democratic institutions and their ability to faithfully uphold the tenets laid down in our Constitution. This is not feasible without sustained focus on providing high quality of universal education, emphasis on social justice and inclusion and an unvarying commitment to ensuring accountability and the rule of law. Focus on infrastructure development in border areas as well as ensuring free and fair elections, greater accountability and breaking the existing nexus between criminal groups and the local political and administrative establishment and unethical corporate houses. Clearly, all stakeholders have to accept that resorting to the use of force in order to ensure a stable security environment is an unviable option with very limited positives.

    The ability of the local populace to oppose the injustices heaped on them has been very subtly neutralised using the Security Forces and Police with wide ranging powers, including in some regions the use of AFSPA, to maintain the status quo.

    Finally, a word with regard to countering terrorist actions such as the one that targeted Mumbai on 26 November 2008. Much has changed since then with our major cites becoming far less vulnerable thanks to a quantum enhancement of the coastal surveillance infrastructure as well as better coordination, integration and demarcation of responsibilities amongst the stakeholders such as the Indian Navy, Coast Guard, local police and the intelligence agencies. In addition, the establishment of integrated National Security Guards (NSG) hubs in Mumbai and other metropolises ensures much speedier response as well as better coordination with local police and their Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Teams. Efforts have also been directed to enhancing training of personnel and upgrading technical capabilities.

    Unfortunately, politics has played a major spoilsport and two important initiatives planned in the aftermath of the Mumbai attack, the establishment of the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) and its intelligence data exchange architecture (NATGRID) have not fully fructified. There can be little doubt that these initiatives, if pushed through as visualised, would have been of immense utility in ensuring our ability to prevent and respond to terror threats in a timely and effective manner. To conclude, it would be fair to suggest that we face an extremely difficult and challenging internal security environment that is deeply entwined in, and impacted by, our external threat perceptions. Of necessity, we must adopt robust policies, with the requisite capabilities, to be able to respond appropriately so as to be perceived as a ‘hard state’ by our neighbours. This would give us the necessary space andenvironment to push through policies focussing on sustainable human development, which is the only feasible option to ameliorate our internal security challenges.

     

    Feature Image Credit: the diplomat

  • Migrant or native, we are all out of Africa

    Migrant or native, we are all out of Africa

    No human group can make a concerted claim as regards nativism and try to make an ‘other’ an immigrant, foreigner or outsider

    Why, and how, does Mizoram get involved in the ongoing ethnic (and religious) strife that has been on for over three months in Manipur? The Kukis and Zomis in Manipur are ethnically related to the Mizos, the dominant community in Mizoram. The Mizos, in turn, are ethnically related to the Chins in Myanmar and the Kuki-Chins in Bangladesh.

    Together they all belong to the greater Zo community, speak a similar language, have common ancestry and parallels as regards their cultures and traditions. These latter groups are predominantly Christian and hence have a strong bond with the Mizos in Mizoram, a ‘Christian state’, like Nagaland. The Chief Minister of Mizoram, Zoramthanga, is a Mizo.

    In Manipur, the Meiteis, a Hindu community, are the majority and overwhelmingly numerically dominant. But it is interesting that the Meiteis are found in small numbers in Mizoram too, and many have started fleeing from the state. A similar fleeing of the Kukis from Manipur to Mizoram has happened. Also, there are the Naga groups in different pockets of Manipur. The neighbouring state of Nagaland has 17 officially recognised Naga groups.

    It is exasperating, and quite disquieting, to note the presence of ethnic groups that are dominant in one state, being minorities in a neighbouring state. Such existence has given rise to very foreboding situations and added to the already prevailing ethnic conflicts in India’s North-East.

    It is not just that the Indian states in the region share common borders. There are international borders too in the area, as Bangladesh and Myanmar adjoin the Indian states. Different communities/tribes/groups of people have lived in the regions that are the focus of our discussion for aeons. Such inter-state and international habitations of ethnic groups across states/countries are come across elsewhere in the world too.

    One of the most interesting and classic instances of a single ethnic group, who regard themselves as a single nation, and inhabit more than one country, is that of the Bedouin (found in Syria, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Israel, and so on). Such situations come about because free-ranging groups of people, or partially or fully settled groups of people, got divided into different states or countries because of the coming in of boundaries and division of territories.

    What would have been the scenario if these borders between states and countries had not come up? We would undoubtedly have diverse groups living in enclaves, either quite separated or adjoining each other either as small groups or larger ones, but sans the borders dividing them; the question of majority/minority or dominance/subservience would not, probably, have had the same kind of meaning or effect as has happened due to the drawing of borders between states and countries.

    Borders that formed between enclaves of diverse inhabitants and made groups of people dominant and/or majority groups have resulted in hegemony, where the traditions, customs, practices, and mores of that group have gained significance. These traditions and customs prevail extensively when compared to the practices of the smaller groups in that same area. Invariably, the dominant group makes claims to being the ‘original inhabitants’ and the ‘natives’ of the state/country concerned.

    Quite often co-habitants develop similar institutions and social and cultural practices despite the differences and diversity between them, and this is quite apparent in multicultural societies. Amitav Ghosh argues that “it is … the vitality of the place itself that creates commonalities between the people who dwell in it, no matter what their origin” (The Nutmeg’s Curse, page 221). But sadly, it is the differences that often come to the fore, and similarities remain latent.

    Here, it is pertinent for us to dwell on the facets of claims that groups make as regards being the autochthons and natives of a given state/country. By extension, the non-dominant groups are labelled ‘immigrants’, ‘foreigners’, and ‘outsiders’. Prior to ‘Out of Africa’, and the spread of Homo sapiens to the different parts of the world, somewhere between 80,000 and 50,000 years ago, there were no fully evolved human beings in any part of the world. Subsequent to a group of them leaving Africa, different parts of the Earth got populated gradually.

    All the physiognomic and phenotypical differences that we find among humans today, including skin colour, hair texture, and colour of the eyes came about as a result of where people settled.

    To put it tersely, no human group can make a concerted claim as regards nativism and try to make an ‘other’ an immigrant, foreigner or outsider. Ghosh endorses this when he says “Except for one small part of Africa, nowhere on Earth can people be said to be truly native, in the sense of having come into being on that soil” (The Nutmeg’s Curse, page 221).

     

    This article was published earlier in Deccan Herald.

    Feature Image:Kuki women leave after attending a protest against the alleged sexual assault of two tribal women, in Churachandpur district in Manipur. Credit: Retuers Photo

     

  • From Civil Wars to Gang Wars

    From Civil Wars to Gang Wars

    Depending on the context, these uprooted and redundant young people can become terrorists, child soldiers, members of youth gangs that dominate the suburbs from Paris to Rio, drug cartels, mafia gangs, or human traffickers.

    With the end of the Cold War in 1991, interstate war seemed to have said goodbye. But even then, there was no end of history, as Francis Fukuyama had assumed. Instead, interstate war was largely replaced by wars of intervention in weak states and civil wars. At the latest since the war in Ukraine, however, interstate war is back on the agenda and a new arms race has begun – the wars of the present have been nationalized. What is often overlooked, however, is that civil wars have not completely ceased to exist but have been replaced by gang wars. This will be analyzed here using the example of South American gangs, but it applies equally to large parts of Africa, Iraq, or Southeast Asia.

    A Brief Review

    In order to analyze this, a brief review is necessary. After the fall of the USSR, a return to the Middle Ages was diagnosed in security policy, and a return to pre-modern weapon carriers such as child soldiers, warlords, and private security companies. After the attacks of September 11, the fight against a new totalitarianism, this time Islamist, seemed imminent, and the “war on terror” was proclaimed. Meanwhile, China and Russia have re-emerged as serious rivals to the U.S., at least militarily, and a new arms race is on the horizon. The U.S. has been weakened by its lost wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which even the much-vaunted and overestimated military-technological revolution could not stop.

    While in the 19th century the Western states conquered the whole world, in the 20th century the defeated empires and civilizations had to learn to live with the victorious West, and now the resurgent empires and the West have to learn to live with each other.

    Are there long-term trends in this rapid succession of different experiences and analyses of violent events? Two immediately come to mind: the “rise of the others,” as the influential US columnist Fareed Zakaria has called it, that is, the resurgence of the great empires and civilizations submerged by European colonization and US hegemony. These are primarily China and India, but also Russia and the littoral states of the North Pacific. In short, world affairs are shifting from the North Atlantic to the North Pacific. Whereas the entire 20th century was dominated by the North Atlantic littoral states (with the exception of Japan), in the 21st century there are at least two such centers: the North Atlantic littoral states and the North Pacific littoral states.  Here, the United States has the unbeatable geostrategic advantage of being located on both oceans. These former great empires and civilizations have almost one goal: to no longer be considered underdeveloped or backward by the states of the West, but as equals. While in the 19th century the Western states conquered the whole world, in the 20th century the defeated empires and civilizations had to learn to live with the victorious West, and now the resurgent empires and the West have to learn to live with each other.

    more and more people are becoming aware that Western modernity has a Janus face.   What is the hallmark of Western modernity: human rights, democracy and the emancipation of women, or colonialism, racism, two world wars?

    While until well into the 20th century many assumptions were that the values of Western modernity would spread throughout the world, more and more people are becoming aware that Western modernity has a Janus face.   What is the hallmark of Western modernity: human rights, democracy and the emancipation of women, or colonialism, racism, two world wars? And even Auschwitz was not carried out by “barbarians” but by the Germans, of all people, who are often associated abroad with Goethe, Schiller, Bach, Beethoven, and Mozart.  The opposing interpretations either argue that this is regrettable but has nothing to do with the nature of the West. And conversely, critics of the West argue just as one-sidedly that Western values are just empty words, and that the reality of Western politics is characterized by colonialism and racism. And Donald Trump’s current polemic against female Democratic Party politicians with immigrant backgrounds is racist, colonialist, and hostile to women. And the fact that there has been no outcry from the liberal West against this polemic may even indicate a concealed complicity because we Europeans also come to terms with racist and colonialist stereotypes. Donald Trump’s racism can be summed up in the simple formula: Make America white again. People of a different skin color or origin are only tolerated as long as they fit into the new hierarchy.

    Racist polemics like those of the new right in Europe, of White Power in the U.S., or even of Bolsonaro’s movement in Brazil can really only be understood against a backdrop of fundamental insecurity and grievance. The West feels deeply offended that the “others” who were always seen as less developed no longer want to copy it, and full of fear that they could even overtake the West. Fear rules the politics of the West, fear of the end of its feeling of superiority and of the fact that nothing could then be left if one no longer feels superior to the others.  Freely according to the motto: I am nothing, I can do nothing, but I am German – and this shows its ugly grimace in hate speech and violent outbursts. But we are not alone in this respect. For alongside the resurgence of the Others, which is significant in terms of world politics, civil wars around the world are turning into gang wars – the political community is disintegrating into ever new gangs. This has not been adequately perceived in the West until today because we have not been able to describe this process adequately with our conceptual system. In Western thought, the paradigm of Thomas Hobbes from the 17th century is still valid. It states that in a theoretically constructed state of nature, which always occurs when there is no longer a functioning state, the “state of nature” of the “war of all against all” occurs. In this conception, everyone is absolutely free and has a right to everything he can take, provided he has the power to do so. This life, however, according to Hobbes, is full of violence and fear eats the soul. To overcome this self-destructive “state of nature,” all individuals transfer all violence to a single sovereign, who in return provides them with protection and security. In this simple construction the modern state was born, secured by the state monopoly of violence. Here, only the state has a right to legitimately exercise violence, and non-state violence is criminalized.

    Gang Wars

    What is not included in this construction are gangs – groups of mostly young men left over from the civil wars since the end of the Cold War, uprooted in the refugee movements, or who have lost their identity in the dramatic transformation process we trivialize as globalization. Depending on the context, these uprooted and redundant young people can become terrorists, child soldiers, members of youth gangs that dominate the suburbs from Paris to Rio, drug cartels, mafia gangs, or human traffickers. The context varies, but the cause is the same everywhere: these young people feel marginalized, superfluous, and uprooted. Approaches that have analyzed related global violence have almost always emphasized individual violence or violent enrichment. Of course, there are civil war economies, markets of violence, and state collapse, including “new wars” (Kaldor and Münkler) characterized by the privatization and economization of violence and asymmetric warfare against the weakest in societies. In such markets of violence, people are traded first and foremost, and about 79% of them are women and children, but also weapons, drugs, rare earths, and the well-known blood diamonds as a synonym for precious stones. In many countries, however, violent gangs play at least as large a role.

    A characteristic feature of these gangs is that they are not exclusively concerned with private enrichment through violence, but paradoxically give their members a sense of identity and even home through their violence. This paradox is not provided for in our conceptual system for understanding violence.  Islamist terrorism can in no way be attributed to the pursuit of material interests. It is true that the Islamic State also used oil and that the Taliban dominate the opium trade in the Golden Crescent between Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. This only proves that there is a link between political and economic struggles, not that the struggles for recognition and identity in these organizations are economically determined. This means that there is still a link between violence and the market, perhaps it has just become more “invisible”, more visible at the micro level. Macro-violence, on the other hand, is increasingly characterized by struggles for identity and recognition.

    If we say there is a transition to a global war of all against all, I think there is a global transition to gang wars. These may or may not be youth gangs. Drug cartels and mafia organizations can also be based on gang structures. Of course, economic interests play an important role here, but I doubt that cohesion is guaranteed by economic interests alone. One example is the Japanese Yakuza. What are gangs?  A gang is a group that originally formed spontaneously and socializes and integrates its members through fighting and conflict. Typical behaviors include meeting in person, hanging out and occupying public space, traveling in a group, and having a high propensity for conflict – such as rocker groups.

    Many children, adolescents, and young adults in Central and South America are active members of youth gangs called “maras” or “pandillas”.

    The result of this behavior is the development of a distinct tradition, an unreflective internal structure, an esprit de corps, paradoxically solidarity and morality within the group, and a sense of belonging to a unified territory.  The leader must constantly maintain a threatening gesture against his own and also constantly rekindle the waning enthusiasm of his followers; in other words, respect for him must be constantly maintained. Many children, adolescents, and young adults in Central and South America are active members of youth gangs called “maras” or “pandillas”.

    After the end of the civil wars in Nicaragua in 1990, El Salvador in 1992, and Guatemala in 1996, there was a forced migration of illegal immigrants from the U.S. to their home countries, including the deportation of Central American-born members of street gangs formed in the U.S. to their parents’ home countries.  These young people had fled poverty and civil war, formed criminal gangs (maras) primarily on the West Coast of the U.S., and were now forced to return to their home countries, which they may never have seen. Back in Latin America, the mareros regrouped and received a large influx of both young people looking for direction and demobilized security forces and guerrillas (there were about 40,000 of them at the time).

    The most important aspects of a Latin American gang member’s life are honor, drugs, and violence. This is what a pandillero’s entire daily life revolves around, and in most cases, it also determines the when, how, and why of his death. In the gangs, there is a certain code of honor that states that gang solidarity and reputation are more important than anything else.  In a sense, the honor of the gang becomes the transcendence of the members, as the collective as such is religiously exalted and the individual counts for less and less. The individual is obligated to kill unconditionally for the honor of the group or die himself. There is also a paradoxical construction in another point: on the one hand, there is an absolute hierarchy, on the other hand, there is a feeling of being a gang: “We rule the barrio so that no one tells us what to do. If someone does, we silence them. You submit because we are many. We young people rule.  The response of the pandillero in a world where he is nothing is to attack, to dominate the barrio, to submit because he is submitted, to define a territory because he lives in uprootedness, to join an institution that gives identity because he lacks it. The pandillero strives to dominate in an environment that excludes him.

    Whoever belongs to a pandilla must not only master the exercise of violence, but must also be able to accept the suffering of violence. The initiation rituals for men and women are different: men must allow themselves to be beaten by existing members of the gang for a certain period of time, which varies from gang to gang, while women must allow themselves to be raped by any member of the gang. The unimaginable extent of violence in Central American youth gangs is an indication that gangs cannot be attributed to interests alone, for although these interests may be predominant in the exercise of violence, they are unlikely to play a role in voluntary submission to the group, self-sacrifice for it, and endurance of violence. Rather, the recognition by group members of having endured violence is the central aspect of one’s identity and loyalty to the gang. This is the too often overlooked connection between the wars of states and parastatal organizations (IS, Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards) and the violence that takes place on a mass but individual level (Hobbes, war of all against all). They cannot be attributed to either level, but are the intermediate realm, the hybrid between the two.

    Feature Image: Salvadoran left wing revolutionary group Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front

  • Hegemonic Regionalism (Indo-Pacific concept): As opposed to locally based Regional Cooperation (ASEAN and Bay of Bengal)

    Hegemonic Regionalism (Indo-Pacific concept): As opposed to locally based Regional Cooperation (ASEAN and Bay of Bengal)

    The late embracing of the Indo-Pacific concept by the United States further supports the position that it is being employed as a strategic instrument to counter a rising power and a potential challenger to its global quasi-hegemonic power position.

    Based on a consideration of capabilities, the United States is currently the only country that can be described as a potential global hegemon. Certainly, there are a number of other countries that have the potential, based on their capabilities, of being candidates to become regional hegemons. Notably, China is among them, but Japan, India, and Brazil are also potential candidates, though their individual capacities vary widely and one could argue, based on capacities, that China takes the lead among them. With the implication that China becomes the main target of the de facto global hegemon, the other potential contenders must be kept in sight, as well. While most recent academic and non-academic discussions about global power transfer are focusing on rising countries, on potential challengers to the existing global hegemon, China in particular, a focus on how the existing quasi-global hegemon, the United States, is reacting to challenges to its dominance, to preserve its leading position and influence, seems almost completely missing. This lack of emphasis constitutes a rather critical issue, because when we focus on global or regional power competition, what should be of interest to analysts is not only the behaviour and strategy of a rising county, i.e., a potential challenger to an existing hegemon, but also to analyse the response of the existing hegemon, as well. After all, when it comes to issues of global and regional stability, the actions of both the existing hegemon and the potential challenger must be taken into account.

    There is no doubt that an existing hegemon does not just ‘sit back’ and watch when its influence is challenged by a new contender for power. Even a declining hegemon will try to challenge a rising power contender, consequently, the potential for instability within the international system arises not only from a rising power but also from the actions of the country which possesses a quasi-hegemonic position, trying to defend its power position. In one of his earlier and most influential works, Mearsheimer (2001) points out that great powers always aim to maximise their share of power and are in constant competition with other power contenders, with the aim of maximising their own power. Therefore, the rise of a new competitor occurs in a dynamic context between the established and the rising hegemon. Ikenberry (2014) points out that, as the overwhelmingly global power once concentrated within the United States dispersed with the arrival of new power challengers in different parts of the world, new struggles over global rules and institutions are emerging. At the very least, as emphasised by Mearsheimer (2013), great powers do not trust one another, as they worry about other countries’ capabilities and intentions.

    Not without reason, Mearsheimer (2013) argues that the United States did not and does not tolerate peer competitors, adding that the United States has demonstrated this clearly during the twentieth century.

    For these reasons, we cannot expect that a hegemon will stay inactive when watching the rise of potential challengers. An established great power, holding an almost global hegemonic position as the United States does, has the capacity to respond to the challenges arising from power contenders, and there are clear indications, past and present, that it will act to preserve its dominant power position, even within an international system that has become more multilateral in comparison with the Cold War period. Not without reason, Mearsheimer (2013) argues that the United States did not and does not tolerate peer competitors, adding that the United States has demonstrated this clearly during the twentieth century. One just has to remember that in the late 1980s, when Japan was close to economically overtaking the United States. at the global level, various United States administrations actively worked against it, refusing Japan more decision-making rights within international organisations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, even though Japan had become a major donor to both organisations. Obviously, the previous Japanese challenge to the United States’ dominance was only economic. Neither will the United States allow other challengers to succeed in undermining its dominant position, even in distant regional settings. Mearsheimer (2001) reminds us that the dominant power will act at the regional level to ensure that no challenge to its own global position will take place, since the crucial task is to block potential peer competitors, even within distant regional settings.

    When evaluating the influence of a hegemon it is worth remembering that this goes beyond a focus on military capabilities, even though such capabilities are essential, and include the hegemon’s ability to disguise its ambitions and interests by pretending that it provides global public goods, which in reality satisfy primarily its own interests. More importantly, as pointed out by Griffiths, O’Callaghan and Roach (2002), all hegemonic states enjoy ‘structural power’, which permits the hegemon to occupy a central position within its own system, as well as shape other states’ preferences. As emphasised by Kupchan (2014), a hegemon also strives to generate a normative and ideological dominance, in support of its power dominance. Indeed, Gilpin, in his seminal influential work on war and change, emphasises that a major power aims to create social structures to serve its hegemonic interests, consequently supporting its domineering position with rules, institutions, and organisational principles, supporting, indeed screening and protecting, its power position with normative dominance (Gilpin 1981).

    one can also reasonably assume that when a hegemonic country introduces a new geopolitical or regional concept of space, such as the Indo-Pacific framework, will be of foremost importance to its own strategy of dominance. Indeed, the Indo-Pacific framework signals the re-mapping of geopolitical space, with little, if any, historical relevance.

    By considering these arguments describing the behaviour of a typical hegemonic power, it is rather consistent to assume that a country, such as the United States, which holds a nearly global like hegemonic position, will use its position and capabilities to support its own power position in different regional settings so as to ward off any potential competitor. For this reason, one can also reasonably assume that when a hegemonic country introduces a new geopolitical or regional concept of space, such as the Indo-Pacific framework, will be of foremost importance to its own strategy of dominance. Indeed, the Indo-Pacific framework signals the re-mapping of geopolitical space, with little, if any, historical relevance. From a historical perspective, the Indian and Pacific Oceans have been perceived as separate maritime spaces. What marries them into one geopolitical space is an invented geopolitical strategy facilitating the strategic power interests of the existing hegemon. What is more, a hegemon or hegemon-like state will not introduce or favour a new geopolitical concept if it goes against its own strategic interests.

    Indeed, from a United States perspective, the Indo-Pacific strategy not only re-strengthens, at least from a hegemonic perspective, its role within the older geopolitical concept of Asia-Pacific, but now extends this influence, from a conceptual perspective, to include the Indian Ocean, as well. One can further argue that the adoption of the Indo-Pacific approach by the United States comes at a time when we can observe considerable changes in the power configuration within East Asia (which encompasses Northeast and Southeast Asia) and to a lesser extent within South Asia. Certain changes in the regional power configuration, namely the rise of China – not only as an economic but increasingly as a military and especially as a maritime power – generate considerable challenges from the perspective of hegemonic power competition. While the strategic challenge that China, as a rising power, generates to the United States quasi hegemonic position is so far limited to a regional challenge, instead of a global challenge, still, based on hegemony theory, the existing hegemon cannot allow such a challenge to take place.

    The late embracing of the Indo-Pacific concept by the United States further supports the position that it is being employed as a strategic instrument to counter a rising power and a potential challenger to its global quasi-hegemonic power position. We may remember that the origin of the Indo-Pacific concept is associated with the previous Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ concept. Shinzo Abe mentioned it as early as 2007 when addressing the Indian parliament and began frequently restating it from 2016 onwards. This was part of his intention that Japan should take a more active role in East Asia and beyond. As such, the Indo-Pacific concept was born out of the political-strategic considerations of a regional actor within East Asia. Only later, around 2018, did the United States become considerably interested in the concept, at a time when the potential challenges from rising countries increased – not only from China; one may also consider India’s rise in this context. In 2018, the United States administration even changed the name of its Pacific Command to United States Indo-Pacific Command to highlight its changing geopolitical perspective and to address the increasing regional challenges it faced from a rising China. Not without reason was the replacement of the previous Asia-Pacific concept with the Indo-Pacific concept aimed at integrating India, another rising power in Asia, more firmly with the hegemonic interests of the United States. In academic terms, one could argue that this may represent a strategy of accommodation, in which an existing hegemon accommodates a rising power by offering political and strategic space for that country. It is a strategy the United States followed previously with China until China started to become a too fundamental strategic challenge to the United States hierarchic position. One may wonder if this may also happen to India, once India becomes too powerful to be contained within a United States hegemonic project. However, for the time being, India seems to feel quite comfortable within the geopolitical space it has been offered by the existing quasi-global hegemon. As revealed by Paul T.V (2016) the strategy of accommodation is not only quite a challenging undertaking – as the hegemon has to offer political status, leadership responsibilities, and even a sphere of influence to a rising country – but in the long run the implications are that this will weaken, if not undermine, the hegemon’s own position, thus indicating the limitation of such a strategy. After all, a hegemon is rather unwilling to give up its dominant position voluntarily, though a strategy of accommodation may buy some time and allow it to employ a strategy of divide-and-rule by offering support to a potential weaker power contender when addressing the challenges of a more powerful contender. There can be no less doubt that the ongoing border conflicts between India and China and the emerging regional power competition between them facilitate India’s readiness to become increasingly enveloped in a stronger relationship with the United States which, by the way, contradicts India’s previous entrenched national strategy of non-alignment in global power politics. Consequently, drafting India into its power orbit enhances the United States’ strategic influence in regions where it is not even a resident power, like East, Southeast, or South Asia.

    There can be no less doubt that the ongoing border conflicts between India and China and the emerging regional power competition between them facilitate India’s readiness to become increasingly enveloped in a stronger relationship with the United States which, by the way, contradicts India’s previous entrenched national strategy of non-alignment in global power politics.

    Therefore, a hegemonic state will try to manipulate even distant regional settings in its favour, to arrest the rise of potential challengers to its dominant position, even by facilitating the introduction of a new geopolitical concept, like the Indo-Pacific, which ignores local perceptions of regional cooperation dynamics, the Bay of Bengal approach or ASEAN. While there are some claims that the Indo-Pacific approach does not represent a challenge to ASEAN, a position that is widely disputed, the more specific issue is that the Indo-Pacific approach does not contribute or offer support to those local-based regional cooperation processes from a conceptual perspective. Therefore, while one has to recognise that more recent regional cooperation processes within the Bay of Bengal are less dynamic for the time being, it does not mean that such a regional cooperation process is altogether missing. As stated by Amrith (2013), Asian economic connections led to renewed interest in the Bay of Bengal as a focus for regional cooperation. Indeed, BIMSTEC[1] which was established in 1997, does provide focus on regional cooperation.

    BIMSTEC creates political space for economic cooperation by addressing common challenges like underdevelopment. Consequently, offering a strategic vision for national development to its member countries, a focus fundamentally different from the geopolitical outlook of the Indo-Pacific regional hegemonic project, with its focus on military and especially maritime power distribution. Another crucial difference is that, while the Indo-Pacific strategy is a rather recent invention, regional recognition of the Bay of Bengal as a particular and unique geographic location for regional cooperation, particularly as a centre for trade and cultural migration, goes back centuries, if not millennia. As such, the Bay of Bengal commands a rich history as a historically recognised cultural and trade-inspired region. Yet, with geopolitical concepts based on hegemonic interests, such home-grown sources of regional cooperation are not recognised or supported only if they would fit the interests of the hegemon. It is evident that the Indo-Pacific concept, from a conceptual perspective, also ignores the ASEAN regional cooperation process. As such, the Indo-Pacific approach represents an artificial strategic overlay, not linked with local beads regional cooperation dynamics, even when a regional cooperation process is very well established, as is the case with ASEAN. With regard to the Indo-Pacific concept, ASEAN’s statement on the Indo-Pacific (ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific 2019) clearly indicates that the perception of the Indo-Pacific area is a contiguous geographic space is misleading and not appropriate, even though the two geopolitical spaces are geographically connected. Indeed, while the Bay of Bengal and the ASEAN regional cooperation favour regional cooperation characterised by horizontal relationships, facilitating the cooperation of countries within the region to address common challenges, the Indo-Pacific approach represent a vertical power arrangement, where a dominant power is projecting its influence onto the regional level.

    However, it should not come as too much of a surprise that a hegemon’s regional strategy, which primarily focuses on supporting its own power interests, has little to say about regional cooperation processes initiated by the people living in that region. Indeed, a global acting hegemon has only a limited interest in the empowerment of independent regional cooperation projects, since they could signal the creation of a more independent political sphere. As Mearsheimer (2013) asserts, based on its superior standing and its need to defend this position, a hegemon has always an inclination to interfere in and re-order the political outlook of even distant regions. We may take into consideration what Mearsheimer (2013) made earlier, that the United States will ensure that it will dominate the commanding heights in Asia. For all these reasons, the Indo-Pacific approach should be recognised as the newest geopolitical strategy supporting the United States’ hegemonic position in Asia.

    Bibliography

    Mearsheimer, John J (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), W.W Norton & Company: New York

    Mearsheimer, John J (2013) Structural Realism. In: Dunne T, Kurki M., Smith S (eds) International Relations Theories Discipline and Diversity, 3rd ed., Oxford University Press: Oxford. pp. 77-93

    Ikenberry, G. J. (2014) Introduction: power, order, and change in world politics. In: Ikenberry, G. J. (ed.) Power, order, and change in world politics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp.1-16.

    Griffiths, M, O’Callaghan T, Roach S T (2002) International Relations: The Key Concepts 2nd; Martin Griffiths, Routledge

    Kupchan, C. A. (2014) Unpacking hegemony: the social foundations of hierarchical order. In: Ikenberry, G. J. (ed.) Power, order, and change in world politics. Cambridge, University Press Cambridge, pp. 19-60.

    Gilpin, R. (2010) War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

    Paul T.V. (2016) The accommodation of rising powers in world politics. In: Paul, T. V. (ed.) Accommodating rising powers past, present, and future. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 3 32.

    Amrith, S. S. (2013) Crossing the Bay of Bengal: The furies of nature and the fortunes of migrants By Sunil S. Amrith Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific 2019, available at: https://asean.org/asean-outlook-on-the-indo-pacific/

    Notes

    [1] BIMSTEC has seven members: Thailand, Myanmar, Bangladesh, India, Bhutan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.

    Feature Image credit: War on the Rocks

  • Quad 2.0: Can it be a win-win for the four Democracies

    Quad 2.0: Can it be a win-win for the four Democracies

    China’s GDP expanded from USD 6 trillion in 2010 to USD 14.3 trillion in 2019. It has had exponential growth over the last three decades, with an average GDP growth rate of 9.23% from 1989 to 2020. Although the impact of the COVID pandemic pushed its GDP into decline and negative (-6.80%) in the first quarter of 2020, it has rebounded with a growth of 5% in the third quarter. It’s military spending, officially, is more than three times that of India, unofficially maybe five times or more. China has become one of the key players in the Indo-Pacific as a significant part of its economic activities depend on this region.

    The Indo-Pacific has replaced the Trans-Atlantic as the epicentre of global politics. Its importance to the global order is multifarious. In economic terms, one half of the world’s commercial influx goes through the Indo-Pacific sea routes and the Indian Ocean carries two-thirds of global oil shipments. Besides, a few of the biggest military spenders are part of the region. China’s hostile actions and policies have agitated the US, Japan, Australia and India. A shared concern over the expansion of China’s political and military clout was fundamental to the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad 2.0), on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Manila, in 2017.

    Quad is seen as cooperation between four large democracies that share the idea of an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific

    There is growing speculation over what the re-emergence of the Quad means. On the one hand, it is seen as cooperation between four large democracies that share the idea of an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific; on the other, a strategic alliance towards keeping China’s assertive actions in check.

    The Quad: Overcoming Intransigence

    The Quad is a mechanism that enables a dialogue on regional security issues between the four countries. Its revival, this year, reflects an intersection of strategic interests: that of an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific and a rules-based international order. The Quad came together in November for the naval exercise – Exercise Malabar – in two phases, in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. The exercise, in its 24th edition, is the biggest so far and has sent significant strategic signalling to China.

    The Quad should be considered less as a formal alliance and more as a mechanism built on existing bilateral and trilateral partnerships between the four countries. It first emerged as a cooperative response to the 2004 tsunami, when the four navies were involved in providing humanitarian and disaster relief. Despite strong support from Japan and the US to formalise the group, it disbanded with Australia and India backing out in 2007, due to concerns about China’s reaction to the grouping. This gave rise to multilateral partnerships among the four countries.

    Between the four democracies, there are three trilateral and six bilateral partnerships. Trilaterally, Japan, India and Australia first came together in 2015 to discuss shared concerns over maritime security in the Indo-Pacific Region and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. More recently, the three countries agreed to develop a supply chain resilience program for the Indo-Pacific Region amid growing recognition of their excessive, economic reliance on China.

    Bilaterally, the US and India signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) on October 27 that gives India access to American geospatial intelligence that will be useful for precision guidance of its missiles. Further, India-Australia ties have strengthened over the last few years with their initial 2+2 dialogue in 2017 and with Australian participation in India’s Milan exercise in 2018, focusing on interoperability between navies in the region.

    China and the Quad

    Over the years, the Indo-Pacific has emerged as a region of strategic importance. As China expands into the region, its actions have created tensions with the Quad members.

    Sino-Indian relations:  India-China relations have touched rock-bottom since the clashes on the LAC in Ladakh.  China’s intrusions and violations along the LAC have been backed up by significant massing of PLA forces, for the first time in 40 years. India’s strong actions at the LAC and subsequent sanctions and banning of Chinese IT applications have signalled that India is not shy of escalating its response. China’s actions are seen as part of its coercive strategy to India’s refusal to back China on BRI, and its vehement opposition to CPEC. It sees India’s closeness to the USA and its coordination in the Quad as a threat to China’s strategic interests.

    China’s increasing influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has raised India’s concerns. It has always been wary of ties between Beijing and Islamabad, which intensified with the launch of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in 2013. The Chinese-operated Gwadar port off the Arabian Sea in Pakistan, which can be used by the Chinese navy to establish a submarine presence in the region, did not rest well with India. Such a port would also help China with its ‘Malacca Dilemma’. Other ports of such concern are Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Kyaukphyu in Myanmar. Though China claims these ports are of economic significance, these are also militarily strategic ports that give it an advantage in the IOR.

    In light of these issues, a revived and active Quad will benefit India’s strategic interests. The partnership could affect China in two ways. First, China would face increased competition in the IOR from India that now works with strong allies. Second, with the recent imposition of the technology ban, China stands to lose a large market for its products.

     Japan-China relations: Over the past few years, the situation in the South China Sea (SCS) has worsened with China’s land reclamation activities and militarisation of islands. Japan sees the South China Sea as key to its security because of its crucial sea lanes vital to its trade and economic health. It is also wary of China’s ability to influence the energy supply chains, which East Asia is dependent on, and the PLA’s movement in the Indo-Pacific region that could affect regional security.

    Despite its renewed trade with China and the recent signing of the RCEP, increased tensions in the SCS has forced Japan to support revival of the Quad. China’s increased naval and air activities in the South China Sea makes the Quad and its possible expansion into Quad Plus even more relevant for Japan.

    China-Australia relations: Australia backed out of the Quad in 2007 primarily because it was concerned about how China would view it, and the possible impact it might have on their bilateral trade. By 2017, China became Australia’s top export destination, and this trend has continued through 2019, pushing Australia into a dangerous economic dependency with China. Further, Australia’s 2016 White Paper called out China for its coercive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific, identifying the South China Sea and the Southern Pacific as vital strategic regions.

    Australia’s economic dependence on China is high and this is unlikely to change despite the strong statements from prime minister Morrison.  Australia’s strong stand against China is also seen as emanating from American pressure. Australia actively supports Quad as it sees an increasingly powerful China working to change the world order. Australia is also a member of the newly signed RCEP, the new economic grouping that will be dominated by China. While Australia has hedged its economic interests by signing the RCEP, its strategic and security priorities are linked to the Quad.

    China-US relations:  China’s rising military power is now seen as a threat to American power and the liberal world order. Since 2011, American strategies and policies have focussed more on the Indo-Pacific. This shift in focus has strengthened its ties with Japan, Australia and India. Tensions between the US and China have increased since then and the 2018 trade war not only aggravated their relations but also kept the rest of the world on an edge.

    With a strong Quad partnership, the US expects to regain and strengthen its influence in the Indo-Pacific. For China already hit hard by the US trade war, more setbacks will accentuate the problems. Moreover, with a more focused Quad led by the US, China’s efforts to project its power and influence in the Indo-Pacific region will come under pressure.

     Conclusion

     A few aspects about the Quad remain unclear. First, its intent is still uncertain because the respective countries have to evaluate their relations with China if they want to make the bloc official. Second, if it were to be official, to what extent would it serve the interests of the member countries? Third, is the Quad a concert of democracies to contain China? Last, will it coordinate with other members in the Indo-Pacific region, that is will Quad translate into Quad Plus?

    China’s actions have managed to bring the four countries closer.  China, however, has scored a success when the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership), the world’s largest plurilateral trade agreement was signed on November 15th. Both Japan and Australia are members of the RCEP. Many see this as a setback for India and America, and an important building block in a new world order, in which China calls the shots all over Asia. It puts in doubt the viability of SCRI (Supply Chain Resilience Initiative), an effort by Quad members to create an alternative to Chinese domination of supply chains.

    The nature of China’s challenge to the global order and the Indo-Pacific is geoeconomics in design, as evidenced by its Belt and Road Initiative and its recent success in RCEP. The Quad will need to go beyond security cooperation.

    While security and military cooperation will help in checking China’s aggressive approach, it must be recognised that this alone will be an incomplete strategy. The nature of China’s challenge to the global order and the Indo-Pacific is geoeconomics in design, as evidenced by its Belt and Road Initiative and its recent success in RCEP. The Quad will need to go beyond security cooperation.

    The conclusion of RCEP maybe China’s gain, but it is important to recognise the fact that ASEAN is the main driver of RCEP. In attempting to balance China, ASEAN and Japan have kept the door open for India to re-join the RCEP. It is possible that the US, under the Biden presidency, may revive the TPP (now proposed by Japan as CATPP, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership), which could balance the RCEP. The Quad, in this context, will continue to be very relevant for peace and security in the Indo-Pacific.