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  • Dealing with China in 2021 and Beyond

    Dealing with China in 2021 and Beyond

                                                                                                                         TPF Occasional Paper
                                                                                                                                                                            February 2021

    The Current Situation

    As Eastern Ladakh grapples with a severe winter in the aftermath of a violent and tension-filled 2020, much analysis concerning happenings on the India-Tibet border during the previous year has become available internationally and within India. Despite variance in individual perspectives and prognoses, the one issue starkly highlighted is that 2020 marks a turning point in the India-China relationship, which, shorn of diplomatese, has taken a clear adversarial turn.

    Enough debate has taken place over the rationale and timing behind the Chinese action. It suffices to say that given the expansionist mindset of the Xi regime and its aspiration for primacy in Asia and across the world, it was a matter of time before China again employed leverages against India. In 2020 it was calibrated military pressure in an area largely uncontested after 1962, combined with other elements of hard power – heightened activity amongst India’s neighbours and in the Indian Ocean plus visibly enhanced collusivity with Pakistan This, despite platitudes to the contrary aired by certain China watchers inside India, who continued to articulate that existing confidence-building mechanisms (CBMs) would ensure peace on the border and good relations overall. Multiple incidents on the border over the last few years culminating in the loss of 20 Indian lives at Galwan have dispelled such notions.

    Currently, in terms of militarization, the LAC in Eastern Ladakh can vie with the Line of Control (LOC) on the Western border.

    As an immediate consequence, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the arena of conflict in East Ladakh is seeing the heaviest concentration of troops in history, supplemented by fighter jets, utility and attack helicopters, the latest artillery acquisitions, armoured formations, road building teams and an inventory of drones, backed by matching logistics. Currently, in terms of militarization, the LAC in Eastern Ladakh can vie with the Line of Control (LOC) on the Western border.

    Within the country, the perception of China as the principal foe has crystallised. At no other time since 1962 has China come in for such intense scrutiny. Indian public discourse is focused on China, towards interpreting its policies and implications for India and the world – all against the backdrop of international geopolitics churned further by the Covid pandemic.

    China and the World in 2021

    In 2017, President Xi Jinping had given a foretaste of things to come when spelling out his vision during the 19th Party Congress – that China has entered a “new era” where it should take the “centre stage in the world’[1]. In an insightful essay, Jake Sullivan (now National Security Adviser in the Biden administration) and Hal Brands have observed that ‘China has two distinct paths towards achieving this aim’ [2]. The first focuses on building regional primacy as a springboard to global power’ while the second ‘focuses less on building a position of unassailable strength in the Western Pacific than on outflanking the U.S. alliance system and force presence in that region by developing China’s economic, diplomatic, and political influence on a global scale’. In the same piece, the authors sombrely conclude that the US ‘could still lose the competition with China even if it manages to preserve a strong military position in the Western Pacific….softer tools of competition—from providing alternative sources of 5G technology and infrastructure investment to showing competent leadership in tackling global problems—will be just as important as harder tools in dealing with the Chinese challenge…’ [3] These observations are prescient.

    China and the Pandemic. A look at China’s conduct in this context and those of other nations over the last 12 months is instructive. The first aspect is its reaction to worldwide opprobrium for initially mishandling the Corona crisis – reprehensible wolf warrior diplomacy, crude attempts to divert the narrative about the origin of the Virus, unsuccessful mask diplomacy[4] and successfully delaying a WHO sponsored independent investigation into the matter for a full year without any guarantee of transparency. Secondly, it has exploited the covid crisis to strengthen its hold on the South China Sea commencing from March 2020 itself. Some examples are the renaming of 80 islands and geographical features in the Paracel and Spratly islands, commissioning research stations on Fiery Cross Reef and continued encroachment on fishing rights of Indonesia and Vietnam[5], in addition to a host of aggressive actions too numerous to mention, including ramming of vessels. Retaliatory actions from the US have continued, with the Trump administration in its final days sanctioning Chinese firms, officials, and even families for violation of international standards regarding freedom of navigation in January 2021[6]. The outgoing administration delivered the last blow on 19 January, by announcing that the US has determined that China has committed “genocide and crimes against humanity” in its repression of Uighur Muslims in its Xinjiang region[7]. As regards Taiwan, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute had recently forecast that China Taiwan relations will be heading for a crisis in a few weeks’ time,[8] (as borne out by serious muscle-flexing currently underway). If so, it would put the American system of alliances in the region since 1945 squarely to the test.

    Pushback in the Indo Pacific. With China constantly pushing the envelope in its adjoining seas, the Quadrilateral Dialogue, whose existence over the last decade was marked only by a meeting of mid-level officials in Manila in November 2017, has acquired impetus. Initially dismissed as ‘sea foam’ by China, the individual interpretations of roles by each constituent have moved towards congruence, with Australia openly voicing disenchantment with China. Though an alliance is not on the cards, it can be concluded that increased interoperability between militaries of India, Australia, Japan and the US is both as an outcome and driver of this Dialogue, deriving from respective Indo Pacific strategies of member nations. Further expansion of its membership and tie-ups with other regional groupings is the practical route towards an egalitarian, long-lasting and open partnership for providing stability in this contested region. Japan’s expression of interest in joining the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network of the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand[9], is a step in this direction. European nations like Germany, the Netherlands and France have recently declared their Indo Pacific strategies. France has provided the clearest articulation, with the French Ambassador in Delhi spelling out the prevailing sentiment in Europe about China, as ‘ a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival’[10], while further stating that  “when China breaks rules, we have to be very robust and very clear”[11] . A blunt message befitting an Indo Pacific power, reflecting the sentiments of many who are yet to take a position.

    BRI will see major reprioritisation – though its flagship program, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is unlikely to suffer despite disagreements on certain issues between the two countries.

    Slowing of a Behemoth. China’s other driver the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has considerably slowed in 2020. Lee YingHui, a researcher with Nanyang Technological Institute Singapore wrote last September  ‘..in June this year, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that about 20 per cent of the projects under its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) had been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same press briefing, Wang Xiaolong, director-general at the Foreign Ministry’s International Economic Affairs Department, also revealed that a survey by the ministry estimated that some 30 to 40 per cent of projects had been somewhat affected, while approximately 40 per cent of projects were deemed to have seen little adverse impact[12]. Given the parlous condition of economies of client states post Covid-19 with many including Pakistan requesting a renegotiation of loans[13], BRI will see major reprioritisation – though its flagship program, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is unlikely to suffer despite disagreements on certain issues between the two countries.

    Resilient Economy. China’s economy has rebounded fastest in the world, growing at 6.5 % in the final three months of 2020[14]. Despite the rate of annual growth being lowest in 40 years[15], its prominence in global supply chains has ensured some successes, such as the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with the EU in December 2020. The deal, which awaits ratification by the European Parliament is more a diplomatic than an economic win for China, being perceived as detrimental to President Biden’s efforts to rejuvenate the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. China has notched up another win with the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), where it along with 14 Asian countries from ASEAN and others (including Quad members like Australia and Japan)  have agreed on an ‘ integrated market’. Given India’s position on the RCEP, how this agreement pans out and implications for its members will be watched with interest.

    America in the New Year. The Biden Administration’s initial actions reaffirm the bipartisan consensus achieved last year on dealing with China. Comments of  Secretary of State Anthony Blinken that  ‘China presents the “most significant challenge” to the US while India has been a “bipartisan success story” and the new US government may further deepen ties with New Delhi,’[16] were indicative, as were those of Gen Lloyd Austin the Secretary of Defence during his confirmatory hearing[17].  President Biden’s first foreign policy speech on 04 February that ‘America is Back’ have provided further clarity. Earlier, Blinken and Austin had dialled Indian counterparts NSA Doval and Defence minister Rajnath Singh to discuss terrorism, maritime security, cybersecurity and peace and stability in the Indo Pacific.[18]Economically, American interest in joining or providing alternatives to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP, with an 11 nation membership, born out of President Trump’s withdrawal from its previous format, the TPP), will be another determinant in matters of trade with China. Harsh national security challenges will test the new administration’s resolve, as has already happened in the South China Sea over Taiwan where at the time of writing, the USS Theodore Roosevelt is conducting Freedom of Navigation operations[19]. Similar tests will occur over North Korea and Tibet, where the Senate’s passage of the Tibet Policy and Support Act 2020 mandates that decisions regarding the Dalai Lama’s succession be taken exclusively by the Tibetan people and the incumbent. Overall, a sense of how the world including the US will deal with China in 2021 is well captured by Commodore Lalit Kapur of the Delhi Policy Group when he states that ‘ …China has become too unreliable to trust, too powerful and aggressive to ignore and too prosperous, influential and connected to easily decouple from………[20] Going back to the views essayed by Sullivan and Brands, it appears that China is following both paths to achieve its objective, ie Great Power status.

    India and China

    The Early Years  India’s attempt, soon after independence to develop a relationship with China, its ‘civilisational neighbour’ was overshadowed by the new threat to its security as the PLA invaded Tibet in 1950 – effectively removing the buffer between the two large neighbours. Dalai Lama’s flight to India in March 1959, the border clash at Hot Springs in Ladakh six months later and the subsequent 1962 war shattered our illusions of fraternity.  Documents published recently pertaining to the period from 1947 to the War and beyond[21], reveal differences in perception within the Indian government in the run-up to 1962 despite the availability of sufficient facts. This combined with Chinese duplicity and disinformation, Indian domestic and international compulsions resulted in disjointed decision making, leading to the disastrous decision to implement the ‘Forward Policy’ with an unprepared military. A brief period of security cooperation with the US ensued including the signing of a Mutual Defence Agreement.[22] However, the US-China rapprochement of the early 70s and India’s professed non-alignment ensured its diminished status in the great power calculus.

    Reaching Out to China. India’s outreach to China commenced with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988 in the aftermath of the Chinese intrusion at Somdorung Chu in 1986 in Arunachal Pradesh, resulting in a full-fledged standoff which lasted till mid-1987. The consequent push towards normalisation of relations resulted in the September 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas,  the November 1996 Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, followed thereafter by the Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between India and China, of June 2003 and finally the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question of April 2005, signed during the visit of Chinese premier Wen Jiabao, which also saw the India China relationship elevated to a ‘Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity’.

    Despite partially successful attempts to broad base the engagement, territorial sovereignty continued to dominate the India China agenda, as can be observed by the number of agreements signed on border management – with minimal outcomes. It appears now that what can only be construed as diffidence in dealing with China on the border (and other issues) arose not because of misplaced optimism over such agreements, but for several other reasons. Some were structural weaknesses, such as lack of development of the border areas and poor logistics. Others arose because of want of a full-throated consensus on how strong a line to take with a  visibly stronger neighbour  – aggravated by growing economic disparity and the limitations imposed by self-professed non-alignment, especially so in the absence of a powerful ally like the Soviet Union, which had disintegrated by 1991. Also, American support could not be taken for granted, as was the case in the 60s.  Overall, the approach was one of caution. This, coupled with lack of long term border management specialists induced wishful myopia on the matter, which was dispelled periodically by border skirmishes or other impasses, before returning to ‘business as usual’.  

    The extent of Engagement Today. To objectively analyse the relationship, it is important to comprehend the extent of the India China engagement on matters other than security. In the context of trade and industry, a perusal of the website of the Indian embassy in Beijing provides some answers. There is a list of 24 agreements/ MoUs /protocols between the two countries on Science and Technology alone, covering fields as diverse as aeronautics, space technology, health and medicine, meteorology, agricultural sciences, renewable energy, ocean development, water resources, genomics, geology, and others. The Embassy brings out India’s concerns regarding trade including impediments to market access, noting that trade imbalances have been steadily rising, to reach $58.4 billion in 2018, reducing marginally to $56.95 in 2019, a first since 2005. The poor penetration of Indian banks in China, India’s second-largest shareholding (8%) in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and being the largest borrower from the New Investment Bank or NIB, a BRICS bank of which all members have equal shareholding provide an understanding of linkages between the countries in the banking sector[23]. Other areas of cooperation are in petroleum and railways.

    Economic Fallout Post April 2020. After the Galwan incident, India has taken strong measures on the economic front against China, from banning over 250 software applications to a partial ban on various categories of white goods,and the imposition of anti-dumping duties on many others. The Consolidated FDI Policy of the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade dated 15 October 2020, mandates Government scrutiny of every Chinese investment proposal before approval. However, the paradox in the India China relationship is well illustrated by trade figures for the first half of the Financial Year 20-21, where China surpassed the USA to become India’s largest trading partner. India reduced imports from China but exports to China grew by a robust 26.2 per cent at $10.16 billion[24]. Also, conditionalities for borrowing from the AIIB and NIB have resulted in India having to permit Chinese firms to bid for works connected with projects funded by these institutions. Consequently in January this year, the contract for construction of a 5.6 km long underground stretch of the Rapid Rail Transit System in the National Capital Region has been awarded to a Chinese company, Shanghai Tunnel Engineering Company Limited.[25] As noted earlier, decoupling is not easy. Incentives for companies to relocate to India have been announced, with some investment flowing in from Google and Facebook, and plans for Samsung to relocate a factory to NOIDA[26]. Finally, India’s exclusion from the RCEP will also have to be factored in when negotiating a long term trade policy with China.

    However, the paradox in the India China relationship is well illustrated by trade figures for the first half of the Financial Year 20-21, where China surpassed the USA to become India’s largest trading partner.

    Soft Power and Academia. Indian soft power in China remains subservient to harsh security concerns despite oft-quoted historical antecedents. Some elements like Indian cinema continue to be extremely popular. Student exchange programs have taken shape, especially under the aegis of Confucius Institutes which have secured a toehold in some Indian campuses. Following the trend worldwide, their programs are also under scrutiny[27].  The few Indian students in China (less than 25000)[28] have been hit hard by the coronavirus. Overall, given the current state of engagement, employing soft power as an effective tool has limited potential. Exchange of scholars from policy and security think tanks has been a good way of imbibing a sense of the other, resulting in greater awareness. While the trust deficit and reasons for the same have always been highlighted by the Indian side, it has been the general experience that China has been less forthcoming in its responses.

    Building Blocks for a China Policy

    In the middle term, unless there is a concerted and verifiable effort by China, trade with that country will be overshadowed by security issues  (the huge trade imbalance also becoming one of these !). The Indian economy has commenced its post-Covid recovery in the new year. The budget for FY 21-22, trade policies of others like the EU and the US, will impact economic policy, as will national security concerns.

    Immediate security priorities vis a vis China are a mix of the geopolitical and purely military. These can broadly be outlined – safeguarding Indian interests in the Indian Ocean region and the littorals, holding the line in the high Himalayas and ensuring sanctity over Indian skies. The first being both a geopolitical and security matter would leverage all elements of statecraft including the military. The balance two are a direct outcome of India’s military power. These, intertwined with India’s multilateral approach towards cooperation in world fora would form the basis of dealing with China.

    Countries in the neighbourhood other than Pakistan when in distress, look first towards India for relief – natural calamities, food shortages[29], and now the corona vaccine, where Indian generosity remains unsurpassed worldwide. India does not indulge in cheque book diplomacy, nor entice weaker neighbours into debt traps.

    Managing the Neighbourhood. In South Asia, India is primus inter pares due to size, geographical location, resources, capability and potential. Its soft power, economic reach ( while not comparable to China’s) and associated linkages with other countries are huge, at times even considered overwhelming. Countries in the neighbourhood other than Pakistan when in distress, look first towards India for relief – natural calamities, food shortages[29], and now the corona vaccine, where Indian generosity remains unsurpassed worldwide. India does not indulge in cheque book diplomacy, nor entice weaker neighbours into debt traps. Despite ethnic linkages and security concerns resulting sometimes in what is perceived by others as ‘interventionist politics’, India’s respect for its neighbours’ sovereignty is absolute. This is in contrast to China, whose recent interventions in Nepal have led to rallies in front of the Chinese embassy[30]. Its pressure on the NLD government in Myanmar over BRI projects had again not been viewed favourably in that country,[31] though the trajectory that the China-Myanmar relationship now follows remains to be seen, with China attempting to support Myanmar’s military in international fora after the coup[32]. Within South Asia, strengthening delivery mechanisms, sticking to timelines in infrastructure projects, improving connectivity and resolving the myriad issues between neighbours without attempting a zero-sum game with China is the way forward for India, which should play by its considerable strengths. Simultaneously, it must look at growing challenges such as management of Brahmaputra waters and climate change, and leverage these concerns with affected neighbours.

    Strengthening Military Capability. A more direct challenge lies more in the military field,  and in measures necessary to overcome these.  The justifiable rise in military expenditure during the current year would continue or even accelerate. The armed forces are inching towards a mutually agreed road map before implementing large scale organisational reforms. Conceptual clarity on integrated warfighting across the spectrum in multiple domains (including the informational ) is a sine qua non, more so when cyberspace and space domains are concerned. This mandates breaking up silos between the military and other specialist government agencies for optimisation and seamless cooperation. Also, while classical notions of victory have mutated, swift savage border wars as witnessed in Nagorno Karabakh remain live possibilities for India, with open collusion now established between China and Pakistan. As always, the study of the inventory, military capability of the adversary and his likely pattern of operations will yield valuable lessons. The armed forces have to prepare multiple options, to deal with a range of threats from full scale two front wars down to the hybrid, including responses to terrorist acts while ensuring sovereignty across the seas. Network-centric warfare will take centre stage, with information operations being vital for overall success, possibly even defining what constitutes victory.

    Progress has been achieved in these directions. As an example, the first Indian weaponised drone swarm made its debut on Army Day 2021, and visuals of a ‘wingman drone’ underdevelopment have been shown during the Aero India 2021 at Bangalore. The military would be planning for operationalisation, induction, deployment, staffing and human resource aspects of this weapon platform with the nominated service. An estimate of the time required to resolve these issues as also for full-scale production of such systems and larger variants will dictate procurement decisions with respect to other land and air platforms providing similar standoff kinetic effects, and surveillance capability. A concurrent requirement to develop sufficient capability to counter such systems would doubtless be under scrutiny. In this regard, the outcome of the PLA merging its cyber and electronic warfare functions for multiple reasons merits attention.[33] While the Navy’s requirements to dominate the Indian Ocean are well appreciated, a consensus on its future role and the need (or otherwise) for a third aircraft carrier would decide the nature, type and numbers of future naval platforms – unmanned underwater vehicles, submarines, shore/ carrier-based aircraft and others.  With decisions over the Tejas LCA induction finalised, induction of a state of the art platforms from the USA and France over the last few years and hope for the acquisition of new generation indigenous air defence systems[34] on the anvil, the IAF is set to gradually regain its edge. Overall, India’s military has to leverage the latest technology and develop the capability to fight in multiple domains, which its hard-earned experience in third-generation warfighting would complement. With restructuring planned concurrently, each decision will have to be fully informed and thought through – more so when mini faceoffs as has happened at Naku La in Sikkim this month continue to occur.

    A Way Forward

    Traditional Chinese thinking has simultaneously been dismissive and wary of India. In his seminal publication at the turn of the century, Stephen Cohen noted that ‘…from Beijing’s perspective India is a second rank but sometimes threatening state. It poses little threat to China by itself and it can be easily countered but Beijing must be wary of any dramatic increase in Indian power or an alliance between New Delhi and some hostile major state..’[35]  As brought out in this paper, outlines of a grounded long term China policy based on previous experiences and new realities are visible. Rooted primarily in the security dimension followed thereafter by the economic, its success will be predicated on peace and tranquillity on the border, without entering into the trap of competition in either of the two domains. As pointed out by the Minister for External Affairs in his talk to the 13th All India Conference for China Studies this month [36] the India-China relationship has to be based on ‘mutuality…  mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interests ..’. The EAM further noted that ‘expectations…. that life can carry on undisturbed despite the situation at the border, that is simply not realistic. There are discussions underway through various mechanisms on disengagement at the border areas. But if ties are to steady and progress, policies must take into account the learnings of the last three decades’[37].

    Rooted primarily in the security dimension followed thereafter by the economic, its success will be predicated on peace and tranquillity on the border, without entering into the trap of competition in either of the two domains.

    In the same talk, the EAM has laid down eight broad and eminently practical propositions as guidelines for future India-China relations. Most prominent of these is that peace and tranquillity on the border are a must if relations in other spheres are to develop. Also, the need to accept that a multipolar world can have a multipolar Asia as its subset. He stressed that reciprocity is the bedrock of a relationship, and sensitivities to each other’s aspirations, interests and priorities must be respected. Concurrently, management of divergences and differences between two civilizational states should be considered over the long term.

    A China policy crafted on these principles would ensure that India’s concerns vis a vis its neighbour is addressed, within the larger National goal of all-round growth and development of India and its citizens in the 21st Century.

     

    Notes:

    [1] ‘Xi JinPing Heralds New Era of Chinese Power’ Dipanjan Ray Chaudhury, Economic Times 18 October 2017

    [2] ‘China Has Two Paths To Global Domination’ Jake Sullivan,  Hal Brands, Foreign Policy, 22 May 2020

    [3] ibid

    [4] ‘China’s Mask Diplomacy is Faltering.But the US isn’t Doing any better’ Charlie Campbell Time Magazine 03 April 2020

    [5] ‘China’s Renewed Aggression in the South China Sea’ Gateway House Infographic 22 April 2020

    [6] ‘US imposes new sanction on Beijing over South China Sea’  Mint 15 January 2021

    [7] In parting shot, Trump administration declares China’s repression of Uighurs ‘genocide’ Humeyra Pamuk, Reuters 19 January 2021

    [8] ‘Pacific Panic: China-Taiwan relations to reach breaking point in ‘next few weeks’ skynews.com.au 18 January 2021

    [9] ‘Japan wants de facto ‘Six Eyes’ intelligence status: defence chief’ Daishi Abe and Rieko Miki Nikkei Asia 14 August 2020

    [10] ‘Emmanuel Bonne’s interview to the Times of India’ 10 January 2021  Website of the French Embassy in New Delhi

    [11] ‘When China breaks rules, we have to be very robust and clear: French diplomat’ Dinakar Peri, The Hindu 08 January 2021

    [12] ‘COVID-19: The Nail in the Coffin of China’s Belt and Road Initiative?’ Lee YingHui, The Diplomat 28 September 2020

    [13] ibid

    [14] ‘Covid-19: China’s economy picks up, bucking global trend’ BBC.com  18 January 2021

    [15] ibid

    [16] ‘New US govt may look to further deepen ties with India: Blinken’ Elizabeth Roche, The Mint 21 Jan 2021

    [17] ‘What Biden’s Defence Secretary Said About Future Relations With India, Pakistan’ Lalit K Jha, The Wire 20 January 2021

    [18] ‘US NSA speaks to Doval, Def Secretary dials Rajnath’ Krishn Kaushik and Shubhajit Roy Indian Express 27 January 2021

    [19] ‘As China Taiwan tension rises, US warships sail into region’ The Indian Express 25 January 2021

    [20] ‘India and Australia: Partners for Indo Pacific Security and Stability’  Lalit Kapur, Delhi Policy Group Policy Brief Vol. V, Issue 42 December 15, 2020

    [21] ‘India China Relations 1947-2000 A Documentary Study’ (Vol 1 to 5)  Avtar Singh Bhasin   Geetika Publishers New Delhi 2018

    [22] ‘The Tibet Factor in India China Relations’  Rajiv Sikri  Journal of International Affairs , SPRING/SUMMER 2011, Vol. 64, No. 2, pp 60

    [23] Website of the Embassy of India at Beijing   www.eoibeijing.gov.in

    [24] ‘What an irony! Mainland China beats US to be India’s biggest trade partner in H1FY21’  Sumanth Banerji        Business Today 04 December 2020

    [25] ‘Chinese company bags vital contract for first rapid rail project’  Sandeep Dikshit   The Tribune   03 January 2021

    [26] ‘Samsung to invest Rs 4,825 cr to shift China mobile display factory to India’ Danish Khan  Economic Times 11 December 2020

    [27]  ‘The Hindu Explains | What are Confucius Institutes, and why are they under the scanner in India?’

    Ananth Krishnan The Hindu August 09 2020

    [28] ‘23,000 Indian students stare at long wait to return to Chinese campuses’  Sutirtho Patranobis  Hindustan Times  08  September 2020

    [29] ‘Offering non-commercial, humanitarian food assistance to its neighbours: India at WTO’ Press Trust of India 19 December 2020

    [30] ‘Torch rally held in Kathmandu to protest against Chinese interference’ ANI News  30 December 2020

    [31] ‘Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visits Myanmar with aim to speed up BRI projects’  Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury  Economic Times  09 January 2021

    [32] ‘China blocks UNSC condemnation of Myanmar coup’ India Today Web Desk 03 February 2021

    [33] ‘Electronic and Cyber Warfare: A Comparative Analysis of the PLA and the Indian Army’ Kartik Bommankanti ORF Occasional Paper July 2019

    [34] ‘India successfully test fires new generation Akash NG missile’ Ch Sushil Rao  Times of India  25 January 2021

    [35] ‘ India  Emerging Power’  Stephen Philip Cohen   Brookings Institution Press 2001   pp 259

    [36] Keynote Address by External Affairs Minister at the 13th All India Conference of China Studies January 28, 2021

    [37] ibid

     

    Image Credit: Wion  and Trak.in

  • e-SLA and the Delhi Act 2011 (Right of Citizen to Time-bound delivery of Services)- Policy Analysis

    e-SLA and the Delhi Act 2011 (Right of Citizen to Time-bound delivery of Services)- Policy Analysis

    Introduction

    As the functions of the modern welfare state expand and the dependency of citizens on it increases, its services must be delivered in timely manner. To this end, the Delhi government developed a robust policy. Through the Delhi Act of 2011 (Right of Citizen to Time Bound Delivery of Services), referred to as “the Act”, and the Delhi (Right of Citizen to Time Bound Delivery of Services) Rules, 2011 [“the Rules”], it has guaranteed timely delivery of 361 services.[1] Delhi is not the only state to confer such a right. However, in these other states, the enforcement of this right requires physical presence. Delhi has used an e-Service Level Agreement [“e-SLA”] to digitise the entire enforcement process. Digitisation has enabled greater accountability, performance review, and convenience, whilst also reducing the invested time and cost of every stakeholder. Thus, through this e-governance tool, Delhi has developed a ‘new ecology’ for the citizen-state relationship.

    In this paper, I will first provide a primer on both the Act and the e-SLA. In the second section, I will examine the constitutionality of the Act. Last, I will test the Act against the principles of good governance and citizen-centric administration.

    Understanding the Act and e-SLA

    The Act and e-SLA are deeply interrelated. While the Act defines the legal rights, procedures, and obligations, e-SLA is the mechanism for their execution. The Act comprises four major components: defined rights and corresponding liabilities, procedural prescriptions, the delegation of rulemaking, and the monitoring platform.

    Every citizen is conferred with the right to time-bound delivery of services,[2] and a liability of compliance imposed on government servants.[3] In cases of default, the government servant is liable to pay the compensatory cost of ₹10 per day for the period of delay, subject to a maximum of ₹200 per application.[4] Correspondingly, citizens are entitled to recover the compensatory costs.[5]

    The Act makes three different but interrelated procedural prescriptions. First, it provides the appointment process, eligibility criteria, and powers of the “competent officer”.[6] He/she must not be below the rank of Deputy Secretary or its equivalent rank and is empowered to impose a compensatory cost on the defaulting government servant. Second, it establishes the procedure governing fixation of liability.[7] If there is a delay, the aggrieved citizen can approach the competent officer, who immediately pays the cost that has been automatically calculated by e-SLA.[8] At a second stage, the officer issues show-cause notice to the concerned servant. If justifiable grounds exist, then the payment is debited from the government exchequer. Otherwise, it is reimbursed from the concerned servant. Third, it prescribes the appointment process, eligibility criteria, and powers of appellate authority as well as a 30-day time limit for filing an appeal. He/she must not be below the rank of Joint Secretary or its equivalent rank and has final authority on the matter.[9]

    The Act provides for delegation of legislative authority in two senses. There is a power to make rules,[10] and the power to remove difficulties.[11] However, the exercise of these powers is subject to Parliamentary scrutiny.

    It is the duty of departments and local bodies to process the application of every citizen and provide an application number. Furthermore, these authorities are obligated to maintain and update the status of applications online.[12] The e-SLA monitoring system has been designated as an online database.[13] To the government, it provides detailed information on the number of disposed or pending cases, which helps in performance evaluation and corrective measures. To the citizens, it provides online facility to track their applications.[14] The information flow is explained below:

     

    Figure 1: Information flow between government officials under e-SLA

     

    Figure 2: Information flow between government officials and citizens under e-SLA

     

    Constitutionality of the Act

    The Constitution provides certain safeguards to “civil servants”.[15] At the outset, it must be noted that these employees are only a sub-set of the “government servants” defined in the Act.[16] Thus, the applicable scope of protection, if any, is not to the entire class of employees enumerated in the Act, but only to civil servants.

    The legal issue herein is the constitutionality of imposing a compensation cost on the civil servant. This is a two-fold question:

    1. Whether there is the power to impose such a cost?

    Appropriate legislatures are empowered to regulate the service conditions of civil servants.[17] As the cost relates to a service condition (i.e., timely delivery), the Delhi Legislative Assembly was empowered in imposing it.

    1. If so, has this exercise violated any constitutional safeguard?

    However, this power is subject to constitutional safeguards guaranteed under Article 311.[18] The protection offered under Article 311(2) is exhaustive and with specific reference to the imposition of three penalties: dismissal, removal, and demotion.[19] Accordingly, the imposition of compensatory cost on the civil servant is beyond the scope of three-fold protection offered by Article 311. Thus, no constitutional safeguard has been violated herein.

    As the imposition of compensatory cost on the civil servants is both within the power and compliant with safeguards, it is constitutional.

    Testing the Act against principles of Good Governance and Citizen-Centric Administration

    Governance refers to the process of decision-making, and the process of implementing those decisions.[20] Good governance is when these processes are tested against a normative standard. Citizen-centric administration refers to governance that places citizens at the centre of all administrative functions.[21] In this section, I will use the characteristics of good governance and the principles of citizen-centric administration as a collective standard[22] to analyze the process of formation and implementation of the Act, its Rules, and e-SLA.

    Assessing Compliance in Formation and Implementation

    a) Participatory. In the absence of statutory provisions, the administrative authorities are not bound to comply with any procedural norms, including notice and prior consultation with the interested parties. The Delhi Act, 2011 does not provide for any such consultation or ante-natal publicity. In the process of policy-making, there was participation only from the relevant government ministries and departments. The government did not take any active steps to broaden consultation to stakeholders such as the civic society organizations, labour unions, or even the general public.

    The lack of participatory policy-making has directly impacted its awareness and enthusiasm among citizens. It was found that only 50% of the people know that their unique ID can be used to track their applications online. Further, only 15% of the people used their ID to track their application.[23]

    b) Transparency. The e-SLA allows for complete transparency to the citizen as to the status of all his applications. The information is not only easily comprehensible but also accessible. However, the transparency does not extend to releasing statistics of operations to the public domain. Currently, these statistics, such as the figures on the number of applications, pendency, disposal rate, performing/underperforming departments, are accessible only to government officials.[24]

    c) Responsiveness. The e-SLA system does not provide for any feedback mechanism. Thus, there is no avenue for the citizens availing these services to share their experiences. As feedback is the basis on which the system continually improves, this deficiency hinders the potential effectiveness of e-SLA.[25]

    1. Accountability

    The right to time-bound service delivery through the mechanism of compensatory cost has, in theory, ensured that the government and its officials are accountable to citizens. This is buttressed by the fact that the Act seeks to develop a culture of timely delivery among the government servants by additionally punishing habitual offenders and providing cash incentives for those without a single default in a year.[26] However, the liability of government servant has been capped at ₹200, compared to other state legislation that penalizes in thousands. Further, the cash incentives are only up to ₹5000. Thus, the quantum is inadequate to cause attitudinal changes in the servants.

    Moreover, there is no culture among public servants to hold their non-performing colleagues in disrepute.[27] There is no indication that this non-performance is factored into promotions. Anyhow, such public servants are typically complacent and not seeking promotions. The security of their present job and status is adequate incentive to persist with present behaviour. Thus, promotions and reputational loss among peers are not adequate incentives for performance either.

    Furthermore, by releasing all relevant statistics of operations to the public domain, the government can broaden its accountability. These statistics can be used by stakeholders, such as news and media agencies and policy think-tanks, to supplement the government in identifying issues and corrective measures. This would also pressurize the government to be more proactive.

         2.  Consensus orientation

    Through reasonable and extensively deliberated timelines, the Act sufficiently balances the interests of citizens in securing timely delivery with the government’s limited capacity.

         3.  Effectiveness and Efficiency

    The usage of e-governance to guarantee the right to public service is a revolutionary process reform. This must be gauged at two levels:

    • For the citizen, this system has reduced the number of physical visits required, thus saving time and cost. In a survey, 66.6% reported that they are not required to visit government offices more than once after submitting their applications.[28]
    • For the government, it eliminates systemic errors and inefficiencies.[29] The statistics help in assessing performance and preparing corrective action.[30] However, if the system can track internal departmental processes too, it would allow determining the exact level at which service delivery is being delayed. Furthermore, the Act ignores the quality of timely delivered services.[31] To provide a comprehensive right to public service, the legislature must develop standards to assess the quality of services rendered on time.

     

        4.  Equitable and Inclusive

    Under the Act, while the citizen is immediately compensated, the government servant is not immediately penalized for default. The procedure allows him/her to provide justified grounds that could excuse liability. For greater inclusivity, the government can prescribe a pro-rata calculation of the penalty. As the amount is automatically calculated by e-SLA, even complex formulas are acceptable.

       5.  Rule of Law

    The Act provides for a fair legal framework and impartial enforcement.

    Conclusion

    Executing the right to time-bound service delivery through an online portal is truly revolutionary. It has emerged as model legislation for other governments. The Act is constitutionally valid. However, when tested against standards of good governance, this policy suffers from problems of non-participation, transparency, responsiveness, accountability, and effectiveness at the government-level. But it scores par excellence on the principles of consensus orientation, effectiveness at the citizen-level, inclusiveness, and rule of law. To embrace the truly revolutionary potential of this policy, the government must make the suggestions recommended in the last section of the paper, vis-à-vis each principle.

     

    References:

    [1] IANS, ‘245 services brought under Delhi time-bound delivery act’ (Business Standard, 24 August 2014) <https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/245-services-brought-under-delhi-time-bound-delivery-act-114082400707_1.html> accessed 17 January 2021.

    [2] The Act, s. 3.

    [3] The Act, s. 4.

    [4] The Act, s. 7.

    [5] The Act, s. 8.

    [6] The Act, s. 9.

    [7] The Act, s. 10.

    [8] The Rules, r. 4(1).

    [9] The Act, s. 11(1).

    [10] The Act, s. 15.

    [11] The Act, s. 16.

    [12] The Act, s. 5.

    [13] The Rules, r. 2(c).

    [14] Arjun Kapoor & Niranjan Sahoo, India’s Shifting Governance Structure: From Charter of Promises to Services Guarantee (ORF Occasional Paper No 35, 2012).

    [15] Constitution of India 1950, Art. 309, 310, 311.

    [16] The Act, s. 2(g).

    [17] Constitution of India 1950, Art. 309.

    [18] Union of India v. S.P. Sharma (2014) 6 SCC 351.

    [19] Yashomati Ghosh, Textbook on Administrative Law (1st edn, Lexis Nexis 2015) 416.

    [20] UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, ‘What is Good Governance?’ <http://www. unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf>.

    [21] Ghosh (n 19) 14.

    [22] Second Administrative Reforms Commission, Citizen-Centric Administration (Report No 12, 2009) p. 8.

    [23] Audit of Functioning of Government of Delhi’s e-SLA Scheme, by Management Development Institute, Gurgaon (2012).

    [24] Ibid.

    [25] Rohit Sinha, ‘Delivering on service guarantee: A case of Delhi’s e-SLA’ (ORF, 29 December 2012) <https://www.orfonline.org/research/delivering-on-service-guarantee-a-case-of-delhis-e-sla/> accessed 17 January 2021.

    [26] The Act, s. 12.

    [27] Kapoor & Sahoo (n 14); Amit Chandea & Surbhi Bhatia, The Right of Citizens for Time Bound Delivery of Goods and Services and Redressal of their Grievances Bill, 2011 (CCS, 2015) p. 25-26.

    [28] Sinha (n 25).

    [29] Chandea & Bhatia (n 27).

    [30] Ibid.

    [31] Kapoor & Sahoo (n 14).

     

    Image Credit: Forbes India

  • India, China, and Arunachal Pradesh

    India, China, and Arunachal Pradesh

    The satellite picture below brilliantly depicts the geographical separation of Arunachal Pradesh (called Lower Tibet by the Chinese) and Tibet. The McMahon Line more or less runs along the crest line of the Himalayas.

    The Chinese have never been quite explicit on how much of Arunachal they seek.  I once saw an official map displayed in a travel agents office in Lhasa that showed only the Tawang tract as Chinese territory. In other maps they have their border running along the foothills, which means all of Arunachal.

    The Chinese have based their specific claim on the territory on the premise that Tawang was administered from Lhasa, and the contiguous areas owed allegiance to the Dalai Lama, the spiritual and temporal ruler of Tibet. Then the Chinese must also consider this. Sikkim till into the 19th century a vassal of Tibet and Darjeeling was forcibly taken from it by the British! By extending this logic could they realistically stake a claim for Sikkim and Darjeeling? Of course not. It would be preposterous. History has moved on. The times have changed. For the 21st century to be stable 20th century borders must be stable, whatever be our yearnings.

    At the crux of this issue is the larger question of the national identities of the two nations and when and how they evolved. The Imperial India of the Mughals spanned from Afghanistan to Bengal but did not go very much below the Godavari in the South. The Imperial India of the British incorporated all of today’s India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, but had no Afghanistan, not for want of trying. It was the British who for the first time brought Assam into India in 1826 when they defeated Burma and formalized the annexation with the treaty of Yandabo.

    It was only in 1886 that the British first forayed out of the Brahmaputra valley when they sent out a punitive expedition into the Lohit valley in pursuit of marauding tribesmen who began raiding the new tea gardens. Apparently the area was neither under Chinese or Tibetan control for there were no protests either from the Dalai Lama or the Chinese Amban in Lhasa. Soon the British stayed put.

    Tibet remained in self imposed isolation and the race to be first into Lhasa became the greatest challenge for explorers and adventurers in the second half of the 19th century. Not the least among these were the spies of the Survey of India, the legendary pundits. The most renowned of these was the Sarat Chandra Das whose books on Tibet are still avidly read today. As the adventurers, often military officers masquerading as explorers began visiting Tibet the British in India began worrying. Reports that the most well-known of Czarist Russia’s military explorers, Col. Grombchevsky was sighted in Tibet had Lord Curzon, the Governor General of India most worried.

    In 1903 Curzon decided to send a military expedition into Tibet led by Grombchevsky’s old antagonist, Col. Francis Younghusband. A brigade strong mixed force of Gurkhas and Tommies went over the Nathu La into the Chumbi valley and advanced unhindered till Shigatse. A Tibetan military force met them there but offered what can only be described as passive resistance. Not a shot was fired back as the British Indian troops rained bullets on them. It was a forerunner to Jallianwalla Bagh. From Shigatse Younghusband made a leisurely march into Lhasa. The British got the Tibetans to agree to end their isolation and having extracted trade concessions withdrew in 1904, the way they came.

    In 1907 Britain and Russia formally agreed that it was in their interests to leave Tibet “in that state of isolation from which, till recently, she has shown no intention to depart.” It may be of interest to the reader to know that the Great Game nevertheless continued. In 1907 Col. Mannerheim then of the Russian Army, later Field Marshal Mannerheim and first President of Finland, led a horseback expedition from Kyrgyzstan to Harbin on China’s northeast to identify a route for the cavalry.

    The next important year was 1913 when the Tibetans declared independence after the collapse of the Qing dynasty and the establishment of a Republic in China under Sun Yat Sen. They attacked and drove the Chinese garrisons in Tibet into India over the Nathu La. Also in 1913 the British convened the Simla Conference to demarcate the India-Tibet border. The British proposed the 1914 McMahon Line, as we know it. The Tibetans accepted it. The Chinese Amban however initialed the agreement under protest. But his protest seemed mostly about the British negotiating directly with Tibet as a sovereign state and not over the McMahon Line as such.

    Things moved on then. In 1935 at the insistence of Sir Olaf Caroe ICS, then Deputy Secretary in the Foreign Department, the McMahon Line was notified. In 1944 JP Mills ICS established British Indian administration in NEFA, but excluding Tawang which continued to be administered by the Lhasa appointed head lama at Tawang despite the fact that it lay well below the McMahon Line. This was largely because Henry Twynam, the Governor of Assam lost his nerve and did not want to provoke the Tibetans. In 1947 the Dalai Lama (the same gentleman who is now in Dharamshala) sent the newly independent India a note laying claim to some districts in NEFA/Arunachal.

    On October 7, 1950 the Chinese attacked the Tibetans at seven places on their frontier and made known their intention of reasserting control over all of Tibet. As if in response on February 16, 1951 Major Relangnao ‘Bob’ Khating IFAS raised the India tricolor in Tawang and took over the administration of the tract. The point of this narration is to bring home the fact that India’s claim over Arunachal Pradesh doesn’t rest on any great historical tradition or cultural affinity. We are there because the British went there. But then the Chinese have no basis whatsoever to stake a claim, besides a few dreamy cartographic enlargements of the notion of China among some of the hangers-on in the Qing emperor’s court. The important thing now is that we have been there for over a hundred years and that settles the issue.

    Arunachal Pradesh has a very interesting population mix. Only less than 10% of its population is Tibetan. Indo-Mongoloid tribes account for 68% of the population. The rest are migrants from Nagaland and Assam. As far as religious affinities go Hindus are the biggest group with 37%, followed by 36% animists, 13% Buddhists. Recent census figures suggest a spurt in Christianity, possibly induced by pocketbook proselytizing. In all there are 21 major tribal groups and over 100 ethnically distinct sub-groupings, speaking over 50 distinct languages and dialects. The population of about a million is spread out over 17 towns and 3649 villages. With the exception of a few villages of Monpas who live north of the McMahon Line, it is an ethnically compact and contiguous area.

    In fact in future boundary negotiations India could make a case for inclusion of the few Monpa villages left behind north of the McMahon Line? Many knowledgeable observers suggest that the area south of the Huangpo/Brahmaputra from the Pemako gorge till it enters the Subansiri division of Arunachal would be a logical boundary as the raging and hence un-fordable and unbridgeable river ensures hardly any Chinese administrative presence in the area.

    It is true that historically India never had a direct border with Tibet till the British took Kumaon and Garhwal from Nepal in 1846 and extended its domain over Arunachal in 1886. On the other hand the formidable Himalayas were always culturally a part of India and formed a natural barrier against ingress from the north, whether Tibetan or Chinese. But times have moved and technology and mankind’s great engineering powers now make it possible for even the most hostile terrain to be subjugated. The Himalayas are no longer the barrier they once were. As China and India emerge as the world’s great economies and powers can India possibly allow China a strategic trans-Himalayan space just a few miles from the plains?

    The view from the Chinese side about what exactly constitutes China is no less confused. Apparently like the British, the Manchu’s who ruled China from the 17th to the early 20th century had a policy of staking claim to the lands that lay ahead of their frontiers in order to provide themselves with military buffers. In a recent article in the China Review magazine, Professor Ge Jianxiong, Director of the Institute of Chinese Historical Geography at Fudan University in Shanghai writes: “to claim that Tibet has always been a part of China since the Tang dynasty; the fact that the Qinghai-Tibetan plateau subsequently became a part of the Chinese dynasties does not substantiate such a claim.” Ge also notes that prior to 1912 when the Republic of China was established the idea of China was not clearly conceptualized. Even during the late Qing period (Manchu) the term China would on occasion refer to the Qing state including all the territory that fell within the boundaries of the Qing Empire. At other times it would be taken to refer to only the eighteen interior provinces excluding Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang.

    Professor Ge further adds that the notions of “Greater China” were based entirely on the “one-sided views of Qing court records that were written for the courts self-aggrandizement.” Ge criticizes those who feel that the more they exaggerate the territory of historical China the more “patriotic” they are. In this context I would like to recall a recent conversation I had with the then Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Yuxi. Ambassador Sun said that while he was soundly castigated in India for his unintended comment, he gained a major constituency in China. The mandarins in the Beijing would do well to take heed to Ge Jianxiong’s advice: “If China really wishes to rise peacefully and be on solid footing in the future, we must understand the sum of our history and learn from our experiences.” The same holds true for the babus in South Block and ‘the having writ move on’ media pundits. If we don’t then we know who will be laughing!

     

    Image Credit: Tawang Monastery

  • History – Thailand’s Golden Buddha

    History – Thailand’s Golden Buddha

    In the month of May 2007 I was invited to speak at the Mahidol University of Bangkok during the SSEASR Conference. I gave a talk on Yogachara Buddhism there. During this occasion, I had the opportunity to visit various Buddhist temples at Bangkok. They include the magnificent ones like Emerald Buddha, Golden Buddha, Buddha in his Maha nirvana time etc. It is very interesting to note that in the Sanctum Sanctorum of all Buddha temples, while the right side wall is covered with pictures depicting instances in Buddha’s life, the left side has paintings exclusively from Ramayana. For a Thai devotee, Hinduism is as important as Mahayana Buddhism.

    During the visit of one of the temple, I learnt this great truth about ignorance obscuring Reality.

    One of these famous temples has a Buddha icon nearly 17 feet tall, which is known till the beginning of 20th century as “Terracotta Buddha temple” . The temple was established in the 13th century with its huge icon of Buddha, for several centuries it was worshipped by the devotees as “Terracotta Buddha”. One day the authorities decided to shift the Terracotta Buddha image to a place several kilometers away, probably to do some repairs to the temple. They put the Terracotta Buddha on a truck and were moving it. When they were half way through, a heavy downpour started. The rain was so heavy that the clay image of Buddha started dissolving. They tried to protect the image with tarpaulins and umbrellas, but to no effect. There was a very heavy wind which blew away the tarpaulins and umbrellas. Due to the heavy rain, the Buddha icon in clay was dissolving fast. The devotees were grief-stricken. They were wondering whether it would have been wiser to have left the temple un-repaired rather than allowing the centuries old terracotta Buddha icon to get dissolved in the heavy downpour.

     

    Presto! A wonderful thing was happening. As the clay was dissolving, from within the clay was emerging a golden Buddha idol! as the idol there was of clay. After a short while all the clay, which was covering the idol got completely dissolved. The people were witnessing the presence of a resplendent “Golden Buddha” appearing before them in all its grandeur.

    What really happened? It was really a golden Buddha at the time of its installation in the 13th century. After some time Thailand was experiencing foreign invasions. Fearing that the invaders would take away the golden image, which was 5.5 tons of solid gold, the devotees covered the image with clay. Thinking that it was only a Terracotta Buddha, the invaders left it untouched. That generation knowing that it was a golden Buddha inside the clay, worshipped Buddha in that form. As many years passed by, the subsequent generations were not aware of this fact. They truly believed in what they saw externally and worshipped it as a Terracotta Buddha only. Thus their minds were conditioned by externalities. Once the clay dissolved what is truly inside came out with all its effulgence. It is today worshipped as the golden Buddha in Bangkok.

    It is happening to all of us everyday, we assume ourselves to be only a body-mind-intellect complex and nothing beyond it. We are conditioned by our awareness of our body, our thinking process and our analysis of the phenomena. These are only externalities within each one of us. It is only a clay that surrounds the wonderful Immanence within us. Within each one of us is the golden Buddha, the great immanent Lord who is also transcendent, he is the great Shiva, who is constantly performing his cosmic dance. In our hearts we not aware of it as our minds are conditioned by what we see, do and think. It is like the Thais seeing only the clay image and concluding it as only terracotta Buddha. As the rain dissolved the clay, the golden icon which is the true-one inside is revealed. Likewise when the spiritual sadhaha and devotion dissolves our mental conditioning, the Lord within ourselves is also revealed. This is the lesson we learn from the Golden Buddha temple.

    The same idea is beautifully explained in Thirumoolar’s Thirumantiram. A sculptor has carved out a beautiful elephant from a block of wood. When you see it as an elephant, you do not see the underlying reality of the wood. When you will be able to see the substratum, the underlying reality of the wood, with which all the objects of carving are made, you do not see the carved elephant; you see the substratum of the wood. Likewise, the ignorance enveloping our minds obscure the ultimate reality within us, when we are graded by the body-mind-intellect complex. When the revelation comes to us through god’s grace and gurus’ teachings coupled with our devotion to Him, the conditioning disappears. The phenomena abide in the ultimate. We experience the Divinity within us.

    Even in the area of management, the story of Golden Buddha has a great relevance. A competent Manager, with a penetrating mind, should be able to see what is the reality hidden in the numerous external information. The external covering only obscures the truth, which you will be able to get through. Once you see the substratum, the ultimate truth is revealed.

     

    Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons

  • Revamping PSUs in India – is Disinvestment the only way forward?

    Revamping PSUs in India – is Disinvestment the only way forward?

    Back in 1948 when India’s first Public Sector Unit (Indian Telephone Industries) was established, India was a newly independent agrarian economy with a weak industrial base. It was clear that the country needed to embark on a path of rapid industrialization if it was to improve the economic status and standards of living. The need was felt for large scale investment from the public sector that private players could not provide. It was in this backdrop that PSUs were first established in the country. It was envisioned that these state-run entities would jumpstart industrialization and spearhead development.

    Today, almost 70 years later, the country itself has come a long way. Once seen as the knights in shining armour come to rescue India’s economy, the same PSUs have come under fire for squandering crores of taxpayer money today. Far removed from their past glories, PSUs today are a cesspool of unproductivity where taxpayer money dies a slow painful death. The sorry state of PSUs in India has even warranted nicknames in the likes of ‘Zombie Companies’ and ‘Zombieland of Taxpayer Money’. While these nomenclatures may seem extreme, they are not without merit.

    The combined loss of these PSU’s amounts to over Rs. 31,635 crores in taxpayer money [1]. What’s more, this number is not inclusive of the losses reported by the dozen public sector banks, which would only add to the already huge mountain of debt.

    Current State of PSU’s in India

    Back in 1951, there were only 5 public sector enterprises in existence. Since then the government has gone on a spending spree, entering more and more businesses over the years. Today the government runs more than 300 PSUs across a plethora of industries ranging from hotels & watches to telecom and steel. It doesn’t come as a surprise that over 70 of these entities are running a net loss. The combined loss of these PSU’s amounts to over Rs. 31,635 crores in taxpayer money [1]. What’s more, this number is not inclusive of the losses reported by the dozen public sector banks, which would only add to the already huge mountain of debt. If the central public sector enterprises have fared poorly, the state-level public enterprises (SLPE) paint a bleaker picture. Barring certain states, the SLPEs of almost all the states in India report a net loss. The losses reported by these SLPEs are almost 3 times greater than the amount reported by their central counterparts.

    The PSUs which have not reported a net loss has not escaped public scrutiny either, with almost all of them losing value over the last decade. While some do report profits, their returns have been dwindling, save a few. The rate of return on capital employed (ROCE), widely used as a measure of profitability and efficiency, has been on a downward trend for PSUs. It has been reported that PSU efficiency has fallen by over 50% in the last decade [2]. In the last six years alone the total market cap of all public sector firms and banks fell by 36% even as the market cap of all BSE and NSE listed companies have almost doubled in the same period [3]. 

    The bad news is that this dismal performance of PSUs is only going to get worse, especially given the current economic climate. Despite years of turnaround efforts and crores of bailout money, these state-run entities have shown no signs of recovery, save a few. In this light, much of the discourse around PSUs has been focused on disinvestment. The government too seems to echo this sentiment as it has chosen to embark upon a long-drawn journey of divesting its holdings. Several sectors in India are already heading towards 100% privatization. With the sale of Air India, the civil aviation industry will become fully private. In the power sector, there has been a growing emphasis on private generation, with the centre reducing its stake in NTPC and BHEL. Sooner or later this sector is also headed for 100% privatization. In other sectors like telecom and health, the government has just a token presence, with much of the market being dominated by private players.

    Push for Privatization

    This push for privatization is welcome and much needed in sectors like civil aviation which lack strategic importance. The sorry state of Air India has made clear that the government simply cannot compete with private players in a highly commercialised industry like aviation. Air India in particular has been languishing for years and has eroded crores of taxpayer money in the process. This has been the case not just for India but for other developing economies like Brazil and Malaysia as well. Malaysia has been trying to turn around Malaysia Airlines for decades altogether with no end in sight. After years of struggle, it seems the government has finally decided to change tracks as it is now looking to give up its majority stake in the airline to private investors. The case with Brazil is no different – the failing national aerospace conglomerate Embraer was revived just in time with a dose of privatization.

    The Embraer turnaround model in particular offers some interesting lessons for India. What started off as a government entity in 1969 was privatised in 1994 in order to avoid bankruptcy [4]. Embraer then went from near bankruptcy to becoming the third-largest aircraft manufacturer in the world. What’s striking here is that the Brazilian government played its cards to near perfection – while it completely privatized the airline, the Brazilian government still holds a ‘golden share’ in Embraer giving it veto power over strategic decisions involving military programs and any change in its controlling interest. This model ensured a win-win situation for the Brazilian government and the rest, of course, is history. 

    Instead of divesting its bleeding PSU’s, the government is currently in the process of selling its 100% stake in 3 large profitable companies (BPCL, CCI, and the Shipping Corporation). While it’s tempting to believe this is a part of an extensive government masterplan, the stark reality is that the government has let fiscal pressures dictate its divestment strategy.

    The problem with the centre’s current disinvestment strategy, however, is that it is focused merely on balancing government books and lacks a long-term strategic vision. Instead of divesting its bleeding PSU’s, the government is currently in the process of selling its 100% stake in 3 large profitable companies (BPCL, CCI, and the Shipping Corporation). While it’s tempting to believe this is a part of an extensive government masterplan, the stark reality is that the government has let fiscal pressures dictate its divestment strategy. It appears the government is simply selling its stake in PSUs to make quick money and ease the fiscal books. There are also concerns that 100% privatization of entities like BPCL and HPCL will feed private monopoly and leave India’s energy security purely in the hands of private players. Even in the sale of loss-making entities the government has lacked a systematic plan, with divestment being carried out in penny packets. This sort of disinvestment just to stop the bleeding is a short term stop-gap measure and will surely have long term repercussions. 

    The case for Public Sector Presence

    While privatization plays are much needed in sectors like civil aviation, the same cannot be said for strategic sectors such as power, pharma, and health. A diluted public sector presence in strategic industries may not bode well for the economy, especially for a developing country like India. As the COVID-19 pandemic has shown, strong public systems are essential to absorbing global shocks. While proponents of disinvestment seek to cut the economic costs of bleeding PSUs, they often ignore the social costs involved in the process and the impact it will have on a developing economy like ours.

    In light of the current global economic climate, as more and more countries turn inward, the role of state-run entities has become all the more important. The experiences of other Asian economies like China and Singapore have shown that state-run units could be tools of economic growth if utilised effectively. Most of China’s industrial push, including the recent ‘Made in China 2025’ plan has been heralded by State-Owned Enterprises (SOE’s). Among the 124 Chinese companies in the Fortune Global 500 list, more than half were SOE’s [5]. Out of these, 3 of the Chinese SOE’s feature in the top 5 globally, speaking volumes of the role they have played in the growth of the country. China has effectively put SOE’s at the core of its vision to combat the challenges it currently faces, including the escalating trade war with the USA. China’s model is also noteworthy given the level of collaborative investments between SOE’s and private players. India can take a leaf or two out of China’s book on the successful use of SOE’s to drive its growth story.

    Turning around existing PSU’s – success stories 

    It is clear that the government simply cannot take the easy way out of simply divesting and washing its hands off the bleeding PSUs. In certain critical sectors (that first need to be recognized in line with the long-term strategy) the government still needs to work on repairing the damage and turning around its existing underperformers. While the task seems impossible given the current state of affairs, policymakers can take heart from the fact that it has been done before both in India and globally.

    One such global success story is that of the Kiwi national carrier Air New Zealand. In a world of post-privatization success stories, Air NZ stands out as one of the few lone dissenters to buck this trend. The NZ based company, privatised by the government in 1989, had to be re-nationalised again in 2001 after it ran into financial troubles. The fortunes of the New Zealand economy have been closely tied to that of Air NZ, with the country being heavily dependent on local and international tourism. Within just two years of nationalisation Air NZ was able to fashion a comeback from near ruin, and today is one of the biggest revenue earners for the NZ government. That a company that failed in private hands was able to be revived by the government offers a beacon of hope for struggling public enterprises worldwide.

    Back home in India as well such success stories do exist, albeit in a bygone era. Aptly recognised as one of the greatest public sector managers of India, Dr. V. Krishnamurthy is the mastermind behind these success stories. His unparalleled contributions to the public sector have earned him several monikers such as ‘the helmsman’ and ‘the man with the golden touch’. He has been largely credited with successfully turning around public sector giants like BHEL, SAIL, GAIL, and Maruti. At a time when public sector turnarounds were unheard of in India, Dr. Krishnamurthy managed to increase profits of BHEL from 17 crore rupees to 57 crores during his five-year tenure [6]. He also came to be widely regarded as the ‘Steel Man of India’ after his successful turnaround of SAIL in the late 1980s. 

    At Maruti he decided to take a different approach, inviting private sector participation through a JV. While many skeptics were against this move initially, the helmsman had the last laugh as Maruti went on to dominate the automobile market in India for decades. Maruti’s turnaround story is also a shining example of the merits of public-private collaboration – something which today’s policymakers have chosen to largely overlook. Maruti today is a 100% private company and is widely credited with creating the automobile industry revolution in India. 

    Way Forward – a two-pronged approach to fix PSU’s

    While such success stories may be scant and the field is mired with accounts of public failure, it is evident that such turnarounds are not impossible. As we have seen from the examples in India and elsewhere, with the right leadership any enterprise can be pulled out of the mud. What is clear is that there is no simple one size fits all answer to the woes of PSU’s in India. Several countries have taken different approaches to tackle this issue. While China has followed a model of strong public presence in several industries, countries like the USA hardly have a public sector presence. The United States government rather exercises its presence by closely regulating and monitoring the industry through effective policy mechanisms.  Other countries like Singapore have chosen to manage PSUs through sovereign funds and holding companies. Singapore plays in the public sector via its two sovereign funds, Temasek and GIC. The companies owned by these funds operate as commercial entities and are no different from private players. Such a model has ensured that the companies get the best of both worlds – public ownership but with private, commercial management.

    countries like Singapore have chosen to manage PSUs through sovereign funds and holding companies. Singapore plays in the public sector via its two sovereign funds, Temasek and GIC.

    While there are many such different models that India can take inspiration from, the verdict is clear that the government must stop the bleeding in the public sector quickly or face the wrath of taxpayers. Going forward, the government must adopt a two-pronged approach to fix PSUs – some need to be killed, while others deserve a chance at resurrection.

    Firstly, the government needs to shut down bleeding enterprises in sectors that have no strategic relevance. The government is present in sectors like biofuel, airlines, hotels, and watches despite making heavy losses every year. Public entities simply cannot compete in these industries nor is there any strategic need to do so. The logical step for the government would be to send these entities to the graveyard and stop the bleeding.

    The top 10 loss making PSU’s account for over 94% of the overall losses reported by all PSU’s together.

    Secondly, efforts must be made to turnaround/transform remaining entities in strategic sectors. The top 10 loss making PSU’s account for over 94% of the overall losses reported by all PSUs together. These large offenders would be the best places to start – the government would do well to either transform these entities in-house through fresh leadership or by inviting private partnerships.

    The above tasks are easier said than done and may take years of policy reform to become a reality. While the problem does seem formidable, it is not unique to India alone. Several economies around the world, developing and developed alike, are grappling with the issue of falling public sector productivity and the need to stay relevant. Indian policymakers and public sector managers have a long road ahead of them, especially given the current global socio-economic scenario. But they can definitely take inspiration (and some valuable lessons) from the several public sector turnaround stories globally and from India’s great helmsman himself.

     

    References

    [1] Department of Public Enterprises. (2019). Public Enterprises Survey 2018-19 (Volume 1, Statement 1). Retrieved from https://dpe.gov.in/public-enterprises-survey-2018-19

    [2] Rai, D. (2019, September 11). PSU returns fell 50% in the past decade; 44 new entities created. Business Today. https://www.businesstoday.in/current/corporate/in-depth-government-companies-almost-lost-half-of-their-efficiency-in-last-10-years/story/378508.html

    [3] How PSU’s market cap fell by 36% in 6 years under Modi govt, while stock market doubled theirs. (2020, October 30). The Print. https://theprint.in/opinion/how-psus-market-cap-fell-by-36-in-6-years-under-modi-govt-while-stock-market-doubled-theirs/533743/

    [4] Haynes, B & Boadle, A. Boeing willing to preserve Brazil’s ‘golden share’ in Embraer deal. (2018, January 19). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-embraer-m-a-boeing-idUSKBN1F72XB

    [5] Fortune. (2020). Fortune Global 500 2020. Retrieved from https://fortune.com/global500/

    [6] Nayar, L. V. Krishnamurthy, SAIL, BHEL, Maruti. (20187, March 23). Outlook India. https://magazine.outlookindia.com/story/v-krishnamurthy-sail-bhel-maruti/298634

     

  • Contemporary and Upcoming Issues In the Field of Intellectual Property Rights

    Contemporary and Upcoming Issues In the Field of Intellectual Property Rights

    1.1   Contemporary Issues: IP Awareness and Drug Price Caps

    1.1.1. Introduction

    The realm of intellectual property (IP) rights has been in existence and been a driving force for novelty and innovation for centuries and can be dated back to at least 500 BC when a state in Greece provided protection for 1 year to innovators of ‘a new refinement in luxury’, ensuring innovators can monopolize and reap benefits out of their innovations.[i] That being the case, the first international convention (known as the ‘Paris Convention’) was enforced much later in the year 1883, establishing a union for the protection of ‘industrial property’. Since then, we have seen rapid growth in the field of IP rights. It goes without saying that till the time entrepreneurs are incorporating companies, innovators are inventing technology or artists are creating their works of art and/or literature, the domain of IP will only progress further.

    Although the evolution of international IP regime has been rapid and the laws have become a lot more complicated than they initially were, it appears that we have only scratched the surface of the extent and reach of IP rights. It cannot be stressed enough that IP rights are crucial to every company, creator and inventor since it ensures that their rights and interests are protected and gives them the right to claim relief against any violation.

    Insofar as the Indian IP regime is concerned, we have seen a gradual but crucial development in our laws which has now motivated not only foreign corporations to seek IP protection in India but has also supported start-ups in seeking protection of their IP to the extent that these enterprises have the liberty to seek the protection of their IP at significantly reduced fees (barring copyright and geographical indications). The Indian Intellectual Property Office (IPO) has also taken measures to promote e-filing by reducing costs associated therewith and improving its e-filing system/mechanism. However, the issues arise when start-ups and small enterprises seek to register their IP and are unaware of these common, but cost-effective mechanisms in place.

    Besides, our intellectual property policies (especially patent policies) have been a subject matter of criticism for a long time at a global stage due to the government’s intervention in the enforcement of patent rights. One of the primary concerns for foreign corporations and organizations have been related to working of patented inventions in India and the issue of compulsory licensing.

    1.1.2. Lack of Awareness of Intellectual Property Rights

    Launched by the Government of India in 2014, the ‘Make in India’ project has motivated entrepreneurs to establish their business with the help of government funding and foreign direct investments (FDI) of up to 100%.[ii] This step has led to a boost in people exploiting their entrepreneurial skills to establish a successful business (in most cases). Although the Make in India project also focuses on the importance of IP rights by attempting to educate the entrepreneurial minds of the importance and benefits of their IP, it appears that small businesses are yet to benefit from the IP aspect of the project. These businesses/start-ups do not realize the importance of their IP and tend to often misuse violate another’s. This leads to the institution of a lawsuit seeking infringement (or passing off) against such businesses by big corporations and since defending such Suits is an expensive and time-consuming process, it becomes an uphill task for the entrepreneurs to defend the Suits and run their business effectively. Entrepreneurs are often misinformed and miseducated of the basics of IP by professionals who do not have an expertise in the area of IP law, which leads them to believe that their acts of adopting an identical or deceptively similar trademark would go unnoticed or would not constitute infringement or passing off. Due to their lack of knowledge in the domain of IP and lack of proper guidance by professionals, these entrepreneurs tend to believe that: –

    • Adopting an identical mark (intentionally) in a different class does not constitute infringement or passing off;
    • Adopting a similar mark in the same (or allied and cognate) class does not constitute infringement or passing off;
    • Even if the competing marks are identical or deceptively similar, filing a trademark application with a user claim would give them a defensible stand against the true proprietor’s claim.

    Needless to say, these are some of the common misconceptions which lead to a claim of infringement or passing off being raised by true proprietors of the marks. Also, the possibility of the Court of law imposing damages and/or costs on a defendant cannot be ruled out either. In such a scenario, due to the limited funding of these start-ups, they are often forced to reconsider their entire business strategy in-line with the pending lawsuit. This can, however, be avoided if the entrepreneurs are either well-educated in the field of IP law or take necessary steps to ensure that they receive proper guidance regarding risks involved in registration and use of their mark, from a professional with expertise in the field of IP laws. Instances of start-ups adopting a similar or identical mark of a big corporation/start-up are quite common nowadays with some of the known cases being instituted by ‘Bookmyshow’ against ‘Bookmyoffer’, ‘Shaadi.com’ seeking relief against use of ‘Secondshaadi.com’, ‘Naukri.com’ suing ‘naukrie.com’, etc.[iii]

    In instances involving the pharmaceutical industry, the issue becomes far severe since adopting a similar or identical mark can result not only in infringement of IP but can only be extremely harmful to the patients/consumers. Unlike any other consumable item, patients/consumers are at much greater risk if they consume wrong medication and such instances where corporations adopt a similar or identical mark for its pharmaceutical drug, the consequence can be fatal to the extent that it may even lead to death. In one such famous instance in India where the Defendant was a repeated/hardened infringer, the High Court of Bombay while imposing exemplary costs of INR 1.5 crores stated “Drugs are not sweets. Pharmaceutical companies which provide medicines for the health of the consumers have a special duty of care towards them. These companies have a greater responsibility towards the general public. However, nowadays, the corporate and financial goals of such companies cloud the decision of its executives whose decisions are incentivized by profits, more often than not, at the cost of public health. This case is a perfect example of just that”.

    Another issue these entrepreneurs/start-ups tend to face in the realm of IP law is vis-a-vis use of copyrighted material without knowledge/intention to infringe upon someone else’s IP rights. For instance, when start-ups launch their online portals, they tend to use images/GIFs or music for their videos which are copyrighted and use thereof without permission is illegal. On account of lack of knowledge of IP laws and consequences of such misuse, they often violate rights residing in the copyrighted work and are then subject to either a legal notice from the owner/proprietor of the copyrighted material or a lawsuit before the Court of law.

    The United States of America’s (USA) Chamber of Global Innovation Policy Center (GIPC) which promotes innovation and creativity through intellectual property standards, in its 2019 list of countries performing in the field of IP law, places India at a substantially low rank of 40 out of 53[iv] which indicates that USA considers India as a major threat when it comes to development and investment the field of IP rights in India (especially in the field of patents). Additionally, India also lacks in the number of patent applications filed before the Indian Patent Office, averaging at around 9,500 filings per year, compared to 2,69,000 filings in the USA.[v] One of the primary reason behind this difference might have something to do with India’s lack of support towards the encouragement of IP protection, especially for start-ups.

    1.1.3. Raising Awareness on Intellectual Property Laws for Entrepreneurs

    With almost 50% of litigations within the domain of IP pertaining to trademark infringement and passing off,[vi] entrepreneurs and small businesses must take the following necessary steps to ensure that their rights and interests in their business are protected: –

    • Entrepreneurs/Business owners must entrust lawyers/law firms specializing in the field of IP rights to advise and prosecute their trademark applications;
    • Understand or attempt to understand each and every step involved in prosecuting and registering a trademark application and participate in discussions leading to every step taken in the prosecution of their IP; and,
    • Approach IP lawyers/law firms to get a gist of importance of IP protection along-with freedom to use a mark either before registering it or using the said mark for goods in classes not forming part of the trademark registration.

    It is also the duty of IP lawyers/law firms to promote IP protection for entrepreneurs and small businesses by organizing interactive sessions with new and/or domestic clients and providing competitive charges for prosecuting and enforcing IP rights of these entrepreneurs and businesses.

    Statistics reflect that majority of IP infringement cases in India involve a small enterprise being unaware of the basics of IP rights and therefore, using an IP that is either deceptively similar or virtually identical to a registered and/or well-known IP.[vii] Often businesses expanding their presence in the online portal (either through their website or a social media page) use copyrighted material without realizing that their use of the same would tantamount infringement.   Raising awareness of the importance of IP and consequences of infringement (and passing off) would ensure that start-ups avoid misusing an IP belonging to someone else.

    1.1.4. The imposition of Price Caps on pharmaceutical drugs in India and its work-around

    One of the primary reasons why the USA considers India’s IP regime a major threat has something to do with India’s patent laws, especially vis-à-vis the pharmaceutical industry. Albeit the US Trade Representative (USTR) last year stated that the USA is attempting to restrict patentability for new pharmaceutical drugs which are “essentially mere discoveries of a new form of a known substance which does not result in enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance ….. machine or apparatus” (which is identical to Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act, 1970),[viii] it still considers India as a threat to its IP regime, especially due of India’s patent laws.

    To better understand the problems faced in the Indian pharmaceutical industry, it would be prudent to point out that unlike developed nations, the Indian government (through its Patents Act and policies) keeps strict control over the drug pricing with an intention to make healthcare (specifically medication) accessible amongst all States and income groups. This can especially be observed in pharmaceutical drugs for cancer and diabetes medication. The Government of India has imposed strict price restrictions for its pharmaceutical drugs, thereby diluting IP rights and causing a severe impact on IP valuation of those pharmaceutical drugs.[ix]Although the impact might seem insignificant to consumers since they benefit from these price reductions, making cancer medicines 90% cheaper due to price control would not make IP holders happy or promote invention. Simply put, once the government slashes prices of pharmaceutical drugs intending to make them easily accessible to the majority of patients, it severely impacts the profit margin of the pharmaceutical industries, forcing them to invest more into the industry of generic drug manufacturers because of a bigger profit margin and lesser costs, rather than invest into inventing new drugs, which might although tackle a currently incurable disease (or a curable disease more effectively), but would at the same time, lead the corporation into losses. These price cuts would also force the pharmaceutical corporations to compromise on the quality of drugs which might, in a longer run, have a severe impact on healthcare.

    India’s investment in its healthcare sector has been a major concern since the Indian States ideally spend as low as 1.3% of their gross domestic product (GDP) on healthcare which results in a substantial increase in out-of-pocket expenses and placement of poor healthcare mechanisms.[x] India’s heavy reliance on generic drugs supporting the lesser privileged consumers has been expressed as a concern by the USTR[xi] and global pharmaceutical giants to the extent that investors and pharmaceutical corporations have restricted their investment into the Indian pharmaceutical industry since their price margin would result in government either forcing price caps on the drugs or implement compulsory licensing for the expensive and life-saving drugs.

    As stated above, this approach of placing price caps towards the Indian and global (vis-à-vis their sale of drugs in India) pharmaceutical industry has a major impact on India’s patent laws since it affects innovation, and since innovation is an essential part of the invention in the healthcare sector, pharmaceutical industries tend to focus more on generic drug production, profit from out-of-pocket expenses of consumers/patients, hospitalization costs, etc.[xii] The imposition of price caps has shown to have no significant improvement in accessibility of pharmaceutical drugs.

    Although the imposition of price caps is necessary for a developing nation, the same should be practiced to a limited extent. For instance, instead of capping the price of a pharmaceutical drug and dropping its price by 90%, the price caps should be dependent on the situation and need for the drug. For instance, cancer and diabetes medication are in high requirements in India[xiii] (and other nations) and therefore, the government can impose price caps and reduce the cost of the drugs by 50%. Insofar as other (less crucial/critical) pharmaceutical drugs are concerned, the government can either refrain from price caps or impose a price cap of a maximum of 20%. This would not only promote investment in innovating patented drugs but would also increase FDI in the Indian pharmaceutical sector, thereby permitting Indian pharmaceutical corporations to invent new and possibly better pharmaceutical drugs.

    At the same time, a concerned person always reserves their right under Section 84(1)[xiv] of the Indian Patents Act, 1970 to request for issuance of a compulsory license (after the expiry of three years from the date of grant of the patent) against the said pharmaceutical drug in case it does not comply with the guidelines issued under Section 83[xv]  of the afore-mentioned Act like in the case of Bayer Corporation v. Union of India.[xvi] In essence, the Indian government must invest more in its healthcare sector policies to reduce out-of-pocket expenses incurred by patients/consumers and reduce the price caps by a significant amount to promote innovation in the field of patent laws, especially in the pharmaceutical sector.

    1.2. A Global Upcoming Issue: Impact of Use/Commercialization of Artificial Intelligence on Intellectual Property Rights

    1.2.1. Introduction

    “Can machines think?” – Alan Turing, 1950

    A few years after Alan Mathiso Turing, a renowned English mathematician, cryptanalyst and computer scientist played a pivotal role in defeating Hitler’s Nazi Germany, he wrote a paper titled ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ (1950) where he asked a simple, yet intriguing question: “Can machines think?”. His paper and subsequent research established the basis of what we refer to as ‘Artificial Intelligence’ (AI) or machine learning/intelligence. Fast forward to today, the concept of AI has become a lot more complex than what had been imagined by researchers around half a century ago. AI or a machine which reflects the ability to think and act in as close of a manner as a human mind is as of date, an exciting new development in the field of technology.

    From ‘The Turin Test’ in the year 1950 to creation of Sophia, a humanoid robot created by Hanson Robotics in the year 2016, technology, especially in the field of AI has progressed at a drastic rate, with some of the major developments being the creation of Google’s Home device (2016), Apple’s virtual assistant ‘Siri’ (2011), Microsoft’s virtual assistant ‘Cortana’ (2014), Amazon’s home assistant ‘Alexa’ (2014), etc. occurring in the past decade (2010 to 2019) itself. It is safe to say that with this progress, it is not far-fetched to assume that we may soon see the age of commercialization of much smarter versions of currently existing machine learning devices. The technology relating to AI has seen explosive growth in recent times with the number of patent applications for technologies relating to AI exceeding 1,00,000.[xvii]

    Today, AI can be dissected into two types of intelligence, namely:

    • Weak AI: This is a more common type of AI which is used amongst major corporations like Google, Apple, Microsoft, etc. and although it is being used widely, its abilities are limited to performing tasks that it has been trained to perform. Such AI can store data and present it to the consumer upon enquiry or on need-basis. However, the algorithms do not permit this AI to think and act in a manner a human mind would and therefore, this AI does not pose a threat within the domain of IP.
    • Strong AI: Unlike weak AI, this form of AI would perform more cognitive functions that imitate a human mind more closely as against weak AI. Even though weak AI is known to perform basic functions more efficiently (when compared to humans), the strong AI will not only perform those basic functions of a weak AI but also will also perform more complex tasks such as inventing or creating a new IP (like a new copyrightable sound or video or a unique design, etc.).

    To a certain extent, researchers worry about the consequences of AI in case its goals end up being misaligned to ours. But at this stage, AI seems to be more promising than dangerous, especially in the field of healthcare and agriculture which is a critical industry for India.

    Needless to say, corporations are investing a lot of resources to develop this field of technology which is said to have revolutionary impacts including prediction of epidemics, advanced disaster warnings and damage prevention methods, increased productivity in all industries, etc. The possibilities and benefits (and in many cases, risks) of AI are innumerable and at the current rate of its development, it will quite possibly be overwhelming. Regardless of its pros and cons, commercialization of AI is inevitable and therefore, this raises a material question: Do we have the appropriate laws in place to tackle issues arising out of commercialization (or use) of AI? The answer, unfortunately, is no.

    1.2.2. The Current Scenario

    Being an upcoming digital frontier, it is apparent that AI will have a huge impact on our current laws and practices. For instance, our current world IP regime only permits a ‘person’ to be a proprietor and/or owner of an IP (see Naruto v. Slater[xviii]) which implies that any form of IP that is generated/invented by an AI cannot be a subject matter of registration. However, a recent decision by the Chinese Court wherein a tech giant ‘Tencent’ claimed copyright infringement against a local financial news company overwork created by its Dreamwriter robot might reflect a contrary view. The Court in the said case held that an article generated by AI is protectable under Chinese copyright law.[xix] Holding a contrary view, the European Patent Office (EPO) in the case pertaining to patent applications filed by ‘DABUS’ an AI technology, gave a finding similar to the Naruto case wherein it held that application has to be filed by a human being.[xx] Professor Ryan Abbott along-with his multi-disciplinary team at the University of Surrey had filed (through their AI called DABUS) the first-ever patent application without a human inventor[xxi] indicating that the move towards AI-based IP filing is underway, however, given that the laws are currently not in place, the application was, unfortunately, refused.

    Although an old principle, the Courts around the world at times rely (either directly or indirectly) on the principle of “sweat of the brow”, which indicates the inventor’s effort and hard work invested in creating an IP. However, the application of the said principle becomes rather complicated when the issue of IP generated by AI comes into the picture. At the same time, the commercialization of AI might also lead to dilution of IP rights, given that the possibility of AI being better and quicker at generating IP than human beings cannot be ruled out. Undoubtedly, AI might eventually be considered as a ‘smarter’ variant of a human inventor since an AI would require a significantly less amount of time and effort to generate a registrable IP. Apart from the ones already mentioned above, several unknown issues are likely to arise upon commercialization of AI (to generate IP) and there is a dire need to highlight and resolve these issues at the earliest.

    The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has recently taken an initiative to invite public feedback on possible impacts of AI on the world IP regime[xxii] by conducting press conferences to tackle the impending issues vis-à-vis IP laws upon commercialization or use of AI. Although the topic of discussion during the previous conference was somewhat restricted to Patent laws and did not tackle IP laws holistically, the next round of sessions might emphasize on all IP laws and be more holistic towards progress. Needless to say, AI will impact our IP regime all the way from the creation of an IP to valuation, commercialization, transfer/assignment, etc. thereof, which would require a complete overhaul of our current laws in order to inculcate and appreciate the investment (in terms of time and costs) and labour involved in the creation of the AI, as well as use/transfer/assignment of an IP generated by that AI.

    1.2.3. India’s Approach towards Artificial Intelligence

    India has seen rapid growth in its information technology (IT) sector which has further contributed to other primary sectors like agricultural sector, healthcare sector, etc. by developing various mechanisms such as a system for online trading or integrated crop management system (amongst other things). It is safe to say that technology has a big role to play in India’s growth. Apart from the agricultural industry, the software industry has played a pivotal role in India’s move towards becoming the fastest-growing trillion-dollar economy.[xxiii]

    Being amongst the most profitable investment jurisdictions, India has recently been a hub for tech-related start-ups. Understanding the importance of technology, Indian entrepreneurs, along-with government support, have started to invest heavily in the technology field and with the help of FDI, there has been a substantial boom in the field of technology. Since other fields such as agriculture, healthcare and education are all somewhat dependent on this field, the scope of AI transforming all the other sectors through the tech sector is clearly perceivable.

    As discussed earlier, India’s healthcare sector is in a dire need for investment and development and on account of lack of funding and need to make medication accessible, reliance on AI would drastically reduce costs incurred in labour, research and development, trials, etc., which would eventually reduce the costs of pharmaceutical drugs themselves, thereby impacting the final sale price of the drug. Reliance on AI (by developing the tech sector) would extinguish the need for State governments to invest heavily in their healthcare programmes. Although the current investment might not cut it, a substantial investment, in that case, would not be required. AI support in the development and marketing of pharmaceutical drugs, thereby reducing the overall costs and increasing production and sale would also invite more FDI in India’s healthcare sector. This will also eventually make healthcare more accessible in less developed regions in India. Statistics indicate that healthcare is majorly accessible/available in limited States/Cities like Bengaluru, Chennai, Gurugram, etc.[xxiv] while cities like Singrauli continue to suffer.[xxv] With the major impediment of drug pricing out of the way, access to healthcare will become more of a focus and would eventually thrive with AI support.

    Insofar as the agricultural sector is concerned, the same plays an essential role in our developing economy. According to a report issued by India Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF), around 58% of Indian population relies on India’s agricultural sector with a contribution of an estimated $265.51 billion (approximately INR 18.55 lakh crore) of gross value added to its economy (in Financial Year 2019).[xxvi] This implies that majority of the lesser developed States and Cities in India rely solely on production and sale of their agricultural produce.[xxvii] With an FDI inflow of up to 100% and an increasing reliance on technology, the sector keeps looking for methods to increase crop yields in a cost-effective manner. Having said that, the agricultural sector still faces some major issues like weather instability and fluctuations, condition of agricultural labourers, poor farming techniques, inadequate irrigation facilities, etc.[xxviii]  Unlike the healthcare sector, the agricultural sector is already witnessing the impact of AI from companies like Microsoft India and Intello Labs which have introduced mechanisms to maximize crop yield and reduce wastage/infestation. For instance, Microsoft India has introduced an AI-based sowing app which determines and informs the farmers of the best time to sow their crop based on analysis of climate data for the specific area and amount of rainfall and soil moisture the crops have received.[xxix]  Farmers can benefit from these AI-based apps without spending any additional costs on installing sensors.

    Indian (and foreign) tech industries have already played an important role in providing ease of business through reliance on weak AI and therefore, if India invests and conducts thorough research into strong AI, the implications of AI can be countless. However, since research and investment in the field of strong AI are extremely limited in India, commercialization thereof seems far-fetched as of date. Due to lack of expertise in the field of AI, it has been difficult to conduct research and yield any result. Colleges/Universities often refrain from investing in the field of AI research due to lack of participation and heavy research costs. Also, since the education system in the majority of institutions is somewhat traditional, graduates (or post-graduates) lack the required skill set to work in this technical field.[xxx]

    In contrast, however, the Chinese government is already taking steps to become a leader in the AI space by 2030s. It has adopted a three-step method which involves appreciating AI-based applications by the year 2020, making cutting edge breakthroughs in the said field by 2025 and leading in the industry by 2030. To support this process, a Chinese Court has already ruled in favour of AI-generated copyright work in its decision favouring Tencent,[xxxi] a tech company focusing on communication and social platforms. Since India (through its tech industry) has started taking steps to work towards its AI technology (albeit weak AI for now) and has also entrusted its think-tank ‘NITI (National Institution for Transforming India ) Aayog’ for assistance in such development through the National Program on AI,[xxxii] we hope to see India catch-up to tech giants like China, USA and Europe.

    1.2.4. Development of Intellectual Property Laws on Artificial Intelligence: An Indian Perspective

     Since WIPO has only recently started discussing the implications of AI on global IP laws, the member states of WIPO are yet to come out with laws pertaining to AI-based IP. While beginning its public consultation process on AI and IP policy, Director General of WIPO Mr Francis Gurry said: “Artificial intelligence is set to radically alter the way in which we work and live, with great potential to help us solve common global challenges, but it is also prompting policy questions and challenges,”.[xxxiii]  On December 13, 2019 WIPO also published ‘Draft Issues Paper on Intellectual Property Policy and Artificial Intelligence’ with an intent to invite feedback/opinion on the most pressing issues IP policymakers will face in the near future. One of the most crucial questions where jurisdictions conflict is whether AI can be an inventor/owner of an IP. While the EPO held that an AI cannot be the inventor of a patent application, the Chinese Court observed the contrary, holding that an AI can be an inventor of a copyrightable subject matter. Apart from the issues arising vis-à-vis prosecution of such applications (assuming an AI can be an inventor/originator of an IP), another important issue would pertain to enforcement by or against IP owned by an AI. For instance, if an AI generates a copyrightable subject matter which is deceptively similar or identical to a copyrighted matter, against whom will a Suit claiming infringement and damages lie? Further, in case of a finding against the AI wherein damages have been awarded, will the AI be expected to bear the damages or the owner of the AI? To answer these complex questions, WIPO has invited inputs from member States on issues (not exhaustive) published on December 13, 2019.[xxxiv]

    In view afore-mentioned development, India should establish a team of technical and legal (IP) experts to review the current laws and issues drafted by the WIPO Secretariat, draft possible answers to the issues and suggest required amendments to our current laws to inculcate rights of AI in the best way possible and then discuss the same at a larger stage, i.e., at the 25th Session of the WIPO Committee on Development and Intellectual Property (CDIP). Until now, India’s role/participation in WIPO’s sessions/meetings has been passive and considering how AI would impact its various sectors, especially the agricultural and healthcare sector (a sector which needs an improvement), India must play an active role in the development of IP laws to support AI. Given the fact that India is one of the fastest-growing economies and one of its cities is also considered as the ‘Silicon Valley’ of India,[xxxv] commercialization/use of AI would greatly benefit its economy to the extent that it would substantially reduce labour costs and at the same time, benefit a lot of entrepreneurs in the tech industry. Additionally, AI would also be crucial for government offices as it would greatly reduce delay in processing time and errors. For instance, the use of AI in Indian Intellectual Property Offices would enable machines to review applications for basic defects such as non-filing of an essential document or improper authentication, etc. In case strong AI is adopted by these departments, it would also enable machines to raise basic objections on applications and upon clearance thereof, advertise or register the same, thereby reducing significant costs and time.

    It goes without saying that AI is the next big thing in the field of technology and once it is commercialized at a large scale, it is going to have a huge impact on our laws (especially IP laws). Given India’s interests and possible benefits in the field of AI, its involvement in the development of our current IP regime is pivotal.

     

    Notes

    [i] Jeff Williams, The Evolution of Intellectual Property, Law Office of Jeff Williams PLLC; link: https://txpatentattorney.com/blog/the-history-of-intellectual-property(published on November 11, 2015).

    [ii] Foreign Direct Investment, published by Make in India; link: http://www.makeinindia.com/policy/foreign-direct-investment.

    [iii] Top 17 Startup Legal Disputes, published by Wazzeer; link: https://wazzeer.com/blog/top-17-startup-legal-disputes (published on May 02, 2017).

    [iv] GIPC IP Index 2020, published by Global Innovation Policy Center; link: https://www.theglobalipcenter.com/ipindex2020-details/?country=in.

    [v] Darrell M. West, India-U.S. relations: Intellectual property rights, Brookings India; link: https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/india-u-s-relations-intellectual-property-rights (published on June 04, 2016).

    [vi] Thehasin Nazia & Rajarshi Choudhuri, The Problem of IPR Infringement in India’s Burgeoning Startup Ecosystem, IPWatchdog; link: https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/11/16/problem-ipr-infringement-indias-burgeoning-startup-ecosystem/id=116019 (published on November 16, 2019).

    [vii] Press Trust of India, Absence of legal awareness root cause of rights’ deprivation, Business Standard, Nagpur; link: https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/absence-of-legal-awareness-root-cause-of-rights-deprivation-119081800664_1.html (published on August 18, 2019).

    [viii] Kristina M. L. Acri née Lybecker, India’s Patent Law is No Model for the United States: Say No to No Combination Drug Patents Act, IP Watch Dog; link: https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/06/26/indias-patent-law-no-model-united-states/id=110727 (published on June 26, 2019).

    [ix] Amir Ullah Khan, India’s drug price fix is hurting healthcare, Live Mint; link: https://www.livemint.com/politics/policy/india-s-drug-price-fix-is-hurting-healthcare-11572334594083.html (published on October 29, 2019).

    [x] Ibid.

    [xi] E Kumar Sharma, Hard bargaining ahead, Business Today; link: https://www.businesstoday.in/magazine/focus/us-to-pressure-india-change-intellectual-property-ipr-regime/story/214440.html (published on February 01, 2015).

    [xii] Amir, supra note 9 at __(page No.)__.

    [xiii] Key diabetes, anti-cancer drugs among 92 in price-ceiling list, published by ET Bureau, The Economic Times; link: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/healthcare/biotech/pharmaceuticals/key-diabetes-anti-cancer-drugs-among-92-in-price-ceiling-list/articleshow/65433283.cms?from=mdr (published on August 17, 2018).

    [xiv] Section 84(1) of the Patents Act, 1970 :-

    Compulsory licenses –

    (1) At any time after the expiration of three years from the date of the 170 [grant] of a patent, any person interested may make an application to the Controller for grant of compulsory license on patent on any of the following grounds, namely:-

    (a) that the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention have not been satisfied, or

    (b) that the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price, or

    (c) that the patented invention is not worked in the territory of India.

    [xv] Section 83 of the Patents Act, 1970:-

    General principles applicable to working of patented inventions –

    Without prejudice to the other provisions contained in this Act, in exercising the powers conferred by this Chapter, regard shall be had to the following general considerations, namely;-

    (a) that patents are granted to encourage inventions and to secure that the inventions are worked in India on a commercial scale and to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable without undue delay;

    (b) that they are not granted merely to enable patentees to enjoy a monopoly for the importation of the patented article;

    (c) that the protection and enforcement of patent rights contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations;

    (d) that patents granted do not impede protection of public health and nutrition and should act as instrument to promote public interest specially in sectors of vital importance for socio-economic and technological development of India;

    (e) that patents granted do not in any way prohibit Central Government in taking measures to protect public health;

    (f) that the patent right is not abused by the patentee or person deriving title or interest on patent from the patentee, and the patentee or a person deriving title or interest on patent from the patentee does not resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology; and

    (g) that patents are granted to make the benefit of the patented invention available at reasonably affordable prices to the public.

    [xvi] Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(S). 30145 of 2014.

    [xvii] Ryan N. Phelan, Artificial Intelligence & the Intellectual Property Landscape, Marshall Gerstein & Borun LLP, published by Lexology; link: https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8c2b5986-95bb-4e8e-9057-e4481bfaa471 (published on September 14, 2019).

    [xviii] No. 16-15469 (9th Cir. 2018).

    [xix] Stefano Zaccaria, AI-written articles are copyright-protected, rules Chinese court, World Intellectual Property Review (WIPR); published on January 10, 2020 (link:https://www.worldipreview.com/news/ai-written-articles-are-copyright-protected-rules-chinese-court-19102).

    [xx] EPO refuses DABUS patent applications designating a machine inventor, European Patent Office; link: https://www.epo.org/news-issues/news/2019/20191220.html(published on December 20, 2019).

    [xxi] Laura Butler, World first patent applications filed for inventions generated solely by artificial intelligence, University of Surrey; published on 01 August, 2019 (link: https://www.surrey.ac.uk/news/world-first-patent-applications-filed-inventions-generated-solely-artificial-intelligence).

    [xxii] WIPO Begins Public Consultation Process on Artificial Intelligence and Intellectual Property Policy, published by World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); PR/2019/843; published on December 13, 2019 (link: https://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2019/article_0017.html).

    [xxiii] Caleb Silver, The Top 20 Economies in the World, Investopedia; link: https://www.investopedia.com/insights/worlds-top-economies/#5-india (published on November 19, 2019).

    [xxiv] Akriti Bajaj, Working towards building a healthier India, Invest India; link: https://www.investindia.gov.in/sector/healthcare (published on January 18, 2020).

    [xxv] Leroy Leo, Niti Aayog calls healthcare system a ‘sinking ship,’ urges private participation in Ayushman Bharat, Live Mint; link: https://www.livemint.com/news/india/niti-aayog-calls-healthcare-system-a-sinking-ship-urges-private-participation-in-ayushman-bharat-11574948865389.html (published on November 29, 2019).

    [xxvi] Agriculture in India: Information About Indian Agriculture & Its Importance, Indian Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF); link: https://www.ibef.org/industry/agriculture-india.aspx (published on November 2019).

    [xxvii] Ayushman Baruah, Artificial Intelligence in Indian Agriculture – An Industry and Startup Overview, Emerj; link: https://emerj.com/ai-sector-overviews/artificial-intelligence-in-indian-agriculture-an-industry-and-startup-overview (published on November 22, 2019).

    [xxviii] Vidya Sethy, Top 13 Problems Faced by Indian Agriculture, Your Article Library; link: http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/agriculture/top-13-problems-faced-by-indian-agriculture/62852.

    [xxix] Ibid.

    [xxx] Neha Dewan, In the race for AI supremacy, has India missed the bus?, The Economic Times; link: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/startups/features/in-the-race-for-ai-supremacy-has-india-missed-the-bus/articleshow/69836362.cms (published on June 19, 2019).

    [xxxi] Rory O’Neill and Stefano Zaccaria,

    AI-written articles are copyright-protected, rules Chinese court, World Intellectual Property Review (WIPR); link: https://www.worldipreview.com/news/ai-written-articles-are-copyright-protected-rules-chinese-court-19102 (published on January 10, 2020).

    [xxxii] National Strategy On Artificial Intelligence, published by NITI Aayog; link: https://niti.gov.in/national-strategy-artificial-intelligence.

    [xxxiii] WIPO Begins Public Consultation Process on Artificial Intelligence and Intellectual Property Policy, PR/2019/843, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Geneva; link: https://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2019/article_0017.html (published on December 13, 2019).

    [xxxiv] WIPO Secretariat, WIPO Conversation on Intellectual Property (IP) and Artificial Intelligence (AI), Second Session, WIPO/IP/AI/2/GE/20/1, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); link: https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/wipo_ip_ai_ge_20/wipo_ip_ai_2_ge_20_1.pdf (published on December 13, 2019).

    [xxxv] Bangalore, published by Wikipedia; link: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangalore (last updated on February 07, 0220).

     

    Image Credit: WIPO

  • Poverty, Inequality, and Marginalisation as Forms of Structural Violence in Pre-Conflict Syria

    Poverty, Inequality, and Marginalisation as Forms of Structural Violence in Pre-Conflict Syria

    The injustice and inequality built into the structural institutions of the Syrian society can be referred to, what has been called as the ‘structural violence’, by the well-known Norwegian sociologist, Johan Galtung.  

    The ongoing civil war in Syria that has resulted in large-scale loss of lives, and forced displacement of millions across the region, is being seen as one of the bloodiest conflicts of this century. While countries continue to witness the horrors of visible atrocities and war crimes, the underlying layers of structural and cultural violence continue to buttress the egregious brutality which is often more direct, and physical.

     

    Although the war is often seen as a result of the outburst of pro-democracy protests in 2011, a close examination of the country’s socio-economic structures would enable one to get a detailed insight into the underlying layers of frustration caused due to large-scale poverty, inequality, and marginalisation. One would also find that the relatively peaceful structure, which existed before the protests of 2011, was held intact largely due to the existence of single-party dominance, where one actor (Hafez al-Assad, and later Bashar al-Assad) held all power and authority, while those existing in lower ranks of society continued to lack resources, as well as opportunities to challenge the dominant power.

    The Syrian economic crisis has existed long before the commencement of the civil war.

    The injustice and inequality built into the structural institutions of the Syrian society can be referred to, what has been called as the ‘structural violence’, by the well-known Norwegian sociologist, Johan Galtung.  The violence, here, is reflective of a position “higher up or lower down in a hierarchy of exploitation-repression-alienation”, where the parties involved are determined either to keep the hierarchy intact or to completely obliterate it. In the case of Syria, the deprivation of the most basic and non-negotiable needs, which threatened the citizens’ need for survival, has been the primary cause for aggression to come into existence. The factors that, thus, led to the conflict in Syria can be seen rooted in years of repression, poverty, and lack of representative institutions, which manifested in the form of protests, or the Arab Spring of 2011.

    The Syrian economic crisis has existed long before the commencement of the civil war. Since the beginning of the economic crisis, Syria’s institutional structures have failed to meet the rising needs and rights of its population. In the 1980s, the country was trapped in a downward spiral of a fiscal crisis, as a result of large-scale drought, and due to both, domestic and external factors. The crisis led to high food deficit, and an increase in the cost of living, leading to a rise in patronage networks which provided small circles of elites with profitable businesses. These networks became increasingly popular in real estate and land management, leaving out large sectors of Syria underdeveloped.

    While the country witnessed a decreasing overall debt and a noticeable rise in the GDP in the 2000s, large sections of the population were excluded from benefitting from these growth rates due to differences in wage rates and declining job opportunities. Increasing inequality was reflected in a paper published by the UNDP, which claimed that 65.6% of all labour in Syria belonged to the informal sector in 2010, with Aleppo and Idlib ranking first with over 75% of their workforce belonging to the informal sector. Further, the four years of drought between 2006 and 2011, and the consequent failed economic policies led to a significant decline in the agricultural sector’s output, forcing 2 million to 3 million Syrians into abject poverty.

    Additionally, the oil revenues fell from more than 14% of GDP in the early 2000s to about 4% in 2010 due to depleting reserves. According to a report, overall poverty in Syria in 2007 impacted 33.6% of the population, of which 12.3% were estimated to be living under extreme poverty. Noting the degree of inequality in Syria in 1997, the report found out that the lower 20% of the population had a share of only 8% in expenditure, while the richest 20% of the population share about 41% of the expenditure. The degree of inequality further decreased in 2004. Moreover, the widely disputed region of North-Eastern Syria witnessed highest levels of inequality in 2007, in addition to deprivation of living standards, and worst levels of illiteracy, and access to safe water, just four years before the outbreak of the civil war. The unequal access to resources was also starkly reflected in the housing situation of the country before the war, where over 40% of the population lived under informal housing conditions, – through squatting, or on lands obtained without legal contracts.

    In addition to the economic crisis, Syrians have been the victims of decades-long political repression, in the form of restrictions on freedom of expression, torture, and enforced disappearances. The political institutions have historically been unstable, with three military coups taking place in 1949 alone, followed by one more in 1954, in addition to the Ba’athist-led coups of 1963 and 1966. The Syrian security forces (Mukhabarat) are known to have detained citizens without proper warrants even before 2010, many of whom have reportedly been tortured in prisons. In their attempts to keep the hierarchy of power relations intact, the centralised institutions are known to clamp down on any public demonstrations, with frequent arrests and employment of state violence.

    The conflict which started with citizens demanding their basic needs and rights has been sustained over the years by the involvement of foreign states, and increased state brutality which has been responded to by an increasingly similar, if not equal, force by the rebellion groups.

    Years of conflict have exacerbated the economic crisis, pushing both the state and its citizens, into chaos, with more than 80 per cent of the Syrian population living below the poverty line, with an unemployment rate of at least 55 per cent in 2018. With most of the business networks now being controlled by the selected few elites, the population at large continues to suffer the brunt of both structural, and direct violence.

    The conflict which started with citizens demanding their basic needs and rights has been sustained over the years by the involvement of foreign states, and increased state brutality which has been responded to by an increasingly similar, if not equal, force by the rebellion groups. The country, now, witnesses itself entangled in a cycle of conflict, where the war has led to steep economic deterioration, political repression, and physical violence, which in turn has led to further widespread cataclysm.

    Image Credit: Photo – Aleppo-Syria destruction in 2019 and  Syria Map – Adobe Stock

  • Lebanon’s Food Security Crisis

    Lebanon’s Food Security Crisis

    Security has been a buzzword in the arena of International Politics since the Cold War, and this is widely recognized to be the subject’s genesis as articulated by Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen in their book, The Evolution of International Security Studies. The traditional view of security as largely related to military is the aspect that is given the most prominent focus in discourses on the subject. However, since the 1990s, “societal security” and concepts related to people are broader and sub-concepts such as food security have gained in importance. Food security looks at how much food is available, the access and affordability of food to all people in a country. Food security is also the ability of the country to keep sufficient food available during tough times, such as inflation, disasters, and other such hardships. The Food Climate Research Network speaks of the five factors of food security; availability of food, access to food, utilization of food, stability, and malnutrition. Perhaps food security is one of the most essential forms of security, as the lack of food leads to starvation. This is the reason one hears of bread riots and bread in many protest slogans; ‘bread’ symbolizes food security and represents people’s survival. The economic meltdown of Lebanon and the failure of governance has created a human catastrophe of instability and poverty. The recent Beirut explosion has highlighted not only the failure of the government but a complete breakdown of safety and social security for its common citizens. Under the current circumstances, Lebanon’s food security situation is a major cause for concern.

    Hikes in Food Prices

    Lebanon today is a country with massive debt, income inequality, with much of its revenue going towards servicing of national debts. In addition, Lebanon has been facing high inflation for the last few months, making it very difficult for families to access food. As a result, basic food items are overpriced and in short supply; for instance, a pat of butter costs 9.4 Euros.  Meat, fruits and other commodities have become luxuries for most Lebanese citizens. There are huge breadlines across Lebanon, and many grocery stores cannot afford to buy food to sell to consumers. The COVID-19 crisis has compounded the economic crisis. Prices of eight basic food items have increased by 56%. Lebanon’s food crisis is so grave that parents are bartering their children’s toys and furniture for food online.

     Economic collapse and Food Security

    The most circulated pictures over the last few weeks on media are of the explosion in Beirut and the spillage of grains. This blast occurred because of the unsafe storage of ammonium nitrate and has led to the death of over 200 people, with over 6,000 injured so far. There are many still missing. For Lebanon, this is a triple layer of burden, as the country is fighting a mismanaged economy, a pandemic, and now the horrific aftermath of the explosion. Post the explosion, many countries and global institutions have rushed emergency support by providing minimal aid and funding to facilitate fast recovery from this catastrophe.  While the world has come together to help Lebanon, the situation remains grim because of the shortage of various necessities like medicine and food. The second-largest port in Lebanon, Tripoli has some storage of flour; however, this suffices to cover just one month’s requirements. Beirut port, the largest in Lebanon, is virtually unusable because of the blast. The port infrastructure is severely damaged, thus hurting imports. Lebanon is a country that relies hugely on imports; it imports 85% of its food from outside, making this a major crisis . By one estimate the blast has destroyed 120,000 metric tons of grains, and this could affect food availability as well as sky-rocketing of food prices. The United Nations Food Program reiterated that Lebanon is in a grim situation regarding food security. The current assessment is that the grains can sustain them for less than a month.

    Grim Outlook and Tough Challenges

    The looming food security crisis is a direct fall-out of the economic collapse and multiple crises facing the country. Discontent with the government in Lebanon is not new, since the protests have been on since last October. The explosion and its resulting loss of life and property have triggered waves of protests again, forcing Hassan Diab, the Prime Minister of Lebanon, to step down from his office on 10th August. Decades of poor governance, entrenched kleptocracy, corrupt political class, criminal negligence, incompetence and economic mismanagement have led to the current catastrophe. The former economy minister, Nasser Saidi, says that ‘Lebanon is on the brink of the abyss of depression, with GDP declining by 25% this year, growing unemployment, hyperinflation, and humanitarian disaster with poverty exceeding half the population. The growing food crisis and poverty could lead to famine conditions’. The government will need to address income inequality, large-scale corruption, and the role of foreign players in contributing to the economic collapse.  Financial institutions and other creditors, more often foreign powers, need to suspend debt repayments and allow the Lebanese economy to recoup; since a considerable portion of the revenue goes into debt servicing, which is unsustainable for long.  International funding agencies, while sympathetic to the common peoples’ plight, are hesitant to go ahead with aid due to the poor governance track record of the political class. By some estimates, they put the immediate requirement for humanitarian aid and the cost of rebuilding essential infrastructure post the blast at USD 15 billion. This pales compared to the even bigger mess in the financial system. Ghazi Wazni, the country’s finance minister who quit with the rest of the government last week, has put the total losses in the banking system at $83 billion, and a black hole in the central banking system of $50 billion. The people are displaying discontent over the sectarian politics that have afflicted the country for decades and are the root cause of endemic corruption. Last year’s protests led to a new government in December, which was forced to resign post the explosion.

    Amidst the political crisis, food security is increasingly the major problem in Lebanon for months now. The blast has left 300,000 people homeless.  International Organizations and Civil Society Organizations, Ukraine, Russia, and the United States are enabling and mobilizing food supplies.

    Poverty is the immediate concern; there are already one million Lebanese in poverty, with the likelihood of more than half of the Lebanese population falling into poverty. Food shortages will most likely result in starvation, malnutrition, and death. Looking at the five tenets of food security mentioned above, Lebanon satisfies neither of the five criteria. Lebanon is an example of how decades of factional strife, warlordism, corruption, and power in the hands of the kleptocratic elite can push a country and its people into the abyss of poverty. While resolving Lebanon’s food security crisis is possible through immediate international aid and support, resolving the larger problem of its economic mess and humanitarian catastrophe will need international intervention.

  • Creation of Statelessness in India: an Analysis of the Crisis and the way Forward

    Creation of Statelessness in India: an Analysis of the Crisis and the way Forward

    Introduction

    Over the last few decades, migration has become a global norm. Although a substantial part of the global population migrates for economic and personal reasons, it is undeniable that migration as a phenomenon is exacerbated by factors such as armed conflicts, ethnic or politico-social tensions, climate change and others. The effect that migration has on global economic, social and political transformations is widely recognized.[1] Naturally, in contrast to migration policies, all States have specific laws to regulate the acquisition of nationality by birth, descent and/or naturalization. While most of us realise the significance of the concept of nationality, we tend to overlook the fact that inclusion by nationality often brings the phenomenon of statelessness with it. In this context, the latest developments in the Indian laws regulating nationality raise several social and legal conundrums. However, the lack of any legal framework on statelessness or India’s abstinence from signing the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons or the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness is a clear indication of India’s unpreparedness to deal with the potential long-term consequences of its new laws.

    Deprivation of Citizenship and Statelessness in the Contemporary Era

    The concepts of nationality and citizenship have attracted great attention for raising several contemporary politico-legal and social issues. Citizenship confers an identity on an individual within a particular state. Consequently, a citizen is able to derive rights and is assigned obligations by virtue of this identity.[2] Political Philosopher, Hannah Arendt, terms this as “the right to have rights”.[3] Citizenship is what entitles a citizen to the full membership of rights, a democratic voice and territorial residence. While we understand the significance of being a citizen of a country, we often fail to ponder upon the consequences of losing it. Immanuel Kant argues that citizenship by naturalisation is a sovereign privilege and the obverse side of such privilege is the loss of citizenship or “denationalisation”.[4] Arendt has also identified the twin phenomena of “political evil” and “statelessness”.[5]

    This condition of statelessness is not only a harmful condition which makes the person vulnerable to violation of human rights, but it also works in delegitimising a person in the socio-legal order of a State.

    An introspect into the right to have the right to a nationality goes on to throw light on the issue of statelessness. Although history has proven the existence of both de facto and de jure statelessness, this chapter is only concerned with de jure statelessness, specifically within the Indian context. The Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons defines a “stateless person” as ‘a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law’.[6] This condition of statelessness is not only a harmful condition which makes the person vulnerable to violation of human rights, but it also works in delegitimising a person in the socio-legal order of a State.[7] The number of stateless persons globally in the year 2018 was 3.9 million.[8] This number is still regarded as a conservative under-estimation owing to the fact that most of the affected population reside precariously within the society and most countries do not calculate comprehensive statistics of stateless persons within their territory. UNHCR estimates at least a global figure of 10 million stateless persons globally.[9]

    Statelessness hinders the day-to-day life of a person by depriving them of access to the most rudimentary rights like education, employment or health care to name a few.  It may be attributed to multiple causes inter-alia discrimination, denationalization, lack of documentation, climate change, forced migration, conflict of laws, boundary disputes, state succession and administrative practices.[10] Discrimination based on ethnicity, race, religion or language has been a constant cause of statelessness globally. Currently, at least 20 countries uphold laws which can deny or deprive a person of their nationality in a discriminatory manner.[11] Statelessness tends to exaggerate impact of discrimination and exclusion that minority groups might already be facing. It widens the gap between communities thus deepening their exclusion.[12]  The phenomenon of statelessness has been the more prominent in South and South East Asian countries. The Hill Tamil repatriates in India from Sri Lanka and the Burmese refugees in Cambodia are examples of Asian Stateless populations who are vulnerable to human rights abuses. The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness are the two most important conventions addressing this issue. The former has 94 parties and 23 signatories, and the latter has 75 parties and only 5 signatories. Albeit international legal norms on the issue of statelessness have restrained the States’ denationalisation power, it has however not erased the use of discrimination as a tool for denationalization.[13] This has been particularly relevant in the case of naturalization of nationals from Muslim-majority countries.[14]  It can be argued that India’s Citizenship Amendment Act has also joined this bandwagon.

    Interplay of the NRC and Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019

    The Citizenship Amendment Act which was passed by the Indian Parliament on 11th December 2019 has caused a lot of uproar and outbreak of protests all over the country. This Act has attracted wide international condemnation[15] for being discriminatory[16], arbitrary and unconstitutional.[17] Before we go on to scrutinise the role of Citizenship Amendment Act in statelessness creation, an analysis of the National Register of Citizens (NRC) is warranted. The NRC process has been the source of several issues regarding migration, citizenship and polarisation of political support in the state of Assam. It has culled out a distinct space in mobilising the political discourse in Assam specifically during the 2014 and 2019 parliamentary elections.[18]

    The NRC is a register containing names of Indian Citizens. This register was prepared for the very first time in the year 1951 based on the data collected during census. This process was done subsequent to various groups[19] causing agitation in Assam over the non-regulation of immigrant inflow into the region. This resulted in resorting to laws like the Foreigners Act, 1946 and Foreigners (Tribunal) Order, 1939. The contrast in India’s approach to disregard the aforementioned laws to accommodate people escaping violence in West Pakistan[20] is to be noted here.  The NRC process in Assam determines illegal migrants based on their inability to prove the nexus between their documented ancestral legacy to the Indian State. The NRC process defined such illegal immigrants irrespective of their religious affinity. The cut-off date used to determine a person’s ability to prove ancestral legacy was set to March 24, 1971 which is in line with Bangladesh’s war of liberation.

    Despite the criticisms and drawbacks, the NRC process is  in fact a much needed exercise in the State of Assam. Owing to its shared border with Bangladesh, Assam has been the gateway for refugees, economic and illegal migrants who come to India.

    As Assam has been a hub for labour migration right from the colonial era, the ethnic Assamese have been insecure about the potential demographic shifts in favour of the ethnic Bengali migrants, for a long time.[21] This concern was exacerbated by the mass influx of Bengali migrants after the birth of Bangladesh. This mass migration which aggravated the already anti-immigrant sentiment culminated in a student-led movement in the 1970s and 1980s.[22] A series of protests broke out in the Assam to pressure the government to identify and expel illegal immigrants. In the year 1985, the Union government and the AASU signed the Assam Accord by which the government assured the establishment of a mechanism to identify “foreigners who came to Assam on or after March 25, 1971” and subsequently take practical steps to expel them.[23] Consequent to a Public Interest Litigation[24] filed in 2009. In the year 2014, the Supreme Court assumed the role of monitoring the process of updating the NRC to identify Indian citizens residing in Assam in accordance with the Citizenship Act of 1955. The very first draft of the process was published in December 2017 and 1.9 million people were left out of the register from a population of 3.29 million people in Assam.[25] In August 31, 2019, the final list was published which left out 4 million residents from the NRC.[26] Neither drafts of the NRC specifically mention the religion or community of the non-included applicants, although certain commentators[27] and media outlets[28] have alleged  that five out of nine Muslim-majority districts of Assam had the maximum number of rejections of applicants.[29] Out of the 4 million applications which were excluded from the final list, 0.24 applicants have been put on ‘hold’. These people belong to categories: D (doubtful) voters, descendants of D-voters, people whose cases are pending at Foreigners Tribunals and descendants of these persons.[30] The NRC process has for long attracted mixed reviews. Scholars have suggested that the process has been an arbitrary one that is aimed more at exclusion[31] than inclusion.[32] It has also been regarded as an expensive process, the brunt of which is borne substantially by the people of India.[33] Despite the criticisms and drawbacks, the NRC process is  in fact a much needed exercise in the State of Assam. Owing to its shared border with Bangladesh, Assam has been the gateway for refugees, economic and illegal migrants who come to India. This not only led to the cultural identity crises of Assamese people but it also significantly influenced the political operations in the State.[34] It is also important to note that, owing to the absence of a concrete refugee law in place and due to the general population’s lack of awareness about refugees in India, the distinction between refugees, illegal migrants and economic migrants often get muddled. This is reflected in the anti-migration narrative that brews in the State. Although we maintain that the NRC process is not necessarily a communal exercise, it does have seem to have such repercussions when read together with the Citizenship Amendment Act which was passed by the Indian Parliament last year.

    The Preamble of the Indian Constitution recognises the India as a secular state. This has also been reiterated in landmark Supreme Court decisions, whereby the principle of secularism has been recognised as one of the basic structures of the Constitution.Therefore, the fact that the Citizenship Amendment Act discriminates migrants based on their religion, makes is fundamentally unconstitutional.

    According to the Indian citizenship Act of 1955, an “illegal migrant” is a foreigner who enters India without a valid passport or such other prescribed travel documentation.[35] The Citizenship Amendment Act, amends this definition. The Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 is not just discriminatory, but it also goes against the basic principles of the Constitution of India. This Act provides that ‘any person belonging to Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi or Christian community for Afghanistan, Bangladesh or Pakistan’, who entered into India on or before December 31, 2014 who have been exempted by the central government by the Passport Act, 1920 or the Foreigners Act 1946, shall not be treated as an illegal migrant.[36] Further, the Act has reduced the aggregate period of residence to qualify for naturalization from 11 years to 5 years for the aforementioned communities.[37] This Act has attracted worldwide criticism from various human rights groups and international organizations. The alleged raison d’etre for the Act is two fold – the alleged religious persecution of minorities in the three Muslim-majority countries mentioned before and rectifying the misdeeds of partition.[38] However, on a careful scrutiny, both these reasons fail to stand the test of rationale and reasonableness. Firstly, it has to be noted that prima facie the Act violates Art.14 of the Indian Constitution by specifically enacting a law that discriminates based on a person’s religion. Documented evidence of persecution of the Islamic minority sects such as the Shias[39] [40], Baloch[41] and Ahmadis[42] [43] in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan is existent. Therefore, the contention that people belonging to Islamic sects would not have faced persecution in Muslim-majority countries is misconceived and simply wrong. Unlike Israel[44], India does not have a ‘Law of Return’. The Preamble of the Indian Constitution recognises the India as a secular state. This has also been reiterated in landmark Supreme Court decisions, whereby the principle of secularism has been recognised as one of the basic structures of the Constitution.[45] Therefore, the fact that the Citizenship Amendment Act discriminates migrants based on their religion, makes is fundamentally unconstitutional.

    Further, the Act seems to operate vis-à-vis three Muslim-majority countries. However, India hosts a large number of refugees and migrants from other neighbouring countries also, particularly Myanmar, Nepal, China and Sri Lanka.[46]There has been no clarification rendered as to the rationale behind including only Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh. Finally, unlike the cut-off date mentioned in the Assam Accord, the date of December 31, 2014 lacks rationale and therefore comes across as arbitrary. While the NRC process is already criticised for being exclusionary, the effect of NRC combined with the operation of provisions of the Citizenship Amendment Act seems to benefit the non-Muslim communities mentioned in the Act while disadvantaging the Muslim migrants whose names did not figure in the list. This essentially pushes the latter into a predicament of statelessness. It has to be noted here that this legislation is not merely discriminatory, but also wildly inconsistent with India’s obligations under International law.

    India’s Approach to Statelessness in the Past

    The outcome of NRC-CAA is not the first time India had to deal with the issue of statelessness. India has taken steps to mitigate the risks and consequences of statelessness in the past. The situation of enclave dwellers being a key example. Chittmahal or enclaves are pieces of land that belonged to East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), yet remained in India, and vice versa. After the India-Pakistan partition in 1947 and the boundary limitations thenceforth, the enclave dwellers were essentially cut-off from access to their country of nationality as they were surrounded by foreign land, eventually pushing them into a state of de facto statelessness. Therefore, crossing borders for daily engagements became an illegal activity.[47] The hostility that ensued from the Partition reflected in the control of these enclaves. In the year 1952, both countries tightened visa policies, making their borders rigid. This trapped the enclave dwellers in a state of virtual lockdown.[48]Despite the sovereignty shift in 1971, with the creation of the independent nation state of Bangladesh, the plight of enclave dwellers remained unaddressed. On the other hand, the Bangladeshi enclave dwellers in India also lived under the constant fear of being arrested under the Foreigners Act of 1946.[49] The very first headcount in enclaves was conducted by state authorities only in the year 2011.[50] After decades of failed negotiations between India and Bangladesh, a Land-Boundary Agreement  was finally implemented on 31 July 2015 at the Indo-Bangladesh border.[51] Despite this being a significant step towards progress, several scholars[52] have noted the continuity of the plight of erstwhile enclave-dwellers even after the Land-Boundary Agreement.[53] Since census had never been conducted in these area, the issue of identity crisis is quite prominent. Enclave dwellers are reported to own false voter ID cards and educational documents to “avoid becoming an illegal migrant”.[54] At this point, it is important to note the potential effects of an NRC process being implemented in the State of West Bengal (as promised by the ruling government) and its implications for enclave-dwellers. The identity crisis already existing within the enclaves, the errors in their identity cards, the threat of being suspected as a foreigner has been exacerbated by the looming NRC-CAA process.[55]

    Another group of people that was forced to face the plight of statelessness due to the post-colonial repercussions, are the Hill Tamils from Sri Lanka. The Shrimavo-Shastri Pact of 1964 and the subsequent Shrimavo- Gandhi Pact 1974 were significant steps taken towards addressing the problems of the Hill Tamils.[56] However, there are a group of Hill Tamils who are stateless or at a risk of becoming stateless in India. The change in legislation in Sri Lanka, their displacement to India and their lack of birth registration and documentation has continued to add to their plight.[57] Despite qualifying for citizenship by naturalization under Sec.5 of the Citizenship Act, the fact that the Amendment Act has overlooked the plight of Hill Tamils is disappointing.[58]

    In 1964, owing to the construction of the Kaptai hydroelectric project over the river Karnaphuli,  the Chakmas and Hajongs were displaced and forced to migrate to India from the Chittagong Hill Tracts of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).[59] Although the Indian government encouraged them to settle in the Area of North East Frontier Agency (now Arunachal Pradesh), they have not been granted citizenship. With neither States claiming them as nationals, these indigenous people have essentially been pushed into a state of de jure statelessness. In the case of Committee for Citizenship Rights of the Chakmas of Arunachal Pradesh (CCRCAP) v The State of Arunachal Pradesh, the apex court upheld the rights of the Chakmas to be protected by the State of Arunachal Pradesh under Art. 21 of the Indian Constitution and also said that they “have a right to be granted citizenship subject to the procedure being followed”.[60]Now, the Citizenship Amendment Act would help in materialising the right to be granted citizenship of the Chakmas as upheld by the Supreme Court.

    Just the fact that the CAA offers comfort and chaos respectively depending on the religious inclinations of the stateless populations in India, is a major red flag.

    India has undeniably taken various steps towards protection of refugee populations and mitigating the risks of statelessness under several circumstances. In the year 1995, India also became a member of the UNHCR Executive Committee and has been playing an important part in reformulating international legal instruments concerning refugees and stateless persons. However, despite assuming such a pivotal position in the Executive Committee, the fact that India lacks a framework regulating the treatment meted out to refugees and stateless persons, thereby resulting in the absolute reliance of socio-politically motivated ad-hoc governmental policies, is worth criticising. Just the fact that the CAA offers comfort and chaos respectively depending on the religious inclinations of the stateless populations in India, is a major red flag.

    International and National Legal Framework on Statelessness in India

    The definition and standard of treatment for a Stateless person is enumerated in the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.[61] This convention is the most comprehensive codification of the rights of stateless persons yet. It seeks to ensure the fundamental human rights of a person and freedom from discrimination against stateless persons. Although the Convention does not entitle a stateless person to acquire the nationality of a specific state, it does require state parties to take steps towards facilitating their naturalization and integration.[62] On the other hand, the 1961 Convention on Reduction of Statelessness provides a directive to States for the prevention and reduction of statelessness.[63] However, as India is a party to neither conventions, as in the case of refugees, we are left to resort to other international human rights instruments that India has signed and ratified.

    The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, although a non-binding instrument, has been recognised for contributing to customary international human rights. Art. 15 of the UDHR provides that ‘everyone has the right to a nationality’[64] and that ‘no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality’.[65] Although the principles enshrined under the UDHR are not legally binding, it is pertinent to note that the CAA directly contravenes the right to nationality mentioned above. Further, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 mandates the parties to the convention to ensure that the rights recognized in the Covenant be upheld without any discrimination of any kind in terms of race, colour, sex, language, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.[66] The Convention also guarantees the right of every child to acquire a nationality.[67]The Convention provides that State parties must ensure the protection of the rights of stateless people, without discrimination including under the law.[68] Despite having acceded to the Convention on April 10, 1979, by virtue of enacting the Citizenship Amendment Act and the operational effects of the NRC process combined with the Act is in clear violation of India’s obligations under the ICCPR.

    Art. 12(4) of the ICCPR can be used particularly in favour of India’s obligations to protect stateless persons. Art. 12(4) states that, ‘No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country’. The phrase ‘no one’ under this provision allows scope for inclusion of nationals and aliens within its ambit. Therefore, we ought to analyse the phrase ‘own country’ in order to determine the beneficiaries of this provision. The General Comments of the Human Rights Committee remain the most authoritative interpretation of the ICCPR that is available to State Parties. With regard to Art. 12(4) of the Covenant, the General Comment reiterates that the phrase ‘own country’ does not refer to the concept of nationality alone. It also includes individuals who by virtue of their special ties or claims in relation to a given country, cannot be considered an alien.[69]The General Comment specifically mentions that this interpretation is to be applied in case where nationals of a country are stripped of their nationality in violation of international law.[70] It also states that the interpretation of Art. 12(4) might be read to include with its scope, ‘stateless persons arbitrarily deprived of the right to acquire the nationality of the country of such residence’.[71] In order to understand the concept of special ties and claims as mentioned in the General Comment on Art. 12(4), we may also refer to the concept of ‘genuine and effective link’ as dealt by the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm Case.[72] The ICJ upheld that although different factors are taken into consideration in every case, the elements of “habitual residence of the individual concerned”, “the centre of his interests” i.e. “his family ties, his participation in public life, attachment shown by him for a given country and inculcated in his children, etc.”[73] are significant in determining a “genuine and effective link” between the individual and the State in question. In India, the people who are facing or at a risk of facing the plight of statelessness are long term residents in India who may be both religiously and ethnically similar to Indian communities and therefore maintain a socio-cultural relationship with India.[74] Under such circumstances, the individuals in question evidently qualify for protection from arbitrary deprivation of the right to enter their own country (India), under Art. Art. 12(4) of the ICCPR.

    Further, by denying citizenship or nationality to people based on religion, India risks effectively excluding stateless persons from the loop of human rights itself. This also goes on to violate India’s commitments under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. Besides Section 3 of the Indian Citizenship Act[75] which deprives a child Indian citizenship by birth in case of either of his parents being an illegal immigrant, the NRC process has also rendered several children Stateless. This violates India’s obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child (CRC), to which India has acceded. Article 7 of the Convention mandates state parties to provide nationality to the children immediately after birth.[76]Thus, the Indian citizenship policy runs contrary to a number of international legal obligations of India. Article 51(c) of the Indian Constitution mandates the government to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations.

    Despite the very evident gap in India’s legal framework on statelessness, Indian Courts have not dealt with the issue in detail. Nevertheless, the Courts have taken innovative approaches to avoid the occurrence of statelessness by applying principles of equity and justice.[77] In the case of Namgyal Dolkar vs. Government of India[78], in 2011, the Delhi High Court upheld, as per Sec.3 of the Citizenship Act that people born in India cannot be denied citizenship and the right to nationality based on their description in the identity certificate. In the case of Sheikh Abdul Aziz vs. NCT of Delhi[79], a ‘foreigner’ in India was detained in Kashmir for entering the country illegally. He was later shifted to the Tihar Central Jail to await deportation proceedings. The deportation proceedings were not executed for several years. In the year 2014, on the basis of the Delhi High Court’s direction to identify the nationality of the Individual, the state identified him to be stateless. Consequently, the State declared that the petitioner could approach the passport office to acquire identification papers and thereby apply for a long-term visa later on.[80] While this case indicates the role of Indian judiciary in identifying and providing relief to stateless persons, it also serves as an illustration of the attitude of the State towards stateless persons. This can be alluded to the fact that a concrete legal framework or mechanism to deal with stateless persons and the data and awareness on stateless persons is practically non-existent. The impact of such lacuna is also evident in the NRC-CAA process in Assam.

    Plight of Stateless People in Assam

    Although the Indian Ministry of External Affairs has communicated that the people excluded from the final draft of NRC would not be put in detention centres until their case is decided by the Foreigners Tribunal[81], the future of people whose cases are rejected by the Tribunal has been left mysteriously evaded. The Detention centres in Assam were originally intended for short-term detention of undocumented immigrants. In the case of Harsh Mander vs. Union of India[82], the Supreme Court of India dealt with important legal questions on the condition of detention centres and indefinite detention of ‘foreigners’. The government of Assam presented a plan to secure the monitored release foreigners who had been in detention centres more than five years on paying a hefty deposit and signing a bond. Ironically, this case which was filed to draw the attention of the apex court to the inhumane conditions in detention centres in Assam, turned into exhortation[83] to the government to work proactively on deporting individuals.[84] Although India does not have any legislation to protect stateless people from being deported to regularise their status or grant them citizenship, it does have legislation in place to deport illegal migrants. The Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunal) Act 1983, which gave the migrants a right to appeal and placed the burden of proof on the government was declared ultra vires by the Supreme Court of India in 2005 and is no longer valid.[85] In the Harsh Mander case, the Supreme Court directed “the Union of India to enter into necessary discussions with the Government of Bangladesh to streamline the procedure of deportation”[86]. Deportation, however, is not a unilateral exercise. Such processes usually follow negotiations and bilateral agreements for the readmission of nations of relevant country.[87] There has been no documented of India entering into diplomatic talks with Bangladesh regarding the issue of statelessness. Also, as recently as October 2017, it has been reported that the Bangladesh Information Minister, Hasanull Haq Inu denied any unauthorised migration from Bangladesh to Assam in the past 30 years.[88] According to the data produced before the Parliament, over 117,000 people have been declared foreigners by the Foreigners Tribunal in Assam up to March 31, 2019, of whom only four have been deported until now. Across the six detention centres in Goalpara, Kokrajhar, Silchar, Dibrugarh, Jorhat and Tezpur in Assam, 1005 people reportedly remain jailed according to the data produced before the Assam Legislative Assembly on July 29, 2019.[89] As detention camps are located within the jail premises, persons marked as illegal immigrants are locked up along with those jailed for criminal offences or who are undertrial. The country’s largest detention camp in the Goalpara district of western Assam, in addition to 10 proposed camps in the state.[90] In the case of P. Ulaganathan vs. The Government of India[91], the Madras High Court deciding on a case concerning the plight of Sri Lankan Hill Tamils in India who have been held in detention camps for about 35 years, upheld that, “keeping them under surveillance and severely restricted conditions and in a state of statelessness for such a long period certainly offends their rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India”.[92] In the absence of any bilateral agreement dealing with deportation of the stateless persons who are allegedly Bangladeshi nationals, the detention of illegal immigrants seems short-sighted and ill-planned. Additionally, the lack of adequate documentation also makes it unlikely for the individuals to be deported to neighbouring countries in the near future. In addition to the apex court’s ratio in the P. Ulaganathan case on long periods of detention of stateless people, such an indefinite period of detention also violates India’s obligations under the ICCPR to uphold right to life,[93]right to dignity in detention[94] and the right against arbitrary deprivation of the right to enter his own country.[95]In their Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention, the UN High Commissioner on Refugees emphasize the importance of setting a definite period of detention. The Guideline states that, without a cap on the period of detention, it can become prolonged and indefinite, especially for stateless asylum-seekers.[96] In the absence of any legal regulation of detention of the people who are rendered stateless in India, the UNHCR guidelines on detention might serve as a good starting point. Although the guidelines explicitly state that they only apply to asylum seekers and stateless persons who are seeking asylum, it also states that the standards enshrined therein may apply mutatis mutandis to others as well.[97]

    Conclusion: The Way Forward

    Customary international law has placed certain limitations on a state’s power of conferment of citizenship. Article 1 of the Hague Convention 1930, states that “it is for each state to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be recognised by other states in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, International custom, and the principles of law generally recognised with regard to nationality”.[98] As explained above, this is not the case with regard to the NRC-CAA process in India. Firstly, in order to deal with the problem of statelessness in India, it is absolutely necessary to identify and acknowledge the gravity of it. The data on the number of stateless persons in India is practically non-existent. It is important for the government to undertake efforts to facilitate data collection on stateless persons in India. This would not only help in mapping the extent of the problem, but it would also facilitate legal professionals, researchers, humanitarian works and practitioners to reach out and offer help where necessary.

    Also, the presence of half-information and non-existence on specific data on the number of stateless persons and government policies vis-à-vis their treatment has allowed room for over-reliance on media sources and resulting confusion and frenzy. It might be important for the government to establish information hubs accessible to the common public to demystify data on statelessness and the rights that stateless persons are entitled to in India.  A database of legal professionals, human rights activists and government representatives should be available in all such places. This would go a long way in reducing unlawful and illegal detention. It would also force the government into exercising transparency in their detention policies.

    the combined effect of NRC and the Citizenship Amendment Act seems to be exclusionary and discriminatory. The Act is violative of the Indian constitutional principles and India’s international legal obligations.

    The absolute lack of a national and international legal framework on statelessness operating in India is a major drawback. While the rights enshrined under the international bill of human rights and other human rights instruments that India is a party to may be referred, it is not sufficient to fill the lacuna. This absence of a concrete legal framework may leave room for adverse predicaments such as arbitrary detention, human rights abuses, trafficking and forced displacement. Especially considering the number of people who have been disenfranchised by the latest draft of the NRC, the need for a law promising the basic human rights of the people who are rendered stateless is dire. India has also abstained from ratifying the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR 1976 and has thereby denied its people the access to the Individual Complaints Mechanism of the UNHRC. The International Court of Justice which is also vested with the power to address ICCPR violations, cannot investigate into the issue of India’s discriminatory and exclusionary Citizenship law as it is a sovereign act of the State.[99] Without the same being disputed by one or more States, the ICJ cannot exercise its power in this case.[100]

    Finally, as explained above, the combined effect of NRC and the Citizenship Amendment Act seems to be exclusionary and discriminatory. The Act is violative of the Indian constitutional principles and India’s international legal obligations. While reviewing the purpose and objective of the Citizenship Amendment Act is important, it is also important for the government to undertake negotiations with the Bangladesh government on the plight of the people who would soon be stateless. The indefinite detention of “foreigners” without a long-term plan in place, would result in grave human rights violations and would also be an expensive affair for India.

    Image Credit: opiniojuris.org 

     

     

    Notes

    [1] See generally IOM, WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2020 (IOM, Geneva, 2019), available at https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf , [accessed on 15 Feb 2020].

    [2] See generally Emmanuel Kalechi Iwuagwu, The Concept of Citizenship: Its Application and Denial in the Contemporary Nigerian Society, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH IN ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES, Vol. 8 No. 1.

    [3] Seyla Benhabib, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS – ALIENS, RESIDENTS AND CITIZENS, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004) P. 49-52

    [4] Ibid at P. 49

    [5] Ibid at P. 49, 50

    [6] Art. 1, Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 1954.

    [7] David Owen, On the Right to Have Nationality Rights: Statelessness, Citizenship and Human Rights, NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 2018, (65),  P. 301.

    [8] Supra note 1, P. 47.

    [9] Lily Chen et al, UNHCR Statistical Reporting on Statelessness, UNHCR STATISTICS TECHNICAL SERIES 2019, available at https://www.unhcr.org/5d9e182e7.pdf, [accessed on 17 Feb 2020].

    [10] See generally Nafees Ahmad, The Right to Nationality and the Reduction of Statelessness- The Responses of the International Migration Law Framework, GRONINGEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 5 No. 1.

    [11] UNHCR, “This is our Home”- Stateless Minorities and their search for citizenship, UNHCR STATELESSNESS REPORT 2017, available athttps://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/wp-content/uploads/UNHCR_EN2_2017IBELONG_Report_ePub.pdf, P. 1, [accessed on 17 Feb 2020].

    [12] Ibid

    [13] Mathew J. Gibney, Denationalization and Discrimination, JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 2019, available at https://doi:10.1080/1369183X.2018.1561065 [accessed on 17 Feb 2020].

    [14] Antje Ellermann, Discrimination in Migration and Citizenship, JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 2019, available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1561053?needAccess=true, P. 7, [accessed on 17 Feb 2020].

    [15] Human Rights Watch, India: Citizenship Bill Discriminates Against Muslims, (11 Dec, 2019),  available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/12/11/india-citizenship-bill-discriminates-against-muslims, [accessed on 18 Feb 2020].

    [16]OHCHR, Press briefing on India, (13 Dec, 2019), available at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25425&LangID=E, [accessed on 18 Feb 2020].

    [17] USCIRF, USCIRF Raises Serious Concerns and Eyes Sanctions Recommendations for Citizenship Amendment Bill in India, Which Passed Lower House Today, (09 Dec, 2019), available at https://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/press-releases-statements/uscirf-raises-serious-concerns-and-eyes-sanctions, [accessed on 18 Feb 2020].

    [18] Manogya Loiwal, India Today, Assam NRC and BJP’s challenge: The votebank politics of NRC,  (31 Aug, 2019), available at https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/assam-nrc-bjp-challenge-votebank-politics-1593711-2019-08-31, [accessed on 18 Feb 2020].

    [19]All Assam Students Union (AASU) and All Assam Gan Sangram Parishad (AAGSP) were the major groups involved in this movement.

    [20] Sanjay Barbora, National Register of Citizens: Politics and Problems in Assam, E-JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY 2019, (3)2, available at  http://app.insoso.org/ISS_journal/Repository/Article_NRC.pdf, P. 14, [accessed on 19 Feb 2020].

    [21]Harrison Akins, The Religious Freedom Implications of the National Register of Citizens in India, USCIRF ISSUE BRIEF:INDIA 2019, available at https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2019%20India%20Issue%20Brief%20- %20Religious%20Freedom%20Implications.pdf, P.1, [accessed on 19 Feb 2020].

    [22] Ibid at P.2.

    [23] Assam Accord, Clause 5.8, available at https://assamaccord.assam.gov.in/portlets/assam-accord-and-its-clauses, [accessed on 19 Feb 2020].

    [24] Assam Public Works v Union of India and Ors. [Writ Petition (Civil) No. 274 of 2009]

    [25] Alok Prasanna Kumar, National Register of Citizens and the Supreme Court, LAW & SOCIETY 2018, (53)29, available at https://www.academia.edu/37909102/National_Register_of_Citizens_and_the_Supreme_Court, P. 11, [accessed on 19 Feb 2020].

    [26]Tora Agarwala, The Indian Express, Assam Citizenship List: Names missing in NRC final draft, 40 ;akh ask what next,  (30 Jul 2018), available at https://indianexpress.com/article/north-east-india/assam/assam-citizenship-list-names-missing-in-nrc-final-draft-40-lakh-ask-what-next-5283663/, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [27] Amit Ranjan, Assam’s National Register of Citizenship: Background, Process and Impact of the Final Draft, ISAS WORKING PAPER 2018, No. 306, available at https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ISAS-Working-Papers-No.-306-Assams-National-Register-of-Citizenship.pdf, P.2, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [28] Sangeeta Barooah Pisharoty, The Wire, Both the BJP and the Trinamool Congress are Stirring the Communal Pot in Assam, (05 Aug 2018), available at https://thewire.in/politics/bjp-tmc-nrc-assam-communalism

    [29] Supra note 27, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [30]Abhishek Saha, The Indian Express, Assam NRC List: No person will be referred to Foreiners’ Tribunal or sent to detention centre based on final draft, (30 Jul 2018),  https://indianexpress.com/article/north-eastindia/assam/assam-nrc-list-final-draft-foreigners-tribunal-detention-centre-5282652/, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [31] Ditilekha Sharma, Determination of Citizenship through Lineage in the Assam NRC is Inherently Exclusionary, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY, Apr 2019, available at https://www.epw.in/node/154137/pdf, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [32] Angshuman Choudhury, National Register of Citizens (NRC): A Synonym for Deep Anxiety, THE CITIZEN , 2019, available at https://www.academia.edu/40257016/National_Register_of_Citizens_NRC_A_Synonym_for_Deep_Anxiety, P. 3, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [33] Anusaleh Shariff, ‘National Register of Indian Citizens’ (NRIC) – Does the Assam Experience help Mainland States?, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY, 2019, available at  https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337366837_’National_Register_of_Indian_Citizens’_NRIC_-_Does_the_Assam_Experience_help_Mainland_States, P. 18, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [34] Supra note 27 at P. 8-11.

    [35] The Citizenship Act 1955, No.57 of 1955, Sec. 2(1) (b).

    [36] The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, No. 47 of 2019, Sec. 2.

    [37] The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, No. 47 of 2019, Sec. 6.

    [38] Narendar Nagarwal, Global Implications of India’s Citizenship Amendment Act 2019, (Jan 2020), available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338673204_Global_Implications_of_India’s_Citizenship_Amendment_Act_2019, P. 3, [accessed on 2 Mar 2020].

    [39] Human Rights Watch, “We are the Walking Dead” – Killings of Shia Hazara in Balochistan, Pakistan, Jun 2014, available athttps://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/pakistan0614_ForUplaod.pdf, [accessed on 2 Mar 2020].

    [40] Anon, The State of Minorities in Afghanistan, SOUTH ASIA STATE OF MINORITIES REPORT 2018, available at http://www.misaal.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/afghanistan.pdf, P. 282, [accessed on 2 Mar 2020].

    [41] Human Rights Watch, “We can Torture, Kill, or Keep Your for Years” – Enforced Disappearances by Pakistam Security Forces in Balochistan, Jul 2011, available at https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/pakistan0711WebInside.pdf, [accessed on 2 Mar 2020].

    [42]UK: Home Office, Country of Origin Information Report, Aug 2019, available at  https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=search&docid=5209feb94&skip=0&query=Ahmediyas%20&coi=PAK, P. 142, [accessed on 2 Mar 2020].

    [43] Human Rights Watch, History of the Ahmadiyya Community, n.d., available at https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/bangladesh0605/3.htm, [accessed on 2 Mar 2020].

    [44] The Law of Return, 1950 in Israel established Israel as Jewish State based on the Zionist Philosophy which is also reflected in their citizenship policies.

    [45] Keshavananda Bharati v State of Kerela, AIR 1973 SC 1461

    [46] Supra note 38.

    [47] Deboleena Sengupta, What Makes A Citizen: Everyday Life in India-Bangladesh Enclaves, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY (53), 15 Sep 2018, available at https://www.epw.in/engage/article/chhit-spaces-a-look-at-life-and-citizenship-in-india-bangladesh-enclaves [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [48] Prachi Lohia, Forum Asia, Erstwhile enclaves in India: A post-LBA Analysis, 10 Dec 2019, available at https://www.forum-asia.org/uploads/wp/2019/12/Enclave-Report-Final-2.pdf, P. 7, [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [49] Ibid

    [50] Ibid

    [51] For the current state of erstwhile enclave-dwellers in India, see supra note 48 and also Prasun Chaudhari, The TelegraphThe same old story in Chittmahal, (12 May 2019), available at https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/the-same-old-story-in-chhitmahal/cid/1690343 [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [52] Supra note 48.

    [53] Sreeparna Banerjee et al., The 2015 India-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement: Identifying Constraints and Exploring Possibilities in Cooh Behar, ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER, Jul 2017, P.5, available at https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/ORF_OccasionalPaper_117_LandBoundary.pdf  [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [54] Ibid.

    [55] Supra note 48, P. 45.

    [56] V. Suryanarayanan, Challenge of Statelessness- The Indian Response, IIC Occasional Publication  (88), , (n.d.), available at http://www.iicdelhi.nic.in/writereaddata/Publications/636694277561224320_Occasional%20Publication%2088.pdf, P. 3, [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [57] See UNHCR, Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: UPR 27th Sessions, Aug 2016, available at https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=search&docid=5a12b5420&skip=0&query=stateless&coi=IND, P. 2, [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [58] Supra note 56, P. 16.

    [59] Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group, Executive Summary of the Report on ‘The State of Being Stateless: A Case Study of the Chakmas of Arunachal Pradesh, (n.d.), available at http://www.mcrg.ac.in/Statelessness.pdf [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [60] Committee for Citizenship Rights of the Chakmas of Arunachal Pradesh (CCRCAP) v The State of Arunachal Pradesh, [WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.510 OF 2007]

    [61] Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 1954, Art. 1, 7.

    [62] Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 1954, Art. 32.

    [63]  See generally Convention on Reduction of Statelessness 1961.

    [64] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1945, Art. 15(1).

    [65] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1945, Art. 15(2).

    [66] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Art. 2.

    [67] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Art. 24

    [68] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Art. 26

    [69] CCPR General Comment No. 27: Article 12(Freedom of Movement), (Nov 2, 1999), ¶ 20 available at https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/45139c394.pdf

    [70] Ibid

    [71] Supra note 69.

    [72] Liechtenstein v. Guatemala (Nottebohm Case) 1955

    [73] Ibid, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. reports 1955, Rep 4.

    [74] Unnati Ghia, Suddenly Stateless: International law Implications of India’s New Citizenship Law, OPINIO JURIS, Feb 5, 2020, available at http://opiniojuris.org/2020/02/05/suddenly-stateless-international-law-implications-of-indias-new-citizenship-law/ [accessed on 16 Mar 2020].

    [75] The Citizenship Act, 1955, Act  No.  57  of  1955,  Sec. 3.

    [76] Convention  on  the  Rights  of  the  Child 1989, Art. 7.

    [77] Sitharamam Kakarala, India and the Challenge of Statelessness – A Review of the Legal Framework relating to Nationality, 2012, available at  http://nludelhi.ac.in/download/publication/2015/India%20and%20the%20Challenges%20of%20Statelessness.pdf, P. 61, [accessed on 5 Mar 2020].

    [78] Namgyal Dolkar vs. Government of India, [Writ Petition (Civil) 12179/2009]

    [79] Sheikh Abdul Aziz v. NCT of Delhi, [Writ Petition (Criminal) 1426/2013]

    [80] Aneesha Mathur, The Indian Express, ‘Stateless man’ to get visa, ID to stay in India, (29 May 2014), available at https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/stateless-man-to-get-visa-id-to-stay-in-india/, [accessed on 5 Mar 2020].

    [81]Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Statement by MEA on National Register of Citizens in Assam, (02 Sep 2019), available at https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/31782/Statement+by+MEA+on+National+Register+of+Citizens+in+Assam, [accessed on 5 Mar 2020].

    [82] Harsh Mander v Union of India, [Writ Petition (Civil) No.1045/2018].

    [83] Colin Gonsalves, Human Rights Law Network, Stateless and Marginalised in Assam, (18 Sep 2019), available at https://hrln.org/reporting_publications/nrc-violates-constitutional-morality-principles-of-international-law/, [accessed on 6 Mar 2020].

    [84] Supra note 82.

    [85] Sarbananda Sonawal v. Union of India, [Writ Petition (civil) 131 of 2000]

    [86] Supra note 82.

    [87] See generally, the Shrimavo-Shastri Accord, 1964 (1992).

    [88]Sanjib Baruah, The Indian Express, Stateless in Assam, (19 Jan 2018), available at https://epaper.indianexpress.com/c/25513604, [accessed on 10 Mar 2020].

    [89]The Economic Times, 1.17 lakh people declared as foreigners by tribunals in Assam,  (16 Jul 2019), available at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/1-17-lakh-people-declared-as-foreigners-by-tribunals-in-assam/articleshow/70244101.cms?from=mdr, [accessed on 10 Mar 2020].

    [90] Nazimuddin Siddique, Inside Assam’s Detention Camps: How the Current Citizenship Crisis Disenfranchises Indians, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY (55)7, Feb 2020, available at  https://www.epw.in/engage/article/inside-assams-detention-camps-how-current, [accessed on 10 Mar 2020].

    [91] P.Ulaganathan vs The Government Of India, [Writ Petition (MD)No.5253 of 2009]

    [92] Ibid

    [93] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Art. 6.

    [94] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Art. 10.

    [95] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Art. 12(4)

    [96] UNHCR, Detention Guidelines – Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention 2012, available at https://www.unhcr.org/publications/legal/505b10ee9/unhcr-detention-guidelines.html, P. 26, [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [97] Ibid, P. 8.

    [98] Nafees Ahmad, The Right to Nationality and the Reduction of Statelessness – The Responses of the International Migration Law Framework, GRONINGEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (5)1, Sep 2017, available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320244117_The_Right_to_Nationality_and_the_Reduction_of_Statelessness_-_The_Responses_of_the_International_Migration_Law_Framework, P. 3, [accessed on 16 Mar 2020].

    [99] Supra note 74.

    [100] International Court of Justice, Frequently Asked Questions, available at https://www.icj-cij.org/en/frequently-asked-questions , [accessed on 16 Mar 2020].

  • Consolidating India-ASEAN Strategic Partnership under Chairmanship of Vietnam

    Consolidating India-ASEAN Strategic Partnership under Chairmanship of Vietnam

    During the first six months of the year, there were 26 meetings and most of these were through video-conferencing, exhibiting a high degree of commitment by the ASEAN under the Chairmanship of Vietnam.    

    Vietnam’s Chairmanship of the ASEAN comes at a time of immense turbulence marked by COVID-19 pandemic, disruption in the global supply chains resulting in economic recession among major economies, and strategic instability in the Indo-Pacific region marked by high tensions between the United States and China in the South China Sea. However, the ASEAN calendar of engagements with its Partner countries has remained busy, and Vietnam has spearheaded the Organisation with adeptness and alacrity and sustained the momentum of the ASEAN’s mandate through meetings and conversations.  During the first six months of the year, there were 26 meetings and most of these were through video-conferencing, exhibiting a high degree of commitment by the ASEAN under the Chairmanship of Vietnam.

     On 16 June 2020, at the 20th ASEAN-India Joint Cooperation Committee Meeting, through a video conference, India and the ASEAN “reaffirmed their commitment to further strengthen and deepen their cooperation.” Both sides noted the progress made for the implementation of the ASEAN-India Plan of Action (2016-2020), and “shared their commitment to complete the development of the new Plan of Action for 2021-2025 to further strengthen their strategic partnership over the next five years”.[i]

    A month later Secretary (East), Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), India, participated in the 22nd annual meeting of the Senior officials of ASEAN countries and India, and commended Viet Nam’s ASEAN chairmanship. Both sides “agreed to continue assisting each other’s citizens affected by the coronavirus outbreak”; provide “ASEAN countries with detailed information about the Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative proposed by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the 16th ASEAN-India Summit in 2019”; welcomed “ASEAN bringing into play its role in fostering cooperation, dialogue and trust building in the region”; and conveyed India’s support for “efforts to seriously and fully implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea and build an efficient and effective Code of Conduct in the waters in line with international law and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea”.[ii]

    COVID-19 Pandemic

    India and ASEAN are confronted with COVID-19 pandemic and there is ample evidence that both sides have conveyed their intention to fight the pandemic together. Prime Minister Modi engaged the leaders of Indonesia, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam through telephonic conversations and assured support to ASEAN Member States. Likewise, Indian Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla has had weekly tele-conversations with counterparts from US, Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Vietnam to share ideas and best practices in the Indo-Pacific region for responding to COVID-19 pandemic.[iii]

    It is an opportune moment for the officials of the health departments in India and ASEAN to set up a dedicated virtual platform/dashboard designated as ‘India-ASEAN Meeting for Health Development (AI-MHD) that can be pluggedinto the ‘ASEAN Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) Network, the ASEAN Risk Assessment and Risk Communication Centre, the ASEAN Bio Diaspora Virtual Center (ABVC) and the ASEAN Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) for future public health emergencies’.

     India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jayashankar, in his remarks at the 6th Roundtable Meeting of ASEAN-India Network of Think Tanks (AINTT), noted that “the impact of the Coronavirus has been beyond our collective imagination. Current estimates put the cumulative loss in the range of USD 5.8-8.8 trillion or approximately 6.5-9.7% of the global GDP.[iv]

    ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific (AOIP)

    India has acknowledged the importance of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific (AOIP) and New Delhi is committed to “explore cooperation in the key areas outlined in the AOIP, covering maritime cooperation, connectivity, sustainable development and economic cooperation, in order to contribute to the maintenance of peace, freedom and prosperity in the region”.[v] Similarly, ASEAN has endorsed synergies in various sectors and promoted regional frameworks under India’s Act East Policy, and SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision. Although health and pandemic issues are conspicuously absent in the AIOP and SAGAR, but these are surely part of the broader thematic issues contained therein.

    India is committed to positive contribution to ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus). It is a staunch believer of ‘rule of law’ and India believes that a Code of Conduct is a useful solution to reduce tensions in the South China Sea.

    On November 04, 2019, Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched the Indo Pacific Oceans’ Initiative (IPOI) at the East Asia Summit held in Bangkok, Thailand.[vi] It is an “ an open global initiative” and “ draws on existing regional cooperation architecture and mechanisms to focus on seven central pillars conceived around Maritime Security; Maritime Ecology; Maritime Resources; Capacity Building and Resource Sharing; Disaster Risk Reduction and Management; Science, Technology and Academic Cooperation; and Trade Connectivity and Maritime Transport.”

    Cooperation, Dialogue and Trust Building

    India is committed to positive contribution to ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus). It is a staunch believer of ‘rule of law’ and India believes that a Code of Conduct is a useful solution to reduce tensions in the South China Sea. India’s Foreign Minister has stated that India is working in conjunction with Vietnam and “responses to that (CoC) are being handled by the Vietnamese and that is the way it should be,” [vii]

                Finally, it has been noted that “as we come out of this pandemic, let us be clear on one fact. The world will never be the same again. That means new thinking, fresh ideas, more imagination and greater openness. We need to go beyond orthodoxies, whether of trade, politics or security. These are domains that all of you debate regularly and I am sure today you will have a very productive discussion.”[viii]  It is useful for ASEAN and India to explore commonalities and convergences in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific (AOIP) and the Indo Pacific Oceans’ Initiative (IPOI). In this context, Vietnam has the unique opportunity to further expand, deepen and strengthen the ASEAN India Strategic Partnership.

     

    Notes

    [i] “ASEAN, India strengthen cooperation”, https://asean.org/asean-india-strengthen-cooperation/ (accessed 20 August 2020).

    [ii] “ASEAN, Indian senior officials gather at online 22nd meeting”, https://www.asean2020.vn/xem-chi-tiet1/-/asset_publisher/ynfWm23dDfpd/content/asean-indian-senior-officials-gather-at-online-22nd-meeting (accessed 20 August 2020).

     

    [iii] “Cooperation among select countries of the Indo-Pacific in fighting COVID-19 pandemic”, https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/32691/Cooperation+among+select+countries+of+the+IndoPacific+in+fighting+COVID19+pandemic (accessed 20 August 2020).

    [iv] “Remarks by EAM during the 6th Roundtable Meeting of ASEAN-India Network of Think Tanks (AINTT)”,https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/32904/Remarks_by_EAM_during_the_6th_Roundtable_Meeting_of_ASEANIndia_Network_of_Think_Tanks_AINTT(accessed 20 August 2020).

    [v] “ASEAN Outlook On The Indo-Pacific” https://asean.org/storage/2019/06/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf (accessed 20 August 2020).

    [vi] “Ministry of External Affairs Indo-Pacific Division Briefs”, https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Indo_Feb_07_2020.pdf (accessed 20 August 20200.

    [vii] “Incident between Indian, Chinese militaries was ‘not skirmish but face-off’: Jaishankar”,https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/incident-between-indian-chinese-militaries-was-not-skirmish-but-face-off-  (accessed 20 August 2020).

    [viii] “Remarks by EAM during the 6th Roundtable Meeting of ASEAN-India Network of Think Tanks (AINTT)”, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/32904/Remarks_by_EAM_during_the_6th_Roundtable_Meeting_of_ASEANIndia_Network_of_Think_Tanks_AINTT (accessed 20 August 2020).

     

    Image Credit: Asia Times