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  • Responsible Decision-making in the Face of Corona – A Need for a Metric

    Responsible Decision-making in the Face of Corona – A Need for a Metric

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    Abstract

    The asymmetry of the human mind in treating the information that is currently available and the information we do not have is remarkable. During the Covid-19 pandemic, many people have been conscious to take precautions to prevent contracting the virus oneself or their family members. However, the consequences of a person infecting another are not consciously considered by everyone while going on about their ‘new normal’ life making daily transactions that involve the labour of a multitude of people. Nobody pauses to wonder whether anyone in the supply chain of the product or service consumed by an individual has contracted the virus or died due to the virus in the process of its production. This is because that information is unavailable to us in a tangible form for our minds to perceive and hence it chooses to ignore it. Although the number of cases increases with every wave, people have started accepting it or rather have become desensitised to the number of lives lost to Covid-19, mainly because these deaths are unseen. This article explores whether such a pondering – number of people infected and consequently lives compromised – would be a consideration in the decision-making in the production and consumption of products and services. If so, is there a need to develop a metric to inform us of this number? Would it be feasible to have such a metric? This article attempts to quantify these unseen deaths, so as to sensitise people to the consequences of a person getting infected.

    Introduction:

    Now, two years after the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, most people reading this would have lost one or more relatives, friends, colleagues or an acquaintance due to the infection. I am no exception. But the trigger for this article is the death of a couple, Razia and Nasir (names changed) that happened in the summer of 2021. Their small fruits and vegetable outlet, by a synergic arrangement, was situated within the spacious premises of another outlet – a cold storage that dispenses meat, poultry and fish for the upwardly mobile residents living in a posh locality of Bangalore. 

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  • Distress Migration: A case study of KBK districts in Odisha

    Distress Migration: A case study of KBK districts in Odisha

    The former districts of Koraput, Balangir and Kalahandi, also known as KBK districts, were reorganised into 8 districts of Koraput, Malkangiri, Nabarangpur, Rayagada, Balangir, Subarnapur, Kalahandi and Nuapada in 1992. These districts form the South-West part of Odisha comprising the great Deccan Plateau and the Eastern Ghats. These highland districts highly rich in mineral resources, flora and fauna remain as one of the most backward regions in Odisha

    Among the different forms of migration, distressed migrants remain the most impoverished and unrecognised. These migrants form the lowest strata of the society; disadvantaged by caste, poverty and structural inequalities. In Odisha, the underdeveloped region of KBK is one among the main sources of distressed migrants. They move to cities in search of employment and better wages, while in cities they are even more disadvantaged due to social, economic and linguistic barriers. Administrative and political apathy over their issues has only enhanced their distress.

    This paper attempts to address three questions:

    1. What are the characteristics of distressed migrants in KBK district, Odisha?
    2. What are the existing policies of the state to curb this form of migration?
    3. What form of government intervention is required to address this distress?

    The analysis is carried out through a review of published articles, government reports, e-books and newspaper reports.

    Defining distress migration

    Migration is a multifaceted concept driven by diverse factors. Migration can be internal or international, voluntary or involuntary, temporary or permanent. Depending on the pattern and choice of migration, each migratory trend could be characterised into different forms. Distress migration is one such form of migration.

    Involuntary migration is often associated with displacement out of conflict, environmental distress, climatic change etc. That is any sudden threat or event forces people to migrate. However, involuntary migration may also arise out of socio-economic factors such as poverty, food insecurity, lack of employment opportunities, unequal distribution of resources etc. This component of involuntary migration is addressed by the concept of distress migration (Avis, 2017).

    To understand distressed rural-urban migration in India, the broad definition used by Mander and Sahgal (2010) in their analysis of rural-urban migration in Delhi can be employed. They have discussed distress migration as:

    “Such movement from one’s usual place of residence which is undertaken in conditions where the individual and/or the family perceive that there are no options open to them to survive with dignity, except to migrate. Such distress is usually associated with extreme paucity of alternate economic options, and natural calamities such as floods and drought. But there may also be acute forms of social distress which also spur migration, such as fear of violence and discrimination which is embedded in patriarchy, caste discrimination, and ethnic and religious communal violence” ( Mander and Sahgal, 2010)

    In brief, the definition states that distress migration is caused by an array of issues. Environmental disasters, economic deprivation, gender or social oppression, lack of alternate employment opportunities and inability to survive with dignity are mentioned as the main drivers of distress migration (Avis, 2017).

    Thus, distress migration is a form of temporary migration driven by environmental and socio-economic factors and not based on an informed or voluntary choice.

    Profile of KBK districts

    The former districts of Koraput, Balangir and Kalahandi, also known as the KBK districts, were reorganised into 8 districts of Koraput, Malkangiri, Nabarangpur, Rayagada, Balangir, Subarnapur, Kalahandi and Nuapada in 1992. These districts form the South-West part of Odisha comprising the great Deccan Plateau and the Eastern Ghats. These highland districts highly rich in mineral resources, flora and fauna remain as one of the most backward regions in Odisha. The region is termed backward on account of rural backwardness, high poverty rates, low literacy rates, underdeveloped agriculture and poor development of infrastructure and transportation (Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 2021).

    The districts are home to primitive tribal communities such as Gonds, Koyas, Kotias etc. dependent on forest produce and subsistence agriculture for a living. KBK region registered a workforce participation rate of 48.06 % in the 2011 census. There was a significant occupation change noticed from the 2011 census.  The region witnessed a fall in cultivators from 33% in 2001 to 26.7% in 2011. However, the fall in cultivators was compensated with an increase in agricultural labourers from 44.24 % in 2001 to 48.87% in 2011. Employment in household industries also witnessed a downfall between the period of 2001 to 2011 (Sethy, 2020).

    The rise in agricultural labourers has a negative impact on the communities. As agriculture is underdeveloped owing to the arid nature of the region, crop failure, extreme calamities, low net irrigated area and falling government expenditure, these workers are pushed into abject poverty. In search of alternate employment options, these workers migrate to other areas of employment in rural or urban pockets. Such a form of seasonal migration during the lean period in agriculture is a predominant phenomenon in these districts. Their dependence on non-timber forest produce is hindered by the rapid deterioration and deforestation of forests for development projects and mining.

    Characteristics of distressed migrants in KBK region

    1. Who Are These Distressed Migrants?

    In the KBK region, distress migration has been a popular coping strategy during lean periods of agriculture. And this strategy is majorly adapted by disadvantaged and marginalised sections of the region. They are disadvantaged by caste, chronic poverty, landlessness, low levels of literacy and skills, increased dependence on forest and agriculture and debt-ridden (Meher, 2017; Mishra D.K., 2011; Tripathy, 2015, 2021).

    1. Why Do They Migrate

    Distressed migration in the region is induced by many interlinked factors. One such factor is that the region is highly under-developed in terms of social and economic infrastructure. Such under-development puts the communities at a disadvantage with low levels of literacy and skills. Their dependence on agriculture and forest produce for livelihood rises. However, agriculture is under-developed and forests are subjected to high levels of deforestation. With low levels of income, crop failure and non-availability of alternate employment opportunities, the communities are subjected to absolute levels of poverty, food and employment insecurities (Kujur, 2019).

    Landlessness is also identified as one significant push factor. As the region is highly dominated by tribal communities, they are more attached to and dependent on the forest cover. Globalisation and industrialisation resulted in deforestation and encroachment of farmlands for industrial and mining purposes. Eventually, a major proportion of land remains with a smaller group of wealthy people (Mishra D.K., 2011).   Relocation and involuntary displacement also result in the loss of their livelihood that is dependent on the local environment (Jaysawal & Saha, 2016).

    With falling income, people approach local moneylenders to meet their basic sustenance needs. With low incomes from agriculture and forest produce, families approach these informal creditors to meet emergency needs like marriage, birth and death rituals or medical treatment as well as to meet basic consumption needs with the expectation of cash flow from labour contractors during the lean season. Moneylenders exploit them by charging higher interest rates. Thus, the non-availability of formal credit facilities pushes them into a debt trap and further to adopt migration (KARMI, 2014; Mishra D.K., 2016).

    The region is also subject to extreme calamities and drought. Small and marginal farmers, poor in income and land, choose to migrate as they are unable to cope with the regular droughts and climate change. A study on historical analysis of the effect of climate on migration in Western Odisha mentions that the migratory trend saw a rise after the mega drought in 1965. Up until then, large-scale migration from the region was not a phenomenon (Panda, 2017).

     

    1. Channel of Migration

    Sardars provide an advance amount and in exchange, the debtor or any family member agrees to work for them for a stipulated period, usually six months. Hence, there exists a form of debt bondage. Large-scale family migration through this system is seen in the KBK region. The major stream of such bonded labour migration is witnessed towards brick kilns in Andhra Pradesh

    In the region, seasonal migration occurs through the channels of agents, locally known as Sardars, on a contractual basis. This form of migration is known as Dadan labour migration. The poor migrant labourers are known as Dadan and they are recruited by Sardars, who are usually local people who are familiar with residents in the region (KARMI, 2014). During the period of Nukhai, they go around the villages and contact prospective labourers. These Sardars are the intermediary between the employer and the migrant labourer. Sardars provide an advance amount and in exchange, the debtor or any family member agrees to work for them for a stipulated period, usually six months. Hence, there exists a form of debt bondage. Large-scale family migration through this system is seen in the KBK region. The major stream of such bonded labour migration is witnessed towards brick kilns in Andhra Pradesh. They are also a major source of labour in the areas of construction, handlooms and other forms of informal sector work across South India (Daniels, 2014). The problems they face in the destination are manifold. They are subjected to poor working conditions, poor housing and sanitation facilities and limited access to education and health facilities. They are recognised as cheap labour with limited bargaining power owing to their social, cultural and linguistic exclusion in the destination state. Upon entering the contract their freedom to move and freedom to express is denied (Acharya, 2020).

    1. Pull Factors to Migrate

    The hope of availability of better job opportunities and wages is the main pull factor. However, upon the analysis of the nature of migration, push factors have a higher weightage in inducing such distress migration. Migration to brick kilns and other informal sectors from the KBK region can be termed as distress migration as in this case, distress is caused mainly by socioeconomic factors. It is not an informed or voluntary choice. Debt migration remains the only coping strategy that they could adopt.

    Government intervention to curb such distress

    1. Policies Addressing Debt-Bondage Migration:

    The first attempt of the state government to address Dadan migration or debt migration is the enactment of the Dadan Labour (Control and Regulation) Act (ORLA) in 1975. The act had provisions for the registration of labourers and agents, ensuring compliance of minimum wages and favourable working conditions and appointing inspection officers and dispute redressal committees (Daniels, 2014).  However, the act remained on paper and no evidence of enactment was published until it was repealed in 1979 upon the enactment of the Interstate Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979 (Nanda, 2017).

    The ISMW act has been criticised to be inadequate and failing to regulate and facilitate safe migration. According to the act, only those interstate migrant workmen who are recruited by licensed agents come under the ambit of the act. However, most agents involved in Dadan migration are not licensed and hence, these workers cannot avail of any of the provisions of the act (Singh, 2020). Though registration of labour contractors is mandatory in the origin state, there is no information about the names of these contractors and hence, further monitoring of the migration process is avoided (NCABL, 2016). Lack of adequate enforcement, under-staffing and poor infrastructure are identified as the reasons for poor implementation of the act in the state (Daniels, 2014).

    A positive attempt against distress migration was the Memorandum of Undertaking (MoU) initiated between the labour department of Odisha and Andhra Pradesh to ensure labour welfare measures of migrant workers in Brick Kilns. After the MoU, the state of undivided Andhra Pradesh took up various progressive measures in education, health, housing and PDS for migrant workers in Brick Kilns. ILO necessitated the need for states to enter into inter-state MoUs to effectively address the bonded labour migration. However, no further MoU was signed with other states like Tamil Nadu, Chhattisgarh etc. which are also among the major host states for migrants from the region (NCABL, 2016).

    The Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act enacted in 1976 governs the provisions for identification, rescue and rehabilitation of bonded labourers across the country. The act has its loopholes in implementation. There is no information on whether vigilance committees have been set up in every district or whether the surveys have been periodically conducted or to what extent the act has been functioning in the state (Post News Network, 2019). The centrally sponsored scheme for Rehabilitation of Bonded Labour also has its setbacks. There have been reported cases of delay and denial of financial aid by district officials ( Mishra .S., 2016). In 2016, with restructuring and revamping of the Rehabilitation scheme, rescued workers could only avail the full amount of financial aid with the prosecution of the accused employers. With no database on the employer, the rates of prosecution have been low and the rescued bonded labour do not receive their funds (NACBL, 2016)

    1.  Ensuring Accessibility of Health Facilities in Destination

    The Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana or RSBY launched by the central government in 2008 provides health insurance to BPL families. The scheme incorporates provisions to split smart cards so those migrant workers could avail health insurance in destination states. After signing of the MoU between Andhra Pradesh and Odisha, the two states took steps to spreading awareness among the migrant workers about how to use the smart cards (Inter-State Migrant Workman Act (ISMW), Labour Directorate, n.d.)

    1. Ensuring Education of Migrant Workers Children

    The state of Odisha has established seasonal hostels to ensure the education of children of migrant workers.  The children are enrolled in seasonal hostels during October-June, that is until their parents return home (Odisha Primary Education Programme Authority, n.d.).  The state has ensured the education of migrant children at their destination state by sending Odiya textbooks and Odiya teachers to residential schools in Andhra Pradesh (Inter-State Migrant Workman Act (ISMW), Labour Directorate, n.d.).

    1. Alternate Employment Opportunities: MGNREGA

    Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) was introduced in 2006 to provide guaranteed employment to rural poor with the objective of uplifting them from poverty and restricting distress migration.  A study analysing the performance of MGNREGA through secondary sources of data suggests that based on physical criteria of 100 Days of Wage Employment, Person-days generated, ST and Women person-days and financial performance in terms of total expenditure, total wages, average cost and average wage rate per day person, the performance of MGNREGA in KBK districts is better compared to Non- KBK districts.  But the region is lagging in rural employability criteria based on average days of employment provided per household and job cards issued (Sahoo et al., 2018).  Labour in the region is not interested to work under MGNREGA due to its dismal implementation in the state. Workers complain about the delay in receiving payments and instances of the creation of non-existent workers’ names among MGNREGA’s beneficiaries (KARMI, 2014).  Uncertain and low wages make these labourers favour migration to Brick Kilns in hope of better wages (Deep, 2018).

    1. Development Policies in KBK Region

    The KBK region has a high incidence of poverty owing to regional disparities in development and social exclusion based on caste. The main initiatives implemented by the state government for the upliftment of the KBK region are the Special Area Development Programme, Revised Long Term Action Plan (RLTAP), Biju KBK Plan, Backward Regions Grants Fund, Gopabandhu Gramin Yojana (GGY), Special Central Assistance (SCA) for tribal sub-plan (TSP) areas, Western Odisha Development Council (WODC) and Grants under Article 275(1) of the Constitution. Development projects to reduce poverty and regional disparities are obstructed by economic, social and institutional factors (Mishra, 2020).

     

    The state of Odisha has done positive interventions in the education of migrant children and health facilities of the migrant population. However, the distress migration is still prevalent owing to the social and economic exclusion and debt bondage situations in the region. Land grabbing in the name of development left the tribal communities poor and in distress. Structural inequalities induced by caste discrimination are enhanced with such landlessness.

     

     

     

    Policy Recommendations

    The state of Odisha has done positive interventions in the education of migrant children and health facilities of the migrant population. However, the distress migration is still prevalent owing to the social and economic exclusion and debt bondage situations in the region. Several initiatives and schemes have been enacted to address distress migration; however, their failure in reducing distress can be linked to dismal governance, poor implementation and misappropriation of schemes.

    The state must ensure migration to be safe and a viable coping strategy. From this study it is suggested the state of Odisha follow a multipronged approach to address the distress.

    Origin state (Odisha) interventions

    •         Short Term Interventions:
    1. The system of debt bondage should be completely abolished by the proper implementation of legislation. Different loopholes in implementation such as the delay in the release of funds, prosecution of accused and identification and registration of middlemen should be addressed. Apart from the financial aid, the state should intervene in providing a comprehensive livelihood plan for the rescued labourers. Abolishing the bonded labour system is essential to reduce distress and make migration safe.
    2. Informal sources of credit should be eliminated and formal credit and microfinance facilities should be made available. Such facilities would reduce the exploitation and prevent the creation of absurd debt. Formal credit provides opportunities for small and marginal farmers to indulge in productive investments. This enables them to cope with extreme climatic changes.
    3. Land grabbing in the name of development left the tribal communities poor and in distress. Structural inequalities induced by caste discrimination are enhanced with such landlessness. The provision of land ownership enables the communities to enjoy land-based benefits which further supports them to sustain their livelihood. Ownership of land also provides the indigenous community with a sense of social and economic significance.
    •         Long term interventions
    1. The state should engage in enhancing the skills of the people in the region. Vocational skill training and development schemes can be introduced. This could expand the opportunities available for employment and distribute labour across all the economic sectors.
    2. Rural development should be given higher priority. The state of Odisha has already initiated many schemes for the development of the KBK region. However, the state should study the economic and social factors that stagnate the process of development in the region. Chronic poverty, poor infrastructural and rural connectivity and dismal education and health facilities are some of the important areas that require attention.

    Host state intervention

    1.   The host state needs to create a database of migrants entering their state. A statistically significant database on migrants solves a huge array of issues faced by the migrant in the destination state. A comprehensive database helps in identifying and recognising migrants. It also allows for understanding the different characteristics of migrants and the sectors in which they are employed. This would be beneficial for monitoring and ensuring safe and favourable working conditions. A database also helps in ensuring the availability and accessibility of social security and entitlements in host states.

     

    1.   Migrant labour is as important to the destination state as it is to the origin state. Both origin and host state should cooperate towards making migration a viable livelihood strategy.

    Another important area where both the origin and host state should intervene together is creating awareness among workers about the existing provisions and rights available to them. Access to the same should be made easy.

    Conclusion

    The highly backward districts of the KBK region remain a major source of distressed migrants. Years of state initiative in reducing distress have had negligible impact. The area remains underdeveloped and migration is the only viable choice of employment. Migration can only be a viable coping strategy for seasonal migrants when the channel of migration is made legal and safe. The major drawback in any initiative attempted to resolve distress is the poor implementation. Administrative apathy, corruption and misappropriation of schemes have stagnated the progress of every initiative.

     

    References

    1. Acharya, A. K. (2020). Caste-based migration and exposure to abuse and exploitation: Dadan labour migration in India. Contemporary Social Science, 1-13.
    2. Avis, W. R. (2017). Scoping study on defining and measuring distress migration.
    3. Bhatta Mishra, R. (2020). Distress migration and employment in indigenous Odisha, India: Evidence from migrant-sending households. World Development, 136, 105047.
    4. Daniels, U. (2014). Analytical review of the market, state and civil society response to seasonal migration from Odisha. Studies, stories and a canvas seasonal labour migration and migrant workers from Odisha, 106-115.
    5. Deep, S. S. Seasonal Migration and Exclusion: Educational Experiences of children in Brick Kilns. Ideas, Peoples and Inclusive Education in India. National Coalition for Education, India. 2018.
    6. Directorate of Economics and Statistics (2021). Odisha Economic Survey 2020-21. Planning and Convergence Department. Government of Odisha. http://www.desOdisha.nic.in/pdf/Odisha%20Economic%20Survey%202020-21-1.pdf
    7. Giri, J. (2009). Migration in Koraput: “In Search of a Less Grim Set of Possibilities” A Study in Four Blocks of tribal-dominated Koraput District, Odisha. Society for Promoting Rural Education and Development, Odisha, 1.
    8. Inter-State Migrant Workman Act (ISMW) | Labour Directorate. (n.d.). Labour Directorate, Government of Odisha. Retrieved August 10, 2021, from https://labdirodisha.gov.in/?q=node/63%27%3B.
    9. Jaysawal, N., & Saha, S. (2018). Impact of displacement on livelihood: a case study of Odisha. Community Development Journal, 53(1), 136-154.j
    10. Jena, M. (2018, July 21). Distress migration: land ownership can put a break. The Pioneer. https://www.dailypioneer.com/2018/state-editions/distress-migration-land-ownership-can-put-a-break.html
    11. KARMI. (2014). Migration Study Report of Golamunda Block of Kalahandi District of Odisha. Pp.13. Kalahandi Organisation of AgKriculture and Rural Marketing Initiative (KARMI), Kalahandi Odisha.
    12. Kujur, R. (2019). Underdevelopment and patterns of labour migration: a reflection from Bolangir district, Odisha. research journal of social sciences, 10(1).
    13. Mahapatra, S. K., & Patra, C. (2020). Effect of migration on agricultural growth & development of KBK District of Odisha: A statistical assessment. Journal of Pharmacognosy and Phytochemistry, Sp, 9(2), 162-167.
    14. Mander, H., & Sahgal, G. (2010). Internal migration in India: distress and opportunities, a study of internal migrants to vulnerable occupations in Delhi.
    15. Meher, S. K. (2017). Distress seasonal migration in rural Odisha A case study of Nuapada District.
    16. Mishra, D. K. (2011, April). Behind dispossession: State, land grabbing and agrarian change in rural Odisha. In International conference on global land grabbing(Vol. 6, No. 8).
    17. Mishra, D. K. (2016). Seasonal migration from Odisha: a view from the field. Internal migration in contemporary India, 263-290.
    18. Mishra, S. (2016, January 13). Rescued migrant workers get raw deal from Govt. The Pioneer. https://www.dailypioneer.com/2016/state-editions/rescued-migrant-workers-get-raw-deal-from-govt.html
    19. Mishra, S. (2020). Regional Disparities in Odisha–A Study of the Undivided “Kbk” Districts. Research Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 11(4), 261-266.
    20. Nanda, S. K. (2017). Labour scenario in Odisha. Odisha Review, 73(10), 20-25.
    21. NCABL. (2016). Joint Stakeholders’ Report on Situation of Bonded Labour in India for Submission to United Nations Universal Periodic Review III. NATIONAL COALITION FOR ABOLITION OF BONDED LABOUR (NCABL), Bhubaneswar Odisha.
    22. Panda, A. (2017). Climate change, drought and vulnerability: A historical narrative approach to migration from Western Odisha, India. In Climate Change, Vulnerability and Migration(pp. 193-211). Routledge India.
    23. Post News Network. (2019, April 30). Elimination of bonded labour calls for cohesive action plan. Odisha News, Odisha Latest News, Odisha Daily – OdishaPOST. https://www.Odishapost.com/elimination-of-bonded-labour-calls-for-cohesive-action-plan/
    24. Sahoo, M., Pradhan, L., & Mishra, S. (2018). MGNREGA and Labour Employability-A Comparative Analysis of KBK and Non-KBK Regions of Odisha, India. Indian Journal of Economics and Development, 6(9), 1-8.
    25. Sethy, P. (2020). Changing Occupational Structure of Workers in KBK Districts of Odisha. Center for Development Economic, 6(06), 17-28.
    26. Singh, V. K. (2020, April 22). Opinion | The ‘nowhere people’ of COVID-19 need better legal safeguards. The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/the-nowhere-people-of-covid-19-need-better-legal-safeguards/article31400344.ece
    27. Tripathy, S. N. (2015). Evaluating the role of micro-finance in mitigating the problems of distress out-migrants: A study in KBK districts of Odisha. The Micro Finance Review, Journal of the Centre for Micro Finance Research.
    28. Tripathy, S. N. (2021). Distress Migration Among Ultra-poor Households in Western Odisha. Journal of Land and Rural Studies, 23210249211001975.

     

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  • Urdu, Hindu Attire, Abrahamisation | It’s much ado about nothing

    Urdu, Hindu Attire, Abrahamisation | It’s much ado about nothing

    Urdu in India seems to have suffered because of a mistaken identity, and has had a decline from the time Pakistan declared Urdu as her national language

    Reacting to the Fabindia’s ‘Jashn-e-Riwaaz’ advertisement, on October 18 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader Tejasvi Surya, who is also president of the Bharatiya Janata Yuva Morcha, and a member of the Lok Sabha from Bengaluru, called it a ‘deliberate attempt of abrahamisation of Hindu festivals, depicting models without traditional Hindu attires….’. For those who are unfamiliar with the term ‘Abrahamisation’, a simple explanation, as conceived by some in the Right wing, is: ‘the process by which tenets of Hinduism are modified to have features of monotheistic religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam)’.

    In what way does the advertisement amount to abrahamisation? Surya says the models are without traditional ‘Hindu attires’. This is not true by any stretch of imagination, as none — none — can have or provide a single monolithic picture of what constitutes ‘Hindu attire’. This argument in itself is both ambivalent, and supercilious. We shall get back to the attire squabble in a bit.

    What to Surya’s mind is more abhorrent, and prompts him to utilise the moniker ‘abrahamisation’ could be the phrase ‘Jashn-e-Riwaaz’, which undoubtedly is a Urdu phrase. Unfortunately, anything that is even remotely connected with Urdu raises the hackles of the Right wing in India. The entire rub as regards the advertisement has to do with this Urdu phrase, as by extension, anything that relates to Urdu gets identified with Muslims.

    It is that what appears to prompt Surya to mark out the advertisement as an attempt at ‘abrahamisation’. If this is the case, the attire has been used as a camouflage to attack the Urdu rendering in the advertisement. Let us dwell deeper on this association of Urdu with Muslims, and analyse to what extent, if any, is such an association (or nexus, depending on how one sees it) valid?

    Urdu Speakers

    The Muslim population of India is about 14 percent, and the proportion of those who speak Urdu as their mother tongue/first language is just about 4 percent. Interestingly, all of these 4 percent Urdu speakers are not necessarily Muslims. So, an overwhelmingly large proportion of Muslims do not have Urdu as their mother tongue/first language.

    Muslims are found all over India, from Kashmir to Kanyakumari and from Arunachal Pradesh in the extreme east to Gujarat in the west. Invariably, all of them speak the local/state languages. So where do Muslims speak Urdu? In a relatively small zone in the central-north areas. Also, small numbers of ‘migrants’ in other states, including the Deccani version, in some pockets in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Telangana.

    Urdu Literature And Journalism

    The very first Urdu newspaper, Jam-i-Jahan-Numa, was published in Calcutta by Harihar Dutta as early as 1822. The weekly Kohinoor was started by Munshi Harsukh Rai in 1850. In 1858, Manbir Kabiruddin started the Urdu Guide. Munshi Nawal Kishore started the first Urdu newspaper, Oudh Akhbar, from Lucknow, also in 1858.

    In 1913 Ganesh Shankar founded Pratap, a famous revolutionary weekly in Kanpur which became a daily in 1920. Now it is published from Delhi. In 1923 Lala Kushal Chand, an Arya Samaji, started the Milap, an Urdu daily, from Lahore. After Independence it was shifted to Delhi, and is still in circulation as the largest Urdu newspaper in India.

    Urdu literature has been overwhelmingly patronised by non-Muslim writers and poets. Some of them are: Krishan Chander, Munshi Premchand, Rajinder Singh Bedi, Raghupati Sahay (Firaq Gorakhpuri), Gulzar (Sampooran Singh Kalra), Khushwant Singh, and so on.

    Clearly, some of the best patrons of Urdu have been non-Muslims. Given all these, where does the Urdu-equals-Muslim equation come from?

    Urdu literature has been overwhelmingly patronised by non-Muslim writers and poets. Some of them are: Krishan Chander, Munshi Premchand, Rajinder Singh Bedi, Raghupati Sahay (Firaq Gorakhpuri), Gulzar (Sampooran Singh Kalra), Khushwant Singh, and so on.

     

    The Pakistan Angle

    That equation came into prominence in 1947. After Pakistan came into being, surprisingly Urdu became her national language, though overall an overwhelming majority spoke Bangla. In the western wing the autochthones of Pakistan, namely the five main ethnic groups — Punjabis, Pathans, Sariakis, Balochis and Sindhis — all spoke a different language, and had very little to do with Urdu.

    It was just small sections in urban areas, and those who went over as Mohajirs (migrants) from India at Partition, who had Urdu as their mother tongue. It must not be forgotten that the 1971 secession of the eastern wing of Pakistan and the genesis of Bangladesh had a lot to do with the politico-linguistic neglect of Bangla.

    Urdu in India seems to have suffered, and has had a decline from the time Pakistan declared Urdu as her national language. No need to go into the political details of that here, except to point out that Punjabi which had till then adopted the Perseo-Arabic script that Urdu uses, gradually shifted to Gurmukhi script subsequent to Partition.

    The attribution of Urdu as an Islamic/Muslim language, and the generalisation to define a homogenous ‘Hindu attire’ are both problematic, as at its core both are built on false assumptions.

    The Attire Conundrum

    Now to the ‘Hindu attire’ ingredient of Surya’s assertion. The models featured in the advertisement do not by any sort of contention wear anything that could be thought of as non-Hindu, or anything offensive, or for that matter anything to suggest that these are ‘abrahamic’. Where do we look for those traditional ‘Hindu attires’?

    We do not have any comprehensive studies as to what women wore during ancient times in different parts of India, and if there was any unanimity or monolithic depiction as regards their attire. Besides, all over the country there have always been a range of dress patterns, and these did, and still do, cut across the various ethnic, religious and caste groups. To take up just a single example, the dress worn by Kathak dancers is common not just to dancers from various religious groups but also to the different genders. Among many other factors climatic conditions and local availability of fabric — and not religion — often determines attire.

    The attribution of Urdu as an Islamic/Muslim language, and the generalisation to define a homogenous ‘Hindu attire’ are both problematic, as at its core both are built on false assumptions. On a related note, the stigmatisation of Urdu by those who are unaware of its rich past can be seen when English is categorised as a ‘foreign language’.

    This article was earlier published in –  money control

    Image Credit: The News Minute

  • 2021-22 Q1 GDP Data Overestimates: Economic Shocks Question Methodology

    2021-22 Q1 GDP Data Overestimates: Economic Shocks Question Methodology

    2021-22 Q1 GDP Data Overestimates: Economic Shocks Question Methodology: The demonetisation shock impacted the unorganised sector far more adversely than it did the organised sector

    There are methodological errors in estimating annual and quarterly GDP data, especially when there is a shock to the economy, by using projections from the previous year, dividing the annual estimates into the four quarters and using production targets as if they have been achieved, explains Professor Arun Kumar

     

    The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has maintained its growth projection for 2021-22 at 9.5% while the World Bank has retained it at 8.3%. These are based on the union government’s growth estimate of 20.1% for first quarter of 2021-22—an unprecedented growth rate based on the low base in the same quarter of 2020-21, which witnessed a massive decline of 24.1%.

    A sharp rise in growth after a steep fall in the preceding year is not a new phenomenon for the economy. Prior to 1999, only annual, not quarterly, data was available. Official data shows that the economy has risen sharply several times since independence: 1953-54 (6.2%), 1958-59 (7.3%), 1967-68 (7.7%), 1975-76 (9.2%) 1980-81 (6.8%), 1988-89 (9.4%) and 2010-11 (9.8%). The data after 2011-12 base revision was controversial. For instance, the new series shows a high growth rate of 8.3% for 2016-17 though it is well known that demonetisation devastated the economy

    Methodological Issues

    If the new series, using 2011-12 as the base year, shows a high growth rate for 2016-17, the methodology is not right. This has been extensively discussed since 2015, when the series was announced. A major change has been the use of the data provided by the union ministry of corporate affairs, called the MCA-21 database, since 2015. But it has been pointed out that many of the companies in this database are shell firms and the government shut down several of them in 2018. Further, many companies were found to be missing.

    Another problem pointed out, starting the year of demonetisation, is that the measurement of the contribution of the unorganised sector—which constitutes 45% of the GDP—is not based on independent data.

    The data for the non-agriculture sector is collected during surveys every five years. In between these years, the organised sector is largely used as a proxy and projections are made from the past. Both these features of estimation pose a problem when there is a shock to the economy.

    The demonetisation shock impacted the unorganised sector far more adversely than it did the organised sector. Hence, after demonetisation, the organised sector data should not have been used as a proxy to measure the contribution of the unorganised sector. Further, due to the shock, projections from the past will not be a valid procedure. This problem was accentuated by the implementation of the Goods and Services Tax (GST), which again impacted the unorganised sector more adversely

    Demand started to shift from the unorganised sector to the organized, making the situation even more adverse. For instance, e-commerce has severely impacted the neighbourhood stores and taxi aggregators have displaced the local taxi stands.

    Due to the shocks, the earlier procedure of calculating GDP becomes invalid and should have been changed. Since this has not been done, in effect, the GDP data is measuring the organised sector and agriculture.

    Thus, 31% of the economy is not being measured, and by all accounts, this part is declining, not growing. Therefore, GDP growth is far lower than what has been officially projected since 2016-17.

    The pandemic and the lockdown have administered the biggest shock to the economy. But the organised sector was hit far less than the unorganised sector. The split between the two sectors has been far greater than due to demonetisation or GST. Therefore, there is an urgent need to revise the method of calculating GDP—also, projections from the past do not make sense.

    Quarterly Data Issues

     The problem is even greater when projecting quarterly GDP growth. The data used is sketchier than the annual data. Not only most of the data for the unorganised sector is unavailable (except for agriculture), even the organised sector data is partial. For instance, the data for businesses is based on companies that declare their results in that quarter. Only a few hundred companies out of the thousands might be declaring such data.

    Worse, the estimation is based on a) projections for the same quarter in the preceding year same quarter, b) in many cases, the projection is not just for the quarter but for the year as a whole and then it is divided into four to get the data for one quarter and c) cases where targets, not actual production data. are used to estimate the contribution to GDP.

    Worse, the estimation is based on a) projections for the same quarter in the preceding year same quarter, b) in many cases, the projection is not just for the quarter but for the year as a whole and then it is divided into four to get the data for one quarter and c) cases where targets, not actual production data. are used to estimate the contribution to GDP.

    Fishing and aquaculture, mining and quarrying, and quasi-corporate and the unorganised sector are a few sectors which belong to the first group. Some sectors belonging to the second category are other crops, major livestock products, other livestock products and forestry and logging. Livestock belongs to the third category, where annual targets/projections are used.

    This procedure is clearly inadequate but maybe acceptable in a normal year. But when there is a shock to the economy, does it make sense? If there is a projection from the previous year, it is likely to give an upward bias since the economy was performing better in the preceding year. Further, projections have to be based on some indicators and the data on these indicators were only partially available due to the lockdown.

    Finally, how can the annual projection be made and then divided into four to obtain the quarterly estimate when the economy is highly variable from quarter to quarter. In 2020, each quarter was very different from the previous one.

    Next, if the data for 2020-21 is erroneous, when there was a massive slump in the economy, the shock continues into 2021-22. How can projections be made from the 2020-21 to 2021-22? Thus, there would be large errors in the quarterly data for the current year. This will then be fed into the data for 2022-23. Therefore, the shock to the economy will play itself out for several years.

    Impact on other Macro Variables

    Quarterly data are also published for other macro variables like consumption, and investment by public and private sectors. The government-related data is available in the Budget documents, but the private sector data poses a huge challenge. These estimates are, again, based on projections from the previous year, and in some cases, annual estimates are divided between quarters. Production data is also used to project consumption and investment by the private sector. So, if the former is incorrect, as pointed out above, then the estimates for the latter will also be erroneous.

    The RBI’s survey of the organised sector showed that capacity utilisation was down to 63% in January 2021, but the official quarterly data was showing a growth of 1.3% rather than a decline of 10%. Thus, the quarterly data was not representative of even the organised sector.

    Similarly, consumer sentiment was down to 55.5 compared to 105 a year back, implying that even the organised sector consumption had not recovered to the pre-pandemic levels. Both these variables were further dented in the second wave of COVID-19 in Q1 of 2021-22. The implication is that the data on these variables is also not reliable.

    If the production data is an overestimate due to the use of projections from the last year, the consumption and investment data would also be over projections. The further implication is that if the data for 2020-21 is not right, the quarterly data for 2021-22, projected from the previous year, will also be erroneous and overestimate.

    Analysis of Macro Variables for Q1 of 2021-22

    For the moment, let us analyse the Q1 data leaving aside the errors pointed out above. When the economy was in decline in the preceding year, comparing rates of growth makes less sense than comparing the level of GDP.

    On a low base of 2020-21 (-24.4%), the rate of growth for 2021-22 looks impressive (+20.1%). But it is 9.2% less than the pre-pandemic Q1 of 2019-20—i.e., the economy has not recovered to the pre-pandemic level.

    Further, if the economy was growing at the pre-pandemic rate, the economy would have expanded another 7.5% in two years. Thus, compared to the possible level of GDP in 2021-22, it is down by about 16%.

    Except for agriculture and the utilities sectors, data shows that none of the other sectors have recovered to the levels in 2019-20. Private final consumption expenditure is down by 11.9% and gross fixed capital formation by 17.1%. Government consumption expenditure and exports have increased compared to their levels in 2019-20. The former does give a boost to the economy by increasing demand but the latter does not since imports remain much higher than exports.

    Therefore, out of the four sources of demand, only government expenditure has increased—but this is not enough to compensate for the decline in the other three and that is why the economy is still down compared to 2019-20.

    It may be argued that over time, data undergoes revision as more data becomes available. But the situation now is unusual due to the pandemic. This necessitated a major revision in the methodology itself due to lack of data and consequent non-comparability across quarters and years.

     The views expressed are those of the author.

    This article was published earlier in NEWSCLICK.

    Image Credit: The Federal

     

  • Environmental Impacts of the Belt And Road Initiative

    Environmental Impacts of the Belt And Road Initiative

    China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), initially known as One Belt One Road (OBOR), was first announced in 2013 by President Xi Jinping. It aims to interconnect Asia, Europe, and Africa through two interlinked projects: the Belt as the land route, and the Road as the maritime route. The BRI aims to contribute significantly to overall economic or monetary development, as well as in the power generation area, it can further develop energy access and unwavering reliability in regions with quickly developing energy demand. Nonetheless, the BRI’s financial advantages and development of power frameworks might come at the cost of significant  environmental degradation. The sheer size of the BRI has ignited increasing global concerns about the potential environmental damage. These concerns include ecologically sensitive areas, concern about the large amounts of raw materials needed, and locking in of various environmentally detrimental forms of infrastructure, for example, non-renewable energy (fossil fuel) related framework.

    The BRI projects are instrumental in meeting the global CO2 emission targets; if all the BRI member states fail to reach the CO2 emission targets, that would result in a 2.7° C increase in the average global temperature.

    There are numerous BRI projects which would pass through ecologically sensitive areas, thus compromising on such fragile regions. Some have even described BRI as the “riskiest environmental project in history”. The BRI has far-reaching influence, and it is estimated that the BRI investments are impacting over 60 per cent of the global population. The BRI projects are instrumental in meeting the global CO2 emission targets; if all the BRI member states fail to reach the CO2 emission targets, that would result in a 2.7° C increase in the average global temperature.

    Securing and protecting the environment while encouraging financial advancement under the BRI will be extremely difficult and challenging, as the initiative crosses a different scope of fragile and delicate environments. Biophysical conditions range from woods and steppes in Russia; to ice, snow, and permafrost across the Tibetan Plateau; and tropical rainforests in Malaysia. Observers are worried about the natural threat that the BRI presents. Infrastructure advancement, trade, and investment ventures under the BRI could bring negative ecological impacts that might offset its economic gains. The possible effects of the BRI are complex and manifold. Foundation projects affect biological systems and wildlife, yet in addition aberrant impacts like logging, poaching, and settlement, adding to deforestation and other land related changes. The BRI could result in biodiversity loss because of fragmentation and debasement of various habitats, and cause increment in greenhouse gas emission due to the development and upkeep of transportation infrastructures and further Chinese interest in coal-terminated power plants. It could likewise speed up extraction of natural resources, like water, sand, and ferrous metal minerals and ores in nations along the BRI.

    One such danger from BRI is the Russia–China Amur Bridge transport corridor, which takes apart two nature reserves with old growth forests. BRI framework will influence practically all of Eurasia’s biggest stream frameworks. Also, numerous BRI courses, for example the Karakoram Highway, go through geo-dynamically active regions. The Karakoram Highway linking the Xinjiang province in China to Gwadar Port in Pakistan, goes through Himalayan areas known for “extremely high geodynamic action” like seismic tremors, avalanches, frigid disintegration and erratic storms, but alternative pathways are even worse. In the Aral Sea, Central Asia, combined effects from the socio-ecological communications between misadministration, over-water system and serious contamination causing water shortage are amplified by truly dysfunctional transboundary management which can possibly result in armed conflicts. Heavily polluting Chinese concrete plants migrating to Tajikistan has been referred to as one illustration of this. Also, a logging ban in China’s Heilongjiang area caused spill-over impacts for forests overseas. Additionally, trade changes methods of production and utilization, changing income and along these lines contamination levels. As indicated by the Kuznets curve, pollution increments at first as income develops, yet over a defining moment, contamination falls as higher earnings bring innovative upgrades and expanding interest for ecological conveniences. Financial development might build the modern contamination base, known as scale effects. Negative scale effects and positive effects for the climate are hard to separate observationally, and quantitative examinations differ on whether the scale or procedure impact is bigger. Various toxins likewise respond diversely to exchange related changes. For instance, a Chinese report joining scale and method effects proposed that trade expanded SO2, and dust fall, however, decreased substance oxygen interest, arsenic and cadmium.

    Arranging and resolving natural issues related with the BRI is colossally complex and multi-scaled. Understanding the attributes of the effects of BRI on the environment is the initial step for conceiving strategy and plans for addressing its effects on guaranteed sustainable development. The main mechanism to achieve the sustainability objectives of the BRI is cooperation, “characterized by governance guidance, business commitment, and social participation”. In any case, environmental governance accompanies different difficulties, first, BRI specific and related approaches are not unyielding, but rather dependent on intentional and corporate self-administrative instruments. China’s vision of a “green BRI” is probably not going to be acknowledged without any stricter approaches that set out concrete and substantial set of activities. Second challenge, for the environmental governance of the BRI is to address tele couplings.

    The Chinese government is taking a functioning, yet delicate way to deal with the environmental governance of the BRI. China utilizes the BRI as a stage to introduce itself as the rule-maker/rule-taker in global ecological administration as it further mobilizes existing environmental governance organisations and assembles new ones. Be that as it may, the environmental stability of the BRI doesn’t just rely on the environmental governance endeavours of Chinese actors, however, strikingly on the implementation, checking, and authorization of environmental laws and guidelines in BRI host nations. Finally, and most importantly the most significant errand for future research is to exactly explore whether environmental standards or norms be subject to California or Shanghai effects.

     

    References

     

    Callahan, William A. China dreams: 20 visions of China’s future Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 1

    Adolph, C., Quince, V., & Prakash, A. (2017). The Shanghai effect: Do exports to China affect labor practices in Africa? World Development, 89, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.05.0091

    Andrews-Speed, P., & Zhang, S. (2018). China as a low-carbon energy leader: Successes and limitations. Journal of Asian Energy Studies, 2(1), 1–9. https://doi.org/10.24112/jaes.02010123

    Abbott, K. W. (2017). Orchestration: Strategic ordering in polycentric climate governance. In A. Jordan, D. Huitema, H. Van Asselt, & J. Forster (Eds.), Governing climate change (pp. 188–209). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108284646.01221

    Cefic 2011 Cefic (2011) Guidelines for Measuring and Managing CO2 Emission from Freight Transport Operations, http://www.cefic.org/Documents/RESOURCES/Guidelines/Transport-and-Logistics/Best%20Practice%20Guidelines%20-%20General%20Guidelines/Cefic-ECTA%20Guidelines%20for%20measuring%20and%20managing%20CO2%20emissions%20from%20transport%20operations%20Final%2030.03.2011.pdf?epslanguage=eni

    Randrianarisoa, Laingo M., Anming Zhang, Hangjun Yang, Andrew Yuen, and Waiman Cheung. “How ‘belt’and ‘road’are related economically: modelling and policy implications.” Maritime Policy & Management 48, no. 3 (2021): 432-460.

    Cockburn , Henry. “China’s $8 Trillion ‘Silk Road’ Construction Programme ‘Riskiest Environmental Project in History’.” The Independent. Independent Digital News and Media, May 20, 2018. https://www.independent.co.uk/climate-change/news/china-belt-and-road-initiative-silk-route-cost-environment-damage-a8354256.html.

    “Decarbonizing the Belt and Road Initiative: A Green Finance Roadmap.” Vivid Economics. Accessed October 1, 2021. https://www.vivideconomics.com/casestudy/decarbonizing-the-belt-and-road-initiative-a-green-finance-roadmap/.

    Ascensão, F.; Fahrig, L.; Clevenger, A.P.; Corlett, R.T.; Jaeger, J.A.G.; Laurance, W.F.; Pereira, H.M. Environmental challenges for the Belt and Road Initiative. Nat. Sustain. 2018, 1, 206–209.

    Teo, Hoong C., Alex M. Lechner, Grant W. Walton, Faith K.S. Chan, Ali Cheshmehzangi, May Tan-Mullins, Hing K. Chan, Troy Sternberg, and Ahimsa Campos-Arceiz. 2019. “Environmental Impacts of Infrastructure Development under the Belt and Road Initiative” Environments 6, no. 6: 72. https://doi.org/10.3390/environments6060072

     

    Feature Image Credit: USC US-China Institute

    Map Credit: Brookings Institution

     

  • Dagshai And Kasauli – The Afghanistan Connection

    Dagshai And Kasauli – The Afghanistan Connection

    With Afghanistan, the Taliban, and the for-ever conflict grabbing the headlines across the world over the last few months, it is well to recognise that the histories of India and Afghanistan are intertwined from time immemorial. Anand Sethi digs into the 19th and 20th-century history to bring out some fascinating connections between Dagshai in Himachal Pradesh and Afghanistan – Team TPF

    The Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) in Dagshai Cantonment is quite unique. Set up some 14 years ago at the instance of a dynamic Commanding Officer of the then Gorkha Rifles Battalion stationed in Dagshai, the ATM is housed in a smallish, stand-alone, colonial-era stone-built sloped roof hutment which most likely served as an extension of the kitchen facilities for a cluster of similarly constructed nearby barracks. It is quite unique. It communicates with the infrastructure by means of a huge, floor-mounted, satellite dish antenna. Given the nearly non – existent banking facilities, this ATM has served as our ‘go-to’ facility to withdraw cash for our personal expenses during the exasperating COVID times!

    On normal working times and days, with the troops busy with their official duties, there is usually only a rare person ahead of one at the ATM. Social distancing is the least of the problems here. However, on this particular day a few months back there were two persons ahead of me to use the ATM. This prompted a little ‘walkabout’ to while away the time and to maintain social distancing. While returning I noticed that there was some inscription or lettering on a whitish background near the top of the hutment but quite obscured due to the collection of grime, mud, rainwater stains that had accumulated over many years. Upon completing the ATM transaction I managed to clamber up and did a vigorous cleaning of the inscription.  What emerged was the signage: ’40 A GHAZNI LINES’. This was quite incredible! There has never been any mention of Dagshai having had a ‘Ghazni Lines’. Certainly not in any maps or documents painstakingly collected over the years by me for our ‘Dagshai Jail Museum’. Evidently, some Regiment(s) had gone from Dagshai to fight in the battles at Ghazni during the Afghan wars (or stationed in Dagshai afterward), received their ‘Battle Honours’ there.

    Research conducted indicates that no formations linked with Dagshai were involved in the Battle of Ghazni (‘Ghuznee’) in September 1842. However, two Regiments with clear Dagshai connections were very much in the ‘Battle Order’ during the First Battle of Ghazni in July 1839 (Gen. Sir John Keane versus Hyder Khan). Both received the Ghazni Battle Honours. One was the 1st Bengal Fusiliers who had been stationed in Dagshai during the tumultuous period of 1856 – 57. They of course had the dubious distinction of having as one of their Officers the ‘infamous’ (Brevet) Major William Hodson (whose portrait hangs amongst the ‘infamous Dagshaiites’ in our Jail Museum), the one who in 1857 apprehended Bahadur Shah Zafar and killed the royal princes. However, it is somewhat doubtful that the 1st Bengal Fusiliers had the Ghazni Lines in Dagshai named after their Battle Honours. The unit was away from Dagshai for a large part of their stay doing duties in and around Delhi during the 1857 ‘troubles’.

    The most likely formation to have the Ghazni Lines in Dagshai named after them would thus be the 2ndRegiment of Foot (Queen’s Royal West Surrey – the Queen, in this case, being Queen Catherine of Braganza, wife of King Charles II), presently operating as the Princess of Wales Royal Regiment.  This was the second senior-most line Regiment (after the Royal Scots) in the regular British Army. (The 1stBengal Fusiliers, on the other hand, was a formation of the East India Company’s Army, during their Dagshai stay). They were first garrisoned in Dagshai in 1870 -71. They not only took part in the 1839 battle at Ghazni but also got Battle Honours at the Battle of Khelat later that year. The Regimental History of the 2nd Regiment of Foot carries this interesting piece – “The formidable Ghazni fortress protected by thick 60 feet high walls prevented a major problem especially due to the lack of heavy artillery. The capture of Ghazni fortress was made possible only because Mohan Lal, a Kashmiri interpreter, spy, and assistant to the Political Officer Captain Sir Alexander Burnes, managed to discover that one of the gates to the fortress was somehow left poorly defended”. An interesting trivia about the 2nd Regiment of Foot – they were the only British Regiment where the Officers were allowed to remain seated while drinking the Loyal Toast to the Monarch. Apparently, this was so because the Regiment had been attached to the Royal Navy for a period of time and adopted the Navy’s tradition of sitting!

    The case for the 2nd Regiment of Foot for having set up Dagshai’s Ghazni Lines gets strengthened by the fact that they returned to Dagshai for the period 1895 – 96.  The Regiment went back to fight in Afghanistan in 1897, this time in Tirah (now in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan) before being garrisoned in Peshawar in 1902. They returned to Dagshai in 1916 for a short third spell in the garrison.

    Arguably, the Regiment with Dagshai as well as old Afghanistan links would be the Gordon Highlanders (earlier the 92nd Regiment of Foot). First stationed in Dagshai in 1860, the Regiment acquired as their Regimental Tune (still is the Regimental Tune and my mobile phone caller tune), the now-classic Pipes and Drums composition “Dagshai Hills” in 9/8 format march by the famous John Wallace. The Gordons fought in the Second Afghan War (1878 – 80) and saw action at Charasaib, Sherpur, and Kandahar where they took part in a winning battle after marching 320 miles from Kabul in just 23 days.

    The greatest battle achievement of the Gordons, however, was at Dargai (near Tirah and now part of Pakistan’s Kabul Pakhtunkhwa). In 1897 the heights at Dargai were held by a strong contingent of Afridi tribesmen. As part of the Tirah campaign, at the time the 21 valiant soldiers of the 36th Battalion (Now 4th Sikhs) of the Sikh Regiment were putting up their heroic stand at Saragarhi, the Gordons were tasked to capture the Dargai height at all costs. On October 20th, 1897 the Gordon Highlanders, with their flanks protected by the Gurkhas and Sikhs, attacked the Afridi-held hilltop redoubt. Despite numerous attempts, the Gordon’s were unable to take the height and had suffered numerous casualties. The Commanding Officer called out to his Pipers, led by Sergeant Piper George Findlater to keep playing ‘Dagshai Hills’ until the hill was taken. Findlater, despite being shot all over his body and bleeding profusely kept on playing the Regimental Tune until Dargai Hill was captured.

    For his extraordinary valour, Piper Findlater was awarded the Victoria Cross which he received in person from Queen Victoria. A huge painting to commemorate this famous battle hangs in the Officers Mess room of the Gordon Highlanders in Aberdeen, Scotland.  A large replica is available to view in our Dagshai Jail Museum along with other exhibits related to the Gordon Highlanders. The Pipe Bands of every formation that gets posted to Dagshai learns to play ‘Dagshai Hills’ and is played at the beginning of the Army Band display at the annual ‘Dagshai Concert’.

    Several of the formations garrisoned in Kasauli (then ‘Kussowlie’) also took part in the various Afghan Wars. Most notable amongst these were the Somerset Light Infantry (action at Jalalabad), 9th Regiment of Foot – Norfolks (action at Kabul), 66th Regiment – King’s Royal Rifles (action at Maiwand), and the 8thKing’s Regiment of Foot (action in the Kurram Valley). However, Kasauli’s Afghanistan connection is predominantly that of the famous Warburton family.

    During the First Afghan War in 1839 when the Bengal and Bombay Divisions of the East India Company (‘John Company’) Army along with some formations of regular British Army troops in India, in support of the ousted Shah Shuja, attacked Afghanistan in an attempt to retake Afghanistan from the ‘usurper’ Amir Dost Mohammed Khan’s forces and their allied tribal warriors.

    Amongst the ‘John Company’ troops was a 27-year-old Lt. Robert Warburton of the 6th Battalion, Bengal Foot Artillery. During the war, Lt. Robert Warburton found himself imprisoned in an Afghan lockup near the famous Buddhist site of Bamyan. A young lady named Shah Jahan Begum Durrani, a niece of Shah Shujah as well as that of Amir Dost Mohammed Khan was married (apparently against her wishes) to Sardar Faiz Talab Khan, a senior advisor to Dost Mohammed, and had a son (named Jahandad Khan) born from him in August 1840. Dost Mohammed and Faiz Talab Khan fled Kabul late in 1839 as the British troops advanced. Dost Muhammad was later to be exiled to Mussoorie.

    What ensued seems like scenes from a potboiler Hindi movie. Apparently, Shah Jahan Begum had met Lt. Robert Warburton in Kabul before she was married off. Clearly, as it turned out, Shah Jahan Begum had already become fond of Robert and this may have been the reason that she was hastily married off against her wishes. With her husband, Sardar Faiz Talib Khan having left along with Amir Dost Mohammed, Shah Jahan Begum managed to get hold of a few of her Durrani tribesmen and went hastily to Bamyan.

    At Bamyan, she and her Durrani followers somehow managed to free Robert Warburton from custody and hastily fled, escorted by the Durrani tribesmen. Somewhere during this daring escape, in November of 1840, Lt. Robert Warburton and Shah Jahan Begum got officially married. A son (also named Robert Warburton) was born to them in July 1842 whilst they were still holed up in Ghilzai (aka ‘Khilji’) fort. By early 1843 the four of them, Lt. Warburton, Shah Jahan Begum, Jahandad Khan, and little Robert Warburton) somehow managed to sneak into Peshawar. On arrival in Peshawar Lt. Robert Warburton officially adopted young Jahandad Khan and had him renamed John Paul Warburton.

    In 1864 John Paul Warburton joined the Punjab Police. Over the next few years, he had a spectacular career as a highly efficient Police Officer busting many criminal gangs and putting into jail scores of offenders. For his efforts, John Paul Warburton (aka Jahandad Khan) became popularly known all across Punjab as ‘Button Saheb – Controller of Devils”. From 1864 through 1900 when he retired, ‘Button Saheb’ had successful postings at Karnal, Delhi, Ludhiana, etc. In a rare eulogy, the famous Rudyard Kipling wrote – “He is supposed to have the gift of invisibility and executive control over many devils.” Needless to say, Kipling’s character Strickling (“Plain Tales From The Hills”) is based on Button Saheb. The then government in appreciation of his services gifted John Paul Warburton a large piece of land in Gujranwala District. This town with its own mainline railway station still exists in Pakistan as ‘Warburton’.

    From 1900 through 1909 Button Saheb served as the Special Advisor to the Patiala State Police with the rank of Inspector General. On his finally quitting service in 1909 John Paul Warburton along with his family came to live in Kasauli after having acquired ‘Gilbert House’ (presently the residence of the Brigade Commander and the former home of the historic figure  Maj. General Walter Raleigh Gilbert. In 1919 Button Saheb tragically died in the driveway of ‘Gilbert House’ after he fell off his favourite horse which had been ‘disturbed’ by his grandchildren and friends playing nearby.

    John Paul Warburton and his wife Mary Meakins had seven children. His youngest son’s (Robert Paul) granddaughter, Pamela Warburton (aka Durrani Warburton) was the last of the family to occupy ‘Gilbert House’. Old-time residents of Kasauli still talk about the regal style that Durrani Warburton lived in and especially about her going around Kasauli in an ornate Rickshaw pulled by fully liveried bearers.

    Durrani or Dani Warburton occupied ‘Gilbert House’ in Kasauli until 1943. She never married but was reputed to be a spectacular tennis player having been Punjab Singles Champion five times. Durrani Warburton did yeoman community service through the years of World War II and for her efforts was awarded the title of ‘Kaiser –i- Hind’.

    The senior Robert Warburton died in Peshawar on Nov. 10th, 1863. Button Saheb’s half-brother, Col. Sir Robert Warburton Jr, KCIE, also joined the Royal Artillery. Later he went on to found the ‘Khyber Rifles’ and died in April 1899 in Kensington, London.

    Needless to say, there have been other individuals and families that have Dagshai / Kasauli – Afghanistan connections. Most notably of course being Rudyard Kipling and the three redoubtable Lawrence brothers. But let this wait for another piece someday.

  • India’s Education: Sacrificing Scientific Temper and Academic Rigour for right wing Ideology

    India’s Education: Sacrificing Scientific Temper and Academic Rigour for right wing Ideology

    The Indian governmental apparatus has been making international headlines, but unfortunately not for the most positive of reasons.

    Most recently, the V-Dem institute based in Sweden has raised alarm about the rapidly deteriorating state of Indian democracy. Since 2017, this non-profit research organization has churned out data-heavy global democracy reports. In its 2021 report, it categorized India as an “electoral autocracy” rather than an electoral democracy.

    Considering such harsh international condemnation and national tumult, it is perhaps the need of the hour to analyse the present regime and its mechanisms that pose a threat to the constitutional values and democratic foundation of India. The developments in Education and Academia are a fitting avenue to carry out this analysis.

    Since the Bhartiya Janata Party came to power in 2014, India’s public policy formulation has changed dramatically. Most changes in educational policies can be divided into two categories: the first pertains to changes in educational institutes’ curriculum, and the second pertains to the violation of scientific integrity by advancing exclusively ideology-based interests.

    Changes in Course Content and Curriculum

    In a bid to lessen the pressure on students who had to adapt to an online mode of learning, the Central Board of Secondary Education announced a 30 percent reduction in the curriculum. Although at first glance, this exercise appears to be a rational and ingenious move catered towards the best interest of students, deeper scrutiny of this initiative presents many glaring issues and unveils a covert saffronisation agenda.

    Under this provision, chapters on federalism, secularism, democratic rights need not be taught, Class 10 political science syllabus also saw the removal of chapters such as “popular struggles and movements” and “democracy and diversity”. The content that these themes deal with has raised rightful concerns from critics that these cuts could have a political motivation.

    These omissions have invited considerable disapproval from scholars and experts across fields. Former director of the National Council of Education Research and Training, Krishna Kumar himself commented that the cuts have rendered some remaining topics “incomprehensible.” The removal of topics that many educators argue promote criticality and self-reflection, must compel one to question the motivations of the bureaucratic apparatus’s policies.

    The effort to rewrite textbooks has seen a parallel launch at both national and state levels. In BJP ruled states the administration is openly pursuing to propagate a counter idea of history, elevating the role of ideologically conservative Hindu organizations and subsequently minimizing the educational attention accorded to efforts made to nurture secularism in Free India.

    The state board in Rajasthan, for example, removed all references to Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister and champion of a diverse and secular India, while adding numerous references to V.D. Savarkar, a staunch believer of Hindutva ideology. Dr B.R. Ambedkar, a leader of the Dalit community who converted to Buddhism has been referred to as a “Hindu social reformer and his work towards Dalit activism has been grossly minimized. In Gujrat too, as far back as 2000, there was a move that made it compulsory for teachers to attend Sanskrit training camps in preparation for when the subject would be made mandatory.

    The Indian political climate has taken a shape wherein the Bhartiya Janata Party’s government has created a perception of an Idea of India that is exclusionary, theocratic, and intolerant. The analysis of public policies and governmental initiatives thus must proceed in this context and be astutely informed by the idea that the policies of the state are not divorced from the charged Indian political climate. To that end, the association between BJP and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh can explain much of the government’s political orientation.

    The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh is an ultranationalist organization that has long nurtured the idea of a Hindu Rashtra. The Bhartiya Janata Party, having had its roots in the political wing of RSS shares much of the same core values which invariably determine the shape and implications of the official government policies. The looming perils of such an association have made themselves visible at a variety of junctures in Indian political history from 2014 onwards- a manifestation of the same is abundantly visible in the violation of academic integrity and rigour under the current political regime.

    Violation of Academic Integrity and Scientific Rigour

    The appointment of ideological and political loyalists for important roles in academia is a pattern that the current regime has religiously followed. Without scholarly pedigree to their name, their appointment as heads of such prestigious institutions is a nod to the government’s priorities of installing right-wing stalwarts in arenas requiring objective intellectual leadership.

    This regime’s impact on academia has been one warranting pointed criticism.  The government’s policies have the effect of harbouring anti-intellectualism and in analysing the various policies during this tenure, one can identify a systematic erosion of academic integrity- new heads of acclaimed public institutions to HRD ministers all align with the core ideology of BJP rather than having any significant reputation and merit in education or academia. Simply put, those in important positions within the educational sector have come to occupy these positions only because of their socio-political location and ideological stance.

    Smriti Irani, the HRD minister from 2014-2016 was accused of heavy-handed approach and interference in dealing with the universities and higher education institutions. The controversy over the minister’s academic credentials claim made it worse, and ultimately, she was shifted from the ministry.  Similarly, the appointment of Gajendra Chauhan as the FTII chairman in 2015 was met with scorn and dissatisfaction from students and critics alike who alleged that he clamped down on artistic liberty of the institution and that his political affiliation with BJP landed him the role he was unfit for. In counter to these criticisms, the government has argued, not without some merit, that the past dispensations have neglected various nuances of Indian culture and civilisation under the rubric of liberalism, pseudo-secularism, and Marxist influence.

    The appointment of ideological and political loyalists for important roles in academia is a pattern that the current regime has religiously followed. Sudershan Rao’s appointment as the head of the Indian Council of Historical Researchand Braj Bihari Kumar’s appointment as the head of the Indian Council of Social Sciences were some other governmental decisions that raised grave concerns. Without scholarly pedigree to their name, their appointment as heads of such prestigious institutions is a nod to the government’s priorities of installing right-wing stalwarts in arenas requiring objective intellectual leadership.

    In the present scenario then, the inroads being made into the educational sphere by ultranationalist ethos are a cause of serious concern – be it changes to curriculum or violation of academic integrity through subverting requirements to become institutional heads. Open and overt- these trends all point to the one larger agenda: systematic saffronisation of education.

     

    Views expressed are those of the author.

     

  • Are we on the path to World War III? The rise of Asia and lessons from World War I

    Are we on the path to World War III? The rise of Asia and lessons from World War I

    Robert McNamara, the US Secretary of State during the Cuban Missile Crisis, famously noted that it was sheer luck, not rationality, that prevented the escalation of this crisis into a world war.

    The rise of East Asia and South-East Asia is inevitable – unless there would be World War III in this region. Whereas World War I was fought by the powers located at the shore of the North-Atlantic, World War II by those of the North-Atlantic and North-Pacific, World War III would be fought by those powers solely at the North-Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Are there lessons to be learned from the devastating conduct and outcome of World War I for our times? Is there only one lesson to be learned – that you can learn nothing from history? Or are we doomed to repeat history if we don’t learn anything from it? History will not repeat itself precisely, but wars repeatedly occur throughout history, even great wars. We are living in an age in which a war between the great powers is viewed as unlikely because it seems to be in no one’s interest, as the outcome of such a war would be so devastating that each party would do the utmost to avoid it. Rationality seems to dominate the assumptions and way of thinking in our times. But no war would have been waged if the losing side, or even both sides, would have known the outcome in advance.

     

    But what if conflicts in Asia would not be fought to pursue national interests so much as recognition? What would this mean: to be accepted as equal again after the humiliation in the course of European colonization and subsequent American hegemony? Indeed, acknowledgement of past suffering seems to be a trauma in the conscience of many Asian nations. Are those desires only irrational or a different kind of rationality, which we have to take into account?

     

    There are striking similarities between the Pre-World War I era and the current developments in Asia: World War I signifies the danger, not the inevitability, of a new world war in the decades to come. World War I is a symbolic representation of the risk that war amongst the great powers could erupt although nobody would benefit from it. It is a writing on the wall, that rationality is not a guarantee for avoiding self-destruction. All reckonings regarding the repetition of World War I in Asia are based on the assumption that it would be in no one’s interest to fight a large-scale war, even with WMD, which could lead to the destruction of great parts of Asia. But what if conflicts in Asia would not be fought to pursue national interests so much as recognition? What would this mean: to be accepted as equal again after the humiliation in the course of European colonization and subsequent American hegemony? Indeed, acknowledgement of past suffering seems to be a trauma in the conscience of many Asian nations. Are those desires only irrational or a different kind of rationality, which we have to take into account? At present, we have apparently a conflict between democracies in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean on one side and authoritarian China on the other. But during my few visits I got the impression that the trauma of colonization and the non-recognition of the Asian civilizations is more counting in the cultural memory of the Asian nations. And especially India should be wary to be instrumentalised by the US in their conflict with China.

     

    During her last visit to Beijing in September 2012, then US secretary of state Hillary Clinton held a press conference in which she stated that the world would soon see, but for the first time in history, that a rising power and an established power would not engage in a war. Of course, her statement was related to China and the US. Additionally, she even compared the competition between China and the US with that of the Peloponnesian War between Sparta and Athens – authoritarian Sparta against democratic Athens. Athens, the strongest city-state in Greece before the war, was reduced to a state of near-complete subjection, while Sparta became established as the leading power. Thucydides, the chronicler of the Peloponnesian War and one of the ancient world’s most important historians, saw the initial cause of this war in the growth of Athenian power: “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.”

    Unlike Plato, though, Thucydides argues that it was not the striving for power in itself but rather fear of loss of power and, in the long term, fear of being oppressed, robbed of one’s freedom, and enslaved that caused the escalation leading to war. In Thucydides’ account, fear was the cause of war on both sides. Sparta was afraid of the growth of Athenian power, and Athens was afraid of what might happen if it gave in to an escalating series of demands and threats, the result of which could not be foreseen.

    The Europeans who went to war assumed they would be home by Christmas 1914. We know now, of course, that World War I not only happened but that it also resulted in the self-destruction of the European powers in two world wars. World War I is foremost a lesson that a limited conflict could escalate into a nightmare of millions of deaths and unspeakable suffering, for which no rational explanation could be found.

     

    No one wanted World War I to happen. Or, at least, no one wanted the kind of war that actually took place. The general assumption was that the conflict would be very limited. The Europeans who went to war assumed they would be home by Christmas 1914. We know now, of course, that World War I not only happened but that it also resulted in the self-destruction of the European powers in two world wars. World War I is foremost a lesson that a limited conflict could escalate into a nightmare of millions of deaths and unspeakable suffering, for which no rational explanation could be found. Military aims and strategies gained priority above meaningful political purposes. Although the generals of the German empire believed that they were relying on Clausewitz’s theory, in fact, they perverted him. Tactics replaced strategy, strategy substituted politics, politics gained momentum above policy, and policy was militarized. It was as if everybody was saying: being at war would mean a stop to thinking.

     

     

    This does not mean a simple equation of rising China with the then rising German Empire. Although the actors then and today seem to be quite different, the dynamics generated by the conflict between emerging, rising and declining powers are strikingly comparable.

     

    Perhaps the deepest and hidden reason for this escalation was that no war party could admit neither defeat nor failure. Striking evidence for this assumption is that the proclaimed war aims of the German Empire got momentum the more they got unrealistic and irrational. The pride, honour and identity of the German Reich prohibited the acknowledgement of defeat and failure. This was the same with Russia, France, England and the Habsburg Empire – and the Turk Empire too. Perhaps especially these Empires knew that their rule wouldn’t survive if they would have had to acknowledge military defeat or failure. Military defeat or failure would have humiliated their identity and their “face”: their social recognition within their society and community. A military defeat would signal their “symbolic death” – and so, the empires fought a war for life and death. This does not mean a simple equation of rising China with the then rising German Empire. Although the actors then and today seem to be quite different, the dynamics generated by the conflict between emerging, rising and declining powers are strikingly comparable.

    Robert McNamara, the US Secretary of State during the Cuban Missile Crisis, famously noted that it was sheer luck, not rationality, that prevented the escalation of this crisis into a world war. In 1983 the world did even need twice more than a great fortune to avoid a nuclear disaster. In current times all great powers are using military means to pursue their political and economic interests. But we just should not allow ourselves to bet in a casino-like style that military conflicts and strategies could not lead to the escalation of limited conflicts into great power wars. The path to World War III would not be similar to that leading to World War II, but comparable to the pre-World War I era.

    This article is an amended version of the Introduction in his book “Lessons from World War I for the Rise of Asia” by Stuttgart:Ibidem Publishers.

    Feature Image Credit: www.express.co.uk 

    Article Images: www.fr21news.com , www.bloomberg.com , L’EXPRESS

  • Indian Foreign Secretary visits Colombo: Attempt to reset India-Sri Lanka ties

    Indian Foreign Secretary visits Colombo: Attempt to reset India-Sri Lanka ties

    India and Sri Lanka are immediate neighbours that share cultural, historical and religious ties spanning over thousands of years. Indian tourists to Sri Lanka are a major source of tourism revenue for the island nation. Despite all these ties, the bilateral relations continue to be impacted by considerable mistrust. Recent increase in tensions between the two South Asian neighbours is a result of the island nation allowing China to enhance its strategic footprints in Sri Lanka and increase its influence in the region. Despite certain inconsistencies in the Indo-Sri Lankan bilateral relationship, it will still be in the best interests of both countries to enhance their relationship amid the uncertain shifts in the geopolitical landscape.

    Indian Foreign Secretary’s visit to Colombo

    India’s foreign secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla concluded a four-day state visit to the Island nation on October 5. His sojourn commenced at a time when Colombo expressed her eagerness to ink a few defence pacts with New Delhi.

    The visit was eventful as well as broad-based. The Foreign Secretary  held a meeting with the Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa on tourism, power generation, and cooperation in economic recovery. To reset the strained relations with Colombo, Shringla’s schedule was kept tight and focused on closed-door discussions. He called on Sri Lankan Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa, Finance Minister Basil Rajapaksa, Foreign Minister G.L. Peiris and Foreign Secretary Admiral Jayanath Colombage (Rerd). From the capital, Shringla hopped from one town to another. He visited and held meetings in Kandy, Trincomalee and Jaffna to enhance bilateral ties.

     

    While in Trincomalee, he explored the possibilities for materializing the India-Sri Lanka energy partnership. In separate meetings with  Tamil National Alliance (TNA), Tamil Progressive Alliance (TPA), and Ceylon Workers’ Congress (CWC), Shringla voiced India’s firm support to the implementation of the 13th Amendment, a constitutional amendment that would empower the Tamil minorities but continues to be held in abeyance by the Sri Lankan government. During his visit, Shringla launched a few Indian initiatives like Model Housing Village’ in the northern district of Vavuniya, a school building at Vadamarachchi in Jaffna, and the Saraswathy Central College building in Pussellawa in Kandy. India had earlier constructed over 46,000 houses for the war-affected families in north.

    New Delhi has supplied to Colombo 100 tons of liquid medical oxygen, 26 tons of medicines and ambulances as part of its support to the Island’s efforts to overcome the pandemic. The state has also received about half a million Covid vaccines from India. Sri Lanka’s Suwa Seriya programme was supported by India. Sri Lanka and India together have implemented a USD 400 million currency swap agreement and one more is expected to happen.

    Colombo Crisis

     India’s External Affairs minister S. Jaishankar and Sri Lankan Foreign minister GL Peiris had a tête-à-tête on the side lines of UNGA in September. Weeks after Dr S. Jaishankar’s visit to Sri Lanka in the first week of January this year, Indian fishermen were killed by the Sri Lankan Navy, which resulted in renewed tensions between the two countries.  Moreover, the cancellation of the tripartite Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Sri Lanka, India, and Japan for the development of the strategically located East Container Terminal (ECT) at the Colombo Port in February, added more salt to the already strained relations between the two neighbours.

    What became an even more controversial issue was when Sri Lanka cleared a Chinese energy project in three islands off the Jaffna peninsula that is barely 50 km from Tamil Nadu coast. Recently, Sri Lankan parliament passed the Colombo Port City Economic Commission Act to oversee a huge Chinese luxury oceanside development project. This gives China a significant foothold in the country and will allow it to enhance its strategic presence throughout the region. Accordingly, India emphasised that it expected Sri Lanka to be “mindful” of ties with New Delhi, particularly in the security realm.

    Interestingly, the series of events that have taken place this year came after the statement given by Sri Lankan Foreign Secretary Jayanath Colombage last year regarding Sri Lanka’s adoption of an “India first approach”, which reflects Colombo’s supposed willingness to protect New Delhi’s strategic interests in the region. However, despite these guarantees, the geopolitical shifts occurring in South Asia make it arduous for Sri Lanka to maintain consistently positive relations with its neighbour.

    Ties that continue to stand

     China has become a critical factor in the Indo-Sri Lankan bilateral equation. The East Asian giant’s deep pockets have become a more attractive economic option for Sri Lanka vis-à-vis India. While India took five months to approve a loan moratorium requested by Sri Lanka last year, China approved an additional USD 500 million loan expeditiously. Moreover, the issue involving the Tamil cause continues to sustain the long-standing trust deficit between the two South Asian neighbours.

    However, this is not to say that Sri Lanka will disregard India for its partnership with China. Colombo is aware of the risks involved in engaging deeply with China. Sri Lanka is no stranger to Beijing’s debt trap that compromises its sovereignty. Despite Rajapaksa’s cordial ties with China, Sri Lanka will have to inevitably reconsider its priorities if this continues to persist.

    While China may have the upper hand in mega-infrastructure projects, India’s role in cementing its people-to-people ties with Sri Lanka and taking the lead in the education, health, and tourism sectors, continue to give it considerable edge in the overall inter-state dynamics. Apart from being its major trading partner, India has also demonstrated its proactive partnership by being the first responder in humanitarian assistance.  Most importantly, India has no interest in compromising Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Additionally, India continues to reiterate that it gives priority to Sri Lanka under key regional frameworks such as its Neighbourhood First Policy and Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR).

    Sri Lanka is also aware of this and has tried to make up for its decisions that have compromised India’s interests. Despite cancelling the ECT tri-partite MoU, Sri Lanka has taken the prerogative to permit Indian companies to develop its West Container Terminal (WCT). Moreover, the scheduled address by Pakistani Prime Imran Khan, to the Sri Lankan Parliament during his visit to Sri Lanka in February, was also cancelled. Recently, much attention has been placed on Sri Lanka’s “roadmap” to restore ties with India and address several important issues such as the fishermen’s issues, building connectivity, trade and investment, and promoting religious links.

    A way forward

     At a time when India’s Indo-Pacific concerns are on the rise, New Delhi is perturbed by Beijing’s diplomatic successes in Sri Lanka and throughout South Asia. China’s quick responses and its its large funding are attractions that has swayed the Island nation towards a pro-China policy. Given the endemic corruption and the Chinese-engineered Sinhala chauvinism with anti-India stance has forced Indian companies to become very cautious about investing in Sri Lanka. But India is ahead of China when it comes to tourism, and health care. Sri Lankan students are now eligible to compete in India’s National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET) and Joint Entrance Examination for the IITs. Last year India’s allocation of $50million for counter-terrorism and $15 million for promoting the Buddhist links drew tremendous positive attention of Lankan policymakers. The first pilgrims’ flight from Sri Lanka to Kushinagar in Uttar Pradesh is expected to take off soon. From the days of Julius Jeyawardane Sri Lanka has evolve a very crafty and nuanced diplomatic strategy, a truly Chanakyan approach. India will need to be equally crafty to checkmate the Chinese inroads into Sri Lanka. [TPF].

     

    Feature Image Credit: Lankaxpress

     

  • The US retreat from Afghanistan: Looking back on an ill-conceived peace deal and a hasty withdrawal

    The US retreat from Afghanistan: Looking back on an ill-conceived peace deal and a hasty withdrawal

    Under an agreement signed on February 29, 2020, between Qatar, The US and the Taliban, the US agreed to withdraw all its troops within 14 months of signing the accord. In return, the Taliban pledged to prevent any terrorist group from operating in Afghanistan against the US and its allies. The pact also envisaged a prisoner swap, the start of intra-Afghan dialogue and sanction removals against the Taliban. But, as we have seen, the peace deal accelerated the collapse of the Afghan state on which the US spent trillions of dollars.

    Trump also permitted the US chief negotiator Zalmay Khalilzad to place the withdrawal of US forces on the negotiating table with the Taliban, throwing away their biggest bargaining chip. The Taliban themselves seemed surprised that the US put the withdrawal of US troops on the negotiating table.

    The US started the peace talks with four specific goals. An end to violence by declaring a ceasefire, an Intra-Afghan political settlement, Taliban renunciation of Al-Qaeda and long-term presence of intelligence assets and special operation forces in Afghanistan for counterterrorism operations, and a timeline for US troops withdrawal[1]. However, with the presidential elections approaching in 2020, Trump was being increasingly restless and wanted a quicker exit. So, to accelerate talks, the long-standing demand for the presence of special operation forces in a counterterrorism mission along with inter-Afghan led peace talks were jettisoned. Trump also permitted the US chief negotiator Zalmay Khalilzad to place the withdrawal of US forces on the negotiating table with the Taliban, throwing away their biggest bargaining chip. The Taliban themselves seemed surprised that the US put the withdrawal of US troops on the negotiating table.

    The US committed itself to a set of measurable commitments, while the Taliban did not. The idea was to create an environment of good faith. However, the Taliban never reciprocated the ‘good faith’ shown by the US, except to ensure safe passage for the retreating US troops. Once the deal was struck, violence increased in the country.

    The Taliban never agreed to a ceasefire or a political settlement. While the intra-afghan dialogue was a part of the deal struck between the Taliban and the US, there was a lack of progress, with the Afghan government and the Taliban blaming each other for the impasse. Violence escalated by almost 50% after the start of the intra-afghan dialogue.

    The peace deal also included a prisoner swap agreement where the Taliban would release up to 1000 prisoners and the Afghan government release up to 5000 prisoners. The Afghan government asked the Taliban prisoners for a written guarantee that they would not return to the battlefield. However, thousands immediately rejoined the insurgency. The Taliban commander, Maulawi Talib, who led a Taliban assault on the capital of Helmand, Lashkargah, was one among the 5000 prisoners released. There was an uptick in violence after the prisoner swap was completed. Afghan officials said the agreement went through only because of pressure from Washington.

    The Taliban proved reluctant to break ties with Al-Qaeda, too, according to a UNSC report. Under the peace deal, the Taliban agreed not to allow al-Qaeda or any other extremist group to operate in areas under their control. However, the Taliban needs allies and Al-Qaeda is one reliable ally. Further, the Haqqani network, an integral part of the Taliban, is known to harbour close links with Al-Qaeda. While stopping a future terrorist attack emanating from Afghanistan will be in the Taliban’s interests, it is unlikely they will break relations with Al-Qaeda after years of close collaboration.

    It was clear from the beginning that the viability of the agreement depended on the US willingness to call off the withdrawal in the future if the Taliban renegade on their promises. But that decision fell to president Biden, who has always made it clear that Afghanistan is a lost cause.

    When Biden came to power, the situation in Afghanistan was deteriorating. The choice he had, according to Biden himself, was to either expand US presence or follow through with the agreement. The dilemma was a result of poor policies pursued during the trump era. The US has been bogged down in Afghanistan for 20 years, and the resolve of president Biden to not escalate meant that the US followed through with the agreement. The peace talks became a cover for complete US disengagement.

    The US withdrawal accelerated the collapse of the Afghan state. The uncertainty of the Doha talks demoralized the Afghan military, who saw it as a deal between the Taliban and the US that guaranteed Taliban victory.

    With the collapse of morale, everything that was rotting started collapsing as well.  Around 30000 troops existed on paper, but the numbers were inflated due to a phenomenon called ‘ghost’ soldiers – soldiers on the official payroll but who never showed up for fighting. There were reports that the soldier was not paid and there were not enough supplies.

    Jack Watling, a research fellow for land warfare and military sciences at the Royal United Services Institute in London, said that the Afghan military collapse was not a reflection of military capability, but a reflection of a collapse in the will to fight.

    In truth, ever since the surge in troops authorized by the Obama administration right after coming to power, what every successive US President wanted was an orderly withdrawal from Afghanistan. The most baffling thing is that the US resorted to negotiation when its leverage was the weakest. Perhaps, in hindsight, greater efforts could have been made during the time of President Obama to find a peaceful solution to the conflict.

    In the end, it was more of a retreat than a withdrawal. The US made concrete measurable commitments while the Taliban made promises, which they can now afford to renegade on.

    The scenes in Kabul airport was anything but orderly. More than 2000 marines had to be brought in to secure the Kabul airport as the Taliban rolled into Kabul for the first time since 2001. “The past 17 days have seen our troops execute the largest airlift in U.S. history, evacuating over 120,000 U.S. citizens, citizens of our allies, and Afghan allies of the United States,” the US president said in the statement. An attack by the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) on Kabul airport killed 13 U.S. service members and 170 Afghans.

    In the end, it was more of a retreat than a withdrawal. The US made concrete measurable commitments while the Taliban made promises, which they can now afford to renegade on.

     

    [1] Pg. 667, carter

     

    Feature Image Credit: www.npr.org