The Peninsula Foundation

Category: Conflict Resolution

  • Chinese Roulette: Which Way Will the Wind Blow?

    Chinese Roulette: Which Way Will the Wind Blow?

    The 2022 campaigning season along the Sino-Indian Line of Actual Control (LAC) opens up in just a matter of months. By all reckoning, the situation is likely to continue remaining extremely volatile, uncertain and tense. While some believe that it may have been this Government’s abrogation of Article 370 and the Home Minister’s statement in Parliament that invited a strong response from the Chinese, the truth is that we are yet to fully comprehend the Chinese leadership’s motivation for damaging, if not jettisoning, over three decades of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and growing economic ties, though the latter seems not to have been impacted in the short term, by resorting to unprovoked aggressive action in Eastern Ladakh and elsewhere.

    In addition, we continue to see a steady build-up of forces and infrastructure, as well as cartographic aggression in the form of renaming of villages in Arunachal Pradesh and the passage of the Land Border Law, effective from 1st January 2022. All of this strongly suggests that the situation will get much worse before it gets better, and we are more likely to see increased Chinese assertiveness and determination to settle territorial disputes on its own terms. Moreover, by its actions in Eastern Ladakh, it has already occupied territory up to its Claim Line of 1959. This begs the question, obviously difficult to answer with any degree of certainty, as to whether there is a likelihood of further Chinese escalation leading to a limited conflict?

    Clearly, the Government is also seized of the problem, as is obvious from the Defence Minister’s statement, while inaugurating border infrastructure, that “We faced our adversary in the northern Sector recently with grit and determination. It could not have been done without proper infrastructural development. In today’s uncertain environment, the possibility of any kind of conflict cannot be ruled out.”i It must be emphasised that conflict is not something that we either desire or is in our interest, especially given the Omicron tsunami that appears to be gathering momentum and the adverse impact that the pandemic has already had on our economy.

    It is therefore quite apparent from the Modi Government’s actions that it has been extremely circumspect and cautious in its response following China’s occupation of our territory, by some estimates extending over a 1600 Sq. Km. Clearly, it has no intention of either attempting to push back the PLA from the intrusion sites, or for that matter, occupying territory elsewhere, as a quid pro quo and bargaining chip for later. However, there is a view that occupying Indian claimed territory in Aksai Chin as a quid pro quo is not a bargain but an acknowledgement that Aksai Chin is alien territory. Therefore this Government has attempted to engage China in talks, both at the diplomatic and military level, though with little success to show for its efforts. Given the mismatch in force levels, this level of military and diplomatic engagement is understandable, though Mr. Modi’s unwillingness to personally call out the Chinese for their provocative behaviour may well give, them and the world at large, an impression of an eagerness to crawl, when just asked to bend.

    However, a deeper examination of events does suggest that the Government has not taken Chinese bullying lightly, and has, in fact, responded in an extremely measured manner, militarily. Following the Galwan incident, it has mirrored Chinese troop accretions by deploying additional forces in Eastern Ladakh, along with armour and other supporting elements. Its pro-active occupation of the Kailash Heights, though these troops were subsequently withdrawn as a part of reciprocal action by the PLA in the Pangong Tso Sector, hinted at the possibility of similar, but more offensive actions, being replicated elsewhere. The reorientation of the Army with the earmarking of a second Mountain Strike Corps for offensive operations has substantially added to the Army’s capabilities and would adversely impact the PLA’s force ratio dynamics. Most importantly, the upgrade of communication infrastructure, not just in Ladakh but elsewhere along the LAC as well, has been greatly speeded up and is coming to fruition, thereby significantly enhancing our defensive capabilities.

    To help us understand if China is likely to resort to force in the ongoing stand-off, an examination of historical precedent may give us some vital clues. As Prof M Taylor Pravel of MIT notes, two characteristics have defined China’s use of force. Firstly, “along its continental border, China has employed force in frontier disputes where it has faced militarily powerful opponents (i.e., states that could possibly challenge its otherwise strong claims). Although the local military balance is difficult to measure with precision, China has on average been vastly stronger in the overall military balance…. India in 1962, the Soviet Union in 1969, and Vietnam in the early 1980s. At the same time, China has refrained from employing force against its weaker continental neighbours. Second, China has used force in disputes where the strength of its claims have been weak, especially when it has occupied little or none of the contested territory. In these disputes, China has been sensitive to any further decline in its bargaining power.”ii

    This suggests that even with neighbours that de facto accept Chinese interpretations of its territorial claims, China is still extremely wary of actions that they may undertake to change the existing relative balance of power along with its disturbed periphery, and prefers to use force against them to delay/stop their progress. For example, there is evidence to suggest Nehru’s Forward Policy and the refuge given to the Dalai Lama were a serious cause of concern to the Chinese leadership. This is borne out by declassified United States documents pertaining to the capture of Longju in August 1959, which reveal that “the late August clashes point of a mode of thought which has remained an ingredient in the Chinese leaders’ calculations on the border dispute: ‘When the Indians show a temperament to advance on the ground, we must alter their frame of mind by letting military action take over political caution. Besides, military risk itself is negligible, because we are the stronger side’.”iii A perception within the Chinese leadership that appears to have remained unchanged in the intervening years, and is especially pertinent at the present time, given President Xi Jinping’s penchant for following in the footsteps of late Chairman Mao Zedong.

    In addition, there are some other factors that have a bearing on this issue of force escalation. For one, it is fairly common for autocratic governments to attempt to conjure up external threats to unify the people against a common enemy, and divert their attention from serious domestic challenges that may lead to unrest or hurt their own leadership position. In this context, as Kalpit Mankikar, a Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation who focuses on China points out, prior to the 1962 Conflict Chairman Mao faced serious internal dissension against his leadership and it had more to do with the intra-CCP power struggle. Mao’s Great Leap Forward (GLP) had been criticised, and for the first time, he had to demit office as State President, forced to hand over to his heir apparent Liu Shaoqi, which came as a huge jolt to him.

    President Xi now finds himself in rather similar circumstances as the economy stutters, in no small measure due to his government’s crackdown on multiple Chinese sectors and companies that have been mascots of growth over the years. His emphasis has been on the idea of “common prosperity” or “reasonable adjustment of excessive incomes and encouraging high-income groups and businesses to return more to society”iv, a blatantly populist measure, that was initially very well received by the average Chinese citizen. However, the enforcement of new regulations in this regard, the so-called “Three Red Lines”, has had a devastating impact on real estate companies such as Evergrande, which hold approximately 75% of all retail investments, bringing them to the verge of bankruptcy, and creating internal turmoil, uncertainty and dissent as the average citizen sees his savings completely wiped out. The likelihood of a domino effect on other facets of the economy cannot be wished away and is bound to adversely impact President Xi’s efforts to stay in power after the end 2022, when his term officially ends.

    In these circumstances creating and tackling an external threat along its borders, as the prevailing situation along the LAC is made out to be, will certainly divert attention and may very well pay great dividends. For example, while President Xi would have preferred to undertake actions to integrate Taiwan, he is hampered by the very real likelihood of The United States and its allies coming to the aid of Taiwan. Taking on India at the LAC is a relatively easier option, as interference by the United States and its allies is likely to be restricted to providing moral and material support at best. Furthermore, it could be viewed as a dress-rehearsal that would allow the PLA to gain vital operational experience, something it has been bereft of since the Sino- Vietnam Conflict of 1979, apart from ensuring a protected flank. Moreover, a successful termination of such a campaign would setback Indian aspirations by decades and severely dent Mr. Modi’s reputation and popularity, much as 1962 did in the case of Pandit Nehru. Not only would such action have a sobering impact on Taiwan’s dealings with the Chinese, but also in the manner other South East and Central Asian neighbours respond to Chinese hegemonistic designs as well.

    It is in this context that the new Land Border Law, now in effect, is likely to be extremely problematic for two reasons, and may well act as the trigger for any future conflict. Firstly, it attempts to give Chinese acts of cartographic aggression, such as differing perceptions on the exact alignment of the LAC, renaming of towns and villages in Arunachal Pradesh, and its acts of ‘salami- slicing’ over the years, a veneer of legality. Secondly, there is a clause in the Law that can be interpreted to suggest that it prohibits the construction of permanent facilities in the vicinity of the LAC without sanction from Chinese authorities, which would obviously be unacceptable to any sovereign state, especially given the manner in which it is rapidly developing communication infrastructure and settlements bordering the LAC.

    Increasing troop concentrations, especially in terms of armour and ballistic/air-defence missiles, in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) along with the external and internal difficulties confronting President Xi suggests a high possibility of a conflict breaking out within the year. There are analysts, including some in this country, who believe that the PLA will be able to achieve a decisive victory given the over-all force disparity, especially in cyber, space and missile capabilities, as was the case in the 1962 Conflict. However, they have tended to disregard the adverse impact of climate and altitude, both on personnel and equipment, that gives a distinct advantage to a military fighting internal lines.

    The PLA can hardly afford to ignore its extended and extremely vulnerable lines of communication, however well developed, and the uncertain internal security environment within TAR and Xingjian. Most importantly, the PLAAF will be operating with greatly reduced capabilities from bases within TAR because of the altitudes involved, while being adversely impacted while operating from bases outside the Region given the extended ranges involved. Finally, the Indian Military does have a sizeable force, reasonably well-equipped with two Mountain Strike Corps and a Division plus of Special Operations Forces in place for offensive operations that will act as a deterrent to Chinese misadventure.

    It understands, however contrarian its public pronouncements may be, that the Indian Armed Forces are a very different force from what they encountered in 1962. Not only is the Indian Army far more experienced and battle-hardened in high altitude and mountain warfare than the PLA, but it will be the Indian Air Force, not utilised in 1962, that will be the battle-winning factor in any conflict. In addition, the employment of the Tibetan manned Special Frontier Force (SFF) in the Kailash Ranges, which received worldwide accolades, would have certainly caused immense disquiet within the Chinese leadership. The SFFs actions and rise of the Taliban have surely given an immense boost to the Independence Movements in both TAR and Xinjiang. Most importantly President Xi and his acolytes must be fully aware that anything other than a decisive victory, will for all intents and purposes, be perceived as a defeat and be the final nail in his coffin.

    Will all of this be sufficient to deter the Chinese from escalating the stand-off? The truth is that while we are inherently placed in an advantageous position, primarily due to location and circumstance, neither deterrence nor success is guaranteed. The fact of the matter is that over the past two decades the military has not just been neglected, but has also been deliberately discriminated against by the political and bureaucratic establishment. The damage that has been done, both to its organisational culture, morale and capabilities will need focus, effort and time to reverse. Most importantly, threats of this nature are best tackled by a nation that is united and willing to place its complete trust in its political leadership. Does our political establishment have the maturity, foresight, integrity and vision to provide the leadership we deserve and need? To quote the poet, philosopher and singer, Bob Dylan, “the answer, my friend, is blowing in the wind”…

    i The Times of India, New Delhi 29 December 2021, p 19.

    ii M Taylor Fravel, Power Shifts and Escalation: Explaining China’s Use of Force in Territorial Disputes, International Security, Winter 2007/2008, Vol 32 No 3, p 56

    https://www.jstor.org/stable/30130518?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents

    iii The Sino-Indian Dispute, Section 1:1950-59, DD/I Staff Study, CIA/RSS March 02, 1963, Approved for Release May 2007, p 33.

    iv Bloomberg News, China Eyes Wealth Redistribution in Push for ‘Common Prosperity’, 18 August 2021

    The article was originally published in Indian Defence Review, Jan – Mar 2022, Vol 37 (1) Pg 50.

    Featured Image Credits: CNBC

  • Truths and lies about pledges made to Russia

    Truths and lies about pledges made to Russia

    The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war is a senseless one. However, we must realise that much of the blame for this war lies at the door steps of the USA, NATO, and the EU. In this article, author Guy Mettan demolishes the myths put out by the Western press, and highlights the real causes of the war. TPF is delighted in republishing this excellent article by the eminent author, journalist, and parliamentarian. He responded to our request with a refreshing candour –

    “I would be very pleased and honoured if you republish my article. I know that Indian people have a very balanced, non-aligned vision of the world that doesn’t exist any more in the West. But I think – and hope – that this hegemonic way of thinking and doing will soon end for a more equitable world.”

    – TPF Editorial Team

    Zbigniew Brzezinski, author of the famous book “The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives”, in which he explains why the United States should definitely grab Ukraine

    In particular, it is necessary to correct numerous articles that claimed that the pledge made by the United States to Gorbachev in 1991, according to which NATO “would not move an inch in the East” in exchange for German reunification and the withdrawal of Red Army troops from Eastern Europe, was a “myth” forged by the Kremlin in order to neutralise or even invade Ukraine.

    This thesis is based on an article published in Foreign Affairs magazine in 2014, at the time of the Ukrainian crisis, and reaffirmed in a book published last November. Its author, Mary E. Sarote, is a member of the most influential think tank in U.S. imperial politics, the Council on Foreign Relations, whose opinions are more propaganda than impartial study.

    For this so-called “myth” could not be truer. It is essential to be aware of it if we want to both understand what is happening and find a negotiated solution to the conflict.

     

    “we consider that the consultations and discussions in the framework of the 2+4 mechanism should provide a guarantee that German reunification will not lead to an expansion of the NATO military organisation to the east”

      – James Baker, US Secretary of State, February 9, 1990. 

     

     

     

    On February 9, 1990, James Baker, then U.S. Secretary of State, said exactly this: “we consider that the consultations and discussions in the framework of the 2+4 mechanism should provide a guarantee that German reunification will not lead to an expansion of the NATO military organisation to the east.” The next day, Chancellor Helmut Kohl echoed, “We consider that NATO should not expand its sphere of activity.”

    Declassified documents show security assurances against NATO expansion to Soviet leaders from Baker, Bush, Genscher, Kohl, Gates, Mitterrand, Thatcher, Hurd, Major and Woerner.

    In December 2017, the National Security Archive at George Washington University published memos, minutes and telegrams from that time, from which it emerges that Western assurances appear in numerous documents recorded or written during chancellery exchanges in 1990 and 1991. All the details can be found on the university’s dedicated website, under the heading “NATO Expansion: what Gorbachev Heard. Declassified documents show security assurances against NATO expansion to Soviet leaders from Baker, Bush, Genscher, Kohl, Gates, Mitterrand, Thatcher, Hurd, Major and Woerner. Slavic Studies Panel Addresses ‘Who Promised What to Whom on NATO Expansion?’”

    Former American ambassador to Moscow, Jack Matlock, also confirmed these facts in his various publications. Guarantees have therefore been given, even if they are not contained in a treaty signed in due form.

    But you have to be willing to take note and recognise that a word is a word.

    President Bill Clinton decided to ignore them and succeeded, in 1997, in expanding NATO eastwards by admitting new members in exchange for a $4 billion “bribe” to his friend Boris Yeltsin, as Yeltsin later called this gift.

    It was only later, with the rise of the neoconservatives, that President Bill Clinton decided to ignore them and succeeded, in 1997, in expanding NATO eastwards by admitting new members in exchange for a $4 billion “bribe” to his friend Boris Yeltsin, as Yeltsin later called this gift.

    At that time, the most resolute anti-Russian in the American administration, Zbigniew Brzezinski, author of the famous book “The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives”, in which he explains why the United States should definitely grab Ukraine, foresaw what would happen today: “If Russia is dismissed or rejected, it will be filled with resentment and its vision of itself will become more anti-European and anti-Western.” And he urged Clinton to hurry: “The longer we wait, the louder Moscow’s objections will be,” he predicted in the mid-1990s, while warning against an overly abrupt expansion.

     

     

    George Kennan, in a February 5, 1997 New York Times article, prophesized the current situation by writing that, following the breach of the given word to Gorbachev, the expansion of NATO is a ‘Fateful Error’.

     

     

     

    This danger was not overlooked by the father of the Soviet Union’s containment, George Kennan. In a 1997 New York Times article, he prophesized the current situation by writing that, following the breach of the given word to Gorbachev, the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO would be “the biggest mistake of post-Cold War American politics and would only serve to inflame nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in the Russian public.”

    Since then, NATO has only made things worse, admitting seven new states in 2004 and promising membership to Ukraine and Georgia in April 2008, before encouraging the latter to attack South Ossetia in August of the same year. This was barely ten months after Putin’s speech at the Munich conference, in which he had expressed the wish that NATO should stop expanding! In 25 years, NATO has doubled the number of its members, all in the East.

    At the same time, it accumulated aggressions by brazenly lying and twisting international law: the Gulf War in 1991 (with the fabricated affair of the babies thrown out of Kuwaiti incubators); the dismemberment of Yugoslavia in 1992, the illegal bombing of Serbia in 1999 and secession of Kosovo (justified by the pseudo-massacre of Raçak and the so-called Operation Horseshoe imputed to Serbia); the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001; the Iraq war in 2003 (started thanks to Colin Powell’s lies to the UN); the destruction of Libya and the assassination of Gaddafi (falsely accused of slaughtering his own population) in 2011; the attempted destruction of Syria and the overthrow of its president between 2011 and 2019; the war in Yemen since 2015, carried out under Saudi flag and considered by the UN to be the most important humanitarian catastrophe of our time.

    It is therefore very difficult to regard the American-led NATO as an innocent and harmless bridge club.

    It should therefore come as no surprise that, after the U.S.-organised coup in February 2014 to overthrow democratically elected Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, whose mistake was to wish for Ukraine to seek a balance between Russia and Europe, Russia regained control of Crimea while the Donbass provinces rebelled against this forfeiture.

    The United States and NATO are of course free to renege on their word and continue their aggressive course at the risk of starting a war. But at least the public has the right to know why and how it has come to this without being misled about who is really responsible for what would be a real mess for Europe.

     

    This article was published earlier in MRonline. It is republished under Creative Commons License,

    Feature Image: www.ft.com

    James Baker Image: www.bakerinstitute.org

    George Kennan Image: Foreign Policy and his article ‘A Fatefull Error’ in NYT.

     

  • The Russia-Ukraine War: Putin’s Reasons, Objectives and the Way Out

    The Russia-Ukraine War: Putin’s Reasons, Objectives and the Way Out

    In 3 weeks since Russia’s president, Putin ordered on February 24 this year, a “special military operation” against Ukraine, many questions were asked on his reasons and goals.

    Putin answered those questions in the early morning address to the nation on February 24. He referred to Russia’s particular concern and anxiety over the NATO expansion to the east and the US policy of containment of Russia through the military “settlement” of the Ukrainian territory. Transformation of Ukraine, historically a part of the Russian state, into an “anti-Russia” controlled and guided by the U.S. was nothing less, in Putin’s view than a real threat to Russia’s very existence.

    Putin went on to mention Ukraine’s use of armed forces against the pro-Russian separatists in Donbas, the potential threat that the Ukrainian nationalists could present for Russia-annexed Crimea, and Kyiv’s desire to acquire nuclear weapons. “Russia’s clash with these forces is inevitable.”

    This was the start of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Few of us believed it would actually happen, but it did, nonetheless. Let’s start by trying to understand, why.

    Russia’s red lines

    According to John Mearsheimer, the West, and especially America, is principally responsible for the current crisis, which actually started at NATO’s Bucharest summit in April 2008, with the US pushing the alliance to announce a plan for Ukraine and Georgia’s prospective membership. Russian leaders characterized the move as an existential threat to Russia and promises to thwart it. Putin warned the West then and there: “if Ukraine joins NATO, it will do so without Crimea and the eastern regions. It will simply fall apart.”

    Nobody listened, or paid attention, thus underscoring the second point from Putin’s pre-invasion speech: the West no longer treats Russia as a great power and will do whatever it deems necessary without taking heed of Russia’s legitimate interests. Instead, Ukraine was actively encouraged to expand its collaboration with NATO and crush the pro-Russian rebellion in Donbas by force. The U.S. and NATO supplied lethal weapons for Ukraine’s civil war, trained its armed forces and turned a blind eye to reports of atrocities that Kyiv and Kyiv-affiliated militias had committed in the region.

    Ukraine started hosting joint land-based and naval exercises with NATO countries, effectively blocking Russia’s Black Sea fleet in its base in Sevastopol. In July 2021, Ukraine and America co-hosted a major naval exercise in the Black Sea region involving navies from 32 countries. In November 2021, the U.S. conducted its annual Global Thunder 22 exercises, which included strategic aviation practising nuclear strikes against Russia over the Black Sea and only 20 km from Russia’s borders. In parallel to that, Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Defense announced his country’s aspirations to put as many US/NATO training centers in Ukraine as possible, which effectively amounted to a request for additional U.S. military personnel in the country.

    As John Mearsheimer observed, Ukraine was fast becoming a de facto member of NATO. It wanted to use NATO’s rearmaments and the US political and strategic back-up to crush the separatist rebellion in Donbas and ensure “de-occupation and reintegration” of Crimea, now an integral part of the Russian Federation, by all necessary means, not excluding “military measures.” Russia’s fears of NATO’s ballistic missiles appearing on the Ukraine-Russia border, within 7-8 minutes of flying time to Moscow no longer seemed overly exaggerated. Putin described such a potentiality as NATO’s holding a knife to Russia’s throat and made an explicit connection between Ukraine’s aspirations of NATO membership and Kyiv’s plan to return Donbas and Crimea by force. Both were equally unacceptable.

    Russia’s goals

    According to the Russian leader, if Ukraine joined NATO, it would be tempted to implement its “de-occupation strategy” for Crimea through the use of force. NATO would then be obliged to help Ukraine under its Article V mutual defence clause. “This means that there will be a military confrontation between Russia and NATO,” Putin said. Such a war would soon turn nuclear. The Kremlin came to a conclusion that a pre-emptive strike on Ukraine was the only way to stave off a future Russia-NATO war over Crimea.

    We haven’t seen it coming. It was hard to anticipate because Ukraine’s turning away from Russia and drawing closer to NATO did not start yesterday. Ukraine’s Yavoriv training ground hosted the first joint manoeuvres with NATO back in 1995. In 1997, Ukraine and NATO signed the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership. In 2000, the Ukrainian parliament ratified the Status of Forces Agreement, which enabled the stationing of NATO troops on Ukrainian soil. In 2002, Ukraine’s goal of eventual NATO membership was first voiced by its President; that goal has since become a part of the country’s official foreign policy doctrine. Ukraine’s forces took part in numerous NATO-led operations and missions over the years, from Bosnia to Kosovo to Afghanistan to Iraq. And Russia observed all of these developments over the period of near 20 years with calm and reserve, leaving an impression that Ukraine is free to proceed as it wants.

    Moscow’s calm evaporated after Ukraine’s Maidan revolution of 2014 deposed Russia-leaning president Yanukovych and, through the revolutionary powers’ first acts, indicated a clear break with the last memories of the Russian influence. Symbolically, the very first move was to strip the Russian language of its semi-official status in the areas where significant numbers of Russian-speaking minorities lived. A clear indication was given as to the status of the Russian Black Sea Fleet naval base in Sevastopol – the new powers would prefer the Russian navy relocate to Russia proper at its earliest convenience. Plans were underway to offer these naval facilities to NATO.

    Putin moved on to annex Crimea, which, in his view, was an act of strategic necessity. He apparently anticipated Ukraine’s eventually acquiescing to the fact.

    It did not happen. Instead, Ukraine grew more nationalistic, and a significant number of its nationalists embraced anti-Russianism together with far-right politics and symbology. Hence, the Russian goals in the present war include “de-Nazification,” which must be read as Ukraine’s abandonment of anti-Russian nationalism and return to the quasi-Soviet ideology of “one people” with Russians and Belarusians. In other words, Russia would seek to reaffirm, if not impose, a version of the Ukrainian identity that was supported through both the imperial and the Soviet times — Ukrainians as a junior kinfolk to the Russian “older brother.”

    The way out

    With Ukraine’s capital Kyiv under assault and the southern port of Mariupol nearing utter destruction, calls for peace have intensified on all sides, including from Russia’s most important backers in China. Unfortunately, the search for a working compromise has not yet started in earnest. Ukraine’s original position at peace talks focused on the immediate withdrawal of all Russian troops from all of Ukraine, Crimea and Donbas included. From the Russian perspective, that would be equal to capitulation and surrender of a part of its own territory (Crimea), plus legal denunciation of a friendship and support treaty just concluded with Donbas.

    Russia’s present terms for ending the war are equally unrealistic. They include Ukraine’s adoption of a neutral status and the abandonment of its hopes for NATO membership; acknowledgement of the Russian sovereignty over Crimea and the independence of separatist regions in the country’s east; and demilitarization. The objective of the regime change, disguised by the “de-Nazification” rhetoric, has not been voiced much as of recent.

    Given the very fact of the ongoing war with Russia, the demand for demilitarization is clearly a non-starter. Russia’s insistence on Ukraine’s constitutional neutrality could, perhaps, be taken back to Ukraine’s parliament for a serious discussion; however, a ceasefire must be reached first for such a discussion to happen. As for Ukraine’s acknowledgement of Russia’s sovereignty over Crimea or independence of Donbas, these Russia-pushed items look more like the terms of surrender and cannot form the basis of a peace agreement.

    A more plausible ground for a compromise could be the two states’ mutual pledge to refrain from all attempts to solve any outstanding issues by force in the future. That would stop short from Ukraine’s recognition of either Crimea or Donbas but would assure Russia that Ukraine has no plans to regain the lost territories by force. Russia would need to withdraw its army from all areas of Ukraine proper. Ukraine would have to accept that its fight for the return of Crimea and Donbas would now be restricted in its choice of means to mostly diplomatic and legal instruments. The assurances of a non-aligned, non-bloc status that Ukraine could give to Russia should be matched with Russia’s assurances of full compensation for the losses that this war inflicted on Ukraine’s economy and society. While such a compromise will most probably draw the rage of hawkish nationalists on both sides, it might actually form the foundation of a peace agreement that everyone needs.

    Image Credits:

    Feature Image: www.militarytimes.com

    Putin Image: Al Jazeera

    Map: Al Jazeera

  • Are we on the path to World War III? The rise of Asia and lessons from World War I

    Are we on the path to World War III? The rise of Asia and lessons from World War I

    Robert McNamara, the US Secretary of State during the Cuban Missile Crisis, famously noted that it was sheer luck, not rationality, that prevented the escalation of this crisis into a world war.

    The rise of East Asia and South-East Asia is inevitable – unless there would be World War III in this region. Whereas World War I was fought by the powers located at the shore of the North-Atlantic, World War II by those of the North-Atlantic and North-Pacific, World War III would be fought by those powers solely at the North-Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Are there lessons to be learned from the devastating conduct and outcome of World War I for our times? Is there only one lesson to be learned – that you can learn nothing from history? Or are we doomed to repeat history if we don’t learn anything from it? History will not repeat itself precisely, but wars repeatedly occur throughout history, even great wars. We are living in an age in which a war between the great powers is viewed as unlikely because it seems to be in no one’s interest, as the outcome of such a war would be so devastating that each party would do the utmost to avoid it. Rationality seems to dominate the assumptions and way of thinking in our times. But no war would have been waged if the losing side, or even both sides, would have known the outcome in advance.

     

    But what if conflicts in Asia would not be fought to pursue national interests so much as recognition? What would this mean: to be accepted as equal again after the humiliation in the course of European colonization and subsequent American hegemony? Indeed, acknowledgement of past suffering seems to be a trauma in the conscience of many Asian nations. Are those desires only irrational or a different kind of rationality, which we have to take into account?

     

    There are striking similarities between the Pre-World War I era and the current developments in Asia: World War I signifies the danger, not the inevitability, of a new world war in the decades to come. World War I is a symbolic representation of the risk that war amongst the great powers could erupt although nobody would benefit from it. It is a writing on the wall, that rationality is not a guarantee for avoiding self-destruction. All reckonings regarding the repetition of World War I in Asia are based on the assumption that it would be in no one’s interest to fight a large-scale war, even with WMD, which could lead to the destruction of great parts of Asia. But what if conflicts in Asia would not be fought to pursue national interests so much as recognition? What would this mean: to be accepted as equal again after the humiliation in the course of European colonization and subsequent American hegemony? Indeed, acknowledgement of past suffering seems to be a trauma in the conscience of many Asian nations. Are those desires only irrational or a different kind of rationality, which we have to take into account? At present, we have apparently a conflict between democracies in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean on one side and authoritarian China on the other. But during my few visits I got the impression that the trauma of colonization and the non-recognition of the Asian civilizations is more counting in the cultural memory of the Asian nations. And especially India should be wary to be instrumentalised by the US in their conflict with China.

     

    During her last visit to Beijing in September 2012, then US secretary of state Hillary Clinton held a press conference in which she stated that the world would soon see, but for the first time in history, that a rising power and an established power would not engage in a war. Of course, her statement was related to China and the US. Additionally, she even compared the competition between China and the US with that of the Peloponnesian War between Sparta and Athens – authoritarian Sparta against democratic Athens. Athens, the strongest city-state in Greece before the war, was reduced to a state of near-complete subjection, while Sparta became established as the leading power. Thucydides, the chronicler of the Peloponnesian War and one of the ancient world’s most important historians, saw the initial cause of this war in the growth of Athenian power: “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.”

    Unlike Plato, though, Thucydides argues that it was not the striving for power in itself but rather fear of loss of power and, in the long term, fear of being oppressed, robbed of one’s freedom, and enslaved that caused the escalation leading to war. In Thucydides’ account, fear was the cause of war on both sides. Sparta was afraid of the growth of Athenian power, and Athens was afraid of what might happen if it gave in to an escalating series of demands and threats, the result of which could not be foreseen.

    The Europeans who went to war assumed they would be home by Christmas 1914. We know now, of course, that World War I not only happened but that it also resulted in the self-destruction of the European powers in two world wars. World War I is foremost a lesson that a limited conflict could escalate into a nightmare of millions of deaths and unspeakable suffering, for which no rational explanation could be found.

     

    No one wanted World War I to happen. Or, at least, no one wanted the kind of war that actually took place. The general assumption was that the conflict would be very limited. The Europeans who went to war assumed they would be home by Christmas 1914. We know now, of course, that World War I not only happened but that it also resulted in the self-destruction of the European powers in two world wars. World War I is foremost a lesson that a limited conflict could escalate into a nightmare of millions of deaths and unspeakable suffering, for which no rational explanation could be found. Military aims and strategies gained priority above meaningful political purposes. Although the generals of the German empire believed that they were relying on Clausewitz’s theory, in fact, they perverted him. Tactics replaced strategy, strategy substituted politics, politics gained momentum above policy, and policy was militarized. It was as if everybody was saying: being at war would mean a stop to thinking.

     

     

    This does not mean a simple equation of rising China with the then rising German Empire. Although the actors then and today seem to be quite different, the dynamics generated by the conflict between emerging, rising and declining powers are strikingly comparable.

     

    Perhaps the deepest and hidden reason for this escalation was that no war party could admit neither defeat nor failure. Striking evidence for this assumption is that the proclaimed war aims of the German Empire got momentum the more they got unrealistic and irrational. The pride, honour and identity of the German Reich prohibited the acknowledgement of defeat and failure. This was the same with Russia, France, England and the Habsburg Empire – and the Turk Empire too. Perhaps especially these Empires knew that their rule wouldn’t survive if they would have had to acknowledge military defeat or failure. Military defeat or failure would have humiliated their identity and their “face”: their social recognition within their society and community. A military defeat would signal their “symbolic death” – and so, the empires fought a war for life and death. This does not mean a simple equation of rising China with the then rising German Empire. Although the actors then and today seem to be quite different, the dynamics generated by the conflict between emerging, rising and declining powers are strikingly comparable.

    Robert McNamara, the US Secretary of State during the Cuban Missile Crisis, famously noted that it was sheer luck, not rationality, that prevented the escalation of this crisis into a world war. In 1983 the world did even need twice more than a great fortune to avoid a nuclear disaster. In current times all great powers are using military means to pursue their political and economic interests. But we just should not allow ourselves to bet in a casino-like style that military conflicts and strategies could not lead to the escalation of limited conflicts into great power wars. The path to World War III would not be similar to that leading to World War II, but comparable to the pre-World War I era.

    This article is an amended version of the Introduction in his book “Lessons from World War I for the Rise of Asia” by Stuttgart:Ibidem Publishers.

    Feature Image Credit: www.express.co.uk 

    Article Images: www.fr21news.com , www.bloomberg.com , L’EXPRESS

  • Indian Foreign Secretary visits Colombo: Attempt to reset India-Sri Lanka ties

    Indian Foreign Secretary visits Colombo: Attempt to reset India-Sri Lanka ties

    India and Sri Lanka are immediate neighbours that share cultural, historical and religious ties spanning over thousands of years. Indian tourists to Sri Lanka are a major source of tourism revenue for the island nation. Despite all these ties, the bilateral relations continue to be impacted by considerable mistrust. Recent increase in tensions between the two South Asian neighbours is a result of the island nation allowing China to enhance its strategic footprints in Sri Lanka and increase its influence in the region. Despite certain inconsistencies in the Indo-Sri Lankan bilateral relationship, it will still be in the best interests of both countries to enhance their relationship amid the uncertain shifts in the geopolitical landscape.

    Indian Foreign Secretary’s visit to Colombo

    India’s foreign secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla concluded a four-day state visit to the Island nation on October 5. His sojourn commenced at a time when Colombo expressed her eagerness to ink a few defence pacts with New Delhi.

    The visit was eventful as well as broad-based. The Foreign Secretary  held a meeting with the Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa on tourism, power generation, and cooperation in economic recovery. To reset the strained relations with Colombo, Shringla’s schedule was kept tight and focused on closed-door discussions. He called on Sri Lankan Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa, Finance Minister Basil Rajapaksa, Foreign Minister G.L. Peiris and Foreign Secretary Admiral Jayanath Colombage (Rerd). From the capital, Shringla hopped from one town to another. He visited and held meetings in Kandy, Trincomalee and Jaffna to enhance bilateral ties.

     

    While in Trincomalee, he explored the possibilities for materializing the India-Sri Lanka energy partnership. In separate meetings with  Tamil National Alliance (TNA), Tamil Progressive Alliance (TPA), and Ceylon Workers’ Congress (CWC), Shringla voiced India’s firm support to the implementation of the 13th Amendment, a constitutional amendment that would empower the Tamil minorities but continues to be held in abeyance by the Sri Lankan government. During his visit, Shringla launched a few Indian initiatives like Model Housing Village’ in the northern district of Vavuniya, a school building at Vadamarachchi in Jaffna, and the Saraswathy Central College building in Pussellawa in Kandy. India had earlier constructed over 46,000 houses for the war-affected families in north.

    New Delhi has supplied to Colombo 100 tons of liquid medical oxygen, 26 tons of medicines and ambulances as part of its support to the Island’s efforts to overcome the pandemic. The state has also received about half a million Covid vaccines from India. Sri Lanka’s Suwa Seriya programme was supported by India. Sri Lanka and India together have implemented a USD 400 million currency swap agreement and one more is expected to happen.

    Colombo Crisis

     India’s External Affairs minister S. Jaishankar and Sri Lankan Foreign minister GL Peiris had a tête-à-tête on the side lines of UNGA in September. Weeks after Dr S. Jaishankar’s visit to Sri Lanka in the first week of January this year, Indian fishermen were killed by the Sri Lankan Navy, which resulted in renewed tensions between the two countries.  Moreover, the cancellation of the tripartite Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Sri Lanka, India, and Japan for the development of the strategically located East Container Terminal (ECT) at the Colombo Port in February, added more salt to the already strained relations between the two neighbours.

    What became an even more controversial issue was when Sri Lanka cleared a Chinese energy project in three islands off the Jaffna peninsula that is barely 50 km from Tamil Nadu coast. Recently, Sri Lankan parliament passed the Colombo Port City Economic Commission Act to oversee a huge Chinese luxury oceanside development project. This gives China a significant foothold in the country and will allow it to enhance its strategic presence throughout the region. Accordingly, India emphasised that it expected Sri Lanka to be “mindful” of ties with New Delhi, particularly in the security realm.

    Interestingly, the series of events that have taken place this year came after the statement given by Sri Lankan Foreign Secretary Jayanath Colombage last year regarding Sri Lanka’s adoption of an “India first approach”, which reflects Colombo’s supposed willingness to protect New Delhi’s strategic interests in the region. However, despite these guarantees, the geopolitical shifts occurring in South Asia make it arduous for Sri Lanka to maintain consistently positive relations with its neighbour.

    Ties that continue to stand

     China has become a critical factor in the Indo-Sri Lankan bilateral equation. The East Asian giant’s deep pockets have become a more attractive economic option for Sri Lanka vis-à-vis India. While India took five months to approve a loan moratorium requested by Sri Lanka last year, China approved an additional USD 500 million loan expeditiously. Moreover, the issue involving the Tamil cause continues to sustain the long-standing trust deficit between the two South Asian neighbours.

    However, this is not to say that Sri Lanka will disregard India for its partnership with China. Colombo is aware of the risks involved in engaging deeply with China. Sri Lanka is no stranger to Beijing’s debt trap that compromises its sovereignty. Despite Rajapaksa’s cordial ties with China, Sri Lanka will have to inevitably reconsider its priorities if this continues to persist.

    While China may have the upper hand in mega-infrastructure projects, India’s role in cementing its people-to-people ties with Sri Lanka and taking the lead in the education, health, and tourism sectors, continue to give it considerable edge in the overall inter-state dynamics. Apart from being its major trading partner, India has also demonstrated its proactive partnership by being the first responder in humanitarian assistance.  Most importantly, India has no interest in compromising Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Additionally, India continues to reiterate that it gives priority to Sri Lanka under key regional frameworks such as its Neighbourhood First Policy and Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR).

    Sri Lanka is also aware of this and has tried to make up for its decisions that have compromised India’s interests. Despite cancelling the ECT tri-partite MoU, Sri Lanka has taken the prerogative to permit Indian companies to develop its West Container Terminal (WCT). Moreover, the scheduled address by Pakistani Prime Imran Khan, to the Sri Lankan Parliament during his visit to Sri Lanka in February, was also cancelled. Recently, much attention has been placed on Sri Lanka’s “roadmap” to restore ties with India and address several important issues such as the fishermen’s issues, building connectivity, trade and investment, and promoting religious links.

    A way forward

     At a time when India’s Indo-Pacific concerns are on the rise, New Delhi is perturbed by Beijing’s diplomatic successes in Sri Lanka and throughout South Asia. China’s quick responses and its its large funding are attractions that has swayed the Island nation towards a pro-China policy. Given the endemic corruption and the Chinese-engineered Sinhala chauvinism with anti-India stance has forced Indian companies to become very cautious about investing in Sri Lanka. But India is ahead of China when it comes to tourism, and health care. Sri Lankan students are now eligible to compete in India’s National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET) and Joint Entrance Examination for the IITs. Last year India’s allocation of $50million for counter-terrorism and $15 million for promoting the Buddhist links drew tremendous positive attention of Lankan policymakers. The first pilgrims’ flight from Sri Lanka to Kushinagar in Uttar Pradesh is expected to take off soon. From the days of Julius Jeyawardane Sri Lanka has evolve a very crafty and nuanced diplomatic strategy, a truly Chanakyan approach. India will need to be equally crafty to checkmate the Chinese inroads into Sri Lanka. [TPF].

     

    Feature Image Credit: Lankaxpress

     

  • The US retreat from Afghanistan: Looking back on an ill-conceived peace deal and a hasty withdrawal

    The US retreat from Afghanistan: Looking back on an ill-conceived peace deal and a hasty withdrawal

    Under an agreement signed on February 29, 2020, between Qatar, The US and the Taliban, the US agreed to withdraw all its troops within 14 months of signing the accord. In return, the Taliban pledged to prevent any terrorist group from operating in Afghanistan against the US and its allies. The pact also envisaged a prisoner swap, the start of intra-Afghan dialogue and sanction removals against the Taliban. But, as we have seen, the peace deal accelerated the collapse of the Afghan state on which the US spent trillions of dollars.

    Trump also permitted the US chief negotiator Zalmay Khalilzad to place the withdrawal of US forces on the negotiating table with the Taliban, throwing away their biggest bargaining chip. The Taliban themselves seemed surprised that the US put the withdrawal of US troops on the negotiating table.

    The US started the peace talks with four specific goals. An end to violence by declaring a ceasefire, an Intra-Afghan political settlement, Taliban renunciation of Al-Qaeda and long-term presence of intelligence assets and special operation forces in Afghanistan for counterterrorism operations, and a timeline for US troops withdrawal[1]. However, with the presidential elections approaching in 2020, Trump was being increasingly restless and wanted a quicker exit. So, to accelerate talks, the long-standing demand for the presence of special operation forces in a counterterrorism mission along with inter-Afghan led peace talks were jettisoned. Trump also permitted the US chief negotiator Zalmay Khalilzad to place the withdrawal of US forces on the negotiating table with the Taliban, throwing away their biggest bargaining chip. The Taliban themselves seemed surprised that the US put the withdrawal of US troops on the negotiating table.

    The US committed itself to a set of measurable commitments, while the Taliban did not. The idea was to create an environment of good faith. However, the Taliban never reciprocated the ‘good faith’ shown by the US, except to ensure safe passage for the retreating US troops. Once the deal was struck, violence increased in the country.

    The Taliban never agreed to a ceasefire or a political settlement. While the intra-afghan dialogue was a part of the deal struck between the Taliban and the US, there was a lack of progress, with the Afghan government and the Taliban blaming each other for the impasse. Violence escalated by almost 50% after the start of the intra-afghan dialogue.

    The peace deal also included a prisoner swap agreement where the Taliban would release up to 1000 prisoners and the Afghan government release up to 5000 prisoners. The Afghan government asked the Taliban prisoners for a written guarantee that they would not return to the battlefield. However, thousands immediately rejoined the insurgency. The Taliban commander, Maulawi Talib, who led a Taliban assault on the capital of Helmand, Lashkargah, was one among the 5000 prisoners released. There was an uptick in violence after the prisoner swap was completed. Afghan officials said the agreement went through only because of pressure from Washington.

    The Taliban proved reluctant to break ties with Al-Qaeda, too, according to a UNSC report. Under the peace deal, the Taliban agreed not to allow al-Qaeda or any other extremist group to operate in areas under their control. However, the Taliban needs allies and Al-Qaeda is one reliable ally. Further, the Haqqani network, an integral part of the Taliban, is known to harbour close links with Al-Qaeda. While stopping a future terrorist attack emanating from Afghanistan will be in the Taliban’s interests, it is unlikely they will break relations with Al-Qaeda after years of close collaboration.

    It was clear from the beginning that the viability of the agreement depended on the US willingness to call off the withdrawal in the future if the Taliban renegade on their promises. But that decision fell to president Biden, who has always made it clear that Afghanistan is a lost cause.

    When Biden came to power, the situation in Afghanistan was deteriorating. The choice he had, according to Biden himself, was to either expand US presence or follow through with the agreement. The dilemma was a result of poor policies pursued during the trump era. The US has been bogged down in Afghanistan for 20 years, and the resolve of president Biden to not escalate meant that the US followed through with the agreement. The peace talks became a cover for complete US disengagement.

    The US withdrawal accelerated the collapse of the Afghan state. The uncertainty of the Doha talks demoralized the Afghan military, who saw it as a deal between the Taliban and the US that guaranteed Taliban victory.

    With the collapse of morale, everything that was rotting started collapsing as well.  Around 30000 troops existed on paper, but the numbers were inflated due to a phenomenon called ‘ghost’ soldiers – soldiers on the official payroll but who never showed up for fighting. There were reports that the soldier was not paid and there were not enough supplies.

    Jack Watling, a research fellow for land warfare and military sciences at the Royal United Services Institute in London, said that the Afghan military collapse was not a reflection of military capability, but a reflection of a collapse in the will to fight.

    In truth, ever since the surge in troops authorized by the Obama administration right after coming to power, what every successive US President wanted was an orderly withdrawal from Afghanistan. The most baffling thing is that the US resorted to negotiation when its leverage was the weakest. Perhaps, in hindsight, greater efforts could have been made during the time of President Obama to find a peaceful solution to the conflict.

    In the end, it was more of a retreat than a withdrawal. The US made concrete measurable commitments while the Taliban made promises, which they can now afford to renegade on.

    The scenes in Kabul airport was anything but orderly. More than 2000 marines had to be brought in to secure the Kabul airport as the Taliban rolled into Kabul for the first time since 2001. “The past 17 days have seen our troops execute the largest airlift in U.S. history, evacuating over 120,000 U.S. citizens, citizens of our allies, and Afghan allies of the United States,” the US president said in the statement. An attack by the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) on Kabul airport killed 13 U.S. service members and 170 Afghans.

    In the end, it was more of a retreat than a withdrawal. The US made concrete measurable commitments while the Taliban made promises, which they can now afford to renegade on.

     

    [1] Pg. 667, carter

     

    Feature Image Credit: www.npr.org

  • The Game of Thrones in Kabul: Taliban’s 2nd Innings

    The Game of Thrones in Kabul: Taliban’s 2nd Innings

    The trajectory of politics in the volatile region of Afghanistan and its neighbourhood is in flux. A month has gone by since the Taliban rebels swept into the capital and occupied the Presidential Palace in Kabul on August 15. Many faces in the interim government announced by the Taliban are globally designated, terrorists. Till now there are only scanty details about the Taliban’s plans for governance. As the Taliban is an integrated group of multiple tribal power centres, there are conflicting views given by different factions. The hard-line zealots are looking to reimpose their harshly interpreted version of the Sharia laws. The graffiti on the walls are being erased across Afghan towns. Music is muted. Schools and cultural institutions are currently shut. The Taliban has changed the name of the democratic state to the name during Taliban 1.0, an  Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, a theological state where democracy has no place.

    Surprising everyone, the Taliban announced their ministerial portfolios and postponed the swearing-in ceremony that was planned for September 9, the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 terror attacks. Mullah Hassan Akhund has been named the prime minister. Whether he is acceptable to all the factions is still in doubt. The Haqqani group, a virulent anti-Indian faction, has garnered powerful ministries. The Interior Ministry will be headed by Alhaj Mullah Sirajuddin Haqqani of the Haqqani Network, while Taliban co-founder Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar has been accredited with the portfolio of the deputy prime minister.

    Sirajuddin Haqqani is long designated as a global terrorist by the US.  The cabinet is likely to expand later. The leaders are yet to come up with some heavyweight names including the judiciary chief. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan will be under the supreme leadership of Sheikh Haibatullah Akhundzada. He was head of Sharia courts under the Taliban 1.0 regime from 1996 to 2001 and was responsible for the harsh and brutal interpretation and implementation of Sharia law.  Molvi Muhammad Yaqoob is in charge of the Ministry of Defence, while Molvi Ameer Khan Muttaqi is announced as the Foreign Minister.

     Four Haqqani leaders are allocated portfolios in the cabinet. The tussle between the Haqqani and Yaqoob factions is already public. The Haqqani network intends to retain complete control of Kabul and thus dominate Afghanistan while the Yaqoob faction led by Mullah Baradar, with their power centre in Kandahar, favours an inclusive government featuring the minorities as well. The Haqqani faction functions with the full support of Pakistan and is masterminded by the ISI. This factional feud could spill out to weaken the Taliban ultimately.

    The Taliban’s cabinet doesn’t reflect the ethnic diversity of Afghanistan, and nearly half the strength consists of members from the previous government in 1996-2001. A slew of challenges has already emerged for the new regime. The first is the problem of recognition and legitimacy by the general population and non-voter citizens across the state. The second challenge will be ensuring inclusive governance, claiming undisputed leadership across the territory, as well as dealing with Al Qaida and the Islamic State Khorasan. Economic reconstruction of the devastated economy, coupled with achieving diplomatic recognition by the global community is the major challenge.

    Afghanistan is known for its mosaic culture. In Article 4 of the Afghan Constitution, 14 major ethnic groups are recognized. Apart from the major populace belonging to Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek, there are ethnic minorities like Turkmen, Baluch, Pashai, Nuristani, Aymaq, Arab, Qirghiz, Qizilbash, Gujur,  Brahui. There are also micro-ethnic settlements across the state.

    Taliban has neither showed empathy towards the minorities nor respected the constitution. Out of the thirty-three ministers and high-level names in the Taliban’s cabinet, two appointees are Tajik (Qari Din Mohammad Hanif, Minister of Economic Affairs and Qari Faseehuddin, Army Chief), and only one name is Uzbek (Molvi Abdul Salam Hanafi, Second deputy to PM). Despite a considerable Hazara demography, no ministry is allocated to anyone belonging to Hazaras or even Shia Islam. .

    Women make up almost half of the 40 million Afghan population. Significantly, no female candidate is projected as a minister in the newly formed ministry. Even though Abdul Baqi Haqqani, the Higher Education Minister clarified that females will be permitted to pursue higher education, there are serious concerns over girls’ education. During the Taliban’s incumbency between 1996-2001, girls and women were barred from attending classes and working outside. The Taliban has renamed the Women’s Affairs Ministry the Ministry of Vice and Virtue.

    After the collapse of Amrullah Saleh led interim government in Panjshir, Afghanistan is being ruled by only one incumbent – The Taliban. But Amrullah Saleh and Ahmed Massoud have formed the Government in Exile in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. With this announcement, the global community is likely to recognize only one among the two- the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in Exile and the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

     

    In order to alter the negative global perception towards them, the Taliban will have to ensure civic rights, human rights and women’s right to work and study. Establishing political stability and non-violence should be clearly demonstrated. To continue ruling poverty-stricken, strife-torn and war-ravaged Afghanistan, the Taliban will have to work on better external engagements within their ideological frameworks. The United Nations and European Union will continue to engage the Taliban on humanitarian grounds, provided the Taliban works to ensure hope and optimism. Through an official communique to Secretary-General on September 15, the Taliban nominated Mohammad Suhail Shaheen and appealed for the UN representation of the Taliban.

    Aid and trade – these two remain the most significant challenges for the Taliban. Apart from the Islamic states like Pakistan, Iran, Qatar and Turkey, the Taliban has been engaging Russia and China for their support. Under these circumstances, Pakistan is expected to negotiate with the Taliban on Haqqani’s power and control in the provinces along the Durand line. Bringing Tehrik-e-Taliban (Pakistan) under control will be a challenge for Islamabad. Pakistan’s military establishment will seek to cut commercial channels between Afghanistan and India and gains in favour of Pakistan.  India continues its wait and watch policy towards considering diplomatic or political links with the Taliban.

    The tussle for power and dominance between the main factions may spawn severe political instability and civil war. The perennial inter-tribe rivalries across the provinces of Afghanistan will complicate the issues further. [TPF]

    Image Credit: inews.co.uk

  • Does ASEAN Need a New Approach to Code of Conduct for the South China Sea?

    Does ASEAN Need a New Approach to Code of Conduct for the South China Sea?

    Reference to Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC, and formulations such as early adoption of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) have featured in the ASEAN Chairman’s Statement of East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers’ Meeting since 2013 when Brunei Darussalam had held the Chairmanship of the ASEAN. These references were reiterated, and the section relating to the South China Sea in the ASEAN Chairman’s Statement for the 11th East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in August 2021 under the leadership of Brunei Darussalam, is no different.

    While the Chinese intent is a welcome development, its new “Maritime Traffic Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China” (MTSL) that came into effect on 01 September 2021, has caused turbulence among the claimant States.

    Meanwhile, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement of 5 August 2021 notes that a new goal has been set by China under which Beijing and ASEAN would “refrain from unilateral actions that aggravate tensions and widen differences, or using force or threat of force in particular”. While the Chinese intent is a welcome development, its new “Maritime Traffic Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China” (MTSL) that came into effect on 01 September 2021, has caused turbulence among the claimant States. As per the MTSL guidelines and procedures, vessels must “report the name, call sign, current position, next port of call and even estimated time of arrival to Chinese authorities”.

    The Philippines has decided to “ignore” the new Chinese Regulations and Philippine Defence Secretary Delfin Lorenzana has clarified his country’s stand on the issue that “we do not honour those laws by the Chinese within the West Philippine Sea because we consider that we have the sovereign right within this waters. So we will not recognise this law of the Chinese,” The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry too has reiterated strict compliance with the 1982 UNCLOS “when promulgating documents of domestic law related to the sea”.

    The Pentagon has accused China of “Unlawful and sweeping maritime claims, including in the South China Sea, pose a serious threat to the freedom of the seas, including the freedoms of navigation and overflight, free trade and unimpeded lawful commerce, and the rights and interests of the South China Sea and other littoral nations,” and the Defense Department spokesman has stated that the country will “ continue to fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows,”

    By all counts, an early conclusion of CoC in the South China Sea is only wishful given that the idea has been on the table for over two and a half decades since 1996. At that time there was euphoria among ASEAN foreign ministers that a CoC in the South China Sea could be the “foundation for long term stability in the area and foster understanding among claimant countries.”

    There is now a view that it is time to change the “objective from coming up with a comprehensive CoC”; instead, ASEAN and China must work towards “incremental development of a series of agreements” that could “eventually become the CoC in the future”

    The ASEAN has made earnest efforts and continues to negotiate a legally binding CoC but its finalization has eluded it. There is now a view that it is time to change the “objective from coming up with a comprehensive CoC”; instead, ASEAN and China must work towards “incremental development of a series of agreements” that could “eventually become the CoC in the future”. This can be achieved by developing “more realistic” and “smaller accords” that can help “de-escalate potential contentious situations”.

    The above argument merits attention for at least two important reasons. First, the South China Sea is simmering due to US-China military contestations. The US Navy continues to engage in exercises and the current deployment in the South China Sea by USS Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group and Air Wing of the Future is a reflection of the US’ commitment to field “combat-ready force to protect and defend the collective maritime interests of the U.S. and its regional allies and partners”. Also, the US Navy has conducted FONOPs relentlessly and is now joined by the US Coast Guard. The Quad Member States have also dispatched their warships to the South China Sea for Malabar Naval exercises and the European navies led by France and Britain are operating in the region. These multi-nation naval manoeuvers have prompted China to respond through similar actions and the PLA Navy and the Air Force are persistently deployed in the region. This ‘state of affairs’ will continue.

    Second, there is a view that while the CoC should necessarily be consistent with the 1982 UNCLOS and should not “prejudice legitimate rights and interests of nations not a party to discussions,” this assessment can potentially trigger clamour among other stakeholders who have politico-diplomatic, economic and strategic interests in the region and have vehemently argued for a rules-based system and have challenged China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea as also its non-adherence to the 2016 PCA ruling.

    Under such circumstances, there are no incentives for China and it is deliberately delaying the finalization of the COC; it prefers to pursue a “business as usual” approach causing immense insecurity in the minds of the claimant States. Meanwhile, there is now a sense of urgency among the ASEAN Member States to finalize the CoC and their “patience” is wearing thin.

     

    Feature Image Credit: Nikkei Asia

  • The United States Must Airdrop Aid to the Blockaded Regions of Afghanistan

    The United States Must Airdrop Aid to the Blockaded Regions of Afghanistan

    With the Afghan economy is on the verge of collapse, the United Nations has warned that half of the population in Afghanistan needs humanitarian aid. While the U.S. military’s combat operations in Afghanistan have come to an end, Washington has pledged to remain engaged with the country through diplomacy, development, and humanitarian aid. After the sudden collapse of the U.S.-backed government on August 15, 2021, the Taliban swiftly seized 33 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces –  the last standing is Panjshir. As Panjshir leads the resistance, it has also become a safe refuge for many Afghans escaping the wrath of the Taliban.

    The Panjshir Valley is surrounded by magnificent mountains and a roaring river at its heart. It has historically been an unconquered territory, be it against the Soviet Union in the 1970s or the Taliban in the 1990s. The current resistance force is led by Mr. Ahmad Massoud, the son of the legendary anti-Soviet freedom fighter Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was tragically assassinated by al-Qaeda in collaboration with the Taliban two days before the horrific attacks of 9/11. Mr. Ahmad Massoud is now leading the National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan, alongside Vice President Mr. Amrullah Saleh, who has proclaimed himself as care-taker President in the absence of President Ashraf Ghani, who has fled the country.

    While people across the country suffer from the shortage of food and basic needs, the situation in Panjshir is dire as the NRF and Taliban are fighting tooth and nail. Notably, several of Massoud’s closest aides have been killed, allegedly by Pakistan’s drones, and there is an active blockade imposed on the valley by the Taliban. The NRF’s attempts to negotiate a peace deal with the Taliban, which included some level of autonomy for Panjshir under a decentralized Islamic democratic system were rebuffed. The Taliban insists on a centralized and puritanical theocracy with the group as the dominant power at the center.  While both sides have sustained casualties, reports indicate a devastating toll on the civilian population.

    The Panjshir valley has been surrounded by the Taliban from all entry points, and they have callously enforced an active blockade, inhibiting humanitarian relief from reaching the afflicted. Internet and telephone communication lines have been cut off for several days. Mr. Saleh has appealed to the international community for humanitarian assistance, but his pleas for help have fallen on deaf ears. The Taliban has confirmed the blockade, by saying that due to fighting goods and food items have not entered the province for some four days but promised to reopen the supply lines. The Taliban also claimed to have captured the entire province, including the capital Bazarak. However, the NRF reports resumption of fierce fighting across the province. This is at a time when Ahmad Massoud has called for a national uprising which has inspired some movements in other provinces. Additionally, several women have also participated in protesting for their rights in cities like Kabul, Herat, and Mazar e Sharif.

    Many amongst the ranks of the NRF are former members of the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). They have risked their lives fighting alongside American troops against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Islamic State Khorasan, and many feel abandoned while they continue to resist. While we do not know a lot about the intensity of the issue due to complete media blackout, some with access on the ground report of the catastrophic humanitarian crisis is unfolding in places like Panjshir and Andarab, a district in neighboring Baghlan province. Upwards of a quarter of a million civilians are trapped in these areas,  and desperately need “food supplies, including baby formula, rice, wheat, and other perishables” and medicine.

    While the U.S. military’s combat mission has ended in Afghanistan,  America and its allies can provide critical assistance through humanitarian aid as originally planned. Some small amount of aid from the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have reached Kabul, but a lot more needs to be done to prevent the catastrophe that the United Nations has warned about. One of the quickest ways to get aid across the country would be through airdropping. The US has conducted several airdrop missions in the past including one in 2014 in Iraq. The US should start with airdropping the much-needed supplies in areas such as Panjshir and other regions where the Taliban has imposed blockades. This can bring great relief to the people in need. Delays in delivering humanitarian aid could risk the lives of many people from starvation and medical attention.

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  • The Fall of Kabul and dealing with the Taliban 2.0

    The Fall of Kabul and dealing with the Taliban 2.0

    The debacle of the democratic apparatus in Afghanistan was inevitable. After pumping billions in aid and significant bloodshed, the US government ended its longest war in defeat, the war in Afghanistan under the euphemism of ‘Global War on Terror’. Right after occupying the White House, the Biden administration has followed the path of its predecessors and commanded the complete withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. The 2020 – Doha peace agreement between the US government and the Taliban brought a scant number of outcomes. Even during the presence of international forces in Afghanistan, the Taliban leaders disrespected the peace agreement and violated significant features of the agreement – that is a ceasefire. Following the agreement, over 5000 prisoners belonging to the separatist groups- were released by the Afghan government, under pressure from the US. Quite naturally, these prisoners were back with their militant outfits, thus strengthening the Taliban’s fighting capability.

    As of now, India has not taken any part in the peace negotiations with the Taliban. One of the major reasons is in the past the Indian government has never recognised the Taliban as a legitimate actor and vouched for a peace negotiation that should be Afghan-led, Afghan controlled and Afghan-owned. Currently, there are speculations about the likely power structure and composition of the government in Afghanistan, but it is quite clear the Taliban will govern the country by Sharia law. At this time of fast transition, the countries in South Asia are seeking to gain diplomatic leverage in the situation.

    India has a huge stake in Afghanistan’s reconstruction. In 2016 Indian Prime Minister and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani inaugurated the Salma dam project in Afghanistan. This 200 million dollar project is part of the larger developmental approach of the Indian government to Afghanistan. But recently, the equipment of the Salma dam was captured by the Taliban. In this scenario, it is unlikely that the Dam project will receive further Indian logistical support in future. Similarly, uncertainty beleaguers the Chabahar Project. India was one of the largest bilateral donors to Afghanistan during the war on terror. It ranges from infrastructure building to the promotion of democracy and small development projects. Almost $3 billion has been invested in and on Afghanistan in capacity building, education, infrastructure and security counts. This developmental commitment has made India the most dependable country and strategic partner for Afghanistan so far. However, now that the Taliban is in full control, the Indian government needs to find a diplomatic solution on how to go ahead with the various projects and commitments in Afghanistan.

    Except for Panjshir province, the entire country is under Taliban control. The president, head of the state, has left the country. Led by interim President Amrullah Saleh and Ahamad Masoud, the Resistance Force from Panjshir Valley is fiercely fighting against the Taliban. Under such circumstances, the conservative approach of the Indian government, as it has begun to talk to the Taliban, could ruin the decades’ long reputation and developmental efforts in Afghanistan. India has legitimate concerns in Afghanistan and should protect its interests carefully. The absence of the US forces and elected Afghan government makes the task very difficult for the government of India. In the past, the Indian government cooperated with the elected Afghan government based on their shared interests and values of democracy, freedom, rule of law and respect for human rights. But the past approach may not work anymore under the Taliban leadership. In the past, the Ministry of External Affairs stated that it is in touch with ‘various stakeholders’ in Afghanistan and other regional countries. Indian officials believe that a ‘double’ peace’ i.e. one within Afghanistan and around the country is necessary for the region. To ensure safety for the Indians living in Afghanistan, the government has already evacuated all Indians employed by the Indian embassy. India has also started emergency E-visa facilities for Afghan citizens. With regard to the diplomatic relationship with the Taliban, the government is following a ‘wait and watch policy with its extended neighbour. The Taliban leadership has announced that they would like to have good relations with the Indian government and access to the Indian market through Pakistan. The Taliban also wants these two countries to resolve their issues as its interests are linked to the two countries. The government of India is yet to respond. The Afghan media personnel, translators, performance artists, civilians are being hunted down by the Taliban soldiers. In this scenario, India will carefully assess the situation and the reliability of the Taliban to make its further move.

    While India is still on the horns of a dilemma over the direct dialogue with the Taliban, India’s arch-rival Pakistan is busy re-establishing its hold and is trying to isolate India diplomatically from the region. Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognise the Taliban as a legitimate actor in the 90s. Last year, the government of Pakistan welcomed an Afghan Taliban delegation led by Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar. In the meeting, Pakistan showed their support for peace and blamed India as a spoiler of peace in the war-torn country. But reports suggest otherwise. According to the US Defense Intelligence Agency, Pakistan harbours Taliban leaders along with other insurgent groups such as the Haqqani network, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Laskar-e-Taiba. Such groups have the potential to disrupt the security and stability in South Asia. The report also says that the strategic objective of the Pakistan government is to counter the Indian influence in Afghanistan. In a recent interview, Pakistan foreign affairs minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi said that the violence in Afghanistan led to a refugee exodus to Pakistan but they cannot take more refugees. Last year, the High Council for National Reconciliation leader Abdullah Abdullah said that Pakistan holds the key role in the Afghan peace process and India should keep their profile low in the Afghan situation.

    As the Taliban emerges in its second avatar while reframing its extremist Islamic ideology, China is poised to become the critical player in the region.  Under a slew of conditions negotiated with the Taliban, China will enhance its role through rapid investments and enabling Afghanistan to integrate into its Belt and Road Initiative. An unstable, dry and war-torn Afghanistan doesn’t offer any attractive economic proposition at the moment. As the economic challenges loom on the Taliban government, it can’t simply sustain on drugs. The Taliban have to rely on China, Pakistan and some Central Asian republics to rebuild its economy. Afghanistan’s unexploited mineral wealth, worth a trillion or more, is a great opportunity for the Taliban to leverage economic gains by engaging China, Iran, Russia, and Turkey. An alliance of China, Pakistan, Iran or Turkey may lead to the marginalisation of India’s role and effectiveness in Afghanistan.

    Whether India will recognize the Taliban is not clear yet but India can’t simply meditate either. Under India’s presidency, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2593 on Afghanistan. Chairing a session India’s Foreign Secretary Harsh V Shringla has clarified that India won’t tolerate if Afghan territory turns into a sanctuary of terrorists and threat for the neighbouring states. Apart from human rights, Shringla emphasized Women’s participation in society.

    India along with its all partners should advocate for strict observation of the Taliban led governance. Having invested over $3 billion over the last two decades in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, India’s considerable contribution cannot be ignored. The recent meeting between India’s envoy Deepak Mittal and the Taliban’s foreign minister-designate Stanekzai at the Taliban’s request signals a possibility for a changed approach and environment from that of the Taliban 1.0. India’s immediate priority should be the safe evacuation of the Indian origin people and stranded Afghans.

     

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