Author: Sakshi Venkateswaran

  • Xi’s third term, the 20th Party Congress and Implications for India

    Xi’s third term, the 20th Party Congress and Implications for India

    The historic 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) concluded on October 23rd. The week-long extravagant event – beginning on October 16th – has brought new faces of the Chinese political elite to the forefront along with a few surprises. Xi’s report before the 20th National Party Congress (NPC) at the opening ceremony and his appointments to the highest posts in the country are very telling of what his third term could look like for the world. Most importantly, the implications for India cannot be clearer – politically, economically, diplomatically, and militarily. India will need to acquaint herself with these new appointments and developments and come up with a strategy to level the playing field.

    What the report says and implies

    Xi’s report to the 20th NPC was in stark contrast to the report delivered in 2017 to the 19th NPC. In 2017, Xi was triumphant of all that China had achieved and hoped to achieve in the future – particularly on the economic front and of its growing international influence. He was proud of China’s assertive foreign policy and soft power. That sentiment has not necessarily changed in the 20th NPC report. However, Xi’s report did strike a sombre tone, predicting a tough future for China – “…strategic opportunities, risks, and challenges are concurrent and uncertainties and unforeseen factors are rising. Various “black swan” and “grey rhino” events may occur at any time.” His speech and report come across as a rallying call meant to safeguard the primacy and authority of the CPC and their way of life against external interference.

    “China’s overall development objectives for the year 2035 are as follows: Significantly increase economic strength, scientific and technological capabilities, and composite national strength; substantially grow the per capita GDP to be on par with that of a mid-level developed country”.              – Xi Jinping in his address to the 20th Party Congress.

    The importance of “national security” (mentioned 81 times) and China’s external and regional challenges is given highest priority and significance. Other key phrases that find frequent mention in the report are “military”, “strategic/strategy” and “risks”. There is a concerted focus on military modernisation and ramping R&D. Simultaneously, Xi is also realistic of the economic challenges ahead of China – “…many bottlenecks hindering high-quality development, and China’s capacity for scientific and technological innovation is not yet strong enough. Many major issues need to be resolved in order to guard against financial risks and ensure that food, energy, and industrial and supply chains are secure and reliable.” Interestingly, China’s economy was not in the spotlight. There was a glaring omission of the development of and plans for the BRI; mentioned only twice in the entire report. Predictably, there was no change in China’s policy towards Taiwan except a veiled threat directed at the US for its interference in its neighbourhood. It appears that Xi’s plans for his third term are to focus on China’s security and strategic challenges through assertive diplomacy.

    Xi stacks the deck in his favour

    Xi Jinping’s appointment as General Party Secretary of the CPC for a third term was the least surprising outcome from the 20th NPC; owing to constitutional amendments made in his previous term i.e., the removal of the constraint of a term limit. He also retains his position as Chairman of the party’s Central Military Commission (CMC). His appointments to the state’s top bodies have broken with the CPC’s age norm of ‘7-up, 8-down’; officials eligible to serve another term at 67 years have been given the boot while people like Zhang Youxia (VC of the CMC), at 72 years, has been given another term when he should ideally have been retired.

    The reshuffling of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) appears to have only one important criterion – loyalty to Xi Jinping. The move is also an indication of the concentration of power that now rests with Xi and his men. With the introduction of the “Two Establishes” and “Two Safeguards”, Xi elevated himself to be on par with Mao Zedong and above Deng Xiaoping, Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin. Indeed, the inclusion of Xi Jinping’s Thoughts on Socialism with Chinese characteristics in the Party Constitution along with the “Two Establishes” and “Two Safeguards” has cemented Xi Jinping as the core of the CPC. His appointments to the PBSC reflect this. Premier Li Keqiang, widely believed to be a dissenter and protégé of former President Hu Jintao was dropped. Hu Chunhua, slated for a position in the PBSC and considered for the premiership was unable to secure a position in the 7-member powerful body and was even dropped from the Politburo. Other members to be removed were Wang Yang, Han Zheng and Li Zhangshu. Both Wang Yang and Han Zheng were closely linked to Li Keqiang and former President Jiang Zemin respectively. The new members of PBSC are Li Qiang, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang and Li Xi. Zhao Leji and ideology tsar Wang Huning were the only members to retain their seats; having closely aligned themselves with Xi Jinping in the period between the 19thNPC and 20th NPC. The composition of the 20th PBSC indicates Xi’s success in removing all factional opposition present within the Party. All the members who were left off the PBSC were a part of the Communist Youth League and rose within its ranks to become powerful men. Their removal, along with Hu Jintao being escorted out during the 20th National Congress is both a signal to Xi’s loyalists and opposition.

    Similarly, the selection of people into the 24-member Politburo and Central Committee are all Xi loyalists and will have a direct impact on China’s domestic and foreign policies going forward. Xi’s prioritisation of security and S&T is reflected in some of the new appointments to the Politburo – Chen Wenqing (an intelligence officer and former minister of the Ministry of State Security), engineers with specialisation in aerospace Ma Xingrui and Yuan Jiajin, Li Ganjie (nuclear engineering), Zhang Youxia (VC of the CMC), Hei Weidong (VC of the CMC and Commander of CMC’s Joint Command Center), Chen Jining (environmental sciences), and Yin Li (public health expert). Notably, both the PBSC and Politburo have no women participation.

    The backgrounds of the appointees to these bodies are also an indicator of the growing premium Xi is placing on technocrats. Beyond party and political loyalty, they are expected to fall in line with his policy agenda and thus, have backgrounds in aerospace, technology, finance, economics, engineering, and advanced manufacturing in sectors like semiconductors. 

    The backgrounds of the appointees to these bodies are also an indicator of the growing premium Xi is placing on technocrats. Beyond party and political loyalty, they are expected to fall in line with his policy agenda and thus, have backgrounds in aerospace, technology, finance, economics, engineering, and advanced manufacturing in sectors like semiconductors. The number of officials with backgrounds in S&T in the Central Committee is at par with Jiang Zemin’s first term in 1992. According to a study by the Brookings Institution, 81 seats in the 20th Central Committee – around 40% – are occupied by Chinese officials with technical expertise. The belief that technocrats generally lack political factions, prefer working in silos and are solution-oriented also works in Xi’s favour.

     

    A stronger and more loyal CMC

    The new CMC appointees stand out for several reasons. For one, Xi has broken with the established retired norms by placing Army veteran Zhang Youxia as VC of the CMC. Further, the placement of He Weidong as the second VC of the CMC is unusual since he has essentially jumped two grades without serving as either a member of the CMC or Central Committee of the CPC. Second, Xi appears to have rewarded those that he has personal and familial connections with.

    Zhang Youxia’s father, Zhang Zongxun was a founding member of the PLA and served with Xi’s father, Xi Zongxun in the 1940s. General Zhang’s decorated career, combat experience (Sino-Vietnamese war in the 1980s) and position as head of the Equipment Development Department of the CMC make him one of Xi’s most trusted allies in the PLA. On the other hand, General He Weidong’s catapult to second VC is significant given his operational experience with both the Western Theatre Command (WTC) and Eastern Theatre Command (ETC) ground forces. Reportedly, both Xi and He are also close friends owing to the time they both spent in Fujian province and Zhejiang province during Xi’s days working in the provincial government.

    The other new appointment with operational and combat experience is General Liu Zhenli. He takes over as Chief of the Joint Staff Committee of the CMC and was previously Chief of Staff and Commander of the PLA Army and Chief of Staff of the PAP. His experience in the Sino-Vietnam border skirmishes in the 1980s as well as his stint with the PAP makes him an important addition to the CMC.

    Finally, General Li Shangfu’s (potentially Minister of National Defense) elevation to the CMC is notable in that it signals a close linkage between the aerospace domain and the military. Li is a technocrat and is widely regarded as the man behind China’s manned and unmanned space program. His time as Deputy Commander of the PLA Strategic Support Force and his current appointment as Director of the Equipment Development Department reflects Xi’s aim of achieving the centenary goal of the PLA Army and modernising its military and national defence.

    The other two members to retain their position in the CMC are Admiral Miao Hua and General Zhang Shengmin. They both rose through the ranks in the Political Work Department as political commissars. Admiral Miao will continue to head the Political Work Department. He is also a close ally of Xi from when they both served in the Fujian province in the 1990s and 2002. No doubt his work as a political commissar in the PLA Navy makes him a strong candidate for a second term in the CMC. Similarly, General Zhang continues to head the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection as he serves in the PLA Rocket Force. His appointment is particularly significant given the fact that he replaced Du Jincai who was being investigated with then VC’s Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou on corruption. Zhang Shengmin’s retainment signals, one, Xi’s trust in him and two, that his anti-corruption campaign is far from over.

    Other appointments such as Airforce General Xu Qilang and PLA Generals Wei Fenghe and Li Zuocheng to the State Commission indicate an overwhelming prioritisation of the WTC and ETC, meaning India and Taiwan – China’s two biggest security challenges. The appointment of several serving chiefs of the ground forces will have far-reaching implications for the LAC and India’s national security.

    The combination of technocrats and veterans in the CMC is a nod towards Xi’s vision for the Chinese military – “…continue integrated development of the military through mechanization, informatization, and the application of smart technologies and work faster to modernize military theory, organizational forms, personnel, and weaponry and equipment. We will enhance the military’s strategic capabilities for defending China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests…”.

    However, the success of these appointments remains to be seen given the relatively limited operational experience some of the members have.

     What do we make of China’s economy?

    The “common prosperity for all” is another major tenet at the heart of China’s domestic economic policy. Whilst outlining all the strides the CPC has made in the last five years to the 20th NPC, Xi is also aware of the economic challenges China faces – the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, the rise of unilateralism and protectionism, a sluggish global economy and regional conflicts and disturbances. To combat these challenges, China is pursuing the “dual circulation” strategy and “high-quality development”. Notably, these two mechanisms have made their way to the Party Constitution. The dual circulation strategy is aimed at improving domestic demand, building secure and resilient supply chains, and reducing China’s dependency on foreign trade for its economic growth.

    China is pursuing the “dual circulation” strategy and “high-quality development”. Notably, these two mechanisms have made their way to the Party Constitution. The dual circulation strategy is aimed at improving domestic demand, building secure and resilient supply chains, and reducing China’s dependency on foreign trade for its economic growth.

    Along with a faster recovery of its industrial production equipment manufacturing and high-tech manufacturing, China’s GDP grew by 3.9% in the third quarter. However, this does not take away from the fact that, presently, China’s exports have diminished. The strict zero-covid policy that China continues to enforce is severely impacting its industries. The recent US Chips Act and export controls targeted at China are affecting foreign enterprises in the country as well as its tech industry.

    Further, the absence of market-reform oriented economists like Premier Le Keqiang, Vice Premier Liu He, head of the Central Bank Yi Gang, financial regulator Guo Shuqing and Finance Minister Liu Kun from the PBSC and Politburo will surely be felt. Li Qiang, the potential candidate for the Premiership does not have an economic background and it is likely that most of the heavy lifting will fall to He Lifeng (tapped for Vice Premier) in the Politburo. He is a supporter of Xi’s “self-reliance” policies and economic nationalism. He will have big shoes to fill as Liu He, the outgoing Vice Premier, had a powerful portfolio that included economic policy and the financial sector. The Harvard-trained economist was also Xi’s go-to man for trade negotiations with Washington.

    India’s continued economic growth is evidence contrary to what China dictates. Even as China seeks membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and uses the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), there are signs of decoupling with the Chinese economy emerging. Already, the US-imposed export controls are impacting China’s production and manufacturing. While China proposes a more “secure” and inward-looking economic policy, achieving this goal will take a long time. This is an opportunity for India to exploit. India becoming the next manufacturing hub for the world will challenge China’s position in Asia and thus, presents an obstacle for the latter.

    China’s wolf-warrior diplomacy to continue

    With Yang Jiechi’s retirement, the position of head of China’s Central Foreign Affairs Commission is set to move to Wang Yi, another seasoned career diplomat. His appointment to the Politburo, at 69 years of age, is yet another display of Xi’s disregard for the Party age norms. But it also indicates that Xi looks to Wang’s expertise as China enters its most challenging period of international engagements. Wang has been the face of China’s foreign policy for quite some time and is another ‘wolf-warrior diplomat’. His appointment signals the continuity of the wolf-warrior diplomacy that China practices. With Wang Yi at the helm, it is expected that Qin Gang, the current ambassador to the US, will become the next Foreign Minister. The other potential appointee to the position is Liu Haixing who is a career diplomat specialising in European affairs and served multiple postings in China’s embassy in France. He is also the Deputy Director of the Office of the National Security Commission (NSC). Other diplomats on the roster are Liu Jianchao and Qi Yu. Liu Jianchao was recently made Director of the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCID) this June and it is unlikely to change so soon. He also previously served at the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission (FAC). Qi Yu, serving as Party Secretary of the Foreign Ministry has no diplomatic experience.

    The choice between Liu Haixing and Qin Gang will also dictate the future direction of China’s foreign policy. The choice of diplomats to the Central Committee also indicates the importance Xi places on public relations. China’s need to sway public opinion, both domestically and internationally, is reflected in the choice of Liu Jianchao and Qin Gang. Both have ample experience serving as spokespersons for the Party and the PRC respectively. Further, Liu Jianchao’s and Liu Haixing’s elevation to the Central Committee also indicates the importance of serving in Party Commissions. Their time at the FAC and NSC, respectively, within the last five years has earned them a fast-tracked promotion to the Central Committee. The path to the top is even closer for Liu Haixing given the fact that his senior, Cai Qi who served in the NSC, now sits in the PBSC.

    The road ahead for India

    The appointments to the PBSC, Politburo and CMC are a reflection of China’s assertiveness on the international stage. The military appointees are of particular importance to India. The overwhelming emphasis on ground forces and service chiefs with experience in the WTC could mean more skirmishes along the LAC and a concerted focus towards engaging in hybrid warfare. The LAC is a priority security concern for India as well and the nationalistic fervour that Xi exemplified in his speech to the 20th NPC is no different from what Prime Minister Modi engages in. That said, India’s military forces must be prepared for an escalation along the LAC at any point in time.

    The Central Committee of 205 members, the majority of whom hold doctorates, includes 47 military leaders. This is reflective of China’s governance structure that is techno-military focused along with the necessary expertise in political, economic, and social domains.

    However, leaving aside the anti-Chinese rhetoric of the West, it is important for India to recognise the competence; educational qualifications, experience, and expertise; and the varied techno-military-politico composition of the Chinese leadership. CCP’s Central Committee consists of 205 full committee members from which are chosen the top leadership forming the Politburo of 24 members inclusive of the apex standing committee of seven members and the Central Military Commission of seven members. All 205 members are highly qualified in various disciplines such as economics, education, politics, philosophy, sciences, engineering, medicine, aerospace, nuclear, space, telecommunications, sociology, history, management, international relations, law, jurisprudence, geopolitics etc. The majority hold doctorates in their chosen fields. Xi Jinping holds a degree in Chemical Engineering and a doctorate in Marxian philosophy and Political Science. In addition, the leadership has a significant presence of military leadership, both serving and veterans that includes 27 Generals and 17 Lieutenant Generals out of the 205 members.

    China’s economic downturn and security-oriented economic policy that Xi has propounded is an opportunity for India to become the next manufacturing hub in Asia. However, India must remain cautious of what competition with China could look like for the neighbourhood.

    The changes to the diplomatic cadre in the 20th NPC do not take away from the fact that India’s standing and position are stronger and more sure-footed than it has ever been. Our diplomacy in the face of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war showcases that. India’s strategic autonomy, respect for international law and norms and growing strategic partnerships with the Indo-Pacific countries are an advantage to her engagement with Beijing.

    Feature Image Credit: orcasia.org

  • Ukraine War: India’s Stature in the Emerging World Order

    Ukraine War: India’s Stature in the Emerging World Order

    The war between Russia and Ukraine has caused a major disruption not only in that region, but the entire world. Power centres are shifting; a new world order is emerging out of this global churn. The world anxiously waits for India to take a more active role in a bid to end hostilities. What will India do?

    India’s firm stand of neutrality about the conflict in Ukraine has attracted considerable attention from the world’s strategic thinkers and governments. In this regard, many see the rise of India as a future pole power of the 21st century, as the current world order has entered a phase of instability, conflict, and competition. The Ukraine war may be the tipping point for the Euro-American dominance in the last three centuries, as a multi-polar world order is emerging, albeit slowly. India’s stature in this world order transformation is critical, as the non-western countries that constitute two-thirds of the world will meticulously observe and monitor it. A careful analysis of the ongoing transformation of the world order amidst the massive cacophony of propaganda and a plethora of biased reports (masquerading as research and academic outputs) is a huge challenge for serious researchers and policymakers.

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  • America’s Two Cold Wars: Hegemony to Decline?

    America’s Two Cold Wars: Hegemony to Decline?

    Book Name: America’s Two Cold Wars: Hegemony to Decline?

    Author: Alfredo Toro Hardy

    Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan

    Year of Publication: March, 2022

    Pages: 305 

     

    The war in Ukraine has necessitated a recalibration of US foreign policy as tensions intensify between America, its allies and Russia. The US’s ‘pivot to Asia’ policy has taken a hit in the face of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. As global attention, once again, shifts to the former Cold War superpower, China appears to be reaping all the benefits in the ensuing power vacuum.

    Alfredo Toro Hardy’s America’s Two Cold Wars: From Hegemony to Decline? is a timely addition, both in terms of what is unfolding presently and the literature that is emerging on the shortfalls of American foreign policy in its dealings with Russia and China. The former Venezuelan diplomat joins the intensifying debate on the emerging reality of a Cold War between the US and China and the broader debate surrounding America’s decline from being a global hegemonic power and its implications for the country’s international engagement with the rest of the world.

    The book offers a comprehensive diagnosis of American foreign policy by way of a comparative analysis of the US’s Cold War with the Soviet Union with the emerging one with China from the American perspective and seeks to answer two questions: one, how different a strategic competitor is China to the erstwhile Soviet Union and two, how different is the US of today compared to its former self when it confronted and won the Cold War with the Soviets.

    Hardy identifies five fundamental issues afflicting US foreign policy in its engagement with China – ideology (or lack thereof), squandered alliances, foreign policy-related inconsistencies, the country’s economic downturn and the containment strategy trap. The author’s key argument recurs throughout the book – that the US is confronting China in the emerging Cold War on a “wrong configuration of factors” (p. 168) and needs to “responsibly explore and analyse the options on the table” (p. 171).

    In acknowledgement of the deficiencies facing America’s foreign policy regarding China, the author sets the context and provides readers with a succinct account of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the emergence of the period of US hegemony and the rise of China in the first two chapters. Hardy rightly emphasises that America is threatened by China’s ascendence – citing research done by the Pew Research Center that showed that 73 per cent of Americans viewed China negatively. In the author’s words, “Washington is aggrievedly and forcefully reacting against what it perceives as an existential contention” (p. 7).

    Hardy also outlines the Chinese perspective and correctly concludes that Beijing is driven by its experience under imperialist powers during the ‘century of humiliation’ and economic mismanagement under Mao Zedong. Indeed, this coupled with the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989, controversy over Chinese dissident Fang Lizhi between 1989-1990, the Taiwan strait crisis in 1996, the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade (p. 23) by American forces and more recently, the independence movements in Hong Kong are insightful examples in understanding why the Party and now, Xi Jinping, are in pursuit of relentless centralisation of power and authority. Despite China’s adroitness in foreign affairs under Xi Jinping, the country’s great power ambitions are driven by domestic considerations and how the international community perceives these ambitions. The US’s belief in China’s disregard for a rules-based order is what the latter takes offence with – believing the former to be constraining it from taking its “rightful place in the world” (p.7). China eschews the American mindset of reverting to the Cold War mentality and instead argues for a more inclusive world where both states are mindful of their responsibilities.

    The author offers a penetrating account of US-China relations – moving from cautious partners with mutual strategic interests to strategic competitors. A pragmatic agreement was drawn up that was mindful of the other’s national interests – the US would recognize the Communist government in China and give it legitimacy and in exchange, China would not seek to limit or challenge the “US’s power projection in Asia” (p.22). China’s gains from this arrangement were enormous and translated into divestment from Mao’s model of productivity and economic self-sufficiency, a foothold in Western markets and a WTO membership. However, 2008 marked the inflexion point in their relations. The diplomat’s insightful analysis of the changing currents in China’s foreign policy and engagement with the US – the global financial crisis and China’s ability in tiding over it, the success of the Beijing Olympics, the US’s failures in the Middle East and disregard for its allies, China’s military build-up, the South China Sea and Xi Jinping’s leadership – is unparalleled and serves as an excellent prelude to why he thinks the two countries are in an “unavoidable collision course” (p. 35). China’s desire to forge a new status quo and challenge the US’s rules and the US’s and China’s “perceived sense of mission and superiority” based on their history and national myths as they look into the future, makes the prospect of a major conflict with spill over effects plausible. Here Hardy goes a step further and claims, based on the plausibility of a war between the two, that they are already in the midst of a Cold War (p. 36). In announcing its ambitions to the world, China may have lost the advantage of its hitherto low profile strategy and believes that American hegemony is on the decline.

    To be sure, the author’s analysis of the five deficiencies in American foreign policy forms the most important section of the book. His commentary on America’s notion of its exceptionalism and “crusader foreign policy” (p. 42) is particularly relevant when we look at its response to the war in Ukraine – the US’s network of financial institutions and media conglomerates have been “able to impose international patterns of credibility or ostracism depending on the acceptance or not of the prevailing liberal ideology” (p. 18).

    Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America described American democracy as a form of Christianity and there is more than a grain of truth to this when they believe they were ordained by God to undertake the responsibility of exporting democracy to the rest of the world, not unlike the colonial powers; as Hardy keenly points out – “the United States never stopped being what its puritan colonists wanted it to become” (p. 42). The ideological calculus worked in America’s favour during the Cold War with the Soviet Union. In confronting China, a country uninterested in exporting communism, in relentless pursuit of efficiency and economic development, the US falls considerably short. This section is a succinct account of the erosion of democracy domestically, the political establishment, poor performance in development indicators (specifically, education and infrastructure) and the labour market. As Hardy puts it – “efficiency is the catchword” (p. 53) and the name of the game in the Cold War between America and China.

    In building alliances to counter China, US foreign policy has a long road ahead as it recovers from the wars in the Middle East, the Trump presidency, its recent misstep in leaving Afghanistan to the Taliban and now, its conflict escalations with Russia. America’s inconsistencies in maintaining its alliances have put them on the back foot in confronting China and only served to better the latter’s position in the international community through cooperative multilateralism (p. 82). The author concludes that the worst-case scenario for the US would be a Russia-China alignment. Indeed, in the fourth iteration of the India-US 2+2 dialogue, the Russia-Ukraine war was the elephant in the room as joint statements from the US and India reflected a sentiment of ‘agree to disagree’. These joint remarks were widely acknowledged to be ‘tame’ in comparison to the statements several White House officials made of India’s position on the matter, most notably that of President Biden’s comment of India being “somewhat shaky” on the Quad and that of Deputy NSA Daleep Singh who warned of “consequences” should India continue to increase its imports from Russia.

    The author is critical of the growing divide between the Democrats and Republicans in the foreign policy establishment – referring to them as “inhabiting different foreign policy planets” (p. 105). Even the consensus on the containment strategy for China is shaky as Progressive Democrats call for restraint. China, on the other hand, is a different story. According to Hardy, China has its eggs in order – a sound national objective, well-rounded foreign policy, cooperative multilateral mechanisms and localised geopolitical ambitions for the moment. China exhibits unwavering focus as it marches towards what it believes is its destiny – to become a world power by 2049. The only downside that the author warns of in China’s strategy is Xi’s presence at the helm. The longer Xi stays at the top, the more the country’s policies will mould around his personality. In the event of his absence “China may find itself in big trouble” (p. 109).

    In comparing the Soviet Union and China’s economies, here too the US falls short. During the first Cold War, America had both economic and military advantages and possessed a technological edge that was unmatched. Today, the US might go toe to toe with China and still not emerge victorious. According to Hardy, China will surpass the US’s GDP in absolute terms and has already achieved the same in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). It is very likely that China’s military expenditure will far exceed the US’s down the line. It has militarily caught up to the US through asymmetric “armament development” (p. 121) and other strategies. Its advantage also lies in the fact that its military deployment is closer to home compared to the US’s strategy of maintaining a standing presence around the world. However, the analysis in this section falls short of elaborating upon America’s weaponization of its financial power. A major factor in the US being a superpower has been the dollar hegemony it has enjoyed since the 1970s. This aspect is intrinsic to understanding US foreign policy, especially when global FOREX reserves in dollars have declined to 59 per cent from 72 per cent in the last two decades. Analysts argue that this reflects the decline of the dollar’s dominance in the face of other currencies. Indeed, China, Russia, India and Brazil are working to reduce their dependency on the dollar and shield themselves from Washington’s vagaries.

    Washington is playing catch-up with Beijing; inheriting the Cold War mentality and deploying used strategies against a competitor that almost evenly matches the US in all aspects. From Hardy’s commentary on the containment strategy that the US pursued against the Soviets, it is immediately evident that the same cannot be replicated in its confrontation with China. While appreciative of the consistency that the Obama, Trump and Biden administrations have shown in dealing with China, the author claims the lack of an overarching strategy and general cohesiveness will not deter China’s ambitions. Considerations of “economic preponderance and geopolitical feasibility” (p. 146) appear to be missing in devising a strategy to counter China. But the author astutely points to the viability of containing China in a region that is of significant geostrategic importance and has historically been its sphere of influence and rightly questions the US’s capability to respond when China has “firm control of the operational theatre” (p. 148) in the region.

    Hardy’s sections that delve into the US’s economy, while useful in the context of its military expenditure, do not adequately explain the sheer influence and entitlement that the country enjoys in international organizations like the IMF, World Bank, OECD, WHO etc. and its impacts in its engagement with China. Similarly, the US has historically turned to sanctions as punitive measures against their enemies – indicative of confidence borne out of the dollar hegemony. Insights into how effective sanctions are and why and how the US weaponizes this power would more forcefully drive home the well-rounded strategy that America has pursued as a hegemon. The Ukraine war is just one example in a long line wherein the US has exercised its power and unilaterally imposed severe sanctions on Russia – encouraging even its allies and partners to take the same measures against Russia. Increasingly, it is becoming evident that the US’s unilateral sanctions are having a negative impact on its credibility as a responsible superpower. Nevertheless, the book offers the general reader a comprehensive assessment of the US in the world order presently and more specifically, a comparison of its foreign policy strategies with the erstwhile Soviet Union and China.

    Overall, America’s Two Cold Wars: From Hegemony to Decline? is a thorough exposition of US foreign policy and draws from experts like Kishore Mahbubani, Mathew Kroenig, Francis Fukuyama, Henry Kissinger and John Mearsheimer and, unlike most literature on the topic, Hardy does not assume a fatalistic narrative that supports the US’s decline of power. Simply put, with the first Cold War, America had all the right configuration of factors in place. This seems to have changed in the second; if the US is facing China on the wrong configuration of factors (p. 168), then the results are only a product of successive administrations lacking coherency in putting together a sound strategy. The author, in a reflection of his experience and expertise, incisively concludes that the US must pursue alternatives to a Cold War with China for three important reasons: first, sharing global governance responsibilities would aid in building US credibility as a responsible superpower as well provide cooperative solutions to global problems like climate change; second, US strategy towards China needs to be a choice between adopting a China-centred policy or alliance centred policy geared towards building multilateral cooperation (p. 169) and third, the interconnectedness of the global economic system will ensure that everyone pays the price for an expensive war between the US and China. The US’s only recourse is to focus on building back its credibility, alliances and partnerships. At the same time, it must be realistic and reflect a deeper understanding of China’s national interests and strategic objectives. These two intentions must work in tandem if the US hopes to successfully counter China.

    About the Author:

    ALFREDO TORO HARDY is a Venezuelan retired diplomat, scholar and author. He has a PhD in International Relations from the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Affairs, two master’s degrees in international law and international economics from the University of Pennsylvania and the Central University of Venezuela, a post-graduate diploma in diplomatic studies by the Ecole Nationale D’Administration (ENA) and a Bachelor of Law degree by the Central University of Venezuela. Before resigning from the Venezuelan Foreign Service in protest of events taking place in his country, he was one of its most senior career diplomats. As such, he served as Ambassador to the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Brazil, Singapore, Chile and Ireland.

    Hardy directed the Diplomatic Academy of the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as other Venezuelan academic institutions in the field of international affairs. He is an Honorary Research Fellow of the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations and has been a Visiting Professor at the universities of Princeton and Brasilia and an online Professor at the University of Barcelona. He has also been a Fulbright Scholar, a two-time Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Center Resident Scholar and an academic advisor on diplomatic studies at the University of Westminster. He has authored twenty-one books and co-authored fifteen more on international affairs and history while publishing thirty peer-reviewed papers on the same subjects.

  • Technology, Politics and China’s Quest for Energy Dominance

    Technology, Politics and China’s Quest for Energy Dominance

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    Abstract:

    This paper will empirically investigate the role of technology in international politics through a case study of China’s development of renewable energy infrastructure (solar PV and wind energy) and its impact on international politics. This paper looks at how technology helps shape a state’s identity using renewable energy technology as an explanatory variable. The paper employs Grygiel’s Model of Geopolitics to analyse the case study; geopolitics because much of China’s development in the renewable sector has been a function of its geography and abundance of natural resources.

    Introduction:

    China has experienced decades of near double-digit economic growth and since the 2000s, has witnessed a growing population and rapid industrialization that has correspondingly driven demand for energy. Its expeditious implementation of economic reforms has elevated it to the status of a global power capable of challenging the US-established status quo. Stability is increasingly being viewed as a function of China’s behaviour vis-à-vis its strategic rivals, primarily the US, and to a lesser extent Japan, India, Russia and the littoral states of Southeast Asia. But more importantly, it has been China’s near fanatic fervour to rise as a technologically superior state, as the US emerged post the World Wars, that has generated interest. The modernization of its military, near the meteoric rise of installed capacities for renewable sources of energy and technological revolution, underscores the importance and role technological advancement plays in a state’s development. Technology and international politics have a near symbiotic relationship and the former has the potential to fundamentally alter the way states exercise their sovereignty in pursuit of their national interests.

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  • China’s Climate Diplomacy and Energy Security

    China’s Climate Diplomacy and Energy Security

    Sakshi Venkateswaran                                                                                July 14, 2019/Analysis

    In the last two years, China has become the leading destination for energy investment. A significant portion of this investment lies in the renewable energy sector of China that has undergone rapid development, accounting for about 45% of global investment(126.6 billion) in 2017. The country overtook Germany in the production of solar panels and solar energy generation in 2014 and in 2015 China’s production of wind energy accounted for one third of global wind energy capacity and needless to say, China has always dominated the market in the production of hydro energy. This has led to widespread speculation of the country being a “renewable energy superpower” following a report by the Global Commission on the Geopolitics of Energy. It has also taken active steps to combat climate change in the form of revamping its energy policies. However, these positive shifts are not without issues. China still remains a net importer of coal and highest emitter of greenhouse gases. This article attempts to understand China’s climate change diplomacy against the backdrop of its energy security concerns and if there is any truth to China becoming a renewable energy superpower.

    The 2018 UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report highlighted that there was only 12 years to control global warming temperatures to 1.5 °Cfollowing which even a half degree rise would prove catastrophic in the form of unprecedented floods, droughts and millions being pushed towards poverty.  Even maintaining the 1.5 °C would require a complete overhaul in the energy, transportation, infrastructure and industrial sectors and global carbon emissions would need to reach net zero by 2050. The Paris Climate Accord was instrumentalized with the intention of capping carbon emissions and containing global warming temperatures below 2 °C. Since the Paris Agreement in 2015, perceptions toward climate change has seen massive shifts following extreme weather patterns in several countries. For one, the US has been strong in their intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement while several others have taken steps to address climate change by decisive shifts in environmental and energy policies. Chief among them has been China’s actions to counter the climate crisis by investing in renewable energy.

    With a population of more than 1.4 billion and a boom in growth since the 2000s, China has been experiencing rising living standards and industrialization. As a consequence, China’s energy consumption has seen a surge as well. Historically, China’s major sources of energy have been its vast domestic coal reserves and imports of crude oil and natural gas from Russia and Middle East. This has resulted in China competing with the US for the position of being the largest emitter of carbon dioxide. In acknowledgment of this, the Chinese have been the first to invest billions in renewable energy.

    China’s Energy Landscape

    China’s investment in renewable energy began as early as 1949 with the construction of the world’s largest hydroelectric plant, the Three Gorges Dam over the Yangtze River. The reason the Chinese shifted towards hydroelectric energy was the rising dependency on imports and harmful effects to the environment due to the usage of coal. Prior to the Sino-Soviet split in 1960, China had been importing close to 50% of its oil from the Soviet Union. However, a combination of losing the Soviet’s support, economic collapse and a shift from being a net exporter of oil to being a net importer in 1993 accelerated China’s desire for energy self-sufficiency. Since the 2000s the country’s oil and natural gas imports from Russia and Middle East have exhibited a dramatic increase. In 2016 China’s imports of crude oil reached a record high of 68%while natural gas imports hit 33% in 2017.

    Concern regarding the emission of greenhouse gases and inefficient use of coal for power generation prompted a shift in the subsequent energy policies that China released. The Chinese established several economic and technological policies to promote energy conservation. An energy saving branch consisting of a three-tier system was set up within the central and local governments and enterprises in the 1980s. Under the 1988 Energy Conservation Law numerous policies were implemented beginning with the ‘Energy Conservation Propaganda Week’ in an attempt to increase energy efficiency and energy conservation. The government also began providing loans and tax incentives to entrepreneurs who developed small hydropower and wind power plants.

    Even the 13th Five Year Plan by the Energy Bureau of China revealed its plans to restrict coal to 58%of its energy mix by 2020 as opposed to previous levels of more than 60%. The country’s shift to renewable energy has garnered itself the title of being the world’s renewable energy superpower”; a title that has increasingly found its way into academic and policy circles.

    China’s Climate Diplomacy

    Climate change or rather, the climate crisis has metaphorically lit a fire under the member states signed on to the Paris Agreement to combat the greatest threat posed to mankind. Germany has rallied several EU member states to achieve “climate neutrality” by 2050 with net zero carbon emissions. Amidst mounting public pressure and weekly climate protests by students (Fridays for Future), several governments have convened in Bonnin Germany from June 17th to 27th of this year for a climate summit to address the carbon emissions. China has been proactive in that regard; having already shifted to electric vehicles and invested in technologies of carbon capture and storage among other initiatives. China’s share of electricity generation from renewable energy accounted for 26.4%in 2017. The country has also made large investments in the power sector in Africa, specifically for electricity generation in the last 20 years. They contributed up to 30% of capacities of which 56%of the total capacity comprised of renewable sources in 2016.

    Given these numbers regarding renewable energy and its position on climate change, it might be reasonable to speculate that China’s behavior in the international system — its dispute over the South China Sea (SCS) with the Southeast Asian countries, challenging the established status quo of the US as a superpower, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and increasing energy diversification in Russia, Central Asia, Latin America and Africa — is an attempt at addressing its current energy insecurity.

    China claims the entirety of the SCS on the basis of historicity, what they refer to as the nine dash line; a claim that is contested by several countries in Southeast Asia. According to reports by the World Bank the SCS has proven reserves of natural gas and oil. China’s rising energy security concerns over the Malacca Strait, Strait of Lombok, Sunda and Ombai Weitar and the Persian Gulf compound its behavior regarding the SCS as more than 50% of China’s trade travels these waters. Another issue that arises is US’s presence and influence it wields in the region.

    In the last 10 years China’s imports of crude oil from the Middle East has been on the decline. Russia, Angola, Brazil and Venezuela have increasingly taken up a major portion in China’s energy mix (14%, 12%, 5.1% and 4% respectively). The influence that the US wields in the Middle East and the general instability pose a very credible threat to China’s imports. Recently, with the US unilaterally leaving the Iran nuclear deal and the return of sanctions on the country, any state continuing to trade with Iran has been under economic fire from the US (China, India, Turkey etc.). In such a scenario China’s focus on renewable energy would prove an alternative as well as a challenge to the US’s power in the international system. 

    Addressing the climate crisis has been on the agenda of energy policies of several countries. That China has taken a massive step towards that end impacts US’s credibility on that front. The Trump administration has made their position on climate change explicitly clear with their decision to withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord. China’s renewable energy generation will damage US’s optics. Barring this, investment in renewable energy could have an effect on the economies of oil rich countries in the Middle East. China’s ambitions to challenge the existing global order by strengthening their military and economy depend upon its strategies to combat their energy insecurity. Hence, the strategic value in investing in renewable energy.

    However, China’s energy shifts do not come without its own set of logistical issues. In spite of leading most of the world in the production of wind, solar and hydro energy, the percent of these in domestic electricity generation remains low. Only 19.2%, 3.8% and 1.2% of hydro, wind and solar power was utilized for domestic electricity generation in spite of a net installed capacity of 344 GW, 148.6 GW and 77.5 GW respectively in 2016. Though there has been incremental rises in these numbers, China still has a long way to go before attaining energy self-sufficiency. China still relies on heavy imports of coal from its neighbours such as Australia, Mongolia, Indonesia and Russia. The country’s usage of coal rose by 1% in 2018 though its share in the energy mix decreased to 59%, a 1.4% decrease from 2017.

    Conclusion

    The blame and burden for finding a solution to the climate crisis cannot solely rest on the shoulders of developing economies contrary to frequent statements made by the US President who blames Russia, China and India for climate change while ignoring the US’s emission of greenhouse gases. The bottom line is that the US and most of the West had almost 200 years to industrialize and develop their economies. Countries such as India and China have only experienced industrialization and a developing economy in the last 50 or so years. In such a situation, the scale to measure with whom the blame for climate change lays is skewed. Specifically in the case of China, a burgeoning population drove the need for rapid growth. Therefore, it is still a commendable fact that China has been environmentally conscious in the development of its economy. It remains one of the few countries on track to meet the Paris Climate Agreement targets for carbon emissions. 

    All this aside, it is rather premature to refer to China as a “renewable energy superpower” at this point in time. The numbers regarding the use of renewables in domestic electricity generation do not paint a picture of a country poised to change its energy dependency from fossil fuels to renewable energy. China’s goal of becoming a global superpower by 2049 does not just include powering up economically and militarily. Even a developed economy implies growth across the entire country and not just in certain provinces, as is the present situation in China. But it is increasingly becoming evident that any country that reaches their target to combat climate change along with being an economic and military powerhouse stand to become a global influencer and dictate the terms of the international system. If recent developments are any indication, China needs to continue its sustained efforts at decarbonization to attain the influence and recognition it seeks from the international community.

    Sakshi Venkateswaran is a Research Intern at The Peninsula Foundation.

    Image by Skeeze from Pixabay.