Author: Lt Gen Kamal Davar PVSM AVSM (V)

  • Agnipath Might have Adverse Consequences

    Agnipath Might have Adverse Consequences

    It takes a soldier a long time to emotionally and physically get moulded into his unit groove, become infused with his unit’s ethos and, thus, be prepared to lay down his life for the unit’s honour

    The government this week announced a recruitment model, Agnipath, for the short-term induction of personnel into the armed forces. As a veteran, who has worn the nation’s uniform with pride for 41 years, I wish the new scheme all success. But due to my loyalty to my motherland, shared by all veterans, I also have some misgivings about the new recruitment programme.

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  • Re-Emergence of Global Terror

    Re-Emergence of Global Terror

    That Terrorism is the scourge of the world is a harsh truism of the times is beyond dispute since the last few decades. That global challenges necessitate global solutions requires no elaboration is also a universally accepted imperative—yet only in lip service and hardly ever adopted in practice. Why else would then the world, with inexplicable insensitivity and inaction, accept the most tragic happenings and the grave humanitarian crisis in intensely fratricidal violence driven AfghanistanFailing to heed to the lessons of history,  US President Joe Biden has committed a monumental  strategic  blunder in  the undue hasty  and unplanned exit  of American troops from Afghanistan is now more than apparent beckoning dismay and condemnation  from even US allies and sympathizers across the world especially by the hapless Afghans.

    Failing to heed to the lessons of history, US President Joe Biden has a monumental strategic blunder in the undue hasty and unplanned exit of American troops from Afghanistan is now more than apparent beckoning dismay and condemnation from even US allies and sympathisers across the world especially by the hapless Afghans.


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  • CDS: A Welcome Reform and the Challenges Ahead

    CDS: A Welcome Reform and the Challenges Ahead

    The Year 2020 ushered in a momentous reform for higher defence management (HDM) in India with the government implementing PM Narendra Modi’s announcement made earlier from the ramparts of the Red Fort on 15th Aug 2019, on establishing the institution of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). Retiring Army Chief General Bipin Rawat, not surprisingly, was appointed as the first CDS of the Indian Armed Forces. The unique honour brings with it myriad challenges lying ahead for the new appointee.

                To those at home and abroad who are accustomed to the working of governments of all political hues in India it should not be a surprise that this  critically vital appointment  took over 18 years to materialise. To recall, as part of the many HDM reforms this appointment was also approved by the NDA led Vajpayee government way back in 2001, after the 1999 Kargil War, based on the recommendations of the Subramanyam led Kargil Review Committee (KRC). Bureaucratic sluggishness, lack of will among different political dispensations as also the fact that there could be indifference on matters of even national security broadly explain the long delay. Thus, the Modi government deserves full credit for institutionalizing the long overdue appointment of the CDS. However, the designated role of CDS, the status and the government charter laying down all the details are still being worked out.

    Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS)

    As promulgated by the government, the CDS will be a ‘four star’ officer and will be considered as the ‘first among equals’ in relation to the chiefs of the Army, Navy and the Air Force. He will be the permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) and can serve till 65 years of age. KRC recommended that CDS appropriately should  be a ‘five star officer’ considering his onerous responsibilities and role.

    Now that the government has given the green signal for the CDS to commence functioning to provide the desired levels of integration in all tri-service matters including policy, operational, training, communications, logistical aspects and so on, the CDS will be confronted with myriad challenges in achieving his onerous missions. Apart from an unwavering encouragement support from the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the CDS will require more than a willing assistance from the three services to truly get-off the ground. As is natural and customary, no service likes to shed its resources and time honoured responsibilities to newer organizations. Having raised the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) way back in 2002, as a result of the same KRC recommendations, I am more than aware of the reluctance of the three Services to shed some of their assets and roles which will now be managed by the CDS. Thus, General Rawat will have to orchestrate extracting resources from the three Services for the new organizations, formations and units directly under his command being raised, with tact and sensitivity.

    Re-organisation of MOD: an analysis

                The MOD, till recently,functioned with four departments namely the Departments of Defence (DOD), Defence Production, Defence Research and Development as well as Ex Servicemen Welfare – each headed by a Secretary – ranked officer. On 30th Dec 2019, the government promulgated a gazette notification establishing the fifth department to be called the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) to be headed by the newly appointed CDS. The Rules of Business existing since 1961 and reallocation of certain responsibilities with the Defence Secretary have been modified though this has also invited adverse comments from defence analysts in India on the ground that the desired level of responsibilities had not been given to the CDS.

                In the last many years, right from the acceptance of the KRC and its approval by  LK Advani led Group of Ministers and subsequently by the Vajpayee government in 2001, it had been accepted by all that the CDS was urgently required as a major reform of  India’s higher defence management. The CDS was required to provide single-point professional military advice to the political leadership. However, what apparently has happened now is that the CDS will be providing his advice to the Defence Minister only and not to both the Prime Minister and Defence Minister. Many see in this, a case of bureaucratic play to reduce the importance of the CDS.

                 In the orders recently issued by the government, four key responsibilities have been taken away from the DOD under the Defence Secretary and now put under the DMA which includes the three services and their headquarters, the Territorial Army and works relating to the army, navy and the air force. Non-capital purchases and promoting jointness in procurement, operations, training, communications, logistics (including repairs and maintenance) and encouraging use of indigenous equipment and platforms will be in the CDS charter.

                Entry 1 of the amended charter for the DOD states that “Defence of India and every part thereof including defence policy and preparation for defence and all such acts as may be conducive in times of war to its prosecution and after its termination to effective demobilization” will be with the Defence Secretary.  This has apparently been done to ensure the primacy of the civil bureaucracy. Why can’t the responsibility of defence policy and the mandate for defence of India not rest with the Defence Minister if this charter, was to be kept away from the CDS?

    Why can’t the responsibility of defence policy and the mandate for defence of India not rest with the Defence Minister if this charter, was to be kept away from the CDS?

                The other amendment is in the field of defence purchases where the earlier formulation of “procurement exclusive to the defence services” has been altered to “capital acquisition exclusive to the defence services.” This means that big-ticket acquisitions will be in the Defence Secretary’s ambit creating an impression of paucity of faith in the CDS in this matter.

    The existing HQ Integrated Defence Staff could have been the backbone for this new integrated structure within the MOD brining about cost-effectiveness as well. 

                The Department of Military Affairs will have a structure that rightly includes civilian bureaucracy as well. The CDS will be assisted by two joint secretaries and a dozen deputy secretary level officers. Ideally not only the CDS but the entire MOD should have seen complete integration of the civil bureaucracy with the military. The existing HQ Integrated Defence Staff could have been the backbone for this new integrated structure within the MOD brining about cost-effectiveness as well.  Military and civil officers should be working in various departments of the MOD in unison. The Defence Secretary could have been retained, as the coordinator of all the departments. The DMA could have been headed by a Secretary level Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) to enable the CDS, in the MOD, to concentrate primarily on critical strategic issues for advising the Prime Minister and Defence Minister on macro-management of defence strategy.

                The Defence Secretary’s charter also includes  military cantonments, veterinary and military farms, land acquisition for defence, Border Roads Organisation, purchasing food items for defence and even the Canteen Stores Department – virtually covering all issues and portfolios related to financial expenditure and management! Surprisingly, even the management of the National Defence College (NDC) and the Institute of Defence Studies has been kept with the Defence Secretary!

    The DMA could have been headed by a Secretary level Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) to enable the CDS, in the MOD, to concentrate primarily on critical strategic issues for advising the Prime Minister and Defence Minister on macro-management of defence strategy.  

    Theatre commands

                One of the critical issues, after the establishment of the CDS system, would be the widely discussed recommendation that integrated inter-service theatre commands should be established to exercise control over all operations in each theatre as practiced in many nations of the world including US and China. Currently the three services have their own operational commands that make for a total of 17 command HQs.  In addition, the Indian Armed Forces through HQ IDS have under their control only one tri-service command headquarters, namely the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC). The Strategic Forces Command (SFC), though led, manned and operated primarily  by personnel from the three services have their ultimate command authority  vested in the Nuclear Command Authority directly under the PM/National Security Council.

                The CDS has been tasked with the responsibility of restructuring military commands for optimal utilization of resources by bringing in jointness in operations through the establishment of joint theatre commands. However, many Indian analysts opine that the armed forces should commence this integration after coursing out exhaustive trials initially for one command headquarters. The significant change must be analysed in its entirety and not rushed through. It may be prudent to adopt ‘best practices’ of some other formidable armed forces in the world and suitably adapt them for our own challenges and genius. Theatre commands, once finally agreed to, can be implemented in a graduated manner employing the incremental concept. In the services even with the current structures, far greater jointness in operational doctrines and plans, training, communications and logistics should be ensured first to establish synergy.

    Theatre commands, once finally agreed to, can be implemented in a graduated manner employing the incremental concept.

                The newly appointed CDS at a recently conducted press conference outlined the likely contours of the envisaged theatre commands. He stated that two integrated commands, namely the Air Defence Command and the Peninsular Command respectively will be raised in the coming year while they will endeavour to raise the first theatre command by 2022. Preliminary studies on the geographical and operational spans for five theatre commands along the northern and western borders are underway. In addition, the services are also carrying out an in-depth study to examine if Jammu and Kashmir should have a separate theatre command.

                The Air Defence Command will be integrating all air defence assets including air defence missiles with the three services, coastal guns, air defence radars and air surveillance systems presently held with the three services.  In view of potent air and ballistic missile threats from India’s adversaries, the Air Defence Command, to be headed by an air force officer, will assume critical significance in terms of its efficacy.

                The Peninsular Command which, some naval officers want to call the Indian Ocean Command will look to merging the western and eastern naval commands. This command to be headed by a naval officer would be given dedicated air force assets and army troops. It would work to ensure India’s maritime security interests in the Indian Ocean region, both on the western and eastern sea-boards, and would also acquire the capably of conducting amphibious operations.

    National Security Doctrine

     As one of his top priorities, the CDS must have the Government Issue a National Security Doctrine which lays down a well-conceived and comprehensive strategic policy for the nation in the short, mid and long term perspective. It will be primarily an articulation of the nation’s overall vision and strategic intent. This document should naturally have both the non-classified and classified objectives which can be disseminated on a ‘need to know’ basis among concerned institutions and personalities in the country. The existing HQ IDS have endeavoured in the past to produce perspective plans for the Indian Armed Forces and have the requisite expertise to produce such policy documents for approval by the government.

    HQrs Andaman and Nicobar Command and newer agencies

                As mentioned earlier, the Indian Armed Forces have under their direct ambit only one tri-service command, namely HQ ANC. This Command HQ is of critical significance for its role in dominating the sea-lanes of the Indian Ocean and preventing the ever-assertive PLA Navy from indulging in mischief in these waters.  The CDS would no doubt accord adequate attention to a further strengthening of the strategic combat capabilities of HQ ANC for handling maritime challenges that will only multiply on India’s eastern seaboard and in the entire Indo-Pacific region.

                For CDS challenges emanating from the entire spectrum of warfare encompassing all domains are a priority. The CDS will also be overseeing the establishment of the recently sanctioned Cyber and Special Forces agencies besides the Defence Space Agency. These entities in the years ahead could qualify for being upgraded to the levels of Command HQs. As widely known, the domains of cyber and space are the battlegrounds of the future – and there the foresighted Chinese have stolen a march even over hi-tech western agencies including those of the US. India, despite being an IT super power, has still a long way to go to bridge the gap between itself and China in this aspect.

    CDS: Nuclear Military Adviser   

                The CDS will now be overseeing the functioning of the SFC far more intimately than was done earlier by the COSC as he has also been designated as the Nuclear Military Adviser to the government. The presence of a senior military officer in the Nuclear Command Authority is a step in the right direction for he would be able to provide the necessary expertise and fillip to the nation’s nuclear preparedness. The CDS may wish to advise the government to review its entire Nuclear Doctrine and revisit the policies of “No-First Use” and “Massive Retaliation”. Also, it may be necessary to re-examine whether India should go in for the development of tactical nuclear weapons for limiting a nuclear exchange. India’s two adversaries, China and Pakistan, are both reckonable nuclear powers and India’s nuclear preparedness has, therefore, to match up to them.

    Defence budgets and inter service prioritization

    It is a strategic truism that the Indian Armed Forces have to be prepared to confront a “two-front war”. Mandated to provide integrated “single-point military advice” to the government, the CDS will have to rise above service loyalties and professionally prioritize conflicting inter-service requirements in the larger interests of the nation. This assumes greater significance in the current scenario where the combat capabilities of the Indian Armed Forces have to be accorded substantial accretions in an environment of great financial strain facing the nation. The volatile situation in West Asia will be greatly impacting the energy security of India and this will further tax India’s currently faltering economy. Thus, the first test for the newly appointed CDS will have to be to convince the financially stressed government to make larger allocations in the capital budget for speedy acquisition of much needed modern weapon systems. As is known, India’s depleting fighter aircraft and submarine fleets, other deficiencies in other platforms, various types of ammunition and spares, force-multipliers etc need concerted attention. Last year’s defence budget had been allocated merely 1.49 per cent of the GDP whereas successive parliamentary committees have recommended at least 3 per cent of the GDP to be assigned for defence. Unfortunately, even this year’s recently announced defence budget has been dismal – considering the big-ticket acquisitions required by the armed forces.

    In the current charter issued by the government, any big-ticket acquisitions will remain in the Defence Secretary’s purview and thus final negotiations with foreign collaborators, Indian Defence Public Sector Undertakings or Indian private industry would rest with the DOD and the Defence Secretary. Delays as earlier are likely to occur. With “Make in India” and “Start-up India” initiatives not yet taking off, the government needs to revisit these areas involving the CDS institution.

    Coordination with civil agencies

                One of the tasks that can do with better handling is improving the coordination between the armed forces and other civilian governmental agencies who are, also handling various other aspects of national security. The CDS structure now will be an important institution to improve coordination between the MHA, MOD, NSAB and NSC Real-time information or intelligence sharing between the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the other national intelligence agencies like the Intelligence Bureau, Research and Analysis Wing, National Technical Research Organisation and other newer intelligence that had come up in the last few years will hopefully improve. However, to start with, the CDS must put the Service Intelligence Directorates of the three services directly under command of the DIA for better effectiveness in the exacting intelligence domain.

    Recommendations: overall mandate for CDS

                The CDS has been formally appointed and his role enunciated and as the appointment matures in the immediate future, a further refinement of his responsibilities should be undertaken. These should include the following: –

    • The CDS should be designated as the Principal Defence Advisor to the Prime Minister (through the Defence Minister) on all matters pertaining to India’s national security.
    • The CDS should provide an overarching ‘strategic vision’ to the government and be responsible for all strategic planning for the armed forces, including all war plans and contingency planning. During peacetime, preparedness for future operations, in the strategic domain, should be one of the prime responsibilities of the CDS. He will have to synergize the mission and assets of the three services in various theatres to achieve the nation’s strategic objectives.
    • The CDS must be made responsible for overall financial planning, budgetary allocations and force structuring for the three services.
    • The CDS should oversee the preparation of the annual Defence Intelligence Estimate which obtains requisite strategic intelligence inputs for overall defence planning.
    • The establishment of theatre commands, the functioning of other tri-service commands like the Strategic Forces Command, Andaman and Nicobar Command and others which may come up in the future like the Air Defence, Cyber, Space and Special Forces Commands must get the utmost attention of the CDS.

    Conclusion

    The coming years in an increasingly troubled world and especially in our volatile neighbourhood portend diverse and formidable challenges to India’s security and economic resurgence. Consequently, an earnest effort must be made to meet them. A major HDM reform like the recent establishment of the CDS edifice goes a long way in the optimal utilization of India’s resources for defence and enhancing its operational preparedness across the entire spectrum of warfare.  All new institutions at their start do face various problems and the office of the CDS will be no exception. But it must get whole-hearted support from the PMO, MOD and the three services themselves in successfully fulfilling the onerous responsibilities and roles assigned to it.

    Views expressed are the author’s own.

    This article was published earlier in Chanakya.

  • POST COVID 19: RE-IMAGINING THE NEW WORLD ORDER

    POST COVID 19: RE-IMAGINING THE NEW WORLD ORDER

    As the world grapples, rather unsuccessfully so far, with its worst pandemic in a century, COVID 19, it would be an understatement that the world, as mankind has known for decades, will ever be the same again! The Coronavirus is not just a medical emergency which has afflicted the entire world, already caused over 125,000  fatalities and  with its rampage  continuing alarmingly,   the socio-economic-political consequences for the world, in the near future, are likely to be as horrendous as the employment of a weapon of mass destruction(WMD).

    Post COVID 19, whenever that period dawns, what the new world order or disorder would be is agitating the minds of governments and analysts the world over. Though it is rather premature today to crystal-gaze as to when the world can rejoice that COVID 19 is now part of history, it is equally imperative for governments and global institutions, the world over, to frankly analyse the ramifications of  the aftermath of such an apocalyptic event. It will be better to be prepared for the after-results now than be found ill-prepared as the world was when this pandemic struck in full surprise and ferocity.

    The onslaught of this coronavirus was indeed a Black Swan event and hence it found the world, including the most powerful nation on the earth, US and most of the technologically advanced nations, like in Europe, grossly under-prepared – a fact that will puzzle future historians. For the uninitiated, a Black Swan event is a metaphor for an unpredictable event that is beyond what is normally expected of a grave situation and is characterized by both extreme rarity and equally severity in occurrence. Events like the Black Death plague which had engulfed the world 600 years back and took a toll of 25 million lives, the Spanish Flu a hundred years back which took millions of lives, the atom bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan by the US Air Force at the near- end of World War II  or the 9/11 terrorist attack on the Twin Towers in the US could be categorized  as Black Swan events.

    Prior to ascertaining through the prism of uncertainty the contours of the “new normal” or the “next normal”, it will be in order to study what all went grievously wrong in the globe’s response to the pandemic. Firstly and, unquestionably, was the emerging superpower China’s total disdain for the fallout of the coronavirus. Reliable reports in the western media point out that as early as 17 Nov 2019, the virus was detected in the Wuhan laboratory in China’s Hubei province. It was attributed to the major animal market of Wuhan which sells dead bats, dogs, cats, fish, seafoods and many other forms of animal produce for the Chinese palate. Once the virus started spreading uncontrollably, it was only on 31 Dec 2019 that China cared to inform the WHO regards the spread of an “abnormal pneumonia”.

    From the beginning of Jan 2020, the pandemic rapidly spread its tentacles to the US and most nations of Europe with devastating effect. Amazingly and regrettably, the US and most nations were rather sluggish in their response mechanisms to combat this dreadful virus. No stringent lockdowns or social/physical distancing or curbs on travel or congregations was enforced—- the tragic results were for all to see with medical systems collapsing and no drugs/vaccines available, no hospital beds or ambulances, as  required, available. It was only that by end Feb/ mid-March some emergency measures were enforced—much too late though. The world expects all fellow nations to share critical information with each other in the event of such emergencies as such viruses do not recognize any international borders.

    In India too, there is a view that we may have been a bit late in enforcing lockdowns and other stringent measures. Nevertheless, PM Narendra Modi’s much awaited 21 days lockdown announced on 24 March (and its subsequent extension till 03 May 2020), though necessary, could have been better implemented with some advance planning. Though the centre and state bureaucracy did step up subsequently to resolve the teething problems, especially of migrant labour, many helpful interventions from well-meaning NGOs, gurdwaras, temples, the public and others, the humanitarian problems have been overcome to a large extent. Overall, the nation’s response, cutting across religious lines, to this medical emergency has been encouraging and embellished with humanitarianism.

    The other major fall-out of the COVID 19 pandemic will, in all certainty, be the catastrophic economic costs the world will have to bear. The IMF has stated that the current crisis is the most horrible in a century and will be likely worse than the “Great Depression” (1929-1939). It visualizes the global GDP to shrink by a whopping 3 percent though it forecasts that next year could witness an improvement. As observed all over the world, stock markets have tumbled to abysmally low levels, production facilities come to virtual shutdowns, staff laid off, air and rail travel shut, supply chains both international and intra-nation disrupted etc. In addition, oil prices have had a dangerously steep decline throwing the world trade and economy out of gear. The US with its financial muscle ultimately, despite being financially badly mauled, is expected to slowly bounce back. President Donald Trump, now in his crucial re-election year, may take some out-of-the box fiscal initiatives to bring the US economy back on track. The ongoing trade war between China and the US may witness contours of a rivalry not witnessed so far. Anyway, China needs to be globally chastised for its unethical practices.

    It will be a natural fall-out for most nations now to take a fresh look at their trade relations with China. Japan has already announced a US $ 2.2 billion package for their industrialists to pull out of China. Others like Taiwan may do so too. Some of the industries moving out of China may prefer to re-locate to India and here is a good chance for India to welcome them here and give a fillip to India’s currently near-stagnant “Make in India” programmes. However, the Indian establishment will have to shed its hollow big talk, traditional lethargic attitudes and genuinely encourage foreign investments into India. India’s private industry is modern, robust, and skilful enough to work together with foreign collaborators.

    The world now must rise and strengthen global institutions like the UN and its various agencies to combat global challenges. No country, however powerful, can exist as an island as witnessed now. Nations like China, notwithstanding its deep pockets, must be cautioned not to disturb the economic equilibrium of the world, most of which is reeking with poverty and under-development. China’s intransigent attitude not even allowing a discussion on the pandemic at the United Nations Security Council last fortnight is unacceptable to the world.

    In the coming years, it is certain that owing to the gruesome after-effects of COVID 19, nations, both the powerful and the poor, are going to take far more seriously their public health preparedness and emergency standard operating procedures. Medical infrastructures, rightly so, demand far greater thought, planning and investments than hithertofore.

    It is well on the cards that even the militarily powerful nations will look into the various nuances of biological warfare. It is now clear to the entire world that a virus can prove to be far more lethal than many megatons of explosives and modern weaponry. According to many western journalists, China may deny its botched-up bio warfare experiment, but it is a matter of time when the bitter truth will unravel. India as a signatory of the Geneva Convention of 1972 (effective since mid-1975) to eschew production and experimentation of  WMDs including bio weapons should not only  use its moral authority to make nations be sincere adherents of existing UN protocols  but, importantly, for its own safety put into place  adequate defensive mechanisms to thwart such challenges. The lessons to be drawn from COVID 19 must be taken seriously. In addition, the UN must draw up contingency plans to prevent, contain and manage and ultimately defeat such likely challenges in the future. It will have to be a synthesis of health, economic, political, and even military measures.

    The new world order, in all likelihood, will be drastically differing, more sobering, additionally fiscally prudent, and conservative and with nations becoming isolationist and inward looking. China’s image and its economy will certainly take a sound beating. Though the pandemic is world-wide and global problems, unquestionably, require global solutions, yet in the coming years we may witness the rise of hyper-nationalism and authoritarianism in most nations including democracies. Nevertheless, as India strives to do its bit to get its economy back on track and takes various prophylactic measures for the future, it must do its bit to strengthen global institutions.

    This article was published earlier in ‘USI – Strategic Perspectives‘. Views expressed are the author’s own.

    Image credit: Tehran Times

     

  • The Wuhan Pneumonia and Biological Warfare

    The Wuhan Pneumonia and Biological Warfare

    Category : China/Biological Warfare

    Title : The Wuhan Pneumonia and Biological Warfare

    Author : Kamal Davar 02-04-2020

    There is a lot of speculation about the origin of the current Cover-19 pandemic. While most say it originated from the wet meat market in Wuhan in China, there are wild speculations about it being an experiment gone wrong resulting in the leakage of the virus from the testing lab, while some accuse the Chinese of having planned a biological war strategy as an extension of the US-China trade war. The Chinese accuse the US military of having inserted the virus in Wuhan during the military exercise. All said, it is worth examining the possibilities if a pandemic can become a tool for waging war. Lt Gen Kamal Davar examines the possibilities of a biological war.

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  • Strategic Autonomy and the Looming Oil Crisis

    Strategic Autonomy and the Looming Oil Crisis

    Kamal Davar                                                                                             May 31, 2019/Commentary

    The new Modi government will have to speedily contend with a serious foreign policy challenge on its hands.

    That this ordeal comes in the wake of some underplayed serious economy problems currently facing the nation will compound the problems for India which imports over 80 per cent of its burgeoning oil needs.

    Thus, if the looming crisis in the Persian Gulf between an arrogant US and an equally defiant Iran does not get resolved peacefully, ominous ramifications await the region, the world and all those nations which import crude oil from Iran.

    The genesis of the current crisis between the US and Iran has its roots in the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA) which was agreed upon by Iran and six western nations in 2015, led by the US, to curb Iran’s nuclear programme, which boils down to deterring Iran from developing nuclear weapons. But in May 2018, the US, under its mercurial President Donald Trump, chose to renege on this treaty as Trump felt that this was the “worst deal ever negotiated.”

    It is also a fact that Iran did not violate any norms of the law as regards this agreement.

    Meanwhile, the US allowed some nations, including India, which import oil from Iran a six-month waiver, which ended on May 2, 2019. As a consequence of the US action, oil prices the world over have jacked and soon its adverse effects will be felt in India as inflation will hit the already strained Indian economy. Over a 10 per cent hike in global oil prices has already taken place in the last one month and a crippling escalation in oil prices ahead is well on the cards.

    Notwithstanding any US pressure on India, the unalterable fact of Iran’s strategic significance to India in the region remains beyond question. India imported 24 million metric tonnes of crude from Iran in the 2018-19. India was Iran’s second largest buyer of crude last year, while Tehran was the third largest supplier to India after Iraq and Saudi Arabia (11 per cent of a total of India’s oil imports).

    Additionally, Iranian crude comes with a longer credit period and cheaper freight owing to Iran’s geographical proximity to India and, thus, Iranian oil remains the best option for India in more ways than one.

    Higher oil prices also make the Indian rupee weaker, making imports to India costlier. Importantly, that Iran-India collaboration in the development in the vital Chabahar Port in Iran will give India vital ingress to Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics cannot be understated.

    Meanwhile, the US has rushed the formidable USS Abraham Lincoln carrier-borne Task Force to the Persian Gulf region and undertaken certain prophylactic steps in case war breaks out.

    The Iranians, too, have mounted some small-range anti-ship missiles on their warships. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani recently said that his nation is facing acute pressure from international sanctions, dubbing it a “war unprecedented in the history of the Islamic revolution.”

    The US has also branded Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guards as a foreign terrorist organisation. A war of words has broken out, with President Trump declaring that if “Iran wants to fight, that will be the official end of Iran. Never threaten the United States again.”

    Replying back sternly, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif retorted that Iranians have stood tall for millennia against aggression and that “economic terrorism and genocidal taunts won’t end Iran.” He added that “never threaten an Iranian. Try respect it works.”

    Importantly, even US allies have steered away from of taking any partisan positions with either the US or Iran. Meanwhile, oil-producing nations like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Mexico and the US itself have been requested to step up their oil production to cater for Iranian oil shortfalls.

    How this oil crisis will shape up to meet global demands is anyone’s guess.

    It is a strategist’s nightmare in conjuring up a scenario concerning the ramifications of a war between Iran and the US. The Persian Gulf is easily one of the world’s critically significant strategic waterways through which one-third of the world’s oil is transported.

    In the event of a war, Iran will definitely close the vital Straits of Hormuz for commercial shipping purposes, throwing the region’s economy out of shape — an eventuality which, hopefully, should not ever take place.

    Preoccupied with its General Election, India, as a major regional player, has so far not reached out to its strategic partner, the US, to impress upon it to defuse the crisis.

    Recently, the Iranian Foreign Minister made a trip to India to explain their position to India on the current standoff.

    India, however, need not succumb to any US pressures or take sides. India has an adequate financial standing and moral stature to play a peacemaker’s role. India must conscientiously follow the time-honoured policy of zealously guarding its strategic autonomy. Respect for India from nations even adversarial to each other — as in earlier decades — will follow automatically and some of India’s economic tribulations will also get simultaneously addressed.

    Let the new government in New Delhi bear in mind Iran’s more than significant strategic value for India in the region.

    The author, Lt Gen Kamal davar is a former DGDIA and is visiting Distinguished fellow at TPF. 

    This article was earlier published in The Tribune.

  • Beware Pak’s intentions over Kartarpur

    Beware Pak’s intentions over Kartarpur

    Kamal Davar                                                                            Apr 18, 2019/Commentary

    During his celebrated cricketing career, Pakistan’s skipper Imran Khan was renowned primarily for his yorkers and inswingers. That in his new avatar as Pakistan’s Prime Minister, on prodding, in all likelihood from the supreme power centre in his nation — the Pakistan Army — Mr Khan recently bowled a “googly” successfully at the unsuspecting Indian establishment is a distinct possibility!

    Pakistan’s offer to accede to a long-standing Indian request to link up Gurudwara Kartarpur Sahib in its Narowal district across the Ravi river with the Dera Baba Nanak shrine in India’s Gurdaspur district clearly has overtones — far beyond what appears on the surface as a non-political, supposedly friendly gesture from Pakistan.

    Gurudwara Kartarpur Sahib has a unique place in the consciousness of Sikhs all over the world as it was here that the founder of the Sikh faith, Guru Nanak, spent the last years of his life till merging into eternity in September 1539. The revered Guru’s 550th birth anniversary falls in November 2019 and the proposed corridor is expected to be built and connected by both nations before this date to enable the proper conduct of celebrations as planned.

    Both India and Pakistan had the foundation stones for the proposed corridor laid in their respective areas in November 2018. This was followed up by a detailed meeting of their technical experts at the Attari-Wagah border on March 14, 2019. However, Pakistan did muddy the waters by mischievously including in their delegation for the next level of talks a few known “Khalistani” supporters based in Pakistan. India strongly objected and called off the proposed April 2, 2019 talks. However, India soon, somewhat surprisingly, agreed to Pakistan’s proposal for a technical meeting on 16 April, 2019, to iron out aspects on the exact alignment, coordinates, crossing points, etc in the proposed corridor. That all technical problems must be sorted out, requisite infrastructure and construction work should commence speedily and completed well in time brooks no emphasis. Equally, the rationale and, consequently, the long-term security ramifications of Pakistan’s acquiescence of India’s request to operationalise the Kartarpur corridor has to be borne in mind.

    Pakistan’s sinister Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has, over the years, been assiduously pursuing its nation’s cunningly crafted strategy of “bleeding India by a thousand cuts” in tandem with its infamous K2 strategy (Kashmir and Khalistan). In some parts of Jammu & Kashmir, the ISI has succeeded, to an extent, in keeping the pot boiling and sustaining insurgency-like conditions, especially in the last few years. However, its devious stratagem for whipping up discontent in Punjab over the years had failed miserably except briefly during the early Eighties. Nevertheless, the ISI has over the decades endeavoured to keep the Khalistani issue alive, setting up offices in the US, Canada, the UK and Germany to brainwash sections of the Sikh diaspora settled in these nations.

    The ISI’s latest malevolence has been to re-energise a Florida-based marginal Sikh separatist group called the Sikhs For Justice (SFJ) and made them establish their office in Lahore. The SFJ, flushed with liberal ISI resources, have had the temerity to publicly announce that that the Kartarpur Corridor would be a “bridge to Khalistan”. The SFJ is concurrently leading the “Khalistan Referendum Campaign — 2020” and will be recruiting, from all over the world, members of the Sikh community to participate in this nefarious separatist exercise. Their earlier effort in London, last year, proved to be a damp squib. Nevertheless, the ISI’s determined machinations to influence the Sikh community, both in India and abroad, must not be taken lightly by India’s security agencies.

    The ISI’s impious activities to destabilise Punjab in the future behind the veil of the Kartarpur Corridor must be seriously factored in by the Indian government. Notwithstanding the fact that India is currently in election mode, India’s security establishment in concert with the Punjab government, currently under an able soldier-politician Capt. Amarinder Singh, our foreign missions abroad and leaders of the Indian Sikh community must nip in the bud any future intrigues of Pakistan’s deep state to re-ignite trouble in Punjab.

    Our own innocent pilgrims to the Kartarpur shrine will have to be sensitised prior to embarking on their pilgrimage and feedback will have to be taken from them on their return. It will be in order for the Indian government to caution beforehand the Pakistan government to rein in its intelligence agencies and the Pakistan Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee to desist from any anti-India activities.

    As all out efforts are made to ensure that the Kartarpur Corridor comes up well in time to celebrate the great Guru’s birthday, India and Pakistan must strive towards the proposed Kartarpur Corridor becoming a bridge for peace between the two nations.

    The writer, Lt Gen Kamal Davar (Retd), was founder of the Defence Intelligence Agency and deputy chief of the Integrated Defence Staff. He is a Distinguished Fellow and Trustee of TPF.

    This article was published earlier in Asian Age.

  • Accountability A Must for Armed Forces

    Accountability A Must for Armed Forces

    Kamal Davar                                                                                                            March 29, 2019/Op-Ed

    In democracies the world over, institutions are constitutionally mandated to serve their nation in consonance with the nation’s aspirations and objectives. An institution exists because of and for the nation, and not the other way around. Legally and logically, all institutions are accountable to the constitution from which they derive their responsibilities and strength.

    In India the image of most institutions over the years, since the country’s independence, has taken a beating with regard to their equity, performance, professional integrity — at least in public perception. However, if there is one institution which has unquestionably retained its awe and respect in the nation’s acuity and, equally, its emotions, it’s the Indian Armed Forces.

    Through challenging times faced by the nation since the violent 1947 Partition, India’s armed forces have acquitted themselves with the highest professionalism, uncommon valour and sacrifices to uphold the integrity and honour of the nation. However, events of the past month, namely, the Pulwama terrorist strike and India’s retaliatory air operations in Pakistan’s Balakot have raised significant points in the minds of some security analysts, the foreign media and even some doubting Thomases in India regarding the results of the military action. The dividing line between military transparency vis-a-vis military secrecy has been much debated.

    A few skeptics and some learned ones too have asked: Does the unique respect of the nation towards its armed forces make the latter remain in the comfort zone of its cocoon, answerable to no one but themselves? It is essential, in keeping with the glorious reputation of India’s tri-services, that doubts in the minds of anyone and anywhere are amply answered in the larger interests of the nation and the armed forces themselves.

    The defence forces exist to defend the country from external and internal aggression, to preserve and further national interests — something that they have consistently achieved with matchless sacrifices, aplomb and victories for the nation. However, it is equally important that wherever shortcomings in their operations surface, those must not be pushed under the carpet and ignored on some fuzzy notions of misplaced pride, secrecy or political considerations under pressure from the ruling establishment. Operational security considerations also must be given their due importance for the elements of surprise and secrecy substantially govern success in military operations.

    The dastardly Pakistan-inspired and supported terrorist strike on February 14, 2019, on a CRPF convoy in Pulwama in Jammu and Kashmir resulted in more than 40 fatalities. That this tragedy is attributable to a serious intelligence failure, shoddy road clearance drills besides the faulty decision to dispatch such huge numbers of paramilitary personnel by road and not by air (as now ordered) cannot be denied by security professionals anywhere. That India altered the counter-terror policy paradigm by launching retributive aerial attacks deep inside Pakistani territory was indeed a welcome change and, resultantly, would have sent the correct signal to a terrorism-sponsoring Pakistan.

    The Indian Air Force’s deep strike and the resultant casualties in and damage caused to Jaish-e-Mohammed’s training camp in Balakot in Pakistan’s Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province and the next day’s shallow aerial counter strike in the Poonch-Naushera sector by Pakistan would have thrown up many lessons for India’s security hierarchy. That these lessons are addressed with alacrity and the seriousness they demand requires no elaboration.

    Even in a democracy where transparency is essential in certain policy matters, the media, especially the over-noisy electronic media, has to absorb the fact that strategies and tactics, operational details, targeting and timings, employment of new weapons and platforms, strengths and weaknesses must not be discussed in the public domain. However, at an opportune time, the official arm of the government/services can and must share relevant details with the public which do not compromise national security. Equally, lapses, where emerging, even within the security forces must be analysed in great depth for future improvements.

    Post the Kargil War, the Vajpayee government had, very appropriately, carried out a comprehensive review of India’s higher defence management under the aegis of the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) and the Group of Ministers (GoM). The KRC and the GoM had done a remarkable job and some of the security organisations now in place owe their existence to them. Though India was clearly victorious in the Kargil War, the government at that time did not hesitate to discuss openly whatever shortcomings in the defence structure there were, dispensing the garb of national security or jingoistic patriotism! In the US, it is commonplace for serving generals/admirals to depose and testify before congressional committees on matters pertaining to national security. Accountability to the nation is thus a very normal hallmark in all democracies.

    As the world’s largest democracy and an aspiring global player, India has to conduct itself like one. Consequently, all its institutions have to be scrupulously accountable to the nation’s Constitution and not to personalities or political dispensations. The Indian armed forces are held in near-reverence and affection by the nation, necessitating them to always display professional acumen, moral courage and integrity of the highest order. As the last bastion of the state, the three services, both in peace and war, must continue to serve the nation as only they can and never, ever compromise on the values of truth, honour and valour. For retaining their high-pedestal-esteem in a democratic set-up, the armed forces must also accept that they are no holy cows either and should welcome any legitimate queries from the government or the public as regards their functioning or performance as long as operational security considerations are not compromised.

    Equally, responsible people in the nation must acknowledge the simple fact that merely questioning the government or any institution on matters pertaining to national security is not being anti-national!

    Lt Gen Kamal Davar is an Indian Army veteran and is former chief of India’s Defence Intelligence Agency. He is a visiting distinguished fellow at the TPF.

    This article was published earlier on March 24th, 2019, on The Asian Age.

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  • Pakistan continues to support terrorism

    Pakistan continues to support terrorism

    Kamal Davar                                                                                                     November 30, 2018/Op-Ed

    As India observes the 10th anniversary of the ghastly Mumbai terror attack on 26 November 2008, which resulted in 166 fatalities including of foreign tourists and over 600 injuries, certain misgivings continue to agitate the minds of its concerned citizens and the security establishment alike.

    For decades, India has been the target of deliberate, well-planned Pakistani sponsored terrorism. Though India’s financial capital, Mumbai, has been a chosen destination for terror acts earlier too in 1993 and the Mumbai train massacres in 2006, those four horrific days of 26-29 November 2008 shook the nation and many civilized countries around the world. In matters of counter-terrorism endeavours, India woke up from its traditional languorous slumber, to a large extent, as it laboured to counter its own version of the infamous 9/11 terror strike on the American homeland. Was it a failure of intelligence, inadequate response mechanisms or, importantly, a systemic failure of the Indian security establishment? The candid answer lies in a combination of all these factors which resulted in this attack.

    In today’s increasingly troubled world, terrorism remains an ever burgeoning scourge outwitting advanced nations and their security forces time and again. Terrorism has explicitly developed into a rabidly dangerous reality with an expanding footprint, both regional and globally. The South Asian region, thanks to the original perpetrator of global terror, Pakistan, remains a hotbed of this plague, with no end in sight owing to continuing Pakistani machinations in India and Afghanistan. To Pakistan, the employment of terror as an extension of state policy appears to be more than a productive stratagem. Regrettably, Pakistan persists with its myopic and self-destructive terror policies in the region, continuing to foment terror in J&K, parts of the Indian hinterland through Nepal and, to some extent, in the north-east via Bangladesh.

    To successfully ward off cataclysmic events, a hard-nosed study and detailed addressal of the many professional and preparedness shortcomings which contribute to the likelihood of such occurrences is an imperative which security agencies can only disregard at the nation’s peril. It is the considered view of many security analysts that Indian commercial, public, military and other iconic, high-value institutions and infrastructure—perennial and lucrative targets for Pakistan-sponsored terror—have to have their security preparedness of the desired order to be vastly buttressed.

    Global problems beckon global solutions. With terrorism now a common threat confronting like-minded nations, intelligence sharing between friendly nations is sine qua non. To a large extent, especially after 26/11, the US intelligence community has established professional links with their Indian counterparts. Though some level of intelligence sharing does exist with certain friendly nations, India must forge far more deliberate intelligence cooperation with intelligence agencies of terror-afflicted nations like the UK, France, Russia, Afghanistan, Iran, Bangladesh and the Central Asian Republics. Though it is not a simple affair to develop seamless coordination resulting in speedy sharing of hard, actionable intelligence with foreign agencies, the criticality of effective counter-terrorism interoperability requires the same. Thus, India must take the lead with like-minded security outfits to get them on the same page. UN protocols on counter-terrorism and agencies like Interpol and the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force must endeavour towards greater cooperation to combat the common enemies of humanity.

    Looking inwards, it is endemic with some intelligence agencies in India to try and be ‘one up’ on each other by not fully sharing their inputs with sister institutions. This malaise, where existing, must be rooted out by the NSA. In addition, it is common knowledge that terrorists today are not merely in rag-tag outfits but with advanced technology and continually improving modern weaponry and tools to support their nefarious designs. Thus, security agencies have to keep abreast of all technological innovations taking place. As the nation endeavours to improve its technical intelligence capabilities in its myriad applications, human intelligence capabilities need also to be sharpened.

    A large number of terror outfits are labelled as ‘non-state’ actors which is a stark misnomer as some of the nations they are located in are supporting these terror conglomerates. In the case of Pakistan, its notorious spy agency, the ISI, funds, trains and equips a large number of these terror ‘tanzeems’ such as the Hafiz Saeed-led Lashkar-e-Taiba which carried out the Mumbai attacks under its watchful eye, the Jaish-e-Mohd, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, and Sipaha-e-Sahaba, among others. US President Donald Trump’s recent imposition of financial sanctions on Pakistan for its duplicity in the war on terror was a long overdue measure. Similarly, Indian financial intelligence set-ups must keep a hawk’s eye on suspicious financial transactions from abroad to accounts in India.

    As Pakistan displays no signs of mending its ways, the Indian security establishment must factor in its preparedness the ever-looming and innovative terror threats from Pakistan and its proxies. Thus, for India, eternal vigilance and security upgrades remain the price to pay to fire-wall itself from terrorism.

    Lt Gen Kamal Davar is an Indian Army veteran and is former chief of India’s Defence Intelligence Agency. He is a visiting distinguished fellow at the TPF.

    This article was published earlier on November 25th, 2018 on Livemint.