Author: Ankit Kapoor

  • Online Justice and the Pandemic: Impact on Procedure

    Online Justice and the Pandemic: Impact on Procedure

     

    Abstract

    The move towards digitization of the judiciary and the adoption of video-conferencing preceded the pandemic. However, the pandemic has necessitated their mainstream adoption. While Indian courts have been prompt in issuing their SOPs, these have been inadequate due to their non-implementation and the inability of traditional legal tools to address unprecedented procedural issues, emerging from the mainstreaming of video conferencing.

    Firstly, there are due process concerns, centred around inadequate hosting platforms, sub-standard organizational practices, inefficient ancillary processes, and non-inclusive technical requirements. Secondly, there is a lack of accountability and transparency because of derogation from the rule of open court, without any effective alternative measures. Thirdly, there are privacy concerns as regards unauthorized participation, the secrecy of data exchanged, and commercial exploitation of data.

    Adopting a design-based approach not only addresses areas conventional legal tools can’t, but also improves efficiency and automates compliance. To this end, several technological and organizational design changes are suggested that can be made to effectively address emerging procedural issues.

    Keywords: online justice, virtual courts, pandemic, design-based approach, digitization, standard operating procedure.

     

    Introduction

    The unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic has necessitated social distancing to be the norm. To this end, courts, across the world, have started resolving disputes through virtual conferencing. While limited physical hearings with rigorous rules have commenced,[i] our courts have limited infrastructural capacity to house adequate daily hearings. Additionally, the surge in COVID-19 cases and the wait for a vaccine mean that virtual conferencing is nevertheless here to stay. The pandemic has decreased the average disposal rates of high courts by 50% and subordinate courts by 70%,[ii] with pendency in the Supreme Court increasing by 3,287 cases.[iii]

    Therefore, at this point, it is opportune to realize that the revolutionary potential of virtual courts can help improve judicial efficiency. Apart from facilitating remote access to justice, virtual courts are cost-effective and time-effective, reduce carbon footprint and the employment of dilatory tactics by parties.[iv] These benefits are particularly important given that annually one billion people require basic access to justice, but close to 30 per cent of them do not even take action.[v] Moving forward, this access to justice problem has to be solved through Information & Communications Technology (“ICT”), which will render courts to function as a ‘service’ and not a ‘place’.[vi] In cognizance of this, India launched the e-Court Mission Mode Project (“MMP”), to implement ICT in the Indian judiciary in 3 phases over 5 years.[vii]

    However, this increasing change in the medium of our court processes will inevitably impact civil procedure in unprecedented ways. A survey found that 44.7% of participants experienced technical difficulty during the hearing, with a majority feeling that remote hearings were overall worse than physical hearings and less effective in terms of facilitating participation.[viii] The skill and digital divide will further compound power imbalances among parties, and thus their access to justice.[ix]

    In light of this, it is important to understand the adequacy of the current response plans from the Court and governments. Therefore, in this paper, I will enumerate the legal and policy developments in India on virtual courts, both pre and post COVID-19. Subsequently, I will critically analyse these developments to elucidate implementational failures, and three procedural concerns: impact on due process, accountability and transparency, and privacy. Recognizing the inadequacy of legal tools in addressing these concerns, ultimately, I will utilize a technological and organizational design-based approach to propose solutions.

    Tracing Legal and Policy Developments on Virtual Courts

    India’s attempts to digitize the judiciary and associated processes predate the pandemic. However, the scale of impact has certainly increased since virtual conferencing has now become the dominant norm. Therefore, in this section, I will analyse how law and policy on virtual courts have evolved. However, before we proceed, it must be noted that virtual courts are broader than just virtual conferencing. Other than virtual conferencing, related processes of digitisation and automation, like e-filing and e-listing, need to be implemented alongside.

    Pre-Pandemic:                      In February 2007, the government approved the Supreme Court E-Committee’s (“E-Committee”) strategic action plan to implement ICT in the Indian judiciary in 3 phases over 5 years.[x] It was co-opted as a ‘Mission Mode Project’ of the National e-Governance Plan,[xi] with the objective of re-engineering processes to enhance judicial productivity, and make the system more affordable, accessible, cost-effective, transparent and accountable. To this end, it launched 4 services: automation of case management, online provision of judicial/administrative services, information gateways between courts and government, and creation of judicial data grids.[xii]

    Virtual courts, and associated processes, have found recognition and regulation in jurisprudence too. In State of Maharashtra v Dr Praful Desai, the Supreme Court allowed video conferencing for the recording of evidence.[xiii] It even observed that technological developments have enabled the possibility of virtual courts. This position has found, subsequently, substantial affirmation.[xiv] Courts have allowed video conferencing on conditions of health[xv] and geographical proximity.[xvi] However, under the revised position, parties cannot resolve matrimonial conflict through video conferencing.[xvii]

    To safeguard these proceedings, courts have issued numerous guidelines. These include authenticating the identity of the witness and examiner, administration of the oath, acquainting non-party witnesses with the case, recording demeanour of witnesses on-screen, notarization of witness testimony/statement, and bearing of costs.[xviii] When video-conferencing is global, the foreign party must record evidence in the presence of an Indian embassy officer member.[xix]

    Post-Pandemic:         To comply with social distancing guidelines, the Supreme Court passed an order, under Article 142 of the Constitution, to suspend the physical hearing.[xx] However, recognizing the importance of access to justice, it identified the duty of courts to use ICT like video-conferencing for dispensation of justice, in urgent matters. Accordingly, it issued directions: empowering itself and all high courts to adopt measures for the functioning of video-conferencing, instructing district courts to follow their respective high courts, for providing videoconference facilities and an amicus curia to the deprived, prohibiting recording of hearing without the mutual consent of parties, and requiring prompt reporting of technical glitches during the video call.

    Pursuant to this, the apex court issued its standard operating procedure (“SOP”) mentioning the instructions for joining/conduct during virtual hearings and the technical requirements as well as the procedure for listing, mentioning, and e-filing.[xxi] Parties can choose between getting virtual links or availing the facility in the Court’s premises. However, only two appearance links and one viewing link is provided to parties. While the hearings are hosted on the “Vidyo” platform available either as a desktop application or on Android or iOS app store, parties are advised against using mobile phones for connectivity reasons. Communication between the registry and participants happens through private WhatsApp groups, with links being shared 30 minutes prior. Parties are forbidden from sharing these links, engaging in indecorous conduct, and recording the hearings. Furthermore, they are expected to ‘mute’ themselves, except when making submissions or responding to questions from the bench, and must ‘raise hand’ to indicate an intention to speak. The Court has also mandated the use of e-filing even if parties file physically at the registry and reduced the cost of filing by half, thus promoting digitization.[xxii]

    Currently, virtual hearings are inaccessible to the public, but limited journalists can attend the Court’s physical video-conferencing room, to report on cases. The Court has now started hearing non-urgent matters too.[xxiii] The E-Committee has also resolved to institutionalize technology even after the pandemic ends.[xxiv]

    While high courts can employ their own rules, 11 of them have adopted the model rules developed by the E-Committee.[xxv] Even those with unique rules broadly convey the same instructions,[xxvi] with the only difference being the hosting platform. The most popular is Vidyo, followed by Zoom, Jitsi, and Cisco Webex.[xxvii] However, pursuant to the Union Ministry of Home Affairs’ advisory declaring Zoom as unsafe, most high courts discontinued using it.[xxviii] Remarkably, the Delhi High Court issued comprehensive legislative rules covering not just the aforementioned matters, but also the procedure for service of summons, examination of persons, sharing of documents, and access to legal aid. It statutorily establishes a “remote point coordinator”, entrusted with ensuring seamless functioning and ingenuity of the hearing.[xxix]

    However, other than Chandigarh District Court and a few others, district courts have failed to organize virtual hearings, given their infrastructure limitations.[xxx] Most tribunals are following the procedure established by the apex court.[xxxi]

    Critically Analyzing Indian Developments on Virtual Courts

    The Mission Mode Project

    The implementation of Phase-II of the MMP has been sluggish, with only 3477 courtrooms having video-conferencing, and 14443 more courtrooms requiring this facility.[xxxii] 2992 sites are yet to still get WAN connectivity.[xxxiii] Only states like Delhi, Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh have started the digitisation of both disposed and pending case records in the high courts and district courts.[xxxiv] E-filing is currently available only in four high courts,[xxxv] and in the NGT, NCLAT, and ITAT.[xxxvi] Even in these courts, only 50-600 cases were instituted through e-filings, as against the 1.9 lakh cases instituted through regular filings.[xxxvii] Despite listing being digital, the process involves significant human input, rather than the use of algorithms.[xxxviii] The implementation of this project will further stagnate because courts have been instructed to utilize their unused funds from Phase-II for meeting immediate needs.[xxxix]

    The failure in technology up-gradation is also at the litigant and advocate’s end. The internet penetration in India is only 40%.[xl] 30% of the population lacks basic literacy, and nearly 90% lack digital literacy.[xli] At least 50% of advocates, mostly at the district and lower levels, do not own relevant devices and lack the requisite skills for virtual proceedings.[xlii] Thus, there is a clear digital, connectivity, and skill divide.

    Evaluating SOPs- Emerging Legal Issue

    • Due Process

    The paradigm shift consequent to virtual hearings has raised numerous unprecedented due process concerns. The smoothness of accessing and using virtual court facilities, along with available facilities, has an inextricable impact on one’s right to properly present their case.

    Technical Issues with the Platform:                       The most popular platform, Vidyo has received an extremely negative response. Reportedly, the platform frequently crashes,[xliii] and participants struggle to log in or are automatically logged out during court proceedings due to bandwidth issues with the platform. There were also difficulties in re-joining the hearing, once logged out.[xliv]

    The screen sharing feature on Vidyo is ineffective, and thus advocates are precluded from even presenting documents before the bench.[xlv] There is also no means for the attorney and client to engage in private discussion during the hearings.[xlvi] The Control Room is tasked with managing the entire process flow. In several cases, advocates have complained of not being unmuted, despite raising their hands, or their chat messages going unread, thus affecting their opportunity to present arguments. This is especially the case in matters involving a large number of parties.[xlvii]

    This adverse impact is compounded since there is no clarity on who to contact for technical issues.[xlviii] The authorities provided in the SOP are extremely unresponsive. Moreover, links for hearings are shared last minute, with communications on WhatsApp being inefficiently followed.[xlix]

    The Court has been ignorant of these technical inefficiencies, passing adverse orders against at least 19 advocates who were unable to attend/connect due to technical issues.[l]

    Issues with Associated Digital Process:      The processes of e-listing and e-filing are not user-friendly and unnecessarily verbose.[li] Under the current e-listing mechanism, there is uncertainty over acknowledgement of their filings, because the diary numbers are not immediately generated. Even the procedure for curing defects is inefficient, voluminous, and confusing. There is also a delay in the listing of matters, despite pleas of urgency in petitions.[lii] Support from the Registry in this regard is inadequate. There is also a need for improving coordination between sections of the Registry, with procedures being more consistent and transparent.[liii]

    Furthermore, court records are not fully digitized, and when so, they cannot be remotely accessed in a centralized server.[liv]

    Technical Requirements as Impediments:             The minimum technical requirements determine who can even access the platform, and therefore, determine who even has the opportunity to present their case, to begin with. Presently, the SOP of all Indian courts require a minimum of 2 MBPS broadband connection or 4G connections, and the onus is on the participant to ensure seamless connectivity. Given that 20% of the internet users in India are still dependent on 2G and 3G,[lv] this directly leads to their exclusion. Even digitally advanced nations like Singapore have stipulated 3G as the minimum requirement.[lvi] Moreover, even the 4G connections in India are relatively slow, with no service provider crossing the 70% LTE threshold.[lvii]

    Even in data-intensive platforms like Skype, the minimum download speed requirement for a high-quality video call is only 400 KBPS, with group calls of up to 3 people supported at 512 KBPs, and 5 people at 2 MBPS.[lviii]

    Additionally, all video-conferencing platforms have only been made available as desktop apps, or on Android or iOS app stores. The over 55 million users with KaiOS, operating mostly on Jio Phones,[lix] are denied access to videoconferencing, despite their phones supporting video calls.

    (Dis)Comfort with Virtual Testimony and Demeanour Assessment:      The process of testimony, along with cross-examination, are in themselves strenuous for witnesses. The unfamiliar nature of virtual conferences can cause severe anxiety among witnesses while appearing, especially if they’re children, foreigners, or persons with disabilities.[lx]

    During video conferencing, courts are allowed to assess the credibility of parties through their demeanour.[lxi] This is problematic because in a virtual setting it is extremely difficult for the judge to accurately understand the body language and emotions of the witness.[lxii] Studies find that one’s social and economic background has a heavy correlation with one’s perception, which plays out in the form of subtle choices like lighting and camera angles.[lxiii] Given these inaccurate and disproportionate adverse impacts, demeanour assessment during virtual hearings must be disallowed.

    • Transparency and Accountability

    The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the importance of the rule of ‘open court’ in preserving and promoting accountability and transparency, and thus guaranteeing a fair trial.[lxiv] Presently, virtual hearings are not recorded, except for witness testimony in some cases,[lxv] even by the court. While theoretically limited journalists are allowed to attend these hearing, this is severely inadequate because this facility is accessible only to reporters who can make it to the Supreme Court’s video-conferencing chamber. Moreover, no such facility has been provided in most high courts. Therefore, there is no effective means of ensuring even a shadow of public pressure, which would bind the judge’s actions. This is contrary to jurisdictions like the UK, Australia, and Singapore where public participation has been allowed through live links or even live streaming.[lxvi]

    Virtual conferencing presents an opportunity to eliminate the practical physical, informational, and temporal barriers to open courts. If hearings are online and broadcasted, then a large number of people can access them. For instance, over 3,500 people viewed a YouTube live stream of oral arguments taking place in the Kansas Supreme Court over Zoom. The digital landscape can even house much more people than the court logistically can.[lxvii]

    However, we must be mindful that live streaming for virtual hearings is distinct from the cameras in the courtroom context.[lxviii] In the latter, even if live streaming is not allowed, the public and media can anyway access the trial. However, if there is no public access to virtual hearings, which entirely supplant in-person proceedings, only then participants to the proceedings have knowledge of events.

    Livestreaming virtual proceedings do raise some legitimate privacy concerns because there is a loss of ‘practical obscurity’. This concept recognizes that there is a privacy interest in the information that is not secret but is otherwise difficult to obtain.[lxix] Public online hearings could make access to personal data easier because the process of transferring information from physical documents to a digital format will not have to be done.

    • Privacy;

    There are serious concerns regarding video-conferencing platforms, which are apps owned by foreign companies. The terms of use of these apps mandate cross-border transfer, and the business model of most of these companies involves selling their consumer’s data.[lxx] Therefore, there is the risk of commercial exploitation of data, either for general profiling of the individual or blackmailing them.[lxxi] This is indicated by the Globe24h.com incident, wherein a Romanian man downloaded judgements in bulk and indexed them so they would be optimized on Google results. Then, he charged people for removing embarrassing personal information from this website.

    The biggest privacy challenges stem from authentication of the participants to the video conference and security of the data exchanged over the platform.[lxxii] Furthermore, the weak data security features of Vidyo and Zoom render them susceptible to unauthorized third-party access.[lxxiii] Inadequate training among Control Room members has also resulted in them engaging in risky practices, like using non-updated versions of the software, thus compromising privacy.[lxxiv]Such weaknesses may allow parties to illicitly obtain information to the detriment of their opponents, which they wouldn’t have gotten under civil discovery.

    There is a petition before the Supreme Court that argues that transfer of such judicial and government data prima facie impacts national security, and violates laws such as the Public Records Act, 1993, and the Official Secrets Act, 1923.[lxxv]

    Utilizing a Design-based Approach

    The courts have so far used conventional legal tools to address the concerns of due process, accountability, and data security. There are inherent limitations to these tools, in that the scope of control is merely through prescriptions, which may not necessarily be followed.[lxxvi] The shift to video-conferencing leads to the emergence of unprecedented issues, which the law itself cannot redress.[lxxvii] On the other hand, using design as a policy tool not only expands the scope of control over the participants but ensures mandatory compliance due to technological automation.[lxxviii] Moreover, as an interdisciplinary and innovative approach, design-based approaches allow anticipation of risks and baking of countermeasures into the systems and operations, throughout the entire lifecycle of the product/service.[lxxix] Notably, this approach extends to only technological operation, but to organizational practices too.[lxxx]

    Therefore, in this section, I will propose design-based changes that need to be implemented to address the aforementioned challenges to civil justice.

    ·      Due Process

    The Platform:                        To address the aforementioned technical issues, there is a need for designing certain features onto the video-conferencing platform. Alike UK, USA, Australia, and Singapore, there must be designated and accessible icons for a private waiting room and a private pop-up chatbox.[lxxxi] During such private communication, the court proceedings must be paused, and no ex-parte discussion must occur. A more nuanced and effective screen sharing option must be introduced, wherein on clicking a designated button, the documents are first shared with the judge(s). Once approved, then this must be shared with other parties. Once any button has been clicked,[lxxxii] there should be a real-time notification that pops up in the centre of the court staff and/or judge’s screens. When participants are kept in the waiting room before the commencement of the hearing, real-time updates should be provided via the chat option. This is similar to the practice in Singapore, where constant updates are provided during the pre-hearing stage.[lxxxiii]

    Given the extent of concerns from Vidyo, courts must move towards adopting a different platform altogether. In the medium-term, they can use Cisco Webex,[lxxxiv] or Microsoft teams given that most of these features exist herein. However, if the court intends to mainstream video-conferencing, it must indigenously develop its platform that consolidates best practices. Thankfully, the Supreme Court has started moving in this direction by inviting tenders for “a comprehensive plan for video conference hearings including hardware and support”.[lxxxv]

    Organisational Practice;                      The video-conferencing screen must contain a help button, which opens a pop-up window that shows a user guide with relevant features available to a participant at their access level. If a participant finds this inadequate, there must be a support button, which allows them to connect to a helpline number. Most importantly, there should be designated officers assigned to each court who uninterruptedly serve as single points of contact.[lxxxvi]Before the platform is re-designed, the coordinators/members of the Control Room must be trained to be more proactive and responsive to the process flow. Anyhow, given peculiar circumstances, courts must largely refrain from passing adverse orders against litigants/advocates claiming to miss hearing due to technical issues.

    Associated Digital Processes:                       Unlike the current system which relies on the physical generation and sharing of links, courts can publish the links for different virtual courts along with the cause list or send automated e-mails to advocates in advance. This will improve efficiency, and reduce anxiety for advocates.[lxxxvii]

    As for e-filing, the Delhi High Court’s model should be adopted nationally.[lxxxviii] The only substantial information that required manual entry is the details of the parties. Thereafter, the entire case file can be uploaded as a single PDF. Even the diary numbers are immediately generated. For curing of defects, advocates are only be required to submit the entire final PDF file, as against separately uploading each page on which defect is secured.

    Technical Requirements;     The video-conferencing platforms must also be available for KaiOS users. Additionally, the bandwidth requirement can be lowered to 512 KBPS or 1 MBPS. To provide access to litigants with lower speeds, the court can always reduce the number of participants on an ad-hoc basis, when required. Even in the worst case, to ensure wider inclusivity, courts can adopt the practice that one bench of the Delhi High Court did. Parties can be asked to submit a 15-minute-long video clip of their arguments within a week of the order. Thereafter, within a week, they must be asked to submit an additional brief note along with a 10-minute-long video clip in rebuttal.[lxxxix]

    ·      Transparency and Accountability

    All virtual hearings should be recorded and stored using cryptography by the courts for a limited period. Additionally, voice-to-text transmission tools can be used for text records of hearings. To preserve privacy, automated redaction software can be used, which automatically redacts sensitive data fields. This is similar to the approach of certain courts like Florida, Pennsylvania, and Michigan.[xc]

    While live streaming promotes greater accountability, there are privacy concerns, as outlined earlier. These concerns can be balanced using the following three-fold approach: (1) Where the case does not involve sensitive information or witnesses, then these can be live-streamed;[xci] (2) When this cannot be done, limited broadcasting can be followed in two ways. While live-streaming is permitted, subsequent dissemination of the hearing, especially by media, is prohibited.[xcii] While public broadcasting may be forbidden, a screen at the courthouse can be provided where these proceedings are broadcasted for people at the court to view;[xciii] and (3) Providing a separate viewing room were advocates, journalists, and CSOs can observe and report on court proceedings, without participating in them.

    Lastly, to promote public awareness the digital portals of court websites must be regularly updated with weekly operational summaries of the working of the court and relevant policy updates, like in the UK.[xciv]

    ·      Privacy

    Technological Design;          The platform must generate unique meeting IDs, which expire after a limited time. The entry to the hearing must be verified using two-factor authentication. This entails OTP verification in addition to entering the unique ID and password of the meeting. The host must have the option of “locking” the meeting once all participants have joined, to ensure unauthorized entry does not subsequently take place.[xcv] All communication on the platform must be end-to-end encrypted using SSL/TLS, which will obfuscate the message and prevent third parties from accessing personal data. Even the entire video session must be encrypted. The servers storing the data must be secure to prevent any end-point vulnerabilities. To this end, advanced threat protection features can be used to protect against sophisticated malware or hacking attempts.[xcvi] Developing an indigenous government-backed platform will also mitigate concerns of data commercialization.

    Organisational Design:        Human errors still contribute to data leaks, despite advanced security designs.[xcvii] Thus, a safe user policy needs to be developed. Participants must be instructed to not connect through unsecured WiFi, or use weak password codes. The video-conferencing software must be routinely updated to ensure only the latest version is used. The coordinators/members of the Control Room must be trained on the necessary steps and contingency plans they must adopt to secure privacy.

    Conclusion

    The move towards digitization of the judiciary and the adoption of video-conferencing preceded the pandemic. However, the pandemic has necessitated their mainstream adoption. Indian courts have been prompt in issuing their SOPs, but these have been inadequate due to non-implementation and the inability of traditional legal tools to address unprecedented procedural issues, emerging from the mainstreaming of video conferencing.

    Firstly, there are due process concerns, centred around inadequate hosting platforms, sub-standard organizational practices, inefficient ancillary processes, and non-inclusive technical requirements. Secondly, there is a lack of accountability and transparency because of derogation from the rule of open court, without any effective alternative measures. Thirdly, there are privacy concerns as regards unauthorized participation, the secrecy of data exchanged, and commercial exploitation of data.

    Adopting a design-based approach not only addresses areas conventional legal tools can’t, but also improves efficiency and automates compliance. To this end, several technological and organizational design changes, as suggested, can be made to effectively address emerging procedural issues.

     

    End Notes:

    [i] PTI, ‘Supreme Court to begin physical hearing of cases in limited manner, releases SOP’ (The Print, 31 August 2020` <https://theprint.in/judiciary/supreme-court-to-begin-physical-hearing-of-cases-in-limited-manner-releases-sop/492699/> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [ii] Sruthisagar Yamunan, ‘Covid impact: Cases disposed of by High Courts drop by half, district courts by 70%’ (Scroll, 4 September 2020) <https://scroll.in/article/971860/covid-impact-cases-disposed-by-high-courts-drop-by-half-district-courts-by-70> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [iii] ‘Court Data: Quantifying the Effect of COVID-19’ (Supreme Court Observer, 29 April 2020) <https://www.scobserver.in/court-by-numbers?court_by_number_id=quantifying-the-effect-of-covid-19> accessed 14 January 2021; Given that the National Judicial Data Grid does not provide statistics on pendency for the Supreme Court, calculating impact on pendency due to COVID-19 is tricky. One metric that can be used is number of judgements delivered, which was 88 in March 2020, the same as March 2018, i.e., when the swine flu outbreak paralyzed the court. While this doesn’t accurately account for situational peculiarities, it provides an indication that the court has managed to fair well, by its own past metric. This discussion is notwithstanding the general impact the pandemic will have on case institution and disposal in the apex court.

    [iv] Nikitha, ‘Impact of Video Conferencing on Court Proceedings with Respect to Litigants and Lawyers’ (BnB Legal, 14 August 2020) <https://bnblegal.com/article/impact-of-video-conferencing-on-court-proceedings-with-respect-to-litigants-and-lawyers/> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [v] Richard Susskind, Online Courts and the Future of Justice (OUP 2019) 27.

    [vi] Anuradha Mukherjee, Amita Katragadda, Ayushi Singhal, & Shubhankar Jain, ‘From the Gavel to the Click: COVID 19 poised to be the inflection point for Online Courts in India’ <https://corporate.cyrilamarchandblogs.com/2020/04/gavel-to-click-covid-19-online-courts-in-india/> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [vii] Ibid; ‘Indian Courts and e-Governance initiative’ (Vikaspedia) <https://vikaspedia.in/e-governance/online-legal-services/how-do-i-do> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [viii] Dr Natalie Byrom, Sarah Beardon, & Dr Abby Kendrick, ‘The impact of COVID-19 measures on the civil justice system’ (2020) Civil Justice Council, 9 <https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/CJC-Rapid-Review-Final-Report-f.pdf> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [ix] ‘Standing Committee Report Summary’ (PRS Legislative Research, September 2020) <https://www.prsindia.org/report-summaries/functioning-virtual-courts> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [x] Shalini Seetharam & Sumathi Chandrashekaran, ‘E-Courts in India: From Policy Formulation to Implementation’ (2016) Vidhi Center for Legal Policy, 6-8 <https://vidhilegalpolicy.in/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/eCourtsinIndia_Vidhi.pdf> accessed 14 January 2021; Vikaspedia (n 7).

    [xi] Seetharam (n 10) 8-9.

    [xii] Phase-II of the project already contemplates video-conferencing and recording facility for courts and jails. So far, as many as 3,388 court complexes and 16,755 court rooms across India have been computerised, with video-conferencing equipment available in 3,240 court complexes and 1,272 jails, see: Mukherjee (n 6).

    [xiii] (2003) 4 SCC 601.

    [xiv] Twentieth Century Fox Film v NRI Film Production Associates AIR (2003) Kar 148; Amitabh Bagchi v Ena Bhagchi AIR (2005) Cal 11; Sujay Mitra v State of West Bengal (2015) SCC Online Cal 1191.

    [xv] Alcatel India Limited v Koshika Telecom Ltd (2004) SCC Online Del 705.

    [xvi] Bodala Murali Krishna v Smt Badola Prathim AIR (2007) AP 43; Dr. Kunal Saha v Dr. Sukumar Mukhurjee (2006) SCC Online NCDRC 35.

    [xvii] Santini v Vijaya Venketesh (2018) 1 SCC 62.

    [xviii] Bagchi (n 14).

    [xix] Desai (n 13).

    [xx] Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 5/2020; Jai Brunner & Balu Nair, ‘Switching to Video’ (Supreme Court Observer, 6 April 2020) <https://www.scobserver.in/the-desk/switching-to-video> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xxi] ‘Standard Operating Procedure for Ld. Advocate/Party-in-person for e-Filing, Mentioning, Listing and Video Conferencing Hearing’ (Supreme Court of India, 4 July 2020) <http://scobserver-production.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/ckeditor/attachments/477/SOP_04072020.pdf> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xxii] SCO Editorial Team, ‘COVID Coverage: Court’s Functioning’ (Supreme Court Observer, 28 July 2020) <https://www.scobserver.in/the-desk/covid-coverage-court-s-functioning> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xxiii] Ibid.

    [xxiv] ‘Use of technology must be institutionalised even after Lockdown: Justice Chandrachud in video conference with HC judges manning E-committees’ (Bar and Bench, 4 April 2020) <https://www.barandbench.com/news/use-of-technology-must-be-institutionalised-even-after-lockdown-justice-chandrachud-in-video-conference-with-hc-judges-manning-e-committees> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xxv] Debayan Roy, ‘Supreme Court allows High Courts to frame own rules for virtual hearings, says media access “should only be for output and not input”’ (Bar and Bench, 26 October 2020) <https://www.barandbench.com/news/litigation/supreme-court-allows-high-courts-to-frame-own-rules-for-virtual-hearings> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xxvi] The main changes involve differing instructions for differing e-filing and e-listing. Others are minor additions in instructions relating to conduct during the hearing, and differing steps, for differing platforms, for joining a video-conference using the virtual link.

    [xxvii] Amulya Ashwathappa, Arunav Kaul, Chockalingam Muthian, et al, ‘Video Conferencing in Indian Courts: A Pathway to the Justice Platform’ (2020) Daksh Whitepaper Series on Next Generation Justice Platform Paper 4, 62-67 <https://dakshindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Paper-4-_Video-Conferencing-in-Indian-Courts.pdf> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xxviii] ‘Impact of COVID19 on functioning of the Indian Judiciary – Weekly Update on Virtual Courts’ (Khaitan & Co, 4 May 2020) <https://www.khaitanco.com/thought-leaderships/Impact-of-COVID19-on-functioning-of-the-Indian-Judiciary-Weekly-Update-on-Virtual-Courts-1242020_2042020> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xxix] Notification No. 325/Rules/DHC dated 1 June 2020.

    [xxx] Gautam Kagalwala, ‘Just Virtually’ (India Business Law Journal, 19 August 2020) <https://law.asia/video-conferencing-lockdown/> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xxxi] PTI, ‘NCLAT issues standard operating procedure for virtual hearings from June 1’ (Financial Express, 30 May 2020) <https://www.financialexpress.com/industry/nclat-issues-standard-operating-procedure-for-virtual-hearings-from-june-1/1976249/> accessed 14 January 2021; For ITAT and NGT, see: Nikitha (n 4).

    [xxxii] Department Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice, Functioning of Virtual Courts(Rajya Sabha 2020, 103) 15.

    [xxxiii] Ibid.

    [xxxiv] Amulya Ashwathappa, ‘The Parliamentary Standing Committee On Virtual Courts In India’ (Daksh, 16 September 2020) <https://dakshindia.org/the-parliamentary-standing-committee-on-virtual-courts-in-india/> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xxxv] These are the High Courts in Delhi, Bombay, Punjab and Haryana, and Madhya Pradesh.

    [xxxvi] Ashwathappa (n 27) 17.

    [xxxvii] Deepika Kinhal, Ameen Jauhar, Tarika Jain, et al, ‘Virtual Courts in India’ (2020) Vidhi Center for Legal Policy Strategy Paper, 20 <https://vidhilegalpolicy.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/20200501__Strategy-Paper-for-Virtual-Courts-in-India_Vidhi-1.pdf> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xxxviii] Ashwathappa (n 27) 18.

    [xxxix] Bar and Bench (n 24).

    [xl] Digbijay Mishra & Madhav Chanchani, ‘For the first time, India has more rural net users than urban’ (The Times of India, 6 May 2020) <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/for-the-first-time-india-has-more-rural-net-users-than-urban/articleshow/75566025.cms> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xli] Ashwathappa (n 27) 20.

    [xlii] Murali Krishnan & Smriti Kak Ramachandran, ‘House panel backs e-courts’ (Hindustan Times, 12 September 2020) <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/house-panel-backs-e-courts/story-F5GNGVNcYT3dTHHdx4uMHJ.html> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xliii] Dipak Mondal, ‘Coronavirus lockdown: Fear of data security over video-conference apps Indian courts use’ (Business Today, 7 May 2020) <https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/coronavirus-lockdown-fear-of-data-security-over-video-conference-apps-indian-courts-use/story/403154.html> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xliv] Murali Krishnan, ‘Supreme Court should migrate from Vidyo app: Survey’ (Hindustan Times, 23 September 2020) <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/supreme-court-should-migrate-from-vidyo-app-survey/story-S5mMZD3K29bYTfoUvZUi2J.html> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xlv] Bhabna Das, D. Abhinav Rao, Harsh Parashar, et al, ‘Survey Report on the Virtual Systems Adopted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court’ (29 August 2020) <https://images.assettype.com/barandbench/2020-09/05eb71ca-d07f-4ef1-9e6c-9d49ae0f64eb/Survey_Report_on_Virtual_Courts_System_adopted_by_SC.pdf> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xlvi] Krishnan (n 44).

    [xlvii] Das (n 45).

    [xlviii] Krishnan (n 44).

    [xlix] Das (n 45).

    [l] Ibid

    [li] Ibid

    [lii] Krishnan (n 44).

    [liii] Das (n 45).

    [liv] Kagalwala (n 30).

    [lv] Sandhya Keelrey, ‘Internet access across India in 2019, by type of mobile network’ (Statista, 16 October 2020) <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1115260/india-internet-connection-by-type-of-network-mobile/> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [lvi] Neeraj Arora, ‘Serving Justice in COVID-19 Pandemic, only option is Virtual Court: an Indian Prospective’ (2020) Cyber Research and Innovation Society, 34 <https://cyberpandit.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Virtual-Court-Room_HandBook.pdf> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [lvii] ‘State of Mobile Networks: India’ (Open Signal, April 2018) <https://www.opensignal.com/reports/2018/04/india/state-of-the-mobile-network> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [lviii] ‘How much bandwidth does Skype need?’ (Skype) <https://support.skype.com/en/faq/FA1417/how-much-bandwidth-does-skype-need> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [lix] Simon Sharwood, ‘India’s contact-tracing app unleashes KaiOS on feature phones’ (The Register, 17 May 2020) <https://www.theregister.com/2020/05/17/contact_tracing_on_feature_phones/#:~:text=Aarogya%20Setu%20App%20is%20now,join%20the%20fight%20against%20COVID19.&text=Jio%20currently%20offers%20two%20phones,Blackberry-like%20%2440%20model%202> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [lx] Arunav Kaul, ‘Examining The Use Of Video Conferencing In Indian Courts’ (Daksh, 30 April 2020) <https://dakshindia.org/examining-the-use-of-video-conferencing-in-indian-courts/> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [lxi] Paragraph 8.6, Notification No. 325/Rules/DHC dated 1 June 2020.

    [lxii] Nikitha (n 4).

    [lxiii] Meredith Rossner & David Tait, ‘Courts are moving to video during coronavirus, but research shows it’s hard to get a fair trial remotely’ (The Conversation, 8 April 2020) <https://theconversation.com/courts-are-moving-to-video-during-coronavirus-but-research-shows-its-hard-to-get-a-fair-trial-remotely-134386> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [lxiv] Naresh Shridhar v State of Maharashtra (1966) 3 SCR 744 [The primary dispute arose out of a civil defamation case filed against the petitioner, who was a journalist, by the Thackerys. The petitioner challenged the lower courts decision on the ground of its in-camera nature. The Court affirmed the importance of open courts in ensuring objective and fair administration of justice as well as preservation and growth of our democracy. Subsequently, it examined the cases where exceptions can be made, such as in rape trials or matrimonial disputes.]; Swapnil Tripathi v Supreme Court of India (2018) 10 SCC 639 [The petitioners, as public-spirited persons, petitioned the Court to direct that cases of national and constitutional importance must be live streamed in a manner accessible to the public. The Court recognized the importance of open justice in ensuring accountability, transparency, and freedom of speech. As an extension of this principle, it noted that live streaming should be allowed. It then amended its own rules, and provided detailed guidelines on live streaming.]

    [lxv] Paragraph 8.9, Notification No. 325/Rules/DHC dated 1 June 2020.

    [lxvi] Mukherjee (n 6).

    [lxvii] Amy Salyzyn, ‘“Trial by Zoom”: What Virtual Hearings Might Mean for Open Courts, Participant Privacy and the Integrity of Court Proceedings’ (Slaw, 17 April 2020) <http://www.slaw.ca/2020/04/17/trial-by-zoom-what-virtual-hearings-might-mean-for-open-courts-participant-privacy-and-the-integrity-of-court-proceedings/> accessed 14 January 2021; While the Supreme Court has expressed support for limited livestreaming matters of constitutional/national importance in Swapnil Tripathi v Supreme Court of India (n 63), nothing has ever come of this, see: Parliamentary Standing Committee Report (n 32) 7-10.

    [lxviii] Salyzyn (n 67).

    [lxix] Jane Bailey & Jacquelyn Burkell, ‘Revisiting the Open Court Principle in an Era of Online Publication: Questioning Presumptive Public Access to Parties’ and Witnesses’ Personal Information’ (2017) 48(1) Ottawa LR 147, 167-178.

    [lxx] Arora (n 56) 44.

    [lxxi] Graeme Hamilton, ‘How a now-defunct Romanian website exposed tension between privacy and openness in Canadian courts’ (National Post, 6 April 2017) <https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/how-a-now-defunct-romanian-website-exposed-tension-between-privacy-and-openness-in-canadian-courts> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [lxxii] Arora (n 56) 23.

    [lxxiii] Arora (n 56) 23-24.

    [lxxiv] Ibid.

    [lxxv] Mondal (n 43).

    [lxxvi] Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s Blueprint: The Battle to Control Design of New Technologies (HUP 2018) 7-11.

    [lxxvii] Ibid.

    [lxxviii] Ibid.

    [lxxix] Ann Cavoukian, ‘Privacy by Design: The 7 Foundational Principles, Implementation and Mapping of Fair Information Practices’ (Information and Privacy Commissioner, 2011) <https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/pbd_implement_7found_principles.pdf> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [lxxx] Ibid.

    [lxxxi] Ashwathappa (n 27) 28.

    [lxxxii] This could include the ‘raise hand’ or ‘screen share’ or ‘text in chat box or ‘request to move to private breakout room’.

    [lxxxiii] Arora (n 56) 34-36.

    [lxxxiv] In a survey, this emerged as the most popular choice among advocates of the Supreme Court.

    [lxxxv] Krishnan (n 44).

    [lxxxvi] Das (n 45).

    [lxxxvii] Ibid.

    [lxxxviii] Practice Direction for Electronic Filing in the High Court of Delhi, accessible at http://delhihighcourt.nic.in/writereaddata/upload/Notification/NotificationFile_LC0S0PP0.PDF.

    [lxxxix] Ashish Prasad & Rohit Sharma, ‘Delhi HC’s VC Hearing Rules – Taking the Virtual Courts System Forward’ (Law Street India, 5 June 2020) <http://www.lawstreetindia.com/experts/column?sid=398> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xc] Ashwathappa (n 27) 46.

    [xci] Colette Allen, ‘Open justice and remote court hearings under the UK’s Coronavirus Act’ (International Bar Association 2020).

    [xcii] This is similar to the position taken up by the Canadian Supreme Court in Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v Attorney General of Canada[2011] 1 SCR 19 [In this case, Stephen Dufour was charged with aiding suicide, and at his trial a video, containing a statement by him, was admitted as evidence. Journalists were permitted to view the film. But the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation petitioned the Court requesting that it should be allowed to broadcast this video. It denied this request but held that this is not a blanket rule. In granting this request, factors such as “the serenity of the hearing, trial fairness, and the fair administration of justice” should be considered. Most importantly, it noted that there is a difference in having to testify in open court and having said testimony telecasted into the houses of Canadians.].

    [xciii] This is similar to what the New York City Court has done, see: Jamiles Lartey, ‘The Judge Will See You On Zoom, But The Public Is Mostly Left Out’ (The Marshall Project, 13 April 2020) <https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/04/13/the-judge-will-see-you-on-zoom-but-the-public-is-mostly-left-out> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xciv] Jeff Galway & Dr. Urs Hoffmann-Nowotny, ‘Impact of COVID-19 on Court Operations & Litigation Practice’ (International Bar Association Litigation Committee 2020) 33.

    [xcv] Arora (n 56) 23-24.

    [xcvi] Nate Lord, ‘What is Advanced Threat Protection (ATP)?’ (Digital Guardian, 17 July 2020) <https://digitalguardian.com/blog/what-advanced-threat-protection-atp> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xcvii] Arora (n 56) 31-33.

  • e-SLA and the Delhi Act 2011 (Right of Citizen to Time-bound delivery of Services)- Policy Analysis

    e-SLA and the Delhi Act 2011 (Right of Citizen to Time-bound delivery of Services)- Policy Analysis

    Introduction

    As the functions of the modern welfare state expand and the dependency of citizens on it increases, its services must be delivered in timely manner. To this end, the Delhi government developed a robust policy. Through the Delhi Act of 2011 (Right of Citizen to Time Bound Delivery of Services), referred to as “the Act”, and the Delhi (Right of Citizen to Time Bound Delivery of Services) Rules, 2011 [“the Rules”], it has guaranteed timely delivery of 361 services.[1] Delhi is not the only state to confer such a right. However, in these other states, the enforcement of this right requires physical presence. Delhi has used an e-Service Level Agreement [“e-SLA”] to digitise the entire enforcement process. Digitisation has enabled greater accountability, performance review, and convenience, whilst also reducing the invested time and cost of every stakeholder. Thus, through this e-governance tool, Delhi has developed a ‘new ecology’ for the citizen-state relationship.

    In this paper, I will first provide a primer on both the Act and the e-SLA. In the second section, I will examine the constitutionality of the Act. Last, I will test the Act against the principles of good governance and citizen-centric administration.

    Understanding the Act and e-SLA

    The Act and e-SLA are deeply interrelated. While the Act defines the legal rights, procedures, and obligations, e-SLA is the mechanism for their execution. The Act comprises four major components: defined rights and corresponding liabilities, procedural prescriptions, the delegation of rulemaking, and the monitoring platform.

    Every citizen is conferred with the right to time-bound delivery of services,[2] and a liability of compliance imposed on government servants.[3] In cases of default, the government servant is liable to pay the compensatory cost of ₹10 per day for the period of delay, subject to a maximum of ₹200 per application.[4] Correspondingly, citizens are entitled to recover the compensatory costs.[5]

    The Act makes three different but interrelated procedural prescriptions. First, it provides the appointment process, eligibility criteria, and powers of the “competent officer”.[6] He/she must not be below the rank of Deputy Secretary or its equivalent rank and is empowered to impose a compensatory cost on the defaulting government servant. Second, it establishes the procedure governing fixation of liability.[7] If there is a delay, the aggrieved citizen can approach the competent officer, who immediately pays the cost that has been automatically calculated by e-SLA.[8] At a second stage, the officer issues show-cause notice to the concerned servant. If justifiable grounds exist, then the payment is debited from the government exchequer. Otherwise, it is reimbursed from the concerned servant. Third, it prescribes the appointment process, eligibility criteria, and powers of appellate authority as well as a 30-day time limit for filing an appeal. He/she must not be below the rank of Joint Secretary or its equivalent rank and has final authority on the matter.[9]

    The Act provides for delegation of legislative authority in two senses. There is a power to make rules,[10] and the power to remove difficulties.[11] However, the exercise of these powers is subject to Parliamentary scrutiny.

    It is the duty of departments and local bodies to process the application of every citizen and provide an application number. Furthermore, these authorities are obligated to maintain and update the status of applications online.[12] The e-SLA monitoring system has been designated as an online database.[13] To the government, it provides detailed information on the number of disposed or pending cases, which helps in performance evaluation and corrective measures. To the citizens, it provides online facility to track their applications.[14] The information flow is explained below:

     

    Figure 1: Information flow between government officials under e-SLA

     

    Figure 2: Information flow between government officials and citizens under e-SLA

     

    Constitutionality of the Act

    The Constitution provides certain safeguards to “civil servants”.[15] At the outset, it must be noted that these employees are only a sub-set of the “government servants” defined in the Act.[16] Thus, the applicable scope of protection, if any, is not to the entire class of employees enumerated in the Act, but only to civil servants.

    The legal issue herein is the constitutionality of imposing a compensation cost on the civil servant. This is a two-fold question:

    1. Whether there is the power to impose such a cost?

    Appropriate legislatures are empowered to regulate the service conditions of civil servants.[17] As the cost relates to a service condition (i.e., timely delivery), the Delhi Legislative Assembly was empowered in imposing it.

    1. If so, has this exercise violated any constitutional safeguard?

    However, this power is subject to constitutional safeguards guaranteed under Article 311.[18] The protection offered under Article 311(2) is exhaustive and with specific reference to the imposition of three penalties: dismissal, removal, and demotion.[19] Accordingly, the imposition of compensatory cost on the civil servant is beyond the scope of three-fold protection offered by Article 311. Thus, no constitutional safeguard has been violated herein.

    As the imposition of compensatory cost on the civil servants is both within the power and compliant with safeguards, it is constitutional.

    Testing the Act against principles of Good Governance and Citizen-Centric Administration

    Governance refers to the process of decision-making, and the process of implementing those decisions.[20] Good governance is when these processes are tested against a normative standard. Citizen-centric administration refers to governance that places citizens at the centre of all administrative functions.[21] In this section, I will use the characteristics of good governance and the principles of citizen-centric administration as a collective standard[22] to analyze the process of formation and implementation of the Act, its Rules, and e-SLA.

    Assessing Compliance in Formation and Implementation

    a) Participatory. In the absence of statutory provisions, the administrative authorities are not bound to comply with any procedural norms, including notice and prior consultation with the interested parties. The Delhi Act, 2011 does not provide for any such consultation or ante-natal publicity. In the process of policy-making, there was participation only from the relevant government ministries and departments. The government did not take any active steps to broaden consultation to stakeholders such as the civic society organizations, labour unions, or even the general public.

    The lack of participatory policy-making has directly impacted its awareness and enthusiasm among citizens. It was found that only 50% of the people know that their unique ID can be used to track their applications online. Further, only 15% of the people used their ID to track their application.[23]

    b) Transparency. The e-SLA allows for complete transparency to the citizen as to the status of all his applications. The information is not only easily comprehensible but also accessible. However, the transparency does not extend to releasing statistics of operations to the public domain. Currently, these statistics, such as the figures on the number of applications, pendency, disposal rate, performing/underperforming departments, are accessible only to government officials.[24]

    c) Responsiveness. The e-SLA system does not provide for any feedback mechanism. Thus, there is no avenue for the citizens availing these services to share their experiences. As feedback is the basis on which the system continually improves, this deficiency hinders the potential effectiveness of e-SLA.[25]

    1. Accountability

    The right to time-bound service delivery through the mechanism of compensatory cost has, in theory, ensured that the government and its officials are accountable to citizens. This is buttressed by the fact that the Act seeks to develop a culture of timely delivery among the government servants by additionally punishing habitual offenders and providing cash incentives for those without a single default in a year.[26] However, the liability of government servant has been capped at ₹200, compared to other state legislation that penalizes in thousands. Further, the cash incentives are only up to ₹5000. Thus, the quantum is inadequate to cause attitudinal changes in the servants.

    Moreover, there is no culture among public servants to hold their non-performing colleagues in disrepute.[27] There is no indication that this non-performance is factored into promotions. Anyhow, such public servants are typically complacent and not seeking promotions. The security of their present job and status is adequate incentive to persist with present behaviour. Thus, promotions and reputational loss among peers are not adequate incentives for performance either.

    Furthermore, by releasing all relevant statistics of operations to the public domain, the government can broaden its accountability. These statistics can be used by stakeholders, such as news and media agencies and policy think-tanks, to supplement the government in identifying issues and corrective measures. This would also pressurize the government to be more proactive.

         2.  Consensus orientation

    Through reasonable and extensively deliberated timelines, the Act sufficiently balances the interests of citizens in securing timely delivery with the government’s limited capacity.

         3.  Effectiveness and Efficiency

    The usage of e-governance to guarantee the right to public service is a revolutionary process reform. This must be gauged at two levels:

    • For the citizen, this system has reduced the number of physical visits required, thus saving time and cost. In a survey, 66.6% reported that they are not required to visit government offices more than once after submitting their applications.[28]
    • For the government, it eliminates systemic errors and inefficiencies.[29] The statistics help in assessing performance and preparing corrective action.[30] However, if the system can track internal departmental processes too, it would allow determining the exact level at which service delivery is being delayed. Furthermore, the Act ignores the quality of timely delivered services.[31] To provide a comprehensive right to public service, the legislature must develop standards to assess the quality of services rendered on time.

     

        4.  Equitable and Inclusive

    Under the Act, while the citizen is immediately compensated, the government servant is not immediately penalized for default. The procedure allows him/her to provide justified grounds that could excuse liability. For greater inclusivity, the government can prescribe a pro-rata calculation of the penalty. As the amount is automatically calculated by e-SLA, even complex formulas are acceptable.

       5.  Rule of Law

    The Act provides for a fair legal framework and impartial enforcement.

    Conclusion

    Executing the right to time-bound service delivery through an online portal is truly revolutionary. It has emerged as model legislation for other governments. The Act is constitutionally valid. However, when tested against standards of good governance, this policy suffers from problems of non-participation, transparency, responsiveness, accountability, and effectiveness at the government-level. But it scores par excellence on the principles of consensus orientation, effectiveness at the citizen-level, inclusiveness, and rule of law. To embrace the truly revolutionary potential of this policy, the government must make the suggestions recommended in the last section of the paper, vis-à-vis each principle.

     

    References:

    [1] IANS, ‘245 services brought under Delhi time-bound delivery act’ (Business Standard, 24 August 2014) <https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/245-services-brought-under-delhi-time-bound-delivery-act-114082400707_1.html> accessed 17 January 2021.

    [2] The Act, s. 3.

    [3] The Act, s. 4.

    [4] The Act, s. 7.

    [5] The Act, s. 8.

    [6] The Act, s. 9.

    [7] The Act, s. 10.

    [8] The Rules, r. 4(1).

    [9] The Act, s. 11(1).

    [10] The Act, s. 15.

    [11] The Act, s. 16.

    [12] The Act, s. 5.

    [13] The Rules, r. 2(c).

    [14] Arjun Kapoor & Niranjan Sahoo, India’s Shifting Governance Structure: From Charter of Promises to Services Guarantee (ORF Occasional Paper No 35, 2012).

    [15] Constitution of India 1950, Art. 309, 310, 311.

    [16] The Act, s. 2(g).

    [17] Constitution of India 1950, Art. 309.

    [18] Union of India v. S.P. Sharma (2014) 6 SCC 351.

    [19] Yashomati Ghosh, Textbook on Administrative Law (1st edn, Lexis Nexis 2015) 416.

    [20] UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, ‘What is Good Governance?’ <http://www. unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf>.

    [21] Ghosh (n 19) 14.

    [22] Second Administrative Reforms Commission, Citizen-Centric Administration (Report No 12, 2009) p. 8.

    [23] Audit of Functioning of Government of Delhi’s e-SLA Scheme, by Management Development Institute, Gurgaon (2012).

    [24] Ibid.

    [25] Rohit Sinha, ‘Delivering on service guarantee: A case of Delhi’s e-SLA’ (ORF, 29 December 2012) <https://www.orfonline.org/research/delivering-on-service-guarantee-a-case-of-delhis-e-sla/> accessed 17 January 2021.

    [26] The Act, s. 12.

    [27] Kapoor & Sahoo (n 14); Amit Chandea & Surbhi Bhatia, The Right of Citizens for Time Bound Delivery of Goods and Services and Redressal of their Grievances Bill, 2011 (CCS, 2015) p. 25-26.

    [28] Sinha (n 25).

    [29] Chandea & Bhatia (n 27).

    [30] Ibid.

    [31] Kapoor & Sahoo (n 14).

     

    Image Credit: Forbes India

  • (Part-II) Proposing a Legal Framework for Distribution of the COVID-19 Vaccination

    (Part-II) Proposing a Legal Framework for Distribution of the COVID-19 Vaccination

    I.   Reassessing Vulnerabilities During a Pandemic

    A general problem across all conventional models is their failure to understand that vulnerabilities during a pandemic are created and compounded by socio-economic factors too. Therefore, there is a need to adopt approaches that holistically assess the correlation between socioeconomic factors and vulnerability during a pandemic.[1]

    The Syndemics Approach

    Under this approach, pandemics are understood as an interaction of that disease with other diseases and the socio-economic and political factors that increase the risk of vulnerability.[2] All these factors synergistically interact to impact the health of individuals and society. Through these risk factors, it identifies the overlapping health and socio-economic problems that increase vulnerability (‘syndemic vulnerabilities’). The socio-economic risk factors are influenced by social determinants of health, i.e., the conditions of housing, food, employment, healthcare, and education.[3] Therefore, the utility of this approach lies in its holistic conception of socio-economic factors that impact the formation, clustering, and progression of diseases.[4] Using this approach, I argue that the COVID-19 pandemic has synergistically interacted and exacerbated the existing diseases and socio-economic conditions of marginalized groups across countries.

    Higher Risks of Infection, Transmission, and Mortality: Typically, due to historic discrimination and denial, marginalized communities have a greater number of pre-existing diseases like diabetes and asthma,[5] which in turn elevates their risk of infection and mortality. Moreover, there is unequal access to healthcare among marginalized communities due to the high costs of medical care and the absence of health insurance.[6] Marginalized communities are also disproportionately poor,[7] which affects their ability to mitigate the impact of the pandemic.

    Typically, marginalized communities are housed in crowded neighbourhoods with smaller houses that lack outside space.[8] They also have higher population densities, especially in urban areas, and lower access to communal green space.[9]Due to historic discrimination, marginalized communities are over-represented in essential services, including low-wage healthcare sectors and sanitation jobs.[10] This reduces their ability to work from home, and thus increases their risk of infection and transmission. Marginalized communities are more likely to take public transportation,[11] which further increases their risk of infection and transmission.

    These syndemic vulnerabilities have increased the risk of mortality among these marginalized communities. For instance, in America, the mortality rate of African-Americans and Indigenous/Latino communities is 3.4 times and 3.3 times higher than a non-Hispanic White person.[12] Evidence from past epidemics/pandemics shows that the rates of infection and mortality are always disproportionately higher among marginalized communities.[13]

    Greater Socio-Economic Disruption: Due to a lack of quality education, members of marginalized communities tend to work in lower-wage jobs in the informal sector, which has been worst hit by the pandemic.[14] The percentage fall in employment for marginalized communities has been far greater, indicating that education was a protective factor in the first wave of job losses.[15] Consequently, there has also been greater housing evictions among these communities.[16]The access to quality education for children in marginalized communities has also been severely impacted because they lack access to the internet,[17] affecting their ability to access education. Moreover, low literacy among adults in marginalized communities indicates their inability to assist their children with any form of home learning.[18]

    Therefore, the increased syndemic vulnerabilities of marginalized communities and the consequent disproportionate socio-economic disruptions of the pandemic on them necessitate a greater strive for their inclusion in distributing the vaccine. Early access to such vaccines allows these groups the opportunity to proportionately mitigate these vulnerabilities and disruptions.

    Intersectionality

    Presently, vulnerabilities among individuals are dominantly viewed from a single-axis framework. This ignores the multiple layers and experiences of vulnerability, resulting from an interplay of power structures and different social identities, held by one individual. This ignorance is avoided when using intersectionality, which is an analytical framework that explains how different social, economic, and political identities overlap to create different modes of discrimination and privilege.[19] Thus, it explains how certain individuals in the population are relatively more disadvantaged than others.[20] Intersectionality not only provides a multi-layered understanding of vulnerabilities during a pandemic but also helps prioritize distribution within an identified category, given the scarcity of vaccines.

     

    II.   Proposing a Multi-Value Ethical Framework

    Given its rational criteria, incorporating utilitarianism’s clinical risk factors is quite valuable. However, as argued, vulnerability during a pandemic is also determined by socioeconomic risk factors. Therefore, there is a need to adopt a multi-value approach that incorporates both clinical and socio-economic risk factors. I propose to do so by simultaneously prioritizing the values of ‘collective wellbeing’ and ‘justice’.

    Borrowed from utilitarianism is the value of ‘collective wellbeing’, which aims at maximizing benefits and minimizing harms. Flowing from a syndemic conception of COVID-19 is the value of ‘justice’, which aims at reducing health inequities and treats like people alike. These values are not necessarily always distinct, but their overlap over one parameter indicates a stronger justification. They can be operationalized using an ‘intersectional multi-parameter weighted framework’.

    Operationalizing Values

    The framework is constructed through three layers: (1) for each risk parameter, there is (2) a value-based justification, along with (3) its extent of weightage. The risk parameters are viewed from an intersectional power axis, with value justifications sourced from clinical and syndemic vulnerabilities. The weightage typically connotes a three-point scale, where 3 indicates the highest priority, and 1 indicates the lowest. The priority order is based on the greatness of one’s total score. The lottery method should only be used as a tie-breaker when the score is the same, and no more doses are presently available.

    Age:    Older people are at a significantly higher risk of infection and severe morbidity or mortality due to physiological changes associated with ageing. Globally, more than 95% of COVID-19 deaths were among individuals aged 60 and above. Even among older people, more than half of all deaths occurred in people aged 80 and above.[21]

    Therefore, in descending order, weightage must be given to individuals above 80 years, individuals between 60-80 years, and individuals between 40-59 years.

    Comorbidities:          Depending on the country, between 48-75% of COVD-19 deaths are associated with existing comorbidities. Those with comorbidities are also at moderately higher risk of infection.[22]

    The prioritization has to be categorized based on the severity of the comorbidity, in contracting the infection and causing death. Therefore, in descending order, higher weightage must be given to severe comorbidities, moderate comorbidities, and mild comorbidities. The severity in infection and mortality is different for countries due to distinct socio-economic realities and evolutionary biology. Therefore, this identification and classification need to be uniquely undertaken. However, as a general rule, it is almost universal for HIV, cancer, and most cardiovascular diseases to be severe comorbidities.[23]

    Profession:     Prioritizing frontline healthcare, sanitation, and defence workers are justified because they engage in services, whose absence has the greatest negative societal impact- whether on health, safety/security, or economy. They are also in constant contact with areas and people having the greatest risk of infection. Therefore, protecting them has a multiplier effect, in that their ability to remain uninfected protects the health of others and minimizes societal and economic disruption. Since the state obligates these workers to work in risk conditions, while everyone else is working from home, it is further obligated to protect them.

    Therefore, in descending order, priority must be given to frontline workers, workers in other essential sectors, and workers in non-essential sectors.

    Income:          One’s economic status affects their ability to access healthcare, thus results in higher rates of mortality and severe morbidity.[24] The syndemic approach reveals that poverty compounds one’s syndemic vulnerability.

    Therefore, in descending order, priority must be given to individuals with low-income, middle-income, and high-income.

    Ethnic Identity:         The syndemic approach reveals that marginalized communities are at a greater risk of infection, transmission, and mortality. They are also worst affected by the pandemic, which further compounds their vulnerability. Given these vulnerabilities, prioritized vaccine access to marginalized communities also helps reduce all three risks among the general population.

    The prioritization criteria would depend on the marginalized communities within a country and the extent of their syndemic vulnerabilities. For instance, in America, the syndemic vulnerabilities are greatest for African-Americans, followed by the Indigenous/Latinos communities, and then Pacific Islanders.

    Conclusion

    The conventional models of vaccine distribution are unethical towards disadvantaged groups. While neoliberalism completely ignores the distributive function of law, utilitarianism, lottery, and FCFS at least acknowledge this. However, their criterion of distribution ignores socio-economic vulnerabilities. This ignorance can be addressed using a syndemics approach and intersectionality.

    The syndemics approach explains the socio-economic risk factors that disproportionately disadvantage marginalized communities, both medically and socio-economically. Intersectionality provides a layered understanding of how vulnerabilities affect people, even those in the same group, differently. Using these approaches, I propose a multi-value ethical framework that balances the pragmatic considerations of medical utilitarianism with greater social inclusion. It operationalizes the values of these ethical systems through the priority order generated under an ‘intersectional multi-parameter weighted framework’.

     

    Notes:

    [1] While each country has different marginalized groups, the patterns of vulnerability explored are similar. Thus, marginalized groups have been generally analyzed hereinafter.

    [2] Merrill Singer, Nicola Bulled, et al, ‘Syndemics and the biosocial conception of health’ (2017) 389 Lancet 941, 941-943.

    [3] Clare Bambra, Ryan Riordan, et al, ‘The COVID-19 pandemic and health inequalities’ (2020) 1 J Epidemiol Community Health 964, 965.

    [4] Singer (n 23) 948.

    [5] Harleen Kaur, ‘Indirect racial discrimination in COVID-19 ethical guidance’ (BMJ Blog, 27 August 2020) <https://blogs.bmj.com/covid-19/2020/08/27/indirect-racial-discrimination-in-covid-19-ethical-guidance/> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [6] Bambra (n 24) 965-966.

    [7] Melanie Moses, ‘A Model for a Just COVID-19 Vaccination Program’ (Nautilus, 25 November 2020) <http://nautil.us/issue/93/forerunners/a-model-for-a-just-covid_19-vaccination-program> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [8] Tonia Poteat, ‘Understanding COVID-19 Risks and Vulnerabilities among Black Communities in America: Syndemics’ (2020) 47 Annals of Epidemiology 1, 3.

    [9] Bambra (n 24) 966.

    [10] National Academies (n 16) 30-31.

    [11] ‘Beyond the data: Understanding the impact of COVID-19 on BAME groups’ (2020) Public Health England Report, 22-23 <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/892376/COVID_stakeholder_engagement_synthesis_beyond_the_data.pdf> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [12] Harald Schmidt, ‘Is It Lawful and Ethical to Prioritize Racial Minorities for COVID-19 Vaccines?’ (2020) 324 JAMA <https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2771874> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [13] Bambra (n 24) 967.

    [14] Shruti Srivastava, ‘Millions Escaped Caste Discrimination. Covid-19 Brought It Back’ (Bloomberg Quint, 21 August 2020) <https://www.bloombergquint.com/politics/millions-escaped-caste-discrimination-covid-19-brought-it-back> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [15] Ashwini Deshpande, ‘Differential impact of COVID-19 and the lockdown’ (The Hindu, 22 August 2020) <https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/differential-impact-of-covid-19-and-the-lockdown/article32416854.ece> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [16] Schmidt (n 33).

    [17] Deshpande (n 36).

    [18] Ibid.

    [19] Olena Hankivsky, ‘An intersectionality-based policy analysis framework’ (2014) 13(119) Intl J Equity in Health 1, 2.

    [20] Ibid.

    [21] ‘Supporting older people during the COVID-19 pandemic’ (WHO, 3 April 2020) <https://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-emergencies/coronavirus-covid-19/news/news/2020/4/supporting-older-people-during-the-covid-19-pandemic-is-everyones-business> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [22] Awadhesh Kumar, ‘Impact of COVID-19 and comorbidities on health and economics’ (2020) 14(6) Diabetes Metab Syndr 1625, 1626-1627.

    [23] Ibid.

    [24] National Academies (n 16) 68-77.

     

    Image Credit: One India

  • Proposing a Legal Framework for Distribution of the COVID-19 Vaccination [Part I]

    Proposing a Legal Framework for Distribution of the COVID-19 Vaccination [Part I]

    Introduction

    Distributing the COVID-19 vaccination has been touted as the biggest policy decision in 2021. This stems from the utility and efficacy of vaccines in immediately addressing pandemics. Specifically, the COVID-19 vaccination not only protects the injected person, with a 70%-95% efficacy[1] but also provides ‘herd immunity’.[2] That is, the non-injected population is also benefited due to a reduced risk of transmission and infection, so long as 70% of individuals in society are vaccinated. Therefore, access to the vaccine determines how much and for whom the adversity of the pandemic is mitigated.

    Currently, most vaccine developers are in the final two phases of clinical trials, with some, like Pfizer/BioNTech’s and Oxford University/AstraZeneca’s, already receiving ‘emergency use authorization’ from multiple countries. Most countries have prepared a ballpark action plan for distribution, while the United Kingdom has already vaccinated more than 3.5 million people.[3]

    In this paper, I evaluate the most ethical framework for distributing COVID-19 vaccinations, amongst the population of one country, by its government. I address this question from the perspective of marginalized communities, using the approaches of realism, syndemics, and intersectionality. In Part I of this article, I will evaluate the conventional models for vaccine distribution. In Part II, I will provide an alternative framework for reassessing vulnerabilities during a pandemic, and propose a multi-value ethical framework.

    1. Evaluating the Conventional Models for Vaccine Distribution

    The decision to distribute COVID-19 vaccines is inherently ethical because it involves allocating an important resource in a resource-scarce world. Thus, determining who can pre-maturely mitigate the pandemic’s adversity. There are four models in conventional discourse that have sought to answer the distribution question. In this section, under each model, I will critically evaluate the role of law in distribution and the ethical values that guide prioritized distribution.

    Neoliberalism

    Neoliberalism is characterized by a strict separation between the state, society, and the market.[4] The objective of all economic activity in the markets is wealth and efficiency maximization.[5] To this end, greater involvement of the private sector in the economy is justified because the market allocation of resources is more efficient. Any state intervention beyond a minimum supporting role is conceived as inefficient because rent-seeking, corruption, and capture by special interests are inevitable.[6]

    The diminished role of the state in securing redistribution means that individuals are responsible for their welfare and income. Therefore, individuals would themselves be responsible for ensuring access to the vaccination, notwithstanding their socio-economic status. They must attain this access by successfully competing in the “free market”, through instruments like price point discovery.[7] The underlying rules of competition create a level playing field where fair bargaining over market transactions can occur, so long as the requisite effort is made. This is because the rules are universal in their applicability, and create a distinct economic space, free from state coercion.[8] Therefore, access to the vaccine is determined by one’s ability to pay for it.

    State intervention is only justified when there is a market failure, but even then, preference is accorded to non-state solutions like direct public action or self-regulation.[9] Neoliberalism addresses equity concerns, like non-access to the vaccine, through safety nets and income transfers rather than through market regulation.[10] Otherwise, inefficiencies are introduced into the system, which distorts market incentives, and thus undermines the goal of economic growth.[11] This means that vaccine developers would lose the incentive to undertake expedient and mass production.

    Critique:         Neoliberalism denies that any redistribution to disadvantaged groups is covered by legal reforms. There is no focus on how economic gains are distributed, and the effect of reforms on vulnerable social groups.[12]Neoliberalism’s refusal to acknowledge the distributive function of legal regulation is flawed because rules necessarily always operate to distribute resources and powers to various groups and actors in particular ways.[13] The neoliberal machinery devises a particular allocation of risks, resources, powers, costs, burdens and benefits among different market actors. The effect is that the existing propertied class receive greater entitlement, whilst others are disadvantaged.[14] This perpetuates the inequalities already in status quo, impacting accessibility to the vaccine. Therefore, the relevant question is not whether distributive concerns must be considered, but rather their manner of incorporation in the process of market reform. To this end, the state, which guarantees the regulatory underpinnings of a market economy, must inherently play a greater role in regulating the distribution of economic gains from the market.

    The idea to distribute vaccines based on personal purchasing power is flawed because it ignores the fact that vaccines possess inelastic demand. Therefore, given short supply at short-term and medium-term levels, the price will continually go up to unaffordable rates. This increased price does not encourage new suppliers because the intellectual property rights and R&D is held only by a few developers.[15]

    Utilitarianism

    Utilitarianism assesses the morality of a decision based on its consequences, whether it maximizes benefits and/or minimizes harms. Under this rationale, priority is accorded based on the greatest clinical risks and greatest utility to social functioning. The clinical factors consider the risk of severe morbidity and mortality, risk of infection, and risk of transmission.[16] The greatest utility to society is measured in terms of the risk of negative societal impact, i.e., the public utility of one’s occupation/social role to society and other individuals’ lives and livelihood.[17]

    Therefore, in this pandemic, utilitarianism would prioritize age (above 50/60 years) and associated comorbidities (identified set of diseases) based on the risk of morbidity/mortality and infection, followed by occupation (healthcare and frontline workers) based on the risk of negative societal impact and risk of infection.[18]

    Critique:         Unlike neoliberalism, there is limited value in the utilitarian model because it recognizes the distributive role of law in allocating benefits. Moreover, it pursues this based on a rational objective criterion.

    However, its main problem lies in assessing vulnerabilities through only a clinical lens. It ignores that socio-economic factors also contribute to overall vulnerability during the pandemic, as I argue in the next section. Additionally, it doesn’t acknowledge that even within the identified categories, some are more vulnerable than others. Therefore, it has the effect of compounding existing socio-economic inequalities.

    Lottery

    This approach prioritizes distribution through a random selection of names. This is premised on the assumption that such selection is egalitarian and impartial, and also overcomes the inherent moral relativity/ambiguity of human reasoning.[19]

    Critique:         Random lotteries acknowledge the role of law in distributing benefits, but they lack any rational prioritization to effectively and immediately address the pandemic. While absolute objectivity is unattainable, avoiding moral reasoning altogether is merely “an easy method to avoid hard decisions”.[20] The assumption that everyone’s life is equally important fails to acknowledge the differential disparities that differentially threaten such lives.[21]

    First Come First Serve

    Like lotteries, this approach is premised on avoiding moral decisions and the assumption that everyone has an equal opportunity to access the vaccine.[22]

    Critique:         While this approach acknowledges the role of law in distributing benefits, it is completely blind to the socio-economic realities. Given scarcity, it is inevitable that access will be confined to those with better connections, access to information, communication, and transportation. All these factors are, in turn, tied to one’s socio-economic status. Thus, there is disproportionate denial to disadvantaged communities.

     

    References:

    [1] James Gallagher, ‘Covid vaccine update’ (BBC, 30 December 2020) <https://www.bbc.com/news/health-51665497> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [2] Rebecca Weintraub, ‘A Covid-19 Vaccine Will Need Equitable, Global Distribution’ (HBR, 2 April 2020) <https://hbr.org/2020/04/a-covid-19-vaccine-will-need-equitable-global-distribution> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [3] Lucy Rodgers & Dominic Bailey, ‘Covid vaccine: How will the UK jab millions of people?’ (BBC, 23 January 2021) <https://www.bbc.com/news/health-55274833> accessed 24 January 2021.

    [4] Manfred Steger & Ravi Roy, Neoliberalism (OUP 2010) 3-4.

    [5] Kerry Rittich, Recharacterizing Restructuring (Kluwer Law International 2002) 50-52.

    [6] Rittich (n 4) 55-59.

    [7] Sahil Deo, Shardul Manurkar, et al, ‘COVID19 Vaccine: Development, Access and Distribution in the Indian Context’ (2020) Observer Research Foundation Issue Brief No. 378, 6 <https://www.orfonline.org/research/covid19-vaccine-development-access-and-distribution-in-the-indian-context-69538/> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [8] Rittich (n 4) 131.

    [9] Rittich (n 4) 74-76.

    [10] Ibid.

    [11] Steger (n 4).

    [12] Rittich (n 4) 130.

    [13] Steger (n 11)

    [14] Rittich (n 4) 158-160.

    [15] Deo (n 7).

    [16] National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Framework for Equitable Allocation of COVID-19 Vaccine (National Academies Press 2020) 102-105.

    [17] National Academies (n 16) 8.

    [18] Ibid.

    [19] Richard Zimmerman, ‘Rationing of influenza vaccine during a pandemic’ (2017) 25 Vaccine 2019, 2023.

    [20] Ibid.

    [21] Erica Moser, ‘Many ethical questions involved in prioritizing groups for vaccine distribution’ (The Day, 13 December 2020) <https://www.theday.com/article/20201213/NWS01/201219766> accessed 8 January 2020.

    [21] Ibid.

    [22] Zimmerman (n 19).

     

    Image Credit: Crowd Wisdom 360

  • Evaluating the Make in India Policy for Defence Manufacturing and Technology Acquisition

    Evaluating the Make in India Policy for Defence Manufacturing and Technology Acquisition

    Led by the Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion, Ministry of Commerce, the Make in India policy (“MII”) extends to 25 focused sectors. Among these is the defence sector, where the nature of the sector renders MII extremely important and relevant. This is outlined by India’s status as the second-largest standing army and third-largest military spender in the world.[1] Yet, it remains the second-largest arms importer and its exports merely amount to 0.2% of the global pie.[2] China is the fifth-largest arms exporter at 5.5% of the global share.[3] However, this is likely to fall in the post-pandemic world, where China’s credibility has been severely tainted.[4] This represents an opportunity for Indian defence manufacturers to attract present and future foreign investment.

    Against this background, MII was enacted with two objectives: (1) to increase domestic manufacturing of defence equipment; and (2) address the national security interest of self-sufficiency over key technologi. There are two ways in which technology up-gradation can happen: (1) indigenous efforts; and (2) transfer of technology, through international agreements. In this article, I flag the main challenges to argue that India has significantly underperformed in both. Subsequently, I propose macro-policy changes to address identified challenges.

    Evaluating technological upgradation in the Defence sector in india

    1. Evaluating ‘Indigenous Efforts’

    Indigenous efforts are confronted with three main challenges:

    • Inadequate Investment for Research & Development (R&D)

    Only 5.7% of the defence budget is allocated to R&D,[5] despite successive parliamentary committees recommending at least 10% to meet minimum requirements.[6] The average allocation among global rivals like USA, UK, France, and China is well above 15%.[7] Even private-sector players in India, like Tata, L&T, and Mahindra and Mahindra, invest less than 1% of their turnover in R&D, as against the average of 10% in the aforementioned countries.[8] The producer lacks the basic R&D required even for making marginal improvements in performance to the product, or altering it based on user-specifications.[9] The effect of this is that the resulting product is obsolete in an already disruptive market. Thus, a buyer, even if domestic, is unwilling to accept such an obsolete product at higher prices merely for the sake of indigenous production.

    • Shortage of Skilled Workforce

    A skilled workforce is the key to achieving self-sufficiency in defence manufacturing because of the highly specialized nature of this sector and the workforces’ vision and skills determine the efficacy of the produced/procured domestic technology. This shortage exists at both the research and procurement level.

    At the research level, there is a severe shortage of skilled human resources, in terms of quantity and quality, at R&D organizations like DRDO.[10] With more than 3,500 engineering colleges producing about 1.5 million engineering graduates annually, India has an unparalleled talent availability.[11] However, only 17.5% of these graduates are employable because colleges lack proper infrastructure and faculty,[12] along with current curriculum ignoring industry skills, defined career paths, and evolving technologies.[13] Thus, organizations are compelled to spend significantly in making fresh talent “employable”.

    While India has a decent pool of highly qualified low-cost engineers and scientists,[14] they are unwilling to work in the public sector due to limited opportunities and low growth potential,[15] where most defence R&D is undertaken. As the departure of 132 scientists in the last five years from DRDO shows,[16] even those employed mostly do not continue long-term due to better opportunities elsewhere.[17] The contribution of most of these scientists has been limited to the production of academic articles,[18] which hasn’t seen any significant and meaningful absorption in the policy. Therefore, the policy has been unable to capture the huge latent employment potential in this sector.[19]

    This position must be contrasted against global competitors like the US and China, where the highly skilled and employable workforce is significantly and routinely absorbed into the most impactful R&D organization, whether private or public.[20] Moreover, unlike other leading countries, India lacks any training and education infrastructure specialized for R&D personnel in the defence sector. These countries have developed specialist defence schools that have managed to produce large pools of exclusive talent. France itself has managed to produce 134,000 specialist employees.[21]

    At the procurement level, the asset acquisition process is not tasked to a dedicated cadre of the workforce.[22] Further, there are no educational or training programs for employees involved in this process.[23] Thus, there is the loss in terms of the benefits of specialization, especially in a sector where progress is characterized by specialization.

    • Limited Involvement of the Private Sector

    There is a significant lack of incentive for greater private sector involvement. The private sector is commercially motivated to establish its manufacturing base only when it has a good chance, or preferably guarantee, of getting frequent and sizeable orders.[24] However, the current manufacturing and procurement process has ignored this motivation but is also completely converse to it.

    As the BJP government’s Rafale fiasco indicates, the procurement processes lack transparency, and frequently fraught with allegations and counter-allegations.[25] This disincentivizes both domestic and global private sector players from conducting business.

    Despite unprecedented inclusion of the private sector, it is widely believed in the private sector that the government is biased towards public sector undertakings, denying a level-playing field for the private sector and even denying opportunities to bid.[26]

    The government’s Strategic Partnership Model, aimed at inviting world-class defence giants to collaborate with Indian entities, has unduly restricted autonomy. Under this program, the government chooses the Indian partner for the foreign OEM, without consulting them.[27] Global defence giants, like Airbus, Lockheed Martin, ThyssenKrupp, and Dassault, have shown interest in contracting with the Indian private sector.[28] However, it is a combination of these factors that this interest has largely failed to materialise into successfully concluded deals.

    Even where, despite these disincentives, the private sector has been involved, this has been in non-critical and less required areas. Most of India’s defence imports are in the category of major platforms such as fighter aircraft, helicopters, naval guns, and anti-submarine missiles.[29] However, the private sector initiatives are predominantly in the category of ammunitions (including rockets and bombs), and surveillance and tracking systems.[30]

    1. Evaluating ‘Transfer of Technology’

    There has been no transfer of technology (“ToT”) in the critical defence procurement process. All major contracts under MII have been “off the shelf”, and without any crucial ToT.[31] As per the CAG Report, between 2007 and 2018, the government concluded 46 offset contracts but failed to implement the ToT agreements in any of them.[32]

    The failure here can be attributed to successive governments unduly hoping that India’s status as a large arms importer would necessarily make international players compliant as regards sharing their intellectual property (“IP”). While foreign companies have shown interest in contracting with Indian players, the large purchase orders have been inadequate to incentivize foreign players to share their IP.[33]

    The government has also been overly ambitious of ToT as a means of technology upgradation. Even implementing the negotiated ToT is not the end because the more challenging issues of absorption of this technology and ownership of IP remain.[34] Moreover, the ToT route provides India only with the ‘know-how’, without any insight into the ‘know-why’.[35] As India’s acquisition of the Sukhoi Su-30 has shown, the public sector is critically dependent on the OEMs, here the Russians, for even minor systemic upgradations.

    Way Forward

    The government must increase allocation to defence R&D to at least 10% and must incentivize greater contributions from the private sector. Existing capabilities and services at training and diploma centres must be upgraded through public-private partnerships. There must be a separate and devoted institutional structure for all procurement-related functions. The procurement policy must also aim at buying talent, besides technology, to bridge technology gaps. The education curriculum at engineering universities needs to be modernized, with a focus on employability. Specialist defence schools must also be established. However, it is most important that the public sector aims at retaining its talent through unique and lucrative incentive structures.

    To incentivize the private sector through minimum order guarantees, the government must utilize ‘public procurement of innovation’. Under this policy tool, the government uses its exchequer to artificially generate demand for an emerging innovative solution, unavailable on a commercial scale.[36] The private sector can further be incentivized by streaming the procurement and dispute resolution process. As for procurement, a fast-track procedure with single-window clearances can be adopted.[37] As for dispute resolution a permanent arbitration tribunal must be established to expeditiously settle disputes with finality.[38]

    Conclusion

    Firstly, the indigenous efforts at technology up-gradation have failed due to limited R&D output, shortage of skilled workforce, and limited private sector involvement. The R&D budgetary allocation is way below the recommended and global standard. The shortage of skilled workforce is both at the research and procurement due to a lack of education and training infrastructure specific to the defence sector, low employability among most graduates, and unwillingness to work in the public sector among highly qualified graduates. The private sector has been disincentivized due to a lack of order guarantees, the unrealistic and retroactive manner of the procurement process, the constant allegations and counter-allegations, and the continued bias towards the public sector. Moreover, the private sector has been involved in non-critical and less required areas.

    Secondly, while the government has concluded ToT agreements, it has been inefficient in enforcing them. Moreover, even if this were to succeed, it has not established any action plan for absorbing this technology and addressing ownership of IP. It has also been overly ambitious of the utility of ToT.

     

     

    References

    [1] Kuldip Singh, ‘Yes, Indian Military Can Go the ‘Make in India’ Way – Just Not Yet’ (The Quint, 25 May 2020) <https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/india-armed-forces-defence-sector-military-expenditure-budget-technology-upgrade-make-in-india> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [2] Arjun Srinivas, ‘Private defence business gets one more nudge’ (LiveMint, 1 October 2020) <https://www.livemint.com/news/india/private-defence-business-gets-one-more-nudge-11601460654397.html> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [3] Snehesh Alex Philip, ‘China has become a major exporter of armed drones, Pakistan is among its 11 customers’ (The Print, 23 November 2020) <https://theprint.in/defence/china-has-become-a-major-exporter-of-armed-drones-pakistan-is-among-its-11-customers/549841/> accessed 4 January 2021.

    [4] Rajan Kochhar, ‘Preparing defence sector for post COVID-19 world: Time to treat private sector as equal partner’ (Economic Times, 5 May 2020) <https://government.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/governance/opinion-make-in-india-a-dream-or-reality-for-the-armed-forces/75552970> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [5] Jayant Singh, ‘Industry Scenario’ (Invest India) <https://www.investindia.gov.in/sector/defence-manufacturing> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [6] Prof (Dr) SN Misra, ‘Make in India: Challenges Before Defence Manufacturing’ (2015) 30(1) Indian Defence Rev <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/make-in-india-challenges-before-defence-manufacturing/2/> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [7] ‘Government Expenditures on Defence Research and Development by the United States and Other OECD Countries: Fact Sheet’ (2020) Congressional Research Service R45441 <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45441.pdf> accessed 19 December 2020; A Sivathanu Pillai, ‘Defence R&D’ in Vinod Misra (ed), Core Concerns in Indian Defence and the Imperatives for Reforms (Pentagon Press & IDSA 2015) 132-133.

    [8] Misra (n 6).

    [9] Amitabha Pande, ‘Defence, Make in India and the Illusive Goal of Self Reliance’ (The Hindu Centre for Public Policy, 11 April 2019) <https://www.thehinducentre.com/the-arena/current-issues/article26641241.ece> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [10] Azhar Shaikh, Dr. Uttam Kinange, & Arthur Fernandes, ‘Make in India: Opportunities and Challenges in the Defence Sector’ (2016) 7(1) Intl J Research in Commerce & Management 13, 14-15.

    [11] Kishore Jayaraman, ‘How Can India Bridge The Skill Gap in Aerospace & Defence Sector?’ (All Things Talent, 24 September 2018) <https://allthingstalent.org/2018/09/24/how-can-india-bridge-skill-gap-in-aerospace-defence-sector/> accessed 30 December 2020.

    [12] Dr. JP Dash & BB Sharma, ‘Skilling Gaps in Defence Sector for ‘Make in India’’ (2017) 32(2) Indian Defence Rev <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/skilling-gaps-in-defence-sector-for-make-in-india/> accessed 30 December 2020.

    [13] Jayaraman (n 10); Dhiraj Mathur, ‘Unlocking defence R&D in India – Do we have the skill?’ (Firstpost, 6 April 2016)<https://www.firstpost.com/business/unlocking-defence-rd-in-india-do-we-have-the-skill-2715650.html> accessed 30 December 2020.

    [14] Mathur (n 13).

    [15] PR Sanjai, ‘Indian aerospace sector needs one million skilled workforce in next 10 years’ (Livemint, 20 February 2015) <https://www.livemint.com/Politics/hRJQjq7ZKVXQ5RFkzWbmAJ/Indian-aerospace-sector-needs-one-million-skilled-workforce.html> accessed 30 December 2020.

    [16] PTI, ‘132 scientists left DRDO on personal grounds in last 5 years: Govt’ (Economic Times, 12 March 2020) <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/132-scientists-left-drdo-on-personal-grounds-in-last-5-years-govt/articleshow/74579857.cms?from=mdr> accessed 30 December 2020.

    [17] Dash (n 12).

    [18] PTI, ‘India is world’s third largest producer of scientific articles: Report’ (Economic Times, 18 December 2019) <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/science/india-is-worlds-third-largest-producer-of-scientific-articles-report/articleshow/72868640.cms?from=mdr> accessed 30 December 2020.

    [19] ‘Make in India: An Overview of Defence Manufacturing in India’ (2015) Singhania & Partners LLP Report <https://www.gita.org.in/Attachments/Reports/Make-in-India-Defence-Manufacturing-in-India.pdf> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [20] Ranjit Ghosh, ‘Defence Research and Development: International Approaches for Analysing the Indian Programme’ (2015) IDSA Occasional Paper 41, 11-34 <https://idsa.in/system/files/opaper/OP41__RanjitGhosh_140815.pdf> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [21] Dash (n 12).

    [22] Shaikh (n 10) 15.

    [23] Ibid.

    [24] Rohit Srivastava, ‘New measures for self-sufficiency in defence – industry perspective’ (Indian Defence Industries, 19 May 2020) <https://indiandefenceindustries.in/defence-reforms-industry-perspective> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [25] Pradip R Sagar, ‘How ‘Make in India’ in defence sector is still an unfulfilled dream’ (The Week, 25 May 2019) <https://www.theweek.in/theweek/current/2019/05/25/how-make-in-india-in-defence-sector-is-still-an-unfulfilled-dream.html> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [26] Ibid; Lt. Gen. (Retd.) (Dr). Subrata Saha, ‘Execution key for defence manufacturing in India’ (LiveMint, 2 April 2020) <https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/Gx9NVPGvIsVbVzLTJ0VouK/Execution-key-for-defence-manufacturing-in-India.html> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [27] Prasanna Karthik, ‘India’s strategic partnership policy is counter-productive in its current form’ (Observer Research Foundation, 8 June 2020) <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/indias-strategic-partnership-policy-is-counter-productive-in-its-current-form-67511/> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [28] Sagar (n 25).

    [29] Srinivas (n 3).

    [30] Ibid.

    [31] Singh (n 1); Sagar (n 25).

    [32] Joe C Mathew, ‘Defence offset policy performance dismal: CAG’ (Business Today, 24 September 2020) <https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/defence-offset-policy-performance-dismal-cag/story/416872.html> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [33] Lieutenant Commander L Shivaram (Retd), ‘Understanding ‘Make in India’ in the Defence Sector’ (2015) 145(601) J United Service Institution of India <https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/understandingmake-in-india-in-the-defence-sector/> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [34] Lt Gen A B Shivane, ‘India needs outcome oriented defence reforms’ (Indian Defence Industries, 22 May 2020) <https://indiandefenceindustries.in/india-outcome-oriented-reforms> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [35] Misra (n 6).

    [36] E. Uyarra & J. Edler, ‘Barriers to Innovation through Public Procurement: A Supplier Perspective’ (2014) 34(10) Science Direct <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0166497214000388> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [37] Kochhar (n 4).

    [38] Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Dalip Bharadwaj, ‘‘Make in India’ in defence sector: A distant dream’ (Observer Research Foundation, 7 May 2018) <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/make-in-india-defence-sector-distant-dream/> accessed 19 December 2020.