The Peninsula Foundation

Author: Alok Deb

The Evolving Situation in Myanmar and it’s Impact on India-Myanmar Relations

For Indians researching security issues in the Northeast, three recent developments in Myanmar have once again put the spotlight on the situation there. The first is a May 2026 report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) that pieces together eyewitness accounts of the killing of at least 170 Rohingya men, women, and children, with many others likely injured, in Hoyyar Siri village in Buthidaung township in Northern Rakhine on 02 May 2024[i]. The second is an account of another influx of Chin refugees into Mizoram in May 2026, following the Tatmadaw’s capture of Falam town in Chin state (adjoining Mizoram and Manipur).[ii] The third is the recently concluded visit of Myanmar President (formerly General) U Min Aung Hlaing to India from May 30 to June 03, 2026. According to the initial press release of the Ministry of External Affairs, ‘…he will be accompanied by a high-level delegation comprising several Cabinet Ministers, senior officials and business leaders. This will be the first visit of President U Min Aung Hlaing to India in his current capacity.’ The three events encompass a spectrum of issues that impact India’s relations with Myanmar, broader regional security, and India’s Act East Policy.

Map: Courtesy – Nations online Project

Myanmar is the bridge connecting Northeast India to Southeast Asia. If geographically included in Southeast Asia, it would be the region’s largest country, with 135 officially recognised ethnicities and a population of over 52 million (2003 census)[iii]. Myanmar is more than four and a half times larger in area than its Western neighbour, Bangladesh, yet has roughly one third of its population. Myanmar is a vital component of India’s Act East policy

Outline Economic Situation

Myanmar’s parliamentary elections were held from Dec 25 to Jan 26, with the Junta-supported Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) winning an overwhelming majority, further consolidating the military’s hold over the state apparatus. As a result of the USDP being perceived as a proxy for the military regime, the continuing clampdowns on civil liberties at home and the visibly close ties with Russia, most sanctions imposed earlier by the West on the military government remain in place. The nexus between Myanmar’s military and Iran, which is rumoured to be supplying drone parts to the Tatmadaw, has also reinforced the West’s perception of the Junta[iv].

The pressure of sanctions was intensified by the impact of the war in Ukraine and compounded by energy shocks from the current West Asian crisis. According to the Lowy Institute, ‘Myanmar has probably been affected more than any other country in Southeast Asia — both in terms of the lack of access to fuel, and also the rising prices… Myanmar is the only country in Southeast Asia whose economy has not recovered to its 2019 pre-COVID levels[v]. With fuel prices having increased more than threefold and deepening scarcity in rural areas, the economy is in a downward spiral, accelerated by power outages, a shortage of essentials such as fertiliser (due to cutbacks by exporters like China), and an overall lack of investment. As per figures of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), ‘…GDP has declined by a cumulative 16 per cent since 2020, with growth falling 2.2 per cent in fiscal year 2025 alone. Inflation has been consistently high, reaching 29 per cent in 2024 and 25 per cent in 2025.[vi] Today, Myanmar has the highest inflation rate in the whole of Southeast Asia[vii].

Currency: One of the most significant issues for the economy is the agreement between the Central Bank of Myanmar and the People’s Bank of China to link the Kyat and Renminbi digitally[viii]. This would bypass the international SWIFT banking system and convert Kyats directly to Renminbi, reducing dependence on the dollar. This move effectively ties Myanmar’s economy to China’s, with attendant consequences, especially regarding sovereignty.

The Security Situation

The civil war between the Tatmadaw and ethnic armies continues unabated in a see-saw fashion. It is taking a toll on the military, which is in the process of updating its conscription lists. According to a May 2026 report, around 13 million citizens have been found fit for conscription, and about 120,000 individuals have been recruited since the Conscription Law was enacted in February 2024[ix].

Since its reverses after the launch of ‘Operation 1027’ on 27 October 2023 (an offensive by the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BTA), composed of three Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) in Shan state bordering China, with tacit Chinese approval for rooting out the scam centres there, the Junta has managed to claw back territory. After 15 months, it is in full control of an important central artery, the Mandalay Myitkyina Road and the connected towns in the Sagaing region[x] (see map on first page). With the capture of Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin state, the Junta is inducting fresh troops and equipment into Kachin. Seeing this, the regional EAO, the Kachin Independent Army (KIA), is reported to have gone on the defensive[xi]. The Junta also continues to hold the important ports of Kyaukphyu (the mouth of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor) and Sittwe (the gateway of the India-built Kaladan Multimodal Port Project), both in Rakhine, though Sittwe is blockaded on land by the AA and is being supplied by air and sea.

Elsewhere, too, the Tatmadaw has gone on the offensive. It has launched an offensive on multiple fronts to retake the trading hub of Maw Taung, which borders Thailand in the Thantharyi region (see map below) and has been under the control of the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) since November 2025.

Note: Location of Maw Taung is approximate and not to scale. Map: Courtesy – Nations online Project.

As mentioned earlier, Falam, where Chin state’s only airport is located, was captured by the Tatmadaw in April 2026. With the Tatmadaw aiming to reestablish control over the Myanmar-Mizoram border crossings, the Myanmar border town of Rikhawdar would be the next objective (see map). This could spark another influx of refugees into India’s Zokhawthar. Even today, after the May 2026 influx of Chins into Zokhawthar, residents claim that refugees now outnumber the local residents there[xii].

Visual of Zokhawthar border gate. Map: Courtesy – Nations Online Project.

Overall, the Tatmadaw has enhanced its capabilities with assistance from its main benefactors, China and Russia, enabling it to conduct offensive operations across the country. In the short- to medium-term, any overthrow of the regime by EAOs aligned with the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) appears unlikely, despite the EAOs still controlling substantial portions of territory in various regions.

Interestingly, the NUG continues to retain Myanmar’s seat in the UN. It has recently cleared pending UN membership dues of around one million dollars using existing funds and public contributions[xiii], a symbol of the support they still generate.

Outside Influences

Myanmar is one state in the Bay of Bengal where Russia, China and the USA have specific, sometimes overlapping and frequently competing interests. Gen (now President) Hlaing has visited Russia seven times to date. Russia is a major supplier of weapons to Myanmar and is rumoured to have shared intelligence with the Tatmadaw, even as it continues cooperation in the energy sphere, including nuclear energy. In February 2026, it signed a five-year military cooperation agreement with Myanmar to protect its territorial integrity and strengthen national sovereignty and security, as per Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu during his visit to Naypyidaw[xiv], further consolidating ties with the Junta. Russia, therefore, has no interest in regime change.

China continues with its on-off strategy of support to the Tatmadaw and the rebels, stopping aid when its own interests, especially along the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), are threatened. China supported the EAOs in cleaning up the scam centres on the border when the Tatmadaw was unable to do so. Its role in subordinating Myanmar’s economy has already been mentioned. The release of Aung San Suu Kyi from prison to house arrest days after Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit in the last week of April is being interpreted as another sign of Chinese influence over the Junta[xv]. Also, between 2021 and 2023, it has supplied around $ 267 million worth of weapons to the Junta[xvi]. Thus far, it has shown no interest in engineering regime change. China appears to be working towards better border security, securing Myanmar’s rare earth supply chains to Yunnan, and making economic investments in that country. Its other objective is access to the Bay of Bengal. Towards this end, it practices ‘selective intervention through multi-actor engagement, ceasefire management, security outsourcing and border pressure. Though it speaks the language of non-interference, China is actively shaping developments in its neighbour to advance its strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific...’[xvii]

The USA has drastically reduced assistance by nearly $1.1 billion since 2025[xviii], but lifted some sanctions on Myanmar companies. The Junta is interested in repairing relations with the US and has hired a Washington, D.C., lobbying firm for around $3 million per year to that end[xix]. The US has shown interest in the rare earth deposits in Kachin state, which are currently being mined by China and, in value terms, account for 60% of Chinese imports – though the process for moving the minerals out of Myanmar remains unclear, as do the prospects for future cooperation. However, it is apparent that the US, like China, increasingly views Myanmar (and Bangladesh) through the Indo-Pacific lens and would endeavour to expand its influence in myriad ways, including using aid as a lever to consolidate further in the Bay of Bengal region and limit Chinese influence.

The Rohingya Factor

There is increasingly palpable discontent among the Rohingya. Many still attempt to enter Malaysia (which is reported to hold over 200,000 Rohingya) by sea. Inside refugee camps in Bangladesh, cuts in food rations, overall shortages and depredations by militias /criminal gangs, including killings, torture and abductions, have worsened the law-and-order situation[xx]. Hierarchies, some of them criminal, run daily lives here through enforced diktats. Recently, triggered by the death of a youth, the Rohingya Gen Z organised themselves in protest by carrying out a coordinated online campaign in the camp, challenging self-styled community leaders. As observed by a journalist,’…for the first time in years, a segment of the Rohingya community is not just reacting to events, it is attempting to shape them’[xxi]

Rohingya militancy is getting increasingly better organised. Four known groups operate across the Myanmar-Bangladesh border and in settlements – the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA), and Rohingya Islami Mahaz (RIM)[xxii]. The Junta frequently employs ARSA to fight the Arakan Army (AA), which ARSA regards as its main enemy. The AA’s self-propagated doctrine, ‘The Way of Rakhita’[xxiii] with its four pillars- Nationalism, Militarism, Historical Criticism and Pragmatism, has varying interpretations. It could denote inclusiveness and a broader national identity, safeguarding the nation, revisiting past errors, and preparing for the future in a practical way – which might include reconciliation with the Rohingya. Equally, it might indicate a narrow focus on an exclusive Arakan identity, backed by military force and a willingness to deal with anyone supporting such goals, which bodes ill for future prospects for the Rohingya and Myanmar-Bangladesh ties. With relief aid for Rohingyas progressively reducing and unrest in the camps barely contained, Bangladesh’s social fabric is coming under increasing strain. This is fuelled by the spillover of activities of such terrorist groups into Bangladesh, which finds its policy options in Myanmar increasingly restricted as outside powers come to terms with the Junta. The fallout of the Rohingya and Chin refugee crisis remains of prime concern for India, which shares borders with both countries, warranting greater vigilance by Indian border guarding forces and dynamic updation of internal security schemes, co-opting the latest technologies.

Views of the NUG: The NUG, Myanmar’s shadow government, recently announced a new council in a statement titled ‘Announcement by the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF) ‘ on its website. A line on ‘inclusiveness’ states ‘…Furthermore, we are committed to protecting and promoting the diverse identities of all ethnic nationalities residing within member states and units of the Union, and to firmly building a new Federal Democratic Union composed of states that fully guarantee equality among nationalities and the right to self-determination. However, as mentioned earlier, the question of the NUG coming to power remains moot, as does the issue of implementing such a contentious agenda in a nation with a well-documented history of ethnic violence and discrimination.

India and Myanmar

Indian President, Draupadi Murmu, with the President of Myanmar, Min Aung Hlaing

Despite the 2021 coup and the overthrow of Aung San Suu Kyi’s government, India has continued to adhere to its principle of non-interference in the affairs of neighbouring states. Accordingly, it has maintained bilateral relations with the Junta. Following February 2021, as a large number of Myanmarese Chins sought refuge with their kin in Mizoram (and some in Manipur, where ethnic strife between Meiteis and other tribal groups continues), India had to formulate a uniform policy to address this issue, incorporating humanitarian aspects, local sensitivities and security concerns. This has since been done.

To ensure peace at the local level and prevent disruption to work on its two-decade-old Kaladan Multimodal Port Project (KMMPP), which links Kolkata to Mizoram (via Sittwe onto Paletwa on the Kaladan River and thence onward to Zorinpui in Mizoram by road, bypassing Bangladesh), India resorted to a tactical outreach that included an unofficial meeting between an Indian Member of Parliament and Myanmar rebel groups[xxiv]. This was further expanded by opening a dialogue in Delhi in late 2024 with the concerned EAOs in Chin and Rakhine, as well as representatives of the NUG and the Junta. Ultimately, separate meetings were held with each group; India advocated for a ‘Myanmar-led, and Myanmar-owned’ solution, thereby reiterating its policy of non-interference.

President Hlaing’s visit to Delhi in June 2026 may have been partly inspired by an appreciation of India’s articulation of the above (non-threatening) policy. Some opine that the primary objective of this visit was to bolster the regime[xxv]‘s legitimacy. That said, the briefing by the Foreign Secretary after President Hlaing’s meeting with Prime Minister Modi indicates that Myanmar has broadly agreed to accommodate India’s major security concerns, notably an ‘assurance that Myanmar’s territory would not be permitted to be used against India’s security interests’[xxvi]. India further emphasised the importance of stability and peace in Myanmar for the security of its Northeast along the 1,643-km-long border. Discussions on cooperation in defence and security, critical minerals and rare earth and connectivity projects were also held. It is hoped that these interactions will lead to visible improvements in border security.

India’s contribution to various facets of Myanmar’s development (as with its other neighbours in South Asia) is vividly illustrated in the note on bilateral relations posted on the website of the Indian Embassy in Yangon. While discussion on defence cooperation during the recent visit was limited to aspects of training, capacity building, institution building, and UN peacekeeping, the larger issue of cooperation in the Bay of Bengal and the Indo-Pacific was addressed during the visit of India’s naval Chief, Admiral DK Tripathi, to Yangon in May 2026. This included strengthening existing arrangements for joint exercises, patrolling, hydrographic surveys, training exchanges, and staff talks. With increasing Chinese naval activity in the Bay of Bengal, India-Myanmar naval cooperation is likely to become increasingly important for India, especially given China’s majority shareholding in Kyaukphyu port at the mouth of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) and the rumoured infrastructure build-up in the Coco Islands[xxvii].

Conclusion

Internally in turmoil, Myanmar, as a neighbour, is becoming increasingly important to India. Great power competition, increasing Chinese inroads into that country and its impact on India’s security remain prime concerns. This necessitates realistic, sustained engagement with the ruling regime. Another factor is the future of India’s substantial investments in infrastructure projects in Myanmar, such as the Trans-Asian Highway and the KMMPP. Of these, the KMMPP, which was initiated in 2007-2008, was estimated to cost around Rs 3,200 crore four years ago [xxviii]. Yet even now, the Paletwa port on the Kaladan river remains in the hands of the AA. This also requires India to maintain engagement with rebel groups.

Overall, India needs to retain leverage with all parties in Myanmar without being perceived as an inimical neighbour. Only then will its border be secured and the vision of Act East, which includes developing the Northeast as a springboard towards Southeast Asia, be actualised.

References:

[i] ‘Skeletons and Skulls Scattered Everywhere’ Arakan Army Massacre of Rohingya Muslims in Hoyyar Siri, Myanmar 18 May 2026.

[ii] ‘Over 800 Myanmar refugees enter Mizoram amid Fears of fresh Junta offensive’ The Assam Tribune 17 May 2026.

[iii] Website of the Embassy of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, New Delhi.

[iv] ‘New resistance alliance built to win Myanmar’s civil war’ Dan Swift and Sean Turnell Asia Times 15 April 2026.

[v] Podcast ‘Myanmar at a crossroads: Five years after the coup’ by Hunter Marston, Sean Turnell The Lowy Institute 22 May 2026.

[vi] Myanmar’s Economy Faces Grim Outlook Under New Government ‘ Ambassador Scot Marciel Bower Group Asia 23 April 2026.

[vii] Inflation Forecast 2026 South East Asia (from TheGlobalEconomy.com)

[viii] ‘Myanmar at a crossroads: Five years after the coup’ Podcast by Hunter Marston and Sean Turnell , Lowy Institute 22 May 2026.

[ix] ‘New Myanmar Regime Tightens Forcible Conscription Covering 13 Million Citizens’ Myo Pyae The Irrawady 18 May 2026.

[x] ‘Myanmar Regime Takes Full Control of Mandalay–Myitkina Road to Kachin’ The Irrawady 08 May 2026.

[xi] ‘KIA Announces Shift to Defensive Strategy as Regime Troops Pour into Kachin State’ The Irrawaddy

May 19, 2026.

[xii] ‘‘Over 800 Myanmar refugees enter Mizoram amid Fears of fresh Junta offensive’ The Assam Tribune 17 May 2026.

[xiii] ‘NUG-funded payments secure Myanmar’s UN voting rights through 2026’ Mizzima News 11 February 2026.

[xiv] ‘Russia and Myanmar Sign Military Cooperation Agreement’ AFP 03 Feb 2026.

[xv] ‘Optics Over Outcomes: Myanmar’s Diplomatic Rehabilitation and India’s Tightrope’ Sreeparna Benerjee Observer Research Forum 13 May 2026.

[xvi] ‘Tatmadaw Moves to Re-Establish Control Over The India-Myanmar Border’ Afiya Ibnath Ayshi Bangladesh Defence Journal 14 May 2026.

[xvii] ‘

[xviii] ‘The Cut of USAID Programs in Burma’ Gemma Nailer The Borgen Project   17 January 2026.

[xix] ‘Myanmar’s military rulers hire Trump ally for US$50,000 a month to lobby Washington’ Maria Siow South China Morning Post 07 May 2026.

[xx] On Myanmar (Substack) 11 May 2026

[xxi] ‘Rohingya Gen-Z breaks the silence’ Shafiur Rehman Dhaka Tribune 13 May 2026.

[xxii] ‘Southeast Asia and the Rohingya Militant Threat ‘ Jasminder Singh The Diplomat 19 February 2026.

[xxiii] ‘Understanding the Philosophy of the Way of Rakhita’   Rhee Rakha Global Arakan Network 22 August 2025.

[xxiv] ‘Mizoram MP meets Myanmar militants in push to speed up work on key connectivity project’. Isaac Zoramsanga, The Print   01 March 2024.

[xxv] ‘What the Myanmar President’s visit means for New Delhi’ Takhellambam Jagjit Singh The Statesman 01 June 2026.

[xxvi] ‘Won’t allow our territory to be used against India’s interests: Myanmar’ Shubhajit Roy Indian Express 02 June 2026.

[xxvii] Operationalising the East: India’s Naval Engagement with Myanmar’s Sreeparna Banerjee ORF 20 May 2026.

[xxviii] ‘India-Myanmar Kaladan project’s completion hangs in limbo’ Yeshi Seli The New Indian Express 05 June 2022.

Feature Image Credit: ddindia.co.in

June 30, 2026
INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN: PRAGMATISM IS KEY

Given that the Taliban appear sincere in their determination to secure peace and improve their citizens’ standard of living, it is prudent for India to remain cooperative and avoid overinvolvement in such matters at this time. It is also likely that, over time, Indian influence on Afghanistan—whether through development, trade, security, health, or education—will have a positive impact on Afghan society, mainly through the younger generation of Afghans studying in India

Introduction

During his week-long visit to India in October 2025, Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi, the foreign minister of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, became the first high-ranking Afghan official to travel to the country since the fall of the Ashraf Ghani regime in August 2021. The minister who faced a travel ban was permitted to enter India after the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee approved a waiver application on his behalf [1]. His visit and its portents have sparked numerous commentaries across South Asia. India-Afghanistan relations, which had receded from the limelight post the 2021 Taliban takeover in Kabul, are now being viewed with renewed interest.

‘Afghanistan Map: courtesy Nations Online Project’

Afghanistan’s Enduring Importance

A glance at the map above shows why Afghanistan is called the ‘Heart of Asia’. A country for the most part rugged and mountainous, it borders seven nations – Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China (Tibet at the tip of the Wakhan Corridor), India, and Pakistan- and sits at the crossroads of South, Central, and West Asia. The sheer geostrategic importance of this location, the multitude of tribal ethnicities and loyalties that transcend borders, and a fierce sense of independence have resulted in a turbulent history and the awarding of a less flattering designation: ‘Graveyard of Empires’. The most recent example is the defeat of the mighty Soviet Union by the Afghan Mujahedin, who were armed and aided by the West and trained by its proxy, Pakistan.

Another reason for interest in Afghanistan is its vast untapped mineral reserves, valued at over $1 trillion, located in 24 specific ‘areas of interest’ across the country’s 34 provinces[2]. With nations eager to diversify sources of critical minerals and rare earths, this represents a hugely attractive opportunity. Landlocked Afghanistan’s access to the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf passes through Pakistan and Iran, respectively. This has implications for the West’s relations with both countries. Russia, seeking to consolidate influence in its neighbourhood, became the first country to recognise the Taliban regime in July this year. However, it is China that has arguably taken the lead in rehabilitating the Taliban regime globally. It has resumed full diplomatic relations by posting an ambassador in Kabul. To quote Shivam Shekhawat in his paper of July 2025, ‘…At the international level, Beijing has argued for Afghanistan’s reintegration and urged the international community not to interfere in its internal affairs. It has called for the removal of sanctions imposed on the Taliban leaders, the release of the country’s foreign reserves, and keeping aid independent from any political preconditions[3]. Also, it steadily expands its influence through trade. During the period August 2024 to August 2025, its exports to Afghanistan increased by 41.7% from $114 million to $161 million[4].

With its unbroken history of conflict since 1979 and the geopolitical, social, and economic consequences on its neighbours, Afghanistan remains crucial to regional stability. Zobair Solahi discusses this in his April 2022 paper, where he states, ‘..A stable and peaceful Afghanistan could be an integral actor in trade, transit, and political stability across the Eurasian continent, but continued unrest will undermine regional peace and stability…’[5] This perspective needs to be appreciated by those who hold reservations about India-Afghanistan relations and who attribute hidden motives to our development efforts aimed at improving the lives of the Afghan people.

The Situation Today

The reasons for the failure of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (the US mission focused on counterterrorism and strengthening Afghan security forces) and NATO’s Operation Resolute Support are widely debated. What is not debated is the outcome – a Taliban regime that holds sway over the entire country. The new government (Taliban 2.0) now includes various factions of the Taliban militia, integrated into a new Afghan Army (AA). This AA has kept the structures of the old Afghan National Army (ANA) intact, replacing key commanders with Taliban loyalists. The AA has successfully sidelined a splintered opposition. While certain officials of previous regimes are eking out a quiet existence in Kabul under Taliban watch, warlords of past eras like Gen Rashid Dostum, now largely ineffective, live in exile. Younger men such as Ahmed Masood, son of the renowned ‘Lion of Panjsher’, Ahmed Shah Masood, lack both experience and influence. The few leaders of significance who still hold credibility, like former Vice President Amrullah Saleh, do not possess the resources to challenge the Taliban on a large scale needed to effect regime change. Although an armed opposition will continue mounting guerrilla actions against the Islamic Emirate, these are unlikely to lead to a change of government, at least in the medium term, and that too with extensive outside support, which is currently not forthcoming.

After its voluntary exit in 2021, the recent shift of the US towards Afghanistan has sparked much speculation. The US desire to retake the Bagram air base outside Kabul is being linked to a host of reasons, including the official one of monitoring Chinese nuclear assets across the Wakhan corridor. There may be other motives—such as using a strategic asset like Bagram to effectively oversee activities in Russia, Iran, and Pakistan, and even the possibility that the threat of retaking the base could be used to extract unspoken concessions from the Taliban. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that the US would forcibly enter Afghanistan without the Taliban’s approval. More critically, even if a small American military presence is allowed by the Taliban, the implications of a superpower’s re-entry into the Heart of Asia will be significant, considering China’s and Russia’s footprints, and the situations in Iran and Pakistan. Afghanistan will once again be a key factor, with potential consequences for India.

India and Afghanistan

The Indian Embassy in Kabul. Original photo courtesy India Today, posted on KabulNow 22 October 2025

Although India downgraded its diplomatic presence in Kabul following the Taliban takeover, it maintained a ‘technical mission’ with minimal staff. After a four-year period of ‘wait and watch’, it became evident that the Taliban is now the sole governing force in Afghanistan. The longstanding history of friendly economic, developmental, and people-to-people ties, the shared strategic understanding with previous regimes dating back to 1947, and the current regional security concerns highlight the need to restore the relationship for the benefit of both nations. On its part, the Taliban is eager to once again secure Indian developmental assistance, especially amid the reduction of Western aid following criticism of the human rights situation in the country.

The outcome of this understanding is the visit of Mawlawi Muttaqi, an event of seminal importance. This was followed by the elevation of the technical mission in Kabul to the status of the Embassy of India on 21 October 2025[6]. Even a brief review of India’s assistance to Afghanistan over the years would reveal the substantial stakes India has in that country and the benefits it has gained in terms of goodwill. Areas of cooperation and assistance (including security collaboration) are well-known and numerous. It is to the credit of successive Indian governments that policy towards Afghanistan has remained consistent (except for a brief cooling period during the first Taliban regime and the current situation).

Understandably, India at this juncture does not want to be crowded out of Afghanistan, ceding all the space to others. To their credit, the Taliban have recognised the advantages of cooperation. Mawlawi Muttaqi struck the right chords in his media interactions in Delhi by answering all questions (including those about women’s rights from Indian women journalists). He has welcomed the return of Sikh and Hindu refugees (an unlikely event, considering that most have either obtained Indian citizenship or secured asylum in the West) and has echoed India’s stance on terrorism. Importantly, he has criticised Pakistan, blaming its policies for the unrest along the Durand Line. India, on its part, has announced six new development projects in Afghanistan, along with several other measures outlined by External Affairs Minister Mr Jaishankar during his meeting with Mawlawi Muttaqi[7]. Muttaqi has also requested increased trade, including via Wagah-Attari, for which Pakistan’s cooperation is vital. Given that countries with hostile relations continue to trade (Bangladesh and Myanmar being examples, with Bangladesh approving the import of 50,000 tonnes of rice from Myanmar under government-to-government agreements)[8], this is a proposal worth pursuing, especially with Chabahar under US sanctions and the economic unviability of a sustained air corridor for trade and commerce.

Importantly, on security issues, India and non-Taliban Afghan regimes have traditionally shared a similar outlook. With Taliban 2.0 promising to end the influence of terror organisations, including Al Qaeda and Islamic State, a stable Afghanistan could become a reality, benefiting regional stability. This would support Indian plans for trade corridors to Central Asia and beyond. It is clear that Afghanistan no longer considers Pakistan its benefactor, as shown by the changes in Afghan-Pakistani relations following the rise of Taliban 2.0. Actions such as Pakistan’s unilateral fencing of the Durand Line (allegedly even encroaching on Afghan territory in certain instances)[9], forcibly returning Afghan refugees, and border skirmishes culminating in Pakistani air strikes on Kabul, followed by the Doha ceasefire, are indicators. Currently, Pakistan’s prized ‘strategic depth’ through Afghanistan stands denied. This benefits India, as Pakistan must maintain heightened vigilance on two borders. If the Pakistani government recognises its constraints, a less hostile relationship with India might also be possible.

Conclusion

Optimists might argue that India-Afghanistan relations have come full circle over four years. However, there are vital differences in how the two nations approach ideology and governance. Despite claims to the contrary, gender and ethnic disparities in Afghanistan are too evident to overlook. Additionally, India must bear in mind that the opposition’s return to power could always be a possibility in the long run. Therefore, fully endorsing Taliban policies in the face of visible social instability in Afghanistan is neither wise nor desirable, as it conflicts with India’s longstanding views on such issues.

That said, the mere fact that such problems have been acknowledged by Taliban 2.0, even if somewhat vaguely, is a step forward. Also, given that the Taliban appear sincere in their determination to secure peace and improve their citizens’ standard of living, it is prudent for India to remain cooperative and avoid overinvolvement in such matters at this time. It is also likely that, over time, Indian influence on Afghanistan—whether through development, trade, security, health, or education—will have a positive impact on Afghan society, mainly through the younger generation of Afghans studying in India. With a combination of pragmatism and goodwill, this relationship is destined to benefit both nations.

End Notes:

[1]‘UNSC Panel Clears Muttaqi’s Travel, Paving Way for Taliban’s First Ministerial Trip to India’ The Wire 03 October 2025.

[2] ‘Mapping Afghanistan’s Untapped Natural Resources’ Mohammed Hussein and Mohammed Haddad Al Jazeera, 24 September 2021.

[3] ‘Understanding China’s Engagement with Afghanistan Under Taliban 2.0’ Shivam Shekhawat Issue Brief Issue No 816 July 2025 Observer Research Foundation.

[4] ‘ Website of the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) China and Afghanistan trade figures’.

[5] ‘Afghanistan: A Junction of Asia’s Connectivity’ Zobair Salahi The National Bureau of Asian Research May 28, 2022

[6] Upgradation of the Technical Mission of India in Kabul to Embassy of India, Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs , media centre press release dated 21 October 2025 on website mea.gov.in

[7] EAM’s opening remarks during meeting with Foreign Minister of Afghanistan (October 10, 2025)’ Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs media centre speeches and statements on website mea.gov.in

[8] 100,000 tons of rice to be imported from Myanmar, Dubai, Dhaka Tribune, 22 October 2025, Tribune Desk.[4] ‘ Website of the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) China and Afghanistan trade figures’.

[9] ‘The Durand Line and the Fence: How are communities managing with cross-border lives?’ Sabawoon Samim, Afghanistan Analysts Network , Regional Relations , April 2024.

Feature Image Credit: www.arabnews.com

October 28, 2025
India and Myanmar: Two Years After The Coup

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December 10, 2024
Recalibrating India’s Act East Policy: New Realities in Myanmar and Bangladesh

On 23 September 2024, Reuters published a news item quoting unnamed sources that said that India had ‘ invited political and military opponents of Myanmar’s ruling junta to attend a seminar in New Delhi. Even as the lack of corroboration of such a report puts it in the realm of conjecture, it is worthwhile mulling over the motivations or otherwise for such a seminal event to be even contemplated, especially in the light of implications for India’s Act East Policy.

TPF Occasional Paper: 10/2024

Recalibrating India’s Act East Policy: New Realities in Myanmar and Bangladesh

Maj Gen Alok Deb (Retd)

On 23 September 2024, Reuters published a news item quoting unnamed sources that said that India had ‘ invited political and military opponents of Myanmar’s ruling junta to attend a seminar in New Delhi’[i]. The item went on to specify that the shadow National Unity Government (NUG) and ethnic minority rebels from the states of Chin, Rakhine and Kachin bordering India had been invited to a seminar in mid-November, to be hosted by the Delhi-based Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), a foreign policy think tank funded by the Government of India. The piece was also carried by some major Indian newspapers with its origin attributed to Reuters. At the time of writing, there has been no acknowledgement or rebuttal of this report by any government agency. Neither has the ICWA posted this on its website as a forthcoming event. Even as the lack of corroboration of such a report puts it in the realm of conjecture, it is worthwhile mulling over the motivations or otherwise for such a seminal event to be even contemplated, especially in the light of implications for India’s Act East Policy.

A Summary of India’s Act East Policy

India’s ‘Act East’ policy of 2014 is an initiative that takes off from its earlier ‘Look East’ policy. ‘Act East’ envisages initiatives at multiple levels with the nations of ASEAN and the wider Indo-Pacific region. These initiatives are to be taken forward through a process of continuous engagement at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels, thereby providing enhanced connectivity in its broadest sense, including political, economic, cultural and people-to-people relations.[ii]

To successfully implement the ‘Act East’ policy, the Indian government is working to make the North East its strategic gateway to ASEAN. Accordingly, it has increased the allocation for the region’s development by more than four times over the last 10 years.[iii] The North East is also poised to benefit from initiatives from countries like Japan which earlier this year had proposed developing an industrial hub in Bangladesh with supply chains to the North East, Nepal and Bhutan.[iv]

As the North East becomes India’s gateway to ASEAN, the centrality of Myanmar to our Act East becomes apparent. It is the key link in the road connectivity between India’s North East and other ASEAN nations whereby the free flow of inland goods, services and other initiatives to and from these nations to India can be ensured. The success or otherwise of Act East is thus directly affected by the security environment in Myanmar. Instability here will negatively impact our North Eastern states sharing borders with that country. The internal situation in Myanmar therefore becomes an area of prime concern for India, warranting close attention.

For similar reasons, another neighbour, Bangladesh, is equally important for the success of India’s Act East Policy. India’s North East has benefitted from good ties with Bangladesh, both security-wise and economically. Militancy in the North East has reduced over the last decade and a half. With Bangladesh agreeing to provide access to its ports in the Bay of Bengal for the movement of Indian goods, the North Eastern states have a shorter route to the sea. Additionally, states bordering Bangladesh such as Assam and Meghalaya have developed trade links with that country for mutual benefit. The BBIN (Bangladesh Bhutan India Nepal) Motor Vehicle Agreement for the Regulation of Passenger, Personal and Cargo Vehicular Traffic was signed in 2015 to ‘ promote safe, economically efficient and environmentally sound road transport in the sub-region and … further help each country in creating an institutional mechanism for regional integration’ is another mechanism for implementing our Act East and Neighbourhood First policies[v]. The role of Bangladesh here is pivotal.

State of the Civil War in Myanmar

Fighting in Myanmar is now in its fourth year. The military junta continues to suffer reverses on the battlefield. Large portions of Rakhine State and certain portions of Chin State are now under the control of the Arakan Army (AA). International Crisis Group has recently averred that ‘..in just a few months, the Arakan Army has created the largest area in Myanmar under the control of a non-state armed group – in terms of both size and population – and is now on the verge of securing almost all of Rakhine’[vi].

In Shan state to the North, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (TBA) of three Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) had by December 2023, captured over 20,000 square kilometres of territory, including key border crossings and trade routes between China and Myanmar in Operation 1027[vii]. On 07 March 2024, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) launched Operation 0307 and successfully captured certain military posts across Kachin State close to the Chinese border. This forced the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military) to redeploy, further thinning out forces[viii]. Fighting also continues in other states and regions across the country, notably Sagaing and Kayah.

Associated Press deduces that ‘.. the announcement of the measure on state television amounts to a major, though tacit, admission that the army is struggling to contain the nationwide armed resistance against its rule..’.The Junta has since conscripted Rohingya youth and deployed them against the Rakhines.

Notwithstanding these losses, there is no let-up in the Tatmadaw’s efforts to combat the rebels. The Junta has resorted to conscription to stem rising attrition, activating an old law in this regard. Associated Press deduces that ‘.. the announcement of the measure on state television amounts to a major, though tacit, admission that the army is struggling to contain the nationwide armed resistance against its rule..’ [ix] To further contextualise, the same article stated the rebel National Unity Government’s (NUG) claim that more than 14,000 troops have defected from the military since the 2021 seizure of power. The Junta has since conscripted Rohingya youth and deployed them against the Rakhines. The Chins fear that they too will be acted upon similarly.[x]

To overcome the asymmetry of force especially in artillery and airpower, the rebels have acquired large numbers of drones. These are being used to bomb military positions, contributing significantly towards the successes of the CNA’s operations[xi]. To summarise, Myanmar’s civil war continues to see-saw with no signs of ebbing. The Junta continues to make periodic peace overtures to the NUG with conditionalities that the latter is unwilling to accept[xii]. With the multiplicity of actors and issues involved, there are no clear indications of how and when the conflict will be resolved.

Impact of the Myanmar Conflict on India’s North-East

The impact of Myanmar’s internal situation on India’s border states has progressively worsened. Initially, after the Junta takeover, it was Mizoram which bore the brunt. The state government citing common ethnicity and humanitarian concerns accepted the influx of Chins from Myanmar as a moral responsibility and initiated rehabilitation measures. These refugees along with earlier refugees from Bangladesh recently joined Kukis from Manipur, number around 44000 and continue to remain in refugee camps.[xiii] The Central government has had to reconcile its policy of preventing infiltration across borders with the societal realities of Mizoram. A positive outcome of this approach is that there has been no violence in Mizoram.

In Manipur, by September 2024, the 18-month-long ethnic conflict had resulted in over 225 deaths and some 60,000 people displaced.[xiv] The administration has been derided by both sides, more so with recent warnings about impending threats to law and order[xv] followed by retractions[xvi]. People of either community have been uprooted from their homes and moved to safe areas separated by buffer zones guarded by security forces. So great is the mutual suspicion that on the clamour of the Meiteis to replace the Assam Rifles, two battalions of this central force have been withdrawn and replaced by the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), against the wishes of the Kukis[xvii].

Voices for an independent ‘Kukiland’ for the Kuki Zo peoples are being raised,[xviii] which are variously interpreted as a demand for greater autonomy within Manipur or for a separate union territory. The current happenings also dredge up the old ghost of ‘Zale’n-gam’ or Kuki nation, comprising the Chin Kuki Zomi peoples (including Mizos) residing across India, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Zale’n- gam has few takers and appears restricted to a YouTube channel[xix]. Today both sides fight each other with a variety of weapons including improvised rockets and drones. Hostage-taking is the latest tactic that has been adopted.[xx]

Tension between the Nagas of Manipur and other communities is discernible with some reports of violence against the former.[xxi] As of now Nagas have kept out of the Kuki-Meitei dispute; also, other than the insurgent National Socialist Council of Nagaland ( Isak Muviah) faction (NSCN-IM) that is observing a ceasefire with the Centre, no other party has demanded integration of all Naga inhabited areas in India ( Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur) and Myanmar – the idea of Greater Nagalim.

At the state level, the responses of Mizoram and Manipur to the Myanmar crisis vary. This can be best seen in their reactions to the Centre’s recent notification to fence the entire 1643 Km Myanmar border and its earlier decision to end the Free Movement Regime that permits movement on both sides of the border for up to a distance of 16 km.[xxii] While the Mizoram government and tribes living in both states oppose the decisions, the Manipur government clamours for its implementation. Currently, only around 30 Km of the border has been fenced.

Since the Tatmadaw now has limited control over its border areas, it has become imperative for India to commence a structured dialogue with other warring parties in Myanmar’s border regions. This, with a view to restoring the situation in Manipur (and on the border) through mutually acceptable solutions at least for the short to medium term, is necessary. Only then can a modicum of security on the border be guaranteed. This involves navigating a maze of ethnic, religious, historical and societal issues with great sensitivity. The importance of such a dialogue cannot be overemphasised, more so because of recent developments in Bangladesh.

The Impact of Bangladesh’s ‘Second Liberation’

The events of 5 August 2024 that witnessed the overthrow of Sheikh Hasina’s government have proved to be yet another watershed in India-Bangladesh relations. India has invested more in the India-Bangladesh relationship than with any other neighbour in South Asia. A glance at the website of our Ministry of External Affairs[xxiii], where details of various agreements and summaries from the last Prime Ministerial meeting in Delhi in June 2024 are provided, will suffice to show just how strong and all-encompassing this relationship has become.

Persons or organisations associated with the previous regime have either fled the country or been placed under arrest and assets confiscated. A few have been killed by mobs. Bank accounts of others have been frozen. Jamaat e Islami which collaborated with the Pakistan Army in 1971 has been resurrected. Extremists with proven murder charges against them have been freed from prison, as have political prisoners.

At the time of writing, it is two months since the interim government headed by Chief Advisor Mohammed Yunus assumed charge. The country continues to make efforts to reestablish the rule of law. All wings of the armed forces have been given magisterial powers[xxiv]. The functioning of the judiciary, higher civil services, local administration, police, security agencies, banking, economy, and higher education, is under review. Persons or organisations associated with the previous regime have either fled the country or been placed under arrest and assets confiscated. A few have been killed by mobs. Bank accounts of others have been frozen.[xxv] The Jamaat e Islami which collaborated with the Pakistan Army in 1971 has been resurrected. Extremists with proven murder charges against them have been freed from prison, as have political prisoners. Commissions have been set up to suggest reforms in the constitution, electoral system, police, judiciary, public administration and in tackling corruption. Elections do not seem to be on the horizon yet. The advisers ( as the ministers are currently known) are new faces, not well known in India.

While this paper does not attempt to be a study of India-Bangladesh relations, the polarised politics in that country coupled with a perception that the misdeeds of Sheikh Hasina’s government were conducted with impunity because of Indian backing, is sure to impact India’s portrayal here.

With the removal of Sheikh Hasina, the India-Bangladesh relationship is undergoing a major reset. Statements of certain public figures and sentiments of a section of the population in that country suggest that a different perspective on the evolution of Bangladesh as a nation from 1971 onwards is emerging. While this paper does not attempt to be a study of India-Bangladesh relations, the polarised politics in that country coupled with a perception that the misdeeds of Sheikh Hasina’s government were conducted with impunity because of Indian backing, is sure to impact India’s portrayal here. This will make it an arduous task for both countries to go back to the trusted, cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship that existed. As mentioned, the list of achievements for both countries is far too numerous – settlement of land and oceanic borders, road, rail and riverine connectivity (including use of ports), economy and business ( both government and private), education including educational scholarships, technology, disaster management, border management, maritime security, military to military cooperation, improved people to people contacts, culture and health. As per records, of the 16 lakh visas issued by India for Bangladesh nationals in 2023, 4.5 lakhs were for medical treatment alone[xxvi]. Economies are so embedded that everyday necessities like onions are exported regularly to Bangladesh ( approximately 6 to 7 lakh tonnes annually).

Even as the new regime provides assurances on the security of minorities and acknowledges India as an important neighbour, the enthusiasm with which it has interacted with official interlocutors from a host of nations worldwide especially China, Pakistan and the US is noteworthy and indicates where its newfound priorities might lie.

A parallel reality, however, is that negative perceptions about India have historically found space in sections of Bangladesh’s polity. These have received a huge fillip after the change of regime with even settled agreements prone to misunderstanding. A recent example pertains to a tripartite agreement dating back to the Hasina period whereby electricity is to be imported from Nepal via India to Bangladesh. The agreement was signed in Kathmandu in the first week of October 2024. Newspaper reports from Bangladesh indicate that there is palpable resentment over the condition that Indian transmission systems inside Indian territory be utilised for this purpose since it increases costs per unit of electricity in Bangladesh.[xxvii] Another issue currently bedevilling relations is the state of minorities in Bangladesh who have faced attacks on their homes, businesses and religious places with some loss of life, since the protests in July. India’s concerns in this regard have been conveyed at the highest level. Even as the new regime provides assurances on the security of minorities and acknowledges India as an important neighbour, the enthusiasm with which it has interacted with official interlocutors from a host of nations worldwide especially China, Pakistan and the US is noteworthy and indicates where its newfound priorities might lie.

Larger Implications for India

Bangladesh and Myanmar are pivotal for India’s Act East policy from the security, economic and connectivity angles. The issues pertaining to Myanmar and Manipur have been brought out earlier. A common concern affecting both nations and India is the Rohingya crisis. Despite international pressure and requests from Bangladesh for China to intercede with Myanmar on its behalf, there has been no positive response from Myanmar. Bangladesh, which currently hosts close to one million refugees,[xxviii] has publicly expressed its inability to accommodate any more Rohingyas and asked for a speedy ‘third country settlement’ [xxix]. A detailed report of the International Crisis Group (ICG) in October 2023[xxx]provides details of activities of militant organisations like the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) which are involved in drug running from Myanmar along with Bangladeshi syndicates for sale of the product in that country. Their participation in violent crime and other illegal activity has become a pressing concern within Bangladesh. Rohingyas have infiltrated into India as well, and have been identified as far North as Jammu. The security implications of such migration for both Bangladesh and India are apparent. The insensitivity of the Myanmar Junta on this account is heightening security risks for India and Bangladesh and merits diplomatic intervention.

With the situation in Bangladesh evolving by the day, it is prudent for India to take a strategic pause as it weighs its options for pursuing its Act East policy. While giving the new regime in Bangladesh its due, India has to consider the impact of resurgent forces aided by inimical powers that aim to derail the India-Bangladesh relationship beyond repair. Even as both countries attempt to reestablish strong ties, the old adage preached by educated Bangladeshis in the context of support to Sheikh Hasina’s regime that ‘India should not put all its eggs in one basket’ resonates. While Myanmar geographically cannot provide the singular advantages that Bangladesh can, it is time for India to press for securing Myanmar’s cooperation to complete pending projects in that country, such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Port Project (KMMPP) via Sittwe and Paletwa, that provides an alternate route to our North East, as well as the Trans Asian Highway (TAH) that provides connectivity with the rest of ASEAN, amongst others.

To summarise, two possible reasons for inviting rebel Myanmar groups to Delhi could be: first, the relative viability of either Bangladesh or Myanmar to help implement the Act East policy in light of the emerging situation in Bangladesh and the state of the civil war in Myanmar. The second, ensuring security on the India-Myanmar border, to prevent aggravating the situation in India’s border states.

Notes:

[i] ‘Exclusive: India extends unprecedented invite to Myanmar’s anti-junta forces, sources say’ Wa Lone and Devjyot Ghoshal Reuters September 23, 2024

[ii] ‘Govt aims to make Northeast gateway of ‘Act East Policy’: President Murmu’ Press Trust of India 27 June 2024.

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] ‘Japan to tie landlocked Northeast India with Bangladesh’ Saleem Samad The Daily Messenger 05 March 2024.

[v] Press Information Bureau Government of India Ministry of Shipping note dated 10 June 2015

‘Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) Motor Vehicle Agreement for the Regulation of Passenger, Personal and Cargo Vehicular Traffic amongst BBIN’

[vi]   ‘Breaking Away: The Battle for Myanmar’s Rakhine State Asia Report N°339 | 27 August 2024’ International Crisis Group (Executive Summary).

[vii]   ‘As Myanmar’s Junta Loses Control in the North, China’s Influence Grows’ Jason Tower, United States Institute for Peace, August 1, 2024.

[viii] Ibid.

[ix]   ‘Facing setbacks against resistance forces, Myanmar’s military government activates conscription law ‘ Associated Press, February 12, 2024.

[x] ‘India’s ‘Forgotten Partition’ and the Myanmar Refugee Crisis’ Swapnarka Arnan The Diplomat 11 May 2024.

[xi] ‘We killed many … drones are our air force’: Myanmar’s rebels take on the junta from above. Aakash Hassan and Hannah Ellis-Petersen The Observer 20 January 2024.

[xii] ‘Armed Groups Snub Myanmar Junta ‘Peace’ Offer’ The Irrawaddy 28 September 2024

[xiii] ‘Centre provides 1,379 MT rice to Mizoram for Manipur, Myanmar, B’desh refugees’ Morung Express 25 September 2024.

[xiv] ‘Ethnic violence in India’s Manipur escalates, six killed’ Tora Agarwala Reuters September 7, 2024

[xv] ‘900 Kuki militants infiltrated Manipur from Myanmar, says Security Advisor’ India Today NE September 20 2024.

[xvi] ‘Input on infiltration by 900 Kuki militants could not be substantiated on the ground, says Manipur security advisor’ Vijaita Singh The Hindu 26 September 2024.

[xvii] ‘Kukis call removal of Assam Rifles from 2 Manipur areas ‘biased, appeasement’, Meiteis call it ‘victory’ Ananya Bhardwaj The Print 04 August 2024.

[xviii]‘ Manipur: Kuki-Zo organizations hold rallies, demand separate ‘Kukiland’ for peace by Northeast News

August 31, 2024.

[xix] YouTube channel titled ‘Zalengam Media’.

[xx] ‘Kuki militants seek release of ‘secessionist’ in Manipur’ Prawesh Lama and Thomas Ngangom Hindustan Times Sep 30, 2024.

[xxi] ‘Keep us out of your war, Manipur Naga body warns two warring communities’ The Hindu Bureau 06 February 2024

[xxii] ‘Government sanctions ₹31,000 crore to fence Myanmar border’   The Hindu

Published – September 18, 2024

[xxiii] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India website mea.gov.in.

[xxiv] ‘Navy, the air force also granted magistracy powers’ The Daily Star September 30 2024

[xxv] ‘Bank accounts of Joy Putul Bobby frozen’ Dhaka Tribune 30 Sep 2024.

[xxvi] ‘Indian High Commission in Dhaka, facing protests & threats, returns 20,000 visa applicants’ passports ‘ Ananya Bhardwaj The Print   29 September 2024.

[xxvii] ‘Bangladesh delegation in Nepal to sign the contract to import 40 MW electricity’ Dhaka Tribune 30 September 2024.

[xxviii] Operational Data Portal of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, for Bangladesh.

[xxix] ‘Bangladesh calls for faster resettlement process for Rohingya’ Ruma Paul Reuters September 8, 2024

[xxx] ‘Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: Limiting the Damage of a Protracted Crisis’ International Crisis Group Autumn Update 04 October 20223.

Feature Image Credit: What does Sheikh Hasina’s resignation mean for India-Bangladesh relations? – aljazeera.com

Map Credit: National Online Project

Bangladesh Parliament Image: The Shattered Identity of a Nation: From Liberation to Chaos – borderlens.com

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Statue: Bangabandhu to Toppled Statue: Mujibur Rahman’s contested legacy post Bangladesh upheaval – Economic Times

October 15, 2024
The Indian Military: Five Issues for the immediate Future

While much has happened in 2023, new developments in the security dynamic warrant a relook at the transformation process. India now has to be prepared to prosecute both short and prolonged wars. Clearly defined political aims must be translated into achievable military objectives on the borders.

2023 was an eventful year. In addition to ongoing conflicts in Africa, Afghanistan, Syria and Ukraine, it witnessed the start of yet another war in the Gaza Strip, which by early 2024 had expanded across West Asia. The Red Sea region is witnessing duels between the Houthis and the West. Israel and Hezbollah are skirmishing in Lebanon. Iran has carried out strikes in Iraq and Syria. The US has blamed Iranian proxies for causing the deaths of its service personnel in Jordan and retaliated accordingly across Iraq and Syria. Iran and Pakistan have carried out tit-for-tat missile strikes. While conflicts such as Nagorno Karabakh have ended for now, other potential trouble spots in the Balkans and South and East China Seas continue to make headlines.

This uncertain security environment has put trade, supply chains and, in some cases, national sovereignty at risk. At home, long-festering structural issues in the India-China relationship have come to a head. China’s belligerence is on full display along our Northern borders even as it makes further inroads in Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. In 2024, Maldives has displayed a pronounced anti-India tilt. Pakistan’s intractability and support for terrorism, despite its precarious internal situation and volatile borders on its West, remains a cause for concern. In Myanmar, the civil war rages on, while the outcome of ethno-religious conflict, which has spilled across international borders in Manipur and Mizoram, poses a different challenge.

Despite 20 rounds of Corps Commanders talks, the Army is completing its fourth winter of ‘mirror deployment’ along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Small-scale operations at the LAC have continued at least till 2022, as citations for gallantry in respect of individual soldiers on Republic Day indicate. The Chief of Army Staff (COAS) announced in his annual press conference in January that there will be no reduction in troop levels until the return to the ‘status quo ante as of mid-2020. Concurrently, the Army continues to battle terrorists on both sides of the Pir Panjal ranges in Jammu and Kashmir. The Air Force remains highly alert even as the Navy is committed full time in the Western Arabian Sea and East coast of Africa, successfully protecting Indian shipping ( and ships of other nations) from piracy and other threats. In sum, the Indian military is committed to ensuring the nation’s security full-time.

The Indian Army had labelled 2023 as its ‘Year of Transformation’, based on the five pillars of Force Structuring & Optimisation, Modernisation & Technology Infusion, Systems, Processes & Functions, Human Resource Management and Jointness & Integration. The Ministry of Defence (MoD), in its 2023 Year End Review, has listed various proposals totalling over Rs 3.50 lakh crores that were approved to enhance operational preparedness. These cover a wide range of equipment and upgrades – from procurement of light combat helicopters to indigenous upgradation of Su-30 MKI aircraft, purchase of medium-range anti-ship missiles for the Navy and acquisition of towed gun systems for the Army. Other notable items are procurement of Sea/ Sky Guardian drones (31 of these since approved for sale by the US State Department in February 2024), utility helicopters, light armoured multi-purpose vehicles, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), Very Short Range Air Defence Systems (VSHORAD) and cadet training ships. Improvements in other spheres – progress towards Atmanirbharta, indigenisation, border infrastructure, roads, induction and career management of women, and welfare of veterans- have also been covered. The individual services have also listed their achievements in enhancing operational capabilities and overall efficiency.

While much has happened in 2023, new developments in the security dynamic warrant a relook at the transformation process. India now has to be prepared to prosecute both short and prolonged wars. Clearly defined political aims must be translated into achievable military objectives on the borders. The nature of these conflicts will be difficult to determine. With elements of both the conventional and non-conventional employment of weapon systems across all five domains with simultaneous conduct of information operations, they will be genuinely hybrid and constantly mutating, based on whichever element achieves more significant success.

As a first step, it becomes necessary to incorporate fresh thought and prepare a fully fleshed-out tri-service Indian military doctrine. The integrated doctrine issued by the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) in 2017 requires review to incorporate analysis and lessons learnt from Nagorno Karabakh, Ukraine, Gaza and our current experiences on the Northern borders, with the ‘collusive threat’ now a reality. Given that doctrine is essentially a set of principles that tells us ‘how to do’, i.e. how to achieve desired effects and not specifically ‘what to do’, capability development logically flows from doctrine analysis. Here, there has to be a consensus between the services on capabilities necessary to fulfil the military’s mandate – new platforms or technology, organisational issues, enhancement of joint or single service logistic capability, training and human resource aspects or upgrades.

For the short to medium term, increasing focus on new technology must be balanced with the capacity to absorb technology and the context in which such weapons are envisaged to be employed. While incorporation of AI, quantum computing, electronic warfare, stealth technology, space warfare and the like will be very much on the cards, all these can truly be incorporated once there is greater clarity and broader consensus upon two issues – what is the right weapon mix for a country like India to have, in terms of the proportion of latest generation weapons vis a vis what remains in the inventory and can be employed effectively now and in the immediate future, to thwart the enemy’s perceived designs? This is especially important when we look at the options available to incorporate new technology in terms of the time required for indigenous self-development and the secretive mindset of foreign suppliers with respect to sharing the intricacies of technologies that power such costly weapon systems. Secondly, a holistic consideration of the number of technologies that need to be developed in this time frame as part of capability development becomes necessary when we analyse the weapon/capability mix required to defend against an attacker – including one whose political and military objectives at the start of a conflict remain opaque, and whose capabilities and pattern of operations are possibly more overhyped than actual.

The above issues become even more relevant when we look at the allocations for defence in the interim budget presented in Parliament on 01 February this year. Detailed analyses on the defence aspect will likely be published in days to come. In the context of this article, just two examples are highlighted. First, the 30 per cent higher allocation for Border Roads is hugely appropriate as it fits into future planning and enhances capability and capacities. Second, the deployment of the budget of Rs 23,855 crores to the DRDO and planned funding of a Rs 1 Lakh crore corpus for R&D projects, including ‘deep defence’ technology, while a positive step, must be carefully thought out, based on the aspects highlighted in the preceding paragraphs.Industry start-ups are doing a valuable job introducing the latest generation of weapons and technology to the military in concert with organisations like the Army Design Bureau. The incorporation of new technology and subsequent production of new weapons will be predicated on answers to these issues.

Organisational aspects are another area for the military’s focus in 2024. Work on integrated theatre commands continues and will surely see the light of day. Notwithstanding the non-availability of a National Security Strategy, the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) has to list out with absolute clarity what the mission of each theatre command is, in synchronicity with national aims. How to ensure optimal efficiency of these integrated resources for mission accomplishment has to be carefully thought out through multiple iterations with all stakeholders. This will have to be subject to rigorous validation in several tabletop and ground variety exercises to arrive at a common and operationally validated solution.

Human resource issues will compete equally for the military’s attention. The Agniveer experiment has completed a little over one year. The performance of these soldiers in operations has been on par with their counterparts of yesteryears (of the same seniority). However, it is their performance in garrison soldiering that is yet to be fully gauged. As mentioned by the COAS, their assessment at multiple levels has to be continuously finetuned to remove any traces of subjectivity. Close monitoring of this scheme is necessary before pronouncing judgement on its success or otherwise, specifically its impact on regimental ethos and overall effect on unit efficiency. Employment of increasing numbers of woman Agniveers and woman officer intakes is another area which will occupy the minds of Commanding Officers (COs) of the three services. The recent decision of the Karnataka High Court in January 2024 striking down the provision of the Indian Military Nursing Services Ordinance 1943, which gives 100% reservation for women in nursing officer posts, is another spinoff in the battle for gender equality. This lends further urgency to the need to evolve an Indian model for the successful integration of women into the armed forces. Gender sensitisation of both sexes in uniform is of utmost priority.

Managing high quality men and women drawn from all corners of India mandates a high degree of personal and professional integrity, sense of balance, and strength of character in military leaders at every level, specially so in an era where misinformed (or deliberate) inputs on social media can wreak havoc in society.

Finally, as always, the military has to continue focusing on reinforcing institutional values. All militaries are dynamic. They must be nurtured and motivated by caring, professional and impartial leadership. A quote attributed to Sir Winston Churchill in his address to the House of Commons in 1923 says ‘…the armed forces.. are living things, if they are bullied, they sulk, if they are unhappy, they pine, if they are harried, sufficiently they get feverish, if they are sufficiently disturbed, they will wither and dwindle and almost die…’.Preserving the health of their respective services along with enhanced operational preparedness is the foremost task of the service chiefs. This comes about by careful selection of higher leadership, strict adherence to the culture, ethics and norms of the Indian military while forswearing all else at the altar of professionalism. Managing high quality men and women drawn from all corners of India mandates a high degree of personal and professional integrity, sense of balance, and strength of character in military leaders at every level, specially so in an era where misinformed (or deliberate) inputs on social media can wreak havoc in society. The responsibility of the Chiefs in this regard is onerous indeed and cannot be overemphasised. All else follows from this.

Feature Image Credit: scroll.in

February 7, 2024
MYANMAR: READING THE TEA LEAVES

On 21 November 2023, India’s Ministry of External Affairs advised Indian citizens to avoid nonessential travel to Myanmar, given the evolving security situation in that country. It further advised that those already living in Myanmar should take precautions and avoid travel to regions affected by violence[i]. Earlier in the same month, UN Secretary-General António Guterres had expressed deep concern at the expansion of conflict in Myanmar[ii] . Both messages highlight the increasingly fragile situation in Myanmar, where two million people are displaced and over 286,000 similarly affected after the current upsurge in fighting[iii].

Operation 1027 and its Implications

The map published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies lists the number and type of violent events countrywide until July 2023. Since then, there has been a spike in the level of violence. Most prominent has been the coordinated attack on 27 October on Tatmadaw (Myanmar Army) posts in the Northern portion of Myanmar’s Shan state (see map), near the Chinese border by three Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), assisted by other Peoples’ Defence Militias (PDFs). As per Richard Horsey of the International Crisis Group[i], the attacks, dubbed ‘Operation 1027’ (after the date they commenced), involved several thousand experienced, well-armed fighters attacking multiple army posts simultaneously. These troops owed allegiance to three major EAOs – the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army ( AA), comprising different ethnicities ( Kokang, Ta’ang and Arakanese, respectively). Of the three, the first two are based in Shan state in the East, while the AA, as the name denotes, is based in Rakhine on Myanmar’s West coast, bordering some portion of the Chittagong Division of Bangladesh. Within two weeks, these three armies dubbed the Three Brotherhood Alliance, had seized several towns along the Chinese border, overrun military bases and captured large stocks of munitions. Specifically, to quote the Asia Times…the key border posts of Chin Swe Haw and Mong Ko were seized along with 80 military and police bases. More than 120 military bases have since been overrun, and sizeable amounts of arms and ammunition seized, including reportedly several 14.5 heavy machine guns (HMGs)…‘[ii]. ISP Myanmar, a Myanmarese think tank based in Thailand, notes that resupply columns are being ambushed on the main artery from Mandalay, around the area of Kyaukme, as shown on the map below[iii].

Operation 1027 has created significant disruptions in the Myanmar-China border trade. The current offensive aims to eradicate online gambling and scam call operations from various casinos in the northern portion of Shan and Kayin states bordering China and Thailand, an objective shared by the Myanmar Government, which is under pressure from China on this matter. Nationals from these countries, along with Chinese criminals, have been identified for their involvement in such illegal activity in concert with local pro-government militias. The rebels’ aim could likely be to gain China’s favour and wrest territory from Tatmadaw’s control[i]. To avoid the bloodshed, many Myanmar nationals are attempting to cross into China. China, whose proposed projects under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) run through these regions in Northern Shan state, has since called for a ceasefire on this border[ii]. Noteworthy for military analysts, however, is the well-coordinated planning and execution displayed in these successful attacks, demonstrating the growing strength and assertiveness of the EAOs and PDFs operating over large swathes of territory.

In concert with Operation 1027, EAOs have been equally active in other parts of Myanmar. The Sagaing region North of Mandalay bordering Manipur and Nagaland is witnessing fresh fighting[iii]. A Myanmar Army spokesman is quoted as having admitted that troops were under “heavy assaults from a significant number of armed rebel soldiers” in Shan state in the North, Kayah state in the East and Rakhine state in the West[iv]. In Rakhine, a year-long ceasefire between the Arakan Army and Tatmadaw collapsed, and fighting recommenced. In Kayah state bordering Thailand, a video clip (verified by Reuters) shows wounded Tatmadaw soldiers surrendering to the rebels who offer medical treatment to them. Fighting rages around the state capital, Loikaw, from which the UN has evacuated its personnel[v]. Heavy fighting has taken place in Chin state. The Junta has declared martial law in certain towns in Shan, Chin and Kayah states and Sagaing region.

Members of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army pose for a photograph in front of the seized army’s infantry battalion in Kunlong township in Shan state, Myanmar, on 12 November. (AP). Courtesy: Rezaul H Laskar, Hindustan Times 15 November 2023.

India’s Concerns

With the Sagaing region bordering Nagaland and Manipur and Chin state bordering Manipur and Mizoram, the upsurge in violence has become a pressing concern for India, which is already grappling with the crisis in Manipur that has a linkage with Myanmar. In the current crisis in mid-November, Chin rebels overran two Tatmadaw posts on the India-Myanmar border in villages close to the Myanmar border township of Rikhawdar. This is adjacent to India’s Land Customs Station (LCS) at Zokhawthar. The Tiau River forms the boundary crossed by a Bailey bridge (picture below).

Picture: Courtesy Reuters

A fresh flow of refugees (estimates from four to five thousand) has now crossed over to the Indian side to escape the fighting as the Tatmadaw attempts to retake these posts. This influx is in addition to those who crossed over earlier during the coup in February 2021. The capitulation of the Tatmadaw in these bases has also resulted in a unique situation; 74 Myanmar soldiers fled to India with their weapons and surrendered to the Indian authorities, who, at the request of the Myanmar Government, facilitated their return[i].

All the above issues highlight the highly volatile climate in Myanmar, necessitating the Indian government’s advisory. Sufficient reportage exists to show that the rebel forces under the National Unity Government (NUG) are steadily gaining ground; Gen Min Aung Hlaing, Chairman of the State Administrative Council (SAC) and de facto head of state conceded early this year that only 198 of the 330 townships are “100 per cent stable,” while the remainder required “security attention.”[ii] This is close to fifty per cent of the country. Clearly, the civil war is entering a more intense phase.

State of the NUG

The dynamism of the NUG can be gauged by its creative methods to raise revenues to support its war aims. Some of these mechanisms, based essentially on the buyers’ ( including the diaspora’s) good faith, are zero-interest bonds, real estate auctions of land (including government land taken from civilians – a lakeside villa appropriated by Gen Hlaing was auctioned some time ago), proposed condominiums for later construction, auctioning of mining rights and leases, lotteries, donations and tax collection. It provides primary education, health, justice and law and order in areas under its control. It has launched a digital currency that is run through the open-source blockchain Stellar network73, used through its digital wallet app, NUGPay. It uses commercial quadcopter drones for logistics, has commenced weapons production to include 60mm and 90mm mortars, and is experimenting with 3D printing[iii].

The NUG’s success in creating such an infrastructure despite the SAC’s depredations and the victories of its forces on the ground over the last two years is testimony to the support it enjoys among the ordinary people, bolstered by sophisticated information operations. The latter includes a Policy Paper of 2021[iv], which enunciates NUG’s efforts to become more inclusive. A beginning has been made by appointing a Rohingya, Aung Kyaw Moe, to a ministerial post. His appointment as the NUG’s Deputy Human Rights Minister is a signal to others, including the UN whose Special Rapporteur for human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, stated this year that ..’ Min Aung Hlaing, who led the genocidal campaign, is now at the head of an illegal and illegitimate military junta that is attacking civilian populations throughout Myanmar. He must be brought to justice and made to answer his crimes…‘[v]. The NUG Policy Paper promises to bring perpetrators of crimes against Rohingyas to justice and grant citizenship rights to all based on parentage or birth in Myanmar. It also speaks of developing a comprehensive repatriation plan for Rohingyas who have fled Myanmar. Resolving this issue will remove a significant obstacle in ties with Bangladesh, which shelters over one million Rohingyas while looking to curb activities of militant organisations like the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). The ARSA operates from both sides of the border, using tunnels to move cadres to and fro and has frequently resorted to terrorism.

Crystal Gazing

What, then does the future hold for the SAC? The regime is facing multiple sanctions from the West. Citing ongoing violence, it had earlier announced the postponement of elections planned for August 2023 and continues with the state of emergency. It, however, seeks to exploit its geography as an Indian Ocean littoral and land bridge between South and South East Asia to gain strategic advantage. Trade with Russia has increased, and MOUs on cooperation in various infrastructure projects, including nuclear and natural energy, have been signed. Though the CMEC is now moving at a snail’s pace with many impediments and under constant security threats, none of its projects have been cancelled[vi] as has happened elsewhere. Russia and China are also the leading suppliers of advanced weapon systems to Myanmar. Military cooperation has been extended to naval exercises; this month, Myanmar held a three-day maritime security exercise’ with the Russian Navy from 06 November in the Andaman Sea for the first time. Again, on 28 November, two Chinese warships and a resupply vessel have docked in Yangon on a ‘goodwill visit’ to be followed up with exercises. Despite such signalling, there is no guarantee how much support these two countries would provide in an increasingly uncertain climate.

India’s policy has been one of non-interference in Myanmar’s affairs. It has been feeling its way through the deepening crisis in that country that originated with the coup over two years ago. Government-to-government cooperation continues, with visits by senior Indian dignitaries on essential occasions. Though India does not support the NUG, looking beyond and planning for multiple outcomes is prudent.

India’s priority is to have peace on the border with Myanmar. Instability here has directly impacted the internal security and societal dynamics of at least two border states. For securing the border, an advanced intelligent fencing system of 100 km along the border ‘is in the pipeline’ while a little over 6 Km has been physically fenced around the border township of Moreh in Manipur[vii]. Fencing the entire 1643 km long border is unlikely to find favour for multiple reasons – costs, physical difficulty, and social and political implications, especially when ethnic kin live on both sides with a Free Movement Regime (FMR) in place that permits movement up to 16 Km inside.

The other way of securing the border will be through cooperation between the three affected parties – India, the SAC and insurgent groups operating in the vicinity. It is here that India’s leverages can come into play – the goodwill built up with local communities by sheltering and providing succour to those who have come across, and non-interference with activities of the Tatmadaw, including assisting as in the case of the fleeing soldiers. Considering that peace on the border will benefit all three parties, communication at the local level with the insurgents through intermediaries and parallel government-to-government interaction can ensure that guarantees for the same are obtained. This can be combined with rehabilitation projects for those displaced, with Indian assistance.

Looking beyond the immediate, the difficulty in providing any prognosis for Myanmar should not obscure the fact that it remains among India’s most important neighbours and a vital cog of our Act East policy. With peace prevailing, its role in the development of our North East will only increase, as an overall assessment of the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project’s potential shows. A stable, peaceful and multi-ethnic Myanmar will always remain a priority for India. In the interim, the need is to contemplate multiple outcomes and plan for eventualities, favourable or otherwise.

Notes

[i] ‘29 Myanmarese soldiers repatriated from Mizoram amid border tension’ Statesman News Service Aizawl 20 November 2023.

[ii] ‘Sustaining Funding for Myanmar’s Spring Revolution’ Stimson Policy Paper Zachary Abuza May 17, 2023

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] ‘ Policy Position on the Rohingya in Rakhine State’ Republic of the Union of Myanmar National Unity Government June 03 2021.

[v] ‘UN expert demands accountability for the Rohingya and an end to ‘paralysis of indifference’’ United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, press release 24 August 2023.

[vi] ‘The Dwindling Prospects For Russian and Chinese-Backed Infrastructure Projects in Myanmar’ Syah Vaghji

The Diplomat November 09, 2023

[vii] Government of India Ministry of Home Affairs Annual Report 2022-23 Chapter 3 Border Management para 3.21

Feature Image: Brotherhood Alliance fighters are seen at the entrance of a regime Army base in Kunlong on Nov 12, 2023/MNDAA – www.irrawaddy.com

November 30, 2023
India and Myanmar: Two Years after the Coup

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Relegated to the sidelines with the ongoing Ukraine war and other crises like Taiwan, Myanmar has resurfaced in world headlines. In a recent dispatch, Associated Press (AP) reported that on 11 April 2023 ‘a fighter jet dropped bombs directly onto a crowd of people who were gathering at 8 am for the opening of a local office of the country’s opposition movement outside Pazigyi village in Sagaing region’s Kanbalu township….’ 1 . Subsequent information indicates that the number of dead including women and children is over 170. If so, this is the deadliest aerial attack carried out by the Myanmar military on its own people in the bloody aftermath of the military coup two years ago.

With various Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) and Peoples’ Defence Forces (PDFs) battling the Tatmadaw, martial law has been declared in 47 townships in Myanmar, cutting across states and regions. 2 More than 154,000 people have been displaced in the first two months of 2023, with total numbers of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) since the military takeover now at 1.3 million. Heavy fighting rages in Kachin State, the South East and North West of the country, 3 and overall 3000 civilian deaths since February 2021 are estimated 4 . Targeted assassination of military appointed government officials continues, the latest victim being the deputy director-general of the Union Election Commission who was shot dead on 22 April this year 5 . In 2022, up to 30,000 civilian infrastructures, including schools are reported to have been destroyed during military operations 6 . This situation has compelled the Tatmadaw to again postpone elections earlier scheduled for August 2023. The state of emergency has been extended.

Important Developments Post February 2021

The above statistics provide a telling perspective of the current violence in Myanmar. Yet there are other noteworthy developments in the country post the February 2021 coup. First of these is the increasing relevance of the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) around which civilian support appears to have coalesced.

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Featured Image Credits: CNBC Indonesia

May 16, 2023
The Strategic Imperative of Developing Ladakh

Abstract
Following the Galwan valley clash in 2020, Ladakh has become the most important place of strategic and operational importance since it adjoins two adversarial neighbours who are strategically aligned with each other. China’s belligerence is taking many forms such as information warfare, land transgression, allegations of hacking, etc. The recent claim of unfurling of the Chinese flag supposedly in Galwan, which was later clarified to have been done in another location is a spoke of its information warfare against India. China’s construction activities enabling quick buildup of its troops and armaments are also a major cause of concern for India. While there are some initiatives launched by the Indian army and the Central government to strengthen the infrastructure in the Northern borders, special attention needs to be paid towards the holistic development of human resources and infrastructure in Ladakh.

2022 began with a fresh show of Chinese belligerence in Ladakh, with a well-known Chinese media outlet putting out a tweet saying, “China’s national flag rises over Galwan Valley on the New Year Day of 2022“, following up with a short video of the event. The tweet further claimed that the flag was special, having flown earlier over Tiananmen Square in Beijing[i]. As Indian government sources confirmed that the ceremony did not occur in any disputed area, the Indian Army released photographs of soldiers hoisting the flag in the Galwan Valley on the occasion of the New Year[ii]. In other incidents across the rest of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), China suddenly ‘renamed’ 15 locations in Arunachal Pradesh, continuing efforts to undermine Indian sovereignty in that state. The Chinese embassy in Delhi wrote to counsel Indian MPs who had attended a reception hosted by the Tibetan government in exile in late December 2021[iii]. The frigid relationship between the two nations was underscored once again by the inconclusive outcome of the 14th round of Corps Commander’s talks held on the LAC on 12 Jan 2022[iv]

Chinese activities have not been restricted to the information domain alone. Construction of a bridge across the Pangong Tso, starting 20 km east of Finger 8 to connect its North and South banks, has come to light, providing an additional approach for a quick build-up of troops and logistics. While the above actions by China, both in the realm of information warfare and otherwise, have been effectively countered by the Indian government[v], the overall situation across the entire LAC continues to be of significant concern. This is despite the much-publicized sharing of sweets between Indian and Chinese troops at ten border crossings across the LAC[vi] in January.

Strategic Importance of Ladakh

As compared to the rest of the LAC, the situation in Ladakh is serious. The killing of 20 Indian soldiers, including a Commanding Officer, in June 2020 has thrust the region into the nation’s collective consciousness. Galwan, Gogra, Daulet Beg Oldi, Pangong Tso, and Chushul are household names across the country and the public today is better educated about the sheer complexity of the border issue and our history of dealing with China on the matter. The importance of safeguarding national sovereignty has taken centre stage with issues such as the institution of ‘no patrolling zones’ and perceptions about the LAC being subjected to frequent debate in the media and elsewhere.

In the aftermath of the Galwan events, the strategic importance of Ladakh, seen more through the lens of tourism in tranquil times, has acquired renewed relevance. It is the only borderland of India adjoining two hostile states, both of which have gone to war with India at different times for their own reasons. Ladakh abuts Gilgit Baltistan, which is under illegal occupation of Pakistan, and Tibet, which is under China’s forced occupation. As the likelihood of collusive action between these countries increasingly grows, Ladakh will remain primus inter pares amongst all the regions on our Northern borders for strategic and operational reasons. Accordingly, plans to bring about a qualitative change in capacity and capability in all aspects of the region’s development to meet security challenges and human aspirations acquire greater importance vis-a-vis other locations.

The above aspect is well appreciated by the Central Government, which has taken many initiatives towards strengthening infrastructure development along the Northern borders in recent years. With regards to Ladakh, development has accelerated dramatically post creation of the Union Territory (UT) of Ladakh in 2019. A review of the UT Administrations’ activities after two years of its creation by the Lt Governor during a media interaction reveals the scale and scope of its achievements[vii]. Future plans are contained in a comprehensive ‘Vision Document,’ prepared on its behalf by a reputed consultancy, available on the internet[viii]. The Document is a comprehensive data-backed effort, listing the status of various developmental markers today and the desired end state. Achieving the vision would require effort, time, and planning for its translation into practical and prioritized implementables, after further considering risks, costs, benefits, and overall viability while adhering to timelines. Despite the progress made on many fronts and considering the constraints remaining, continued and focused long-term efforts by the administration are required here: equally important, the current and future security perspective has to be a key pillar of such plans.

Development Issues and Imperatives

A key priority that requires greater impetus is to accelerate the movement of locals for populating areas that, for reasons of geography and proven Chinese intent, have acquired strategic or operational significance. Page 9 of the Vision Document[ix] mentions that 65% of the total population is in and around Leh and Kargil cities. Though the paper has recommended setting up other population centres, enhanced hostile activity by China in and around places like Demchok on the LAC warrants that such areas also be included for consideration. In recent years, the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) has dramatically enhanced connectivity. Greater resources and manpower have constructed important roads and opened up East Ladakh and other parts of the UT[x]. The next step is to actualize a long-term plan with short and intermediate goals, which could see the setting up of small townships – after creating suitable infrastructure in housing, health, education, connectivity, and other civic amenities to support small-sized populations. Here the focus has to be on providing livelihood options other than the purely pastoral, with options explored for setting up Small Manufacturing Enterprises (SMEs), which might take time to prove financially viable. In this respect, China has succeeded with the construction of border villages and resettlement of Tibetans in areas opposite the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh and its disputed border with Bhutan[xi]. Though the Indian experiment in that region, which commenced post-1962, has not been as successful, it has to be pushed through in Ladakh. Here, reconciling developmental cum security needs with genuine environmental concerns would be necessary, considering that the Army’s premier firing range in Ladakh in the Tangtse Chushul area was closed some years ago for such reasons.

There is scope too for the military, as an essential stakeholder to assist in development in other spheres, such as preparation of dual-use facilities; helipads and Advanced Landing Grounds wherever feasible, are one example. Another option is to create infrastructure for specialized training in the Ladakh region – archives of the Press Trust of India mention an international training event, ‘Exercise Himalayan Warrior’ held in 2007 where Indian and British troops trained together in mountain warfare techniques in an area North of Leh[xii]. Training facilities of this nature would naturally benefit the local economy, though the fallout of such strategic signalling would have to be carefully weighed.

A fourth option to enhance the military’s participation, albeit indirectly, is to increase local recruitment. While recruit balancing would be carried out at Army Headquarters, there is a need to examine the feasibility of expanding the number of Ladakh Scout battalions (either regular units or on the Territorial Army model), which are eminently suited for fighting in such terrain. Being a permanent measure, this would offset, to an extent, the expense on induction of at least a few units from outside Ladakh. Benefits accruing from deploying local sons of the soil can be easily appreciated.

Harnessing through Civil-Military Engagement

At the turn of the century, it was in Ladakh that the Indian Army launched Operation SADHBHAVNA. Displaying strategic foresight, then GOC 14 Corps, Lt Gen Arjun Ray, set a one-point aim – ‘To Forestall Militancy in Ladakh.’ The program, a runaway success, was adopted subsequently by other field formations of the Indian Army. A process of continued oversight, course correction, innovation, and streamlining at various levels has made it an effective tool for helping assimilate our border populations into the national fold by winning hearts and minds. Here, it must be emphasized that SADBHAVNA has not been conceptualized as a developmental program per se. Neither is such an approach being followed on the ground – the projects being small, community-based, and including aspects of human resource development. It has had very positive spinoffs, with Ladakh being a significant beneficiary. With major development programs like the Ministry of Home Affairs’ flagship Border Areas Development Program (BADP) and others at the state level already in place, it is worth examining if an interaction between the local administration (at the panchayat level, say) and local military garrisons, both working from the ground upwards can help further synergize efforts to achieve optimum results.

Strategic contestation between India and China is a reality. The border issue will continue to influence many aspects of bilateral relations. Continued information warfare, a huge trade deficit, allegations of hacking, and now evidence of massive tax evasion by smartphone companies[xiii] are indicators of the need for a realistic appraisal of that country’s intentions and strengthening own capabilities. The development of Ladakh is an important factor in this regard.

Notes

[i] Free Press Journal, January 03, 2022.

[ii] ‘LAC Standoff: India exposes China’s lies in Ladakh as Indian Army hoists tricolour in Galwan Valley’. Ajeyo Basu, News24, January 04, 2022.

[iii] ‘China protests Indian MPs’ attending Tibetan reception, Tibet govt-in-exile fires back’. Geeta Mohan, India Today, January 01, 2022.

[iv] ‘Joint Press Release of the 14th round of India-China Corps Commander Level Meeting’. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, January 13, 2022.

[v] ‘Government breaks silence, hits back at China on letter to MPs, Pangong bridge’. Shubhajit Roy, Indian Express, January 07, 2022.

[vi] ‘New Year: Indian, Chinese troops exchange sweets at Demchok and other border points’. Press Trust of India, January 01, 2022.

[vii] ‘Major transformation in developmental profile of Ladakh UT in nearly 2 years: Lt Governor’. Mohinder Verma, Daily Excelsior, September 18, 2021.

[viii] ‘Vision 2050 for UT of Ladakh’. Government of India.

[ix] ibid

[x] ‘Five Mega Road Infrastructure Projects Launched in Ladakh Amid Border Row With China’. PTI, October 01, 2021.

[xi] ‘More evidence of China building villages in disputed areas along borders with India, Bhutan’. Hindustan Times, November 18, 2021.

[xii] Press Information Bureau, Government of India. Ministry of Defence note, Exercise “Himalayan Warrior”. September 16, 2007.

[xiii] ‘Xiaomi India under lens: DRI says evasion of customs duty of Rs 653 cr by Chinese smartphone maker’. Economic Times, January 05, 2021.

Feature Image Credit: Bloomberquint

Map Credit: Newschrome

Images: www.deccanherald.com and www.business-standard.com

January 29, 2022
Lessons from Gaza

The latest round of fighting between Israel and Palestinians within Israel and the Gaza Strip ended on Friday 21 May under an Egypt brokered ceasefire. Already categorised in the media as the Fourth Gaza War[1], the 11-day conflict left 232 Palestinians including 65 children killed and more than 1,900 wounded in aerial bombardments[2]. Israeli authorities put their death toll as 12, with hundreds injured due to rocket attacks while claiming to have killed at least 160 combatants[3]. One Indian civilian caregiver too lost her life in the line of duty.

Patrick Kingsley’s piece in the New York Times provides a view of a series of events from early April that led to the current conflict[4]. Several avoidable actions in Jerusalem, such as cutting off loudspeakers at the Al Aqsa mosque on the first day of Ramadan to prevent Jerusalem Day celebrations at the Western Wall from being disturbed, closing off a popular plaza at the Damascus Gate where the faithful gather after prayers leading to nightly protests, and orders for the evacuation of Palestinian families from their homes as per existing law (an act seen by Palestinians as a precursor to their removal from East Jerusalem, the proposed capital of an independent Palestine) followed by clashes between Jews and Arabs – together provided multiple triggers for the violence, aggravated further by Jewish right-wing groups marching through Jerusalem shouting provocative slogans.

As the demonstrations gathered momentum with more Palestinians rallying in support of the families facing eviction, the order was stayed by Israel’s Supreme Court. The cancellation of elections to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) by President Mahmoud Abbas added another element of uncertainty to the situation, fuelled by suspicion over his intent. The final straw was another police raid on the Al Aqsa Mosque on the last Friday of Ramadan and sealing off access to the mosque the next day. Sensing a cue, Hamas commenced rocket fire the following Monday from Gaza.

International Crisis Group opines that ‘this occasion is the first since the September 2000 intifada when Palestinians have responded simultaneously and on such a massive scale throughout much of the combined territory of Israel-Palestine to the cumulative impact of military occupation, repression, dispossession and systemic discrimination[5]. It further goes on to explain how the dynamic of this conflict differs from earlier ones. Central to this is the role of Hamas – in terms of military capability through an expanded long-range rocket arsenal which has exponentially enhanced its ability to terrorize Israel’s civilian population, as also its political ambitions in trying to negotiate the future of Jerusalem as leverage for subsequent resolution of the Palestinian issue, instead of confining itself to Gaza. Tellingly, it also named its rocket offensive ‘Sword of Jerusalem’.

The second noteworthy issue is about clashes in cities and townships across Israel and the West Bank, between Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs and Palestinians leading to loss of life and property, something that had never happened since the Second Intifada. A state of emergency was declared in certain areas[6], and Israeli President Reuven Rivlin was constrained to warn of the danger of civil war[7]. Thirdly, as per United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) press releases of 17 and 19 May, rockets were fired on both days from South Lebanon across the Blue Line into Israel. Israeli artillery shelled the launch sites in retaliation. Also, Iranian complicity with Hamas was indicated when Israel downed an armed explosive drone, assessed to have been launched from either Syria or Iraq[8]. This raised the spectre of a wider conflict – the deepest fear of a nation-state surrounded by inimical neighbours, some of whom along with other non-state terrorist organisations refuse to recognize its right to exist.

Strategic and military aspects of this short conflict along with outcomes warrant analysis to provide a glimpse of the way ahead. Though President Biden announced that Israel had agreed to a mutual unconditional ceasefire, it is unclear what Hamas’s final stand on the matter was. More so, since it had set two conditions for a ceasefire: that Israeli forces stop incursions into the Al-Aqsa compound, and desist from evacuating Palestinian residents from East Jerusalem. No guarantees appear to have been received on these.

It appears, therefore, that since Hamas’s strategic aim of positioning itself as the champion of Palestinians through offensive action has been achieved, it could claim victory despite the high human, material and infrastructural cost. Israel has also claimed victory, by ensuring maintenance of the status quo along its borders and ensuring the security of its citizens at minimal cost, though with a perceptible fraying of its internal fabric. However prominent Israelis have criticized their government for lacking strategy and acting in ‘default mode’ in responding to Hamas in the same manner for the last 15 years[9].

Essentially, this was a conflict characterized by tremendous force asymmetry between opposing sides.

It is in the military domain that some interesting conclusions are drawn. This conflict did not witness any hand to hand fighting or launch of physical assaults, though Israel did use tanks and artillery against Hamas targets. Essentially, this was a conflict characterized by tremendous force asymmetry between opposing sides. The main weapon that Hamas used was unguided rockets of various ranges and dimensions. While in earlier days these were received from Iran or other allies across the Egyptian border at Sinai or smuggled in through sea, Hamas has developed sufficient expertise to develop its systems, using primitive technology and materials such as steel tubing and chemicals for making explosives. Israeli estimates suggested that ‘most of Hamas’s arsenal of 5,000 to 6,000 rockets can strike somewhere between the Gaza border communities and 40-55 km. away.’[10] Other estimates posit that Hamas now has rockets with ranges of 200 km or more, some with warheads carrying hundreds of kilograms of TNT and shrapnel. Raw construction material even uses detritus from Israeli missiles, with three rocket manufacturing factories rumoured to be existing inside Gaza[11]. Overall, Hamas fired around 4,360 rockets during the 11-day campaign, including a sizeable number that fell short, inside the Gaza Strip itself[12]. The long-range versions permitted engagement of targets from just outside the Strip to as far North as Jerusalem.

Hamas Qassam rocket ready for launch.    Photo and description: Forbes May 12, 2021

Iron Dome carrying out intercepts – Image Credit: Businessinsider

The Israeli response on the other hand was a combination of air power and ground-based air defence with the firepower of tanks and artillery – all state-of-the-art weapon systems with latest generation cutting edge technology, including Israeli variant F 16s, F 15 Air Defence aircraft and F 35 Stealth fighters. Videos of Israeli strikes are testimony to their effectiveness. Israel too gave its campaign a symbolic name ‘Guardian of the Walls’. The Iron Dome Missile Defence System proved its worth with engineers continuously upgrading its algorithms to improve interception capability against larger rocket salvos. This has enabled Iron Dome to intercept one of the largest barrages fired ever – of around 130 rockets towards Tel Aviv on 11 May. Despite attempts to saturate the system, Iron Dome was able to neutralize the majority, permitting only a handful to get through[13]. However, limitations of Iron Dome are becoming apparent- Israeli security officials estimate that opponents like Hezbollah can fire over 1,000 rockets per day from a stockpile of over 150,000[14], which could overwhelm its capabilities. Also, Israeli IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) techniques were shown to be wanting, as the downing of a Skylark reconnaissance drone by Iron Dome friendly fire indicates[15]

Israeli soldiers fire a 155mm self-propelled howitzer towards the Gaza Strip from their position along the border with the Palestinian enclave on May 16, 2021. Photo: AFP/Jack Guez

asymmetric warfare thrives on a logic of its own, where the intelligent application of limited resources by the weak ensures some degree of military success

The above instance is a singular example of an asymmetry arising from one side’s lack of sophisticated warfighting equipment or access to technology being compensated for by sheer force of numbers, to defeat or stalemate superior enemy systems. Operations Research analysts have worked out a ratio of one Israeli dying for every 206 rockets reaching Israel in the first four days of fighting, with at least 134 rockets hitting populated areas[16]. Israeli military sources put the accuracy of these rockets at around 15 per cent. Though many fell in open areas, their deterrent effect was enough for Israelis to descend into their bomb shelters[17], thereby proving that even today, asymmetric warfare thrives on a logic of its own, where the intelligent application of limited resources by the weak ensures some degree of military success. This, despite a situation where most of the Artificial Intelligence, networked communication, quantum computing and precision standoff capability was on one side – though one could grant some level of technology available to Hamas, through its research laboratories in the Strip and inputs from Iran. Adding another dimension to such asymmetry in the larger context however is the history of injustice perpetrated on Palestinians over the years, providing strong psychological motivation in favour of any opponent of Israel.

Coming to the issue of outcomes, it is apparent that notwithstanding the asymmetry in capability, Hamas’s strategy has paid off. Having realized that the situation during Ramadan (created by Israel mostly through application of a purely law and order cum security template) was tailor-made for exploitation, it made Jerusalem the focus of its campaign, escaping in one go from the confines of Gaza.

With Palestinians rallying to its cause, resultant unrest in Israel and the West Bank and some support from Hezbollah in Lebanon, it was able to create a narrative in its favour. Notwithstanding its designation as a terrorist organization by the US, EU, UK and many other nations, it has garnered huge political capital, enabling it to rival the current Palestinian leadership as reports of Palestinians carrying green Hamas flags in cities on the West Bank, where the PNA traditionally holds sway, indicate[18]. The stark difference in respective casualty figures also helped, once again raising the issue of ‘proportionate vis a vis disproportionate response’, against the backdrop of repeated injustice to Palestinians over the last 70 years.

The IDF on the other hand worked efficiently with their usual precision, taking out as many targets as possible from their prepared lists, including networks of tunnels, headquarters, senior Hamas commanders and research infrastructure in the minimum amount of time. Without a doubt, Israel is a clear winner in military terms.

This conclusion however begs the larger question of whether military victory alone can decide winners and losers in world geopolitics. At the time of writing US Secretary of State, Blinken is on a four-day visit to the region, to interact with leaders of Israel, the PNA, Jordan and Egypt to strengthen foundations for a durable ceasefire. President Biden has signalled that West Asia is back on his agenda: in a hugely symbolic gesture, the US has announced its decision to reopen its Consulate in East Jerusalem and promised $32 million worth of aid to the UN in Gaza. White House spokesperson Jen Psaki has called this part of America’s efforts to rebuild ties with the Palestinians.

Whether this effort will be to purely manage a crisis or look for a permanent solution is unclear. The latter venture will require creative thinking by Israel, Palestinians and their neighbours and a shift from absolute positions which have shackled the region for over 70 years. In that eventuality, a fresh look at the Two-State Solution guaranteeing the right of both nations to exist as sovereign states might yet provide the alternative. Reverting to the status quo of April 2021 will not.

Notes:

[1] ‘Daily Chart. The Israel-Palestine conflict has claimed 14,000 lives since 1987’   The Economist 18 May 2021

[2] ‘Israel-Hamas truce begins after 11 days of fighting, Palestinians celebrate’ Reuters 21 May 2021

[3] Ibid.

[4] ‘After Years of Quiet, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Exploded. Why Now? ‘ Patrick Kingsley, The New York Times 15 May 2021

[5] ‘The Israel-Palestine Crisis: Causes, Consequences, Portents’   International Crisis Group 14 May 2021

[6] International Crisis Group 14 May 2021

[7] ‘Israeli president warns of civil war as Jews, Arabs clash over Gaza’   Rami Ayyub Reuters 13 May 2021

[8] ‘Netanyahu: Drone shot down earlier this week was Iranian UAV armed with explosives’   Judah Ari Gross The Times of Israel 20 May 2021

[9] Maj Gen Giora Eiland Retired, former head of Israel’s National Security Council in comments to Crisis Group 14 May 2021

[10] ‘What do Hamas and PIJ have in their rocket arsenals? – analysis’ Yonah Jeremy Bob The Jerusalem Post 11 May 2021

[11] ‘Israel’s Gaza challenge: stopping metal tubes turning into rockets’ Arshad Mohammed, Jonathan Saul, John Irish and Parisa Hafezi, Reuters 24 May 2021.

[12] Ibid.

[13] ‘How Israel and Hamas returned to armed conflict’ The Economist 22 May 2021

[14] ‘Is Iron Dome effective against Hamas rockets as originally thought?’ Yonah Jeremy Bob The Jerusalem Post 14 May 2021.

[15] ‘Iron Dome Shot Down an Israeli Drone During Israel-Gaza Fighting’ Yaniv Kubovich Haaretz 25 May 2021.

[16] ‘Gaza’s rocket technology challenges Israeli defenses’ Michael J Armstrong Asia Times 18 May 2021

[17] ‘Israel’s Gaza challenge: stopping metal tubes turning into rockets’ Reuters 24 May 2021.

[18] ‘Israel and Hamas Begin Cease-Fire in Gaza Conflict’ Iyad Abuheweila and Adam Rasgon The New York Times 21 May 2021

Image Credit: Wikipedia

June 2, 2021
Dealing with China in 2021 and Beyond

TPF Occasional Paper
February 2021

The Current Situation

As Eastern Ladakh grapples with a severe winter in the aftermath of a violent and tension-filled 2020, much analysis concerning happenings on the India-Tibet border during the previous year has become available internationally and within India. Despite variance in individual perspectives and prognoses, the one issue starkly highlighted is that 2020 marks a turning point in the India-China relationship, which, shorn of diplomatese, has taken a clear adversarial turn.

Enough debate has taken place over the rationale and timing behind the Chinese action. It suffices to say that given the expansionist mindset of the Xi regime and its aspiration for primacy in Asia and across the world, it was a matter of time before China again employed leverages against India. In 2020 it was calibrated military pressure in an area largely uncontested after 1962, combined with other elements of hard power – heightened activity amongst India’s neighbours and in the Indian Ocean plus visibly enhanced collusivity with Pakistan This, despite platitudes to the contrary aired by certain China watchers inside India, who continued to articulate that existing confidence-building mechanisms (CBMs) would ensure peace on the border and good relations overall. Multiple incidents on the border over the last few years culminating in the loss of 20 Indian lives at Galwan have dispelled such notions.

Currently, in terms of militarization, the LAC in Eastern Ladakh can vie with the Line of Control (LOC) on the Western border.

As an immediate consequence, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the arena of conflict in East Ladakh is seeing the heaviest concentration of troops in history, supplemented by fighter jets, utility and attack helicopters, the latest artillery acquisitions, armoured formations, road building teams and an inventory of drones, backed by matching logistics. Currently, in terms of militarization, the LAC in Eastern Ladakh can vie with the Line of Control (LOC) on the Western border.

Within the country, the perception of China as the principal foe has crystallised. At no other time since 1962 has China come in for such intense scrutiny. Indian public discourse is focused on China, towards interpreting its policies and implications for India and the world – all against the backdrop of international geopolitics churned further by the Covid pandemic.

China and the World in 2021

In 2017, President Xi Jinping had given a foretaste of things to come when spelling out his vision during the 19^th Party Congress – that China has entered a “new era” where it should take the “centre stage in the world’[1]. In an insightful essay, Jake Sullivan (now National Security Adviser in the Biden administration) and Hal Brands have observed that ‘China has two distinct paths towards achieving this aim’ [2]. The first ‘focuses on building regional primacy as a springboard to global power’ while the second ‘focuses less on building a position of unassailable strength in the Western Pacific than on outflanking the U.S. alliance system and force presence in that region by developing China’s economic, diplomatic, and political influence on a global scale’. In the same piece, the authors sombrely conclude that the US ‘could still lose the competition with China even if it manages to preserve a strong military position in the Western Pacific….softer tools of competition—from providing alternative sources of 5G technology and infrastructure investment to showing competent leadership in tackling global problems—will be just as important as harder tools in dealing with the Chinese challenge…’ [3] These observations are prescient.

China and the Pandemic. A look at China’s conduct in this context and those of other nations over the last 12 months is instructive. The first aspect is its reaction to worldwide opprobrium for initially mishandling the Corona crisis – reprehensible wolf warrior diplomacy, crude attempts to divert the narrative about the origin of the Virus, unsuccessful mask diplomacy[4] and successfully delaying a WHO sponsored independent investigation into the matter for a full year without any guarantee of transparency. Secondly, it has exploited the covid crisis to strengthen its hold on the South China Sea commencing from March 2020 itself. Some examples are the renaming of 80 islands and geographical features in the Paracel and Spratly islands, commissioning research stations on Fiery Cross Reef and continued encroachment on fishing rights of Indonesia and Vietnam[5], in addition to a host of aggressive actions too numerous to mention, including ramming of vessels. Retaliatory actions from the US have continued, with the Trump administration in its final days sanctioning Chinese firms, officials, and even families for violation of international standards regarding freedom of navigation in January 2021[6]. The outgoing administration delivered the last blow on 19 January, by announcing that the US has determined that China has committed “genocide and crimes against humanity” in its repression of Uighur Muslims in its Xinjiang region[7]. As regards Taiwan, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute had recently forecast that China Taiwan relations will be heading for a crisis in a few weeks’ time,[8] (as borne out by serious muscle-flexing currently underway). If so, it would put the American system of alliances in the region since 1945 squarely to the test.

Pushback in the Indo Pacific. With China constantly pushing the envelope in its adjoining seas, the Quadrilateral Dialogue, whose existence over the last decade was marked only by a meeting of mid-level officials in Manila in November 2017, has acquired impetus. Initially dismissed as ‘sea foam’ by China, the individual interpretations of roles by each constituent have moved towards congruence, with Australia openly voicing disenchantment with China. Though an alliance is not on the cards, it can be concluded that increased interoperability between militaries of India, Australia, Japan and the US is both as an outcome and driver of this Dialogue, deriving from respective Indo Pacific strategies of member nations. Further expansion of its membership and tie-ups with other regional groupings is the practical route towards an egalitarian, long-lasting and open partnership for providing stability in this contested region. Japan’s expression of interest in joining the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network of the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand[9], is a step in this direction. European nations like Germany, the Netherlands and France have recently declared their Indo Pacific strategies. France has provided the clearest articulation, with the French Ambassador in Delhi spelling out the prevailing sentiment in Europe about China, as ‘ a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival’[10], while further stating that “when China breaks rules, we have to be very robust and very clear”[11] . A blunt message befitting an Indo Pacific power, reflecting the sentiments of many who are yet to take a position.

BRI will see major reprioritisation – though its flagship program, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is unlikely to suffer despite disagreements on certain issues between the two countries.

Slowing of a Behemoth. China’s other driver the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has considerably slowed in 2020. Lee YingHui, a researcher with Nanyang Technological Institute Singapore wrote last September ‘..in June this year, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that about 20 per cent of the projects under its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) had been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same press briefing, Wang Xiaolong, director-general at the Foreign Ministry’s International Economic Affairs Department, also revealed that a survey by the ministry estimated that some 30 to 40 per cent of projects had been somewhat affected, while approximately 40 per cent of projects were deemed to have seen little adverse impact[12]. Given the parlous condition of economies of client states post Covid-19 with many including Pakistan requesting a renegotiation of loans[13], BRI will see major reprioritisation – though its flagship program, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is unlikely to suffer despite disagreements on certain issues between the two countries.

Resilient Economy. China’s economy has rebounded fastest in the world, growing at 6.5 % in the final three months of 2020[14]. Despite the rate of annual growth being lowest in 40 years[15], its prominence in global supply chains has ensured some successes, such as the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with the EU in December 2020. The deal, which awaits ratification by the European Parliament is more a diplomatic than an economic win for China, being perceived as detrimental to President Biden’s efforts to rejuvenate the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. China has notched up another win with the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), where it along with 14 Asian countries from ASEAN and others (including Quad members like Australia and Japan) have agreed on an ‘ integrated market’. Given India’s position on the RCEP, how this agreement pans out and implications for its members will be watched with interest.

America in the New Year. The Biden Administration’s initial actions reaffirm the bipartisan consensus achieved last year on dealing with China. Comments of Secretary of State Anthony Blinken that ‘China presents the “most significant challenge” to the US while India has been a “bipartisan success story” and the new US government may further deepen ties with New Delhi,’[16] were indicative, as were those of Gen Lloyd Austin the Secretary of Defence during his confirmatory hearing[17]. President Biden’s first foreign policy speech on 04 February that ‘America is Back’ have provided further clarity. Earlier, Blinken and Austin had dialled Indian counterparts NSA Doval and Defence minister Rajnath Singh to discuss terrorism, maritime security, cybersecurity and peace and stability in the Indo Pacific.[18]Economically, American interest in joining or providing alternatives to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP, with an 11 nation membership, born out of President Trump’s withdrawal from its previous format, the TPP), will be another determinant in matters of trade with China. Harsh national security challenges will test the new administration’s resolve, as has already happened in the South China Sea over Taiwan where at the time of writing, the USS Theodore Roosevelt is conducting Freedom of Navigation operations[19]. Similar tests will occur over North Korea and Tibet, where the Senate’s passage of the Tibet Policy and Support Act 2020 mandates that decisions regarding the Dalai Lama’s succession be taken exclusively by the Tibetan people and the incumbent. Overall, a sense of how the world including the US will deal with China in 2021 is well captured by Commodore Lalit Kapur of the Delhi Policy Group when he states that ‘ …China has become too unreliable to trust, too powerful and aggressive to ignore and too prosperous, influential and connected to easily decouple from………[20] Going back to the views essayed by Sullivan and Brands, it appears that China is following both paths to achieve its objective, ie Great Power status.

India and China

The Early Years India’s attempt, soon after independence to develop a relationship with China, its ‘civilisational neighbour’ was overshadowed by the new threat to its security as the PLA invaded Tibet in 1950 – effectively removing the buffer between the two large neighbours. Dalai Lama’s flight to India in March 1959, the border clash at Hot Springs in Ladakh six months later and the subsequent 1962 war shattered our illusions of fraternity. Documents published recently pertaining to the period from 1947 to the War and beyond[21], reveal differences in perception within the Indian government in the run-up to 1962 despite the availability of sufficient facts. This combined with Chinese duplicity and disinformation, Indian domestic and international compulsions resulted in disjointed decision making, leading to the disastrous decision to implement the ‘Forward Policy’ with an unprepared military. A brief period of security cooperation with the US ensued including the signing of a Mutual Defence Agreement.[22] However, the US-China rapprochement of the early 70s and India’s professed non-alignment ensured its diminished status in the great power calculus.

Reaching Out to China. India’s outreach to China commenced with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988 in the aftermath of the Chinese intrusion at Somdorung Chu in 1986 in Arunachal Pradesh, resulting in a full-fledged standoff which lasted till mid-1987. The consequent push towards normalisation of relations resulted in the September 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, the November 1996 Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, followed thereafter by the Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between India and China, of June 2003 and finally the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question of April 2005, signed during the visit of Chinese premier Wen Jiabao, which also saw the India China relationship elevated to a ‘Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity’.

Despite partially successful attempts to broad base the engagement, territorial sovereignty continued to dominate the India China agenda, as can be observed by the number of agreements signed on border management – with minimal outcomes. It appears now that what can only be construed as diffidence in dealing with China on the border (and other issues) arose not because of misplaced optimism over such agreements, but for several other reasons. Some were structural weaknesses, such as lack of development of the border areas and poor logistics. Others arose because of want of a full-throated consensus on how strong a line to take with a visibly stronger neighbour – aggravated by growing economic disparity and the limitations imposed by self-professed non-alignment, especially so in the absence of a powerful ally like the Soviet Union, which had disintegrated by 1991. Also, American support could not be taken for granted, as was the case in the 60s. Overall, the approach was one of caution. This, coupled with lack of long term border management specialists induced wishful myopia on the matter, which was dispelled periodically by border skirmishes or other impasses, before returning to ‘business as usual’.

The extent of Engagement Today. To objectively analyse the relationship, it is important to comprehend the extent of the India China engagement on matters other than security. In the context of trade and industry, a perusal of the website of the Indian embassy in Beijing provides some answers. There is a list of 24 agreements/ MoUs /protocols between the two countries on Science and Technology alone, covering fields as diverse as aeronautics, space technology, health and medicine, meteorology, agricultural sciences, renewable energy, ocean development, water resources, genomics, geology, and others. The Embassy brings out India’s concerns regarding trade including impediments to market access, noting that trade imbalances have been steadily rising, to reach $58.4 billion in 2018, reducing marginally to $56.95 in 2019, a first since 2005. The poor penetration of Indian banks in China, India’s second-largest shareholding (8%) in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and being the largest borrower from the New Investment Bank or NIB, a BRICS bank of which all members have equal shareholding provide an understanding of linkages between the countries in the banking sector[23]. Other areas of cooperation are in petroleum and railways.

Economic Fallout Post April 2020. After the Galwan incident, India has taken strong measures on the economic front against China, from banning over 250 software applications to a partial ban on various categories of white goods,and the imposition of anti-dumping duties on many others. The Consolidated FDI Policy of the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade dated 15 October 2020, mandates Government scrutiny of every Chinese investment proposal before approval. However, the paradox in the India China relationship is well illustrated by trade figures for the first half of the Financial Year 20-21, where China surpassed the USA to become India’s largest trading partner. India reduced imports from China but exports to China grew by a robust 26.2 per cent at $10.16 billion[24]. Also, conditionalities for borrowing from the AIIB and NIB have resulted in India having to permit Chinese firms to bid for works connected with projects funded by these institutions. Consequently in January this year, the contract for construction of a 5.6 km long underground stretch of the Rapid Rail Transit System in the National Capital Region has been awarded to a Chinese company, Shanghai Tunnel Engineering Company Limited.[25] As noted earlier, decoupling is not easy. Incentives for companies to relocate to India have been announced, with some investment flowing in from Google and Facebook, and plans for Samsung to relocate a factory to NOIDA[26]. Finally, India’s exclusion from the RCEP will also have to be factored in when negotiating a long term trade policy with China.

However, the paradox in the India China relationship is well illustrated by trade figures for the first half of the Financial Year 20-21, where China surpassed the USA to become India’s largest trading partner.

Soft Power and Academia. Indian soft power in China remains subservient to harsh security concerns despite oft-quoted historical antecedents. Some elements like Indian cinema continue to be extremely popular. Student exchange programs have taken shape, especially under the aegis of Confucius Institutes which have secured a toehold in some Indian campuses. Following the trend worldwide, their programs are also under scrutiny[27]. The few Indian students in China (less than 25000)[28] have been hit hard by the coronavirus. Overall, given the current state of engagement, employing soft power as an effective tool has limited potential. Exchange of scholars from policy and security think tanks has been a good way of imbibing a sense of the other, resulting in greater awareness. While the trust deficit and reasons for the same have always been highlighted by the Indian side, it has been the general experience that China has been less forthcoming in its responses.

Building Blocks for a China Policy

In the middle term, unless there is a concerted and verifiable effort by China, trade with that country will be overshadowed by security issues (the huge trade imbalance also becoming one of these !). The Indian economy has commenced its post-Covid recovery in the new year. The budget for FY 21-22, trade policies of others like the EU and the US, will impact economic policy, as will national security concerns.

Immediate security priorities vis a vis China are a mix of the geopolitical and purely military. These can broadly be outlined – safeguarding Indian interests in the Indian Ocean region and the littorals, holding the line in the high Himalayas and ensuring sanctity over Indian skies. The first being both a geopolitical and security matter would leverage all elements of statecraft including the military. The balance two are a direct outcome of India’s military power. These, intertwined with India’s multilateral approach towards cooperation in world fora would form the basis of dealing with China.

Countries in the neighbourhood other than Pakistan when in distress, look first towards India for relief – natural calamities, food shortages[29], and now the corona vaccine, where Indian generosity remains unsurpassed worldwide. India does not indulge in cheque book diplomacy, nor entice weaker neighbours into debt traps.

Managing the Neighbourhood. In South Asia, India is primus inter pares due to size, geographical location, resources, capability and potential. Its soft power, economic reach ( while not comparable to China’s) and associated linkages with other countries are huge, at times even considered overwhelming. Countries in the neighbourhood other than Pakistan when in distress, look first towards India for relief – natural calamities, food shortages[29], and now the corona vaccine, where Indian generosity remains unsurpassed worldwide. India does not indulge in cheque book diplomacy, nor entice weaker neighbours into debt traps. Despite ethnic linkages and security concerns resulting sometimes in what is perceived by others as ‘interventionist politics’, India’s respect for its neighbours’ sovereignty is absolute. This is in contrast to China, whose recent interventions in Nepal have led to rallies in front of the Chinese embassy[30]. Its pressure on the NLD government in Myanmar over BRI projects had again not been viewed favourably in that country,[31] though the trajectory that the China-Myanmar relationship now follows remains to be seen, with China attempting to support Myanmar’s military in international fora after the coup[32]. Within South Asia, strengthening delivery mechanisms, sticking to timelines in infrastructure projects, improving connectivity and resolving the myriad issues between neighbours without attempting a zero-sum game with China is the way forward for India, which should play by its considerable strengths. Simultaneously, it must look at growing challenges such as management of Brahmaputra waters and climate change, and leverage these concerns with affected neighbours.

Strengthening Military Capability. A more direct challenge lies more in the military field, and in measures necessary to overcome these. The justifiable rise in military expenditure during the current year would continue or even accelerate. The armed forces are inching towards a mutually agreed road map before implementing large scale organisational reforms. Conceptual clarity on integrated warfighting across the spectrum in multiple domains (including the informational ) is a sine qua non, more so when cyberspace and space domains are concerned. This mandates breaking up silos between the military and other specialist government agencies for optimisation and seamless cooperation. Also, while classical notions of victory have mutated, swift savage border wars as witnessed in Nagorno Karabakh remain live possibilities for India, with open collusion now established between China and Pakistan. As always, the study of the inventory, military capability of the adversary and his likely pattern of operations will yield valuable lessons. The armed forces have to prepare multiple options, to deal with a range of threats from full scale two front wars down to the hybrid, including responses to terrorist acts while ensuring sovereignty across the seas. Network-centric warfare will take centre stage, with information operations being vital for overall success, possibly even defining what constitutes victory.

Progress has been achieved in these directions. As an example, the first Indian weaponised drone swarm made its debut on Army Day 2021, and visuals of a ‘wingman drone’ underdevelopment have been shown during the Aero India 2021 at Bangalore. The military would be planning for operationalisation, induction, deployment, staffing and human resource aspects of this weapon platform with the nominated service. An estimate of the time required to resolve these issues as also for full-scale production of such systems and larger variants will dictate procurement decisions with respect to other land and air platforms providing similar standoff kinetic effects, and surveillance capability. A concurrent requirement to develop sufficient capability to counter such systems would doubtless be under scrutiny. In this regard, the outcome of the PLA merging its cyber and electronic warfare functions for multiple reasons merits attention.[33] While the Navy’s requirements to dominate the Indian Ocean are well appreciated, a consensus on its future role and the need (or otherwise) for a third aircraft carrier would decide the nature, type and numbers of future naval platforms – unmanned underwater vehicles, submarines, shore/ carrier-based aircraft and others. With decisions over the Tejas LCA induction finalised, induction of a state of the art platforms from the USA and France over the last few years and hope for the acquisition of new generation indigenous air defence systems[34] on the anvil, the IAF is set to gradually regain its edge. Overall, India’s military has to leverage the latest technology and develop the capability to fight in multiple domains, which its hard-earned experience in third-generation warfighting would complement. With restructuring planned concurrently, each decision will have to be fully informed and thought through – more so when mini faceoffs as has happened at Naku La in Sikkim this month continue to occur.

A Way Forward

Traditional Chinese thinking has simultaneously been dismissive and wary of India. In his seminal publication at the turn of the century, Stephen Cohen noted that ‘…from Beijing’s perspective India is a second rank but sometimes threatening state. It poses little threat to China by itself and it can be easily countered but Beijing must be wary of any dramatic increase in Indian power or an alliance between New Delhi and some hostile major state..’[35] As brought out in this paper, outlines of a grounded long term China policy based on previous experiences and new realities are visible. Rooted primarily in the security dimension followed thereafter by the economic, its success will be predicated on peace and tranquillity on the border, without entering into the trap of competition in either of the two domains. As pointed out by the Minister for External Affairs in his talk to the 13^th All India Conference for China Studies this month [36] the India-China relationship has to be based on ‘mutuality… mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interests ..’. The EAM further noted that ‘expectations…. that life can carry on undisturbed despite the situation at the border, that is simply not realistic. There are discussions underway through various mechanisms on disengagement at the border areas. But if ties are to steady and progress, policies must take into account the learnings of the last three decades’[37].

Rooted primarily in the security dimension followed thereafter by the economic, its success will be predicated on peace and tranquillity on the border, without entering into the trap of competition in either of the two domains.

In the same talk, the EAM has laid down eight broad and eminently practical propositions as guidelines for future India-China relations. Most prominent of these is that peace and tranquillity on the border are a must if relations in other spheres are to develop. Also, the need to accept that a multipolar world can have a multipolar Asia as its subset. He stressed that reciprocity is the bedrock of a relationship, and sensitivities to each other’s aspirations, interests and priorities must be respected. Concurrently, management of divergences and differences between two civilizational states should be considered over the long term.

A China policy crafted on these principles would ensure that India’s concerns vis a vis its neighbour is addressed, within the larger National goal of all-round growth and development of India and its citizens in the 21st Century.

Notes:

[1] ‘Xi JinPing Heralds New Era of Chinese Power’ Dipanjan Ray Chaudhury, Economic Times 18 October 2017

[2] ‘China Has Two Paths To Global Domination’ Jake Sullivan,  Hal Brands, Foreign Policy, 22 May 2020

[3] ibid

[4] ‘China’s Mask Diplomacy is Faltering.But the US isn’t Doing any better’ Charlie Campbell Time Magazine 03 April 2020

[5] ‘China’s Renewed Aggression in the South China Sea’ Gateway House Infographic 22 April 2020

[6] ‘US imposes new sanction on Beijing over South China Sea’ Mint 15 January 2021

[7] In parting shot, Trump administration declares China’s repression of Uighurs ‘genocide’ Humeyra Pamuk, Reuters 19 January 2021

[8] ‘Pacific Panic: China-Taiwan relations to reach breaking point in ‘next few weeks’ skynews.com.au 18 January 2021

[9] ‘Japan wants de facto ‘Six Eyes’ intelligence status: defence chief’ Daishi Abe and Rieko Miki Nikkei Asia 14 August 2020

[10] ‘Emmanuel Bonne’s interview to the Times of India’ 10 January 2021 Website of the French Embassy in New Delhi

[11] ‘When China breaks rules, we have to be very robust and clear: French diplomat’ Dinakar Peri, The Hindu 08 January 2021

[12] ‘COVID-19: The Nail in the Coffin of China’s Belt and Road Initiative?’ Lee YingHui, The Diplomat 28 September 2020

[13] ibid

[14] ‘Covid-19: China’s economy picks up, bucking global trend’ BBC.com 18 January 2021

[15] ibid

[16] ‘New US govt may look to further deepen ties with India: Blinken’ Elizabeth Roche, The Mint 21 Jan 2021

[17] ‘What Biden’s Defence Secretary Said About Future Relations With India, Pakistan’ Lalit K Jha, The Wire 20 January 2021

[18] ‘US NSA speaks to Doval, Def Secretary dials Rajnath’ Krishn Kaushik and Shubhajit Roy Indian Express 27 January 2021

[19] ‘As China Taiwan tension rises, US warships sail into region’ The Indian Express 25 January 2021

[20] ‘India and Australia: Partners for Indo Pacific Security and Stability’ Lalit Kapur, Delhi Policy Group Policy Brief Vol. V, Issue 42 December 15, 2020

[21] ‘India China Relations 1947-2000 A Documentary Study’ (Vol 1 to 5) Avtar Singh Bhasin   Geetika Publishers New Delhi 2018

[22] ‘The Tibet Factor in India China Relations’ Rajiv Sikri Journal of International Affairs , SPRING/SUMMER 2011, Vol. 64, No. 2, pp 60

[23] Website of the Embassy of India at Beijing   www.eoibeijing.gov.in

[24] ‘What an irony! Mainland China beats US to be India’s biggest trade partner in H1FY21’ Sumanth Banerji        Business Today 04 December 2020

[25] ‘Chinese company bags vital contract for first rapid rail project’ Sandeep Dikshit   The Tribune   03 January 2021

[26] ‘Samsung to invest Rs 4,825 cr to shift China mobile display factory to India’ Danish Khan Economic Times 11 December 2020

[27] ‘The Hindu Explains | What are Confucius Institutes, and why are they under the scanner in India?’

Ananth Krishnan The Hindu August 09 2020

[28] ‘23,000 Indian students stare at long wait to return to Chinese campuses’ Sutirtho Patranobis Hindustan Times 08 September 2020

[29] ‘Offering non-commercial, humanitarian food assistance to its neighbours: India at WTO’ Press Trust of India 19 December 2020

[30] ‘Torch rally held in Kathmandu to protest against Chinese interference’ ANI News 30 December 2020

[31] ‘Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visits Myanmar with aim to speed up BRI projects’ Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury Economic Times 09 January 2021

[32] ‘China blocks UNSC condemnation of Myanmar coup’ India Today Web Desk 03 February 2021

[33] ‘Electronic and Cyber Warfare: A Comparative Analysis of the PLA and the Indian Army’ Kartik Bommankanti ORF Occasional Paper July 2019

[34] ‘India successfully test fires new generation Akash NG missile’ Ch Sushil Rao Times of India 25 January 2021

[35] ‘ India Emerging Power’ Stephen Philip Cohen Brookings Institution Press 2001 pp 259

[36] Keynote Address by External Affairs Minister at the 13th All India Conference of China Studies January 28, 2021

[37] ibid

Image Credit: Wion and Trak.in

February 8, 2021